SRI LANKA’S NORTH II: REBUILDING UNDER THE MILITARY

Asia Report N°220 – 16 March 2012

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
II. LIMITED PROGRESS, DANGEROUS TRENDS ........................................................ 2
A. RECONSTRUCTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT .....................................................................3
B. RESETTLEMENT: DIFFICULT LIVES FOR RETURNEES....................................................................4
1. Funding shortage ..........................................................................................................................6
2. Housing shortage .........................................................................................................................7
3. Lack of jobs, livelihoods and economic opportunities.................................................................8
4. Poverty and food insecurity .......................................................................................................10
5. Lack of psychological support and trauma counselling .............................................................11
6. The PTF and limitations on the work of humanitarian agencies ..............................................12
III. LAND, RESOURCES AND THE MILITARISATION OF NORTHERN
DEVELOPMENT ............................................................................................................ 15
A. THE MILITARY TAKEOVER OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING .......................15
B. INFRASTRUCTURE OF CONTROL: MILITARY CAMPS AND THE SEIZURE OF LAND .......................17
1. New military camps and continued displacement ......................................................................17
2. Jaffna high security zones: protracted displacement amid some progress .................................21
C. MILITARY ECONOMIES ..............................................................................................................22
1. Land taken by the military for farming ......................................................................................22
2. The military’s other economic activities ....................................................................................23
IV. CONCLUSION: RESISTING MILITARISATION: WHAT DONORS
CAN DO ........................................................................................................................... 24
APPENDICES
A. MAP OF SRI LANKA .........................................................................................................................26
B. MAP OF SRI LANKA’S NORTHERN PROVINCE ...................................................................................27
C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................28
D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2009 .........................................................39
E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................31
Asia Report N°220 16 March 2012

SRI LANKA’S NORTH II: REBUILDING UNDER THE MILITARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Sri Lanka’s military is dominating the reconstruction of the damaged or looted. Most returnees remain in makeshift and
Northern Province, weakening international humanitarian inadequate shelters and many struggle to afford food, with
efforts and worsening tensions with the ethnic Tamil ma- few jobs or economic opportunities and little or no sav-
jority. Since the war ended in 2009, hundreds of millions ings. Few schools and medical centres have been rebuilt.
of dollars have poured into the province, but the local pop- Women in the north face particularly difficult situations:
ulations, mostly left destitute by the conflict, have seen female-headed households, many without permanent shel-
only slight improvements in their lives. Instead of giving ter or regular income, in the context of domination by a
way to a process of inclusive, accountable development, male, Sinhalese military are extremely vulnerable.
the military is increasing its economic role, controlling
land and seemingly establishing itself as a permanent, oc- Gender-based violence and the Sinhalisation of the North-
cupying presence. Combined with what many Tamils see ern Province through cultural and demographic changes
as an effort to impose Sinhala and Buddhist culture across have been addressed in Crisis Group’s two most recent
the whole of Sri Lanka and a failure to address many social papers on Sri Lanka, the latter a companion report to this
aspects of rebuilding a society after conflict, these policies one. This report examines the dominance of the military
risk reviving the violence of past decades. Donors should in the reconstruction of a region that was almost complete-
put government accountability, the needs of returnees and ly destroyed during decades of war. It also looks at the
the expansion of a democratic political role for the Tamil ways in which military priorities have shaped the gov-
minority at the heart of their aid policies or risk contrib- ernment’s and the international community’s response to
uting to a revival of ethnic extremism. the deprivations of the local population. A focus on phys-
ical infrastructure over the rebuilding of a confident, open
The heavy militarisation of the province, ostensibly de- society benefits the military and the political elite – finan-
signed to protect against the renewal of violent militancy, cially and otherwise – at the expense of the majority of the
is in fact deepening the alienation and anger of northern province’s population.
Tamils and threatening sustainable peace. Major new mil-
itary bases require the seizure of large amounts of public Government restrictions on aid and early recovery activi-
and private land and the continued displacement of tens ties, often enforced by local military commanders, have
of thousands. The growing involvement of the military in prevented the effective delivery of many social services,
agricultural and commercial activities has placed further including systematic and effective trauma counselling and
obstacles on the difficult road to economic recovery for other psycho-social support to families struggling to cope
northern farmers and businesses. When challenged by pub- with the deaths and disappearance of tens of thousands of
lic protest, the military has shown itself willing to physical- relatives. The military’s influential role over northern de-
ly attack demonstrators and is credibly accused of involve- velopment policy – through the Presidential Task Force
ment in enforced disappearances and other extrajudicial on Resettlement, Reconstruction and Security in the North-
punishments. ern Province (PTF) and at the district level – has margin-
alised the largely Tamil civil administration and led to in-
The government points to the many new roads, rapid eco- effective and ethnically biased rebuilding. More general-
nomic growth and numerous new infrastructure projects ly, the government’s emphasis on large-scale development
as signs of a post-war “northern spring”. For most of the projects has diverted resources and energies away from
more than 430,000 people who have returned to their lands the more immediate needs of returnees. Donors and de-
and villages over the past two years, however, there has velopment and aid agencies have done too little to speak
been little benefit. Residents of the Vanni region – the out about or effectively challenge these policies, even as
mainland of the Northern Province – returned to a land they undermine the prospects for sustainable return and
devastated by the final years of war: almost all homes and recovery.
buildings were destroyed; most personal property was lost,
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page ii

International engagement with Sri Lanka should prioritise

the reestablishment of civilian and democratic govern-
ance in the north, and the end of the military control over
development activities. Donors, particularly the multilat-
eral agencies, China, India and Japan, should insist that
their programs address the pressing needs of the more
than 430,000 returnees in a manner that is transparent and
accountable to the local population. They should press the
government to lift onerous restrictions on the delivery and
monitoring of assistance. UN agencies and non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs), with the support of their
donors, should more actively resist the government’s tight
controls over their operations, better defend humanitarian
principles, and push for the restoration of civilian authori-
ty throughout the north. Monitoring of projects must go
beyond platitudes to ensure that reconstruction money does
not fuel the culture of corruption and the erosion of democ-
racy that have worsened despite the end of the war.

Colombo/Brussels, 16 March 2012

Asia Report N°220 16 March 2012

SRI LANKA’S NORTH II: REBUILDING UNDER THE MILITARY

I. INTRODUCTION nant role of the military and the gravity of the threat it pre-
sents to democracy and effective reconstruction.2

Sri Lanka’s Northern Province has been at the heart of the This report also looks at the nature of the resettlement of
country’s three decades of ethnic conflicts and the loca- the displaced as well as physical reconstruction and eco-
tion of most destructive fighting and greatest loss of life, nomic development. It examines in whose interest and un-
culminating in the humanitarian crisis in the final months der whose control these transformations are taking place
of war in early 2009.1 The north is now the focus of the and what their effects on conflict dynamics will likely be.
government’s proclaimed efforts to rebuild a united Sri It follows on from a companion report, Sri Lanka’s North
Lanka and move beyond the war. Major resources are be- I: The Denial of Minority Rights. Issues of gender and the
ing devoted to its physical and economic reconstruction – status of women in the post-war north are not discussed in
beginning with the resettlement of more than 430,000 peo- detail here, given our December 2011 report Sri Lanka:
ple displaced by the war and the ongoing rebuilding of Women’s Insecurity in the North and East.
roads, power lines, railways and other infrastructure de-
stroyed by the fighting. How this reconstruction unfolds, Future Crisis Group reporting will look at the complex
and whether it can be joined to a genuine process of na- dynamics within and among Tamil political parties, espe-
tional reconciliation, political inclusion and democratisa- cially in the north. It will examine current debates over
tion will help determine the future of Sri Lanka’s ethnic the future of Tamil nationalist politics and how likely ne-
power relations and whether the country can truly move gotiations with the government and other political parties
from a post-war to a post-conflict state. are to achieve constitutional changes that would produce
meaningful devolution of power to the Northern and East-
To date, while there have been clear improvements in phys- ern Provinces.
ical infrastructure, lives for most of those who have re-
turned to the north remain extremely difficult, and the
emerging social and political order – militarised and lack-
ing basic democratic protections – bodes ill for lasting
peace. This report, the product of series of visits to the
north from October 2010 through September 2011, focuses
on the Sinhalese military’s domination of reconstruction
efforts and the impact that has on the lives of the mostly
ethnic Tamil population. Research for this report, based
on interviews with farmers, fishermen, villagers, journal-
ists, clergy members, human rights activists, international
aid workers, politicians and local and central government
officials in the north and in Colombo, confirms the domi-

1
All Crisis Group reporting on Sri Lanka, starting in 2006, is
available at www.crisisgroup.org. Of particular relevance to
this report are Crisis Group Asia Reports N°219, Sri Lanka’s
North I: The Denial of Minority Rights, 15 March 2012; N°217,
2
Sri Lanka: Women’s Insecurity in the North and East, 20 De- Due to high levels of fear, all those interviewed requested ano-
cember 2011; N°209, Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Harder than nymity. Written questions sent to various ministries and depart-
Ever, 21 July 2011; and N°191, War Crimes in Sri Lanka, 17 ments of the Sri Lankan government in November 2011 received
May 2010. no answers.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 2

II. LIMITED PROGRESS, DANGEROUS To date, the government has refused to provide any clear,
TRENDS public indication of its long-term plans for the north.4 Nor
has it provided any timetable for the reestablishment of
civilian rule or given any guarantee of a move toward a
Senior government officials, including President Mahinda democratic north where civil and minority rights are re-
Rajapaksa, point to four interrelated areas in which Sri spected. The deliberate absence of any official roadmap
Lanka has made great progress in the north since the end towards a just and equitable north and east guarantees
of the war: there is no counterpoint to the increasing evidence that
the government’s policies, far from contributing to recon-
 Reconstruction and economic development; ciliation, are generating new tensions and increasing the
 Rapid resettlement of more than 430,000 displaced risks of future instability.
persons, including most of the nearly 300,000 Tamils
Despite the lack of a comprehensive and transparent road-
who survived the final fighting in 2009 and were held
map for the post-war north, however, the government’s ac-
in government-administered internment camps; tions show what its basic goals and political priorities are,
 “Rehabilitation” and “reintegration” of almost all the and how it aims to achieve them.
nearly 12,000 Tamils detained at the end of the war on
suspicion of involvement with the LTTE; and  Two and a half years after the total military destruc-
tion of the LTTE, the government’s highest priority
 Return of democratic elections to the north and other remains the total control of the state and the repression
steps toward “reconciliation”. of any possible future military resistance. Any dissent
or popular protest is viewed through a counter-insur-
There has unquestionably been substantial reconstruction gency lens and risks being considered terrorism.5
of some physical infrastructure and some improvement in
living standards from the desperate low point of May 2009.  Rather than democratisation and power sharing, the
Nonetheless, in all four areas where the government claims chief tool for blunting minority grievances is econom-
progress, the situation remains worrying: economic devel- ic development, implemented primarily through large-
opment that fails to reach those most in need and the ben- scale infrastructure projects, but without meaningful
efits of which are not distributed at all equitably; grave popular consultation or direct economic benefits for
problems still facing most of those who have returned home most northern Tamils and Muslims.6 “Separatist tenden-
as well as an estimated 120,000 still displaced; large ques- cies will fade away when we have better road connec-
tion marks about the treatment and future prospects of
those released from “rehabilitation” camps as well as those
who remain unaccounted for since being taken into cus-
tody; and a near-complete absence of political space for
the democratic expression of political views or effective 4
In 2011, the government and the UN, together with some NGOs,
influence on reconstruction policy for those who live in the
signed a “Joint Plan of Assistance for the Northern Province”
north or their elected representatives. (JPA), which lays out targets for assistance in various humani-
tarian and development sectors. The plan avoids any mention of
More worrying still, while failing to address adequately the complex political issues involved and was prepared without
the urgent needs and political rights of the Tamil and Mus- input from Tamil and Muslim political or community leaders.
lim populations of the north, the government’s policies The 2012 JPA was reportedly delayed due to various disagree-
are also producing new grievances, especially with regard ments between the government and the UN, but eventually re-
to land. The many forms through which the region has leased on 20 February 2012. Crisis Group interviews, diplomats,
been thoroughly militarised are clear to anyone who visits January 2012.
5
or lives there, from the many military camps and check- In response to a series of clashes between Tamil protestors and
points to the military-run shops and vegetable farms. Mil- the army and police, the military spokesperson referred to those
who attack police stations or army camps as “terrorists” against
itarisation has also brought with it various forms of “Sin-
whom anti-terrorism laws will be applied. “Civilians will be dealt
halisation”, including increasing evidence of slow but real with under PTA – army”, BBC Sinhala, 4 September 2011. For
demographic transformation as the government settles Sin- more on the clashes that provoked this response, see Crisis Group
halese along the southern borders of the province.3 Report, Sri Lanka’s North I: The Denial of Minority Rights, op.
cit., Section III.D.
6
Resettlement and reconstruction, while necessary precondi-
tions for successful reconciliation, are often conflated by the
government with reconciliation itself. The government sees no
3
The question of Sinhalisation and its relation to the militarisa- need to reach out to the Tamil community, acknowledge their
tion of the north are addressed in detail in this report’s companion loss and grievances, and take measures to include them within
paper, Sri Lanka’s North I: The Denial of Minority Rights, op. cit. society and government as equal partners and citizens.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 3

tivity”, argued President Rajapaksa, speaking of his they believe they can rule it as they please”.11 The more
plans for an expressway linking Jaffna and Colombo.7 they do, the less likely that rule will go unchallenged.
 The government will actively resist the ability of Tam-
il nationalists to claim the north as the core of their A. RECONSTRUCTION AND ECONOMIC
homeland, both rhetorically, but also perhaps through DEVELOPMENT
demographic change. Colombo has offered no guaran-
tees that the historically Tamil character of the north Government officials claim to have achieved “tremendous
will be preserved, and important constituents of the successes in connection with the reconstruction” of the
ruling coalition have made clear their belief that no Northern Province: “Roads, bridges, public buildings,
community has any right to its own “ethnic enclaves”.8 schools, health facilities, water supply and the like have
President Rajapaksa announced in his 2012 Independ- been rebuilt not just to replace what existed in the past
ence Day speech that “ethnic communities have no sep- but at a vastly improved level with an eye on the future
arate regions. The entire country belongs to all ethnic needs of people in those areas”.12
communities”.9 Other officials have repeatedly argued
that all Sri Lankans have the right to live anywhere With significant foreign assistance, much of it from India
they wish.10 What remains unclear is whether the gov- and China, the government has undertaken numerous large-
ernment will pursue an active policy of state-sponsored scale infrastructure projects in the Northern Province. Most
demographic change in the north, or rely on other ways obvious has been the reconstruction of roads throughout
of weakening Tamils’ claim of a distinct and privileged the north, notably the A9 highway that links the southern
relationship to the region that justifies some form of provinces with Jaffna. Many other roads and bridges have
collective self-rule. been rebuilt or are under construction,13 and the president
is now promising an expressway to connect Jaffna and
These government goals and priorities necessarily give a Colombo.14 The northern power grid15 and the Jaffna-
central role to the military both in setting the overall frame- Kilinochchi water and sanitation system are being rebuilt
work for developing the new north as well as in everyday and improved, with support from Japan and the Asian
decision-making and influence at the local level. As a Development Bank (ADB).16
senior citizen in Jaffna described the situation, “The army
has sacrificed lives and has won the war in the north, so

11
Crisis Group phone interview, September 2010.
12
“Minister Samarasinghe addresses the 18th Session of the UN
Human Rights Council in Geneva”, 12 September 2011, www.
lankamission.org/content/view/2768/1. According to the Cen-
7
“Heroes’ Day incident-free in Jaffna”, The Hindu, 27 November tral Bank governor, Ajith Nivard Cabral, the government is
2011. spending LKR (Sri Lankan Rupees) 253 billion, roughly $2.2
8
See for example, “Politicos air views on SLMC [Sri Lanka billion, on northern reconstruction in 2011-2012. This number
Muslim Congress]’s latest demands”, The Nation, 12 February would appear to include non-budgetary international develop-
2012, quoting Western Province minister and legal adviser to the ment assistance. “Promoting Financial Inclusiveness in the North
Jathika Hela Urumaya (National Heritage Party, JHU), Udaya and the East, the Experience of the Past Two Years”, Central
Gammanpila, warning that devolution of power to the north and Bank of Sri Lanka, 20 May 2011.
13
east “would result in the establishment of ethnic enclaves”, The Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) $150 million “Con-
which would be a violation of the constitution and of “fundamen- flict-Affected Region Emergency Project” is funding the repair
tal human rights”. and construction of over 250km of roads in the Northern Prov-
9
“Rural people should be given the results of giant development ince and adjoining areas. Other donors, including the World
works – President addressing the 64th Independence Day cele- Bank, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and
brations at Anuradhapura”, 4 February 2012, at www.president. the British government are also funding the rehabilitation of
gov.lk/speech_New.php?Id=122. northern roads and bridges.
10 14
“Govt. quashes colonization canard”, 25 October 2011, Daily “Rajapaksa wants Colombo-Jaffna expressway”, The Hindu,
News. In December 2011, JHU member and minister Champika 28 November 2011. The planned road has been dubbed both a
Ranawaka argued in a speech that just as Tamils have the right “Gateway to Wonder” and a “pathway to peace” by the state
to live in large numbers in Colombo, so Sinhalese have the right media centre. “President at ‘Gateway to Wonder’ launch … Ef-
to live in the north and east. “Tolerance of Sinhalese is not cow- ficient road network, pathway to peace”, Media Centre for Na-
ardice”, Sri Lanka Mirror, 6 December 2011. In a speech in tional Development of Sri Lanka, 28 November 2011.
15
Colombo in November 2011, former President Chandrika Ku- The ADB is funding reconstruction of the Kilinochchi-Chu-
maratunga reported that during her term in office “the JHU and nakam electricity transmission line, while the JICA is support-
other extremists tried to convince me that the solution to the ing reconstruction of the Vavuniya-Kilinochchi line.
16
(ethnic) problem was to settle Sinhalese on the borders of Jaff- The ADB is contributing $90 million to the “Jaffna and Kili-
na”. “Chandrika on Reconciliation”, Lakbima News, 27 Novem- nochchi Water Supply and Sanitation Project”, while the French
ber 2011. Development Agency is contributing an additional $40 million
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 4

The entire northern network of railroads – destroyed and central government’s tight control over development plan-
out of service for more than two decades – is also being ning and the nature of Sri Lankan patronage networks for
rebuilt, thanks to an $800 million concessionary line of the distribution of government benefits and contracts.
credit from New Delhi and the technical expertise of the Tamil politicians complain that most of the new jobs and
Indian national railway construction company, IRCON.17 contracts from development projects are not going to
India is also funding and assisting in the clearance and Tamils in the north, but to workers and businesses from
reconstruction of the Kankasanthurai port, which will the south.22 In the absence of proper political and regula-
provide a quick and direct link between the Jaffna penin- tory safeguards, development projects threaten to force
sula and southern India.18 Also under way with Indian as- additional residents from their lands.23
sistance is the rebuilding and expansion of the Palaly air-
port in Jaffna, which is reportedly being converted from A more central defect of the government’s focus on large-
military to civilian use, and the rehabilitation of the Jaffna- scale infrastructure projects is that it has come at the ex-
Atchchuveli industrial zone.19 pense of meeting the urgent needs of those most affected
by the war. “There is no development that benefits the
These development projects help explain what the gov- people,” argues Tamil National Alliance (TNA) parliamen-
ernment claims was the “22 per cent growth rate of the tarian M.A. Sumanthiran. “There are roads, bridges and
economy of the Northern Province” in 2010, which it sees culverts being built but they do not benefit the people. That
as “a clear indication of the success achieved by the gov- is worse when the people do not have the roof over their
ernment’s initiatives with regard to development in that heads and they have to watch all these mega projects go-
part of the country”.20 The rapid growth rate is also a re- ing around them without priorities such as housing and
sult of the general increase in trade between the north and their own livelihood opportunities are not met”.24
south, buoyed by the huge military presence in the north,
and the increase in agricultural production and fishing
made possible by the end of the war and of most war-time
B. RESETTLEMENT: DIFFICULT LIVES
restrictions on movement.21 It also comes off a low base, FOR RETURNEES25
allowing for such a sharp rise as is common in most post-
war economies. Government officials proudly proclaim their success in
returning to their home areas “95 per cent” of the nearly
Unfortunately, the economic “peace dividend” has yet to 300,000 people displaced by fighting in 2008 and 2009
be distributed widely or shared equitably with northern and later held in government camps.26 “Resettlement has
Tamils – due to the heavy militarisation of the north, the

22
See Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s North I: The Denial of
and the government of Sri Lanka $34 million. “$90 million Minority Rights, op. cit., Section IV.A.
23
Project to Address Water, Sanitation Issues in Sri Lanka’s Con- This has already happened in the Eastern Province, with the
flict-Affected Area”, ADB, 1 December 2010. The ADB, World displacement of some 2,800 people by the Indian-sponsored
Bank and other donors are also funding smaller water supply coal-power plant in Sampur, and many others losing land to a
and sanitation projects across the north. string of hotels being planned and built along the eastern coast.
17
In November 2011, the Indian and Sri Lankan governments M.A. Sumanthiran, “Situation Report: North and East Sri Lanka”,
signed the latest of a series of loan agreements, this time to re- paper tabled in the Sri Lankan parliament by the Tamil National
build the final leg of the Yal Devi line running from Colombo Alliance, 21 October 2011, hereinafter cited as “TNA Situation
to Kankasanthurai in the Jaffna peninsula. IRCON is currently Report”, and Crisis Group interview, human rights activist, Lon-
rebuilding rail-links on the Omanthai-Pallai, Medawachchiya- don, January 2012. Large infrastructure projects are also partic-
Madu and Madu-Talaimannar segments. “Signing of an Agree- ularly vulnerable to corruption due to their complexity, variety of
ment for Restoration of Pallai- Kankesanthurai Railway Line in contracts and contractors and the difficulties of oversight. See
Northern Province of Sri Lanka”, Indian High Commission, 18 the Global Infrastructure Anti-Corruption Centre for details on
November 2011. why corruption afflicts these sorts of projects (www.giacenter.org).
18 24
“KKS also to become a major port in Sri Lanka”, Media Cen- “TNA visited on USA invitation: Sumanthiran”, The Nation,
tre for National Development of Sri Lanka, 5 May 2011. 13 November 2011.
19 25
“Indian aid for Palali airport”, Daily Mirror, 29 April 2010; In Sri Lanka, contrary to established international terminolo-
“Rs 192 million Indian Grant to rehabilitate Jaffna-Atchuveli gy, the “resettlement” of displaced persons refers to their return
Industrial Zone”, government news portal (news.lk), 11 De- to their original locations and is generally used interchangeably
cember 2011. The project is funded as a grant and is expected with “return”. “Relocation” is used to refer to the process of set-
to be completed in fourteen months. tling people in new locations.
20 26
“The might of powerful nations cannot prevail against justice The government has been claiming 95 per cent resettled since
and fair play – President at UNGA”, 25 September 2011, at mid-2011 and now claims 98 per cent. See “Over 210,000 IDP
www.lankamission.org/content/view/2772/9. families resettled”, Sri Lankan government website (priu.gov.lk),
21
Unfortunately, there is little useful and publicly available 3 February 2012; and “Over 95 percent of N-E displaced reset-
analysis of the current state of the northern economy. tled”, Sri Lankan government website (priu.gov.lk), 12 April 2011.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 5

been achieved at a pace that is perhaps unmatched else- numbers remain unable to return home. Of the nearly
where”, it argues and “is a potential role model for other 300,000 who survived the final year of fighting and were
countries and conflict zones”.27 subsequently detained in government camps, government
figures compiled by the United Nations High Commis-
The vast majority of the displaced have now returned to sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and shared with donors
their home villages. That they are no longer kept in closed show that 49,664 were still displaced at the end of 2011,
camps, as almost all were for the first nine months after either living with host families or in internment camps.31
the war, is certainly progress.28 Large numbers of inter- Another 88,702 are “protracted IDPs”, displaced before
nally displaced persons (IDPs) from earlier phases of the April 2008, in many cases for more than a decade. This
war, including many Muslims who had been expelled by brings the total IDP population to 138,366 people – nearly
the LTTE, have also been able to return home in the past three years since the end of the war.32
two years. Overall, just over 430,000 people have re-
turned to the Northern Province since early 2010.29 Their The official numbers of IDPs remaining from the final
return was made possible in part by the impressive work year of fighting would be higher if not for an October
of numerous demining agencies, together with the Sri 2011 edict by the Presidential Task Force for Resettlement,
Lankan army, which have cleared mines and unexploded Development and Security in the Northern Province (PTF)
ordnance from an area of 1,930 sq km.30 forcing district secretaries in the north to exclude from
the list many of those living with host families: this re-
Nonetheless, despite government efforts to present inter- duced the number of IDPs by more than 20,000.33 The
nal displacement as virtually a problem of the past, large

31
These figures are from an unpublished UNHCR document,
27
“Minister Samarasinghe addresses the 18th Session of the based on government figures. The most recent public document
UN Human Rights Council in Geneva”, op. cit. from the UN, the “JHERU” for January 2012, makes no men-
28
Early reports by international aid agencies on Menik Farm tion of any population living with host families. As a senior aid
camp – where the government interned the largest number of worker put it, “these people have disappeared, at least on pa-
the 300,000 mainly Tamil civilians forced to flee the fighting per”. Crisis Group phone interview, January 2012. On 10 Janu-
between the LTTE and government armed forces in the north – ary 2012, the government announced that only 6,553 IDPs re-
detailed overcrowded, inhumane conditions with regular inci- mained from the 283,000 listed as displaced in June 2009. The
dents of brutality, poor sanitation, insufficient water for drink- statement claims “the government has released and resettled
ing and bathing and inadequate food and medical care. This 275,065 IDPs so far under its programme of speedy resettle-
was reiterated privately by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon ment”, including 27,720 ‘released’ ‘for humanitarian reasons’”.
in 2009, in a U.S. diplomatic cable published by WikiLeaks. “He “IDPs drop to 6,553”, Sri Lankan government website (priu.gov.
said the conditions were worse than those at any other camps, lk), 10 January 2012. UNHCR figures for 31 January 2012 list
including in Darfur and Goma, that he had visited, and noted he only 225,788 “new IDPs” who have returned to their areas of
had seen signs of malnutrition”. “Ban Ki Moon briefs co-chair origin. “JHERU”, No. 39, op. cit. See notes 33 and 94.
32
ambassadors on visit”, U.S. embassy Colombo, 27 May 2009, This number does not include 102,000 Tamil refugees in In-
at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09COLOMBO567.html. dia, some 75,000 of whom live in government-run camps in
See also “Sri Lanka: Tensions Mount as Camp Conditions De- Tamil Nadu. “Sri Lankan refugee return figures fall in 2011,
teriorate”, Human Rights Watch, October 2009. amidst suspension of ferry service”, UNHCR press release, 6
29
432,566 people, both “old” and “new” IDPs, have returned in January 2012. For more on the situation of Sri Lankan Tamil
the north, according to government figures reported in January refugees in India, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°206, India
2012. “Joint Humanitarian and Early Recovery Update” (JHE- and Sri Lanka after the LTTE, 23 June 2011.
33
RU), No. 39, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian “IDPs living in welfare centres and with friends and rela-
Affairs (UNOCHA), January 2012, published 23 February 2012. tives”, PTF letter to Northern Province district secretaries, 27
The “Joint Plan for Assistance, Northern Province, 2012” uses October 2011. The UN notes that “following a revision of the
a higher figure, stating that “by 31 October 2011, 456,000 peo- Jaffna statistics, the number of post-April 2008 IDPs with host
ple (138,000 families) displaced at various stages of the three- families has declined from 57,474 to 34,671”. “JHERU”, No.
decade-long conflict had returned to the five northern districts”. 37, 31 October 2011 (published 23 November). In light of the
30
“Over 1,930 sq km landmines free in North”, Sri Lankan gov- PTF edict, this decline likely reflects a change in how people
ernment website (priu.gov.lk), 18 January 2012. The government are categorised rather than in their actual circumstances. Since
reports another 126 sq km remain to be cleared. According to October 2011, there have been no figures released by the gov-
the director of the national demining centre, “Sri Lanka will be ernment or the UN for displaced persons living with friends,
mine free before 2020”. “Post-war SL example to global com- relatives or host families, which constitutes the bulk of remain-
munity-Justice Weeramantry”, The Island, 27 November 2011. ing pre-2008 IDPs. Instead, the January 2012 JHERU, follow-
Figures released by the UNOCHA show that 554.88 sq km of ing the 2012 JPA, states that “the Government and the United
land has been cleared of mines and ordnance since 1 January Nations and its partners acknowledge that there are a number
2009 and an estimated 133 sq km remains contaminated in the persons/families, who were displaced and are living with friends
north and east. “JHERU”, No. 38, November-December 2011, and relatives, or who left camps and are still living with friends
published 24 January 2012. and relatives. Humanitarian partners will be consulting with the
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 6

PTF argued that since virtually all parts of the north and 1. Funding shortage
east had been cleared of mines and made ready for reset-
tlement, the large numbers living with host families and One reason for the slow progress in meeting basic human
friends in Jaffna must have chosen to do so voluntarily, in needs among the recently returned IDPs is a severe short-
order “to enjoy the urban facilities.”34 age of international funding. As of 14 February 2012, do-
nors had provided only $99.9 million – or 35 per cent – of
From the beginning of the government’s program of the $289 million estimated to be needed for projects listed
“speedy resettlement”, the conditions to which people re- in the 2011 Joint Plan of Assistance (JPA) agreed upon
turned were extremely difficult, with virtually none of the by the UN and government.38 According to a mid-year
needed infrastructure – houses, transport, electricity, assessment of the JPA, only 35 per cent of food security,
schools, hospitals, or job or livelihood opportunities – in agriculture and livelihood, 24 per cent of shelter and
place. However relieved people were to be out of the housing, 2 per cent of health and nutrition, and 1 per cent
camps, it was far from the dignified, safe or sustainable of water and sanitation requirements had been met”.39 By
return that international standards require. For many it the end of 2011, the figures were little improved. A senior
added further injury to a defeated and marginalised popu- humanitarian worker described this as “one of the poorest
lation.35 Conditions have since improved, with some new responses to a UN humanitarian appeal anywhere in the
schools and medical centres built, additional government world. It’s the second worst in Asia, second only to North
services reestablished and slowly improving infrastruc- Korea”.40
ture, though with human resources (especially teachers
and medical staff) lagging far behind needs.36
when UNHCR had budgeted for 20,000. If refugees don’t come
Most people in the Vanni are living in extremely difficult
back, why? It’s an indicator that something is wrong. … There’s
circumstances, many of them still lacking some of the no real carrot for them to come back to Sri Lanka”. Crisis Group
basic amenities needed for a dignified life. The most press- interview, diplomat, January 2012.
ing problems are the lack of adequate housing and income- 38
“JHERU”, No. 39, op. cit. Announcing that “there are over
generating opportunities. The situation is particularly bad 160,000 families in dire need of permanent housing, livelihoods,
in the poorest districts of Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu water and sanitation”, the president of the Sri Lanka Red Cross
where, other than the welcome end of war, most people’s Society criticised the shortfall in donor assistance as one of its
lives are harder than ever.37 primary causes. “Sri Lanka Red Cross Society appeals Interna-
tional community for greater assistance for reconstruction ef-
forts in the North”, transcurrents.com, 27 September 2011. Ac-
curate and up-to-date statistics for how much of its own money
the government spent on humanitarian relief and reconstruction
Government on how best to arrive at numbers on the persons of the north are difficult to find. According to a report released
who still require assistance. … Moreover, the Government and by the PTF, for “assistance aimed at the re-establishment of
the UN are committed to finding solutions for displaced people services and livelihoods across the Northern Region”, “the Gov-
who sought shelter with friends and relatives, left camps and ernment spent US$ 360.3 million from its own budget and was
are still living with friends and relatives, or are stranded in able to secure donor commitment of around US$ 2220 million
transit sites. Again, determining the number of people falling of which US$ 1799 million was on loan and US$ 331 million
under this category and whether they continue to live with hosts were grants. The areas of donor assistance include water, hous-
by choice or for lack of solutions will be critical to support fu- ing, irrigation, supply of electricity, rehabilitation of roads &
ture strategies of assistance”. “JHERU”, No. 39, op. cit. railway and health services.” “Sri Lanka’s Humanitarian Ef-
34
PTF letter, op. cit. fort”, PTF, August 2011, p. 83. The period covered for these
35
There was no effective or independent monitoring of the re- figures is not clear, but appears to be from 2009 through 2010.
turn process, and a large portion of returnees were not actually According to a separate study cited by the financing and plan-
returned to their homes, but sent to “transit centres” in their ning ministry, a total of LKR 37.6 billion ($304 million), pre-
home districts, without adequate transport to and from their sumably both government and donor money, was “channelled
homes or livelihood opportunities. Areas were not fully demined, to northern province development activities in 2010”. Of this
placing restrictions on travel, work and farming, as well as add- total, LKR 26.6 billion ($215 million) was devoted to infra-
ing to the psychological toll of war, repeated displacement and structure development and LKR 11 billion ($89 million) for
months of incarceration. Many encountered homes that were demining, resettlement, and “welfare of IDPs”. Annual Report,
badly damaged or destroyed, with almost all looted of any Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2010. Sri Lanka’s 2012
items of value, while those resettled often did not receive the budget, passed by parliament in December 2011, included LKR
supplies and financial resources that they were promised. For 230 billion ($2 billion) for the ministry of defence and urban
more on the poor quality of the initial returns process, see Cri- development, an increase of LKR 15 billion from 2011 and 10
sis Group Asia Briefing N°99, Sri Lanka: A Bitter Peace, 11 per cent of the entire budget, the largest share of any ministry.
39
January 2010. “Joint Plan for Assistance, Northern Province, 2011 Mid-
36
See “JHERU”, No. 39, op. cit. Year Review”, Government of Sri Lanka, UN & Partners, July
37
According to a diplomat, “It’s very indicative that fewer peo- 2011, hereinafter referred to as “JPA, 2011 Mid-Year Review”.
40
ple returned from India in 2011 than in 2010 – only 1,700, Crisis Group phone interview, January 2012.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 7

2. Housing shortage ture, and housing should be left to the diaspora and donors.
Yet they didn’t even ask the donors in any serious way”.45
Since the government’s late 2009 decision to return IDPs
rapidly to their home districts, most returnees have been The absence of reliable records of land ownership and the
living in temporary shelters, often of poor quality, with regularity of land disputes have increased the challenges
many made up of mere tarpaulins and jungle poles.41 More involved in building houses in the north and posed seri-
than two and half years since the end of the war, a relative- ous questions of conflict sensitivity for donors and con-
ly small number of houses have been rebuilt or repaired. tractors. These concerns have further slowed progress.
While an estimated 120,000-150,000 houses in the North- According to a recent report, “The confusion over land
ern Province are in need of rebuilding or repair, only ownership has posed a real dilemma for agencies involved
16,400 new houses have been constructed, while major re- in house construction. Most agencies do not want to go
pairs have been completed on 4,296.42 ahead with building a house for a beneficiary only to find
out later that the land is owned or claimed by someone
The slow rate of progress is explained in part by the diffi- else. Simultaneously, agencies are facing a time crunch.
culty of accessing areas of return in 2009 and early 2010, Donors insist on strict adherence to deadlines and funding
as well as by the lack of skilled labour and shortages of cycles. Further, there is a humanitarian imperative to en-
timber and sand.43 What the UN calls “major gaps in shel- sure affected communities are able to restart their lives”.46
ter assistance” have also been the result of “severe funding
restrictions”.44 As a senior aid official explains, “the gov- In June 2010, the Indian government formally pledged to
ernment never bought into housing. The government felt build 50,000 houses, 43,000 of them in the Northern Prov-
they should concentrate on electricity and other infrastruc- ince.47 Eventually, this could address a large portion of the
needs, yet progress has been exceptionally slow. In re-
sponse to the slow start, the Indians launched a pilot pro-
ject for 1,000 houses, targeting some of the most vulnerable
of returning IDPs48, and due to be completed by June 2011.
41
For a valuable discussion of housing issues in the north, see
Bhavani Fonseka and Mirak Raheem, “Land in the Northern
Province: Post-war politics, policy and practices”, Centre for
45
Policy Alternatives, December 2011, Chapter 5 (hereinafter re- “The government felt since there had been an awful lot of
ferred to as “Land in the Northern Province”). funding from overseas to support the war by the LTTE, this
42
Numbers as of 7 February 2012. Another 6,726 were under money should continue to flow into the north post-war from the
construction and 1,458 under repair. “JHERU”, No. 39, op. cit. same diaspora sources for building houses. Senior members of
The exact level of need is not known, as no formal assessment the government felt that most of these families will self-recover
of housing in the north and east has been done. According to a from all the money their families have from overseas. … In fact,
senior aid official closely involved in housing in the north and we’ve been surprised by how little money has come in from
east, the current working estimate for the total houses damaged overseas. Much much smaller than we’d imagined …. We prob-
or destroyed in the north is 172,000. The actual number of ably weren’t going to get a lot of support, anyway, especially
damaged or destroyed houses, however, is thought to be signif- given donor concerns about the end of the war and how it end-
icantly lower, somewhere between 120,000 and 150,000; the ed. Lots of people have been standing back and watching.” Crisis
60,000 figure for Jaffna in particular is thought to be an overes- Group phone interview, January 2012.
46
timate of at least 20,000, in part because many houses have Fonseka and Raheem, “Land in the Northern Province”, op.
been rebuilt over the past decade. When gauging needs, 20 per cit., p. 87.
47
cent of families are estimated to have their own resources for Some houses will be built in the Eastern Province and for
rebuilding, while as many as 20 per cent may never return to the “Indian Origin Tamils” in the Central Province. “Commence-
north. There are also, however, a significant number of landless ment of next phase of the Indian Housing Project”, Indian High
families who have never had houses and thus have not been in- Commission, Colombo, 2 December 2011. For more on the In-
cluded in the 172,000 figure. This explains the working figure dian housing project in the context of India-Sri Lankan rela-
of “a total ‘need’ which exceeds 100,000 houses” used by the tions, see Crisis Group Report, India and Sri Lanka after the
UN and government. “JHERU”, No. 39, op. cit. Crisis Group LTTE, op. cit., p. 9. A useful analysis of the Indian housing pro-
phone interview, January 2012. See also “JPA, 2011 Mid-Year ject can be found in Fonseka and Raheem, “Land in the North-
Review”, op. cit. ern Province”, op. cit., pp. 94-97.
43 48
Crisis Group phone interview, senior aid officials, January “In Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu people who do not have land
2012. See also “JHERU”, No. 37, op. cit., and “Joint Permanent were selected for the housing grant with the plan of giving them
Housing, Shelter, NFI Sector meeting minutes”, UNOCHA, 18 a half-acre land permit. State jungle lands were cleared and al-
August 2011. lowed for construction. But no documentation has been given
44
“JHERU”, No. 38, op. cit. As of the end of 2011, international to the beneficiaries in this regard and they are unaware which
donors and the government had committed to building and re- land belongs to them, yet”. The source added, “In Jaffna some
pairing 34,500 houses. This figure does not include the Indian favouritism and biases have been observed. Earlier the pilot
project for 43,000 houses, whose financing was only formally project was to be only for war-affected IDPs but in Point Pedro
agreed in mid-January 2012. some people who had not been displaced have also been select-
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 8

On 18 January 2012, Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. between the two major Indian companies that were awarded
Krishna handed over the first batch of houses to their new the building contracts – neither of which has prior experi-
owners in Ariyalai, Jaffna.49 Delays have been due in part ence in the island – and their many Sri Lankan subcontrac-
to the reluctance of Sri Lankan officials to see India gain tors.54
the good-will from the northern population that such a
project would likely generate.50 After disputes over vari- On 1 December 2011, the Indian cabinet formally approved
ous aspects of the project, including the selection of bene- funding for the construction and repair of the remaining
ficiaries, Colombo’s reluctance now seems to have given 49,000 houses, and on 17 January 2012, Krishna signed a
way to grudging acceptance.51 memorandum of understanding with his Sri Lankan coun-
terpart for a $260 million project for their construction.55
Building has also been delayed by implementation bottle- In an effort to speed up the building process, most houses
necks due in part to the Indian government’s inexperience will now be built by the house-owners themselves, with
in carrying out humanitarian projects in Sri Lanka.52 There technical assistance and support provided.56
has been confusion over the division of labour between
district-level Sri Lankan administrators and Indian con- 3. Lack of jobs, livelihoods and economic
tractors. While government officials in the north were ex- opportunities
pected to identify locations and prepare the sites, the rele-
vant district secretaries were allocated no money for this An equally urgent problem for newly returned residents of
from Colombo.53 There have also allegedly been disputes the Vanni in particular is the lack of jobs and other liveli-
hood opportunities.

ed while rejecting some Vanni returnees”. Crisis Group inter- A 2011 study of recipients of a U.S. Agency for Interna-
view, local activist, Kilinochchi, December 2011. tional Development (USAID) cash-for-work program in
49
“EAM hands over houses (under the 1,000 houses Pilot Pro- the north noted “the lack of labour market opportunities”
ject) and bicycles to beneficiaries in Jaffna”, Indian High Com- and found that the “majority of the respondent families
mission, Colombo, 18 January 2012. The Indians released no relied on low and erratic income. In the sample, 89 per cent
figures for the number of houses actually occupied. An aid of- of respondent families did not have any family member
ficial closely involved with housing in the north and east esti- engaged in a type of work for which a salary or a regular
mated that between 200 and 400 of the initial 1,000 houses may wage was paid”.57 A separate assessment of food security
have been completed. Crisis Group phone interview, January
2012. For more details on the project, see “Commencement of
next phase of the Indian Housing Project”, op. cit. On 26 Janu-
ary 2012, the Indian government published its call for tenders Crisis Group interview, government official, Northern Province,
to manage the housing contract. It could be until mid-2012 be- September 2011.
54
fore the project is fully underway. Crisis Group phone inter- Hindustan Prefab and RPP Infra Project Limited have been
view, senior aid official, January 2012. awarded the contract by the Indian government. Sri Lankan sub-
50
Crisis Group interviews, Sri Lankan government officials and contractors have reportedly complained of cost over-runs, delays
diplomats, September 2011. in payment and poor margins, which has made others reluctant
51
Crisis Group interviews, Sri Lankan government officials, to take on work. Lack of information about total cost details
housing contractors, September 2011. According to an official, have reportedly made sub-contractors, beneficiaries and local
“The military thinks that the TNA is influencing the government government officials wary. Crisis Goup interview, local activ-
officials in beneficiary selection. They therefore want to verify ist, Kilinochchi, December 2011.
55
it. That is why Douglas Devananda [cabinet minister and leader “EAM hands over houses (under the 1,000 houses Pilot Pro-
of Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP)] also said that TNA ject) and bicycles to beneficiaries in Jaffna”, Indian High Com-
is influencing the Indian companies. Whatever the case may be, mission, Colombo, 18 January 2012. Building is projected to
the finalisation of the beneficiary list got dragged out and the cost INR (Indian rupees) 13.19 billion ($260 million). 44,000
Indians were given the list much later than agreed. The first list houses will be newly built, 5,000 houses will be repaired.
56
was later amended”. Houses for some 6,000 families “who are unable to build their
52
Crisis Group interviews, government officials, housing con- own houses, like households headed by single women, disabled,
tractors, September 2011. Until the final months of the war, when elderly people etc., will be built by construction agencies”. “Com-
it provided large amounts of humanitarian assistance, the Indian mencement of next phase of the Indian Housing Project”, op. cit.
57
government has not traditionally provided significant amounts The study further noted: “The distribution of reported main
of aid to Sri Lanka. It has never before carried out any develop- source of family income in the past three months reflects in the
ment or humanitarian work on the scale of the housing project. areas where the CFW [cash-for-work program] was implement-
53
According to a local official: “They say the Indian contractors ed: The largest segment of respondent families (42.8 per cent)
are building the house, but those guys will not set foot without was engaging in irregular, non-skilled labour work. Irregular
all the prior work being done by us. We have to identify land, skilled labour (6.91 per cent), home gardening (7.18 per cent),
do jungle clearing, surveying, levelling and other site prepara- small business/self-employments (7.73 per cent) and paddy cul-
tion activities. Where is the money for all this …? I had to do tivation (6.91 per cent) are the other most common categories
with what I have and to ask some others [NGOs] to help out”. from which families earned some form of income. Notably, 7.73
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 9

conducted in April 2011 by the UN World Food Pro- ermen requires large outlays of capital. The assistance re-
gramme (WFP) in conjunction with government agencies ceived so far has been grossly inadequate relative to the
found that “livelihoods are still underdeveloped” in the losses incurred.61 According to a fisherman in Mullaitivu,
north and that “the substantial non-availability of basic “Many of us who were engaged in beach seine [net] fish-
infrastructure and services in many parts of the Northern ing are unable to start that because we do not have money.
Province and serious damage to private and public assets Today you need an investment of at least LKR (Sri Lankan
provide a challenging environment for households to Rupees) 2 million [$18,000] to re-start. We have lost all
reestablish their livelihoods”.58 assets, where will we go for that?”62 Getting loans has not
been easy, though some with collateral and influence have
The 2011 mid-year review of the UN-government Joint succeeded.63
Plan for Assistance noted that “escalated interventions to
rehabilitate livelihood facilities, particularly at the com- Other groups face their own specific challenges. Ex-com-
munity level, and tangible support to help people establish batants and others released from the government’s “reha-
a regular source of income and move toward self-suffi- bilitation” system have faced real difficulties finding jobs
ciency will be necessary for the rest of 2011 and ahead”.59 and other economic opportunities. Those working with
released detainees explain that “there aren’t many jobs in
The fishing industry, a mainstay for the livelihoods of a the north” and that many of the ex-detainees have lost the
large percentage of northern residents, is struggling to education certificates required by many employers.64 In
reestablish itself amid complicated ethnic, security and addition, “some have trouble holding down jobs. Many
modernisation challenges. Many security restrictions, which aren’t used to having a regular job. And quite a few have
had severely limited fishing off the northern and eastern to check in regularly with the military, which can interfere
coasts during the war, have been removed, though not with holding down a job”.65
all.60 The war destroyed most assets – boats, motors, nets,
equipment – and resuming livelihoods for sea-faring fish- Some ex-combatants complain that NGOs – sources of
some of the few good jobs in the Vanni – are often reluc-
tant to hire them. “Recently an NGO advertised and re-
per cent of the surveyed families reported to have no source of cruited some officers. I was qualified but they brought
income at all. Only 3 per cent of them had a family member someone from outside the district. Even though I don’t
engaged in regular salaried employment”. “Expenditure Pat-
terns of Cash-for-Work versus Non Cash-for-Work Households
within a Food Security Context”, Agency for Technical Coop-
61
eration and Development (ACTED), June 2011, p. 7 (hereinaf- The Mullaitivu district cooperative alone lost over LKR 80
ter referred to as “ACTED Survey”. The survey of families re- million ($700,000) worth of assets and infrastructure. Needs are
ceiving USAID support in the form of cash-for-work was con- gradually being met, with coolers, refrigeration facilities and an
ducted in Mannar, Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi in March 2011. ice factory in progress and replenishment of some equipment
58
“Food Security in the Northern, Eastern and North Central with donor assistance. The cooperative is back in operation and
Provinces: A Food Security Assessment Report – Sri Lanka”, is confident of building up the membership system it used ef-
Hector Kobbekaduwa Agrarian Research and Training Institute, fectively before the war. A LKR 45 million ice factory, apparent-
ministry of economic development and UN World Food Pro- ly funded by the Chinese, is being constructed in Kallappaadu.
gramme, April 2011, pp. 95-96, hereinafter referred to as “WFP Crisis Group interviews, fishermen and fishing cooperative of-
Assessment”. ficials, Mullaitivu, September 2011.
59 62
“JPA Mid-Year Review”, op. cit., p. 3. Crisis Group interview, Mullaitivu, September 2011.
60 63
“Now there is no restriction in this part. We can go at any time Though the Sri Lankan government promised loans at con-
of the day or night with a token [provided to registered fisher- cessionary rates, as of early September 2011, only fourteen
men by the military]. Even in the sea the navy does not disturb members from the Mullaitivu fishing cooperative society have
us. But we know that in some areas – for example to go to Kok- received the promised 4.5 per cent interest-rate loans from the
kilai or to go to places where the war took place – there are re- Bank of Ceylon. 200 had applied and are in the process of re-
strictions”. Crisis Group interview, fisherman, Mullaitivu, Sep- ceiving funding from other lenders at commercial rates. Some
tember 2011. On 9 July 2011, in advance of local government have resorted to borrowing from informal markets. Individual
elections in the north, the government announced it was remov- bilateral donors have taken “responsibility” for supporting the
ing all security-related restrictions on fishing. Yet, various forms restoration of the industry in different villages, but there remain
of regulation and restrictions continue to be imposed on Tamil serious gaps in coverage of villages. Crisis Group interviews,
(and at times Muslim) fishermen that are not imposed on Sinha- Mullaitivu, September 2011.
64
lese. For examples of these restrictions, see Fonseka and Ra- Crisis Group phone interview, Richard Danziger, country di-
heem, “Land in the Northern Province”, op. cit., pp. 122-123, rector, International Organisation for Migration, March 2012.
65
165-166 and 195-196. See also Watchdog, “Post war situation in Ibid. Others report that the regular checking by the military
Northern Sri Lanka & Prospects for Reconciliation”, Ground- contributes to the resistance that many employers have to hiring
views, 19 November 2011 and Mirudhula Thambiah, “Fisher- ex-detainees, already suspect to some for their real or alleged
men in the North are unsettled and unhappy”, The Sunday Times, links with the LTTE. Crisis Group interviews, ex-detainees and
11 December 2011. human rights activists, September 2011, February 2012.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 10

have the experience, if I am given a chance I would learn. says its priority is to support the most vulnerable.71 This
But NGOs are scared to take people who have come from includes the disabled and single women heading house-
detention. It is they who look at us suspiciously”.66 holds, but also the “socially vulnerable”, focusing on
“those who have been in rehab longer, the harder-core
Some of those released from detention have reported long LTTE members being released now. It is important to as-
delays in accessing promised financial assistance from the sist them quickly. This is a basic lesson of DDR [dis-
International Organisation for Migration (IOM).67 Speak- armament, demobilisation and reintegration] work from
ing in September 2011, one complained that “It is well over around the world”.72
a year since I returned and there are many others in the
village too who came around that time. None of us have
4. Poverty and food insecurity
got the assistance to date”.68 Another explained, “I went
[to the IOM office] over nine times, and now I have given Recent assessments by a variety of agencies reveal extreme-
up. Let them come. I know of others who have gone four- ly high rates of poverty and food insecurity. The WFP food
teen times and had still not got any response. We do all security assessment found poverty rates to be particularly
that we are asked to do – register with an application and high throughout the north: in all five districts more than
documents, give a plan, get quotations – but they don’t do half the population lives below the poverty line; in Kili-
what they are supposed to do”.69 nochchi, 26 per cent of households live on less than half
the official poverty line.73
IOM officials accept that their reintegration programs in
the north were slow getting off the ground and that “reha- With so few jobs or other sources of income, many peo-
bilitees” often had to wait too long to receive support. “It’s ple are struggling to buy the food they need to survive.
true, we were very behind”, says the IOM Sri Lanka coun- High food prices and poverty have forced many to eat less
try director. “I wouldn’t want to say we are completely and/or to borrow money to pay for food. The WFP survey
caught up, but we are now on track. Lack of staff was the found that more than 60 per cent of households in the
main issue, but we’ve had more funding so have been able Northern Province were food insecure, and some 15 per
to increase our support. We’ve also started to do more out- cent severely food insecure.74
reach”.70 Most released detainees reportedly use IOM fi-
nancial assistance to start their own businesses, and IOM

71
Ibid. Businesses have included home gardening, running a
shop, taxi services, tailoring, carpentry, masonry, computers,
66
Crisis Group interview, ex-detainee, Mullaitivu, September printing, and translation work. The maximum IOM grant is
2011. LKRs 65,000 ($575).
67 72
The IOM has had a program to work with those released from Ibid.
73
government “rehabilitation centres” since 2009. The program “WFP Assessment”, op. cit., p. 13. The poverty line in Sri
has been controversial since it involves assisting a “rehabilita- Lanka is 1 U.S. dollar per day.
74
tion” system that has detained as many as 12,000 people without In absolute numbers, the WFP survey estimates 649,000 peo-
charge, without access to lawyers, and without any independent ple in the north to be food insecure. Of these, 142,000 were se-
monitoring. The International Committee of the Red Cross has verely food insecure and 507,000 moderately food insecure. Ibid,
been barred from the centres since July 2009. IOM has had on- p. 80. For the purposes of the WFP study, “food security” was
ly limited access to the detainees while they are in detention defined as a “composite indicator based on income level, ex-
and has not been allowed to monitor conditions in the centres. penditure patterns and food intake” and depends on the availa-
68
Crisis Group interview, Mullaitivu, September 2011. “They bility of food and households’ access. To be food insecure is
promised in the meeting that we will be given houses. But see either to have actual difficulty affording or finding adequate
what I am now living in – and it is not even ours, it is our par- amounts of food or to be at risk of this being the case in the event
ents. My husband and I still sleep in the tent. The GS [grama of price increases or loss of income. Ibid, p. 77. The report notes
sevaka, local-level government official] was giving us govern- that “The trend and severity of food insecurity are particularly
ment assistance, but that too is finished. I would like to get worrisome in Killinochchi. Low income levels and high food
training in a technical line … but no funds. At the beginning I prices have led to weak purchasing power of households in the
heard that agencies would pay for the classes, but no one does Northern and Eastern Provinces. As a result, there are signs of
it now. I registered with IOM several months ago and got token asset depletion, high indebtedness and adaptation of relatively
number 800 odd. No one came to see me … they have lost the serious coping behaviours, especially in the Northern Province.
leasing letter … I went 4-5 times. Now I have given up and will In Vavuniya and Jaffna, the level of need in the not recently
take it whenever it comes”. returned population – a population not typically the focus of
69
Crisis Group interview, Kilinochchi, August 2011. assistance – is of similar severity as the recently returned popu-
70
Crisis Group phone interview, Richard Danziger, March 2012. lation. The most substantial food assistance reduction is ex-
Danziger reports that IOM has now assisted more than 4,000 of pected in Mullaitivu where the situation requires close monitor-
the roughly 10,000 people released from Sri Lanka “rehabilita- ing in the near future”. Ibid, p. iii. A separate study of a USAID
tion” centres. cash-for-work (CFW) program in Mannar, Mullaitivu and Kili-
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 11

The Northern Province, along with the east, has tradition- also worrying signs that with most people having no sav-
ally been the most impoverished in Sri Lanka, due in part ings or assets to fall back on, and having to borrow even
to the decades of war and devastation, as well as political to buy food, debt levels in the Vanni and elsewhere in the
neglect. The destruction of property and possessions in north are reaching dangerous levels. According to the WFP,
the final years of conflict in the north was particularly se- more than half the population in the north is indebted,
vere and left most returnees with little or nothing with with the average level of debt equalling six months of in-
which to rebuild their lives.75 As the WFP study notes, come.78 Despite the severity of the problem, the govern-
“Tens of thousands of people returned to their homelands ment has not yet extended its chief poverty alleviation
empty-handed and are still struggling to develop their live- program, known as samurdhi, to the Northern Province.79
lihoods with limited resources”.76
5. Lack of psychological support and trauma
As a result, the population of the Vanni has remained re-
counselling
liant on international food assistance, even after they were
released from camps and allowed to return home. Since Rates of war- and trauma-related mental health conditions
late 2009, the WFP has provided six to nine months of food are very high in the north. According to a 2009 study con-
assistance to all returnees. With virtually all the displaced ducted in Jaffna – but with very few who had survived the
now returned for more than nine months the level of food final months of fighting – 7 per cent of residents suffered
insecurity could well be significantly higher than when from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 22.2 per cent
the WFP survey was conducted in April 2011.77 There are from depression, and 32.6 per cent from anxiety.80 The

nochchi by ACTED found that “96 per cent of all surveyed productivity and profitability of livelihoods. Food assistance
families (CFW & non-CFW recipients) stated that their main projects should focus on creating assets and developing capaci-
monthly expenditure is for food items”. The study also found ties at the household level and on helping to address key envi-
that “Nearly 70 per cent of the beneficiaries have spent between ronmental bottlenecks such as irrigation infrastructure or road
53 per cent (LKR 16,000) and 93 per cent (LKR 28,000) of their networks”. Ibid, p. 96. In the meantime, however, “unconditional
earnings to purchase food”. “ACTED Survey”, op. cit., pp.11 safety nets without a component of work or training requirement
and 18. UNOCHA reported that in September 2011, the WFP will be necessary for vulnerable groups, including food insecure
provided food assistance to 57,858 malnourished children under households without able-bodied adult men. The size of this popu-
five years. “JHERU”, No. 37, op. cit. lation is approximately 266,000 persons”. Ibid, p. 97. According
75
Most of those recently returned to the Vanni were displaced to their spokesperson in Colombo, WFP is looking for funding
multiple times in 2008 and 2009. When fleeing the fighting, to cover assistance for an estimated 176,000 beneficiaries in the
people took as many of their possessions as they could bring north. Of this total, 65,000 would be targeted on the basis of
with them, but eventually had to abandon or sell most of their vulnerability and eligible for “food for assets” and “food for
things as they moved from place to place and eventually ended training” programs. Crisis Group phone interview, February 2012.
78
up trapped amid the fighting on the Mullaitivu coast. When en- Ibid, pp. 47-49. The ACTED study noted indications “that the
tering the huge Menik Farm displacement camps, IDPs were debts of the families are growing, while the opportunities to re-
allowed to bring in no more than five kilograms of belongings; pay the loans (from job earnings) are not necessarily arising.
many had to abandon much of what they had managed to save The inability to re-pay the loans might cause severe constraints
through the fighting, including in some cases, their pets. In the to the families in the near future”. “ACTED Survey”, op. cit., p.
end, most lost almost all they had. When they finally returned 18. “After depleting their remaining assets, people increasingly
home, they found their houses and lands looted and stripped of resort to measures such as selling most treasured personal items
anything of value they might have left. Crisis Group interviews, (jewellery, etc.) and also buy food and essential items on credit”.
aid workers and Vanni residents, September 2011. Ibid, p. 12.
76 79
“WFP Assessment” p. 86. “In the Northern Province the 26- “We don’t get samurdhi relief payments, however poor we are.
year civil war was the single most important cause of food in- That scheme is not implemented in this district”. Crisis Group
security”. In addition to the “loss of property, assets and liveli- interview, local government official, November 2010.
80
hoods due to frequent multiple displacements. … [p]oor land Farah Husain, et al., “Prevalence of war-related mental health
access for cultivation due to mined fields and high security conditions and association with displacement status in postwar
zones as well as lack of irrigation facilities and soil salinity Jaffna District, Sri Lanka”, Journal of the American Medical
have made cultivation problematic for many”. Ibid. Association, Vol. 306, No. 5 (3 August 2011). Given the sam-
77
The WFP study warns that: “With the expected continuation ple population, these figures significantly downplay the preva-
of the reduction of food assistance to the Northern Province, it lence of trauma and its psychological effects among the nearly
is likely that food security conditions will deteriorate in the 300,000 who survived the final months of fighting. The survey
coming months, particularly when the lean season approaches. interviewed 1,448 people: among these, 68.5 per cent were
Therefore, food assistance should be extended to food insecure long-time residents of Jaffna (who had either never been dis-
households until their livelihoods are re-established and sys- placed or were displaced before 2000), 29.5 per cent were “re-
tems for the monitoring of the food security situation should be cently resettled” (displaced at some point since 2000), and only
introduced”. WFP Assessment”, p. iii. “Poverty is deep and wide- 2 per cent were in displacement camps when the survey was
spread, the only sustainable solution to which is to enhance the conducted between July and September 2009. Since almost no
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 12

rates among those displaced in the final years of fighting a small number of organisations have been given permis-
were much higher: 13 per cent suffered from PTSD, 41.8 sion to provide psychological counselling and related sup-
per cent from depression and 48.5 per cent from anxiety.81 port so long as they work through local government health
services. But the need is enormous and the available staff
These latter conditions are likely to particularly affect the and programming far from adequate. In the words of a sen-
current Vanni population given its greater recent experi- ior staff member of an international organisation, “psycho-
ence of traumatic events: 68 per cent of all those surveyed social counselling is still pretty poor in the north. There is
had experienced at least one “trauma event”; among the some going on now, but not enough”.85
recently displaced, almost 58 per cent had experienced ten
or more trauma events. Among these events were the fol- Making matters worse, the government and military con-
lowing: 80 per cent of those displaced in 2008-2009 had tinue to prevent any public mourning or commemoration
experienced “attacks/bombardments with shells/rockets”, by the surviving family members of those killed in the
76.9 per cent had been “caught in crossfire of an attack or war – including religious observances for the deaths of
battle”, 60.9 per cent had been shot at by a gun, and 32.7 per civilians. In addition, attempts to commemorate the more
cent had been injured by a “knife, gun or other weapon”.82 politically charged “Heroes Day” – the LTTE’s tradition-
al day of remembrance of its fighters killed in action –
The deep personal losses and severe psychological stresses have been violently disrupted across the north since the
suffered by residents of the north help explain the large in- end of the war.86
crease in alcoholism widely reported from the Vanni, which
in turn brings other physical and psychological problems,
6. The PTF and limitations on the work
including domestic violence, sexual abuse, and economic
of humanitarian agencies
difficulties.83
The PTF’s restrictions on psycho-social programming have
For the first two years after the war, the PTF and the mili- been particularly severe, and its limitations on the opera-
tary strictly prohibited any local or international NGOs tions of humanitarian organisations in other sectors, too,
from conducting programs designed to address war-related have contributed to the serious problems northern residents
trauma and other psycho-social stresses.84 Since mid-2011, continue to face.

Appointed by the president in May 2009, the PTF was giv-

en far-reaching powers that have determined the course of
one had by then been released from the camps, few if any of the
resettlement and reconstruction of the north.87 It has cen-
“recently resettled” would have been among those displaced in
the final phase of the war.
81
Ibid.
82
Ibid. In addition: 15 per cent had been injured by “a landmine resettlement and disaster relief services, nation-building and
or unexploded ordnance”, 13.3 per cent had a “disability from estate infrastructure development, highways and road develop-
an injury received during battle or attack”, 37.3 per cent had been ment, power and energy, land and land development, health care
interrogated or harassed “by combatants and/or others with and nutrition, the chief of the defence staff, the commanders of
threats to life”, 9.8 per cent had been kidnapped or abducted, the army, navy and air force, the inspector general of police, the
6.7 per cent had been tortured, 31.2 per cent had missing or lost head of the civil defence forces, the competent authority for the
family members, 29.1 per cent had experienced the death of an Northern Province, and the former director general of the na-
acquaintance due to fighting, murder or suicide, and 28.8 per tional planning department. The responsibilities and names of
cent had experienced the death of a family member due to some of the ministries have since changed, but the PTF mem-
fighting, murder or suicide. bership is believed to remain virtually the same.
83 85
Brewing illicit alcohol has become a popular means of income Crisis Group phone interview, March 2012. A diplomat adds:
generation in the Vanni. Women are reportedly increasingly tak- “The psycho-social situation is bad, but yes, it is possible to do
ing it up since it is considered comparatively easy work and is it now, though very difficult. You have to work very closely with
very lucrative. This places them, and particularly their young local-level health services and present it as a capacity building
daughters, vulnerable to exploitation, violence and other prob- project for local structures. But there is an opening on this fi-
lems. For further discussion of problems faced by women in the nally, a recognition that there is a large population who is psy-
Vanni, see Crisis Group Report, Women’s Insecurity in the North chologically shaken up”. Crisis Group interview, January 2012.
and East, op. cit. See also “There is an urgent need for psychological assistance
84
The PTF was established in mid-May 2009, in the closing days in the North”, Groundviews, 30 July 2011.
86
of the war. Its chairman has from the beginning been Basil Ra- For a longer discussion of government efforts to prevent the
japaksa, one of the president’s brothers and now the minister of commemoration of Tamils killed in the fighting, whether civil-
economic development, and the secretary has been S.B. Diva- ian or LTTE, see Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s North I: The
ratne. There is no publicly available list of the current member- Denial of Minority Rights, op. cit., section III.D.
87
ship of the PTF, but when first appointed, its other seventeen The basis of the PTF’s legal authority is uncertain, given that
members were the secretary to the president, the defence secre- it was established neither by an act of parliament nor by a pub-
tary, the secretaries to the ministries of finance and planning, lic notification in the government gazette.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 13

tralised virtually all decision-making in a small number of These and other PTF restrictions were motivated in part by
mostly Sinhalese officials in Colombo, with a prominent a general suspicion of international humanitarian agencies
role given to military officials. and aid workers, whom the government, and especially mil-
itary leaders, saw as key sources of information and critical
In the first two years of return and resettlement of the Van- analysis to the outside world and an impediment to im-
ni, the task force placed strict limitations on which NGOs plementing government policies on the ground. “Hardware”
could work in the north and which services they could de- programs, such as the provision of infrastructure and tan-
liver, as well as time-consuming restrictions on visas and gible goods and other forms of material support to return-
military controls on the movement of NGO vehicles and ees are also easier to monitor and control, and, some would
foreign workers.88 Its regime of permits, approvals and argue, to profit from.
extensive reporting requirements, often applied arbitrari-
ly, has significantly reduced the amount and quality of the In the second half of 2011, PTF reporting and approval
assistance delivered to the north.89 procedures were made more efficient, making work easier
for NGOs so long as they operate within the priorities laid
Until mid-2011, the PTF routinely denied permission for down by the task force. The July 2011 removal of the re-
projects including a “software” program – ranging from quirement for defence ministry pre-authorisation for for-
beneficiary consultations, field-based needs assessments, eigners travelling to the north has also made work easier
social mobilisation, local capacity building, community for international agencies. Nonetheless, the government
level trainings, psycho-social programs, and gender and priority for “hardware” remains strong and “soft” program-
human rights awareness projects. In a typical case, ex- ming that targets community development and rights pro-
plains a senior aid worker, “The PTF forced a European- tections are rarely approved. “The PTF’s latest stand”, ex-
funded recovery program scheduled for implementation plains the senior aid worker, “seems to be an acceptance of
through leading INGOs and NGOs to be revised, strip- ‘software’ – but only when implemented through govern-
ping it of all ‘software’ and other unwanted activities and ment agencies as a part of their routine work. Rights aware-
requiring it to focus on ‘hardware’. The agencies, if they ness and social mobilisation are still out of the question”.91
were to implement any program at all, had no option but
to comply, which they did without public protest”.90 Aid workers point to standoffs in 2011 between the PTF
and humanitarian actors on access, on priority areas and
on recognition of the legitimate role of NGOs in resettle-
ment, as well as the task force’s pressure on UN agencies
88 and bilateral donors to fund activities directly through
Projects could be implemented only through agencies – in-
government bodies.92 More recently, Colombo has begun
ternational or Sri Lankan – approved by the PTF to work in the
north, even when agencies were already properly registered with pressing donors and implementing agencies to limit aid to
the NGO secretariat or the district secretary. Until late 2011, a recently resettled communities and instead to focus their
recommendation from the PTF was required for operational assistance on the longer-term displaced Muslim and Sin-
agencies to gain ministry of defence approval to enter the re- halese populations.93 As noted above, the PTF has attempt-
gion to work. The task force also played a role in determining
and allocating the specific divisions and villages in which an
agency could implement its projects. If the project activity, im-
plementing partner or the village had to be altered during the sustainable and people-centred resettlement drawn from years
course of implementation, the approval process had to start of humanitarian response. A smaller number of aid workers and
again from scratch. donors point to positive aspects of the PTF’s work, including
89
Stringent PTF controls, some of which ran counter to estab- the sense of urgency that it has brought to tangible activities like
lished principles for sustainable resettlement, led some donors well-cleaning, jungle-clearing, and the distribution of agricul-
to reduce their support. In the words of a senior aid worker, “The ture starter packs; its generally strict accountability for physical
strong arm tactics of the PTF, aimed at getting more resettlement deliverables; and improved coordination across divisions and
funds channelled through government mechanisms for priori- districts. Crisis Group interviews, UN and NGO workers, Sep-
ties it determined, did not find favour with some donors, who tember 2011 and January 2012.
91
had legitimate reservations about the centralisation and milita- Crisis Group interview, senior aid worker, November 2011.
92
risation of the process”. Crisis Group email correspondence, Crisis Group interviews, diplomats and staff with humanitar-
March 2012. ian organisations, September 2011 and March 2012.
90 93
Crisis Group interview, senior aid worker, November 2011. Ibid. In a letter to UN agencies and heads of NGOs, the PTF
Many experienced humanitarian workers, as well as local gov- announced a target of having “no IDPs at the end of the year”
ernment officials well versed in responding to emergencies, are and request agencies to “formulate your project proposals for
critical of the PTF for centralising decisions and “straight- the year 2012 taking into consideration” three priorities: fami-
jacketing” the resettlement work of many agencies, ultimately lies displaced before 1995, families still in Menik Farm camp
to the detriment of the population in need. They argue the PTF and others displaced from the same areas, and those still dis-
functioned as an additional layer of bureaucratic administrative placed from areas recently opened for resettlement in Mullaitivu.
control, with its directives contradicting essential lessons on Assistance to those already resettled was not listed as a priority.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 14

ed – with some success – to reduce the official count of and threats. The government has cancelled or refused to
both “new” and “old” IDPs in an effort to present the prob- renew the visas or work permits of a long list of interna-
lem as largely solved.94 tional aid workers who have made critical public com-
ments and/or were suspected of sharing information with
This is one example of a larger government strategy of diplomats, human rights organisations or journalists.99
controlling and limiting information needed to assess the “PNG-ing is an old trick to mute the critical voices or those
humanitarian and development needs of the region and to perceived as being too well informed. … The government
monitor the effectiveness of government and international is profoundly allergic to those INGO reps who manage to
programs. In the words of a diplomat, “preventing inde- get better organised among themselves and vis-à-vis the
pendent and thoroughly evidence-based needs analysis is UN”.100 Some bilateral donors, in particular the U.S., have
a main feature of the Sri Lankan government’s strategy had some occasional success in persuading the government
for keeping control over developments in the north.”95 to relax restrictions on issuing visas for international work-
ers, but there have been few if any collective attempts to
Aid workers and donors regularly report difficulties in defend aid workers from government retribution.
getting permission to conduct rigorous needs assessments
in the north and east under the current government. When The source of many of the restrictions on humanitarian as-
assessments are allowed, there are tight restrictions on the sistance and information gathering and sharing has been
range of issues that can be explored and questions asked.96 the military and the prioritisation of its restricted definition
Finally, what information is gathered by agencies is tightly of national security. The military continues to be the first
guarded, at times making sharing difficult even between and final authority throughout the north.
UN agencies. A former UN staff member has described his
repeated failures in obtaining human rights related data
from another UN agency, even in confidential settings
convened precisely for the purpose of information sharing
and collaboration, and even though the information was
being shared with the government.97 Echoing a commonly
heard complaint, a diplomat adds, “Information gathering
and sharing among aid stakeholders is poorly managed
and subject to political manipulation. There is lots of self-
censorship.”98

The crippling lack of information sharing within and be-

tween UN agencies and between the UN, INGOs and the
public is in large part a response to Colombo’s pressures

“Assistance of UN agencies and NGOs in resettlement activi-

ties in the north”, PTF letter, 21 December 2011. According to
a senior aid worker, “At least 10 NGOs have been requested to
shift activities to meet the priorities laid out in the PTF letters,
regardless of needs assessments and local authorities’ requests”.
Crisis Group email correspondence, March 2012.
94
See notes 31 and 33. Traces of the dispute can be seen in the
2012 JPA’s discussion of the need for an assessment of the
numbers of protracted IDPs and those living with friends, rela-
tives and host families. According to an official with UNHCR,
99
“a joint survey of protracted IDPs” began in the third quarter of One of the best known casualties of government vengeance
2011 and includes participation from the PTF and the ministries was UNICEF spokesperson James Elder, forced to leave Sri
of resettlement, defence and industries and commerce, along Lanka in September 2009. “Sri Lanka expels Unicef official”,
with UNHCR, WFP, and the UN Office for Project Services BBC News, 7 September 2009. At least two senior aid workers
(UNOPS). “The survey is going quite slowly. Government co- have had their visas cancelled in early 2012, both known for
operation may be waning. We would like very much for the sur- their strong commitments to humanitarian principles. Crisis
vey to remain joint, as it’s important that its finding get buy-in Group interviews, diplomats and aid workers, March 2012. There
from all stakeholders”. Crisis Group phone interview, March 2012. are also reports of increased government scrutiny of humanitar-
95
Crisis Group phone interview, March 2012. ian agencies in late 2011 and early 2012. This has included de-
96
Crisis Group interviews, September and December 2011, Feb- tentions of local staff, questioning of organisations and request
ruary and March 2012. for personnel details of staff. Crisis Group email correspondence,
97
Crisis Group email correspondence, December 2011. lawyer, March 2012.
98 100
Crisis Group phone interview, March 2012. Crisis Group email correspondence, diplomat, March 2012.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 15

III. LAND, RESOURCES AND THE disbursement events.103 In some locations the military has
MILITARISATION OF NORTHERN reportedly also been tasked with monitoring progress on
behalf of the PTF.104
DEVELOPMENT
A government official posted in the north explains, “We
A. THE MILITARY TAKEOVER have been instructed to keep the military informed and
OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND involved in all our activities. We have a letter from the PTF
DECISION-MAKING saying that we have to invite the military for all our func-
tions like handing over, planning development projects,
The military rules the north in part by exercising forms of etc.” Another explains that for each humanitarian or devel-
power that are not within its traditional ambit. Crucial opment project “We have to get the beneficiary lists ap-
among these are its de facto control over what development proved by the military in the area. That is the responsibility
and humanitarian projects are allowed in the Northern of the department concerned. The army uses it to verify as
Province; how, where and by whom resources and services well as to track what assistance people have got”.105
are distributed; and who benefits from them.
Donors and officials with humanitarian organisations have
In the absence of an elected provincial council, the north been worried by the formal power granted by the PTF to
is governed by Colombo through the appointed provincial the military to approve beneficiaries of humanitarian and
governor, retired major general G.A. Chandrasiri.101 The development assistance in the north.106 All projects imple-
day-to-day administration in each of the province’s five mented by NGOs and civilian government agencies have
districts is carried out by the district secretary (also known required the submission of beneficiary lists to the local
as the government agent), under whom serve divisional military commanders for approval. While the military does
secretaries. This civil administration in the north is paral- actively cross-check the list of beneficiaries, the worst
lel to – and frequently overruled by – a separate military fears of many – that it would actively work to deny benefits
architecture. The military command structure consists of to particular individuals or categories of individuals – do
a security forces headquarters (SFHQ), headed by a major- not appear to have materialised. District-level government
general, roughly covering the boundaries of each district, officials and humanitarian workers more often complain
in which army divisions and task forces are stationed in about delays in implementing projects due to the extra
different camps. Each division is usually headed by a brig- step of getting army approval of beneficiaries, as well as
adier or a colonel. There are also naval and air force bases the military leveraging their position of power in the pro-
with separate commands structures, but under the overall cess to their advantage.107
coordination of the district SFHQ.
Nonetheless the military’s review of beneficiary lists gives
While the mostly Tamil civil administration is nominally it an additional tool of control over the local population.
in charge of decisions on reconstruction, land and reset- Just as they did with the LTTE in the recent past, many
tlement in the north, the almost entirely Sinhala military residents in the north already regularly appeal to the mili-
has enormous powers to interfere with and in most cases
directly determine policies on issues it considers important.
103
The PTF has been an important vehicle by which the mili- New UN-sponsored guidelines are designed to prevent this
tary has taken on a bigger role in the resettlement process. from continuing. “Guidelines on humanitarian communications
The senior most leaders of the military are all included at with military authorities” (UN Guidelines), UN Country Team
the apex of the task force102, ex-military personnel are in- and Humanitarian Country Team, Sri Lanka, October 2011. See
the conclusion of this section for more details.
volved in the project and agency approval processes, and 104
Crisis Group interviews, government official, Vavuniya, Sep-
local area commanders have been given the power to ap- tember 2011.
prove beneficiary lists for humanitarian projects. NGOs 105
Crisis Group interviews, senior government officials, North-
and development agencies have been required to invite ern Province, September 2011. In a representative letter from
local commanders for consultations, openings and project the PTF approving work in the north, an NGO was “kindly re-
quested to select the Grama Niladhari [GN] divisions and bene-
ficiaries in consultation with the divisional secretary and the
brigade commander”. PTF letter, October 2011.
106
In a letter to the five district secretaries of the Northern Prov-
101
Chandrasiri was security forces commander for Jaffna until ince, the secretary to the PTF ordered that “all the [beneficiary]
January 2009, when he was appointed as the competent authori- selection lists must be vetoed [sic] and finalized by a committee
ty for the Northern Province, chiefly in charge of the massive in- comprising of the Divisional Secretary, the Divisional Coordi-
ternment camps in Menik Farm, Vavuniya, where nearly 300,000 nator and a representative of the Brigade Commander.” “Shel-
survivors of the war were held. He was appointed governor in ter, wash, livelihood and other assistance to resettled families”,
July 2009. PTF, 1 July 2010.
102 107
See note 84 above. Crisis Group interviews, Northern Province, September 2011.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 16

tary as the final authority over local disputes, including in official like a DS doesn’t accept [the military’s] decisions
cases where some are seen to receive opportunities or re- or are doing anything contrary, then they openly say ‘we
sources that others have been denied. This power is rein- heard that you are a DS who was supportive of LTTE’.
forced by the fact that it has resources of its own – includ- Everyone had to toe the line when LTTE was around and
ing houses, boats, vehicles and equipment – which it can now has to do the same with the army”.113
choose to distribute as it wishes.108
In this context, the October 2011 UN-drafted guidelines
On some occasions, particularly with regard to resettlement limiting the extent of cooperation and communications
issues and the need for land, military commanders directly between humanitarian agencies and Sri Lankan military
take over decision-making power. For instance, a brigade authorities has been a welcome and long-overdue initia-
commander in Mullaitivu reportedly “told the people of tive, despite the fact that they merely restate established
Maruthodai not to go to their lands and that he will arrange international humanitarian standards and practices.114 The
to give them land for cultivation in the interior and for guidelines prohibit UN agencies and partner NGOs and
them to give up their land in the border areas. The people INGOs from:
seem to have agreed probably out of fear. He told the peo-
ple that the DS [divisional secretary] had agreed to the plan  providing military authorities with information regard-
and he told the DS that he had spoken to the people and ing individual beneficiaries of programs and projects,
that they had agreed”.109 or allowing military engagement in humanitarian as-
sessments, beneficiary selection processes and project
The military has also asserted its control by regularly tak- evaluations;
ing charge of meetings that are under the purview of civil-
ian authorities. This closes the space for meaningful con-  participating in humanitarian coordination meetings,
sultations and allows it to force acceptance of decisions review meetings or other meetings of civilian nature
made in advance. “When first there was a meeting in Menik undertaken at military installations, or led/co-led by
Farm regarding resettlement of the remaining people in military personnel;
the camp, the general view was that they prefer to go to  utilising military assets in the delivery of humanitarian
their own villages. The army facilitated the meeting and assistance;
basically said that it is not an option”.110 After a few addi-
tional meetings, the first batch of families were moved to  cooperating with any military monitoring or observing
the relocation village currently being constructed in Kom- of the delivery of humanitarian and development pro-
bavil, yet without a clear plan as to when or whether they grams.115
will be able to settle back in their villages.111 Government
“The guidelines are commendable and a rare sign of inter-
officials, as well as the UN and NGOs, have been affected
agency policy collaboration”, says a diplomat.116 “How-
by this local military decision-making.
ever, the impact at the field level remains limited. District
Given the power imbalance between the military and the military commanders have continued to call in recent
Tamil civil servants in the north, there is little the latter can months for aid coordination under their supervision. Lo-
do.112 As one civil servant explains, “If any government cal NGOs feel vulnerable and respond to these calls. Field
coordination among UN, INGOs and NGOs is erratic, and
coordination between field and capital is inconsistent and
subject to self-censorship”.117 It remains to be seen what
108
In other cases, the military has been known to pressure NGOs
to build facilities for Sinhalese families who are not actually
living there but are temporarily returning in order to access
government assistance during cultivation season, for example Crisis Group interviews, Vavuniya, September 2011. While the
near Paavatkulam, in Vavuniya. accuracy of the causal connection is difficult to establish, it is
109
Crisis Group interview, government official, Mullaitivu, clear that the local government officials know who holds the
September 2011. power in the region and condition their behaviour accordingly.
110 113
Crisis Group interview, government official, Vavuniya, Sep- Crisis Group interview, Northern Province, September 2011.
114
tember 2011. UN Guidelines, op. cit.
111 115
For a detailed discussion of the problems associated with the Ibid. The guidelines do allow “the participation of relevant
relocation of Menik Farm residents to Kombavil, see Section military officials at ‘Progress Review’ or other humanitarian co-
III.B.1.2 below. ordination meetings” so long as “such meetings are undertaken
112
Active resistance to military plans can bring severe reper- under civilian authority leadership and at civilian venues”.
116
cussions. Another official asked, “You know what happened to Crisis Group email correspondence, March 2012.
117
the Karachchi DS, right? She was not very amenable to the ar- Ibid. Crisis Group has confirmed that at least some local
my because she was raising some issues regarding land taken commanders in the north and east – in Mannar, Trincomalee, and
for military camp expansion. She is no more there, has been trans- Batticaloa – have continued to invite NGOs and INGOs to dis-
ferred. To survive in the system we have to work accordingly”. trict-level humanitarian coordination meetings as recently as
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 17

long-term impact the new UN position will have and wheth- an aid worker. “There are no-go areas scattered through-
er enough support will be given to local NGOs to empower out the Vanni. Small camps are everywhere”.121 With the
them to resist military interference. military and its interests deciding who is allowed to return
to their home villages, some critical areas still remain
closed to residents.
B. INFRASTRUCTURE OF CONTROL:
MILITARY CAMPS AND THE SEIZURE The system of camps and checkpoints constitutes an un-
OF LAND precedented physical entrenchment of the military in the
daily life of the northern population, with negative effects
Underpinning the military’s ability to control the popula- on the hoped-for return to normalcy. The process of es-
tion is a network of newly built or rebuilt military camps tablishing these camps has already contributed to simmer-
located throughout the Northern Province. The government ing anger among the many people directly affected and
justifies this network as essential to ensure there will be actively undermines the chances of reconciliation. What
no future armed uprising. Whatever the intention, the army, follows is an overview of some of the largest and best
navy and air force are setting up a comprehensive security known of the recently built camps. Many other smaller
complex consisting of major base camps linked to a sys- camps exist, but are harder to visit and investigate.122
tem of detachments and satellite camps. These include
large cantonments, some of which feature Chinese-built 1. New military camps and continued
housing that is distinct from typical military-style barracks. displacement
Among northern Tamils, these are widely believed to be
designed to house military families.118 1.1. Kilinochchi-Iranamadu camp
The largest of the new cantonments has been built in the
This infrastructure is further reinforced by a large increase centre of the Vanni, stretching along the A9 highway from
in the number of military intelligence units119 and numer- the village of Murigandi, south of Kilinochchi town, up to
ous checkpoints dotted across the Northern Province. While Iranamadu. The camp goes east to include areas on the far
almost all the checkpoints have been removed from the side of the Iranamadu reservoir and zones the LTTE used
A9 highway,120 the main arterial that links the north and as bases, including its Iranamadu airstrip and adjoining
the south, it is a different story in the interior of the Van- villages. The camp’s establishment has required the dis-
ni. There, nearly three years after the war, checkpoints get placement of numerous families from their houses and
denser as you go further in. “It’s two different worlds”, says lands.123

Initially a large section of the village of Shantapuram,

January. Some NGOs have attended. In addition, military offi- which forms one of the camp’s boundaries, was to be in-
cials have continued to request information on projects and staff cluded within it. More than 100 families who returned from
members from humanitarian organisations in the field. Crisis Menik Farm internment were forced to spend months in a
Group interviews, UN and humanitarian agency staff, March 2012. nearby school building. The army first insisted that all of
118
The following statement from army Commander Jagath them had to be relocated and would be given land else-
Jayasuriya is notable in this regard: “Army personnel arriving where. But after strong resistance by the families and lo-
in those areas for duty are to be provided permanent houses and cal government officials, which garnered international
allowed to engage in cultivation work if they so desire”. “Asgi- publicity, the army relented and released over 80 per cent
ri-Malwatte Prelates Laud Army’s Role in Development”, Sri
of the village for resettlement. The bold defence of the
Lankan army website (army.lk), 26 June 2011. Government of-
ficials have denied there are any plans to bring military families
to live in the north [cite], yet the army commander is quoted as
121
having told troops on 1 March 2012 that “while scaling down Crisis Group interview, senior aid worker, October 2011.
122
the number of different regimental and area headquarters and There are also numerous places throughout the north where
presence of troops in the North and East, plans are afoot to as- the military occupies small plots of land, a house or a building.
semble more and more battalions together to form only most Some of these had been taken from their original owners and
required headquarters. In such places, both officers and other occupied by the LTTE during their years in control. Since the
ranks are to be housed after marriage with members of their end of the war, the military has taken over these properties, un-
families”. Army to scale down its presence with planned struc- der the pretext that former guerrillas’ property now belongs to
tural reforms – Commander”, army.lk, 1 March 2012. the army.
119 123
Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa is reported to have While the Kilinochchi-Iranamadu camp is huge, it was built
said that the army has increased its intelligence units from one to around a captured LTTE camp and by clearing additional jun-
six, in order to counter the threat from LTTE remnants. “LTTE gle. As a result, it is only villages along the edges of the camp
‘still trying to cause trouble’”, BBC Sinhala, 21 October 2011. where people have been prevented from returning home. In ad-
120
The main checkpoint at Omanthai, which was once the de dition to the examples cited in the text, there may be a number
facto border between government and LTTE-held territory, re- of other villages with marginal displacement which Crisis Group
mains in operation. was not able to visit.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 18

villagers’ land rights by the then divisional secretary for UN in trying to mediate have been futile in the face of
Karachchi is widely believed to be responsible for her military intransigence.129
subsequent transfer.124
In addition, the military has restricted fishing in the Irana-
About 30 houses and private plots of land remain inside madu lake to half the area, badly affecting the 100 families
the perimeter fence of the newly established camp. As a who rely on this activity for their livelihoods.130 “Land on
compromise arrangement, the remaining families were al- the built-up side of the tank [reservoir] is occupied by the
located land adjoining the village and promised temporary military and so are vast stretches on either side of the
shelter, water and sanitation facilities. According to them, tank. … The army took us and marked the boundary with
none of the promises have been kept. Many of them have flags and there is a sentry watching over all the time ….
large and well-built houses on their own plots and have When we start fishing, the fish run off to the army’s end
refused to renounce their rights to the original lands. The and we can’t go there for fishing …. Another problem is the
families concerned are slowly building up their lives from tank shrinks as the water dries up and the effective area in
scratch in tents, huts and damaged structures, while see- which we can fish reduces. During the dry season the
ing their well-built houses across the fence being used by available portion can get down to less than a quarter of its
military.125 size for all the families to fish from”.131

The camp has also caused further displacement along its There have been reports that the army has allowed Sinhala
south western border. The military has earmarked several fishermen to fish in the Iranamadu tank during the nights,
acres of land along the A9 as a buffer zone, has occupied whereas Tamil fishermen are allowed to fish only during
private paddy lands and also refused permission for over the day. As a person familiar with the situation explained
115 families to return to their homes in Murigandi.126 in August 2011:
These families have been living there since the 1970s and
despite having returned from Menik Farm in 2010, they Even last week there were ten Sinhala fishermen who
still have not been able to get back to their homes.127 “We were caught fishing in the tank. When they were caught
have complained to several authorities. The army totally the local fishermen immediately informed the military
refuses to give it back. We don’t understand why they are
not willing to give our land. We know that a section of the
village is now inside the camp and they are fencing it. But 129
why can’t they allow the land in front that is outside the “A few days ago we had a meeting. It was convened by Mul-
fence?”128 Efforts by local government authorities and the laitivu AGA [additional government agent] because of our re-
peated pleas. There also were the land officer, officials from the
Oddusuddan divisional secretary’s office and also UN staff. They
were asking about our problem. Then suddenly the local mili-
tary commander came. He was very agitated. He said how can
anyone organise a meeting without informing him or inviting
him. He said the land issues in the area have already been de-
124
Crisis Group interview, local government official, Vavuni- cided, and there is no more discussion needed: the army has
ya, August 2011. been given the land by Mahinda Rajapaksa and that decision
125
Crisis Group interview, displaced family, Shanthapuram, cannot be changed. Then the AGA was helpless. He asked us
August 2011. what our opinion is. We told him that we want to return to our
126
Community leaders report that the military’s original plan land. He discussed with the commander and informed him that
was to take over the whole village, displacing over 250 fami- he will report about the meeting to his superior [the Mullaitivu
lies. They believe these plans were later scaled back and a little district secretary] and for the commander to inform his superior
over half allowed to return to their land as a direct consequence and let them come to some decision. The commander got even
of them raising the issue with Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama more agitated, saying there is no more discussion on this. He
Rao during her August 2010 visit to Kilinochchi in the presence threatened the families saying ‘either you accept the alternate
of the northern province governor. Crisis Group interviews, land we are proposing [about 3km away] or I will see to it that
Murigandi, September 2011. you all are put in Kombavil and are not allowed to move from
127
“We came and settled in these areas in the 1970s. Since then there for at least 10 years’”. Crisis Group interview, villager,
we have developed these lands. We cleared the lands. There are Murigandi, September 2011.
130
coconut trees, jack trees, wells. Each of us had about an acre or An activist who has visited the fishing communities in
so and we did small cultivation in our lands. For many of us this Iranamadu explains that the restrictions on access mean fisher-
is all we have”. Crisis Group interviews, Murigandi, Kilinochchi, men have to go four kilometres out of their way. “Using manu-
September 2011. al row boats, they row eight kilometres in, lay the nets and row
128
Villagers also stated that: “We are willing to give part of our back and then come back the next day, making an extra sixteen
land to those [29] families [in Shantapuram] who have lost land kilometres rowing each day. This is very tiring. And with the
to the army camp, if they allow the 115 families to settle [in Mu- smaller catches, they are just surviving”. Crisis Group phone
rigandi]”. Crisis Group interviews, Murigandi, Kilinochchi, Sep- interview, December 2011.
131
tember 2011. Crisis Group interview, villager, Shantapuram, August 2011.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 19

… [which] asked them to destroy all the tents and the 200 families of the village …. If Kokkuthuduvai people
tubes … The army confiscated all the fish they caught are resettled and they go for cultivation in their land,
and gave it to the local fishermen. They asked them to we may come across problems of Sinhalese cultivat-
pay for the transport cost for the Sinhala fishermen to ing. We don’t know because none of us are allowed to
get back to their villages, which was 13,500 rupees. go into those areas. We know that there are such prob-
They sold the fish in the market for 100,000 rupees of lems in Oddusuddan and Nedunkerny DS divisions. In
which the military asked for 50,000 to buy a motor, our areas we will know only when people are actually
some chairs and table for the camp … These things resettled.137
happen and people have to live with it. Local fishermen
are not allowed to stay in the nights, but strangely these A similar situation is also reported from Kaeppapulavu
Sinhala fishermen seem to be able to fish in the night. village in Mullaitivu district. While the villagers in the
I am not saying that the military is assisting or the com- vicinity reported an expanding military installation in this
manders are purposely doing it, but you know there are village, the army maintained that resettlement was being
army soldiers who are making use of the situation”.132 postponed on account of mine-clearance. In the words of
a senior humanitarian worker, “In Kaeppapulavu they say
But some fishermen noted that in certain ways the situa- mines, but the army has a big camp built in the village and
tion had improved in mid-2011 since the army now “does they are even doing paddy cultivation in lands belonging
not ask for fish or engage in extortion. The commander has to the villagers”.138
strictly ordered them not to do that and he has also told us
not to give any fish”.133 The best-known instance of the military re-displacing peo-
ple concerns eight or nine Grama Niladhari [GN] divisions
1.2. Mullaitivu army and navy bases and forced in Mullaitivu – amounting to more than nine villages – to
relocation to Kombavil which residents are not being allowed to return from Menik
There are also a number of cases in Maritimepattu and Farm.139 The closed area includes the string of coastal vil-
Puthukkudiyiruppu divisional secretary (DS) divisions134 lages in Maritimepattu DS division which were the site of
where resettlement has been hampered by irregular sei- the last stages of war, as well as other villages, some of
zures of land for new military installations. Kaeppapu- which have been taken over by a large new military base.
lavu, a village west of Nandikadal lagoon (and scene of The central government and army have officially main-
the final battles of the war) and Kokkuthuduvai are two tained that the closure of the villages is temporary and that
such locations. people will be allowed to return home after mines and un-
exploded ordnance have been cleared.140 While the army
According to a government official, “They plan to resettle has now commissioned demining agency work in most of
people in Karunaddankerni, which is adjoining Kokku- the affected villages, some remain fully closed, with even
thuduvai, … but they have refused to allow villagers of humanitarian agencies not allowed to visit.141 Privately,
Kokkuthuduvai to come back because they have a camp
in part of the village”.135 Given its proximity to the Sinha- 137
la settlements in the Weli Oya/Manal Aru area, this has Crisis Group interviews, local government official, Mullai-
also given rise to anxiety about the land.136 He adds: tivu, September 2011.
138
Crisis Group interviews, Mullaitivu, September 2011.
139
We don’t know what is happening to the paddy lands According to the ministry of defence, the affected area in-
cludes ten GN divisions – three in Maritimepattu division and
of the people of Kokkuthuduvai. They are well-irrigated
seven in Puthukudiyiruppu (PTK) division. “Govt. to shut down
and fertile lands and the main livelihood for about Manik Farm, remaining IDPs to be resettled in Kombavil”,
ministry of defence, 20 September 2011. According to a humani-
tarian group, the inaccessible GN divisions in Maritimepattu
132
Crisis Group interview, fisherman, Shantapuram, August 2011. are Mullaivaikal East (partial), Mullaivaikal West, and Am-
133
Crisis Group interviews, fishermen, Shantapuram, August 2011. pelavanpkanai; in PTK: PTK East, PTK West, Sivanagar, Man-
134
The highest ranking official in each district is the district thuvil, Malligaitheevu, and Ananthapuram. In addition, “mili-
secretary, also known as the government agent, or GA. Each tary installations continue to occupy lands of origin of IDPs” in
district is divided into “divisional secretary divisions”, known Keppapulavu GN division in Maritimepattu. Unpublished doc-
as DS divisions, and headed by a divisional secretary. Each DS ument, humanitarian advocacy organisation, September 2011.
140
division, in turn, is divided into “Grama Niladhari divisions”, “The government has taken this remedial measure until total
or GN divisions, headed by a grama niladhari, still frequently completion of ongoing de-mining process”. “Govt. to shut down
referred to according to the former title of “grama sevaka”. Manik Farm, remaining IDPs to be resettled in Kombavil”, op. cit.
135 141
Crisis Group interviews, senior humanitarian worker, Kili- The UN announced that “on 2 November 2011, the govern-
nochchi, September 2011. ment permitted mine action activities to commence in six GNDs
136
For an extensive discussion of Weli Oya/Manal Aru, see in PTK DSD: PTK West and East, Malagathivu, Sevanagar,
Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s North I: The Denial of Minority Manthuvil and Anandapuram”. “JHERU” No. 38, op. cit. Two
Rights, op. cit. and a half GN divisions along the coast in Maritimepattu divi-
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 20

some local government officials expect some, if not all, Some fear moving to Kombavil will mean either continu-
of those affected will likely be permanently displaced.142 ing to live in limbo, as they await a chance to return home,
or else will result in losing their right to move back to their
Many of the displaced villagers are among the last 6,700 original lands. Many of the families fear the loss of their
still housed in Menik Farm; others are with friends and traditional livelihoods, which depended on fishing and easy
relatives spread across different parts of the north.143 Some, access to the sea. Some have petitioned the Sri Lankan
exhausted by two and a half years in camps and under in- Human Rights Commission demanding they be allowed to
tense pressure from the government, have now agreed to return to their homes.147
move to a newly constructed 600-acre “village” recently
carved from the jungle in Kombavil.144 Located 8km from Despite advocacy by UNHCR and donors, the government
the coast, conditions in this new “village” remain rudimen- has failed to consult meaningfully or share adequate in-
tary: the housing only semi-permanent, and little infra- formation with those affected and has offered no practical
structure built as of the end of 2011.145 alternatives to relocation to Kombavil. According to an
activist who met some of the recently relocated families,
Discussions with villagers indicate that most would strong- “people didn’t feel they had an option to say no. Govern-
ly prefer to return to their villages as soon as possible.146 ment officials said they couldn’t tell them when they might
be able return to their home villages, so people felt they
had no choice. It amounts to forced relocation. The mili-
tary has now experimented with the first batch and they’ve
sion remain fully closed and no demining activities authorised. gotten away with it”.148
Crisis Group phone interview, UN official, March 2012.
142
One government official was more hopeful: “I am optimis-
Given the clear questions about the voluntary nature of
tic. Sitting in Menik Farm after the war, I did not think that
things would improve. Earlier we thought that many of the are- the process, UN agencies and international donors are not
as, we may not be allowed to return. But that has not been the currently funding the relocation to Kombavil or offering
case. Some villages, like Karunaddankerni, Puthukudiyiruppu, any support for those who have moved. The UN and do-
etc., we thought will never get resettled so quickly, but they nors are currently assessing their position and have re-
have been …. So it might seem impossible now, but many of the quested more information from the government about
banned villages will also I think eventually get resettled. But of Kombavil and plans for the closed villages. They have yet
course in the interim it will be misery for the people and we to express any public concerns about the forced re-dis-
might lose a generation”. Crisis Group interviews, Mullaitivu, placement.149
September 2011.
143
As of 31 November, 6,732 remained displaced in Menik
Farm camp, which the government is eager to close. An un-
published document from a humanitarian group mentions that
according to an unconfirmed estimate from the military, anoth- witnessed there in the last days of fighting, as well as those who
er 31,000 people could be among the displaced from these did not have any land and for whom half an acre and a govern-
GNs. This would be consistent with the average population of a ment house may be a promising option. According to diplomats
GN division in Maritimepattu, which is more than 1,000, and and UN officials, a majority of the small number of IDPs al-
the average population of GN divisions in PTK, which is more lowed to visit Kombavil in October indicated a willingness to
than 4,000. move. Crisis Group email correspondence, December 2011.
144 147
The new settlement is in Thippily, an area which is mostly “Re-displacement of Menik Farm inmates to Kombavil (Mul-
forest and shrub, in the Kombavil GN division. The site is re- laitivu)”, Watchdog, Groundviews, 3 October 2011.
148
portedly close to the army’s 68th Division Training School. The Crisis Group phone interview, human rights activist, Co-
first group of 72 families (229 individuals) was moved on short lombo, December 2011. According to an official with UNHCR,
notice to the site in late November 2011. Crisis Group inter- “Those still in Menik Farm have never been provided by the
views, diplomat and human rights activist, Colombo, December government with any written list of what will be provided when
2011. See also “JHERU”, No. 38, op. cit. The government in- and if they move to the Kombavil site. The government has not
tends the remainder of those in Menik Farm to be sent to Kom- provided this despite us pressing for it. There has also been no
bavil in 2012. For a valuable analysis and critique of the Kom- clear government statement on their plans for the remaining
bavil relocation project, see “The Resettlement Report”, Tamil closed areas. There has been a variety of different claims that the
National Alliance, October-December 2011. areas will eventually be released but with no clear timetables or
145
Crisis Group phone interview, human rights activist, Colom- written promises”. Crisis Group phone interview, March 2012.
149
bo, December 2011. Those villagers allowed to visit Kombavil An official with UNHCR states that “The UN’s policy con-
reportedly expressed concerns about the lack of access to paddy tinues to be one of non-engagement with Kombavil other than
lands, the inadequate number of wells, and the small size of the for protection work”, but that this policy “is currently under re-
shelters and kitchens. Unpublished donor documents, October examination”. On the question of the alleged forced nature of
2011. the move to Kombavil, the official says “It’s a complicated sit-
146
Crisis Group interviews, government and UN officials, NGO uation; it’s not all good or all bad. It’s clear that when you speak
workers, September 2011. The exceptions are those that may not to people at the Kombavil site, some say that even if their area
want to return home due to the continuing trauma from what they at home opens up for return, they want to stay here. One wom-
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 21

1.3. Mullikulam Naval Base – Mannar District Muslim villages and so the minister [Rishad Bathiudeen]
In another relatively well-known case, the navy has estab- got them prioritised. Mullikulam, a Tamil village, is near
lished a new base in the coastal village of Mullikulam, these villages but we have not been able to go”.155
the southernmost location in Mannar district. About 300
families have been refused permission to return to their 2. Jaffna high security zones: protracted
homes. Despite complaints to the government and advo- displacement amid some progress
cacy by the Catholic church, the UN and human rights
groups, the navy has refused to move the camp or reach Since the early 1990s, large areas of the Jaffna peninsula
compromise arrangements.150 “The government officials, have been designated “high-security zones”156 and closed
AGA [additional district secretary] have gone and seen to the public for use by the military or as military buffer
the place and they say it is ready to be resettled. But what zones, leading to the displacement of an estimated 65,000
can they say, it is the military that decides”, quipped a dis- to 70,000 people.157 Most of those displaced had lived in
placed fisherman. “We are willing to do anything within Jaffna’s largest HSZ centred around Palaly airbase and
our power, even file a case, but what is the point. In the covering 43 GN divisions in Tellippillai and Valikamam.
country no one is willing to oppose the army or navy”, Since late 2010, the majority of those divisions have been
said another.151 or are in the process of being reopened to allow the dis-
placed to return.158 Other areas in Jaffna have seen the re-
The fishing community is now scattered in several nearby lease of some private property previously occupied by the
villages and Mannar town, squatting on the properties of
relatives and friends. Without the right to fish or any land
to cultivate, they work as labourers and live in poverty.152
155
“We are not saying that the camp should not be there. Let Crisis Group interview, Thaazhvuppaadu, Mannar, Septem-
it be there on one side, but allow us to go back to our vil- ber 2011. Another claims: “Rishad [Bathiudeen, industries and
lages. It allowed us both occupations: sea on the one side commerce minister] is prioritising Muslims, not focusing on us.
and a fertile area for agriculture on the other side. We will He is looking after his own”. For Muslim views on the issues,
not be depending on outside support if we are able to get see Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s North I: The Denial of Mi-
nority Rights, op. cit., Section V.
back to our places”.153 156
High security zones in Jaffna and other parts of the north were
never officially gazetted under Sri Lankan law, but were estab-
Many of those displaced complain at what they see as pref-
lished under emergency powers in place for most of the 30 years
erential treatment for local Muslims.154 “All the nearby prior to the lifting of the state of emergency on 31 August 2011.
villages have been resettled”, explains a fisherman. “Mar- There currently appears to be no legal basis for any of the exist-
ichukkatti, Paalakkudi, Karadikuli. Pookkulam, which is ing HSZs in the north. In September 2011, Justice Minister Rauff
in the Puttlam district, has also been resettled. These are Hakeem announced that any lands the government needed to
retain as HSZs would henceforth be acquired legally and the
residents relocated. “Govt. to acquire private lands within
HSZs”, Sunday Times, 11 September 2011. In addition, an army
an told us she doesn't want to return because there are too many spokesman has reportedly promised that owners will be com-
bad memories at home. Others say, ‘we want to stay here for a pensated for any lands the army will retain for security purpos-
while and then move back to home areas when they are open’”. es. “High Sec-Zone land stays put with Army”, Lakbima News,
Crisis Group interview, March 2012. 15 January 2012. See also, “Land in the Northern Province”, op.
150
Crisis Group interview, displaced villager, Thaazhvuppaadu, cit., p. 154.
157
Mannar, September 2011. According to some reports, this figure may refer only to
151
Crisis Group interview, Thaazhvuppaadu, Mannar, September those displaced from the Telippillai/Palalay/Valikamam HSZ,
2011. with the total number of those displaced from lands across Jaff-
152
“We don’t have rights to fish here”, explains a displaced fish- na much higher. See “Hathurusinghe, Imelda, deny existence of
erman. “So the local fishermen don’t allow us to fish usually and ‘High Security Zone’”, Tamilnet, 19 December 2010. In No-
we have to be beholden to them… which is fair because it is their vember 2011, Crisis Group wrote to the governor of the North-
area and they will not allow outsiders. In Mullikkulam we had ern Province and to the PTF requesting information on how
fishing and we also had agricultural land”. Says another dis- much land was occupied and how many people were displaced
placed villager, “See, we are living in other people’s land and by HSZs or for other security reasons. There was no reply.
158
over the last several years we can’t do any development of the In November 2010, three GN divisions were opened for the
land because it is not ours. Though the land we are using belongs return of displaced families; a further nine divisions were re-
to one of our relatives, there is always uncertainty. What if she leased in May 2011. “Land in the Northern Province”, op. cit.,
decides to sell and will the new owners allow us to stay”? Crisis p. 154-155. The UN reports that as of January 2012 demining
Group interviews, Thaazhvuppaadu, Mannar, September 2011. was ongoing in another ten GN divisions. “JHERU”, No. 38,
153
Crisis Group interviews, fishing families, Thazhvuppadu, op. cit. According to a humanitarian group, demining had been
Mannar, September 2011. completed in a further six GNs as of September 2011, but the
154
Crisis Group interview, Thaazhvuppaadu, Mannar, Septem- areas had not been officially opened for return. Unpublished
ber 2011. report, humanitarian advocacy organisation, September 2011.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
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army and some of the long-term displaced have begun to C. MILITARY ECONOMIES
return.159
1. Land taken by the military for farming
Nonetheless, fifteen GN divisions in Tellippalai have still
not been approved for demining and remain closed to all Across the Vanni numerous plots of land, ranging from
returns, and many thousands remain displaced.160 Accurate half an acre to over five acres, have been taken over by
information on how many remain displaced from HSZs in the military to grow vegetables and for other forms of
Jaffna is difficult to come by, with government officials cultivation.164 While the total extent of such irregular land
making conflicting claims and providing no clear policies acquisition is not known, it is estimated by some to run
about the future of those areas still closed. According to into several hundred acres, possibly several thousand.165
the most recent government statements reported in the me- Some of these lands belong to the government,166 while
dia, some 30,000 people have returned to newly opened others are owned by private individuals. For instance, pad-
HSZs in Jaffna, leaving some 36,000 still displaced.161 dy land used by the military near Kaeppaulavu in Mullai-
Some 6,400 of these continue to live in government-man- tivu district belongs to villagers who have been told they
aged “welfare centres”, the others with host families.162 cannot return home due to the presence of land mines.167
Given the difficult conditions in the areas recently opened, In fact, the area already hosts an expanding military base
many of those listed by the government as “returnees” have in addition to the land taken for cultivation.
not in fact returned and may not until conditions improve.163
In other cases, the military has taken over private land
that had formerly been occupied and used by the LTTE.
Rather than taking steps to find and restore the properties
159 to the original owners, the army apparently is operating
In March 2011, the army returned Subash Hotel to its own-
ers and reopened Victoria Road. This “marked the removal of on the basis that any property captured from the guerrillas
High Security Zones in Jaffna town”. “Sri Lanka shrinks high now rightfully belongs to it.168 Since the LTTE had seized
security zones in the north”, Colombo Page, 20 March 2011. several such properties – both government-owned and pri-
Since 2010, a few other small HSZs have reportedly been re- vate – many families are still unable to get their land back.
leased. See “Land in the Northern Province”, op. cit., p. 155. The Vaddakatchi farm in Kilinochchi district and the agri-
160
“JHERU”, No. 38, op. cit. cultural lands near Muththaian-Kattukulam in Oddusud-
161
“SLGA in Jaffna blamed for manipulating statistics of up- dan are examples of such army occupation.
rooted people rom HSZs”, Tamilnet, 12 December 2011. In May
2011, the government announced it was beginning the resettle- As of September 2011, additional plots of land throughout
ment of 12,274 persons belonging to 3,511 families in the Ma- the Vanni were visibly being prepared by the military for
vaddipuram area of the Valikamam North HSZ. “Resettling ci-
growing a variety of different crops. Government officials
vilians in HSZ begins”, Daily Mirror, 12 May 2011. In June
2011, government officials announced it was resettling 18,000 based in the north reported that the military plans to ac-
persons from 4,000 families in former HSZs in Jaffna. “Demining quire more lands in the region for agricultural purposes
of Sri Lanka’s north nearing completion”, ColomboPage, 18
June 2011. It is not clear if the government’s 30,000 figure is
simply the product of these two sets of returns. Earlier reports infrastructure and livelihood opportunities in the newly opened
had the government claiming that 111,199 people from 35,968 areas, and the presence of mines close to some residential lands.
families had already been resettled in former HSZs in Jaffna. Unpublished donor document, humanitarian advocacy organi-
“36,000 families ‘resettled in HSZs’”, BBC Sinhala, 24 August sation, September 2011. For a valuable analysis of these and
2011. Unpublished donor documents reported that as of the end other obstacles to sustainable returns to former HSZs, see “The
of July 2011 the government recognised 51,500 old IDPs in Resettlement Report”, op. cit.
164
Jaffna, of whom almost 7,000 were in welfare centres. Lawyers Crisis Group saw military agricultural plots in several places
for the TNA reported as part of a case before the Supreme Court including Mankulam, Pandivirichchan, Keppepulavu, Palai,
that more than 26,000 remained displaced from Jaffna HSZs at Oddusuddan, Kanagarayankulam, Periya Madu and Janakapura.
165
the end of 2011. “26,000 not resettled due to HSZ”, BBC Sin- According to the TNA, “The military has taken several thou-
hala, 28 December 2011. sands of acres in Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu and Vavuniya for culti-
162
“SLGA in Jaffna blamed for manipulating statistics of up- vation without due process”. “TNA Situation Report”, op. cit., p. 4.
166
rooted people from HSZs”, Tamilnet, 12 December 2011. As of For instance, land the military has taken over near Kanaka-
October 2011, there were reportedly 6,436 “old IDPs” living in rayankulam in Kilinochchi was part of a farm run by the agricul-
54 welfare centres. Unpublished donor documents, humanitari- ture department for the purpose of producing food for the area.
167
an advocacy organisation, October 2011. They are among those being forced to resettle in Kombavil.
163
According to humanitarian organisations, many of the nearly See Section III.B.1.2.
168
20,000 individuals registered by the government as returnees to “This had been used by the LTTE, now it is ours. You did not
Tellippilai as of June 2011 had not actually gone back to their ask them when they were using so don’t ask us”, said a villager
lands, preferring to remain with host families or in government in Oddusuddan division describing the response he got from the
centres. Reasons given for the lack of return included the lim- military when he went to ask for his land back. Crisis Group
ited reintegration assistance being offered, the lack of shelter, interview, September 2011.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 23

and to regularise the acquisitions.169 The same phenome- 2. The military’s other economic activities
non was also noted by officials in the Sinhala villages of
Weli Oya.170 In addition to its agricultural work, the military is involved
in a growing range of commercial activities in the north.174
Besides the arbitrary and uncompensated loss of land for Most noticeable are the army-run restaurants and shops
residents, involvement of the military in agriculture also along the A9 highway, as well as army trading posts scat-
creates severe hardship for farmers struggling to resume tered throughout the province. Many Tamils complain the
their livelihood activities. In some instances, release of the shops are undermining local entrepreneurship and deny-
military’s produce onto local markets at much lower pric- ing economic opportunities for local residents, though the
es can have devastating consequences for local farmers exact impact is hard to measure.175 The army has also an-
whose costs – and thus prices – are much higher.171 Mili- nounced the formation of a private construction company
tary farms are able to access government support like fer- to handle development contracts in the north.176
tilisers, water pumps and tractors on a priority basis at the
expense of the ordinary farmers in the area.172 This also The military has also moved into the tourist market.177 The
puts the army in competition with the local villagers for army has established a number of hotels and guesthouses
scarce resources like water, which are critical for agricul- in the north.178 The air force has expanded flights by its
ture but are in short supply during certain seasons.173 Most commercial wing and now serves Jaffna, Kilinochchi,
of the army’s agricultural activities seem to be organised Vavuniya and locations in the east.179 The navy, for its part,
at the camp commander level; while heavily subsidised by is reported to manage its own ferry services.180
the central government, it is unclear who ultimately re-
ceives the revenues.

169
Crisis Group interviews, September 2011.
170 174
For example, in and near Janakapura and Kiri-ibbanwewa. Since the end of the war, the military has been involved in a
171
“The forces involving themselves in agriculture is a problem. range of economic spheres throughout the country. In addition
They get things for free. Their labour is paid for by the govern- to the businesses active in the north, the army has its own travel
ment, whereas all the expenses like seeds, fertiliser, weedicide, agency and tour service (Air Travel Services), the navy offers
harvesting for a farmer are all expenditures that one has to pay whale-watching tours off the south-western coast, and the de-
for from one’s own pocket. So the forces are easily able to sell fence secretary is the head of a private security company that
their produce for a lower price than the farmers. It is creating a contracts to government departments and private clients.
175
problem. But of course the consumers are benefiting. If we sell The TNA complains the army’s businesses “impact nega-
a product for twelve rupees, they are able to sell for eight.” Crisis tively on the local economies. By appropriating the limited eco-
Group interviews, farmers, Weli Oya, September 2011. Accord- nomic opportunities that might otherwise be used by local resi-
ing to a government official based in the same area, “A farmer dents to bring income and revenue to the fragile local commu-
who had cultivated ocra was devastated by the low prices at nities, the military is sustaining and reinforcing the cycle of
which the civil defence forces were able to dump their produce. poverty. With the access and advertising support of corporate
The farmer had a skirmish with the camp officers, and when I entities in the South and the unfair benefits of highly subsidized
intervened, I found out it was about ocra. I said as a consumer I cost structure through the use of state infrastructure the military
am happy to buy at a lower price. The farmer replied, ‘I am liv- is distorting and suppressing any attempt at economic recovery
ing with my only child, a daughter, and if this continues I may in the North”. “TNA Situation Report”, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
176
have to take poison’. For them [the military] there is no cost for “Sri Lanka Army to launch a development and construction
labour”. Crisis Group interview, Weli Oya, September 2011. company”, Colombo Page, 6 November 2011.
172 177
“The military commander [from Kaeppapulavu] asked the In the words of the TNA: “An entire military tourism industry
agrarian services and took the fertilisers for free. Twice. These catering to Southern visitors is run by the military establish-
were earmarked for farmers of the village. I think they also took ment”. “TNA Situation Report”, op. cit., p. 3.
178
water pumps and other inputs from the department”. Explained See www.thalsevanaresort.com. Raisa Wickrematunge, “Ar-
another: “When the army comes and asks, what can a govern- my Resort Opened In Jaffna”, The Sunday Leader, 10 October
ment department official do?” Crisis Group interviews, villag- 2011.
179
ers, Maritimepattu, Mullaitivu, August 2011. The air force recently purchased additional helicopters as
173
“The army is also doing cultivation. Mahaweli authority part of its plan to expand its commercial wing, Helitours. “Post-
constructed wells for them. But they had also used our water war Sri Lanka buys 14 military choppers from Russia”, Reu-
sources. It created a problem and the Brigade commander had ters, 17 August 2011.
180
to intervene. Then they took the water pumps away from our wa- According to the TNA, “The Navy uses state resources to
ter source”. Crisis Group interview, farmer in Weli Oya, August- run ferry services for the Southern tourist industry”. “TNA Sit-
September 2011. uation Report”, op. cit., p. 3.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 24

IV. CONCLUSION: RESISTING UN guidelines on cooperation and communication with

MILITARISATION – WHAT DONORS the military are an important first step.183 This and other
efforts by UN agencies to uphold the internationally
CAN DO accepted standards and principles should be actively
supported by all INGOs and donors, including the
For too long, donors, UN agencies and INGOs have agreed World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Local
to work within a framework dictated almost entirely by NGOs should also be given all possible support to be
the government’s perceived security imperatives, initially able to assert their own independence from the mili-
developed in response to an active threat from a militarily tary. Donors should also lobby to minimise the work
powerful insurgent group. Despite the war being over and of former and current military officials in formally ci-
the LTTE destroyed, it is still the narrowly defined secu- vilian roles – such as the provincial governor and nu-
rity concerns of the military that shape the rebuilding of merous officials in the PTF;
the north.181
 Advocating the return by the military of all private prop-
The result has been a process of resettlement and recon- erty and government land and resources traditionally
struction whose priorities, timetable and rules have large- used by local communities that have been acquired
ly been determined by the military, even as it was to a without adhering to established legal procedures and
large extent funded by international donors and imple- international standards;
mented through UN and humanitarian agencies.182 While  Supporting actively the ability of northern communi-
some humanitarian goals have been achieved – chiefly the ty-based organisations and domestic and international
return to their villages of the large majority of those dis- NGOs to engage freely in all aspects of resettlement
placed in 2008 and 2009 – the process has allowed the and development activities, including the use of par-
military to entrench itself in the north in dangerous ways, ticipatory needs assessments involving beneficiaries,
encroaching into civilian spaces and running a parallel civil society organisations and relevant government
administration that has undermined the authority of civil- officials;184
ian institutions. This has reduced the quality of humanitar-
ian and development assistance and fed resentment and an-  Encouraging a rights-based approach to all humanitar-
ger among Tamils, with alarming potential consequences ian and development assistance and insisting on the
for future security and politics in the north. ability of humanitarian and development actors to raise
awareness of the rights and entitlements of their bene-
Donors, UN agencies and humanitarian organisations should ficiaries in line with the laws and constitution of Sri
recognise the dangers to the long-term stability of the north Lanka and international covenants. This would involve
in allowing current trends to continue. They should work supporting government and civil society organisations
hard to ensure their assistance contributes to lasting solu- working on human rights, rights of the displaced, land
tions for those returning from displacement and to sus- rights, rights to documentation and reparation, and
tainable and conflict-sensitive forms of development. This women’s rights, as well as supporting initiatives to
will require openly defending the rule of law and interna- trace the disappeared and to allow for the public griev-
tional humanitarian principles and gradually but concrete- ing and commemoration of lost family members and
ly reclaiming civilian space – both through their programs friends. This will require challenging current PTF reg-
on the ground as well as through coordinated messages to
the government. Such efforts should involve:
183
“UN Guidelines”, op. cit.
 Advocating publicly and privately for the removal of 184
Sri Lanka is a signatory to the 2011 Busan partnership for
the military from the process of devising, implement- effective development cooperation, which states among other
ing and monitoring resettlement and development ac- things that “Civil society organisations (CSOs) play a vital role
tivities and its return to a limited role in providing se- in enabling people to claim their rights, in promoting rights-
curity within the limits of the law. The October 2011 based approaches, in shaping development policies and partner-
ships, and in overseeing their implementation. They also pro-
vide services in areas that are complementary to those provided
by states. Recognising this, we will: (a) Implement fully our re-
181
The Sri Lankan government has continued to pursue its mili- spective commitments to enable CSOs to exercise their roles as
tarised agenda even after the war in part to make sure there is no independent development actors, with a particular focus on an
possibility for any resurgence of separatist capacity among the enabling environment, consistent with agreed international rights,
currently defeated population. It has also done so to prevent the that maximises the contributions of CSOs to development”.
gathering of evidence and testimonies that might inform do- “Busan partnership for effective development cooperation”, Out-
mestic and international campaigns for investigations into and come Document, Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effective-
accountability for possible war crimes. ness, 1 December 2011, available at www.aideffectiveness.org.
182
See note 38 above.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 25

ulations that virtually proscribe any work with a rights

component;
 Ensuring and protecting the free flow of information
about current conditions in the north. This will require
publicly challenging: military and police intimidation
of activists and outspoken members of the public; PTF
and military controls over what information district and
divisional secretaries are allowed to share with inter-
national organisations and the public; and government
denials of visas used to punish and intimidate interna-
tional aid workers who speak publicly about poor quali-
ty assistance or rights violations; and
 Ensuring that their assistance and policies treat the dis-
placed from all three communities equitably. This will
require regular field-based monitoring of the implemen-
tation of projects and in-depth consultations with local
populations, free from military surveillance and intim-
idation. To facilitate this work, donors and implement-
ing agencies should establish a collective monitoring
and evaluation unit with dedicated personnel.
Militaries are rarely successful at development work. Strict
hierarchies, obedience and few demands for consultation
may be useful on the battlefield, but they are not tools for
the successful reconstruction of societies shattered by war.
And yet it is the military that has been leading efforts to
rebuild the Northern Province. The centralised control over
resources, the lack of accountability, transparency or con-
sultation and the diversion of money will only lead to
growing resentment among the majority Tamil population,
thus increasing the risks of a return to violence.

The north may be quiet now and the population acquies-

cent, but that will not last unless long-standing grievances
over land, language and political marginalisation are ad-
dressed in ways that give people in the north meaningful
control over their own futures. That will not happen as
long as the military remains the key engine of reconstruc-
tion and control in the Northern Province.

Colombo/Brussels, 16 March 2012

Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 26

APPENDIX A

MAP OF SRI LANKA

Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 27

APPENDIX B

MAP OF SRI LANKA’S NORTHERN PROVINCE

Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 28

APPENDIX C

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an inde- Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyp-
pendent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some rus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, North Caucasus, Serbia
130 staff members on five continents, working through and Turkey; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria,
field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon,
resolve deadly conflict. Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Western Sahara and Yemen;
and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Colombia, Guate-
Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams mala, Haiti and Venezuela.
of political analysts are located within or close by countries
at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent con- Crisis Group receives financial support from a wide range of
flict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it governments, institutional foundations, and private sources.
produces analytical reports containing practical recommen- The following governmental departments and agencies have
dations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis provided funding in recent years: Australian Agency for In-
Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly ternational Development, Australian Department of Foreign
bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of Affairs and Trade, Austrian Development Agency, Belgian
play in all the most significant situations of conflict or po- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International Devel-
tential conflict around the world. opment Agency, Canadian International Development and
Research Centre, Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed Canada, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch
widely by email and made available simultaneously on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Commission, Finnish
website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Foreign Office,
with governments and those who influence them, including Irish Aid, Principality of Liechtenstein, Luxembourg Min-
the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate istry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for Interna-
support for its policy prescriptions. tional Development, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Swedish International Development Agency, Swedish
The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of
from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United
– is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and Kingdom Department for International Development, U.S.
recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers Agency for International Development.
around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former U.S.
Undersecretary of State and Ambassador Thomas Pickering. The following institutional and private foundations have pro-
Its President and Chief Executive since July 2009 has been vided funding in recent years: Adessium Foundation, Carne-
Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human gie Corporation of New York, The Charitable Foundation, The
Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Elders Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation, William & Flora
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. Hewlett Foundation, Humanity United, Hunt Alternatives
Fund, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Open
Crisis Group’s international headquarters is in Brussels, and Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, Rockefeller Brothers
the organisation has offices or representations in 34 locations: Fund and VIVA Trust.
Abuja, Bangkok, Beijing, Beirut, Bishkek, Bogotá, Bujum-
bura, Cairo, Dakar, Damascus, Dubai, Gaza, Guatemala March 2012
City, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Jerusalem, Johannesburg,
Kabul, Kathmandu, London, Moscow, Nairobi, New York,
Port-au-Prince, Pristina, Rabat, Sanaa, Sarajevo, Seoul, Tbilisi,
Tripoli, Tunis and Washington DC. Crisis Group currently
covers some 70 areas of actual or potential conflict across four
continents. In Africa, this includes, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbab-
we; in Asia, Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kash-
mir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Nepal, North Korea,
Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan,
Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 29

APPENDIX D

CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2009

Central Asia China and Inter-Korean Clashes in the The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen
Yellow Sea, Asia Report N°200, 27 Bangladesh, Asia Report N°187, 1
Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure, Asia
January 2011 (also available in Chinese). March 2010.
Report N°162, 12 February 2009.
Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the
Women and Radicalisation in Kyrgyzstan,
South, Asia Report N°208, 14 July 2011 Afghan National Army, Asia Report
Asia Report N°176, 3 September 2009.
(also available in Korean). N°190, 12 May 2010.
Central Asia: Islamists in Prison, Asia
South Korea: The Shifting Sands of War Crimes in Sri Lanka, Asia Report
Briefing N°97, 15 December 2009.
Security Policy, Asia Briefing N°130, 1 N°191, 17 May 2010.
Central Asia: Migrants and the Economic December 2011. Steps Towards Peace: Putting Kashmiris
Crisis, Asia Report N°183, 5 January
First, Asia Briefing N°106, 3 June 2010.
2010.
South Asia Pakistan: The Worsening IDP Crisis, Asia
Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses,
Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process, Asia Briefing N°111, 16 September 2010.
Asia Briefing N°102, 27 April 2010.
Report N°163, 19 February 2009 (also Nepal’s Political Rites of Passage, Asia
The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan, Asia Report
available in Nepali). Report N°194, 29 September 2010 (also
N°193, 23 August 2010.
Afghanistan: New U.S. Administration, available in Nepali).
Central Asia: Decay and Decline, Asia
New Directions, Asia Briefing N°89, Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary,
Report N°201, 3 February 2011.
13 March 2009. Asia Report N°195, 17 November 2010.
Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent
Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge, Afghanistan: Exit vs Engagement, Asia
Threats, Asia Report N°205, 24 May
Asia Report N°164, 13 March 2009. Briefing N°115, 28 November 2010.
2011.
Development Assistance and Conflict in Sri Reforming Pakistan’s Criminal Justice
Lanka: Lessons from the Eastern Prov- System, Asia Report N°196, 6 December
North East Asia ince, Asia Report N°165, 16 April 2009. 2010.
North Korea’s Missile Launch: The Risks Pakistan’s IDP Crisis: Challenges and Nepal: Identity Politics and Federalism,
of Overreaction, Asia Briefing N°91, Opportunities, Asia Briefing N°93, 3 Asia Report N°199, 13 January 2011
31 March 2009. June 2009. (also available in Nepali).
China’s Growing Role in UN Peace- Afghanistan’s Election Challenges, Asia Afghanistan’s Elections Stalemate, Asia
keeping, Asia Report N°166, 17 April Report N°171, 24 June 2009. Briefing N°117, 23 February 2011.
2009 (also available in Chinese). Reforming Pakistan’s Electoral System,
Sri Lanka’s Judiciary: Politicised Courts,
North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Compromised Rights, Asia Report Asia Report N°203, 30 March 2011.
Weapons Programs, Asia Report N°167, N°172, 30 June 2009. Nepal’s Fitful Peace Process, Asia Briefing
18 June 2009. N°120, 7 April 2011 (also available in
Nepal’s Future: In Whose Hands?, Asia
North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Pro- Report N°173, 13 August 2009 (also Nepali).
grams, Asia Report N°168, 18 June available in Nepali). India and Sri Lanka after the LTTE, Asia
2009. Report N°206, 23 June 2011.
Afghanistan: What Now for Refugees?,
North Korea: Getting Back to Talks, Asia Asia Report N°175, 31 August 2009. The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heart-
Report N°169, 18 June 2009. land, Asia Report N°207, 27 June 2011.
Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA,
China’s Myanmar Dilemma, Asia Report Asia Report N°178, 21 October 2009. Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Harder Than
N°177, 14 September 2009 (also avail- Ever, Asia Report N°209, 18 July 2011.
Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of
able in Chinese).
Governance, Asia Briefing N°96, 25 Aid and Conflict in Afghanistan, Asia
Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North November 2009. Report N°210, 4 August 2011.
Korea, Asia Report N°179, 2 November
Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Nepal: From Two Armies to One, Asia
2009 (also available in Chinese).
Track, Asia Report N°182, 11 December Report N°211, 18 August 2011 (also
The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from 2009. available in Nepali).
Beijing, Asia Briefing N°100, 17 Feb-
Sri Lanka: A Bitter Peace, Asia Briefing Reforming Pakistan’s Prison System, Asia
ruary 2010 (also available in Chinese).
N°99, 11 January 2010. Report N°212, 12 October 2011.
North Korea under Tightening Sanctions,
Nepal: Peace and Justice, Asia Report Islamic Parties in Pakistan, Asia Report
Asia Briefing N°101, 15 March 2010.
N°184, 14 January 2010. N°216, 12 December 2011.
China’s Myanmar Strategy: Elections,
Reforming Pakistan’s Civil Service, Asia Nepal’s Peace Process: The Endgame
Ethnic Politics and Economics, Asia
Report N°185, 16 February 2010. Nears, Asia Briefing N°131, 13
Briefing N°112, 21 September 2010
The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the December 2011 (also available in
(also available in Chinese).
LTTE, Asia Report N°186, 23 February Nepali).
North Korea: The Risks of War in the
2010. Sri Lanka: Women’s Insecurity in the North
Yellow Sea, Asia Report N°198, 23
and East, Asia Report N°217, 20
December 2010.
December 2011.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 30

Sri Lanka’s North I: The Denial of Illicit Arms in Indonesia, Asia Briefing Myanmar: A New Peace Initiative, Asia
Minority Rights, Asia Report N°219, 16 N°109, 6 September 2010. Report N°214, 30 November 2011 (also
March 2012. Managing Land Conflict in Timor-Leste, available in Chinese).
Asia Briefing N°110, 9 September 2010. Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Thai-
South East Asia Stalemate in Southern Thailand, Asia Cambodian Border Conflict, Asia Report
Briefing N°113, 3 November 2010 (also N°215, 6 December 2011 (also available
Local Election Disputes in Indonesia: The
available in Thai). in Chinese).
Case of North Maluku, Asia Briefing
N°86, 22 January 2009. Indonesia: “Christianisation” and Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism
Intolerance, Asia Briefing N°114, 24 in Cirebon, Asia Briefing N°132, 26
Timor-Leste: No Time for Complacency,
November 2010. January 2012.
Asia Briefing N°87, 9 February 2009.
Indonesia: Preventing Violence in Local Indonesia: Cautious Calm in Ambon, Asia
The Philippines: Running in Place in
Elections, Asia Report N°197, 8 Briefing N°133, 13 February 2012.
Mindanao, Asia Briefing N°88, 16
February 2009. December 2010 (also available in Indonesia: The Deadly Cost of Poor
Indonesian). Policing, Asia Report N°218, 16
Indonesia: Deep Distrust in Aceh as
Timor-Leste: Time for the UN to Step Back, February 2012.
Elections Approach, Asia Briefing N°90,
23 March 2009. Asia Briefing N°116, 15 December Timor-Leste’s Elections: Leaving Behind a
2010. Violent Past?, Asia Briefing N°134, 21
Indonesia: Radicalisation of the “Palem-
The Communist Insurgency in the February 2012.
bang Group”, Asia Briefing N°92, 20
May 2009. Philippines: Tactics and Talks, Asia Indonesia: Averting Election Violence in
Report N°202, 14 February 2011. Aceh, Asia Briefing N°135, 29 February
Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand,
Myanmar’s Post-Election Landscape, Asia 2012.
Asia Report N°170, 22 June 2009 (also
available in Thai). Briefing N°118, 7 March 2011 (also
available in Chinese and Burmese).
Indonesia: The Hotel Bombings, Asia
Briefing N°94, 24 July 2009 (also avail- The Philippines: Back to the Table, Warily,
able in Indonesian). in Mindanao, Asia Briefing N°119, 24
March 2011.
Myanmar: Towards the Elections, Asia
Report N°174, 20 August 2009. Thailand: The Calm Before Another
Storm?, Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April
Indonesia: Noordin Top’s Support Base,
2011 (also available in Chinese and
Asia Briefing N°95, 27 August 2009.
Thai).
Handing Back Responsibility to Timor-
Timor-Leste: Reconciliation and Return
Leste’s Police, Asia Report N°180, 3
from Indonesia, Asia Briefing N°122, 18
December 2009.
April 2011 (also available in
Southern Thailand: Moving towards Polit- Indonesian).
ical Solutions?, Asia Report N°181, 8
Indonesian Jihadism: Small Groups, Big
December 2009 (also available in Thai).
Plans, Asia Report N°204, 19 April
The Philippines: After the Maguindanao 2011 (also available in Chinese).
Massacre, Asia Briefing N°98, 21
Indonesia: Gam vs Gam in the Aceh
December 2009.
Elections, Asia Briefing N°123, 15 June
Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua, 2011.
Asia Report N°188, 11 March 2010 (also
Indonesia: Debate over a New Intelligence
available in Indonesian).
Bill, Asia Briefing N°124, 12 July 2011.
Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh, Asia
The Philippines: A New Strategy for Peace
Report N°189, 20 April 2010.
in Mindanao?, Asia Briefing N°125, 3
Philippines: Pre-election Tensions in August 2011.
Central Mindanao, Asia Briefing N°103,
Indonesia: Hope and Hard Reality in
4 May 2010.
Papua, Asia Briefing N°126, 22 August
Timor-Leste: Oecusse and the Indonesian 2011.
Border, Asia Briefing N°104, 20 May
Myanmar: Major Reform Underway, Asia
2010.
Briefing N°127, 22 September 2011
The Myanmar Elections, Asia Briefing (also available in Burmese and Chinese).
N°105, 27 May 2010 (also available in
Indonesia: Trouble Again in Ambon, Asia
Chinese).
Briefing N°128, 4 October 2011.
Bridging Thailand’s Deep Divide, Asia
Timor-Leste’s Veterans: An Unfinished
Report N°192, 5 July 2010 (also
Struggle?, Asia Briefing N°129, 18
available in Thai).
November 2011.
Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama’ah
The Philippines: Indigenous Rights and the
Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Asia Briefing
MILF Peace Process, Asia Report
N°107, 6 July 2010.
N°213, 22 November 2011.
Indonesia: The Deepening Impasse in
Papua, Asia Briefing N°108, 3 August
2010.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 31

APPENDIX E

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES

CHAIR Emma Bonino Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown

Vice President of the Italian Senate; Former Min- Former Administrator of the United Nations
Thomas R Pickering
ister of International Trade and European Affairs Development Programme (UNDP) and UN
Former U.S. Undersecretary of State; Ambassa-
of Italy and European Commissioner for Deputy Secretary-General
dor to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Jordan, El
Salvador and Nigeria Humanitarian Aid
Lalit Mansingh
Wesley Clark Former Foreign Secretary of India, Ambassador
PRESIDENT & CEO Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, to the U.S. and High Commissioner to the UK
Europe
Louise Arbour Jessica Tuchman Mathews
Former UN High Commissioner for Human Sheila Coronel President, Carnegie Endowment for
Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Toni Stabile, Professor of Practice in Investiga- International Peace, U.S.
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia tive Journalism; Director, Toni Stabile Center for In-
and Rwanda vestigative Journalism, Columbia University, U.S. Benjamin Mkapa
Former President of Tanzania
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
Former Foreign Minister of Denmark Moisés Naím
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Senior Associate, International Economics
Morton Abramowitz Gareth Evans Program, Carnegie Endowment for International
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State President Emeritus of Crisis Group; Former Peace; Former Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy
and Ambassador to Turkey Foreign Minister of Australia
Ayo Obe
Cheryl Carolus Mark Eyskens Legal Practitioner, Lagos, Nigeria
Former South African High Commissioner to Former Prime Minister of Belgium
Paul Reynolds
the UK and Secretary General of the ANC
Joshua Fink President & Chief Executive Officer, Canaccord
Maria Livanos Cattaui CEO & Chief Investment Officer, Enso Capital Financial Inc.; Vice Chair, Global Head of
Former Secretary-General of the International Management LLC Canaccord Genuity
Chamber of Commerce
Joschka Fischer Güler Sabancı
Yoichi Funabashi Former Foreign Minister of Germany Chairperson, Sabancı Holding, Turkey
Former Editor in Chief, The Asahi Shimbun,
Jean-Marie Guéhenno Javier Solana
Japan
Arnold Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Former EU High Representative for the Common
Frank Giustra Studies, Columbia University; Former UN Under- Foreign and Security Policy, NATO Secretary-
President & CEO, Fiore Capital Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations General and Foreign Minister of Spain

Ghassan Salamé Carla Hills Lawrence Summers

Dean, Paris School of International Affairs, Former U.S. Secretary of Housing and U.S. Former Director of the US National Economic
Sciences Po Trade Representative Council and Secretary of the US Treasury;
President Emeritus of Harvard University
George Soros Lena Hjelm-Wallén
Chairman, Open Society Institute Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Min-
ister of Sweden
Pär Stenbäck
Former Foreign Minister of Finland Swanee Hunt
Former U.S. Ambassador to Austria;
Chair, Institute for Inclusive Security; President,
OTHER BOARD MEMBERS Hunt Alternatives Fund
Adnan Abu-Odeh Mo Ibrahim
Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah II
Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim Foundation;
and to King Hussein, and Jordan Permanent
Founder, Celtel International
Representative to the UN
Igor Ivanov
Kenneth Adelman Former Foreign Minister of the Russian Federa-
Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the
tion
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Asma Jahangir
Kofi Annan President of the Supreme Court Bar Association
Former Secretary-General of the United Nations;
of Pakistan, Former UN Special Rapporteur on
Nobel Peace Prize (2001)
the Freedom of Religion or Belief
Nahum Barnea Wim Kok
Chief Columnist for Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel
Former Prime Minister of the Netherlands
Samuel Berger Ricardo Lagos
Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group LLC; Former
Former President of Chile
U.S. National Security Adviser
Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Former International Secretary of International
PEN; Novelist and journalist, U.S.
Sri Lanka’s North II: Rebuilding under the Military
Crisis Group Asia Report N°220, 16 March 2012 Page 32

PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL

A distinguished group of individual and corporate donors providing essential support and expertise to Crisis Group.

Mala Gaonkar George Landegger Ian Telfer

Frank Holmes Ford Nicholson & Lisa Wolverton White & Case LLP
Steve Killelea Harry Pokrandt Neil Woodyer

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL

Individual and corporate supporters who play a key role in Crisis Group’s efforts to prevent deadly conflict.

APCO Worldwide Inc. Seth & Jane Ginns McKinsey & Company Belinda Stronach
Ed Bachrach Rita E. Hauser Harriet Mouchly-Weiss Talisman Energy
Stanley Bergman & Edward Sir Joseph Hotung Näringslivets Inter- Tilleke & Gibbins
Bergman Iara Lee & George Gund III nationella Råd (NIR) – Kevin Torudag
Harry Bookey & Pamela Foundation International Council of
Swedish Industry VIVA Trust
Bass-Bookey George Kellner
Griff Norquist Yapı Merkezi Construction
BP Amed Khan and Industry Inc.
Chevron Ana Luisa Ponti & Geoffrey
Faisel Khan R. Hoguet Stelios S. Zavvos
Neil & Sandra DeFeo Family Zelmira Koch Polk
Foundation Kerry Propper
Elliott Kulick Michael L. Riordan
Equinox Partners
Liquidnet Shell
Fares I. Fares
Jean Manas & Rebecca Statoil
Neemat Frem Haile

SENIOR ADVISERS

Former Board Members who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on (to the
extent consistent with any other office they may be holding at the time).

Martti Ahtisaari Mong Joon Chung Timothy Ong Grigory Yavlinski

Chairman Emeritus
Pat Cox Olara Otunnu Uta Zapf
George Mitchell Gianfranco Dell’Alba Lord (Christopher) Patten Ernesto Zedillo
Chairman Emeritus
Jacques Delors Shimon Peres
HRH Prince Turki al-Faisal Alain Destexhe Victor Pinchuk
Hushang Ansary Mou-Shih Ding Surin Pitsuwan
Óscar Arias Gernot Erler Cyril Ramaphosa
Ersin Arıoğlu Marika Fahlén Fidel V. Ramos
Richard Armitage Stanley Fischer George Robertson
Diego Arria Malcolm Fraser Michel Rocard
Zainab Bangura I.K. Gujral Volker Rüehe
Shlomo Ben-Ami Max Jakobson Mohamed Sahnoun
Christoph Bertram James V. Kimsey Salim A. Salim
Alan Blinken Aleksander Kwasniewski Douglas Schoen
Lakhdar Brahimi Todung Mulya Lubis Christian Schwarz-Schilling
Zbigniew Brzezinski Allan J. MacEachen Michael Sohlman
Kim Campbell Graça Machel Thorvald Stoltenberg
Jorge Castañeda Nobuo Matsunaga Leo Tindemans
Naresh Chandra Barbara McDougall Ed van Thijn
Eugene Chien Matthew McHugh Simone Veil
Joaquim Alberto Chissano Miklós Németh Shirley Williams
Victor Chu Christine Ockrent