VERDICTUM.

IN

Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:182781-DB

AFR
Court No. - 39

Case :- WRIT - C No. - 33687 of 2021

Petitioner :- Dinesh Ahuja @ Chinu And Another

Respondent :- District Magistrate And 2 Others
Counsel for Petitioner :- Nitin Sharma
Counsel for Respondent :- Abhitab Kumar Tiwari,C.S.C.,Vinay
Khare,Vivek Saran

Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal Singh,J.

Hon'ble Donadi Ramesh,J.

1. Mediation offered to the parties has failed. Accordingly, the matter has
been proceeded

2. Heard Sri Nitin Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners; Sri Vivek
Saran, learned counsel for the private respondent and Ms. Kritika Singh,
learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State respondents.

3. Present writ petitions has been filed for the following relief :-

(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing

the order dated 22.11.2021 (Annexure No.5 to this instant writ petition)
passed by the Additional City Magistrate (Brahmpuri), Meerut
(Respondent No.2) in Case No.4925 of 2021 (Computerized Case
No.D202111520004925) title Inderjeet Ahuja versus Dinesh Ahuja @
Chinu and another, under Section 7(1) U.P. the Maintenance and
Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007.

(ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing

the respondent authority not to take any coercive action against the
petitioners in pursuance of the order dated 22.11.2021.

(iii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing

the respondent authority not to interfere in the peaceful possession of the
premises of the petitioners.

4. The factual matrix giving rise to the present writ petition is undisputed.
The petitioner Dinesh Ahuja (herein after described as ‘S2’) is the
younger son of respondent no.3 Indrajeet Ahuja (hereinafter referred to as
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‘F’). ‘F’ has another son (elder) born to him, namely, Hemant Ahuja
(hereinafter described as ‘S1’). It is also admitted to the parties that ‘F’
(along-with his sons ‘S1’ and ‘S2’ and their wives) is residing in the
dwelling house described as House No.689/56, (Old No.B-99), Jwala
Nagar, Sabun Godaam, Police Station T.P. Nagar, Meerut City, District
Meerut (hereinafter described as ‘property’). At present ‘F’ and ‘S1’ and
his wife and family enjoy good relations to the extent there is no litigation
between those parties, inter se. At the same time it does appear that
petitioner ‘S2’ and his wife have fallen apart with ‘S1’ and his family. The
petitioners allege that ‘F’ is acting in collusion and/or under the undue
influence of ‘S1’ and his family. As a result, at the instigation and
prompting offered by ‘S1’ and his family, ‘F’ instituted a proceeding
under Section 22 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior
Citizens Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’) read with Rule 21 of
the Uttar Pradesh Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens
Rules, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules’), on 24.09.2021.

5. Further, according to the petitioners, that proceeding was instituted by

‘F’ only to defeat the earlier suit proceedings instituted by the petitioner /
‘S2’ being O.S. No.837 of 2020, (Dinesh Ahuja versus Indrajeet Ahuja
and another) seeking an injunction against ‘F’ and ‘S1’. That suit
proceeding is described to be pending. At the same time, no injunction has
been granted in such proceedings.

6. In the proceedings instituted under Section 22 of the Act read with Rule
21 of the Rules, the petitioners appeared and filed their objections on
08.11.2021. It is their grievance that their objections have been wrongly
rejected, and erroneously, a direction has been issued to evict the
petitioners from the property in question.

7. In such facts, Sri Nitin Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners has
primarily raised three submissions. First, it has been submitted that the
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application filed by ‘F’ under Section 22 of the Act read with Rule 21 of
the Rules is a proxy litigation at the behest and instigation of ‘S1’. ‘F’ has
no grievance with the petitioners. Only for reason of other disputes
existing between ‘S1’ and ‘S2’, ‘F’ has been needlessly dragged into the
situation, at the behest of ‘S1’.

8. Second, it has been submitted, no proceeding may have been instituted

under the Act read with the Rules seeking eviction simplicitor of the
petitioners. At most, ‘F’ would have a right to seek right to claim
maintenance allowance from such of his sons who may inherent to his
property. Only in the event of default in payment of maintenance
allowance if any awarded, a proceeding for eviction may follow. In the
present facts, neither ‘F’ has claimed any maintenance allowance from the
petitioners nor there pre-exists any order providing for such maintenance
allowance. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner
has relied on a decision of a learned single judge of this Court in Krishan
Kumar versus State of U.P. & Ors. (Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-
LKO:54220) decided on 18.08.2023 in Writ Petition No.35884 of 2019
(2023 9 ADJ 113), wherein it has been observed as below :-

“29. Further, this court is of considered opinion that a Tribunal, under

Chapter-II of Act, 2007 cannot direct eviction simplicitor from the
property at the instance of senior citizens, though the Tribunal can direct
the children and relatives to make available a residence to such senior
citizens in pursuance of an application, filed under the abovesaid
chapter. It further emerges that the District Magistrate as an appellate
authority under the Act, 2007, can ensure that no one should make any
hindrance to a senior citizen to enjoy the property as per his ‘need’ and
the right to eviction is the last step, where such authority finds that the
need of a senior citizen is not being fulfilled. The case in hands is that
the present petitioner is living in one room with his wife and he is not
making any hindrance in the peaceful living of the parents, in other part
of the house and therefore, so far as the objective of the Act, 2007 is
concerned, is no way hampered by the petitioner.”

9. Then reliance has been placed on another decision of a learned single

judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Simrat Randhawa
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versus State of Punjab & Others [2020 Supreme (P & H) 5], wherein a
learned single judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court declared
unconstitutional the Comprehensive Action Plan (CAP in short), framed
by the Punjab State Government under the provisions of the Act. Thus, a
learned single judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court reached the
conclusion that there was no power vested under the Act and the delegated
legislation arising thereunder, in support of eviction simplicitor from any
immovable property, at the instance of the senior citizen who may be the
owner of such property. To the same effect reliance has been placed on a
decision of Supreme in Smt. S. Vanitha versus The Deputy
Commissioner Bengaluru Urban District and Ors. [2021 (15) SCC 730],
wherein in the context of parallel proceedings having arisen under the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 at the instance of
a daughter-in-law of a senior citizen (seeking eviction from her property),
the Supreme Court set aside the orders passed by the authorities under the
Act and the Rules framed thereunder and thus protected the occupant
daughter-in-law from her eviction from such premises.

10. Last, he has relied on a decision of a Division Bench of Patna High

Court in Ravi Shanker and another versus State of Bihar and others,
Letters Patent Appeal No.907 of 2023 in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case
No.7851 of 2022, decided on 03.01.2024, wherein following the Punjab
and Patna High Court Simrat Randhawa versus State of Punjab &
Others (supra) and Smt. S. Vanitha versus The Deputy Commissioner
Bengaluru Urban District and Ors. (supra), the Patna High Court has
also ruled against eviction simplicitor being offered at the instance of a
senior citizen, under the provisions of the Act and Rules framed
thereunder.

11. Third, it has been submitted that in any case, the proceedings under
the Act and the Rules are summary in nature. Natural jurisdiction of the
Civil Courts has neither be excluded nor eclipsed nor restricted. In face of
 VERDICTUM.IN

civil suit seeking injunction instituted by the petitioner No.1/’S2’ prior to

the institution of application under the Act read with the Rules framed
thereunder and in face of such suit proceedings being pending,
specifically with respect to the property in dispute, no jurisdiction
survived with the authorities constituted under the Act and the Rules
framed thereunder to proceed to pass any order to evict the petitioners
during pendency of O.S. No.837 of 2020, (Dinesh Ahuja versus Indrajeet
Ahuja and another) pending in the court of Civil Judge (S.D.), Meerut.
Again reliance has been placed on the above noted decisions specially in
Smt. S. Vanitha (supra) and Ravi Shanker and another (supra).
Reliance has also been placed on another decision of Supreme Court in
Sau Rajani versus Sau Smita & another, 2022 INSC 805.

12. On the other hand, Sri Vivek Saran, learned counsel for the respondent
would submit that there is no collusion between ‘F’ and ‘S-I’. ‘F’ has
instituted the proceedings on his own account with respect to his own
property for reason of his own grievance against ‘S2’. Merely because
‘S1’ is not opposed to ‘F’ and merely because ‘S1’ may be supporting ‘F’
generally in life and specifically in the litigation between ‘F’ and ‘S2’, it
may not be said-that therefore there exists collusion between ‘F’ and ‘S1’.
These being family disputes and parties being closely related, it is not an
uncommon occurrence that a parent may have no grievance with one of
his two more children or that they may have grievance with another child.
For reason of absence of grievance between the father of his first son /
‘S1’, it cannot be said that the father is acting under the influence of his
first son or that the proceeding instituted by the father is a proxy litigation
on behalf of his first son. No material or evidence exists on record in
support of that objection raised by learned counsel for the petitioner.

13. Coming to the second point raised by learned counsel for the
petitioner, it has been submitted that the issue is no longer res integra.
Insofar as our court is concerned, the issue was squarely thrashed out by a
 VERDICTUM.IN

co-ordinate bench in Shivani Verma vs. State of U.P. and 4 others, 2023
(6) ADJ 496. In that decision the co-ordinate bench had the occasion to
take note of the comprehensive of CAP framed by Government of U.P. in
the context of the Act and the Rules. For ready reference and useful to our
discussion, we may note that the co-ordinate bench observed as below :-

“51. Chapter IV of the Rules 2014, mandates for providing the scheme
for management of old age homes for indigent senior citizens.

52. Chapter V, relevant for the purposes of the instant writ petition,
provides for duties and power of the District Magistrates. The relevant
portion of Rule 21 of Rules 2014, is extracted:

"21. Duties and Power of the District Magistrate- (1) The District
Magsitrate shall perform the duties and exercise the powers mentioned
in sub-rules (2) and (3) so as to ensure that the provisions of the Act are
properly carried out in his district.

(2) It shall be the duty of the District Magistrate to:

(i) ensure that life and property of senior citizens of the district are
protected and they are able to live with security and dignity."

53. On bare perusal the Sub-rule (i) of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 21, it
employs the expression 'property' which is referable to the definition of
'property' defined under Sub-clause (f) of Section 2 of Act 2007. In other
words, the expression 'residence', has not been employed in the Rules
2014. Though 'property' would include residential property but would
certainly not include or mean the residence sought for maintenance by
the senior citizen. The provision for residence could include property
owned by the senior citizen or that of his children or relative as the case
that may be setup by the senior citizen before the Tribunal claiming
maintenance.

54. Further, Rules 2014 does not confer on the District Magistrate
explicit power of eviction of the occupants from the residence of the
senior citizen, though, it confers power upon the District Magistrate to
ensure that the 'life and property' of the senior citizen is protected and
they are able to live securely with dignity.

55. The State Government vide Government Order dated 21 March

2006, in purported exercise of powers under Sub-section (2) of Section
22 of Act 2007, has framed policy for the senior citizen. The relevant
portion reads thus:
fo"k;% m-iz- jkT; ofj"B ukxfjd uhfr ds lEcU/k esaA egksn;] mi;ZqDr fo"k; ds lUnHkZ esa ;g
dgus dk funsZ'k gqvk gS fd izns'k ds xzkeh.k o 'kgjh {ks= ds ofj"B ukxfjdksa dh leL;k,a
vyx&vyx gSa] ;Fkk& LokLF; lsokvksa dh vuqiyC/krk ,oa fxjrs LokLF; ds dkj.k nSfud
dk;kZsa ds lkFk&lkFk thfodksiktZu dh leL;k ifjokj ds vU; lnL;ksa ds jkstxkj gsrq ckgj
 VERDICTUM.IN

pys tkus ij muds Lo;a dh ns[k&Hkky djus dh leL;k] vf/kd vk;q ,oa 'kkjhfjd vleFkZrk
ds dkj.k Lo;a dh ns[k&Hkky u dj ikus dh fLFkfr esa fdlh vU; ds lgk;d u gksus dh
leL;k] vf/kd mez ds dkj.k lfdz;rk ,oa xfr'khyrk de gksus ls ,dkdhiu dh leL;k
bR;kfnA ofj"B ukxfjdksa dks fofHkUu lqj{kk mik;ksa ,oa dk;Zdzeksa ds ek/;e ls 'kkafriwoZd]
lqjf{kr ,oa lEekutud <ax ls thou&;kiu dk volj nsus ds mn~ns'; ls izns’k ds
’kgjh ,oa xzkeh.k {ks= ds ofj"B ukxfjdksa gsrq ek- ea=hifj"kn ds vkns’k v’kkldh; i= la0
4@2@3@2016&lh-,Dl- (1), fnukad 14 ekpZ] 2016 ds dze es “m-iz- jkT; ofj"B ukxfjd
uhfr” fuEuor cuk;h tkrh gS &1- mRrj izns'k jkT; ofj"B ukxfjd uhfr ds mn~ns';
fuEuor~ gksaxs& izns'k ds ofj"B ukxfjdksa dh lqj{kk dh mfpr ,oa izHkkoh O;oLFkk lqfuf'pr
djukA izns'k ds ofj"B ukxfjdksa dh vkfFkZd lqj{kk] vkoklh; lqfo/kk] muds lexz dY;k.k
rFkk mudh vko'k;drkvksa dh iwfrZ gsrq ;Fkko';d lg;ksx dh O;oLFkk lqfuf'pr djukA
nqO;Zogkj ,oa 'kks"k.k ls mudh j{kk dh O;oLFkk lqfuf'pr djukA

56. Paragraph 2.4 of the policy with regard to the 'protection of life
and property' reads thus:
ofj"B ukxfjdksa dks thou ,oa lEifRr dk Hk; izk;% rhu rjg ds O;fDr;ksa ;Fkk&Lo;a ds
ifjokj ls] lsokdkjksa ls rFkk vijk/khx.k ls gksrk gSA lEifRr dh pkg esa ifjokjhx.k ls]
vdsys jgus dh n'kk esa ?kjsyw ukSdjksa ls ,oa lqulku vdsys ?kjksa es jgus ds dkj.k ?kweus okys
vijkf/k;ksa ls ofj"B ukxfjd vklkuh ls f'kdkj gks tkrs gSaA vr% lekt ds mDr Js.kh ds
yksxksa ls ofj"B ukxfjd ,oa mudh lEifRRk dh lqj{kk fd;k tkuk vko';d gSA lM+d nq?
kZVuk Hkh ofj"B ukxfjd ds fy, ?kkrd gS rFkk blls Hkh o)tuksa dh lqj{kk dh tkuh
vko';d gSA ofj"B ukxfjdksa ds thou ,oa lEifRr dh lqj{kk gsrq dne mBk, tk,axsA

57. Most of the senior citizens live with their parents (sic children). They
face tussle over inheritance or division of property. Elders come under
intense pressure to sell off their property or transfer ownership to their
sons and are subjected to various forms of abuse if they relent. Senior
citizens face harassment and threat from neighbours, encroachment of
property, etc.

58. In the event, property of a senior citizen as defined under Sub-clause

(f) of Section 2 of Rules 2014, is under threat from any person, District
Magistrate has been conferred power to protect the life and property of
the senior citizen.

59. Property can be tangible items, viz., homes, cars or appliances or it

can refer to intangible items that carry the promise of future worth, such
as, stock and bond certificates. Intellectual property refers to idea such
as logo, design and patents.

60. Chapter V, in particular, Section 22, read with, Rule 21(2)(i) and the
Government action plan/policy framed by the State Government, it
mandates and directs the District Magistrate/District Police officers to
protect the property of the senior citizen. Protection of property without
the power and authority of eviction would render the provision
meaningless. Protection of property would certainly include the power to
order eviction of the occupant and restoration of the property to the
senior citizen.

61. The question that follows is which kind of property and against
whom. Any kind of property [Section 2(f))] in the possession or threat of
dispossession by the senior citizen from the relatives, family member,
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helps, service providers or anti social/criminals. Family members would

include children of senior citizen. The senior citizen in respect of such
property other than covered under maintenance (residence), would have
to approach the District Magistrate for protection.

62. In other words, the expression 'property' would not include the
property claimed by the senior citizen for 'maintenance' before the
Tribunal for provision of residence. Accordingly, a senior citizen seeking
maintenance, other than monetary maintenance, i.e., only residence to
the exclusion of his children and relative of a property in his possession
or otherwise owned by him, the remedy for such property (residence)
would lie before the Tribunal.

63. In this backdrop, it follows that protection of 'life and property'

would confer implicit power upon the District Magistrate to evict
unauthorized occupant of the property, including, children/relative or
third party from the property of the senior citizen. However, Tribunal
alone would have power to order eviction from the property of a senior
citizen/parent on an application claiming maintenance towards
residence to the exclusion of his children/grand-children.

64. The senior citizen while making an application (Form A) before the
Tribunal may claim only residence as maintenance for his need to enable
him to lead a normal and peaceful life, irrespective of the plea that his
children/relatives are subjecting the senior citizen to harassment or not.
The plea of harassment is not a prerequisite to maintain an application
for an order of maintenance for provision for residence. In the event,
Tribunal if (sic) satisfied on the claim of the senior citizen, it would
order maintenance for residence, that would necessarily include eviction
of the occupant of the residence being a consequence of the maintenance
order. [Rule 14] In other words, Tribunal while exercising powers on an
application seeking maintenance of residence by a senior citizen, while
making order of maintenance for provision of residence, in consequence
can direct eviction of the occupants, i.e., children/relative but not against
minor children. An order of residence towards maintenance without
passing the consequential order of eviction would render the power and
authority of the Tribunal meaningless.

65. It follows that Tribunal has power to deal only with a particular kind
of property (residence) sought for maintenance but lacks powers to
adjudicate upon any other kind of property of the senior citizen. Such
power is vested with the District Magistrate under Chapter V to protect
any kind of property, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible
against any person, i.e., children/relative or third party, but would not
include the property sought by the senior citizen for residence towards
maintenance from his children/relatives. Any other interpretation would
be conferring power upon the District Magistrate to deal and adjudicate
upon property sought by the senior citizen for provision of maintenance,
merely for the reason that the power of eviction has to be read
exclusively into the expression 'protection' of the property of senior
 VERDICTUM.IN

citizen. Tribunal has a limited power while adjudicating the issue of

property required only for the maintenance of the senior citizen.

66. Tribunal can be approached by senior citizen or parent, as the case

may be, for maintenance. Whereas, senior citizen alone can approach
the District Magistrate for protection of his life and property of any kind,
other than the property (residence) involved in proceedings before the
Tribunal.”

14. Thereafter, the co-ordinate bench recorded its conclusions. Conclusion

number “iv” reads as below :-

“ (iv) Chapter V is confined to protection of life and property of the

senior citizen alone. Protection of property would also include eviction
of the occupant from the tangible property. The power is conferred on
the District Magistrate. The occupant could be children / relatives or
third party.”

15. Thus, it has been submitted, insofar as the State of U.P. is concerned,
there is no doubt as to existence of CAP. The same has never been
declared unconstitutional. There is no challenge to the CAP in these
proceedings. As to the power of the District Magistrate under Chapter V
of the Act, there exists no doubt. A senior citizen may apply and the
District Magistrate may provide for eviction simplicitor from an
immovable property belonging to a senior citizen.

16. The ratio of the learned single judge decision in Krishna Kumar
(supra) to the extent it runs contrary to the ratio in Shivani Verma
(supra) remains per incuriam and does not declare binding law.

17. With respect to the decision of the Punjab and Haryana, High Court, in
Simrat Randhawa (supra) a point of distinction has been drawn on the
reasoning that in the present facts there is no challenge to the CAP and
again in view of co-ordinate bench decision in Shivani Verma (supra) the
ratio in Simrat Randhawa (supra) may remain of non persuasive value.
Also, it has been pointed out that there exists an earlier decision of
Punjab and Haryana, High Court in Harcharan Singh vs. Bhagat Singh
and others 2019 (2) R.C.R. (Civil) 313, wherein it was observed as
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10

below:-

“The petitioner, herein, is residing in the house of respondent No.1 on

the basis of concession given by his father in the property owned by him.
He, as a licensee, is only permitted to enjoy the possession of the
property licensed but without creating any interest in the property. A
licence stands terminated the moment the licensor conveys a notice of
termination of a licence. There is no vested right of any type to remain in
possession of the property of respondent No.1. Admittedly, respondent
No.1 is owner of the property, in dispute. Respondent no.1 is required to
be protected as mandated by Section 22 of the Act read with Rule 23 of
the Rules and para 1 of the Action Plan. There cannot be any effective
protection of property of the senior citizens unless the District
Magistrate has the power to put the senior citizen into possession of the
property and/or to restrain or eject the person who interferes in the
possession of the property of the senior citizen. The protection of the
property of a senior citizen includes all incidences, rights and
obligations in respect of property in question. Once a senior citizen
makes a complaint to District Magistrate against his son to vacate the
premises of which the son is a licensee, such summary procedure ensures
for the benefit of the senior citizen. The petitioner has no right to resist
his eviction only on the ground that he is the only son or he does not
have any source of income. The eviction is one part of the right to
protect 8 of 10 the property of a senior citizen and this right can be
exercised by a senior citizen in terms of provisions of the statute, Rules
framed and the Action Plan notified.”

18. As to the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. S. Vanitha (surpa),

it has been submitted that, that decision has no bearing to the present
facts. In the first place the Supreme Court has not ruled or reasoned that
no summary eviction may arise under the provisions of the Act and the
Rules framed thereunder. Second, in the facts of that case, summary
eviction ordered under the Act was set aside for reason of those
proceedings being a device.

19. That point of distinction as supported by the reasoning of the co-

ordinate bench of this Court in Shivani Verma (supra) has also been
pressed against the applicability of ratio of the Patna High Court decision
in Ravi Shankar (supra).

20. As to the third submission advanced by learned counsel for the

petitioner, it has been submitted, in absence of any jurisdictional error on
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11

part of the statutory authority, it cannot be said that the proceedings thus
initiated would abate or be placed in abeyance during the pendency of a
civil suit instituted by one of the parties, whose eviction has been sought.
If that were to be applied by way of principle in law, no proceeding for
eviction may ever arise under the Act and Rules framed thereunder as the
party at risk of eviction may only file a civil suit and defeat the entire
object and purpose of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.

21. Once the Parliament has recognized the vulnerability factor of the
aged members of the society and has enacted the special welfare
provisions to protect senior citizens from exploitation and abuse,
occasioned by their vulnerability, accompanying feeble health and frugal
means, there exists no room to accept the line of reasoning being
canvassed by learned counsel for the petitioner.

22. Having heard leaned counsel for the parties and perused the record, in
the first place we do not find any evidence or material to reach an
exceptional finding that the proceedings instituted by ‘F’ are proxy
proceedings instituted by him for the benefit of ‘S1’. Merely because ‘S1’
may either be neutral to the dispute between ‘F’ and ‘S2’ and / or merely
because ‘S1’ may be supporting ‘F’ in his dispute with ‘S2’, it may not
lead to the conclusion as suggested by learned counsel for the petitioner.

23. No pleading made by ‘F’ and no process applied by ‘F’ is shown to be

one instituted or performed by ‘S1’ for his benefit. To that extent the
objection raised by the petitioner is found to be misconceived and
unfounded, on facts and evidence.

24. As to the second objection, we may have been invited to offer a

detailed discussion with respect to the submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties. However, as noted above, the co-ordinate bench in
Shivani Verma (supra) speaking through Suneet Kumar (J) has made a
detailed, lucid and nuanced discussion covering all aspects and facets of
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12

the submission presently advanced. The decision of the Supreme Court in

Smt. S. Vanitha (supra) was also considered. Having quoted in extenso
the reasoning offered by the co-ordinate bench, no useful or further
purpose may be served in repeating the same. Suffice to record, we find
ourselves in complete agreement with the reasoning of the co-ordinate
bench. There being proceedings referable to Chapter V of the Act, the
pre-condition of claim / or maintenance allowance does not exist. The
application filed by ‘F’ before the District Magistrate was wholly
maintainable.

25. At the same time, with respect to the decision in Smt. S. Vanitha
(supra), we may add that the said decision arose in the context of facts
that were entirely different. The applicable law and its effect was also
found different. In the present case, no proceeding has been instituted
under the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005, on
the contrary here the senior citizen ‘F’ is seeking the eviction of both ‘S2’
and his wife. In Smt. S. Vanitha (supra), the senior citizen (mother-in-
law), was seeking eviction of her daughter-in-law alone, the latter having
suffered proceeding for dissolution of her marriage. Further, the property
in issue (in that case) was originally purchased by the son of the senior
citizen. He sold it to his father who in turn gifted it to his wife.

26. Then, the said daughter-in-law had also instituted proceedings seeking
residence under the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act,
2005.Therefore, it was also her objection that the proceeding set up under
the Act were by way of a device to defeat her just claim under that special
Act.

27. Last, before the Supreme Court, the submissions as were advanced on
behalf of the daughter-in-law were recorded in paragraph 9 in Smt. S.
Vanitha (supra) as below :-

“9. The appellant, aggrieved by the judgement of the Division Bench of

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the High Court, has preferred the present special leave petition. Mr
Yatish Mohan, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
submitted that:

(i) The appellant is residing in her matrimonial home as the lawfully

wedded spouse of the Fourth respondent and she cannot be evicted from
her shared household, in view of the protection offered by Section 17 of
the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005.

(ii) The proceeding under Section 3 and 4 of the Senior Citizens Act
2007 was filed by her mother-in-law and father-in-law in connivance
with her estranged spouse to deprive her of her matrimonial home;

(iii) The finding of the Division Bench on the appellant‟s currents current
residential status was based on a fraudulent set up. The alleged postal
cover was dispatched on 21 June 2018, during the pendency of the
proceedings before the Single Judge, and merely indicated a postal
endorsement (“no such person”) as it arrived when nobody was present
at home to receive it;

(iv) The decree for the dissolution of marriage which was passed against
the appellant by the Trial Judge on 5 December 2013 has been set aside
by the High Court on 14 January 2016 and the proceedings have been
remanded back to the jurisdictional Family Court for a disposal afresh.
Hence, as of date, the appellant continues to be in a lawful relationship
of marriage with the Fourth respondent and she has no other place to
live except the suit premises, with her minor daughter;

(v) The provisions of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 have been
manipulated to defeat the rights of the appellant. The manner in which
the premises were transferred by the spouse of the appellant to his father
and the gift deed thereafter to mother-in-law of the appellant are
indicative of an attempt to misuse the provisions of the Act, to defeat the
claims of the appellant; and

(vi) In asserting her right under Section 17 of the PWDV Act 2005, the
appellant relies on the decision of this Court in Satish Chander Ahuja vs.
Sneha Ahuja (Civil Appeal No. 2483 of 2020, decided on 15 October
2020). In sum and substance, it has been urged that the authorities
constituted under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 had no jurisdiction to
order the eviction of the appellant. Moreover, the proceedings have been
utilised to secure the eviction of the appellant so as to deny her claim of
a right to reside in the shared household under the PWDV Act 2005.”

28. Thus, no submission was advanced to the effect that authorities

constituted under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder have no
jurisdiction to seek eviction simplicitor under Chapter V of the Act.
Though, that nature of submission may have existed earlier before the
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Karnataka High Court in the writ petition and the writ appeal, at the same
time, that submission was not advanced before the Supreme Court.
Therefore, the same has not been considered by the Supreme Court. That
is not part of the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court.

29. In fact the Supreme Court observed in summation point 24(ii) and
24(iv) that the daughter-in-law (in that case) may not be evicted
summarily during pendency of her proceedings under the Protection of
Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Thus, it appears to us the
Supreme Court itself was cognizant that the summary eviction proceeding
may otherwise arise and be concluded under the Act and the Rules framed
thereunder. However, it reasoned that such proceeding may not be
concluded and made final during the pendency of another proceedings
under another special Act. To that extent, discussion exists in the decision
of the Supreme Court itself that Protection of Women From Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 and the protections thereunder are not to be trifled or
ignored.

30. In view of that reason offered by us, we find ourselves in respectful

disagreement with the decision of the Patna High Court in Ravi Shankar
(supra) and the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Simrat
Randhawa (supra). The decision of the learned single judge of this Court
in Krishna Kumar (supra) is distinguishable, that being referable to
proceedings under Chapter II of the Act and not Chapter V of the Act, as
is the present case.

31. As to the third objection raised by learned counsel for the petitioner
based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sau Rajani (supra), we
find the same has no application in the present case. While the jurisdiction
of the Civil Courts may survive summary proceedings for eviction under
Chapter V of the Act read with the Rules framed thereunder, read with the
CAP, that summary proceeding may remain subject to the out come of
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any civil suit wherein larger issues and other rights may be involved.

32. At present, we make it clear that we are not proposing to rule as to the
exact extent and nature of proceedings to which the summary eviction
proceedings under Chapter V of the Act may remain subject to. However,
solely to deal with the objections raised on the strength of plenary
jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, we provide that the summary eviction
under the Act would remain subject to final out come of O.S. No. 837 of
2020 (Dinesh Ahuja vs. Indrajeet Ahuja and another) pending in the Court
of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Meerut. In those proceedings larger and
other rights of the parties may be contested and decided. Any other
construction made would defeat the entire object and purpose of the
special welfare law, namely, the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.

33. Unfortunate as it may be, it is a hard reality of life that upon breaking
down of joint families and perhaps as a direct result of smaller units of
family, the aged are feeling isolated and at times abused. Whatever be the
true reasons that may exist in particular families, the Act and the Rules
offer a life preserving protective umbrella to all the aged members of the
society, who may feel victimized or helpless at the hands of their children,
or their relatives and others, both with respect to provision for
maintenance allowance and with respect to protection of their properties.
Once that protection has been granted, there is no reason to restrict its
operation. Any margin of restriction created by courts may be wholly
counter productive to fulfillment of the legislative and societal needs as
those standing under the umbrella of protection offered by the Act and the
Rules framed thereunder are in their sunset years and do not have
decades of time or abundance of energy and resources or the motivation
or the conviction to contest legal proceeding-that too often with those who
came into the world through them.

34. In view of the above, we find no merit in the submissions advanced by

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learned counsel for the petitioner. In absence of any other submissions,

the writ petition fails and is dismissed.

35. No order as to costs.

Order Date :- 22.11.2024

I.A.Siddiqui / Manoj

(Donadi Ramesh,J.) (S. D. Singh, J.)