Title

Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason and Co., Inc.

Case Decision Date

G.R. No. L-23749 Apr 29, 1977

Cruz sought reimbursement for land improvements and enforcement of an oral

agreement for 3,000 sqm. Court dismissed due to lack of cause of action, Statute of
Frauds inapplicability, and pro-forma motion.
S CO SO

[ G.R. No. L-23749. April 29, 1977 ]

FAUSTINO CRUZ, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. J. M. TUASON & COMPANY, INC., AND

GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

DECISION

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the order dated August 13, 1964 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in
Civil Case No. Q-7751, Faustino Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and Gregorio Araneta, Inc.,
dismissing the complaint of appellant Cruz for the recovery of improvements he has made
on appellees' land and to compel appellees to convey to him 3,000 square meters of land
on three grounds: (1) failure of the complaint to state a cause of action; (2) the cause of
action of plaintiff is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds; and (3) the action of the
plaintiff has already prescribed.

Actually, a perusal of plaintiff-appellant's complaint below shows that he alleged two

separate causes of action, namely: (1) that upon request of the Deudors (the family of
Telesforo Deudor who laid claim on the land in question on the strength of an "information
posesoria") plaintiff made permanent improvements valued at P30,400.00 on said land
having an area of more or less 20 quinones and for which he also incurred expenses in the
amount of P7,781.74, and since defendants-appellees are being benefited by said
improvements, he is entitled to reimbursement from them of said amounts; and (2) that in
1952, defendants availed of plaintiff's services as an intermediary with the Deudors to work
for the amicable settlement of Civil Case No. Q-135, then pending also in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, and involving 50 quinones of land, of which the 20 quinones
aforementioned form part, and notwithstanding his having performed his services, as in
fact, a compromise agreement entered into on March 16, 1963 between the Deudors and the
defendants was approved by the court, the latter have refused to convey to him the 3,000
square meters of land occupied by him, (a part of the 20 quinones above) which said
defendants had promised to do "within ten years from and after date of signing of the
compromise agreement", as consideration for his services.

Within the period allowed by the rules, the defendants filed separate motions to dismiss
alleging three identical grounds: (1) As regards the improvements made by plaintiff, that the
complaint states no cause of action, the agreement regarding the same having been made
by plaintiff with the Deudors and not with the defendants, hence the theory of plaintiff
based on Article 2142 of the Civil Code on unjust enrichment is untenable; and (2) anent the
alleged agreement about plaintiff's services as intermediary in consideration of which,
defendants promised to convey to him 3,000 square meters of land, that the same is
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, there being nothing in writing about it, and, in
any event, (3) that the action of plaintiff to compel such conveyance has already prescribed.

Plaintiff opposed the motion insisting that Article 2142 of the Civil Code is applicable to his
case; that the Statute of Frauds cannot be invoked by defendants, not only because Article
1403 of the Civil Code refers only to "sale of real property or of an interest therein" and not
to promises to convey real property like the one supposedly promised by defendants to
him, but also because, he, the plaintiff has already performed his part of the agreement,
hence the agreement has already been partly executed and not merely executory within the
contemplation of the Statute; and that his action has not prescribed for the reason that
defendants had ten years to comply and only after the said ten years did his cause of action
accrue, that is, ten years after March 16, 1963, the date of the approval of the compromise
agreement, and his complaint was filed on January 24, 1964.

Ruling on the motion to dismiss, the trial court issued the herein impugned order of August
13, 1964:

"In the motion, dated January 31, 1964, defendant Gregorio Araneta, Inc. prayed that the
complaint against it be dismissed on the ground that (1) the claim on which the action is
founded is unenforceable under the provision of the Statute of Frauds; and (2) the plaintiff's
action, if any has already prescribed. In the other motion of February 11, 1964, defendant J.
M. Tuason Co., Inc. sought the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that it
states no cause of action and on the identical grounds stated in the motion to dismiss of
defendant Gregorio Araneta, Inc. The said motions are duly opposed by the plaintiff. "From
the allegations of the complaint, it appears that, by virtue of an agreement arrived at in 1948
by the plaintiff and the Deudors, the former assisted the latter in clearing, improving,
subdividing and selling the large tract of land consisting of 50 quinones covered by the
informacion posesoria in the name of the late Telesforo Deudor and incurred expenses,
which are valued approximately at P38,400.00 and P7,781.74, respectively; and, for the
reasons that said improvements are being used and enjoyed by the defendants, the plaintiff
is seeking the reimbursement for the services and expenses stated above from the
defendants. "Defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. claimed that, insofar as the plaintiff's claim
for the reimbursement of the amounts of P38,400.00 and P7,781.74 is concerned, it is not a
privy to the plaintiff's agreement to assist the Deudors in improving the 50 quinones. On
the other hand, the plaintiff countered that, by holding and utilizing the improvements
introduced by him, the defendants are unjustly enriching and benefiting at the expense of
the plaintiff; and that said improvements constitute a lien or charge on the property itself.
"On the issue that the complaint insofar as it claims the reimbursement for the services
rendered and expenses incurred by the plaintiff, states no cause of action, the Court is of
the opinion that the same is well-founded. It is found that the defendants are not parties to
the supposed express contract entered into by and between the plaintiff and the Deudors
for the clearing and improvement of the 50 quinones. Furthermore in order that the alleged
improvement may be considered a lien or charge on the property, the same should have
been made in good faith and under the mistake as to the title. The Court can take judicial
notice of the fact that the tract of land supposedly improved by the plaintiff had been
registered way back in 1914 in the name of the predecessors-in-interest of defendant J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. This fact is confirmed in the decision rendered by the Supreme Court on
July 31, 1956 in case G. R. No. L-5079 entitled 'J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Geronimo
Santiago, et al'. Such being the case, the plaintiff cannot claim good faith and mistake as to
the title of the land. "On the issue of statute of fraud, the Court believes that same is
applicable to the instant case. The allegation in par. 12 of the complaint states that the
defendants promised and agreed to cede, transfer and convey unto the plaintiff the 3,000
square meters of land in consideration of certain services to be rendered then. It is clear
that the alleged agreement involves an interest in real property. Under the provisions of
Sec. 2(e) of Article 1403 of the Civil Code, such agreement is not enforceable as it is not in
writing and subscribed by the party charged. "On the issue of statute of limitations, the
Court holds that the plaintiff's action has prescribed. It is alleged in par. 11 of the complaint
that, sometime in 1952, the defendants approached the plaintiff to prevail upon the Deudors
to enter into a compromise agreement in Civil Case No. Q-135 and allied cases.
Furthermore, pars. 13 and 14 of the complaint alleged that the plaintiff acted as emissary of
both parties in conveying their respective proposals and counter-proposals until the final
settlement was effected on March 16, 1953 and approved by the Court on April 11, 1953. In
the present action, which was instituted on January 24, 1964, the plaintiff is seeking to
enforce the supposed agreement entered into between him and the defendants in 1952,
which has already prescribed. "WHEREFORE, the plaintiff's complaint is hereby ordered
DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs. "SO ORDERED." (Pp. 65-69, Rec. on
Appeal.)

On August 22, 1964, plaintiff's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration dated August 20,
1964 as follows:

"Plaintiff through undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court, respectfully moves to
reconsider its Order bearing date of 13 August 1964, on the following grounds:
 "I. THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES A SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANTS IN SO FAR AS PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM PAYMENT OF
SERVICES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF HIS EXPENSES, IS CONCERNED;

"II. THAT REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OVER THE 3,000 SQ. MS., THE
SAME HAS NOT PRESCRIBED AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT
APPLICABLE THERETO;

"A R G U M E N T

"Plaintiff's complaint contains two (2) causes of action the first being an action for sum of
money in the amount of P7,781.74 representing actual expenses and P38,400.00 as
reasonable compensation for services in improving the 50 quinones now in the possession
of defendants. The second cause of action deals with the 3,000 sq. ms. which defendants
have agreed to transfer unto plaintiff for services rendered in effecting the compromise
between the Deudors and defendants; "Under its order of August 13, 1964, this Honorable
Court dismissed the claim for sum of money on the ground that the complaint does not
state a cause of action against defendants. We respectfully submit:

"I. THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES A SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION

AGAINST DEFENDANTS IN SO FAR AS PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR
PAYMENT OF SERVICES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF HIS EXPENSES, IS
CONCERNED.

"Said this Honorable Court (at p. 2, Order):

"O R D E R

xx xx xx "On the issue that the complaint, in so far as it claims the reimbursement for the
services rendered and expenses incurred by the plaintiff, states no cause of action, the
Court is of the opinion that the same is well-founded. It is found that the defendants are not
parties to the supposed express contract entered into by and between the plaintiff and the
Deudors for the clearing and improvement of the 50 quinones. Furthermore, in order that
the alleged improvement may be considered a lien or charge on the property, the same
should have been made in good faith and under the mistake as to title. The Court can take
judicial notice of the fact that the tract of land supposedly improved by the plaintiff had
been registered way back in 1914 in the name of the predecessors-in-interest of defendant
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. This fact is confirmed in the decision rendered by the Supreme
Court on July 31, 1956 in case G. R. No. L-5079 entitled 'J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Geronimo Santiago, et al. ' Such being the case, the plaintiff cannot claim good faith and
mistake as to the title of the land.' "The position of this Honorable Court (supra) is that the
complaint does not state a cause of action in so far as the claim for services and expenses is
concerned because the contract for the improvement of the properties was solely between
the Deudors and plaintiff, and defendants are not privies to it. Now, plaintiff's theory is that
defendants are nonetheless liable since they are utilizing and enjoying the benefits of said
improvements. Thus, under paragraph 16 of the complaint, it is alleged:

'(16) That the services and personal expenses of plaintiff mentioned in

paragraph 7 hereof were rendered and in fact paid by him to improve, as
they in fact resulted in considerable improvement of the 50 quinones,
and defendants being now in possession of and utilizing said
improvements should reimburse and pay plaintiff for such services and
expenses.

"Plaintiff's cause of action is premised inter alia, on the theory of unjust enrichment under
Article 2142 of the Civil Code:

'ART. 2142. Certain lawful voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of
quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense
of another.'

"In like vein, Article 19 of the same Code enjoins that:

'ART. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.'

"We respectfully draw the attention of this Honorable Court to the fact that ARTICLE 2142
(SUPRA) DEALS WITH QUASI-CONTRACTS or situations WHERE THERE IS NO
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE ACTION. Further, as we can readily see from
the title thereof (Title XVII), that the same bears the designation 'EXTRA CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS' or obligations which do not arise from contracts. While it is true that there
was no agreement between plaintiff and defendants herein for the improvement of the 50
quinones, since the latter are presently enjoying and utilizing the benefits brought about
through plaintiff's labor and expenses, defendants should pay and reimburse him therefor
under the principle that 'no one may enrich himself at the expense of another, ' In this
posture, the complaint states a cause of action against the defendants.

"II. THAT REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OVER THE 3,000 SQ. MS. THE
SAME HAS NOT PRESCRIBED AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT
APPLICABLE THERETO.

"The Statute of Frauds is CLEARLY inapplicable to this case: "At page 2 of this Honorable
Court's order dated 13 August 1964, the Court ruled as follows:

"O R D E R

xx xx xx
'On the issue of statute of fraud, the Court believes that same is applicable to the instant
case. The allegation in par. 12 of the complaint states that the defendants promised and
agree to cede, transfer and convey unto the plaintiff, 3, 000 square meters of land in
consideration of certain services to be rendered then. It is clear that the alleged agreement
involves an interest in real property. Under the provisions of Sec. 2(e) of Article 1403 of the
Civil Code, such agreement is not enforceable as it is not in writing and subscribed by the
party charged. '

"To bring this issue in sharper focus, we shall reproduce not only paragraph 12 of the
complaint but also the other pertinent paragraphs therein contained. Paragraph 12 states
thus:

"C O M P L A I N T

xx xx xx

'12). That plaintiff conferred with the aforesaid representatives of defendants

several times and on these occasions, the latter promised and agreed to
cede, transfer and convey unto plaintiff the 3, 000 sq. ms. (now known as
Lots 16-B , 17 and 18) which plaintiff was then occupying and continues to
occupy as of this writing, for and in consideration of the following
conditions:

(a) That plaintiff succeed in convincing the DEUDORS to enter into a

compromise agreement and that such agreement be actually entered
into by and between the DEUDORS and defendant companies;

(b) That as of date of signing the compromise agreement, plaintiff shall be

the owner of the 3, 000 sq. ms. but the documents evidencing his title
over this property shall be executed and delivered by defendants to
plaintiff within ten (10) years from and after date of signing of the
compromise agreement;

(c) That plaintiff shall, without any monetary expense on his part, assist in
clearing the 20 quinones of its occupants;

'13). That in order to effect a compromise between the parties, plaintiff not only
as well acted as emissary of both parties in conveying their respective
proposals and counter-proposals until plaintiff finally succeeded in
convincing the DEUDORS to settle with defendants amicably. Thus, on
March 16, 1953, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by and
between the DEUDORS and the defendant companies; and on April 11,
1953, this agreement was approved by this Honorable Court;
 '14). That in order to comply with his other obligations under his agreement
with defendant companies, plaintiff had to confer with the occupants of
the property, exposing himself to physical harm, convincing said
occupants to leave the premises and to refrain from resorting to physical
violence in resisting defendants' demands to vacate;

'That plaintiff further assisted defendants' employees in the actual demolition and transfer
of all the houses within the perimeter of the 20 quinones until the end of 1955, when said
area was totally cleared and the houses transferred to another area designated by the
defendants as 'Capt. Cruz Block' in Masambong, Quezon City. ' (Pars. 12, 13 and 14,
Complaint; Italics Ours).

"From the foregoing, it is clear then that the agreement between the parties mentioned in
paragraph 12 (supra) of the complaint has already been fully EXECUTED ON ONE PART,
namely by the plaintiff. Regarding the applicability of the statute of frauds (Art. 1403, Civil
Code), it has been uniformly held that the statute of frauds IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS BUT NOT WHERE THE CONTRACT HAS BEEN PARTLY
EXECUTED:

'SAME ACTION TO ENFORCE. - The statute of frauds has been uniformly interpreted to be
applicable to executory and not to completed or executed contracts. Performance of the
contract takes it out of the operation of the statute. xx xx.

The statute of frauds is not applicable to contracts which are either totally or partially
performed, on the theory that there is a wide field for the commission of frauds in
executory contracts which can only be prevented by requiring them to be in writing, a fact
which is reduced to a minimum in executed contracts because the intention of the parties
becomes apparent by their execution and execution, in most cases, concludes the right of
the parties. x x x. The partial performance may be proved by either documentary or oral
evidence. (at pp. 564-565, Tolentino's Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1962 Ed.; Italics
Ours).

"Authorities in support of the foregoing rule are legion. Thus, Mr. Justice Moran in his
'Comments on the Rules of Court' , Vol. III, 1947 Ed., at p. 167, states:

'2. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO EXECUTORY

CONTRACTS: CONTRACTS WHICH ARE EITHER TOTALLY OR PARTIALLY
PERFORMED ARE WITHOUT THE STATUTE. The statute of frauds is
applicable only to executory contracts. It is neither applicable to executed
contracts nor to contracts partially performed. The reason is simple. In
executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud because unless they be in
writing there is no palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting
parties. The statute has been enacted to prevent fraud. On the other hand
 the commission of fraud in executed contracts is reduced to a minimum in
executed contracts because (1) the intention of the parties is made apparent
by the execution and (2) execution concludes, in most cases, the rights of
the parties.' (Italics Ours)

"Under paragraphs 13 and 14 of the complaint (supra) one can readily see that the plaintiff
has fulfilled ALL his obligations under the agreement between him and defendants
concerning the 3,000 sq. ms. over which the latter had agreed to execute the proper
documents of transfer. This fact is further projected in paragraph 15 of the complaint where
plaintiff states:

'15). That in or about the middle of 1963, after all the conditions stated in
paragraph 12 hereof had been fulfilled and fully complied with, plaintiff
demanded of said defendants that they execute the Deed of Conveyance
in his favor and deliver the title certificate in his name, over the 3,000 sq.
ms. but defendants failed and refused and continue to fail and refuse to
heed his demands.' (Par. 15, Complaint; Italics Ours).

"In view of the foregoing, we respectfully submit that this Honorable Court erred in holding
that the statute of frauds is applicable to plaintiff's claim over the 3,000 sq. ms. There
having been full performance of the contract on plaintiff's part, the same takes this case out
of the context of said statute. Plaintiff' s Cause of Action has NOT Prescribed: "With all due
respect to this Honorable Court, we also submit that the Court committed error in holding
that this action has prescribed:

"O R D E R

xx xx xx

'On the issue of the statute of limitations, the Court holds that the plaintiff's action has
prescribed. It is alleged in par. 11 of the complaint that, sometime in 1952, the defendants
approached the plaintiff to prevail upon the Deudors to enter into a compromise agreement
in Civil Case No. Q-135 and allied cases. Furthermore, pars. 13 and 14 of the complaint
alleged that plaintiff acted as emissary of both parties in conveying their respective
proposals and counter-proposals until the final settlement was effected on March 16, 1953
and approved by the Court on April 11, 1953. In the present action, which was instituted on
January 24, 1964, the plaintiff is seeking to enforce the supposed agreement entered into
between him and the defendants in 1952, which has already prescribed. ' (at p. 3, Order).

"The present action has not prescribed, especially when we consider carefully the terms of
the agreement between plaintiff and the defendants. First, we must draw the attention of
this Honorable Court to the fact that this is an action to compel defendants to execute a
Deed of Conveyance over the 3,000 sq. ms. subject of their agreement. In paragraph 12 of
the complaint, the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties are spelled out.
Paragraph 12 (b) of the complaint states:

'(b) That as of date of signing the compromise agreement, plaintiff shall be the
owner of the 3,000 sq. ms. but the documents evidencing his title over this
property shall be executed and delivered by defendants to plaintiff within
ten (10) years from and after date of signing of the compromise agreement.'
(Italics Ours).

"The compromise agreement between defendants and the Deudors which was concluded
through the efforts of plaintiff, was signed on 16 March 1953. Therefore, the defendants had
ten (10) years from said date within which to execute the deed of conveyance in favor of
plaintiff over the 3,000 sq. ms. As long as the 10 years period has not expired, plaintiff had
no right to compel defendants to execute the document and the latter were under no
obligation to do so. Now, this 10-year period elapsed on March 16, 1963. THEN and ONLY
THEN does plaintiff's cause of action against defendants accrue. Therefore, the period of
prescription began to run against plaintiff only on March 17, 1963. Thus, under paragraph 15
of the complaint (supra) plaintiff made demands upon defendants for the execution of the
deed 'in or about the middle of 1963.' "Since the contract now sought to be enforced was not
reduced to writing, plaintiff's cause of action expires on March 16, 1969 or six years from
March 16, 1963 WHEN THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED (Art. 1145, Civil Code). "In this
posture, we again respectfully submit that this Honorable Court erred in holding that
plaintiff's action has prescribed.

"P R A Y E R

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court reconsider its Order
dated August 13, 1964; and issue another order denying the motions to dismiss of
defendants G. Araneta, Inc. and J. M. Tuason Co. Inc. for lack of merit." (Pp. 70-85, Record
on Appeal.)

Defendants filed an opposition on the main ground that "the arguments adduced by the
plaintiff are merely reiterations of his arguments contained in his Rejoinder to Reply and
Opposition, which have not only been refuted in herein defendant's Motion to Dismiss and
Reply but already passed upon by this Honorable Court."

On September 7, 1964, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration thus:

"After considering the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of August 20, 1964 and it
appearing that the grounds relied upon in said motion are mere repetition of those already
resolved and discussed by this Court in the order of August 13, 1964, the instant motion is
hereby denied and the findings and conclusions arrived at by the Court in its order of
August 13, 1964 are hereby reiterated and affirmed. "SO ORDERED." (Page 90, Rec. on
Appeal.)

Under date of September 24, 1964, plaintiff filed his record on appeal.

In his brief, appellant poses and discusses the following assignments of error:

"I. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND
THAT APPELLANT'S CLAIM OVER THE 3,000 SQ. MS. IS ALLEGEDLY UNENFORCEABLE
UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS; "II. THAT THE COURT A QUO FURTHER COMMITTED
ERROR IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND THAT HIS CLAIM
OVER THE 3,000 SQ. MS. IS ALLEGEDLY BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS;
and "III. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION IN SO FAR AS APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR
REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES AND FOR SERVICES RENDERED IN THE
IMPROVEMENT OF THE FIFTY (50) QUINONES, IS CONCERNED.

We agree with appellant that the Statute of Frauds was erroneously applied by the trial
court. It is elementary that the Statute refers to specific kinds of transactions and that it
cannot apply to any that is not enumerated therein. And the only agreements or contracts
covered thereby are the following:

"(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers; "(2) Those that do
not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an
agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note
or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a
secondary evidence of its contents:

(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from
the making thereof;

(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;

(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual

promise to marry;

(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price
not less than five hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive part
of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, of such
things in action, or pay at the time some part of the purchase money; but
when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his
sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind of property sold,
 terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers and person on whose
account the sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum;

(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the
sale of real property or of an interest therein;

(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.

"(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract. (Art. 1403, Civil
Code.)

In the instant case, what appellant is trying to enforce is the delivery to him of 3,000
square meters of land which he claims defendants promised to do in consideration of his
services as mediator or intermediary in effecting a compromise of the civil action, Civil
Case No. 135, between the defendants and the Deudors. In no sense may such alleged
contract be considered as being a "sale of real property or of any interest therein." Indeed,
not all dealings involving interest in real property come under the Statute.

Moreover, appellant's complaint clearly alleges that he has already fulfilled his part of the
bargain to induce the Deudors to amicably settle their differences with defendants as, in
fact, on March 16, 1963, through his efforts, a compromise agreement between these parties
was approved by the court. In other words, the agreement in question has already been
partially consummated, and is no longer merely executory. And it is likewise a fundamental
principle governing the application of the Statute that the contract in dispute should be
purely executory on the part of both parties thereto.

We cannot, however, escape taking judicial notice, in relation to the compromise

agreement relied upon by appellant, that in several cases We have decided, We have
declared the same rescinded and of no effect. In J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bienvenido
Sanvictores, 4 SCRA 123, the Court held:

"It is also worthy of note that the compromise between Deudor and Tuason, upon which
Sanvictores predicates his right to buy the lot he occupies, has been validly rescinded and
set aside, as recognized by this Court in its decision in G. R. No. L-13768, Deudor vs. Tuason,
promulgated on May 30, 1961."

We repeated this observation in J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Teodosio Macalindong,6 SCRA
938. Thus, viewed from what would be the ultimate conclusion of appellant's case, We
entertain grave doubts as to whether or not he can successfully maintain his alleged cause
of action against defendants, considering that the compromise agreement that he invokes
did not actually materialize and defendants have not benefited therefrom, not to mention
the undisputed fact that, as pointed out by appellees, appellant's other attempt to secure the
same 3, 000 square meters via the judicial enforcement of the compromise agreement in
which they were supposed to be reserved for him has already been repudiated by the
courts. (pp. 5-7, Brief of Appellee Gregorio Araneta, Inc. )

As regards appellant's third assignment of error, We hold that the allegations in his
complaint do not sufficiently constitute a cause of action against defendants-appellees.
Appellant's reliance on Article 2142 of Civil Code is misplaced. Said article provides:

"Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-
contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of
another."

From the very language of this provision, it is obvious that a presumed quasi-contract
cannot emerge as against one party when the subject matter thereof is already covered by
an existing contract with another party. Predicated on the principle that no one should be
allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, Article 2142 creates the legal
fiction of a quasi-contract precisely because of the absence of any actual agreement
between the parties concerned. Corollarily, if the one who claims having enriched
somebody has done so pursuant to a contract with a third party, his cause of action should
be against the latter, who in turn may, if there is any ground therefor, seek relief against the
party benefited. It is essential that the act by which the defendant is benefited must have
been voluntary and unilateral on the part of the plaintiff. As one distinguished civilian puts
it, "The act is voluntary, because, the actor in quasi-contracts is not bound by any pre-
existing obligation to act. It is unilateral, because it arises from the sole will of the actor who
is not previously bound by any reciprocal or bilateral agreement. The reason why the law
creates a juridical relation and imposes certain obligations is to prevent a situation where a
person is able to benefit or take advantage of such lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts at
the expense of said actor." (Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Law, Vol. VI, p. 748, 1969 ed.) In the case
at bar, since appellant has a clearer and more direct recourse against the Deudors with
whom he had entered into an agreement regarding the improvements and expenditures
made by him on the land of appellees, it cannot be said, in the sense contemplated in
Article 2142, that appellees have been enriched at the expense of appellant.

In the ultimate, therefore, Our holding above that appellant's first two assignments of error
are well taken cannot save the day for him. Aside from his having no cause of action against
appellees, there is one plain error of omission We have found in the order of the trial court
which is as good a ground as any other for Us to terminate this case favorably to appellees.
In said order which We have quoted in full earlier in this opinion, the trial court ruled that
"the grounds relied upon in said motion are mere repetitions of those already resolved and
discussed by this Court in the order of August 13, 1964", an observation which We fully
share. Virtually, therefore, appellant's motion for reconsideration was ruled to be pro-
forma. Indeed, a cursory reading of the record on appeal reveals that appellant's motion for
reconsideration above-quoted contained exactly the same arguments and manner of
discussion as his February 6, 1964 "Opposition to Motion to Dismiss" of defendant Gregorio
Araneta, Inc. (pp. 17-25, Rec. on Appeal) as well as his February 17, 1964 "Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss of Defendant J. M. Tuason & Co." (pp. 33-45, Rec. on Appeal) and his
February 29, 1964 "Rejoinder to Reply of Defendant J. M. Tuason & Co. ". (pp. 52-64, Rec. on
Appeal) We cannot see anything in said motion for reconsideration that is substantially
different from the above oppositions and rejoinder he had previously submitted and which
the trial court had already considered when it rendered its main order of dismissal.
Consequently, appellant's motion for reconsideration did not suspend his period for appeal.
(Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, 28 SCRA 890, 905-6.) And as this point was covered by appellees'
"Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration" (pp. 86-89), hence, within the frame of the
issues below, it is within the ambit of Our authority as the Supreme Court to consider the
same here even if it is not discussed in the briefs of the parties. (Insular Life Assurance Co.,
Ltd. Employees Association-NATU vs. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. [Resolution en banc
of March 10, 1977 in G. R. No. L-25291]).

Now, the impugned main order was issued on August 13, 1964, while the appeal was made
on September 24, 1964 or 42 days later. Clearly, this is beyond the 30-day reglementary
period for appeal. Hence, the subject order of dismissal was already final and executory
when appellant filed his appeal.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Faustino Cruz in this case is dismissed. No costs.

Fernando, (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino, and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J., did not take part.

Designated to sit in the Second Division.