The evolution of comparative

politics
Klaus von Beyme

Chapter contents
Introduction 28
Comparative politics in pre-modern times 28
Comparative politics in modern times 30
Comparative politics in post-modern times 38
Political influences on comparative politics 40
Conclusion 4
28 Klaus von Beyme

Introduction
The evolution of comparative politics has been clas- paradigm which conquered the community and tol-
sified in stages, such as the ‘pre-paradigmatic phase’ erated deviant approaches only in marginal positions.
which was not dominated byasingle theoretical ap- But the typology is ethnocentric in so far as it general-
proach in the scientific community, and the “‘paradig- izes the American development. In Europe there was
matic phase’, in which the scientific community never a dominance of the behavioural approach. In
adhered to a dominant theory. According to this clas- this chapter I prefer a threefold classification for the
sification (Chilcote 1994: 58) the paradigmatic phase evolution of comparative politics, with stages such as
is followed by as ‘crisis phase’ and finally ends up ina ‘pre-modern’, ‘modern’, and ‘post-modern’.
‘phase of scientific revolution’ which occurs when the
scientific community shifts to different paradigms.
Kuhn’s frequently abused term paradigm, how-
ever, is hardly applicable in this context. Most phases KEY POINTS
in the evolution of political science have been ‘pre-
Q It is difficult to describe the evolution of compar-
paradigmatic’ in the sense that no single approach
ative politics as a sequence of paradigms (even
predominated completely. Chilcote is aware that his
in the case of the behavioural revolution; see the
subdivision of ‘traditional’, ‘behavioural’, and ‘post-
Introduction to this volume).
behavioural’ approaches do not precisely fit Kuhn’s Q The evolution of comparative politics follows the
definition of paradigms. Only the dominance of the pre-modern, modern, and post-modern sequence.
‘behavioural revolution’ came close to the idea of a

Comparative politics in pre-modern times

The pre-modern stage or the traditional approach (1656) of James Harrington. One of the earliest and
to comparison since Aristotle was highly speculative most complete comparisons was the work of a fol-
and normative, mostly ethnocentric used compar- lower of Machiavelli’s, Traiano Boccalini (1614: 1).
ison in an anecdotal way, but hardly ever attempted a In his Ragguagli di Parnaso a ‘university of politicians’
systematic comparison over time. Political science is was summoned by Apollo on Mount Parnassus and
the youngest social science in terms of modern pro- had to give responsible answers concerning their
fessional performance. Comparative political science various political systems. In spite of many insights,
owes a lot to other sciences: philosophy since Aris- this work was distorted by a blind hatred of the ‘im-
totle, legal constitutionalism from Bodin to Bryce, perialist power’ of that time, the Spanish monarchy,
political economy from Smith, Ricardo, Bentham, which according to Boccalini interfered too much in
Marx, and Mill. Mill was especially fruitful in meth- Italian affairs.
odology. In the nineteenth century ‘sociology’ was Many historical comparisons in early modern
added—a term coined by Auguste Comte—and times—from Machiavelli’s Discourses on the First
soon became important in helping political science Ten Books of Titus Livius (1513) to Montesquieu’s
liberate itself from jurisprudence and be transformed Considérations sur les Causes de la Grandeur des
into a ‘social science’. Romains et de leur Décadence (1734)—were rather
During the Renaissance Machiavelli came close to ahistorical confrontations of Roman experiences and
a social science approach, minimizing the philosoph- the life of modern states. Reasons for the decay of the
ical normativism of former times. Later comparisons Roman Empire were popular as a kind of normative
were sometimes used to criticize one’s regime, dis- warning for modern states. The diachronic com-
guised under the description of distant systems, as in parisons treated various systems like contemporary
Montesquieu’s Lettres Persanes (1721) or even uto- societies. But they did not help to developacritical
pian constructions of systems such as in the Oceana methodology of comparison.
 Chapter 1 The evolution of comparative politics 29

The evolutionist counter-reaction to the French In pre-modern political theories certain features of
Revolution was also not favourable for a scientific the decision-making process in polities were mostly
theory of comparison. History in the nineteenth deducted as constant types, but hardly ever scien-
century turned increasingly to historicism and the tifically analysed as politics. The policies were still
discipline developed more reservations to the com- more rarely investigated. Some utopias, such as
parative method than former political theories in the Harrington’s Oceana (1656) represented a notable
age of Enlightenment. Every historical event and de- exception. The theory of the ‘reason of state’ of
velopment was declared ‘unique’. Goethe indeed said Machiavellians like Giovanni Botero (1589, 1948:
‘only blockheads compare’ —but he had only works 58 ff.) which represented a kind of ‘Jesuit welfare-
of art and literature in mind. Goethe was afraid that Machiavellism’—went far beyond Machiavelli’s ob-
mediocre connoisseurs might avoid a value judge- session with foreign and military policies in so far
ment about works ofart. This was indeed a permanent as he developed the elements of domestic welfare
danger of the comparative sciences in many fields: policies in different states as the main criterion for
relativism describing various historical solutions led political stability.
neither to a conclusion nor even to a prediction about Pre-modern comparisons mostly aimed at classi-
possible future historical developments. fications of whole political orders (polity). Only in
Otto Hintze, with his comparative typologies, was modern times was politics compared when the tech-
an outsider in his discipline of German history. niques of ruling in theories of ‘reason of the state’ or
Troeltsch (1922, 1961: 191), another social science ‘sovereignty were discussed after Machiavelli. Com-
oriented historian, accepted comparisons only when parisons were rather simple typologies, such as those
they kept their ‘methodological and heuristic char- counting the number of rulers. Many of them con-
acter’ at the level of building of hypotheses. This tained normative assumptions. The characteristic
was consistent with older pioneers of the histor- features were not always logically consistent, such
ical method such as Droysen (1858, 1960: 163) who as Montesquieu’s classification of monarchy, repub-
knew already that without implied comparisons no lic, and despotism. Voltaire mocked this typology
meaningful hypothesis could be found in an ocean which appeared to him as logical as the categories
of facts and motivations among historical actors. of a ‘church registration of births’, containing the
American history in the twentieth century, with Bar- elements: ‘male’, ‘female’, and ‘illegitimate’.
rington Moore, Charles Tilly, Theda Skocpol, and Pre-modern approaches in the nineteenth century
many others, led the anti-historicist counter-reaction ‘modernized’ by turning away from static ontological
and gave up the anti-comparative bias of historicist classifications to historical theories of evolution. The
historiography. most influential models were the evolutionary model
Since Tocqueville (1961: 5, 12) there had been of Darwin and the historical materialism of Marx
a widespread assumption that a new world under with his historical stages. In comparative social sci-
conditions of modernization needs a ‘new political ence the two extremes were sometimes synthesized
science’, able to work on certain social developments as in the evolutionary model of Herbert Spencer.
which were likely to spread in all modern societies. The three authors presented approaches to theory-
The US were only a pretext to denounce the threats of building: Darwin’s was a kind of early ‘functionalism’,
equalization and democratization which were likely Marx adopted from Hegel the dialectical method, and
to spread also in Europe. Even a pioneer of com- Spencer established himself as a precursor of systems
parative methods such as John Stuart Mill (1840, theory. Since John Stuart Mill (1959: 253) the logic
1859: 62) in the Edinburgh Review resented that his of social science implied two methods, the Method of
friend Tocqueville in his seminal book ‘has bound Agreement and the Method of Difference. The first
up in one abstract idea the whole of tendencies of method was a kind of ‘artificial experiment’ and the
modern commercial society, and given them one second method was to be applied in situations where
name—democracy’. This was an important preced- experiments were unfeasible. Early comparisons in
ent in the history of book reviews, criticizing the the pre-modern era were obsessed with finding simil-
remains of a teleological approach to the evolution arities. Only in the twentieth century was the primacy
of comparative politics. of the Method of Difference increasingly developed.
30 Klaus von Beyme

KEY POINTS

QO) Pre-modern comparative politics was speculative, when establishing his Methods of Agreement and
normative, and anecdotal. The boundaries with philo- Difference.
sophy, jurisprudence, and history were not clearly Q) Polities, rather than politics and policies, were de-
defined. scribed. The main goal of these analyses was to es-
QO) Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Tocqueville come tablish classifications and typologies. Very often these
close to founding a modern comparative political classifications concerned evolutionary models (derived
science. This was acknowledged by John Stuart Mill from Darwinism), as in the case of Spencer and Marx.

Comparative politics in modern times

Scientific comparison as discovered in the metaphysical-minded Staatslehre.
On the basis of American pragmatism he developed
controlled experiment in Chicago an extremely anti-state theory of polit-
There is no agreement when modernity starts. In ics. Groups— instead of states—were now the basic
art and literature it is often located earlier in the concept of comparative analysis. Former deductive
nineteenth century. In the social sciences modernity elements of comparisons were substituted by induct-
is scheduled later. The criteria of definition—a truly ive observations. In Europe British guild socialism
scientific theory which can be controlled empiric- and Harold Laski created an equivalent of an empir-
ally—offer a more precise proof for modernity than ical political theory, directed against the ‘statism’ of
works of arts. In order to avoid quarrels of definition continental political theory.
we should use the term classical modernity for the Spencer among the ‘evolutionists’ of the nine-
new social sciences in the twentieth century. teenth century was the most influential thinker
Classical modernity coincides largely with the for empirical comparative politics. But in spite of
establishment of separate disciplines in the social his variation of a systems theory the founder of
sciences, such as sociology and political science. The structural-functional systems theory, Talcott Parsons
neighbouring social sciences, suchas public law, polit- (1961: 3), opened his theory of action with an attack:
ical economy, or general history, in the nineteenth ‘Spencer is dead, but who killed him and how?’ Spen-
century still claimed to deal with politics in the evol- cer was not killed, but increasingly forgotten—as
ution of modernization and specialization. In the were most of the theories of historical stages in the
twentieth century they withdrew from comparative nineteenth century, especially Auguste Comte. Par-
politics. “Comparative economics’ continued to exist sons tried to smooth down his verdict in a footnote:
as a subfield, but it never played the dominant role ‘Not, of course, that nothing in his thought will last.
of comparative politics in political science because It is his social theory as a total structure that is dead.’
of the mathematical character of the most influential Critical rationalism of the neo-positivist school of
economic models. Karl Popper was later keen on ‘hunting’ what it called
The German Staatslehre (theory of state), located ‘historicism’. Charles Merriam and other founders of
in the law departments, hada certain influence among political science in the US were more tolerant and
the founding fathers of American political science, recognized at least a certain progress because this
such as Francis Lieber, a Prussian refugee who taught kind of historicism was ‘historical-comparative’ and
at Columbia University. But the second generation no longer normative and purely deductive like the
of American scholars, including Woodrow Wilson, traditional, mainly anecdotal, comparisons in the
already abhorred general theories of the state. A pion- classical political literature.
eer of group theory, such as Arthur F. Bentley (1908, The various approaches had some assumptions
1949: xix), after studies in Berlin and Freiburg, turned in common, even if Durkheim, Weber, and Pareto,
away from the ‘spooks in the grain fields’ which he for Parsons (1961) the champions of modern social
 Chapter 1 The evolution of comparative politics 31

science, differed in many ways. Oddly enough they was afraid of a lasting dominance of the eco-
did not relate to each other—though all the three nomy in society. Especially after the failures of
were able to read the language of the two others. His- dictatorship, political theory reduced its claims
torical factors, which Darwin (biological struggle for and renounced of the primacy of the political
life) or Marx (class conflict grounded on the contra- subsystem.
diction between the economic base and the political 4. Science is guided by theory. Value-free science
superstructure) saw as the driving force behind the should be comparative and theory-guided, not
evolution, were no longer accepted. But neverthe- just an enumeration and typology of institutions,
less a ‘dominant variable’ was behind the modern as in the works of some pioneers of “compar-
evolution: for Weber it was occidental rationalism ative government’—as the new discipline was
and bureaucracy, for Durkheim it was the division of initially called by scholars from James Bryce to
labour, leading to a kind of ‘organic solidarity’, and Carl J. Friedrich.
for Pareto it was the cycles of rise and decay of elites.
In spite of these differences there are four prin- Typologies are the initial stage of theory-building in
ciples common to all thinkers of classical modern- order to develop a hypothesis for empirical work.
ism: Some typologies claimed to be a theory. Theor-
ies contain generalizations about political reality,
1. History is not identical with evolution. There is
typologies are abstractions about political reality
no longera telos, a final point where the evolution
according to some formal criteria. Some theories
is aiming at. In so far as political theory has to give
were close to one approach, such as functional-
up the old normative idea, historia magistra vitae,
ism (see Chapter 2). In other cases a methodology
history can no longer serve as a teacher for later
such as the behaviouralist approach tried to gain
generations.
the status of a monopolistic theory. In recent times
2. Theory and practice are divided. The scholar is rational choice showed similar tendencies. Some ty-
not obliged to take political action, as was still pologies were comparative only in an indirect way.
the case in the theories of Marx and Engels. This Even Max Weber’s typology of types of legitimate
did not prevent Pareto and Weber from standing rule—traditional, charismatic, and rational or legal-
as candidates for parliamentary election. Fortu- bureaucratic rule—are not free of remainders of the
nately for the progress of social science they failed. old debate on ‘uniqueness vs. comparability’ because
Anti-normative value-free science was discovered the ideal types contained elements of uniqueness
as a protection against the interferences of the as ‘individual totalities’. The ideal types served to
state as well as against the demands of polit- elaborate the special features of social institutions.
ical groups which consider scholars close to their Only in the time of classical modernity were typolo-
ideologies. There is no longer the hope for a gies of dynamic processes offered. Historical research
‘philosopher king’ who combines knowledge and continued, however, to suspect such taxonomies as
political action. they were developed in Crane Brinton’s Anatomy of
3. Subsystems are autonomous. The spheres of life Revolutions (1937).
and sub-systems of the social system are sep- We should not identify the modern breakthrough
arated and autonomous. There is no hope that to scientific comparisons with behaviourism, as
the political system—as in the times of absolut- sometimes occurs in American literature. Even
ism—will be able to steer the subsystems of the the broader and less rigid form of ‘behavioural-
whole society. With totalitarian ideologies this ism’—which dominated for a while the torchbear-
kind of hope was renewed, until the dictatorships ers of modern political science in the 1950s and
collapsed between 1949 and 1989. Carl Schmitt 1960s—was soon combined with other approaches,
was probably the most influential political the- such as functionalist system theories. Functional con-
oretician who tried, in a heroic turn back to siderations were not completely compatible with the
‘revolutionary conservatism’, to reinstall “polit- strictly individualistic assumptions of behaviourism.
ical decision’ in its primordial rights in society. This contradiction can be shown in the seminal
The driving force behind this was that Schmitt research on The Civic Culture by Almond and Verba
32 Klaus von Beyme

(1963: 52, 68). The authors had some misgivings American political science after 1945 seven scholars
whether the uses of comparative survey studies would among the top ten were in comparative politics, two
allow the ‘uniformity of a psychological type’ to be in theory, and one in international politics. In the
discovered in a whole country. In order not to distort German case there was only one scholar in the field
the results a concentration was recommended on the of international relations among the top ten in polit-
behaviour or attitudes that are least determined by ical science. All the rest—mostly Americans, one
the structure of the situation. Behaviouralism started Italian, one Dutch, one German—vwere scholars in
from a rather mechanistic stimulus—response model comparative politics (see Table 1.1).
of behaviour, functionalism was closer to organic Thanks to a new world situation, the development
models. Systems theory is holistic and presupposes of the “Third World’ and modernization theories
‘purposes’ of a system which was speculative for which dealt with the transition from traditional so-
many behaviouralists. But neither systems theory cieties to modern democracy, the main theoretical
nor behaviouralism in practice stayed completely innovations in political science were developed by
dogmatic, so that a cooperation of various method- comparative scholars. Only political science has ac-
ological tenets was possible. commodated the comparative aspects in a special
Beyond the general metatheoretical consensus of subfield. The existence of a subdiscipline “compar-
all empirical scholars in political science, behaviour- ative politics’, however, was not uncontested in the
alism developed major tenets, as David Easton clas- organized discipline. There was never a dominant be-
sified them in his Framework for Political Analysis havioural stage of comparative politics as postulated
(1965: 7): by Chilcote (1994: 56).
From sociology—in methodological questions far
* Regularities or uniformities in political behaviour
more sophisticated—political science inherited two
should be expressed in generalizations or theory.
traditions:
The validity of these generalizations has to be tested.
Contrary to Popper’s orthodoxy, which admitted 1. The historical-institutional tradition of Max
only falsification, verification was possible. Weber was comparative. Weber almost excessively
Techniques of seeking and interpreting data have looked in all the great cultures of the world for
to be developed. comparable elements, especially in his sociology
of religions.
Quantification and measurement in the recording
of data. 2. The opposite school was initiated by Herbert
Spencer and led by Emile Durkheim (1950: 137)
Values as distinguished between propositions re-
He opposed a subdiscipline of “comparative so-
lating to ethical evaluation and those relating to
ciology because comparison for him was la
empirical explanation.
sociologie méme (sociology itself). Systems the-
‘Pure science’, or the seeking of understanding ory with various degrees of intensity joined this
and explanation of behaviour before utilization of opinion, most vehemently the autopoietic variant
knowledge for solution of societal problems. of Niklas Luhmann (1970: 25, 46) who tried to
Integration of political research with that of other go beyond Talcott Parsons’s structural—functional
social sciences. theory.

Only once political science was well established in From economics—in mathematical questions
American universities did “comparative politics’ de- far more sophisticated—political science inherited
velop its dominant position, in theory-building of formal modelling. In economics the former historical
the discipline as well as in the evaluation of the ranks orientations were increasingly substituted by math-
of individual scholars in the scientific community. ematical models. One branch of political science took
American and German rankings since Somit and over this kind of approach. Anthony Downs gave the
Tanenhaus (1964: 66) and Falter and Klingemann prediction abilities of political theory priority over its
(1998) have shown that comparative scholars had capacity to describe the political reality: ‘Theoretical
the highest reputations among their colleagues. In models should be tested primarily by the accuracy of
 Chapter 1 The evolution of comparative politics 33

Table 1.1 Ranking of influential political scientists

US ranking by Somit and Tanenhaus (1964) German ranking by Falter and Klingemann (1998)

_ Rank Author Discipline Rank Author Discipline

1 Key CP 1 Huntington CP and IR

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; et RANGA suntan in Coe cor teats: sto ined ener ne erae:

tee ean jeitaees eee co PE edi bites? Sas eater: .Se er ee Saad ReRR UA. ol ts

Be Wade pie ialeies Raton apevues we meeesdsteataes : ee §ibis Sr masa Ne ste acarate

; ae: BALE OTe eects: ;basrecautes ; ie seme? Pe tested oo etst etn

ee: eee ae ese speed egantse 3: eg cepateuda fs : ee oe garetts

: ;peteaagetass BE lbs igs ts Be Nee eer ss ; es eesestaeee sister nin Tapa Be se See are

eeBese hadesae seneettonhtte e SCE ERAS. «.. EE ;s aaaa eas SED ee.

CP = comparative politics; IR = international relations; PT = political theory.

their predictions rather than by the reality of their in anthropology. Systems theory on the contrary
assumptions’ (1957: 21). looked for dissimilarities which were able to serve
Comparative politics therefore has been particu- as ‘functional equivalents’ in various systems with
larly embarrassed by its failure to predict any major sometimes ‘similar results’. Only the post-modernist
political events since 1945. The student rebellions of Luhmann went as far as to claim the one-party state
the 1960s, the oil crisis, the rise of new fundamental- in Communist systems was a functional equival-
ism, the collapse of communism of 1989—all these ent of the pluralist democratic party regimes in the
events came as a surprise to comparative political sci- West.
entists. Some forecasts were correct, such as the pos-
sible end of the Soviet Union, but the prediction was Typologies and classifications:
based on the wrong reasons, such as a Chinese—Soviet the first step to comparison
war in the bestseller of Amalrik (1970). Forecasting
had to lower its ambitions. In forecasting short-term There is a large consensus that the main purpose of
electoral results the discipline boasts of only 5 per comparative research is not comparing but explain-
cent margins of error. Many political scientists came ing. Comparison is a tool for building empirically
to accept that macro-theoretical predictions are little falsifiable explanatory theories. A first step is a rigid
more than informed guess-work. The evolution can classification. “Miscomparing’ starts from “misclassi-
only be reconstructed ex post facto (postdiction). fication’, ‘concept stretching’, and what Sartori (1991:
The ‘most similar design’ of comparison was still 248) called ‘degreeism’. This neologism meant the re-
widespread, but some researchers preferred a ‘most placement of dichotomous treatment by continuous
different system design’ (Przeworski and Teune 1970: notions. According to Sartori the classification by
31 ff.; see also Chapter 3 below). In historical per- degrees leads to logical messiness. Pre-modern and
spective the similarities were mostly demonstrated by some modern typologies do not live up to these rigid
the diffusion of institutions, a method widely applied criteria. The predicaments of typological work as a
34 Klaus von Beyme

base for comparison show that systems theories are predicament we might consider the type of a ‘semi-
frequently characterized by geometrical obsessions of presidential system’ (see Chapter 5). The term is
order, while institutional typologies follow arithmetic not quite correct, because a system with a popularly
intentions. Religious remainders invade typologies: elected president remains a variation of a parliament-
trinities are discovered everywhere (see Table 1.2). ary system: parliament can topple the government
These trinities do not violate Sartori’s verdict by votes of non-confidence and the president can
against “degreeism’, but logically we would prefer dissolve the chambers. But Duverger’s expression
dual typologies, such as Spencer’s (society of war- (1988) was accepted in the scientific community.
riors/industrial society), Durkheim’s (mechanical/ In popular debates, however, ‘presidial’ or even
organic solidarity), Ténnies’s (community/society), ‘presidential government’ still occurs for this type
Bagehot’s (dignified/efficient parts of the constitu- of representative government. A survey has shown
tion). If more than three elements are put into one that as many as 6 per cent of the German depu-
taxonomy the danger cannot be excluded that the ties wrongly classified the German parliamentary
theoretical value is reduced to a kind of checklist. system.
Remainders of a teleological typology are frequently The problem of miscomparing by misclassification
found in trinitarian classifications. The third element has been overcome by the construction of fourfold
is quite often hailed as the normatively desired type matrices which allow at least two classificatory
in the development. elements (close to a typology of Arend Lijphart 1984)
The problem of different criteria in classifications to be put into relation to each other and to subsume
of types of regimes was not always solved—not even various countries in four fields (Figure 1.1)
in modern typologies. Probably the last scholar who The more complex such a matrix, the more com-
tried to classify all the regimes in history—from parative scholars have to be aware that such instant
anarchy and tribal rule to totalitarian dictator- pictures can change quickly. British devolution, for
ships—was Carl J. Friedrich (1963: 188-9). He listed instance, since the institutionalization of parliaments
thirteen types of rule, but they lacked a common for Scotland and Wales has developed in the direction
criterion of classification. Some regimes were char- of Spain—with the exception of the electoral law. If
acteristic of early societies, others were only minor proportional electoral system—under the pressure
institutional variations of representative government, from the European Union—is one day accepted even
such as presidential or parliamentary systems. Some for British elections the whole type might shift to top
regimes, such as the types of dictatorship, were clas- quarter of the matrix. Russia with its mixed type of
sified not by their institutional characteristics, but an electoral law and with different levels of equal-
by the extent of control over the citizens. In formal ity of the rights of the federal units is somewhere
sociology there was for a while a tendency to classify in-between the four fields of the matrix.
outrageously, as in the treatises of Georges Gurvitch
in France or of Leopold von Wiese in Germany. In
political science this happened only occasionally in
the classification of regimes. Classifications of re- From the comparisons of
gime types should not reinvent Greek notions as ‘polities’ and ‘politics’ to the
Kiichenhoff (1967) did, but rather try and find a
common-sense solution in terms which are accepted
comparisons of ‘policies’
by scholars as well as by the public debate. Comparative politics overcame the remainders of
Excessive preoccupation with terminological clar- institutional typologies in the 1970s and 1980s when
ity revealed a predicament: neologisms, mostly in it turned from politics to policies. Input—output
Greek or Latin, reduced terminological ambiguities, comparisons were clearly inspired by the economic
but they had no chance of entering the public de- sciences. The main question was: “does politics
bate. Political science terminology is imbued with matter?’ (See, for a development of this question,
traditional perceptions of politics and can hardly Chapter 3.) Comparative politics, influenced by
proceed like chemistry or medicine in preserving political economy, even suggested that the difference
purely scientific jargon. As an example of this between capitalist and communist systems in the
 Chapter 1 The evolution of comparative politics 35

Table 1.2 Typologies in comparative social Table 1.2 (continued)

sciences
Authors
_ Authors Types
Mobilization developing
Historical types regime
Compte Theological era Consociational developing
edb oct Seatnete ees
regime
pry aes eS A oes hte Sus vat
Modernizing developing
regime
an esate re

ile i bal, thie a See eRinceeseeetar sesso ek

Paste Ppt, seta toe ett

light of modernization theory was exaggerated by
fer eek Daaher as "Ae Miss. the propaganda of both systems in a bipolar world
of confrontation. Socio-economic determinism of
Berths Eee ite, oN id :2a eu ew shoes Western theories of convergence of the systems
since the 1970s had some traits in common with
feudalism, capitalism)
agi t BS es peda oS economy-centred Marxism which for reasons of
methodology was not accepted.
By the early 1970s comparative public policy had
Theoretical types emerged as a recognized subdiscipline within political
Weber Traditional rule science (see Chapter 20). The timing was not as a sur-
ieee ice eice stcits he areas ops prise. The worldwide intellectual unrest from Berke-
Ea aibicbiskse Eerectsneatagenssateendeeats
ley to Berlin had mobilized scholars to support an act-
ivist image of the state. Most of the scholars—except
Huntington who wrote from a neo-conservative
bya: gee aeons aa ears F:sii ai areas
point of view—were liberal leftists. Though many
ee terns Sea BEd of these comparativists had some ‘social-democratic
bias’ and admired the Scandinavian welfare state, they
Paar a RIE CH NE setae were tired of ideological discussions. The grand de-
bates between neo-Marxism and critical rationalism
aera ee ene sito were abandoned. Scholars from different metathe-
oretical schools agreed to stop discussing abstract
ee ei constructs and study instead the needs of groups
in the society. “The state is better described by its
Verba
te ee a52%43 policies than by its principles and alleged norms
of individual choice and preference’ (Ashford 1977:
SEs a ene ‘eae: 572) was a widely shared assumption, especially in
American political science, though less so in Europe
eee cen w cere weer ee ener ec es eee ssesssreevessesesessesesessssesrssessssseeseeee
where the remains of ideological debates were still
Traditional electoral
strong.
committee of notables
The behaviouralist approach in the 1950s and
Mobilized party organised in 1960s frequently started with survey studies of
sections individuals. Therefore it was normally less open
(continued) to transnational comparisons. The predicament of
the small number of cases for comparison drove
36 Klaus von Beyme

Federalism demographic and bureaucratic outcomes are the root

Equal rights Unequal rights
causes of the general emergence of the welfare state’.
Moderately egalitarian: Only European-born scholars, such as Anthony King
Austria, Germany
Proportional Unequal autonomies: (1973: 423), challenged this widespread consensus
Italy, Spain
Egalitarian: on the priority of economic development by assert-
Belgium, Switzerland
Russia ing that ideas constitute a sufficient condition for
explaining the variance in policy performance. Most
law
Electoral
Majoritarian
Equal states’ rights:
US
Devolution:
UK scholars combined the importance of ideas with the
focus on elite groups or answered positively the ques-
tion ‘Do parties matter?’ The discovery of corporat-
Fig. 1.1 Institutional mix for the mitigation of territorial ism in the 1970s linked the elite approach with an em-
conflicts
phasis on interest groups rather than on parties alone.
The Heidenheimer—Heclo school, based on his-
research into studies of cities or parts of cities in the torical and institutional studies, had the virtue of
Californian Bay area or in New York (Sharpe and not neglecting ‘politics’ and the actors of decision,
Newton 1984: 218). Przeworski and Teune (1970) or reducing them to a kind of ‘black box’ for the
pleaded for concentration on the sub-units ofa polit- production of a policy outcome which had little
ical system for comparison. But the result sometimes causal links to the decision-making process. Parties
came close to a new parochialism which could be and interest groups were considered as analytically
dubbed “The Westside story’ of comparative politics, important. Increasingly, the role of the administrat-
because research concentrated on comparisons of ors was discovered. These were the main actors in
hospitals or school districts in Westside New York. an intermediary stage of decision. They operated
One further result of this kind of evolution was between input and output of the political system and
the abandoning of theories in comparative research. their contribution has been called within-put. The
The new policy orientation in the 1970s again variance in the output of the compared systems was
concentrated on transnational comparisons. A model frequently explained in terms of rather vague special
was created when Heidenheimer, Heclo, and Adams institutions, such as corporatism in Scandinavia or
got an award for the best political science public- consensus democracy in Switzerland and the Benelux
ation. Their definitionwas as follows: “Comparative countries. Only the enlightened neo-institutionalism
public policy is the cross-national study of how, of the 1980s stopped to look for unilateral causal rela-
why, and to what effect government policies are de- tionships between two variables in the polity system
veloped’ (1975: v). The two schools which initiated and the policy output. But the inclination of com-
comparative research continued to fight each other parative public policy for historical determination of
also in the subfield of “comparative public policy’. policy outputs was mostly preserved.
The Heidenheimer-Heclo school was criticized for The concept of path dependence was introduced
its descriptions without theories. to explain why so many rising expectations for
The ‘Quasi-Eastonians’ in the school of Dye (1966) reform had failed in the 1970s. Restrictions, gen-
and Hofferbert, on the other hand, overcame the lack erated by historical developments and institutional
of theory by adopting abundantly the terminology of barriers, left only ‘narrow corridors’ and windows
structural—functional systems theory. On the ground of opportunity for policy action (on path de-
of a modernization theory this approach had one pendence see Chapter 21). To avoid a new kind
assumption in common with the neo-Marxists: levels of historicism it was important that comparative
of economic development were more important than research was growing in order to avoid ‘culture-
the political characteristics of individual states. In the bound generalizations’ as a danger of one-country
US this assumption was mainly tested by comparis- studies. The hopes for reform proved to be de-
ons among the policy performance of states. Harold pendent on the type of decision which has been
Wilensky (1975: xiii) upheld the hypothesis about classified. Different types of conflicts give rise to
the centrality of economic development for the pro- different types of legislative response and measures.
vision of social services: ‘Economic growth and its Policy determines politics was an exaggerated slogan
 Chapter 1 The evolution of comparative politics 37

PROFILE ‘United Kingdom

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Legal system

Common law tradition with early Roman and modern con-
State formation
tinental influences; nonbinding judicial review of acts of
England has existed as a unified entity since the 10th century. Parliament.
The union with Wales was first formalized in 1536; in 1707,
England and Scotland joined as Great Britain. The union of
Great Britain and Ireland was implemented in 1801 (United Legislature
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland). After the partition of Bicameral parliament.
Ireland in 1921, six northern Irish counties remained part of Lower house House of Commons: 646 seats; term of 5 years
the United Kingdom. unless the House is dissolved earlier.
Constitution Unwritten; partly statutes, common law, and Upper house House of Lords: approximately 500 life peers,
practice. : 92 hereditary peers and 26 clergy. No elections (but in 1999
elections were held to determine the 92 hereditary peers;
Form of government
elections are held only as vacancies in the hereditary peerage
Constitutional monarchy. arise).
Head of state The monarchy is hereditary.
Head of government Prime Minister, usually the leader of
the majority party in the lower house. Electoral system (lower house)
Cabinet Cabinet of Ministers appointed by the Prime Minis- Simple majority vote (plurality).
ter. Constituencies 646 single-member constituencies.
Administrative subdivisions England: 47 boroughs, 36 Barrier clause Not applicable.
counties, 29 London boroughs, 12 cities and boroughs, Suffrage Universal, 18 years.
10 districts, 12 cities, 3 royal boroughs. Northern Ireland: 24
districts, 2 cities, 6 counties (historic). Scotland: 32 council
Direct democracy
areas. Wales: 11 county boroughs, 9 counties, 2 cities and
counties. Every referendum needs a special ad hoc law.

Party system Results of the 2005 legislative elections (House of Commons):

Electorate 44, 245, 939 100.0%

eon Te sia: St eae

Party Valid votes % Seats

Labour Party 9,552, 436 3522 355
‘ea sig eae Beer aN en eee eee nas oe LOAD) Ord Tra Oe:
32.4 198
PY eee 2 er i re ee raat twee Paha i :Be TM EAEorah ese eee Ghecete des
22 62
ee seat PRM EISTNOES Soe BEE A 2
De) 0
a a ee ce ae Matte ese ide al iaa Santa tt eat hoae,
15 6
PMD ARIAS REE RES ge Ty ee estonia kc eects ce tts nee wee
1 0
Se eg ETO RTEE er NT oe ee act teste ORG eee
0.9 9
ea es ane wen fran aed ET :oe Me ee
0.6 3
Ng Sopranos "ebb “esetna :Ton «gle et cea her Ree NE
0.6 5
Rien. ee= ae SPREE 7 ORE. OGRE ond :oa » GT « igh PPR aac ee
0.5 1
: vik 4 eigen: ee :ie :i Seat se i 5) eee a
0.5 3
eas cs ;a ESRI SEE EL GMCR SH GPSAT TA SATS on cn addled a = Be ccincidht ek each ea
0.4 0
ei saith en ne en ee Te oe ado neta Lan sande bye Bo cf ansagie ee REN Sexe dt a:
0.3 1
(continued)
38 Klaus von Beyme

COUNTRY PROFILE United Kingdom (continued) —

Party Valid votes % Seats

Health Concern 18, 739 0.1 1 4

No label 2225 0.1 1

Na eee so cpcBag is Sd PCAs REESE Ses G OS TOC Ts Cec le Sa eT a IO oe ee meee eee Noe Chey Olle

: SE nessa kded cekeditrasanc ee ee pests :"3:> hope,oie doteasasisiom 0e Se ER ae includes parties with less
Others 417, 602 1.6 0 than 1% nation-wide and
aisisie no seats.
ie aa\cla)e eleie piuoleluie(o.6lele.6.¢/eca wieleig ie 0:8 uiwie'ele.ein/e'e oe alu\uie'e'sie [6p a/biel6 eleieielbia' [email protected]\p e\olwlale aes o16/6(e:e eiulesieie bicleisis\e eiple.git'o.0(4/s1s)¥)4 a\nclejelele\a\sielejele)=iein.aia

Total 2705727, 100.0 646 Source: The Electoral

Commission.

by Theodore Lowi (1964) frequently tested in com- implementation) even if they start from policies as an
parative politics. Lowi’s typology initially showed a ‘independent variable’.
trinitarian design (regulative, distributive, and redis-
tributive). Later he added a fourth type: constituent KEY POINTS
policy (see Chapter 20). The elements of the ty-
pology were, however, not all on the same logical Q In classical modernity separate disciplines are es-
level. If we differentiate between regulative (restrict- tablished: sociology and political science. Evolution
ive limitation of rights, regulative laws, neutral to the theories are abandoned and theory and practice are
separated (evaluative science). Also, politics is seen
question of gain and loss, extensive measures aiming
as following its own logic, different from that of
at an enlargement of rights) and distributive levels of
other sciences.
decision (protective, distributive, and redistributive
Q) The behavioural revolution played a crucial role in
measures) we end up with a sixfold typology (Beyme, establishing a modern comparative political sci-
1998: 5-6). ence: regularities lead to generalizations to be
The typologies of policy fields and instruments tested empirically and measured quantitatively.
of politics were soon connected by the network ap- QO Comparative politics was progressively established
proach. A new slogan network determines policy in US and then European universities with depart-
was launched, but the differences between network ments and chairs. Internationally, associations and
theory and Lowi’s assumptions were slight. Both consortia were created for the exchange of inform-
predominantly saw a determination of the policy ation and scientific collaboration.
output by interest groups and other actors in the QO) From typologies and classifications of polities, com-
“cosy triangles’ of the decision-making process (depu- parative politics moved to the analysis of politics
and policies.
ties, interest groups, and administrators who prepare

Comparative politics in post-modern times

Post-modernism in comparative political theory is Post-modernity is a set of theoretical assumptions
not conceived as a completely new paradigm. Most rather than a clearly discernible new structure of
reasonable post-modernists accept post-modernism society. The hopes which were widespread in those
only as a stage of modernity which implements its European countries where ecological parties were
basic principles in a more consequential and sys- strong, that a new ‘society of movements’ might
tematic way than classical modernity. It cannot be develop, failed to materialize. The new social move-
equated with post-materialism or with certain pro- ments in most systems were strong in the phase
cesses of further differentiation and individualization of agenda setting (see Chapter 16). But decision
which may lead to more decline of the old class social and implementation was predominantly directed by
stratification and end up in theories of ‘lifestyle’. traditional organizations.
 Chapter 1 The evolution of comparative politics 39

Post-modernism strengthened thinking in terms ‘classical modernity’, and ‘post-modernism’ show

of constructivism. Durkheim’s assumption that soci- differences in the application of comparative meth-
ology is by definition comparative was most eagerly ods. Pre-modern scholars mostly used comparison
adopted in post-modern autopoietic theories of sys- in an anecdotal way or deducted characteristics from
tems. But Durkheim was still a realist and not yet a human nature or certain forms of rule (e.g. the
constructivist. “Le fait social’, the social fact, was his Roman Empire vs. Greek states). From the nine-
basic assumption but, in spite of his realistic way of teenth century a historicist approach, believing in
thinking, it was a kind of ‘construct’. Post-modernist a teleological development of the political systems,
theories sometimes referred to Durkheim’s approach began to spread. Comparisons had to show the in-
to comparative social science. fluence of a dominant factor such as demography or
The comparative method was not a special ap- economy on the political systems. Comparison was
proach for Luhmann, because he suspected that it predominantly applied to ‘polities’, rarely to ‘polit-
aimed at a ‘normative ontological framework’. He ics’, and seldom to the ‘policies’ in the respective
emphasized instead that comparative aspects had systems.
to be kept ‘variable’. In autopoietic systems theory The era of classical modernity for the first time de-
comparisons were not concerned with facts. In a so- veloped rigorous criteria for scientific comparison,
ciety without a steering centre only the ‘codes’ which no longer confounding evolution and history, the-
determined the development of the subsystems could ory and practice, and accepting that the political
be compared. But radically different codes (govern- subsystem was no longer steering a whole soci-
ment—opposition in politics, true—false in science, ety. Post-modern theories aimed more strongly still
legal—illegal in law, beautiful—ugly in the arts) can at variety and doing away with the remains of
hardly be compared since they function according ‘reification’ of phenomena in classical modernity.
to radically different logics. Systems and subsystems ‘Communication’ as a key concept and the assump-
which evolve according to different codes can only tion of constructed mutual perceptions changed the
‘observe’ but not ‘influence’ each other. Adaptations mood of comparative scholars. The authors of clas-
from one system in another are hardly feasible. sical modernity also for the first time tried to develop
Thus the main impetus for comparative politics was logically consistent typologies as a tool for developing
given up. hypotheses.
Post-modern theories, such as Foucault’s Ar- Two traditions dominated comparative research
chaeology of Knowledge (1969), looked for variety. which can be traced back to Max Weber’s historical
The ‘summing up notions’ in the ‘archaeological institutional comparisons or to Emile Durkheim’s
comparisons’ aimed at further pluralization of dis- early systems approach, starting from the assump-
courses. The critical approach to comparative politics tion that there is no special field of comparative
in post-modern thinking was overdue. But ‘think- social science. Sociology and political science were
ing in fragments’ finally leads “ad absurdum’ since considered as comparative per se. The second line
a controlled comparison is no longer feasible. In of development—under the impact of economic
autopoietic theories of systems comparisons are close theory—was more interested in forecasting fu-
to pathology in biology, where degenerated cells are ture developments than in realistic description of
compared with sound elements of an organism. facts.
The evolution of comparative politics is not—as
it has sometimes been presented in the literature—a
clear evolution of subsequent paradigms. There is KEY POINTS
permanent change in the perception of the needs of
QO Post-modernism contests the idea that there are
scientific comparisons, but a dominant mainstream
‘social facts’ and is rather based on the idea that so-
can hardly ever be traced which deserves Kuhn’s cial facts are social constructs. However, this does
mostly overstretched term ofa ‘paradigm’. There are, not represent a total rupture with the past but
however, phases in the relationship of political theory rather a different set of ontological assumptions.
toward comparisons. The eras of ‘pre-modernity’,
40 Klaus von Beyme

Political influences on comparative politics

Theories and methodological approaches do not arise transition: to democracy were mostly modelled on
out of a blue sky. Methods of comparative politics developments in Southern Europe and South Amer-
proved to be influenced by political events. After ica in the 1970s. With the simultaneous transforma-
1945 American interest in foreign countries called for tions of both economic and political systems which
a new interest in foreign institutions. Soon, however, had no precedent in recent history, old assump-
the behavioual revolution was distinguished from the tions of modernization theories about the economic
old institutionalism in the tradition of Herman Finer prerequisites of successful democratization were no
or Carl J. Friedrich. longer applicable. New approaches were applied to
The counter-movement emphasized the compar- the unique character of the peaceful revolutions in
ison of dynamics of politics and political behaviour. 1989, such as the testing of chaos theories from recent
The emphasis shifted towards interest groups and developments in biology and physics, although most
political movements. As a consequence of world- of the applications remained metaphorical (Marks
wide unrest and disobedience among the youth in 1992)s
the late 1960s new critical-dialectical and some- Theories of various feasible roads to modern-
times Marxist theories challenged the alleged con- ity in the tradition of Barrington Moore (1966) all
servatism of the behaviouralist mainstream which of a sudden were outdated. On the other hand,
was blamed for only duplicating the alienated typologies of transitions, such as ‘liberalization’,
political world by its surveys. Political science democratization, and ‘consolidation’, were prema-
discovered that the institutions were ill adapted turely generalized (see Chapter 5). They were difficult
but remained unchallenged by behaviouralists and to find in many areas of the world and proved to
functionalists. The scientific revolt started under the be a generalization of those former dictatorships in
label of “critique of parliamentarianism’ and soon Southern Europe which consolidated quickly because
ended up in a dogmatic new political economy of they were soon integrated in the European Union
revolution. (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). They might apply
When the revolt petered out, neo-institutionalism only to the Western tier of states in East—Central
and policy analysis became a minimal common de- Europe which recently became members in the EU.
nominator of leftists and mainstream scholars. The Consolidology as a subfield of transitology be-
decline of communist regimes facilitated the change came a new branch of comparative politics. The
in theories and methods of comparative politics. New normative equation—communism was a perver-
democracies were founded. In the era of the beha- sion of modernity, whereas post-communism is
vioural revolution nobody would have dared to talk enlightened modernity—was quickly seen to be
about constitutional engineering. The breakdown of an untenable simplification. Soon comparativists
dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s created the need discovered the ‘defective democracies’ which cre-
to discuss old and new institutions. Even rational ated another busy growth sector of comparativism
choice institutionalism was applied to the study of (Merkel et al. 2003).
who took which option when creating a new constitu- The acceptance of three worlds—the capital-
tional order. Some former leftist scholars, such as Jon ist West, the communist world, and the Third
Elster, Claus Offe, or Adam Przeworski, developed World—until 1989 included the acceptance of a
an approach, dubbed as ‘rational choice Marxism’ plurality of systems. After the breakdown of com-
which no longer accepted a ‘telos of history’ but munism convergences are growing throughout the
worked out alternative options for the new elites in a world (see the Introduction to this volume). The
post-communist world. concept of a ‘world society emphasized by post-
The breakdown of communism re-encouraged modern variations of systems theory seems to be
most distant systems designs. Transitions to demo- more plausible than before 1989. When the bio-
cracy were compared in different areas and at logist Maturana in the early 1980s developed the
different times. The theories of modernization and hypothesis that no country in the world was able
 Chapter 1 The evolution of comparative politics 41

to develop its communism fully because the world choice approaches had the virtue of being applicable
system was predominantly capitalist, this was taken to any behaviour, from the most egoistic rationality
as an abstract oddity of a non-social scientist. Nev- to the most altruistic behaviour of saints. Against the
ertheless the hypothesis proved to be true. Oddly assumptions of macro theories about autopoietic sys-
enough theories of post-modernity which emphas- tems, the analysis of political actors remained mean-
ize plurality face an increasing streamlining of the ingful. The strictly individualistic origin of the new
world. approach was soon abandoned. Rational choice was
The consequences of this development for the applied to collective entities and even to whole states.
methodology of comparative politics are not yet The research programme of rational choice institu-
fully recognized. Political science mostly ignored tionalism conquered many departments in American
the ‘grand debates’ on the level of macro-systems universities, but never dominated in Europe. It was
(see Chapter 24). Business as usual continued. Polit- not unchallenged because of its abstractions, its sim-
ical science stuck to the middle level of mainly plifications, its analytical rigour, neglecting context.
actor-oriented approaches. Recent revivals such as ‘Context’ was a new catchword of comparative stud-
neo-institutionalism or rational choice had more im- ies which turned back to individual cases or to compa-
pact on political science than the abstract peaks of a risons in a middle-range historical perspective.
general theory in sociology. The status of institution-
alism in comparative politics changed dramatically
over the years. Institutionalism used to be an invect-
ive. At the turn of the century a new exaggeration
was Offered: ‘we are all institutionalists now (Pierson QO Theories, contents, and methods of comparative
and Skocpol 2002: 706). politics were influenced by political events. Espe-
Rational choice approaches initially served as a cially after the Second World War there was a
counter-balance to the dominance of behavioural new interest in foreign institutions, groups, and
studies in the 1960s. It was easily combined with movements.
a multi-level analysis and with an enlightened neo- Q Modernization, decolonization, transitions to, and
consolidation of, democracies influenced compar-
institutionalism which spread in the 1980s. It was
ative politics and the practical application of Its
linked with new attempts to reach the scientific level
theories. Also the development after the Second
of neighbouring social sciences, such as economics:
World War of social welfare states had an impact on
‘Rational choice institutionalism began as pure theft, the move away from Institutions towards policies |
lifting analytical tools from mathematics, operations and their impact on society. |
research, and economics’ (Shepsle 2006: 55). Rational

Conclusion
The evolution of comparative politics was not challenged the naive trust in democratic institu-
a self-steering development, but one that proved tions and an ‘enlightened neo-institutionalism’ had
to be deeply influenced by political events. The its revival. In combination with rational choice ap-
predicament of political science was that its capacity proaches, the two traditions merged in many ways.
to forecast major events was limited. There was The crisis of policy-making under the impact of
little anticipation of the student rebellion, the ‘third- the oil crisis in 1973 strengthened the interest in
worldism’, the technological and ecological revolu- transnational comparisons of public policies. The
tions, or the breakdown of communism. After 1945 breakdown of communism renewed fields of com-
the scope of American political science broadened to parisons which formerly had been treated under the
worldwide interests in area and systems studies. auspices of modernization theories with a simpli-
The ‘behavioural revolution’ for a while seemed fied analysis of dominant factors. Democratization
to develop into a kind of dominant paradigm—but and consolidation of the new democracies was one
only in the United States. The events after 1968 major interest. But soon the failure of consolidation
42 Klaus von Beyme

ended in a new boom of studying defective demo- defective democracies but nowhere a perfect demo-
cracy all over the world. If democracy was the final cracy—not even in the world of consolidated states
normative target of comparative studies, the scientific and representative governments in North America
community had to face the fact that there are many and Europe.

World trends

Trend 1 Trade: urbanization

(1300-2010) and prospects (to
2030)
= Source: UN-World Population Prospects,
2e
Bairoch (1985).
JS
=)
Qa
oO
a

~©
°
E
e
°
vo
QD
oO
a
=
wv
oO
—
wv
a

1300 1500 1700 1800 1900 1950 1980 2005 2030

—- - Less developed More developed -——-—- World urban
regions regions population

1. Why can the evolution of comparative politics not be described as a sequence of paradigms?
2. What characterized comparative politics in pre-modern times? Who were the most important thinkers?
3. What characterizes comparative politics in modern times?
4 What was the contribution of the ‘behavioural revolution’ to the development of a scientific comparative
political science?
Can experiments in comparative politics lead to a true scientific discipline?
Why are classifications and typologies important but problematic at the same time?
Why did comparative politics progressively shift Its attention from polities to politics and policies?
Does politics determine policies or the other way round?
YWOOND
What is the influence of rational choice theory on comparative politics?
10. In what ways have political events influenced the evolution of comparative politics?
tica
a