Guide to

understanding the

Maria Elena Rodriguez

Marta Fernández
Renan Guimarães Canellas de Oliveira

Caderno para entender o BRICS • 1

ABOUT THE BRICS POLICY CENTER BPC Team
The BRICS Policy Center / BRICS Research Director of the Institute of
and Study Center (BPC) is a think thank linked International Relations
to the Institute of International Relations of Isabel Rocha de Siqueira
PUC-Rio (IRI / PUC-Rio), is an independent,
Director of the BRICS Policy Center
non-partisan and non-profit center for reflec-
Marta Fernández
tion in the city from Rio de Janeiro. The BPC’s
mission is to contribute to the advancement Diretora Adjunta
of a rights base development agenda and Maria Elena Rodriguez
promotion of equality in the countries of the
Administrative Coordinator
global south, throughout the production of Lia Frota e Lopes
critical and relevant knowledge for the public
debate about the transformations in the inter- Comunicação
national system and its consequences at the Isabelle Bernardes e Luiz Segretto
local, national and regional levels. Project Officer
The opinions expressed here in are the sole Clara Costa
responsibility of the author(s), and do not Project Assistant
necessarily reflect the position of the institu- Luana Freitas
tions involved.

Rua das Laranjeiras, 307, 3º andar – Casas Casadas | La-

ranjeiras. Rio de Janeiro/RJ. CEP: 22240-004

www.bricspolicycenter.org / [email protected]

Authors: BPC Papers V.11. N. 06 - December/2024.

Maria Elena Rodriguez Rio de Janeiro. PUC.
Marta Fernández BRICS Policy Center
Renan Guimarães Canellas de Oliveira ISSN: 2357-7681
Design: 48P, 19cm x 25cm
Ana Dibiasi Key-words: 1. Brics; 2. Multilateralismo; 3.
Nova Governança.
Table of Contents
What is BRICS? 4
Formation and Expansion: From BRIC to BRICS+ 5
What Unites BRICS? 7

BRICS: How does it work? 12

What is BRICS’s role in Brazil? 19

Intra-BRICS Relations 20

New Development Bank 25

BRICS global governance 30

Civil society engagement in BRICS 33

Towards the 2025 Summit: “Strengthening

Global South Cooperation for More Inclusive and
Sustainable Governance” 36

Sources 37
What is BRICS?

B RICS is a grouping of the largest emerging economies in the world:

Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, the United Arab Brazil
Emirates, Ethiopia, Iran and Indonesia. Its main purpose is to promo-
te transformation of the global governance system established after
World War II through the reform of traditional financial institutions Russia
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
Additionally, it aims to contribute to the construction of a multipolar
order that reflects the power distribution of the 21st century.
India

Since 2009, the grouping has held annual meetings, chaired by one
of its member countries. The first BRIC Summit – still without South
Africa – took place in 2009 in Yekaterinburg, Russia. Starting January China
1, 2025, Brazil will assume the rotating presidency of BRICS, under
the motto “Strengthening Global South Cooperation for More Inclusive
and Sustainable Governance” (Vieira, 2024). South Africa

Egypt

United Arab
Emirates

Ethiopia

Iran

Indonesia

4
Formation and Expansion: From BRIC to BRICS+

T he acronym “BRIC” (Brazil, Russia, India, In September of the same year, the foreign
and China) originated in the early 2000s, ministers of the BRIC countries met on the si-
coined by Jim O’Neill (2001), a British econo- delines of the United Nations General Assem-
mist at Goldman Sachs, to describe a group of bly, still informally.
emerging countries that he predicted would
In 2008, Russia organized a meeting with the
experience significant economic growth and
foreign ministers of Brazil, India, and Chi-
whose share of global production would also
na, who emphasized the prospects for BRIC
grow significantly in the following ten years.
dialogue based on mutual trust and respect,
As pointed out by Stunkel (2013), O’Neill did common interests, and similar approaches
not consider political aspects and projec- to urgent global development issues (BRIC,
ted a group based exclusively on economic 2008). According to Reis (2013), this meeting
indicators. Due to the institutional nature of marked the point where BRIC ceased to be an
Goldman Sachs (an investment bank), the acronym designating four emerging countries
text aimed to alert long-term investors to in the global economy and transformed into
economies that could present more vigorous a political-diplomatic entity. The year 2009
growth compared to more developed econo- was marked by the first BRIC summit, when
mies, according to the projections (Ramalho, the heads of state Lula da Silva (Brazil), Di-
2017). Despite starting as an announcement, mitry Medvedev (Russia), Manmohan Singh
the acronym soon gained international promi- (India), and Hu Jintao (China) met in Yekate-
nence (Lima, 2013), as the heads of state and rinburg, Russia. On that occasion, the coun-
government of Brazil, India, and Russia be- tries agreed to promote intra-BRIC dialogue
gan to refer to themselves as BRIC members and cooperation in an incremental, proactive,
(Stunkel, 2013). pragmatic, open, and transparent manner, ai-
ming to build a harmonious world of lasting
It was in this context that in July 2006 the le-
peace and common prosperity (BRIC, 2009).
aders of the BRIC countries met for the first
time in St. Petersburg, Russia, on the side- It was only at the BRIC foreign ministers’ me-
lines of the G8 Summit – a group of countries eting, held on the sidelines of the UN Gene-
considered the most industrialized and in- ral Assembly in September 2010, that it was
fluential in the world, comprising the United decided to incorporate South Africa. The
States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, state was invited to participate in the grou-
France, Italy, Canada, and Russia (the latter ping’s third summit in 2011, held in Sanya,
until 2014, the year of Crimea’s annexation). China, giving rise to BRICS. Since then, the

Caderno para entender o BRICS • 5

group has continued to hold annual summits, ted Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, and Iran. Also in
establishing itself as an alternative political- 2023, Javier Milei, newly elected president of
-diplomatic mechanism to traditional postwar Argentina, declined the invitation and Saudi
institutions, composed only of countries that Arabia has not yet formalized its accession.1
self-represent as developing. Except for this one, the other four countries
became part of what is now known as BRICS+
After more than 10 years (2023) with the
on January 1, 2024.
same format, during the XV BRICS Summit in
Johannesburg, South Africa, the bloc took a According to Herrero (2024), China played a
new step in its expansion, inviting six coun- central role in the group’s expansion. Besides
tries: Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Egypt, the Uni- China, Russia also supported the expansion

Figure 1: Group expansion timeline

Source: Original work

1. Due to the fact that Saudi Arabia has not officially joined, data on this country has not been taken into account
at the time of publication of this Guide.

6
to protect itself from isolation and Western to join the grouping as Partners. Since Janu-
sanctions resulting from its military invasion ary 2025, under the Brazilian presidency, the
of Ukraine in 2022. Regardless of the moti- grouping has officially included the following
vation at play, the addition of new members partner countries: Belarus, Bolivia, Kazakhs-
makes BRICS more representative of develo- tan, Cuba, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Ugan-
ping countries and strengthens their voices da and Uzbekistan.
on the global stage.
At the beginning of January 2025, under the
During the XVI BRICS Summit in 2024, in Ka- Brazilian presidency, Itamaraty confirmed In-
zan, Russia, the creation of a new category donesia’s formal entry into the grouping as a
of country membership in the group’s struc- full member. The Southeast Asian country’s
ture was announced. In the Kazan Declara- candidacy had been approved by the other
tion (BRICS, 2024), the final document of the members in August 2023, in the context of
Summit, the group confirmed the establish- the process of expanding BRICS’ member-
ment of the “BRICS Partner Countries” cate- ship. However, due to presidential elections in
gory: countries that can join the group but 2024, Indonesia formally informed the group
with limited participation and no voting rights. of its interest in joining BRICS only after the
The invitations were made by Russia, con- formation of a new government.
sulting whether the countries really wanted

What Unites BRICS?

I n the early years of the 21st century, BRI-

CS countries underwent significant political
Other than the fact that all BRICS countries
were experiencing significant economic
and economic transformations: Brazil rose to growth, few characteristics united them: they
the position of the world’s sixth-largest eco- were large in territory and population, and
nomy (2011); China ascended to the position they were not part of the group of develo-
of second-largest economy (2010); Russia ped countries. The differences between the
stabilized economically, positioning itself as countries are striking: Russia, Brazil, and Sou-
the eleventh-largest economy (2010); India th Africa operate as raw material exporters,
maintained high annual growth rates, posi- while India and China depend on imports;
tioning itself in ninth place (2010); and South Brazil and South Africa do not possess nucle-
Africa stood out as the largest economy on ar weapons, unlike Russia, China, and India,
the African continent, responsible for 14% of the latter not being a signatory to the Nucle-
African GDP (Reis, 2013). ar Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); China and

Caderno para entender o BRICS • 7

Russia are permanent members of the UN Se- BRICS then stands as a new instance of linka-
curity Council, a position not held by Brazil, ge and coordination among developing coun-
India, and South Africa (Stuenkel, 2013); and tries in a context in which postwar institutions,
all have distinct development trajectories and mainly financial ones like the World Bank and
models of social organization (Leão, 2013). the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were
accumulating a lack of representativeness,
and as a result legitimacy.
Given such heterogeneity, what unites
BRICS countries? In this sense, BRICS emerges with a common
denominator: “an affinity (...) in a critical rea-
The main point of convergence among BRICS
ding of the distribution of power in global go-
countries beyond economic, territorial, and
vernance systems” (Leão, 2013, p. 77). Des-
population issues, was the fact that, except
pite contesting its legitimacy, the group could
for the particular case of the UN Security
be seen as a political-diplomatic mechanism
Council (for China and Russia), they were not
aiming to complement, rather than compete
at the decision-making center of the main in-
with or replace, the existing global governan-
ternational regimes created after World War
ce system.
II (Cozendey, 2013). While the importance of
BRICS countries to the world economy was With the entry of South Africa into the group,
evident, they were still excluded from the the final text of the III BRICS Summit, held in
“hard core of economic power” (Reis, 2013, 2011 in Sanya, China, outlined objectives that
p. 53): the G7, the group formed by Canada, can be understood as pillars of the group’s
France, Italy, Germany, the United States, political agenda. The text, in general, advo-
Japan, and the United Kingdom (Reis, 2013). cates:

The need for comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security
Council, to make it more effective, efficient, and representative, so it
can more successfully address today’s global challenges. China and
Russia reiterate the importance they attach to the status of India, Bra-
zil, and South Africa in international affairs, and understand and su-
pport their aspiration to play a more significant role in the UN.

That the administrative structure of international financial institutions

should reflect changes in the world economy, increasing the voice and
representation of emerging economies and developing countries.

The reform and improvement of the international monetary system,

with a broad-based international reserve currency system that provi-
des stability and predictability (BRICS, 2011).
8
As discussed, during the XV BRICS Summit, new countries were in-
vited to join the group, making it even more diverse. To illustrate the
heterogeneity resulting from this Summit, we can highlight:

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran are major exporters
of oil and natural gas, and significant per-capita CO2 emitters, while
Ethiopia’s emissions are minimal.

Ethiopia suffers from acute malnutrition levels, 21.90%, while malnu-

trition in Iran and Egypt is around 6-7%. Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates have levels below 4% (FAO, 2024).

In terms of geographic representation, Ethiopia and Egypt strengthen

the African presence in the group, while Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, and Iran add one in the Middle East. After Argentina’s rejec-
tion of the invitation, Latin America remains underrepresented with the
sole presence of Brazil.

With the recent expansion, the group’s homo- For Indian Prime Minister Modi, the strength
geneity is again in question, and the question of BRICS lies in the strong belief of member
reappears: what unites the BRICS+ coun- countries in diversity and multipolarity (Modi,
tries? 2024). Brazilian President Lula da Silva echo-
es this position: “we want to reaffirm the bloc’s
As indicated by Chinese President Xi Jinping
vocation in the fight for a multipolar world and
at the latest BRICS Summit in Kazan, the
for less asymmetrical relations between cou-
“dynamics of international power are under-
ntries” (Da Silva, 2024, original translation).
going profound changes, but global gover-
nance reform has been lagging for a long In this sense, despite the differences among
time” (Xi, 2024, original translation). For him, the group’s members, what unites the BRICS+
BRICS should become the “primary channel countries remains the shared goal since the
for strengthening solidarity and cooperation formation of BRIC in 2008: to promote greater
among Global South nations and a vanguard representativeness of the global governance
for advancing global governance reform” (Xi, system with the reform of mechanisms such
2024, original translation). as the UN Security Council and the Bretton

Caderno para entender o BRICS • 9

Woods institutions, as well as proposing al- such as the New Development Bank (NDB)
ternatives for fostering emerging economies, created in 2014 at the Fortaleza Summit, Brazil.

POPULATION TERRITORIAL TOTAL GDP

(2023/mi) SIZE (2023/mi)

Brazil 216,422.45 8,358,140.0 km² US$ 2,173,665.66

Russia 143,826.13 16,376,870.0 km² US$ 2,021,421.48

China 1,410,710.00 9,388,210.0 km² US$ 17,794,781.99

India 1,428,627.66 2,973,190.0 km² US$ 3,549,918.92

South
60,414.50 1,213,090.0 km² US$ 377,781.60
Africa

Egypt 112,716.60 995,450.0 km² US$ 395,926.08

UAE 9,516.87 71,020.0 km² US$ 504,173.45

Ethiopia 126,527.06 1,128,571.3 km² US$ 163,697.93

Iran 89,172.77 1,622,500.0 km² US$ 401,504.51

Indonesia 281,190.07 1,892,555 km² US$ 1,371,171.15

10
 POPULATION

TERRITORIAL SIZE

TOTAL GDP

Source: Original work

Caderno para entender o BRICS • 11

BRICS: How does it work?

J ust like the G7 and G20, BRICS is an in- multilateral institution, BRICS is based on
formal multilateral institution or grouping. principles of generalized reciprocity, in which
These arrangements are considered flexible states make shared commitments and agree
and non-institutionalized platforms for enga- to act cooperatively, regardless of the level of
gement between countries (Larinova, 2018). institutionalization.
Generally, these groupings are called “clubs”
However, it is necessary to point out that
mainly due to the limited number of mem-
informality is distinct from illegitimacy. The
bers and virtually non-existent membership
presence of 36 leaders (including heads of
or expansion processes. However, the recent
state and government) at the Kazan Sum-
expansion of BRICS points to the opposite:
mit demonstrates the consolidation of the
a group concerned with being a more open
group’s legitimacy and recognition as an im-
and representative channel of the demands
portant space in global governance. At the
of Global South nations. As President Lula
same time, the establishment of the New
stated: “BRICS cannot be a closed club. The
Development Bank, though a fully indepen-
G7 is a closed club“ (Da Silva, citing Toledo,
dent institution, points to a greater degree of
2023, n.p.).
institutionalization in BRICS, as it controls a
It is also important to note that, in these in- normative platform capable of influencing ru-
formal institutions like BRICS, states do not le-making in the global development sphere
transfer certain levels of authority to interna- (Abdenur and Folly, 2015). Beyond NDB, the
tional bureaucrats as is done in international creation of the BRICS Contingent Reserve
organizations like the UN. This way, states Arrangement (CRA) is another mechanism
retain sovereign control over the design and representing further institutionalization for
agenda of these institutions. the bloc. Its objective is to provide support
through additional liquidity and other means
Furthermore, the commitments contained in
to BRICS countries in times of economic crisis
their collectively agreed documents are not
(BRICS, 2023b).
legally binding like international treaties, but
their implementation is encouraged via poli- The presidency of BRICS is rotating, mea-
tical and moral pressure of peers. As in any ning it changes place annually among mem-

12
ber countries. The president sets the priori- The table below summarizes the main topics
ties and the event calendar for the year, and addressed in the sixteen BRICS Summits held
hosts the summit and all related meetings. so far.

Table 01: Highlights of BRICS Summits

SUMMIT PLACE MAIN TOPICS

Financial crisis of 2008 and reform of international

financial institutions; advocacy for a more signifi-
cant role for India and Brazil in the United Nations;
1st Summit Yekaterinburg, condemnation of international terrorism; food
(2009) Russia security and combating hunger; and the defense
of resource diversification and energy supply
(BRIC, 2009).

Criticism of trade protectionism and defense of

the multilateral trading system; support for the
Millennium Declaration and achievement of the
2nd Summit Brasilia, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); com-
(2010) Brazil bating poverty, particularly in African countries;
advocacy for energy transition and recognition of
the need to act on climate change (BRIC, 2010).

Condemnation of terrorism and a call for the

completion of negotiations at the UN on the
Comprehensive Convention on International
3rd Summit Sanya, Terrorism; development of renewable energies;
(2011) China the importance of nuclear energy for the energy
matrix of BRICS countries; cooperation in science,
technology, and innovation, including the peaceful
use of space (BRICS, 2011).

Reflections on the creation of a BRICS Deve-

lopment Bank; agreement on facilitating credit
4th Summit New Delhi, extension in local currency; investments and in-
(2012) India tra-BRICS cooperation; sustainable development,
climate change, combating hunger, and energy
security (BRICS, 2012).

Caderno para entender o BRICS • 13

 SUMMIT PLACE MAIN TOPICS

Feasibility of establishing a New Development

5th Summit Durban, Bank for financing infrastructure in BRICS coun-
tries and creating a Contingent Reserve Arrange-
(2013) South Africa ment; integration and cooperation with the African
continent (BRICS, 2013).

Establishment of the New Development Bank

(NDB); signing of the treaty for the establishment
of the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement;
6th Summit Fortaleza, completion of the Cooperation Agreement on
(2014) Brazil Innovation under the BRICS Interbank Coopera-
tion Mechanism; BRICS–South America relations;
investment in information and communication
technologies (ICTs) (BRICS, 2014).

Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership; expan-

sion of the use of national currencies in intra-BRI-
7th Summit Ufa, CS transactions; combating corruption, drug traf-
(2015) Russia ficking, transnational organized crime, and piracy;
peaceful use of outer space; internet governance
and the importance of ICTs (BRICS, 2015).

Adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable

8th Summit Goa, Development Goals (SDGs); efficient energy ge-
neration and distribution, as well as decarbonizing
(2016) India energy matrices and other clean energy solutions;
combating HIV and tuberculosis (BRICS, 2016).

Digital economy and e-commerce; sustainable

9th Summit Xiamen, development, energy transition and security, and
climate change; interpersonal exchanges within
(2017) China BRICS; and global health governance (BRICS,
2017).

Circular economy; gender inequality and women’s

rights, youth development, employment and the
10th Summit Johannesburg, future of work, urbanization, migration, and aging;
(2018) South Africa advancement of the 4th Industrial Revolution and
the possibilities for BRICS countries in it; intra-
-BRICS cooperation on tourism (BRICS, 2018).

14
 SUMMIT PLACE MAIN TOPICS

Commitment to the carbon emission reduction

11th Summit Brasilia, targets set in the Paris Agreement; pursuit of
common development based on fair competition
(2019) Brazil
and open markets; commitment to the 2030
Agenda and SDGs (BRICS, 2019).

Broad reform of international financial institutions

and multilateral institutions, such as the UN,
the World Trade Organization, the World Health
12th Summit Saint Petersburg,
Organization, and the IMF; condemnation of
(2020) Russia (Online) international terrorism; recognition of the need
for comprehensive immunization and combating
COVID-19 (BRICS, 2020).

Combating COVID-19 and the importance of

viewing immunization as a global public good;
13th Summit New Delhi, commitment to the 2030 Agenda and SDGs;
(2021) India (Online) intra-BRICS cooperation in science, technology,
and innovation; energy security and transition and
climate change (BRICS, 2021).

Promotion of post-pandemic economic recovery;

14th Summit Beijing, commitment to the 2030 Agenda and SDGs; ener-
gy security and transition and climate change;
(2022) China (Online) cooperation in food security; Russo-Ukrainian
conflict (BRICS, 2022).

Agricultural cooperation and food security; transi-

15th Summit Johannesburg,
tion to a digital economy; growing global inequali-
(2023) South Africa ty; expansion process (BRICS, 2023b).

Illegal unilateral sanctions; non-selective,

non-politicized, and constructive human rights
16th Summit Kazan, regime, without double standards; condemnation
(2024) Russia of Israeli military incursions in the Middle East;
establishment of a grain negotiation platform
(BRICS, 2024).

Source: Original work

Caderno para entender o BRICS • 15

As we can see, some themes are cross-cutting the 2030 Agenda and SDGs (Sustainable De-
and well established in the statements from velopment Goals); energy security and tran-
all the Summits, reflecting the shared priori- sition, and climate change. These points un-
ties of the BRICS member countries. Among derline the group’s commitment to promoting
these themes, notable mentions include the a fairer and more inclusive international order
reform of multilateral institutions, advocating that takes into account the needs and aspira-
for a more significant role for BRICS and de- tions of developing countries. The word cloud
veloping countries in the UN, the condemna- below highlights the most prevalent terms in
tion of international terrorism, commitment to the Joint Declarations of the BRICS group.

Figure 2: Word cloud of the Joint Declarations of BRICS

cooperation

sustainable
commerce

community

measures
Financial
energy

stability brics
promotion

rights health terrorism

financing peace Africa efforts UN
international security
global

respect

development economy growth

Source: Original work

16
In addition to the traditional leaders’ meetings ings; high-level and sectoral meetings; as well
(the Summits), throughout the year there are as various workshops, seminars, and forums
also meetings of sherpas and sous-sherpas on diverse topics. Notable are the different
(where the Summit agenda is discussed by working groups created to advance specific
different representatives from the member topics, such as Environment, Energy, Health,
countries who also evaluate the implemen- Counterterrorism, Geospatial Technologies
tation of what was decided in the previous and their applications, Science Technology,
Summit); ministerial and agency head meet- Information, etc.

Box 1: Some BRICS Working Groups

Environmental Working Group

Established in 2015 under the Russian presidency, the group aims to identify and discuss priority areas
for cooperation, share environmental best practices, and facilitate the exchange of environmentally sou-
nd technologies and expertise with the participation of public and private stakeholders.

Health Working Group

Aims to discuss various challenges and threats to the health systems of BRICS countries, as well as pros-
pects for greater cooperation in areas such as nuclear medicine, combating antimicrobial resistance, and
public health. The establishment of the BRICS Medical Association and the creation of an Integrated Early
Warning System for Mass Infectious Disease Risk Prevention in BRICS countries are expected.

Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Working Group

Established in 2016 under the Indian presidency, the working group seeks to promote intra-BRICS coope-
ration in the field of smart grids, digitalization and artificial intelligence, synthetic fuels and green energy,
solar panels, wind energy, and biofuels.

Counterterrorism Working Group

Established in 2016 under the Indian presidency, a platform aimed at promoting dialogue among experts
on preventing and combating terrorism and extremism, as well as sharing best practices among member
countries.

Source: Original work

Caderno para entender o BRICS • 17

Besides its political structure, BRICS archi- are the BRICS Business Council, the BRICS
tecture also extends to business, academia, Think Tanks Council, and the BRICS Women’s
media, parliaments, political parties, civil so- Business Alliance.
ciety, and sports. Among the main initiatives

Box 2: BRICS Initiatives

BRICS Business Council

Created with the purpose of forming a platform that facilitates and strengthens business, trade, and
investment ties among the business communities of BRICS countries. This platform aims to ensure cons-
tant dialogue between the private sector and the governments of these countries. Furthermore, the
Council plays a role in identifying obstacles and difficulties, proposing solutions that promote deeper
economic and commercial integration among the group’s nations. The Council was established during the
Durban Summit in 2013 (BRICS Business Council, n.d.).

BRICS Think Tanks Council (BTTC)

Responsible for sharing and disseminating information, research, policy analysis, and prospective stu-
dies, as well as providing training. The Council also makes recommendations to BRICS leaders. The BTTC
consists of the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) (Brazil), the National Research Committee
on BRICS (NRC/BRICS) (Russia), the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) (India), the China Council for
BRICS Think-tank Cooperation (CCBTC) (China), and the National Institute for Humanities and the South
African BRICS Think Tank (SABTT) (South Africa). The creation of the BRICS Think Tanks Council was
proposed at a think tank meeting in March 2013 and confirmed by BRICS leaders at the Durban Summit
that same year (BTTC, n.d.).

BRICS Women’s Business Alliance

Seeks to connect the challenges faced by micro-, small, and medium enterprises with the need for broa-
der economic inclusion of women in the economy. Goals include increasing female participation in BRICS
countries’ economies; expanding women-led business networks, promoting female entrepreneurship and
strengthening their leadership; and including women-owned businesses in global value chains. The idea
of creating the Alliance was proposed at the First International Forum of Women SCO and BRICS in the
summer of 2017. However, it was only in the Brasília Declaration of the BRICS Summit in 2019 that leaders
welcomed the establishment of the BRICS Women’s Business Alliance (BRICS WBA, n.d.).

Source: Original work

18
What is BRICS’s role in Brazil?

D uring the early years of the 21st century, projects, which are necessary for developing
Brazil was growing as a global economy countries like Brazil. With NDB, BRICS offered
and a regional power, while multilateralism an alternative to the World Bank and other
faced a crisis. As Brazil consolidated itself as development banks. More than just a channel
an emerging power, its diplomacy began to to amplify Brazil’s voice on the international
more intensely perceive a lack of legitimacy stage, the creation of the New Development
of the postwar multilateral institutions and Bank gave an important meaning to BRICS in
mechanisms, which no longer represented Brazilian foreign policy as a facilitator of sus-
the global power distribution (Becard, Bar- tainable development.
ros-Platiu, and Lessa, 2019). In this sense,
Currently, Brazil holds the rotating presiden-
the emergence of BRIC (and later BRICS) was
cy of NDB, represented by Dilma Rousseff.
understood by Brazilian foreign policy as a
The former Brazilian president took office in
channel to amplify Brazil’s international voice,
April 2023, appointed by President Lula. She
especially regarding the reform of internatio-
replaced diplomat Marcos Troyjo, and her
nal institutions.
mandate extends until July 2025. Additio-
The creation of the New Development Bank nally, next year, Brazil will assume the rota-
and the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrange- ting presidency of BRICS, being responsible
ment in 2014 was vital to strengthening the for setting the priorities and event calendar
significance the bloc would have for Brazil. for the year, as well as hosting the summit
Currently, BRICS architecture enables gre- and all related meetings.
ater access to financing for infrastructure

Caderno para entender o BRICS • 19

Intra-BRICS Relations

W ith the formal establishment of the Intra-BRICS trade has grown significantly sin-
group in 2008, from the first meeting ce the beginning of the 21st century. In 2000,
of BRIC foreign ministers in Yekaterinburg, the values were around US$ 17 billion, but by
the relations among BRIC(S) countries have 2020, the total in traded products between
progressively grown stronger. This process is the economies reached the US$ 334 billion
especially noticeable in the economic sector. mark, as shown in the graph below.

Figure 3: Growth of Intra-BRICS Trade, Selected

Years (US$ Billion)

400

US$ 334.7

300
US$ 242.5

US$ 210

200

100

US$ 16.9

0
2000 2010 2015 2020

Source: Original work using WITS, n.d.

20
To be sure, the weight of China in trade rela- mark of US$ 167 billion – 50% of the total tra-
tions among BRICS countries deserves spe- ded value among all BRICS countries. The ta-
cial attention. Among member countries, it is ble below details the intra-BRICS export flow
the main trading partner of all, and its exports in selected years.
to other BRICS countries in 2020 reached the

Table 2: Intra-BRICS Trade (US$ Billion)

Export from
Russia India China South Africa Total
Brazil

2000 0,4 0,2 1,0 0,3 1,9

2010 4,1 3,4 30,7 1,3 39,5

2015 2,4 3,6 35,1 1,3 42,4

2020 1,5 1,5 67,7 0,9 71,6

Export from
Brazil India China South Africa Total
Russia

2000 0,2 1,0 5,2 0,0 6,4

2010 1,7 5,4 19,7 0,0 26,8

2015 1,9 4,5 28,3 0,2 34,9

2020 1,9 5,7 46,1 0,2 53,9

Export from
Brazil Russia China South Africa Total
India

2000 0,1 0,8 0,7 0,3 1,9

2010 3,6 1,3 17,4 3,6 25,9

2015 3,0 1,6 9,5 3,8 17,9

2020 3,6 2,5 19,0 3,4 28,5

Caderno para entender o BRICS • 21

 Export from
Brazil Russia India South Africa Total
China

2000 1,2 2,2 1,5 1,0 5,9

2010 24,4 29,6 40,9 10,7 105,9

2015 27,4 34,7 58,2 15,8 136,1

2020 34,9 50,5 66,7 15,2 167,3

Export from
Brazil Russia India China Total
South Africa

2000 0,2 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,8

2010 0,7 0,2 3,0 8,0 11,9

2015 0,6 0,2 3,1 7,3 11,2

2020 0,2 0,3 3,2 9,7 13,4

Source: Original work using WITS, n.d.

In addition to trade exchanges, intra-BRICS ca. On the other hand, Russia’s contribution
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows also play is modest, amounting to only $0.8 billion of
an important role in the economic growth of all all intra-BRICS investments. India stands out
BRICS countries (UNCTAD, 2023). According as the second-largest originator of FDI in the
to a UNCTAD report (2023), BRICS countries bloc with a volume of $23 billion, with Russia
are among the main recipients of global FDI being its main destination. China, as expec-
flows, and some of them are also significant ted, is the main source of intra-BRICS invest-
sources of FDI, making them relevant both as ments, accumulating a total of $181.9 billion.
investment recipients and origin countries. Meanwhile, South Africa plays a significant
role, accounting for $15 billion of the total,
In this regard, Brazilian investments, totaling
reinforcing its position as a significant player
$8.5 billion between 2010-2022, are primarily
in intra-BRICS foreign direct investment.
destined for China, followed by South Afri-

22
 Table 3: Intra-BRICS Foreign Direct Investment 2010-2022 (US$ billion)

Country of destination

Country of origin Brazil Russia India China South Africa Total

Brazil - 0,1 0,5 6,8 1,1 8,5

Russia 0,3 - 0,2 0,3 0 0,8

India 2,4 10,1 - 5,5 5,0 23,0

China 27,0 65,8 18,2 - 70,9 181,9

South Africa 3,6 4,3 1,5 5,8 - 15,2

Source: Original work based on IMF, n.d.

As illustrated by the following graph, intra- largest investor and recipient of intra-BRICS
-BRICS FDI experienced significant growth investments. This process reflects China’s le-
from 2010 to 2020. However, similar to the in- ading role as the main source of capital and
crease observed in trade, this expansion was financing within the BRICS framework.
largely driven by China, which is by far the

Caderno para entender o BRICS • 23

 Figure 4: Intra-BRICS FDI Origin (US$ billion)

30

20

10

0
2010 2015 2020

South Africa China India Russia Brazil

Source: Original work based on IMF, n.d.

24
New Development Bank

T he New Development Bank is a multila- 2025, when, in theory, she will be replaced
teral development bank established by by a Russian appointee. However, in a press
the BRICS countries in 2014 during the VI statement during the Kazan Summit, Russian
Summit held in Fortaleza. The purpose of the President Putin proposed extending Dilma’s
Bank is to mobilize resources for infrastruc- term, considering both the Western sanctions
ture and sustainable development projects in imposed on Russia and the fact that Brazil will
developing countries, aiming to minimize the preside over the 17th BRICS Summit (Tortella,
financing gap for such projects that persists 2024).
in these countries (Abdenur and Folly, 2015).
Currently, in addition to the BRICS countries,
The Bank is headquartered in Shanghai, Chi- the Bank has been expanding since 2021. In
na, and is currently presided over by Dilma September of that year, Bangladesh became
Rousseff, appointed by the President of Bra- a member of NDB, and in October, the United
zil, Lula da Silva. The presidency of the Bank Arab Emirates. Egypt joined in February 2023.
is held for 5 years on a rotating basis. The first Additionally, Uruguay has been accepted as
country to lead NDB was India (2015-2020). a future member, having been admitted by
Dilma replaced diplomat Marcos Troyjo, who NDB’s Board of Governors, but will officially
had been appointed by former President Jair become a member country once it deposits
Bolsonaro, so her term extends until July its instrument of accession.

Caderno para entender o BRICS • 25

 Figure 5: Timeline of the New Development Bank (NDB)

Source: Original work

As can be seen, there is no exact correspon- even shown interest in joining the group. This
dence between the Bank’s members and BRI- has happened because, although a BRICS ini-
CS members. The UAE and Egypt, for exam- tiative, the Bank is a completely independent
ple, joined the Bank before becoming BRICS institution, allowing the accession of other
members. Bangladesh and Uruguay are not developing countries that are not part of the
part of BRICS, nor are they on the list of po- bloc.
tential Partner Countries. Uruguay has not

26
 Figure 6: Members of the New Development Bank and BRICS

Source: Original work

The New Development Bank’s operations Learn about all the

are divided into the following areas: Clean projects financed by NDB:
energy and energy efficiency; Transport in-
frastructure; Water and sanitation; Environ-
mental protection; Social infrastructure; and
Digital infrastructure. Additionally, during the
COVID-19 pandemic, the Bank had an emer-
gency response program to the economic
and health crisis, aiming to provide up to $10
billion in crisis-related assistance, including
support for the economic recovery of mem-
ber countries (NDB, n. d b).

Caderno para entender o BRICS • 27

Since its creation, the Bank has prioritized In the last ten years, this bank has emer-
infrastructure and sustainable development ged as an important option for the de-
projects that drive economic growth and im- velopment needs of the countries of the
prove people’s lives in member countries. Ac- Global South. (…) NDB should continue

cording to NDB, “everything we do is aimed to work on the basis of the demand dri-
ven principle. And, while expanding the
at shaping a more sustainable future“ (NDB,
bank ensuring long-term financial sustai-
n.d.). This objective is exemplified by the
nability, healthy credit rating, and market
Bank’s institutional strategy, which set a goal
access should remain a priority. (Modi,
for 2026 to direct 40% of all its financing to
2024).
climate change projects, including operations
contributing to the energy transition (NDB,
2022).
During this last Summit, Chinese President Xi
According to a study on NDB’s contribution Jinping emphasized the need to expand and
to the energy transition process of BRICS strengthen NDB (Xi, 2024), making it possi-
countries (Rodriguez et al, 2024), the Bank’s ble to “ensure that the international financial
efforts to achieve its goals are evident. Ac- system more effectively reflects the changes
cording to the study’s authors, more than in the global economic landscape“ (Xi, 2024).
40% of the Bank’s projects are already in the
Also this year, it is important to highlight
area of energy transition, specifically pro-
NDB’s contribution of $1.115 billion (approxi-
jects in decarbonization, energy efficiency, or
mately R$ 5.7 billion) to support the recons-
both, after deducting projects related to the
truction of the state of Rio Grande do Sul and
COVID-19 pandemic response. The authors
restructuring its economy after it was affec-
argue that among the energy transition pro-
ted by heavy rains and floods between May
jects, there is a concerted effort for decarbo-
and April 2024 (Rousseff, 2024). The amount
nization, covering more than 70% of all transi-
will be disbursed in conjunction with BNDES
tion projects. China and India, the main BRICS
(Brazilian National Bank for Economic and So-
countries in terms of fossil fuel consumption,
cial Development), Banco do Brasil, and BRDE
are also the leaders in decarbonization in-
(Regional Development Bank of the Extreme
vestments, representing about 40% of their
South) for projects related to environmental
total loans (Rodriguez et al, 2024).
protection; infrastructure; water and basic
NDB, celebrating its 10th anniversary this sanitation; disaster prevention; agricultural
year (2024), received positive evaluations infrastructure, storage projects and logistics
from its members during the Kazan Summit. infrastructure; urban development and mobi-
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated: lity; and water resources (Brazil, 2024).

28
 Box 3: Use of local currencies

The dollar assumed the position of main currency of the international economy in the pos-
twar period due to the disintegration of European economies and the rise of the United
States as a major power in the capitalist world. The dominance of the dollar has remained
since the 1950s, despite significant instabilities. Among these imbalances are the break-
down of the fixed exchange rate regime resulting from the Bretton Woods Agreement in the
1970s, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, and the internationalization of the German mark
and the Japanese yen in the 1980s. Additionally, the launch of the euro in the 1990s also
impacted the financial landscape but did not compromise the dollar’s hegemony (Cunha,
Peruffo and Ferrari, 2023).

The dominance of the dollar in the world economy allows the US to control foreign sove-
reign financial assets, freeze or seize them within existing technical and regulatory sys-
tems, and unilaterally impose sanctions (Arnold, 2024).

In this context, in recent years, BRICS countries have advocated for the importance of
increasing the use of local currencies in commercial and financial transactions among the
grouping’s countries. This process is popularly known as “dedollarization.” However, the
use of local currencies in intra-BRICS transactions, whether in trade or through FDI, does
not necessarily mean that these countries are “dedollarizing” their economies entirely; but
it is the beginning of a broader and long-term movement.

For BRICS countries, using local currencies in their transactions means reducing their ex-
posure to economic shocks linked to the dollar and US monetary policies.

Even though the BRICS Summit has recommended the use of local currencies since 2015,
the alarm was raised after the unilateral sanctions imposed by the US on Russia in 2022.
Efforts to use national currencies in international transactions, to build or strengthen al-
ternative payment systems, and even to create a new BRICS reference currency have
intensified.

Within the BRICS architecture, NDB is an important instrument demonstrating the bloc’s
effort to introduce other currencies in development financing processes. Since 2019, the
Bank has also made contributions in currencies other than the dollar, such as the Chinese
renminbi and the South African rand. In 2024, Brazil obtained its first financing in renminbi
worth RMB 1.5 billion for the construction of a wind power plant in Paraíba by China Three
Gorges Brasil.

Source: Original work

Caderno para entender o BRICS • 29

BRICS global governance

T he 21st century has been marked by the main international arenas less representative
rise of new emerging powers in the world of the global power distribution. Neverthe-
economy, such as Brazil, India, South Africa, less, their participation in global governance
and many others, which at the same time re- and multilateral engagement spaces was not
mained marginal in the main multilateral spa- null. The diagram below indicates the mem-
ces and international financial institutions bership of BRICS countries in two of the main
such as the UN and the IMF. This context dis- global governance spaces: the G20 and the
tanced these countries from the main interna- United Nations Security Council.
tional decision-making processes, making the

Figure 7: Overlapping membership of BRICS, G20 and

UN Security Council

Source: Original work

30
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Afri- held in Rio de Janeiro in November. Russia,
ca (the original BRICS) are members of the in turn, also reduced its participation, mainly
G20, an important forum for coordinating the due to Vladimir Putin’s inability to attend sum-
world’s financial architecture formed by the mits following his recent indictment by the In-
top 20 economies in the world. According to ternational Criminal Court for war crimes re-
Azera (2024), during the early years of BRI- lated to the invasion of Ukraine. Despite this,
CS, the five member countries and emerging according to Azera (2024), the other BRICS
powers in general believed that pressure on members still see the G20 as an essential
the G7 could be exerted within the G20, in- mechanism for North-South coordination in
creasing the chances of reforms in global go- global governance, as demonstrated by the
vernance structures. Over the years, the ins- troika’s efforts in leading the grouping (India,
titutional advances of the G20 strengthened Brazil, and South Africa in 2023, 2024, and
the bargaining power of developing nations, 2025, respectively).
in line with the growing influence of the Glo-
Russia and China, unlike the other BRICS
bal South in international markets. During this
member countries, have permanent seats on
period, BRICS meetings highlighted the bloc’s
the UNSC and thus enjoy greater influence
interest in actively participating in the conso-
within the United Nations system. Even so,
lidation of the G20.
the two countries, through BRICS declara-
In recent years, as Azera (2024) points out, tions, have committed to supporting greater
BRICS countries have faced a reduction in participation by Brazil, India, and South Africa
their ability to act jointly within the G20, main- in the UN and its Security Council – a signifi-
ly due to the growing individualization of their cant demand for the diplomacy of these three
agendas. The author highlights the case of countries.
China, which has reduced its engagement in
As Rodriguez and Oliveira (2024) point out,
the G20, evidenced by Xi Jinping’s absence
during the latest Summit in Kazan, BRICS cou-
from the forum meeting in New Delhi in 2023.
ntries highlighted their support for a reform of
This absence can be explained by two rea-
the United Nations, including the UNSC, ai-
sons: the Chinese leadership’s dissatisfaction
ming to make it more democratic, representa-
with the current state of global governance
tive, efficient, and effective, and to increase
and its interest in undermining the prominen-
the representation of developing countries
ce the Indian government seeks as a repre-
among Council members (BRICS, 2024). In
sentative of the Global South. However, du-
line with the inclusion of new members, this
ring Brazil’s G20 presidency in 2024, China
Declaration did not specifically advocate for
re-engaged actively in the mechanism, inclu-
a more significant role for India, Brazil, and
ding Xi Jinping’s participation in the Summit

Caderno para entender o BRICS • 31

South Africa in the UN, as previous texts did was the only one to vote for the withdrawal
(Rodriguez and Oliveira, 2024). of Russian troops from Ukraine. Egypt and
the United Arab Emirates, which joined BRICS
Regarding the common BRICS agenda on
in 2023, a year after the resolution, also vo-
global governance, there is a noticeable con-
ted in line with the West. In a 2017 resolution
vergence in their voting strategy at the UN. A
condemning human rights violations in Syria,
case that clearly illustrates this is a recent re-
there was also a degree of alignment in the
solution on the Israel-Palestine crisis, in whi-
foreign policy of BRICS countries: only Brazil
ch only India and Ethiopia abstained, while all
and the UAE voted with the West, while Rus-
BRICS countries voted in favor. In the case in-
sia, China, and Iran opposed the condemna-
volving the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the-
tion of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The others
re is also a degree of convergence in voting:
abstained.
among the original BRICS members, Brazil

Table 4: BRICS voting records on UN Resolutions

Resolution on the Resolution on the Resolution on Human

Israel-Palestine Crisis Russia-Ukraine Conflict Rights in Syria
October 27, 2023 March 2, 2022 December 19, 2017

Brazil In favor In favor In favor

Russia In favor Against Against

India Abstained Abstained Abstained

China In favor Abstained Against

South Africa In favor Abstained Abstained

Egypt In favor In favor Abstained

UAE In favor In favor In favor

Ethiopia Abstained Abstained Abstained

Iran In favor Absent Against

Indonesia In favor In favor Absent

Source: Original work based on United Nations, n.d.

32
Civil society engagement
in BRICS

R
egarding civil society and social move- As Garcia (2014) argues, “building BRICS from
ment participation in BRICS processes, the ground up” is a slower process than that
it is predictable to imagine that the interna- of governments. According to the author, this
tional themes of the grouping might seem is mainly due to the differences in social rea-
distant from local and national agendas (Gar- lities of the countries, as well as the difficulty
cia, 2014). However, as Graciela Rodriguez of movements communicating in English (es-
(2024), coordinator of the Brazilian Network pecially those outside India and South Africa).
for the Integration of Peoples (Rebrip), points Garcia also points to the differences in the
out, in an increasingly globalized world, inter- relationships of these movements with their
national geopolitics is becoming increasingly states: Chinese and Russian organizations
important for the agenda of social organiza- tend to be closer to their governments, diffe-
tions. ring in their positions on the green economy,
extractivism, and social participation.
In this sense, there is a consistent history of
social engagement within the context of BRI- Parallel to the V BRICS Summit in Durban, the
CS, particularly by Brazilian, South African, first edition of “BRICS from below” took place,
and Indian civil societies. Since the Summit a meeting of grassroots social movements,
held in Durban, South Africa in 2013, civil so- trade unions, and academics. In parallel to the
ciety has been promoting events and semi- VI BRICS Summit in Fortaleza, the “Develop-
nars parallel to the leaders’ Summit, aiming to ment Dialogues: BRICS from the perspective
create synergies, strengthen their networks, of the peoples” were held. The event was or-
and develop joint action strategies. These ac- ganized by Brazilian trade unions and NGOs,
tors mainly oppose the multilateral systems with participation from organizations from
defined as exploitative, which accentuate Africa, South America, Europe, and the US.
unequal development, ecological destruction, Also noteworthy this year was the significant
and other injustices at a global level intensi- participation of women’s movements in orga-
fied by the capitalism of BRICS countries. nizing the “First BRICS Women’s Forum.” The

Caderno para entender o BRICS • 33

event is the result of the network tradition of In 2016 and 2021, despite the BRICS Civil Fo-
Brazilian and foreign social organizations in rum being held under the Indian government’s
the so-called “People’s Summits”: indepen- presidency, the People’s Forum on BRICS was
dent summits of social resistance held alon- organized by Indian and international social
gside different international summits, such as movements and NGOs. This was due to the
the G20 and Free Trade Area of the Americas understanding that the official Summit pro-
(FTAA) negotiations (Rodriguez, 2024). cess completely ignored the people and their
concerns (People’s Forum on BRICS, 2016).
Starting in 2015, under the Russian presiden-
cy, the BRICS Civil Forum was created, an of- In 2019, under the Brazilian presidency led by
ficial space for social participation during the Michel Temer, there was no BRICS Civil Fo-
summit. However, as Ramos et al. (2018) indi- rum. However, parallel to the Leaders’ Sum-
cate, the control exercised by the Russian go- mit, civil society organized the “BRICS of the
vernment over the political space meant that Peoples” Seminar. Central themes revolved
many NGOs were not invited, while others around international geopolitics and the role
chose to decline the invitation. Even so, the of BRICS and peoples, economic, social, and
Forum was institutionalized within the grou- environmental crisis, and popular develop-
ping, always taking place parallel with the Le- ment alternatives (BRICS dos Povos, 2019).
aders’ Summit. In 2017 and 2022, under Chi-
In this way, the main spaces for civil society
nese leadership, the Forum was named the
engagement in BRICS have been as follows:
BRICS Forum of Political Parties, Think Tanks,
and Civil Society Organizations.

Parallel to the Leaders’ Summits, civil society organizations orga-

nized the “People’s Summits”: BRICS From Below in 2013 (Durban,
South Africa), People’s Forum on BRICS in 2016 and 2021 (Goa and
New Delhi, India), and BRICS of the Peoples in 2019 (Brasília, Brazil).

The BRICS Civil Forum, organized by governments, took place in

2015 (Ufa, Russia), 2016 (New Delhi, India), 2018 (Johannesburg,
South Africa), 2020 (Moscow, Russia – online), 2021 (New Delhi, In-
dia – online), 2023 (Johannesburg, South Africa), and 2024 (Mos-
cow, Russia).

34
 Under the Chinese presidency, in 2017 and 2022, the Forum of Po-
litical Parties, Think Tanks, and BRICS Civil Society Organizations
took place in Fuzhou and online, respectively.

The coordinator of Rebrip states there is an interest from social move-

ments in opening new channels of participation, coordination, and so-
cial influence within the BRICS framework. For example, the institutional
formalization of a civil society participation mechanism is important to
foster dialogue with the governments of the grouping in order to ensure
popular demands are considered.

Caderno para entender o BRICS • 35

Towards the 2025 Summit: “Strength-
ening Global South Cooperation for More
Inclusive and Sustainable Governance”

I
n 2025, Brazil will once again assume the presidency in 2024. This approach reinforces
rotating presidency of BRICS, holding the the coherence and convergence of Brazil’s
position from January to December. After this priorities in different multilateral forums.
period, the leadership of the group will be
Under the slogan “Strengthening Global Sou-
transferred to India. The priorities defined by th Cooperation for more Inclusive and Sustai-
the Brazilian government are likely to conti- nable Governance”, the Brazilian presidency
nue a broader foreign policy agenda, aligning will work on two main axes: Global South Co-
with the themes addressed during the G20 operation and Global Governance Reform.

The agendas are reflected in five priorities:

• facilitating trade and investment between the countries of the

grouping, through the development of means of payment

• promoting inclusive and responsible governance of Artificial

Intelligence for development

• improving financing structures to tackle climate change, in dialogue

with COP 30 (United Nations Climate Change Conference 2025)

• encouraging cooperation projects between countries in the Global

South, with a focus on public health

• institutional strengthening of the BRICS.

36
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Interview
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