Great Britain and Spanish Recognition of the Hispanic American States

Author(s): John Tate Lanning

Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review , Nov., 1930, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Nov.,
1930), pp. 429-456
Published by: Duke University Press

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 GREAT BRITAIN AND SPANISH RECOGNITION OF
THE HISPANIC AMERICAN STATES

In the spring of 1836, there was a great hubbub in official

Washington. Spain, with meager spirit and grandiloquent
language, at last had expressed a willingness to recognize the
independence of its revolted colonies. The idea that England
might claim the glory of persuading Spain to take this
step and thus garner the mercantile advantages of Hispanic
American gratitude caused great uneasiness in Washington.
Post haste an American vessel was dispatched to notify the
Spanish Americans of Spain's recognition. Prompted by
jealousy, Britain's government naively communicated this
news to Spain with the request that that country should set
the world aright as to what power secured Spanish recog-
nition. Certainly, replied the Spanish minister, neither Eng-
land nor the United States determined Spain's actions; more-
over, the United States in sending a vessel had taken a paso
oficioso (officious step). Yet it was a fact that England and
America had cooperated in securing Spanish recognition, al-
beit their ambassadors did not always break together the
bread of mutual endeavor, with Rush, American ambassador
at the court of St. James's, all eagerness in his efforts to
precipitate the cautious, but determined Canning, and to com-
mit him to the American policy of speedy acknowledgment.
The American ryle in securing this end and its interrelations
with British diplomacy have been ably discussed,' but what
of England's direct efforts? To answer that question is the
nurnose of this article.

I W. S. Robertson, " The Policy of Spain toward Its Revolted Colonies ",
Hispanic American Historical Review, VI. 21-46 (1926); "The Recognition of
the Spanish Colonies by the Motherland", ibid., I. 70-91 (1918); "The United
States and Spain in 1822 ", American Historical Review. XX. 781-800 (1915).

[ 429 ]

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430 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

When, in 1814, it was still uncertain what would appear

when the seething pot of revolution in Hispanic America sim-
mered down, England was groping for commercial harmony
with Spain. The odds were still in its favor. In pursuance
of this idea, the English ambassador, Sir Henry Wellesley,
signed with the Duque de San Carlos a treaty of friendship
and alliance, expressing the agreement of the signatories to
forward their respective interests, to frame a treaty of com-
merce, and, in the event of the opening of Hispanic American
trade, to admit Great Britain as the most favored nation.2
When the United States in 1822 announced its intention of
recognizing the new republics and called upon the great pow-
ers to follow its example, Castlereagh could express his in-
terest in peace, but peace based on the authority of King
Ferdinand.3 Thus spoke a diplomat of the old world. Three
years later, however, the petitions of English merchant asso-
ciations urging recognition of the de facto governments,4 and
abundant alarms concerning American plotting, eagerness,
and ability to seize Cuba,5 brought England into another
double rile. Henceforth, until it despaired of Spain, England
employed all its influence to reestablish peace between the
mother country and its late colonies on the basis of recognition
and mutual advantages, especially commercial." We
are in a course of amicable and furious correspondence with Spain-
amicable as far as relates to Europe, in which quarter of the globe we
defend her against invasion; furious in relation to America, where
we have a squadron now employed in seeking forcible redress for
grievances. To keep these two strains simultaneously operating upon
the Spaniards; to hold a shield before them with one hand, and pun-
ish them with the other, has been and still is a matter of no small
delicacy and difficulty.7

2 F. 0. (Foreign Office), Spain, 94/268, 28 August, 1814.

3 Espania y Inglaterra, estuido objeotivo, pp. 73-74.
4F . O., Spain, 72/283, 9 May, 1822.
5 F. O., Spain, 72/261, H. Theo Kilbee to W. Hamilton, 11 August, 1820.
6C. A. Villanueva, Fernando FII. y WOS Nuevos Estados, pp. 166-167.
I J. Bagot, George Canning and his Friends, p. 152.

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 GREAT BRITAIN AND SPANISH RECOGNITION 431

Thus, in confidence, Canning depicted the dilemma into which

his country was thrown in its opposition to France in Europe
and to the futile, but high-handed methods of Spain in
America.
Spain was seeking to align Europe against the new Ameri-
can states through the Holy Alliance. To the Paris confer-
ence the English government refused to send delegates. It
resolved that the conferences at Aix-la-Chapelle had been
futile; that the Spanish system had proved impracticable;
and that any further steps toward recognition would depend
upon the circumstances. This news, according to Sir William
a Court, English ambassador in Spain, created consternation
in Madrid. Tension, however, was relieved by the hope that
the decree of the council of the Indies opening the ports of
South America to all nations would cause the English
government to relax its determination not to assist in the
conference.8
The British government, said Canning in 1824, did not
wish to anticipate Spain. On the contrary it insisted "that
his Catholic Majesty should have the grace and advantage of
leading the way in that recognition among the powers of Eu-
rope. "9 But Ofalia, now Spanish secretary of state, exploit-
ing Anglo-American rivalry in Hispanic America, dramatic-
ally delivered a vigorous tirade, pointing to the "big stick"
of the Americans in countering the English suggestion. He
contended that supporting the Spanish colonies would only
eclipse England itself through American seizure of a recog-
nized Mexico, and the ever increasing naval potentiality of
the United States.10 Ten days later, January 14, 1824, the
Spanish secretary again attempted to demonstrate that Eng-
land was working against its own interest, pointing out the
danger of Yankee domination, the compatibility of the Span-
ish monarchy with that of England, and Spain's readiness to
8 F. O., Spain, 72/285, a Court to Canning, 8 and 10 February, 1824.
9 F. O., Spain, 72/284, Canning to a Court, 30 January, 1824.
'0 F. O., Spain, 72/285, a Court to Canning, 4 January, 1824.

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432 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

make commercial concessions."1 By February, 1824, Ofalia,

who had lived in the United States, agreed to produce positive
proof of plans for the federation of the Hispanic colonies with
the United States which would immediately appropriate the
trade and ports of South America,12 contrary to the true in-
terests of Britain.
The representative report of the merchants of London pre-
sented by Sir James Mackintosh on June 15, 1824, like that
of their polemic forbears of 1739, complained of undue ten-
derness toward Spain. The merchants thought Castlereagh's
recognition of Spanish American commercial flags in 1822 and
Canning's appointment of consuls in 1823 "as much an act
of recognition as the appointment of higher ministers". The
Polignac memorial of October 9, 1823, and Canning's rejec-
tion of a general conference early in the next year cleared the
field for recognition in Europe. The position thus assumed
by England was the basis of the decision transmitted to Spain
no longer to consult that country, but to rely upon expedi-
ency.12 Thus far the policy of England had been deferential
and the publicity given it was an element in educating the
cabinet to the point of recognition.14
Either England must become a competitor for superior
commercial concessions and spheres of influence in Spain's
disintegrating empire and thus perpetuate anarchy and light
anew the European conflagration, or England must renounce
any such pretensions and thereby claim the privilege of ex-
cluding its rivals from that which it did not claim itself. That
England chose the latter course, probably out of expediency,
is evident from the nature of the Polignac Memorandum,
Canning's suggestion of a Monroe Doctrine, and the tone of the
correspondence from Westminster to Madrid. In January,
1824, Canning announced clearly his eagerness to initiate
"F. O., Spain, 72/285, a Court to Canning, 14 January, 1824.
12Ibid., 2 February, 1824.
13C. A. Villanueva, Fernandoe VII. y los Nuemos Estados, p. 186.
14 H. W. V. Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning, pp. 142-145.

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 GREAT BRITAIN AND SPANISH RECOGNITION 433

negotiations between Spain and its recalcitrant colonies on

the basis of securing for Spain commercial advantages supe-
rior to those conceded to other nations. He professed no
desire for exclusive privileges for England, but asked free-
dom for all. Spain, he remarked, should show no surprise at
this. In this same dispatch he laid down the law: absolute
commercial interdiction or the employment of foreign arms
to reestablish dominion in Spanish America would automatic-
ally lead to England's recognition of the new governments.
The Spanish minister observed that British hostility to for-
eign aid was equivalent to throwing Great Britain on the side
of the colonies.15
Delay, a Court informed the foreign office, was the policy
of Spain. Alarmed, Ofalia expressed his satisfaction at Eng-
land's delaying recognition, which he hoped further to retard
by satisfying the two British conditions. There was, he made
it known, no intention of soliciting and using foreign arms or
establishing a commercial interdiction. Although England
was the logical mediator, its mediation with recognition as a
sine qua non was not acceptable to Spain. Restive under
English and American pressure, the Spaniards alleged that
the clergy, nobility, and proprietors of Spanish America were
royalists and likely to effect a reaction. Was not Cuba, they
asked, an example of steadfastness ?16 Feigning optimism
while hiding his despair, Ofalia sought to placate England and
perhaps to hoodwink Spain.
Sir William a Court was instructed simply to read the
Canning dispatch to the officials in Madrid and to declare
anew the British view. Then, if other powers differed, Can-
ning expected by this method to avoid needless discussion,
mystery, jealousy, and delay. This perfect frankness before
the world was intended to be a fitting answer to the decree of
the council of the Indies. Finally, Ofalia, Spanish secretary
of state, was informed, in answer to his appeal to British
15 F. 0., Spain, 72/285, a Court to Canning, 14 January, 1824.
1 Ibid., 17 February, 1824.

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434 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

experience in the loss of the American colonies, that Spain

must see the expediency of recognition before the grace and
advantages of granting it were lost.17 Spain retorted that it
did not consider the recovery of the colonies so hopeless as
to admit the principle of independence. The British govern-
ment was accused of being ill informed as to conditions in
Peru and Buenos Aires. Spain stood ready to maintain a new
kind of sovereignty, admitting a separate administration and
government. A perpetual hope was preferable to a few mil-
lion piasters for the king and the commercial advantage of
his subjects,'8 concluded Ofalia with a flourish of pride more
befitting a conquistador than a nervous statesman futilely
struggling to hold together what the conqueror had laid at the
feet of Spain. A wavering spirit and the genius of Spain's
politics-delay-are revealed in these statements.
To England the issue of recognition now appeared to be
only one of time.'9 The English government believed that its
sincerity and the soundness of its advice had been amply
demonstrated in this momentous year for the Spanish empire
-1824. English mediation was not yet contingent upon abso-
lute recognition by Spain, but England refused to be bound
by Spanish acceptance of mediation should immediate recog-
nition become necessary.
In the spring of 1824, the British cabinet viewed Mexico
as possibly ready for recognition, while the agents sent to
Mexico to investigate immediately confirmed the view. Can-
ning's hand was forced, but he thought to avoid the issue by
feigning to consider the report immature. Yet Spain was
warned that the British regarded Spain's situation in Mexico
as hopeless. Everyone, including the Spaniards, now knew
that British recognition could only be withheld until the ar-
rival of the Mexican agent or until Spain considered fairly
and reasonably the expediency of leading the way in such ac-
17 F. 0., Spain, 72/284, Canning to a Court, 30 January, 1824.
18". O., Spain, 72/285, a Court to Canning, 6 March, 1824.
19 F. O., Spain, 72/285, Canning to a Court, 1 March, 1824.

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 GREAT BRITAIN AND SPANISH RECOGNITION 435

knowledgment-a thing which, as Canning did not fail to

stress, it could do with dignity and arms in hand, as its troops
still held San Juan de Ulloa near Vera Cruz. Spanish power
had vanished in Colombia; no vestige of Spanish authority
remained in Buenos Aires and almost as little in Chile; a deaf
ear turned to all of the new republics would serve only to unite
them in a common cause-tthus ran the ruthless, but cajoling
and accurate arguments of Canning and a Court. The Span-
ish secretary, affected by this logic, became the scapegoat of
anti-English feeling. "The enemies of M. Of alia", a Court
explained,

have built an accusation upon this of a traitorous deference to the

suggestions of England, and of his wish to betray the best interests of
Spain. The absurdity and malignity of such a charge are too evident
to need refutation, but though he has said nothing to me upon the
subject, I know that M. de Of alia has felt hurt at the accusation; and
his feeling may possibly have an influence upon his future arrange-
ments.20

Respectful toward England and yet trying to reclaim the sup-

port of a dubious public opinion, Ofalia in March and May of
1824 replied to the English with seeming confidence that aside
from a few lawyers and physicians the whole population of
South America was desirous of an amicable arrangement with
Spain; that the British ministers had declared in open parlia-
ment that the right of recovering the colonies, if possible, was
Spain's. This information, ran the ironical comment, came
not from agents sent to secure it, but from all professions,
classes, colors, and from the British themselves.21
Again on June 15, 1824, Sir William a Court was in-
structed to ply Conde de Ofalia with the urgency of prompt
action and to offer his government as the channel for any
reasonable proposals to Hispanic America, especially Mexico.
Refusal of English mediation or failure to arrange distinct
20 F. O., Spain, 72/285, a Court to Canning, 15 March, 1824.
21 Ibid., 21 March, 1824.

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436 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

terms of accommodation with Mexico-a Court let it be known

-would be regarded as discharging his government from any
obligation of further reference to Madrid.22 English patience
was reaching a low ebb, yet the situation in the motherland
needed delicate handling.

Spain is bewildered and irresolute, clings to the hope of foreign as-

sistance at one moment, despairs of the probability of obtaining it,
and of its efficacy, if obtained, at the next; and is of herself equal to
no greater effort, than that of stealing out a few officers, from time
to time to the West Indies.23

Plainly Canning was nervous as he played his last high

cards. Two days after this final offer of mediation, he asked
a Court to inform Ofalia that the English fleet stood ready to
protect Cuba against external aggression [England was as
anxious as Spain to prevent its occupation by the United
States!] as soon as Spain should on its part comply with the
suggestions of the English minister's last dispatch. Cuba
thus preserved, Spain could make of it an entrepot of trade
or haven for the influx of loyal Spaniards from the rest of
America [Spain insisted that they existed there]. The Eng-
lish, however, with no uncanny political prescience, refused to
guarantee Cuba against revolution.
In reality, England was seeking to guarantee Cuba against
the United States. If England would fall in line with the
United States in recognizing the Hispanic American republics,
said the American ambassador, he would "say, swear, sign
anything, sub spirit' .24 But this was not Canning's tune.
Cuba, he thought, could not be guaranteed against one of the
22F. O., Spain, 72/284, Canning to a Court, 31 March, 1824.
23 J. Bagot, George Canning and his Friends, II. 337.
24H. W. V. Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827, pp. 110-113;
J. Bagot, George Canning and His Friends, II. 216. "Rush le declare entonces
que si reconocia inmediatamente la independencia de los Nuevos Estados, podia
garantisarle que el Gobierno de Washington no permanecerfa inactivo ante seme-
jante ataque contra las antiguas colonias espafloles". C. A. Villanueva, Fernando
VI1. y los Nuevos Estados, p. 217.

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 GREAT BRITAIN AND SPANISH RECOGNITION 437

belligerents-Spain. The United States remained, therefore,

almost alone. "We offered", said Canning,

to guarantee Cuba:-which for a power so shy of guarantees, was a

great offer; and which, if accepted, would have involved us in great
difficulties.

The Spanish evidently understood the maneuver, and refused

to accept a proposal so "clogged with . . . conditions" . This
smooth manipulation Canning would not accredit to the Span-
iards. It was due to the workings of the Russians in the
reactionary Quadruple Alliance! "The voice is the voice of
Ofalia", Canning wrote to his friend Bagot with whom he
could drop diplomatic restraint,

but the hand is the hand of Pozzo:-Pozzo's hand, however, as the

natural hand of Essau, but a kid glove on the hairy side turned in-
wards. Nothing can be more smooth than the style of the Spanish
note. There is not a word to find fault with: but the matter is (as
Of alia thought it) ruinous to Spain-being intended to be only detri-
mental to England. Well, we cannot help. Livarvimus avimas nostras.
And that's an end.25

Spain was grateful for England's offer to mediate, but the

conditions for protecting Cuba were still unacceptable. That
the English might henceforth act without reference to Madrid
did not apparently alter Spain's position. Later in the sum-
mer of 1824, Ofalia expressed his happiness that the English
government had had no correspondence with Iturbide.26 In
July, however, the Conde de Ofalia was dismissed at the in-
stigation of Ugarti. Zea Bermudez, then in London on a spe-
cial mission, was appointed in his place.27 Before returning
to Spain to assume a post in which he despaired of doing
good, he admitted to Secretary Canning that Buenos Aires
and Colombia were hopeless except in case of complete suc-

25 J. Bagot, George Canning and his Friends, II. 240.

'm F. O., Spain, 72/286, a Court to Canning, 8 June, 1824.
27 Ibid., 13 July, 1824.

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438 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

cess elsewhere, but he appeared unwilling to abandon any

chance of Spanish recovery. To Canning the international
conferences only prolonged a hope which should long since
have been extinguished.28
On the last day of the busy year of 1824, instructions were
addressed to Bosanquet, the new English ambassador at Mad-
rid, for conveyance to Secretary Zea. After a review of the
state of Mexico, Colombia, and Buenos Aires, Canning an-
nounced unequivocally the decision of the British government
forthwith to negotiate commercial treaties with the new states,
the effect of which, when severally ratified, would amount to a
diplomatic recognition of the de facto governments of those
three countries. Again the British government tendered its
offices for the establishment of a friendly understanding be-
tween Spain and those countries which Spain could no longer
hope to reduce on terms honorable and advantageous to
Spain.29 Such dogged persistence at least revealed some
knowledge of intercourse with the Spanish. Secretary Zea,
now thoroughly converted to the Spanish view, endeavored to
counteract this policy on the ground of its eventual detriment
to England, as an encouragement to rebellion, and as a war
on the principle of legitimacy upon which the stability of the
old governments depended. Even better sources than Can-
ning's, said the Spanish minister, showed the majority senti-
ment in the colonies was suppressed by factions and demon-
strated the practicability of recovering Spanish America.
Spain, he said, would never have refused the proffered medi-
ation of England had it not been offered on the one condition
Spain could not accept-loss of sovereignty over Spanish
America -a right which Spain would sooner or later be in a
position to assert.30 English recognition of America, Zea
parroted his predecessor, would only raise up a naval power
to rival England itself some day. Bosanquet therefore re-
28 F. O., Spain, 72/284, Canning to a Court, 7 August, 1824.
29 F. 0., Spain, 72/288, Canning to Bosanquet, 31 December, 1824.
30 F. O., Spain, 72/299, Bosanquet to Canning, 20 January, 1825.

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 GREAT BRITAIN AND SPANISH RECOGNITION 439

ported Zea's position unalterable. He also wrote that Zea

would not separate Spain and the colonies in the commercial
negotiations.3'
On January 21, 1825, the Spanish ministry presented to
Ambassador Bosanquet its official answer to Canning's note
of December 31. The Spanish case was simply reviewed in a
long and weak document which ended in requesting a recon-
sideration-within itself an excellent vindication of England's
steps.
During the winter of 1824 and the spring of 1825, the Eng-
lish evinced some fear of Russian interference in the affairs
of Spain despite the efforts of the Russian minister at Madrid
to disclaim any such intention.32 There were rumors of the
departure of an agent, Ugarti, for St. Petersburg as a bearer
of a Spanish protest against the conduct of Great Britain with
respect to the colonies. Spain could afford to take such a step
now, for the fear of hastening the recognition of the colonies
by England which had deterred Spain from seeking physical
aid from its allies for the recovery of its possessions, no longer
existed,33 as England had committed itself.34
In March, 1825, Canning wrote directly to the Spanish offi-
cial, Los Rios, in order to relieve Bosanquet from further
painful explanations to Zea. The cardinal note of Canning's
advice to Bosanquet was to avoid further controversy, but the
dispatch to Zea ended with the hope that Spain might recon-
cile itself to a matter already irrevocably decided.35 The in-
structions to the successor of Bosanquet, Frederick Lamb,
held the note of the foreign office of January 31 to be final and
insisted that the American question be kept as quiet as pos-
sible and that no conversation with Zea be held on the subject
unless the latter had plans whereby the mediation of Great
31 F. 0., Spain, 72/299, Bosanquet to Canning, 27 January, 1825.
"2Ibid., 27 January, 1825.
33 F. 0., Spain, 72/299, Bosanquet to Canning, 7 February, 1825.
34 Ibid., 21 March, 1825.
36 F. 0., Spain, 72/299, Canning to Bosanquet, 29 March, 1825.

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440 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

Britain might promote better relations between Spain and the

South American republics.36
This silence upon so important a subject was only tactical.
In May, the ambassador at Madrid reported the formation of
a junta by the Spanish government for the purpose of deciding
whether it might be expedient to make a new attempt to re-
cover the trans-Atlantic dominions by force or to acknowledge
their independence on condition of obtaining commercial ad-
vantages. This information revealed a great anxiety to please
England.37 Ambassador Lamb soon reported that he had
been betrayed into a conversation on America with Zea in
which he had discovered that the king's obstinacy in non-rec-
ognition was due to an article of faith based on an antiquated
oath of Charles V. not to alienate any part of his dominions.
Lamb expressed his fear to Zea that the knot of Spanish
prosperity was to be untied in America, for by allowing other
nations to make arrangements with Spanish America, Spain,
although ultimately compelled to take the same course, would
be too late to keep any of the immense benefits which might
have been derived from an accommodation at an earlier
moment.38
By August, 1825, Spain began to take seriously the Eng-
lish offer to guarantee Cuba, but a priori precluded recog-
nition. The United States was feared, although it disclaimed
any intention of seizing Cuba. For Spain to dispatch men and
ships to Cuba would be equivalent to mobilization against
South America. "In truth", Canning wrote to Ambassador
Lamb,
this fundamental error is at the bottom of all the Spanish reasoning-
that Spain considering the Spanish Americans as rebels, insists upon
treating them in that light, and in no other....

Lamb's instructions to enter no controversy with Zea were

strong and sDecific. but Lamb thought the failure distinctly
36 F. 0., Spain, 72/300, Instructions to Lamb, 18 February, 2 May, 1825.
37 F. O., Spain, 72/299, Bosanquet to Canning, 16 May, 1825.
's F. O., Spain, 72/300, Lamb to Canning, 20 June, 1825.

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 GREAT BRITAIN AND SPANISH RECOGNITION 441

to explain the two points of view would not be tenderness to-

ward Spain, but delusion.39
Although during the last six months of 1825 America was
scarcely mentioned in Spanish society, Lamb urged the prec-
edent of England in recognizing the United States in spite of
its loyal elements; and of France in recognizing Santo Do-
mingo.40 The recognition of Brazil also afforded an oppor-
tunity to renew the English offices to the Duque del Infantado
who had succeeded Zea. He was reticent, but it appeared that
he was suffering under extreme jealousy at the arrangement
which Portugal had obtained and that the overthrow of the
Brazilian Empire would be highly agreeable to him. Finally,
Infantado confessed that he could not mention pacification to
his sovereign however much the English associated it with the
possibility of the renewed splendor of Spain, and that only a
direct communication from the Portuguese king would induce
his sovereign to recognize Brazil.41
Lamb thought that the sinking finances of Spain and the
increasing smuggling into the peninsula could be alleviated
only by the withdrawal of the French troops and recognition
of the new states, which the king, supported by foreign troops,
alone prevented.42 Lamb likewise reported French efforts to
convert the members of the cortes and to induce the govern-
ment through reason and persuasion to recognize Colombia
and Mexico.43 The Austrian minister (probably the channel
most agreeable to England) also quickened his interest in the
American question. The papal nuncio became so openly in
favor of arrangements as to indicate orders from Rome.
Lamb assured the Austrian minister that England could not
view with pleasure any conduct which would revive war in
America. Infantado sounded England on the guarantee of
39 F. O., Spain, 72/300, Instructions to Lamb, 1 August, 1825.
40 F. 0., Spain, 72/302, Lamb to Canning, 17 October, 13 December, 1825.
41 F. 0., Spain, 72/303, Lamb to Canning, 12 December, 1825.
42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., 25 December, 1825.

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442 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

Cuba, whose governor was clamoring for three thousand men,

as soon as he heard of the fall of San Juan de Ulloa. Infantado
now held that the acknowledgment of the republics would be
made possible through Bourbon princes. In the royal council
which was to consider the American question, Ambassador
Lamb commissioned Count Brunetti to have a proposition
made for the suspension of arms, but the meeting broke up in
general disapprobation of this proposition. In vain did Lamb
paint for Infantado the hopeless situation in Mexico and the
danger of Cuba from both rebellion and invasion.44
The English and French ambassadors then made common
cause. Adjustment of the American question seemed possible.
The Spanish king was in dire need of money: "Como, no tengo
nada ". " Settle with America 9, retorted Pere Cyril. " If I
thought that, I should not be long about it", said the king.
Great hope was now placed in the French ambassador who
had the discretion of employing large sums of money in cases
of emergency, but he appeared in doubt.45 Meanwhile, the
American ambassador had addressed a note of 153 pages to
the Duque del Infantado on the subject of the recognition of
Hispanic America.46 Infantado began to talk of a plenipo-
tentiary. The English minister reported that a feather might
turn the scales or the war might go on until it reached the
shores of the peninsula. Yet he lamented that he possessed
not the requisite feather. Soon the scales appeared tipped
the other way. The Spanish expedition, which Spain thought
lost, arrived at Havana. Brazil's attitude was uncertain and
Bolivar's troops had that fact to concern them before they
could look forward to Cuba. Spain again fell back on its old
principle of procrastination. Even Infantado recommended
Louis XIV. 's example to Ferdinand VII.48

"F. O., Spain, 72/314, Lamb to Canning, 7 February, 1826.

45Ibid., 18 February, 1826.
46Ibid., 19 February, 1826.
47 Ibid., 15 February, 1826.
48 Ibid.

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 GREAT BRITAIN AND SPANISH RECOGNITION 443

In the spring of 1826, the British foreign office held em-

phatically that the renewal of the American question when
Spain had a navy in America and men at Ulloa was no
longer possible. While the disposition to mediate still re-
mained, England had no intention of mediating to secure ad-
vantageous terms for Spain.49 At the same time, however,
the foreign office announced the acceptance of the invitation
of Hurtado, the Colombian envoy at the Court of St. James 's,
for the appointment of a commissioner to the Panama Con-
ference. Lamb was ordered to acquaint the Duque del In-
fantado of the appointment of Dawkins; but also to explain
that his object was only to watch the interests of Britain there
and to give no offense to Spain.50 That part of Dawkins 's in-
structions which related to pacification between Spain and its
late colonies was also immediately dispatched to the British
minister in Madrid with the suggestion to withhold its dis-
closure until the success of its execution could be determined,
else Spain might be led to expectations which might not be
realized; moreover, the French ambassador and the American
minister might try to prevent its success.
Postponement of further consideration of the American
question was contingent upon another factor so seldom
stressed, but of such imponderable weight in diplomacy-the
state of politics at home. "We have agreed to postpone the
consideration of Spain and her colonies", said Canning to
Granville,
till after the rising of our respective Parliaments. Could we take up
that subject in June-you and I-with Villele, and settle it in sub-
stance leaving the formalities to be gone through by you and Damas
after my coming away?51

In spite of the statement of his government that Spain had

lost its colonies irretrievably, the French ambassador soon
4F F. 0., Spain, 72/312, Canning to Lamb, 15 February, 1826.
6 Ibid.
1 Canning to Granville, London, 18 April, 1826, in E. J. Stapleton, Political
Correspondence of George Canning, II. 30.

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444 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

slackened his pace in the American affair. The English min-

ister in Madrid cut off relations with the American minister
because he proposed the admission of Russia to a general
conference.52
In May, Hurtado, the Colombian ambassador and minister
plenipotentiary in London, appealed for the good offices of
Britain to secure a cessation of hostilities between Colombia
and Spain, not necessarily on the basis of complete and imme-
diate recognition through a definitive treaty of peace, but on
the basis of an armistice of long duration such as Spain had
used in reconciling itself to the emancipation of the United
States of the Low Countries. Circumstances for presenting
the proposition to Spain seemed inauspicious, but Canning
suggested two facts which might open Spanish eyes. First,
the forts of Callao had capitulated, which tended to render
acute the problem of Spain's retaining even its insular pos-
sessions. Infantado's reaction to this fact would determine
whether or not Hurtado's proposal should be disclosed. The
second fact was the intimated disposition of France to
withdraw its troops. This, he thought, would operate more
strongly than any other consideration to quicken the decision
of the Spanish ministry for reconciliation with its late Ameri-
can provinces.53
The English actually made another attempt, but their ef-
forts were again chilled. At Infantado 's reception of their
overture, Canning was plainly exasperated and agreed with
Lamb that constant advice and pressure served only to excite
unfounded suspicion. To the selfish interests of Great Brit-
ain, he said, it was all the same if Spain recognized its colonies
then, ten years subsequently, or not at all, for was not Great
Britain the only European power in legalized intercourse with
Spanish America? Was not similar intercourse with other
European powers dependent upon a recognition which in turn
appeared contingent upon Spanish recognition? Recognition
&2F. 0., Spain, 72/315, Lamb to Canning, 22 April, 1826.
FI F. o., Spain, 72/312, Canning to Lamb, 12 May, 1826.

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 GREAT BRITAIN AND SPANISH RECOGNITION 445

by Spain would have divested England of these obvious ad-

vantages. Canning further insisted that Infantado's mind be
set aright on the guarantee of Cuba. By what right, he
inquired, could the United States department of state de-
cree that one belligerent power shall not attack? To him it
amounted to becoming a direct party to the war. This last
response of Spain, Canning concluded, "destroys the hope, if
it does not destroy the desire, of being useful".54
By a dispatch of October 6, 1826, the English renewed their
insistence despite the fact that all forms of advice appeared
exhausted and that English interest now hardly extended be-
yond justice and humanity.55 Yet the mediation of England
was still Hurtado's express desire, and Dawkins reported that
the same sentiment permeated the Panama Congress. In this
very month of October, Lamb let the Spanish government
know that silence would be considered as a total and unquali-
fied refusal of reconciliation and thus reported to the Ameri-
cans. The failure of French and Russian pressure and the
unfavorable Spanish note to Secretary Everett were taken as
a refusal by England, which, while willing to render service,
held the time past for offering it.56 And thus ended Canning's
'amicable and furious correspondence'.57 Henceforth Brit-
ish efforts were never shot through with the same eagerness
and enthusiasm.
For four years after 1826, British diplomatic interest in
the recognition of the colonies by the mother country was ex-
pressed only in a few desultory remarks. The American ques-
tion was now quiet. England could no longer urge recognition
without becoming ridiculous. Notwithstanding, occasional
dispatches attested to the omnipresence of the question. The
new ambassador, Bosanquet, in the spring of 1828, wrote to

c4 F. O., Spain, 72/312, Canning to Lamb, 1 July, 1826.

55 F. O., Spain, 72/313, Canning to Lamb, 11 October, 1826.
56 Ibid., 19 October, 1826; 72/316, Lamb to Canning, 2 June, 2 August, 1826.
57 J. Bagot, George Canning and his Friends, p. 152.

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446 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

the Earl of Dudley58 that the American question was again

being considered, probably without the participation of Ofalia
who would not dare recommend recognition as he had been
accused of selling himself to England upon a former offer of
mediation. Although not sanguine, Bosanquet believed that
mere consideration was a point gained and asserted that there
were numerous advocates of reconciliation if they only dared
speak out. In this view no doubt he was right, for within
three months the consulado of Cadiz, a body well qualified to
understand the situation, addressed a most respectful memo-
rial to the king favoring the recognition of America, although
even so late as 1830 no one dared to present it to him.59
But England was shaken from this unavoidable inactivity
when it learned of a Spanish expedition which was fitting out
at Havana against Mexico. Bosanquet urged that the publi-
cation of the opinion of his Majesty's government would serve
to discountenance the expedition.60 To the next ambassador,
Addington, Aberdeen held up this new step as demonstrating
lack of progress in terminating difficulties. It also made
Cuba, Aberdeen pointed out, a center of insurrection and
strife which might be followed by the intervention of the
United States. Addington was accordingly instructed to pro-
test in the strongest manner possible in friendship.61 The
minister was, however, upbraided62 for protesting in writing,
for it was believed that this might preclude further remon-
strance.
Prince Polignac was now (1830) broaching the question of
a Spanish prince for Mexico, but it was the opinion of the
English minister that neither the Spanish king nor the Mexi-
cans would accept him.63

58 F. 0., Spain, 72/340, Bosanquet to the Earl of Dudley, 28 April, 1828.

59 F. O., Spain, 72/341, Bosanquet to Aberdeen, 30 July, 1828.
60 F. O., Spain, 72/365, Bosanquet to Aberdeen, 18 January, 1830.
61 F. 0., Spain, 72/366, Aberdeen to Addington, 17 February, 1830.
62 Ibid., 19 March, 1830.
63 F. O., Spain, 72/368, Addington to Aberdeen, 15 April, 1830.

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 GREAT BRITAIN AND SPANISH RECOGNITION 447

Under Palmerston pressure for Spanish recognition of

Hispanic America was again exerted as it always was upon
the slightest possibility of success. The English ambassador
received urgent instructions to press the Spanish government
to recognize the independence "pure and simple" of the whole
of the Spanish American states.64 Accordingly, Addington
took advantage of reports in the French journals concerning
the arrival of Mexican commissioners in Havana to negotiate
for recognition by Spain and spoke to Secretary Salmon.
That minister replied that he knew nothing of the report,65
but "I observed to M. Salmon", continued Addington,

in a half-serious half-jocular tone that notwithstanding I believed him

and his colleagues to be incorrigible on the subject of Spanish Ameri-
can independence, I should take the liberty of once more telling his
excellency that the Spanish govt. had committed an egregious fault
in not acknowledging that independence long since; and every day
that passed, that error was assuming a deeper dye.

Here he depicted the advantages Spain had already forfeited,

and contended that a real equivalent was the great extension
which would accrue to Spanish trade from reopening the
American ports to Spanish vessels. Such a privilege Ad-
dington regarded as worth the renunciation of a barren and
empty title. Clearly the Spanish government was wavering.
Spain, remarked Secretary Salmon, was not incorrigible, but
more pressing affairs had submerged the American question,
and in any event Spain could not admit independence before
negotiations. Addington cited the treaty of 1783. The ad-
vantages which Canning had stressed were now expected.
Such a suggestion Addington countered by showing that
other powers already had as great privileges as could be con-
ferred on any foreign power, Spain included. Still Salmon
aooeared to believe himself in possession of a high card.

'%F. O., Spain, 72/395, Addington to Palmerston, 2 December, 1832.

65 F. 0., Spain, 72/379, Addington to Palmerston, 26 May, 1831.

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448 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

probably the idea of Spanish American monarchies. "I saw",

summarized Addington,

that it was useless to press the matter further at this moment, but I
think I have of late perceived, both in M. Salmon and in M. Balles-
teros, a disposition to look upon the question of recognition of Ameri-
can independence with less morbid disfavor than heretofore: as if they
had begun to accustom their minds to view that recognition as not so
totally out of the pale of possibility as they did some time ago.66

Late in the year he could cite the Spanish wish to prevent a

clash with Great Britain and Spain's tendency toward recon-
ciliation with America in answer to Palmerston 's inquiry
concerning a Spanish-Russian convention against Mexico, re-
ported without proper foundation by the Mexican minister.67
In 1832, the Duke of San Fernando was "desired by some
friends of his", probably the queen, to learn if Great Britain
would concur in case the king, who was violently prejudiced,
could be induced to recognize Mexico under the sovereignty
of one of his brothers. Ambassador Addington thereupon be-
gan to press recognition pure and simple, without a proviso
or peculiar scheme of government, in fact, with the under-
standing that the states should be recognized under the exist-
ing governments. He had, however, failed in his attempt to
carry out Wellington's instructions as well as subsequent
ones. Neither the former British government nor the pres-
ent government, the ambassador added, had any view of rec-
ognition except of the simplest nature. He repeated that
armed force would be opposed by Great Britain and added
that while Britain preferred monarchy to a republic, the new
world would not tolerate a despot of the old world type. Duke
Fernando urged the preference of Britain for monarchy and
the encroachments of the United States in "Tyas" [Texas]
66 F. O., Spain, 72/379, Addington to Palmerston, 26 May, 1831.
67F. O., Spain, 72/379, Palmerston to Addington, 9 November, 1831; 72/381,
Addington to Palmerston, 12 December, 1831; 72/391, Addington to Palmerston,
23 February, 1832.

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 GREAT BRITAIN AND SPANISH RECOGNITION 449

in case of recognition according to Britain's scheme, but he

naturally left the question to the ministry. Addington con-
cluded with reference to the king's obstinacy:

Unless his intellect gives way under his bodily infirmities, I can give
your Lordship no hope of our attaining the end which we desire with
regard to Spanish America.68

Whenever they chose, Spanish officials completely stalled con-

versation on the question of recognizing America by very per-
plexingly connecting it with the Portuguese question in which
Britain stood opposed to Spain.69
Palmerston completely approved Addington 's discreet
course with Duke San Fernando:

H.M. Govt. undoubtedly think that the recognition of the New Ameri-
can states by Spain and the conclusion of peace between Spain and
those states would be an arrangement most fortunate for the civilized
world, and highly advantageous to the real interests of Spain herself.
H.M. Govt. would feel no less pride than satisfaction if they were
able to contribute to the accomplishment of so desirable a consum-
mation; but while the Portuguese question is pending H.M. Govt. do
not deem it expedient to make any fresh communication to the Span-
ish govt. upon the tender subject of American affairs.

The evidence tended to show that nothing but overwhelming

force would induce the American states to accept a king, and
that king a Spaniard. It was generally believed that armed
force would in all probability fail as the former attempts of
Spain to retain or recover its American dominion had failed.
In that contingency, if Palmerston could have his way, Eng-
land would not remain passive.70
Again on September 9, 1833, the foreign office issued in-
structions to the new ambassador, Villiers, at Madrid. The
real welfare of Spain, the progress of civilization in the new
68 F. O., Spain, 72/395, Addington to Palmerston, 2 December, 1832.
69 F. O., Spain, 72/390, Palmerston to Addington, 3 December, 1832.
70 Ibid., 28 December, 1832.

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450 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

world, and the commercial interests of Great Britain urgently

required Spanish acknowledgment of the new republics, ran
these instructions. Palmerston, who had frequently inter-
viewed Zea, the Spanish secretary of state, when he was in
London, accurately summed up his and the Spanish view dur-
ing Spain's last days of irreconcilability.
His [Zea's] notion seemed to be, that the American states would be
driven to seek in the arms of Spain a refuge from the miseries of in-
ternal anarchy, and that they would return like prodigal offspring
with repentant submission to the parental embrace, forgetting that
what he styled triumphant anarchy presupposed the ascendency of a
party. . . Another idea which seemed not to appear altogether
chimerical to M. de Zea was that some of these states might ask for,
or accept, princes of the royal family of Spain as their sovereign.

The foreign office stressed the futility of arms, and the fact
that Great Britain had already acknowledged most of these
republics. Spain supposed that intercourse with democracies
using the Spanish language and institutions would endanger
absolute monarchy. These dangers, the English apprehended,
could not be diminished by further delay.
In view of the delicate situation, Villiers, replacing Ad-
dington, was instructed to conform his language to the senti-
ments of the British government and not to make any specific
proposition, but to communicate with the government should
it appear that this would be attended with advantage.71
The conflict between the queen regent and Don Carlos now
monopolized the Spanish stage,72 as the Portuguese question
had done previously, to the exclusion of the American prob-
lem. Secretary Zea was soon dismissed and Martinez de la
Rosa appointed in his stead.73
With the ministry of Martinez de la Rosa, Spanish senti-
ment became unmistakable. Villiers learned of the intention

71 F. O., Spain, 72/306, Palmerston's instructions to Canning, 9 December,

1833.
72 F. O., Spain, 72/309, 310, 311, 312, 314, 315, 316, pas&am.
73 F. O., Spain, 72/420, Villiers to Palmerston, 10 June, 1834.

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 GREAT BRITAIN AND SPANISH RECOGNITION 451

of the Spanish government to recognize the Brazils74 and

took advantage of the knowledge to urge the recognition of
the Spanish-American provinces, as an act of sound policy
and justice too long delayed, before the meeting of a cortes
which had already once shown its narrow views and prejudices
on the subject. Then Martinez de la Rosa was pressed to
accept the credentials of General Montilla, representing the
leading Spanish-American de facto governments. After
some discussion Martinez de la Rosa said he could no longer
contemplate difficulties and agreed to supply General Mon-
tilla with passports for coming to Madrid to begin negoti-
ations for recognizing the states which Montilla was charged
to represent.75 In accordance with the instructions of the
British government its minister presented the request of
General Montilla that a person might be appointed to nego-
tiate a treaty between Spain and Venezuela. Martinez de
la Rosa now readily expressed the willingness of the Spanish
government to recognize the Spanish American states and
to enter into friendly relations with them. The Spanish min-
ister himself agreed to negotiate the treaty upon terms of
perfect equality and, he hoped, reciprocal advantages, if
General Montilla would accept the invitation of the Spanish
government to come to Madrid. The former asked that
Palmerston be informed of his readiness to comply with
the British wishes and to receive any authorized agents of
the South American states who were desirous of negotiating
treaties with Spain upon the same terms as those accorded
General Montilla.76 Next year General Soublette was sent
from Venezuela via England to Madrid.77
As the matter of acknowledgment approached its con-
summation, it became increasingly apparent that British
74 F. O., Spain, 72/420, " Official Article " concerning the appointment of
Dalanot Charge d 'Affaires at Rio de Janeiro, 7 June, 1834.
"F. O., Spain, 72/423, Villiers to Palmerston, 5 May, 1834.
TO F. 0., Spain, 72/427, Villiers to Palmerston, 16 September, 1834.
TT F. 0., Spain, 72/339, Wellington to Villiers, 10 March, 1835.

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452 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

wishes had been appreciably altered. In 1823, in a confer-

ence with Prince de Polignac, Canning had disclaimed any
inclination to appropriate any part of the Spanish colonies
and expressed England's willingness to be ranked after the
mother country on terms of equality with other powers.
This memorandum obviously referred to a particular period
and had the particular object of inducing Spain to make
treaties of peace with those provinces already declared inde-
pendent.78 But that policy was evidently abandoned after
Spain was
so repeatedly, but in vain urged by Great Britain to recognize their
independence, and to obtain for herself advantages which no other
nation would have then disputed or complained of.

About this juncture, moreover, Britain proposed that Spain

cede the British settlement in Honduras in order to take it
out of the range of the discussions between Spain and South
America and made the whole Central American question con-
tingent upon this session.79 In the negotiations the English
ambassador accused the American minister of bad faith and
called the attention of Martinez de la Rosa to the unfounded
merit claimed by the United States in determining the bent
of American affairs.
General Soublette concurred in the British view that the
treaty which Count Toreno, successor to Martinez de la Rosa,
had requested him to draft should avoid details. With this
document Toreno was dissatisfied, because it included no
offer of advantage to Spain or reparation for damages to
Spanish subjects. Villiers answered this complaint by ex-
pressing England's intention to claim the same position as
Spain. He also pointed out that the United States and
France would possibly do likewise.80 Villiers availed him-
self, however, of every opportunity which presented itself
78 F. 0., Spain, 72/339, Villiers to Wellington, 19 March, 1835.
79 F. O., Spain, 72/339, Wellington to Villiers, 12 March, 1835.
"IF. 0., Spain, 72/341, Villiers to Wellington, 18 April, 1835.

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 GREAT BRITAIN AND SPANISH RECOGNITION 453

to facilitate negotiations between the Spanish government

and General Soublette. Little progress was made after the
report of the cabinet in 1834 which thought the colonies eager
to sacrifice greatly for recognition, for Martinez de la Rosa
delayed in order to avoid the responsibility of terminating
Spain's overseas dominion and Toreno followed his example.
Santa Maria, the Mexican delegate, refused Toreno's invita-
tion to come to Madrid. Toreno showed some asperity and
threatened to use the Mexican loyal party. Soublette re-
quested a year in which to persuade Santa Maria to comply
with Toreno 's request.8' Upon Palmerston's urging, Santa
Maria wrote Soublette his decision to repair to Madrid with
a view to terminating in a satisfactory manner the question
of recognition.
The whole question was now referred to the council of
regency. Villiers, upon request of Toreno, who was appre-
hensive of differences in the council, visited the duke of Ahu-
mada in order to bring him into line, but found him still ex-
pecting some commercial advantages. Of this misconception
Villiers relieved him and elicited from him the statement
that equality was the only basis upon which to treat and the
promise to recommend this course in the council of regency.
But the business of negotiation did not proceed apace.
At first Soublette's mission was unsatisfactory. Then both
Soublette and Santa Maria expected the same outcome.
Again, the Spanish minister dallied. Santa Maria appealed
to Villiers on the ground of the war in Texas and the conduct
of the United States, but Villiers replied that so long as the
claims of British subjects in Mexico were unsettled, Great
Britain would not consider Mexico as having any claim to
the good offices of Great Britain. On February 27, 1836, Vil-
liers reported to his government that the negotiations, in
which the South American delegates had consulted him at
every step, were no more advanced than on the day when
Soublette arrived in Madrid.
81 F. O., Spain, 72/357, Villiers to Palmerston, 17 and 21 February, 1836.

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454 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

It now devolved upon the British minister to prevent the

new secretary, Mendizabal, from carrying the whole South
American affair before the cortes. No minister, said Mendi-
zabal, could assume responsibility for the disarmament of an
empire. Mandizabal abandoned the idea but answered Sou-
blette's project with a counter proposal for a reduction of
one half on duties as levied on other countries. Against such
family arrangements of mutual commercial advantages,
which England had first urged and then conveniently decided
to deny, the British protested vigorously.82 Mina, now the
Mexican agent, presented, upon the advice of the English min-
ister, an able, temperate, and convincing note on Mexico's
previous engagements, but Mendizabal's insistence on the
sanction of the cortes brought Mina and Soublette to the verge
of demanding their passports. But in view of the time already
spent the English minister advised them to wait for the
cortes which was to assemble seven weeks later.
As grandiloquent as stubborn, the keynote of the queen's
speech before the cortes was:
It is high time that two people whom nature made brethern should
become forever friends, and that the bonds of subordination and de-
pendence being dissolved, others shall succeed them more gentle and
more. lasting-those of equality and concord founded upon reciprocal
advantages.

The report of the special committee on recognition was ac-

cepted unanimously and without a word against the general
measure. In the same month, Spain stood ready to issue a
royal decree, placing the subjects and commerce of Mexico
on the footing of a friendly nation and to sign an interna-
tional treaty. Such was the news which the United States,
displaying unseemingly haste, dispatched southward in a
special ship to her sister republics.
Thus, in a quarter century, British negotiation on the
Spanish American question had passed through four phases.
" F. 0., 72/478, Villiers to Palmerston, 11 February, 1837.

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 GREAT BRITAIN AND SPANISH RECOGNITION 455

Vacillating under the continental statesmanship of Castle-

reagh, England, between 1810 and 1822, held aloof as far as
possible from a question rapidly becoming the obsession of
Americans like Henry Clay. In the second phase, from 1822
to 1824, Britain absolutely opposed foreign partitions, but
favored a commercial entente between Spain and its lost
colonies or even Bourbon princes for the new world. British
diplomacy also employed its wiles to induce Spain to have
the grace to precede England and the rest of Europe in the
inevitable recognition of the new states. This policy reached
a grand crescendo under Canning in 1824 when Spain was
informed that the use of a commercial interdiction would
elicit English recognition of Spain's late colonies and the
employment of foreign armies require the acquiescence of
the British navy. But after numerous and futile overtures
to Spain, Canning resolved in the same year no longer to
hold English recognition contingent upon that of Spain. In
the third period, between 1824 and 1826, interspersed with
months of tactical but ominous silence, English memorials
and protests to Spain-which after England's recognition of
the new world had one reason less for pleasing that country
insisted that the danger of losing Cuba through invasion
and revolution, England's willingness to guarantee the is-
land, and the trade and best interests of Spain, all rendered
imperative a step already irrevocably decided. After the
fall of San Juan de Ulloa in 1826, however, England would
no longer support commercial concessions for Spain. The
American question then dropped into comparative silence for
a span of four years. Willing to render service to Spain in
avoiding an error every day assuming "a deeper dye", al-
though holding the time past for offering it, England began
its last and desultory period of pressure-that of Palmer-
ston. With no inducements to offer but the behests of com-
merce, civilization, and the welfare of Spain itself, England,
between 1830 and 1836, sometimes raised the American ques-

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456 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

tion "in a half-serious, half-jocular" vein, only to be goaded

at other times by rumors of coercive expeditions and the
growing fear of Yankee imperialism, into more serious effort
on behalf of "pure and simple" Spanish recognition of the
new world offspring.
JOHN TATE LANNING.
Duke University.

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