WILL EUROPE

REBUILD OR DIVIDE?
The Strategic Implications of the
Russia-Ukraine War for Europe’s Future

ALEXANDRA T. EVANS • KRYSTYNA MARCINEK • OMAR DANAF

For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA3141-5.
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About This Report

This report examines the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on how the United States’ European
allies understand and pursue their security. To assess whether the conflict is likely to drive long-lasting
changes in European security priorities, investments, and relations, this report focuses on the conflict’s
effect on (1) European attitudes toward relations with Russia; (2) European collective security
strategies, institutions, and resources; and (3) prospects for increased integration with Ukraine. It
assesses the likely durability of changes observed since 2022 and highlights implications and
recommendations for the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. government.
The research reported here was commissioned by the U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE)–Air
Forces Africa (AFAFRICA) Plans and Programs Directorate (A5/8) and conducted within the
Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE as part of a fiscal year 2024 project,
“End Game: How Might War in Ukraine End and How Will the Outcome Shape Future Force
Needs?”
This report is part of a series of five reports produced for this project. The other four are:
• Bryan Frederick, Alexandra T. Evans, Mark Hvizda, Alisa Laufer, Howard Wang, Samuel
Charap, Krystyna Marcinek, Howard J. Shatz, Khrystyna Holynska, David A. Ochmanek,
Omar Danaf, Brett Zakheim, and Kristen Gunness, The Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine
War, RAND Corporation, RR-A3141-1, 2025
• Mark Hvizda, Bryan Frederick, Alisa Laufer, Alexandra T. Evans, Kristen Gunness, and
David A. Ochmanek, Dispersed, Disguised, and Degradable: The Implications of the Fighting in
Ukraine for Future U.S.-Involved Conflicts, RAND Corporation, RR-A3141-2, 2025
• Alisa Laufer, Howard J. Shatz, and Omar Danaf, Russia’s War on Ukraine and Implications for
the Defense Industrial Base, RAND Corporation, RR-A3141-3, 2025
• Howard Wang and Brett Zakheim, China’s Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War: Perceived
New Strategic Opportunities and an Emerging Model of Hybrid Warfare, RAND Corporation,
RR-A3141-4, 2025.
This research was completed in November 2024. It has not been subsequently revised.

Project AIR FORCE

RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of RAND, is the Department of the Air Force’s
(DAF’s) federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses, supporting both
the United States Air Force and the United States Space Force. PAF provides the DAF with
independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness,
and support of current and future air, space, and cyber forces. Research is conducted in four programs:
Strategy and Doctrine; Force Modernization and Employment; Resource Management; and

iii
Workforce, Development, and Health. The research reported here was prepared under contract
FA7014-22-D-0001.
Additional information about PAF is available on our website:
www.rand.org/paf/
This report documents work originally shared with the DAF on September 9, 2024. The draft
report, dated September 2024, was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and DAF subject-matter
experts.

Acknowledgments
We are indebted to the numerous people who provided advice and assistance in the completion of
this research. We thank Brig Gen Scott Rowe at USAFE for his sponsorship of this study and Lt Col
James Staley, Leo Kowatch, Lt Col Sean Thompson, and Lt Col John Yates for their essential
feedback. Bryan Frederick provided indispensable project leadership as well as insightful suggestions
for the design of this research and its implications for the U.S. defense community. Conversations
with Anna Dowd, Ashley Rhoades, and Marta Kepe provided insight into ongoing European debates
and historical challenges. Feedback and suggestions from the reviewers, Max Bergmann and Stephen
Flanagan, sharpened our analysis and findings. RAND PAF Strategy and Doctrine Program Director
Raphael Cohen lent encouragement and suggestions, and Laura Poole provided invaluable
administrative and logistical support.

iv
Summary

Issue
The Russia-Ukraine war has moved fundamental questions regarding European security and
defense back to the fore. The fighting has compelled European leaders to consider the realities of
modern interstate conflict and the tools available to manage the current emergency and defend against
future threats. Since the war began, European nations working collectively through the European
Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and sub-regional coalitions have come
together to oppose Russia’s invasion and defend Ukraine’s sovereignty. However, it is unknown
whether the war will drive broader changes in understandings of the threats to Europe’s collective
interests and what is required to ensure their collective defense.

Approach
This report examines the consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war for how U.S. allies in Europe
understand and pursue their security. To assess whether the conflict is likely to drive long-lasting
changes in European security priorities, investments, and relations, we analyzed the conflict’s effect on
(1) European attitudes toward relations with Russia; (2) European collective security strategies,
institutions, and resources; and (3) prospects for increased integration with Ukraine. We consider the
likely durability of changes observed and offer implications and recommendations for the U.S. Air
Force (USAF), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and the U.S. government.

Key Findings and Implications

• The European shift away from engagement with Russia is likely irreversible absent a
significant change in Russian leadership, domestic politics, or external behavior. The scale
and longevity of European restrictions and progress toward reducing energy dependencies
have reduced incentives to restore prewar economic engagement. Some countries may use
bilateral relations with Moscow as leverage in negotiations with Brussels, but the European
majority has demonstrated the ability and resolve to maintain a more confrontational
approach.
• The war has energized Europeans to improve their operational flexibility, but any
movement toward strategic autonomy from the United States is likely to be limited. The
war has motivated member states to empower the EU to promote defense integration, yet
NATO’s resurgence since 2022 underlines that Europeans—particularly Central, Northern,
and Eastern Europeans—continue to view the transatlantic alliance as critical to ensuring their

v
 security. Rather than develop an alternative architecture, European members are seeking to
integrate the EU and NATO.
• Europeans have recognized the need to improve their ability to act with reduced U.S.
support but are likely to still depend on the U.S. security role in the medium term given
the scale of their existing production and capability gaps. The multiyear increases in
European defense spending and increased political attention to building national and collective
defenses marks a significant departure from pre-2022 trends. Yet disagreements among
European countries over whether to prioritize indigenous production or speed of procurement
are likely to continue, potentially contributing to inefficiencies and hampering efforts to
advance defense integration.
• Although the EU has sought a greater defense role, the substantial reforms that would
enable Brussels to direct collective military action are unlikely because of national
differences and the immaturity of existing proposals. European, EU, and NATO leaders
have taken steps to strengthen existing institutions by developing new capabilities,
institutionalizing novel procedures and relationships, and adapting existing funding and
coordination mechanisms to support collective defense goals, but novel organizations largely
operate within existing institutions.
• European engagement with Ukraine is generally one-directional and falls short of
standards for de facto defense integration. To meet Ukraine’s warfighting needs, Europeans
have extended unprecedented aid and built new frameworks to sustain support. These
wartime interactions can advance European-Ukrainian interoperability and familiarity, but
how Ukraine may or can contribute to European defenses is untested.
• Ukraine’s formal integration through the EU and NATO is unlikely in the near term. EU
membership negotiations are likely to highlight practical challenges and differences among EU
members.

Recommendations
For the U.S. government:
• Expand U.S. consultations and coordination with the EU on defense matters. Increase coordination with
the EU to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the principle of complementarity and redress allies’ concerns
that investments in EU defense capability will alienate the United States.
• Encourage the creation of an EU fund to support member states’ implementation of NATO resilience
initiatives. Hardening allied critical infrastructure benefits U.S. forces operating in the theater by ensuring
access to critical off-base resources.
• Continue to encourage economic and industrial cooperation between U.S. allies in Europe and the
Pacific through non-NATO frameworks. Given the EU’s budgetary and regulatory powers, EU initiatives
may be better suited to developing cross-regional cooperation.
For DoD:
• Increase and regularize dialogues with the European Defence Agency and other EU institutions to
encourage the interchangeability of new systems and equipment, particularly munitions, developed
through new European joint development and procurement programs.

vi
 • Identify and communicate where European producers may be best suited to address U.S. gaps.
Interoperability goes both ways, and new EU defense initiatives may provide novel solutions for meeting
U.S. stockpiling and prepositioning needs.
• Work through NATO forums to identify high-return investments useful for a variety of contingencies,
including measures short of war. Future terrorism or migration crises could divert attention or galvanize
opposition to initiatives focused on large-scale conflict. To prepare for a variety of futures and preserve
support, DoD can assist NATO in identifying “common denominator” requirements and communicate their
usefulness for a variety of contingencies.
• Continue to cooperate with the EU on regional and security issues beyond Russia. This includes issues
that preoccupy Southern members and those that could generate friction among European countries that
weakens the consensus needed to advance European defense capacity and resilience initiatives.
For USAF:
• Assess and communicate to European allies’ potential munitions, maintenance, and spare parts
requirements that might differ from demand signals created by the Russia-Ukraine war. Current
European efforts to boost production focus on what’s needed to supply Ukraine or backfill donors’
inventories. However, a potential future NATO-Russia conflict likely would generate different demands,
particularly for air forces.
• Increase information-sharing on USAF operational requirements in other theaters, particularly in the
Indo-Pacific region. Uncertainty about the future availability of U.S. forces contributes to tensions among
Europeans and between the United States and its allies. Making U.S. policy and posture decisions more
predictable by clarifying the rationale behind them can help right-size expectations, avert or reduce future
tensions, and inform European force structure and acquisitions decisions.

vii
Contents

About This Report........................................................................................................................................................... iii

Summary ............................................................................................................................................................................. v
Figures and Tables ............................................................................................................................................................ix
CHAPTER 1 ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 1
The Russia-Ukraine War’s Challenge to Europe.......................................................................................................... 1
Understanding European Reactions to the War in Ukraine .................................................................................. 1
Research Approach ...................................................................................................................................................... 2
Report Organization .................................................................................................................................................... 4
CHAPTER 2 ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 5
Will Europe Engage or Confront Russia? ...................................................................................................................... 5
Prewar Positions........................................................................................................................................................... 5
Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War, 2022–2024 ....................................................................................... 16
Conclusion................................................................................................................................................................... 24
CHAPTER 3 ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 26
Will Europe Build Great Capability and Exercise Greater Strategic Autonomy? .................................................. 26
Prewar Positions......................................................................................................................................................... 27
Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War, 2022–2024 ....................................................................................... 35
Conclusion................................................................................................................................................................... 46
CHAPTER 4 ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 49
Will Europe Accelerate Ukraine’s Integration? ........................................................................................................... 49
Prewar Positions......................................................................................................................................................... 49
Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War, 2022–2024 ....................................................................................... 55
Conclusion................................................................................................................................................................... 61
CHAPTER 5 ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 63
Charting Europe’s Future Course ................................................................................................................................. 63
Findings and Implications ......................................................................................................................................... 63
Factors That Could Alter This Analysis................................................................................................................. 64
Recommendations ...................................................................................................................................................... 75

Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................................... 80
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................................................... 81

viii
Figures and Tables

Figures
Figure 2.1. Favorable Views of Russia in the Six Most Populous European Union and NATO Countries ...... 14
Figure 2.2. European Union-Russia Trade, 2013–2023 ........................................................................................... 15
Figure 2.3. Imports of Russian Fossil Fuels as a Percentage of European Union Consumption .......................... 15
Figure 2.4. Positive Views of Russia in the European Union Countries.................................................................. 22
Figure 3.1. Defense Expenditures in 2014 and 2021 as a Share of Gross Domestic Product ............................... 31
Figure 3.2. Number of European NATO Members Meeting the 2 Percent Pledge .............................................. 36
Figure 4.1. European Union-Ukraine Trade Balance, 2013–2022 .......................................................................... 53

Tables
Table 2.1. The European Union’s Mixed Approach to Russia, 2016–2021 ............................................................. 9
Table 2.2. Summary of Trends in Europe’s Orientation Toward Russia ................................................................ 24
Table 3.1. Timeline of Major NATO Enhancements, 2014–2021 ......................................................................... 30
Table 3.2. Timeline of Major NATO Enhancements, 2022–2024 ......................................................................... 43
Table 3.3. Summary of Trends in European Autonomy Concepts and Policies .................................................... 47
Table 4.1. Summary of Trends in European Positions on Ukrainian Integration ................................................. 62

ix
Chapter 1

The Russia-Ukraine War’s Challenge

to Europe

This research was completed in November 2024. It has not been subsequently revised.

The Russia-Ukraine war has moved fundamental questions regarding European security and
defense back to the fore. The fighting has led European leaders to reconsider the realities of modern
interstate conflict and the tools available to both manage the current emergency and defend against
future threats. In the two and half years since the war began, European nations working collectively
through institutions like the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) as well as sub-regional coalitions have come together in opposition to Russia’s invasion and
in defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty. It remains to be seen, however, whether the war in Ukraine will
drive broader changes in European understandings of the threats to their collective interests and what
will be required to ensure their collective defense.
In this report, we examine the consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war for how U.S. allies in
Europe understand and pursue their own security. To assess whether the conflict is likely to drive
long-lasting changes in European security priorities, investments, and relations, we focus on the
conflict’s effect on European attitudes toward relations with Russia; European collective security
strategies, institutions, and resources; and prospects for increased integration with Ukraine. Based on
research conducted between October 2023 and September 2024, we assess the likely durability of
changes observed since 2022 and highlight implications and recommendations for the U.S. Air Force
(USAF), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and the U.S. government.

Understanding European Reactions to the War in Ukraine

In the years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, many have assessed the European
community’s reactions and adaptions to the war. Some have sought to explain Europe’s unexpected
cohesion in responding to Russian aggression and to document the scale of assistance provided
through the EU or individual countries to Ukraine. These efforts have included expert analysis of
European sanctions packages and humanitarian aid, changes in European energy and migration policy,
and proposals to increase military assistance or facilitate Ukraine’s eventual reconstruction.1 Other

1
For examples of this approach, see Marie Jelínková, Michal Plaček, and František Ochrana, “The Arrival of Ukrainian Refugees
as an Opportunity to Advance Migrant Integration Policy,” Policy Studies, Vol. 45, Nos. 3–4, 2023; Daniel W. Drezner, “Lose-
Lose: The Economic Sanctions of the Russo-Ukrainian War,” in Hal Brands, ed., War in Ukraine: Conflict, Strategy, and the

1
analysts have taken an institutional approach to examine how the EU and NATO have adapted their
strategies, policies, and investments to facilitate support to Ukraine, maintain political cohesion, and
refocus on the threat of major conventional war in Europe, including by pursuing defense industrial
base (DIB) reforms.2 Within this literature, particular attention has been paid to recent and potential
EU and NATO enlargement, including the debate over reforms that might be required to
accommodate eventual Ukrainian membership.3
This report builds on these prior analyses, as well as the extensive international press reporting on
the conflict, in examining whether—and to what extent—the fighting in Ukraine has altered major
European actors’ strategic orientation. Although past research has documented policy changes since
the war began, existing work is generally focused on specific countries, in particular France, Germany,
and Poland; specific institutions, including the EU and NATO; or specific policy areas, such as
industrial base reforms or military assistance to Ukraine.4 The war’s first- and second-year
anniversaries also prompted analysis of broader trends, but additional updates are required to consider
adaptations since.5 This study differs by taking a regional approach that seeks to identify areas of
consensus or disagreement across major European powers as they operate through shared institutions
and regional coalitions. And although analysts have mined the fighting for insights into the character
of future warfare, less attention has been dedicated to understanding whether Europe’s adaptations to
the war will translate into long-term changes in the regional security architecture, institutions, and
resources.

Research Approach
This report evaluates whether the Russia-Ukraine war has driven lasting changes in how
Europeans understand and pursue their own security through examination of three research
questions:

Return of a Fractured World, Johns Hopkins University Press, April 2, 2024, pp. 273–287; and Samantha Gross and Constanze
Stelzenmüller, Europe’s Messy Russian Gas Divorce, Brookings Institution, June 18, 2024.
2
See, for example, the special editions and dedicated volumes of journals like the Journal of European Integration (Vol. 45, No. 3,
2023), Policy Studies (Vol. 45, Nos. 3–4, 2024), and the Journal of Common Market Studies (September 26, 2023); the Brookings
Institution’s Talbott Papers on the Implications of the War on Ukraine; Hans Binnendijk, Daniel S. Hamilton, and Alexander
Vershbow, “Strategic Responsibility: Rebalancing European and Trans-Atlantic Defense,” Brookings Institution, June 24, 2022;
Luis Simón, “The Ukraine War and the Future of the European Union’s Security and Defense Policy,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies, January 30, 2023; and Mark Leonard, “The European Union as a War Project: Five Pathways Toward a
Geopolitical Europe,” in Hal Brands, ed., War in Ukraine: Conflict, Strategy, and the Return of a Fractured World, Johns Hopkins
University Press, April 2, 2024, pp. 258–272.
3
For examples, see Ryhor Nizhnikau and Arkady Moshes, “The War in Ukraine, the EU’s Geopolitical Awakening and
Implications for the ‘Contested Neighbourhood,’” Policy Studies, Vol. 45, Nos. 3–4, 2024, pp. 489–506; Theresia Töglhofer,
Widening Without Falling Apart: Germany’s EU Enlargement Policy, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, May 2024;
Hans Kribbe and Luuk van Middelaar, “Preparing for the Next EU Enlargement: Tough Choices Ahead,” Brussels Institute for
Geopolitics, September 2023; Kinga Brudzińska, “EU Enlargement and Reform (II): The Troubled Polish-Ukrainian
Partnership. A View from Warsaw,” Internationale Politik Quarterly, September 28, 2023; and Sophia Besch and Eric Ciaramella,
“Ukraine’s Accession Poses a Unique Conundrum for the EU,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 24, 2023.
4
For a notable exception reflecting on the war’s first year, see Max Bergmann, Ilke Toygür, and Otto Svendsen, A Continent
Forged in Crisis: Assessing Europe One Year into the War, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2023.
5
See, for example, Bergmann, Toygür, and Svendsen, 2023.

2
 1. Have European attitudes on the prospects for engagement or confrontation with Russia
changed?
2. Has the war contributed to changes in European attitudes, resources, and policies on fostering
European defense autonomy?
3. Has the war altered the prospects for Ukrainian integration into the European security
architecture?
Taken together, these questions provide a basis to explore how the war has shaped dynamics
internal to the European community, such as the role of the EU in shaping national defense policies, as
well as the region’s external policies toward its neighbors, rivals, and allies.
For the purpose of this study, we use the terms Europe and European to refer to the countries that
comprise the European Union, as well as NATO members other than the United States and Canada.
Our usage is intended to encompass the primary U.S. allies, partners, and institutions that set and
resource Europe’s strategic course. This usage is not intended to imply whether other countries or
territories located on the European continent, including Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Belarus,
possess related historical, cultural, or political affiliations.
To identify changes since the fighting in Ukraine began, we first sought to baseline European
policies and projected trends prior to 2022. Next, we surveyed European responses and adaptations
from February 2022 through July 2024 to identify areas of continuity and change. Notably, we did not
attempt to produce a comprehensive history of European support to Ukraine or reactions to the
resulting crisis. Rather, we examined whether and to what extent the war has led major European
powers and institutions to revise their security and defense rhetoric, resources, and relationships.
Given that the war in Ukraine is ongoing, the national sensitivities regarding aid to Ukraine, and
the complexity of European politics, a comprehensive account of specific countries’ adaptations or
internal EU and NATO deliberations is not feasible. However, national security and defense policies
are by necessity debated publicly in European countries and institutions. To identify major initiatives
and characterize ongoing deliberations, we conducted an extensive review of publicly available sources,
such as national, EU, and NATO documents; think tank analyses; academic research; and news
accounts. We relied heavily on analysis and press reports published by European research and media
organizations but primarily consulted sources written in or translated into English.
After identifying changes in European rhetoric, policies, and resources, we next assessed the likely
durability of these changes. To do so, we evaluated the extent to which changes had been
institutionalized through the creation of new organizations, the articulation of new authorities, and
the dedication of new funds or resources that could not be easily diverted to other purposes. We also
considered the maturity of new initiatives or proposals, including the extent to which relevant actors
have articulated a clear plan for implementation or agreed on next steps. For example, although EU
member countries have agreed to open membership negotiations with Ukraine, they disagree over
whether reforms are required to prepare the bloc before enlargement can occur (as discussed in more
detail in Chapter 4). Finally, we assessed the broader implications for U.S. defense and security policy
toward Europe.

3
Report Organization
In the next three chapters, we examine the war’s consequences for European attitudes and policy
toward Russia, concepts and capabilities for fostering European defense autonomy, and the prospect
for integration with Ukraine. Chapter 5 concludes by highlighting the implications for European
countries’ future orientation toward Russia, the United States, and their regional community and
draws recommendations for the Department of the Air Force (DAF), DoD, and other U.S.
policymakers. Because the war is still ongoing, the concluding chapter also highlights where identified
trends may be conditional on factors that could change during the war or its immediate aftermath.

4
Chapter 2

Will Europe Engage or Confront

Russia?

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russian Federation,
Europeans have viewed Russia, with its vast resources, large population, and military potential, as a
both a potential partner and a probable threat. Perceptions of the severity of the Russian challenge—
and the potential benefits of efforts to deepen relations—have varied among European countries and
over time. Differences in countries’ geographic proximity, strategic cultures, and historical experience,
among other factors, have contributed to differing preferences for whether Europe should seek to
engage Russia by expanding trade relations, promoting people-to-people ties, and seeking to
accommodate Russian security interests or confront Russia by conditioning future cooperation on
significant behavioral changes and adopting a more assertive defensive posture.
Will the Russia-Ukraine war drive lasting changes in European countries’ orientation toward
Russia? The full-scale invasion challenged European conceptions of their security environment and
raised new concerns about Russia’s ambitions. This chapter examines how European states perceive
Russia in the wake of the invasion and assess whether the conflict has altered preferences for adopting
policies based on confrontation and engagement with the country. To assess the extent to which the
Russia-Ukraine war has contributed to changes in European attitudes or policies, we first describe
European policies following the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 through the end of 2021. Next,
we examine whether and how European attitudes toward Russia have changed since the February
2022 full-scale invasion and describe how European states—both individually and collectively through
institutions like the EU and NATO—have altered their policies to date.

Prewar Positions
Since the early 1990s, European countries have differed in their approach toward Russia. By and
large, Western European countries perceived the new Russia as a potential economic partner and
sought opportunities to improve communication; accommodate Russian concerns; and expand social,
political, and economic linkages.6 In contrast, Central and Eastern European countries, many of which
experienced Russian or Soviet invasion and occupation, were comparatively suspicious of the country’s
ambitions.7 Even then, however, Central and Eastern Europeans differed in their perception of the

6
See, for example, European Council, “Madrid European Council Presidency Conclusions—Annex 8: European Union’s
Strategy for Future EU/Russia Relations,” December 15–16, 1995.
7
Andrei Zagorski, ed., Russia and East Central Europe After the Cold War: A Fundamentally Transformed Relationship, Human
Rights Publishers, 2015.

5
immediacy and severity of the Russian threat and their willingness to adopt confrontational policies.
Some former Warsaw Pact members, such as Poland, prioritized NATO and EU memberships and
implemented policies aimed at lowering existing dependencies, especially on oil and natural gas
imports.8 Others, such as Bulgaria, maintained close ties with Russia for cultural and economic
reasons.9
Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent destabilization of eastern Ukraine
signified a potential watershed moment for Europe. Prior to Russia’s de facto annexation of Crimea,
many Europeans had come to believe that Russia’s gradual integration into the global economy, paired
with persistent European attempts at engagement and cooperation, would encourage a moderation in
its policies. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 had underlined Moscow’s continued willingness to
punish states on its periphery that appeared to be moving too close to the West, but it had not spurred
a fundamental reorientation in Europe’s approach.10 Now, the bloody conflict unfolding on the EU’s
doorstep raises the prospect of a collapse in relations—and challenges Europe to develop new concepts
for how to restore stability and avert an expansion of the conflict. In the immediate aftermath of the
Russian annexation, popular sentiments toward Russia soured significantly compared with pre-
annexation baselines. A Pew Research Center survey of global attitudes based on interviews held from
March to June 2014 found that more than 60 percent of European respondents reported unfavorable
views of Russia, an increase of 27 percentage points in Poland, 24 points in the United Kingdom
(UK), 23 points in Spain, 19 points in Germany, and 18 points in Italy.11
Yet the 2014–2015 crises had also caught European capitals off guard, forcing them to scramble
to devise a response.12 Although European leaders, working through NATO and the EU, sought to
convey their opposition to Russian actions and deter future attacks, national disagreements about
what the crisis revealed about Russia’s medium-term ambitions—and the potential benefits of
continued engagement with Moscow—limited the extent and cohesiveness of their response.13
Russia’s strategy of circumventing the EU to engage European countries bilaterally exacerbated
regional tensions and helped to inhibit the formation of a coherent and consistent European policy to
either its annexation of Crimea or the subsequent violence in eastern Ukraine.14 By and large,

8
Christopher S. Chivvis, Raphael S. Cohen, Bryan Frederick, Daniel S. Hamilton, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Bonny Lin,
NATO’s Northeastern Flank: Emerging Opportunities for Engagement, RAND Corporation, RR-1467-AF, 2017, pp. 67–93;
Kamil Lipiński, Secure Gas Supplies for the Winters to Come: European Path from Crisis to Independence, Polish Economic
Institute, June 2023.
9
Stephen J. Flanagan, Anika Binnendijk, Irina A. Chindea, Katherine Costello, Geoffrey Kirkwood, Dara Massicot, and Clint
Reach, Russia, NATO, and Black Sea Security, RAND Corporation, RR-A357-1, 2020, pp. 81–85.
10
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, “Europe’s Shattered Dream of Order,” Foreign Affairs, April 20, 2015.
11
Pew Research Center, Russia’s Global Image Negative amid Crisis in Ukraine: Americans’ and Europeans’ Views Sour
Dramatically, July 9, 2014.
12
Krastev and Leonard, 2015.
13
The difference between common and individual responses reflects a longer historical pattern. As one Dutch diplomat wrote
about the 1999 Common Strategy on Russia: “The final result proved to be neither very common, nor really strategic. . . . [I]t was
the lowest common denominator on which consensus could be reached.” Tony van der Togt, In Search of a European Russia
Strategy, Atlantisch Commissie, 2020, p. 38.
14
This preference has been attributed to Moscow’s lack of appreciation for the principle of the EU, where smaller countries’
interests have to be taken into account—and in fact, represented—by larger members. Stefan Meister, “A Paradigm Shift: EU-
Russia Relations After the War in Ukraine,” Carnegie Europe, November 29, 2022.

6
European policy toward Russia after 2014 was a mix of engagement and confrontation, with a strong
preference among key European players for the former. Although European leaders generally agreed
that a firm demonstration of opposition to Russian actions was required, they proved reluctant to
abandon engagement and supported policies to maintain some high-level, existing channels of
communication with Russia.
Within NATO, European members joined the United States in denouncing “Russia’s aggressive
actions against Ukraine”; suspending all practical cooperation, including through the NATO-Russia
Council (NRC) with Moscow; and, in a public reaffirmation of their commitment to the principle of
collective defense, pledging to strengthen the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture (see Chapter
3).15 Even though NATO “continue[d] to aspire to a cooperative, constructive relationship with
Russia,” it acknowledged that such a relationship would not be possible without a “change in Russia’s
actions that demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and
responsibilities.”16 The lack of conditions that would allow the “return to ‘business as usual’” was noted
during all NATO summits between 2014 and 2022.17 At the same time, NATO sought to preserve
some existing communication channels, including at the ambassadorial level and above in the NRC
and certain military-to-military lines of communication “to avoid misunderstanding, miscalculation,
and unintended escalation, and to increase transparency and predictability.”18 The NRC’s meetings
resumed in 2016 and until 2022; the NRC met 11 times to exchange views (albeit with little genuine
dialogue) on key issues of European security, including the crisis in Ukraine, arms control, military
activities, transparency, and risk reduction.19
For its part, the EU enacted punitive measures intended to demonstrate support for Ukraine’s
territorial integrity, “increas[e] the costs of Russia’s actions . . . and to promot[e] a peaceful settlement
of the crisis,” as a Council of the European Union regulation underlined.20 First, members imposed
travel bans and froze assets of individuals identified as “responsible for actions threatening Ukraine’s
territorial integrity.”21 Between March 2014 and the year’s end, the list swelled from 21 to more than
130 individuals and almost 30 entities; by the end of 2021, 187 individuals and 48 entities were

15
NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in Wales,” press release, September 5, 2014, updated July 4, 2022h.
16
NATO, 2022h; NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8–9 July 2016,” press release, July 9, 2016, updated July 1, 2022g.
17
NATO, 2022h; NATO, 2022g; NATO, “Brussels Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government
Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 11–12 July 2018,” press release, July 11, 2018, updated
July 1, 2022f; NATO, “Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021,” press release, June 14, 2021, updated July 1, 2022e.
18
NATO, “NATO-Russia Relations,” fact sheet, February 2022b; Kadri Liik and Merle Maigre, “NATO-Russia Dialogue and
the Future of the NATO-Russia Council,” European Council on Foreign Affairs, July 5, 2016; NATO, 2022g.
19
There were no meetings in 2014 and 2015. Three meetings took place in 2016, three in 2017, two in 2018, two in 2019, and
one in January 2022. NATO, “NATO-Russia Council,” webpage, updated July 25, 2024h.
20
Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July, 2014 Concerning Restrictive Measures in
View of Russia’s Actions Destabilising the Situation in Ukraine, July 31, 2014g.
21
Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 Concerning Restrictive Measures in
Respect of Actions Undermining or Threatening the Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty and Independence of Ukraine, March 17, 2014b;
Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 Concerning Restrictive Measures in Respect
of Actions Undermining or Threatening the Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty and Independence of Ukraine, March 17, 2014a.

7
listed.22 In addition, the EU adopted in June 2014 a set of measures restricting economic relations
with Crimea and Sevastopol.23 These were followed in July by new economic sanctions prohibiting
new arms sales between the EU and Russia, restricting Russian access to services and technologies
used in oil production and exploration, banning the export of certain dual-use goods for military use
or military end users, and limiting certain Russian companies and banks’ access to EU capital
markets.24 Demonstrating the extent of EU discontent, leaders have continually voted to extend these
restrictive measures every six months since 2014.25
However, the extent of EU economic sanctions was limited as Brussels and individual European
countries sought to preserve avenues for engagement with Russia.26 The EU’s mixed approach toward
Russia is exemplified in the “Guiding Principles” the European Commission promulgated in 2016.27
In an effort to establish a more coherent and comprehensive policy toward Russia than the reactive
sanctions-based policy launched after the annexation, Brussels adopted five guiding principles for EU-
Russia relations, which it relabeled in 2021 as a threefold approach (see Table 2.1).28 First, the EU
directed that member states, collectively and bilaterally, would push back against Russia’s violations of
human rights, anti-democratic policies, and international law violations by conditioning the removal of
sanctions to full implementation of the Minsk agreements aimed at a peaceful resolution of the
Ukraine crisis. Second, the EU sought to constrain Russia by strengthening relations with the former
Soviet republics in the EU’s Eastern partners and increasing EU resilience against Russian hybrid
threats in energy, cyber, and information areas.29 Finally, the EU sought to continue engaging Russia
on select areas of common interest, such as public health and climate change, while supporting people-
to-people contacts.30

22
Council of the European Union, 2014b.
23
Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EU) No 692/2014 of 23 June 2014 Concerning Restrictions on the Import
into the Union of Goods Originating in Crimea or Sevastopol, in Response to the Illegal Annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, June 23,
2014d; Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2014/386/CFSP of 23 June 2014 Concerning Restrictions on Goods
Originating in Crimea or Sevastopol, in Response to the Illegal Annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, June 23, 2014c.
24
Council of the European Union, 2014g; Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014
Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of Russia’s Actions Destabilising the Situation in Ukraine, July 31, 2014f.
25
Clara Portela, Paulina Pospieszna, Joanna Skrzypczyńska, and Dawid Walentek, “Consensus Against All Odds: Explaining
the Persistence of EU Sanctions on Russia,” Journal of European Integration, Vol. 43, No. 6, 2021; Maria Shagina, “Friend or
Foe? Mapping the Positions of EU Member States on Russia Sanctions,” European Leadership Network, June 28, 2017.
26
Jan Hanousek and Matěj Bělín, “Making Sanctions Bite: The EU-Russian Sanctions of 2014,” Center for Economic Policy
Research, April 29, 2019; Matěj Bělín and Jan Hanousek, “Which Sanctions Matter? Analysis of the EU/Russian Sanctions of
2014,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 49, No. 1, March 2021.
27
European Parliament, “Five Principles Guiding the EU’s Policy Towards Russia,” webpage, undated; European External
Action Service (EEAS), “Remarks by the HRVP Federica Mogherini at the Press Conference Following the Foreign Affairs
Council,” February 6, 2017.
28
European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council on EU-
Russia Relations: Push Back, Constrain and Engage,” June 16, 2021b.
29
For examples, see Andrew Radin, Alyssa Demus, and Krystyna Marcinek, Understanding Russian Subversion: Patterns, Threats,
and Responses, RAND Corporation, PE-331-A, February 2020.
30
European Commission, 2021b.

8
 Table 2.1. The European Union’s Mixed Approach to Russia, 2016–2021

2016 “Guiding Principles” for EU-Russia Relations 2021 Threefold Approach to Russia
1. Implementation of the Minsk agreements as the 1. Push back against Russian human rights
key condition for any substantial change in the violations by raising Russian breaches of
EU’s stance toward Russia international law; reaffirming support to Ukraine
and its territorial integrity, sovereignty, and
independence; calling on Russia to fully
implement the Minsk agreements; and
continuing to respond to hybrid threats “in an
appropriate manner.”
2. Strengthened relations with the EU’s Eastern 2. Constrain Russian attempts to undermine EU
partners and other neighbors, in particular in interests by developing EU cyber security and
Central Asia defense capacity and capabilities; improving
3. Strengthening the resilience of the EU coordination among members and with like-
minded partners, such as NATO and the Group
of Seven (G7); and increasing support to Eastern
partners.
4. Need for selective engagement with Russia on 3. Engage on key challenges and areas of common
issues of interest to the EU interests, including public health, climate
5. Need to engage in people-to-people contacts change, and conflict prevention and regional
and support Russian civil society and global issues; increase technical
engagement with the Russian government on
“economic irritants”; and further people-to-
people contacts.
SOURCES: Adapted from European Parliament, undated; European Commission, 2021b; European Commission, “EU-
Russia Relations: Commission and High Representative Propose the Way Forward,” press release, June 15, 2021a.
NOTE: The G7 consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the United States.

In adopting a combination of measures to confront and engage Russia, the EU sought to satisfy
disparate preferences among and within member states. After the initial wave of condemnations in
2014 and 2015, European capitals divided, as one expert has described, among those that advocated
for the community to “accommodate and engage” Russia (for example, Italy, Austria, Hungary,
Slovakia, and Czechia, to varying degrees); those that wanted to “confront and contain” what they
maintained was an active threat to European security and stability (for example, the UK, the Baltic
and Nordic countries, and Poland); and those states that wished to pursue a middle path of “pressure
and engagement” (for example, Germany and France).31
Europeans’ differing approaches toward Russia reflected broader disagreements over the nature
and immediacy of the threat Russia posed to regional security and stability. For frontline countries like
Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, Russian actions in Ukraine raised fears that the
Kremlin might next seek to destabilize their pro-Western governments or even attempt to broach
their borders. Highlighting their proximity to Russia, Poland and the Baltic states requested that
NATO establish a permanent presence to ward off Russian incursions and expand defense

31
Axel Hellman, How Has European Geostrategic Thinking Towards Russia Shifted Since 2014? European Leadership Network,
July 2019. For stances on sanctions, see Shagina, 2017.

9
cooperation with the Nordic countries.32 To a lesser extent, Norway, Sweden, and Finland also
expressed concerns about Russia’s renewed assertiveness and potential intent to either threaten or use
military force to alter the European security order.33 Amid increasing Russian military activity in the
High North and North Atlantic, Norway in 2016 unveiled a new long-term plan for its armed forces
that included substantial increases in defense spending to improve readiness and expand procurement
of modern air defense and strike capabilities.34
By contrast, Germany maintained that the EU should continue to preserve, and potentially
expand, engagement with Russia. Germany strongly condemned Russia’s policy toward Ukraine and,
together with France, played an instrumental role in maintaining the sanctions regime and securing
the Minsk agreements, which outlined steps to resolve the conflict and restore Ukrainian territorial
integrity.35 Nevertheless, German leaders were disinclined to publicly characterize Russia as an
adversary, maintaining, as then–Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel stated in 2016, that “lasting
security in Europe can only be achieved with, and not against, Russia.”36 German leaders supported
efforts to bolster NATO’s deterrence posture, worked within the EU to maintain a unified front on
sanctions, pressed for Russia to end its military involvement in Donbas, and publicly acknowledged
Russian violations of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Yet German leaders maintained that
continued engagement with Russia, in the form of political dialogue, economic cooperation, and trade,
was necessary to alter Russia’s strategic orientation without provoking further, unwanted escalation.37
At the core of this policy was a belief that the same dynamics that had secured peace among Western
European countries after World War II could be replicated to encourage economic, and ultimately
political, reforms within Russia.38 Crimea shook, but did not dispel, German expectations that Russia
shared an interest in European stability and could become a partner in the future.
German policy also reflected the country’s growing dependence on Russian energy. Between 2014
and 2021, Russian imports accounted for 45–68 percent of German natural gas consumption, 27–35
percent of crude oil refinery intake, and 5–7 percent of oil products supply.39 At its peak in 2017,

32
Robin Emmott and Sabine Siebold, “NATO Agrees to Reinforce Eastern Poland, Baltic States Against Russia,” Reuters, July
8, 2016; James Shotter, “Polish President Calls on EU to Step Up Sanctions on Russia,” Financial Times, January 24, 2021.
33
Stephanie Pezard, Andrew Radin, Thomas S. Szayna, and F. Stephen Larrabee, European Relations with Russia: Threat
Perceptions, Responses, and Strategies in the Wake of the Ukrainian Crisis, RAND Corporation, RR-1579-A, 2017.
34
Norwegian Ministry of Defence, “Long Term Defence Plan Adopted,” November 18, 2016. A 2020 update reaffirmed
Norway’s commitment to increased defense spending and force modernization. Norwegian Ministry of Defence, The Defence of
Norway: Capability and Readiness, 2020.
35
Céline Marangé and Susan Stewart, “French and German Approaches to Russia: Convergence Yes, EU Compatibility No,”
Chatham House, November 2021, p. 33; Stefan Wagstyl, “Angela Merkel’s Sanctions Balancing Act Outwits Putin, for Now,”
Financial Times, December 2, 2014.
36
Angela Merkel, transcript of statement given at 183rd session of the German Bundestag, German Federal Government, July 7,
2016.
37
Stefan Meister, Reframing Germany’s Russia Policy—An Opportunity for the EU, European Council on Foreign Relations,
ECFR/100, April 2014.
38
Marangé and Stewart, 2021, p. 9.
39
Eurostat, “Supply, Transformation and Consumption of Gas,” database, last updated July 17, 2024c; Eurostat, “Imports of
Natural Gas by Partner Country,” database, last updated June 21, 2024a; Eurostat, “Supply, Transformation and Consumption
of Oil and Petroleum Products,” database, last updated July 17, 2024d; Eurostat, “Imports of Oil and Petroleum Products by
Partner Country,” database, last updated June 27, 2024b.

10
Germany imported more than 62 million cubic meters of natural gas, or more than 65 percent of its
consumption.40 Although imports declined after 2018, experts estimated that natural gas imports
would increase as Germany began to implement plans to phase out nuclear and coal power. 41 Despite
protests from other allies and the United States, Germany did not seek to diversify its energy supply
or reduce its dependence and defended its investments in the Nord Stream 1 and 2.42 “[I]f we even
imported Russian gas during the Cold War . . . then I don’t know why the situation today should be
so much worse that we can’t say that Russia remains a partner,” explained Chancellor Merkel in
2016.43
France adopted similar policies toward Russia after 2014 and often worked closely with Germany
to deepen EU cooperation with neighboring countries (see Chapter 4) and continue efforts to advance
a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Donbas. Compared with Germany, French rhetoric toward
Russia after 2014 placed a greater emphasis on establishing a “firm” European stance to deter future
adventurism and coerce Russia to abide by the terms of the Minsk agreements.44 Yet like their
German counterparts, French leaders generally envisioned that Russia could be encouraged to
moderate its policies and cooperate in building a mutually beneficial European strategic architecture.
As French President Emmanuel Macron underscored in a joint conference with Russian President
Vladimir Putin in 2017, “no essential issue can be addressed today . . . without dialogue with Russia.”45
But whereas Germany’s preference reflected long-standing pacifist trends, France viewed engagement
with Russia as a means for Europe to establish a foreign policy independent of the United States.46
During the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, then–French President François Hollande said,
“Russia is not an adversary, is not a threat. Russia is a partner which . . . can sometimes . . . use force,
and we condemned it when it came to Crimea.”47
Between 2014 and 2021, French policy vacillated between engagement and confrontation with
Russia. Within multilateral forums, France called for strong collective action and lent rhetorical
support to NATO reforms and EU condemnations of Russia’s poisoning of Sergei Skripal, Yulia
Skripal, and Alexei Navalny. On the bilateral level, however, preference was given to “renewed
strategic dialogue.”48 Newly elected President Macron welcomed President Putin as his first foreign
visitor in 2017 and stressed the need for continued dialogue, although he also used the visit to publicly

40
Eurostat, 2024c; Eurostat, 2024a.
41
International Energy Agency, Germany 2020: Energy Policy Review, February 2020, p. 148.
42
Kai-Olaf Lang and Kirsten Westphal, Nord Stream 2 – A Political and Economic Contextualisation, German Institute for
International and Security Affairs, March 2017; Kirsten Westphal, Nord Stream 2 – Germany’s Dilemma, German Institute for
International and Security Affairs, April 2021.
43
Angela Merkel, transcript of address given at the 55th Munich Security Conference, German Federal Government, February
16, 2019.
44
République Française, Defence and National Security Strategic Review 2017, 2017; François Hollande, transcript of press
conference in Warsaw, Élysée, July 9, 2016.
45
Emmanuel Macron and Vladimir Putin, transcript of joint press conference in Versailles, République Française, May 29,
2017.
46
Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean, “France’s Policy Towards Russia: The Hard Art of ‘At the Same Time,’” in Kalev Stoicescu, Dialogue
with Russia: Russia Needs to Reset Relations with the West, International Centre for Defence and Security, June 2021.
47
Hollande, 2016.
48
“Emmanuel Macron in His Own Words,” The Economist, November 7, 2019.

11
confront President Putin over evidence of Russian cyber and disinformation interference in the
French elections.49 When prompted by journalists to comment on the Russian state’s disinformation
campaigns, President Macron emphasized the long-standing Franco-Russian friendship and the
continued need for cooperation on a wide set of issues.50 Indeed, France sought to use its international
position to break Russia’s political isolation. In 2019, France restarted 2 + 2 meetings with Russia.
Later that year, President Macron signaled his willingness to relay Russian concerns in international
forums when he met with President Putin shortly before the G7 Summit.51 Reportedly, France
supported the return of the Russian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, but its proposals for an EU summit with President Putin were rejected by other European
leaders.52
Meanwhile, other European countries, particularly in the south, questioned the importance of
confronting Russia over Ukraine and sought instead to accommodate Russian interests and expand
areas of cooperation. Although countries like Italy and Spain continued to support the EU’s sanctions
policy in a demonstration of solidarity, they sought to preserve opportunities for bilateral engagement
with Russia on a host of issues, including migration, terrorism, and the conflicts in Syria, Libya, and
Afghanistan, which they perceived the EU was neglecting and for which Russia could play a critical
role in resolving.53 For its part, Russia recognized that regional disagreements over migration, fiscal
policy, and other topics endangered EU unity, and it sought to exploit emerging rifts by cultivating
relations with a new generation of far-right and populist politicians that rose to power in countries like
Italy, Austria, and Hungary. Already suspicious of Brussels and inclined to look to Russia for
commercial gain, governments in these countries emerged as reliable advocates for renewed economic
cooperation and critics of policies deemed overtly hostile to Russia.54 For example, Italy pursued
cooperative production of the Russian Sputnik V vaccine during the coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic before it was approved by the European Medicines Agency.55
The resulting disagreements among European capitals and within EU forums prevented the
formation of a coherent approach. Rather than promote cohesion, the EU’s ambiguous strategy
allowed individual members to select elements that aligned with their national preferences.56 For
example, although the EU sought to increase people-to-people contacts by funding collaboration in

49
Andy Greenberg, “The NSA Confirms It: Russia Hacked French Election ‘Infrastructure,’” WIRED, May 9, 2017; Nicholas
Vinocur, “Macron and Putin’s Awkward First Date,” Politico, May 29, 2017.
50
Macron and Putin, 2017.
51
Susan Stewart, “Macron’s Russia Policy: Already a Failure?” in Ronja Kempin, ed., France’s Foreign and Security Policy Under
President Macron: The Consequences for Franco-German Cooperation, German Institute for International and Security Affairs,
May 2021, p. 31.
52
Kastouéva-Jean, 2021, p. 11; Nikos Chrysoloras and Arne Delfs, “EU Rejects Merkel-Macron Call for Leaders’ Talks with
Putin,” Bloomberg, June 24, 2021.
53
Angelantonio Rosato, “A Marriage of Convenience? The Future of Italy-Russia Relations,” European Council on Foreign
Affairs, July 15, 2016; “Counting on Russia for G20 on Afghanistan—Di Maio-Lavrov,” ANSA English, August 27, 2021;
Leonid Bershidsky, “Putin Gets Love in Italy, but Not Much Else,” Moscow Times, January 17, 2018.
54
Andrew S. Weiss, With Friends Like These: The Kremlin’s Far-Right and Populist Connections in Italy and Austria, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, February 2020.
55
Colleen Barry and Daria Litvinova, “Russia to Make Sputnik V Vaccine in Italy, a First in EU,” Associated Press, March 9,
2021.
56
European Commission, 2021b.

12
higher education and scientific research, supporting civil society in Russia, and promoting cross-
border cooperation, Poland suspended visa-free local cross-border traffic with the Kaliningrad Oblast
in 2016.57 And although Poland prioritized energy resilience by investing in infrastructure, such as the
liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal and the Baltic Pipe to Denmark, that diversified its natural gas
imports, Germany continued to support construction of the planned Nord Steam 2 pipeline, which,
once completed, would expand the flow of Russian gas to the country.58 Although the EU was able to
retain support for sanctions, disagreements among EU member states over the relative benefits of
further restrictions and the distribution of costs limited their scale and precluded the possibility of
stronger cost-imposition measures.59 For example, countries with extensive trade ties to Russia, such
as Germany and Italy, successfully blocked a UK-backed proposal to cut off Russian access to the
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system of financial
transactions.60 As a consequence of these disagreements, the capital access and dual-use goods trade
limitations applied to very few companies. By 2022, the list contained only five banks, three arms
producers, three oil and gas companies, and nine importers of dual-use technologies.61
Europe’s ambiguous approach toward Russia was also emblematic of a second factor: Few believed
Russia presented an imminent threat to European territorial security. For even those countries most
concerned about Russia’s intent, the most immediate concern was that Russia appeared to be seeking
to influence their domestic politics and undermine their stability through cyberattacks, information
campaigns, and irregular support to Russian minority populations in the Baltics. As a RAND study
based on extensive interviews noted in 2017, “[w]hile Russia’s neighbors see Russia as capable of and
potentially willing to carry out a conventional attack against them, they do not necessarily see such an
attack as likely.”62 Accordingly, efforts to build momentum for new policies related to Russia were
often superseded by debates over more urgent crises, including the UK’s referendum to leave the EU;
the surge in migration resulting from ongoing conflicts in Libya, Syria, and elsewhere; the rule of law
crisis in Hungary and Poland; and the COVID-19 pandemic.
After the initial shock of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and involvement in Donbas, European
attitudes toward the country began to recover after 2016. As depicted in Figure 2.1, public opinion

57
Russia’s participation in the Erasmus+ program peaked in 2018. Martin Russell, The EU’s Russia Policy: Five Guiding
Principles, European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 614.698, February 2018, pp. 7–8; Martin Russell, The EU and Russia:
Locked into Confrontation, European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 652.030, July 2020, p. 9; Dorota Bartyzel and Stepan
Kravchenko, “Poland Keeps Russia Border Shut to Traffic amid Business Chagrin,” Bloomberg, August 4, 2016; Kinga
Dudzińska and Anna Maria Dyner, “Small Border Traffic with Kaliningrad: Challenges, Opportunities, Threats,” Polish
Institute of International Affairs, October 2013.
58
International Energy Agency, “Poland Natural Gas Security Policy,” webpage, June 30, 2022; Martin Russell, The Nord
Stream 2 Pipeline: Economic, Environmental and Geopolitical Issues, European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 690.705, July
2021.
59
“EU Seeks to ‘Balance the Pain’ from Russia Sanctions,” Euractiv, July 24, 2014; Andrew Byrne, “Hungary Questions EU
Sanctions on Russia,” Financial Times, October 16, 2014.
60
Robert Hutton and Ian Wishart, “U.K. Wants EU to Block Russia from SWIFT Banking Network,” Bloomberg, August 29,
2014; “The Pros and Cons of a SWIFT Response,” The Economist, November 20, 2014. The measure was supported by a
European Parliament resolution. European Parliament, “European Parliament Resolution of 18 September 2014 on the
Situation in Ukraine and the State of Play of EU-Russia Relations,” September 18, 2014.
61
Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/52 of 13 January 2022 Amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP
Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of Russia’s Actions Destabilising the Situation in Ukraine, January 13, 2022a.
62
Pezard et al., 2017, p. xi.

13
surveys demonstrated signs of a gradual improvement in popular sentiments toward Russia. Although
regional differences contributed to different baselines, post-2014 trends follow similar patterns across
Europe, possibly showing more compatibility than official statements would imply. Even in Poland,
public attitudes toward Russia improved significantly between 2014 and 2019.

Figure 2.1. Favorable Views of Russia in the Six Most Populous European Union and NATO
Countries

SOURCE: Features data from Pew Research Center, Topline Questionnaire: Pew Research Center Spring 2023 Global
Attitudes Survey, June 27, 2023.
NOTE: 2016 and 2021 (and 2020 for Poland) data are missing.

Notably, European trade with Russia followed similar trend lines despite continued sanctions (see
Figure 2.2). Multiple factors beyond EU sanctions and Russian countermeasures contributed to a
steep decline in the value of EU-Russia trade after 2014, including an overall contraction of the
Russian economy as a result of ruble depreciation, the global decline in oil prices, and high inflation.63
But the country’s trade with the EU began to recover as Russia’s economic situation improved until
the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic produced another plunge. Despite differences in Italy, France, and
Germany’s stated policy toward Russia, the countries’ trade followed similar patterns. Even Poland,
which continued to press the EU for tougher punitive measures and sharply criticized other states’
economic engagement with Russia, saw periods of improvement. Similarly, natural gas imports from
Russia did not decline significantly after 2014 (see Figure 2.3).

63
Oliver Fritz, Elisabeth Christen, Franz Sinabell, and Julian Hinz, Russia’s and the EU’s Sanctions: Economic and Trade Effects,
Compliance and the Way Forward, European Parliament, 2017.

14
 Figure 2.2. European Union-Russia Trade, 2013–2023

SOURCE: Features data from United Nations, UN Comtrade Database, undated.

Figure 2.3. Imports of Russian Fossil Fuels as a Percentage of European Union Consumption

SOURCE: Features data from Eurostat, Energy, database, undated.

By the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, no unified European policy toward
Russia had emerged. The EU’s “push back, constrain, and engage” framework reflected general
concerns about Russian behavior in Crimea, ongoing political interference in European countries, and
deep disagreements among states about how best to prevent further Russian malign behavior. On the
one hand, Russia’s actions have been described as causing a “radical shift” in some European countries’
policies toward Russia by putting into question many of the key assumptions underlying the pre-2014

15
policy of engagement and cooperation.64 For the first time, European countries not only condemned
Russia’s actions in the common neighborhood but also took steps to counter them, in a stark contrast
to the EU’s response to Russia’s recognition of Georgia’s territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as
independent states in the aftermath of the 2008 war.65 On the other hand, a general preference for
cooperation persisted as NATO, the EU, and individual European countries—albeit to different
degrees—sought areas of “selective engagement” and “constructive cooperation.”66 For example,
sanctions targeted mostly individuals, not the economy, and therefore have been described as
“deliberately designed to send signals of disapproval to Russia rather than to significantly weaken it.”67
With the recovery of public attitudes and the trends in EU-Russia trade, Europe proved unwilling to
confront Russia.

Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War, 2022–2024

That all changed when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Over the following
months, the majority of European countries united behind a new assessment of Russia, not as a
“strategic challenge,” as the EU had characterized the country in 2016, but as a “long-term and direct
threat for European security,” as articulated in the new EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence
approved just a few weeks after the start of the war.68 In contrast to statements released in response to
previous crises, EU documents now characterized the return of large-scale war to Europe as a “tectonic
shift in European history.”69 In a new strategic concept approved that summer, NATO member
countries similarly designated Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and
to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.”70 The Washington summit declaration further added
that the “all-domain threat Russia poses to NATO will persist into the long term.”71
As of September 2024, the EU has not defined a new formal Russia policy, but it has adopted a
firm and unambiguous demand that Russia “immediately ceases military actions, unconditionally
withdraws all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respects
Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.”72 According to the European
Parliament, the EU’s approach to Russia since 2022 has been guided by the following six principles:
1. Russia must be internationally isolated and sanctioned to prevent further aggression.

64
Marangé and Stewart, 2021, pp. 9–10.
65
Leo Cendrowicz, EU Talks Tough on Russia,” Time, September 1, 2008.
66
Hellman, 2019.
67
Carl Bildt, Gustav Gressel, Kadri Liik, and Nicu Popescu, Push Back, Contain, and Engage: How the EU Should Approach
Relations with Russia, European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR/384, March 25, 2021, p. 2.
68
EU, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, June 2016, p. 33; Council of the European Union, A Strategic Compass
for Security and Defence, March 22, 2022e.
69
Council of the European Union, 2022e, p. 14.
70
NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, June 29, 2022d, p. 4.
71
NATO, “Washington Summit Declaration Issued by the NATO Heads of State and Government Participating in the
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. 10 July 2024,” press release, July 10, 2024, updated July 15, 2024g.
72
European Council, “Joint Statement by the Members of the European Council,” February 24, 2022a.

16
 2. Russia and its accomplices must be held accountable for violations of international law and
war crimes in Ukraine.
3. EU neighbors and global partners must be supported to address the adverse consequences of
Russia’s war.
4. The EU must cooperate closely with NATO and global partners to defend the rules-based
international order.
5. The EU must strengthen resilience in energy security and critical infrastructure and counter
Russia’s information, cyber, and hybrid threats.
6. The EU must support Russian civil society, human rights defenders, and independent media.73
Together, these principles amount to a major shift in the EU’s stance on Russia away from an
approach that sought to combine elements of cooperation and confrontation to one intended to isolate
Russia and roll back its gains in Ukraine. EU statements underscore that its sanctions are intended to
increase the costs of its war in Ukraine and to pressure the Kremlin to enact significant changes in its
foreign, domestic, and defense policies.74 In expanding support to EU neighbors and, in the case of
Ukraine, supporting further EU enlargement (see Chapter 4), Europeans have placed themselves in
clear opposition to Russia’s broader goal of reestablishing a sphere of influence and privileged interest
in the post-Soviet space.75 Similarly, the EU’s efforts to deepen cooperation with NATO (see Chapter
3) represents a newfound willingness to reinforce the security architecture that Russia has opposed
and which the Kremlin has accused of provoking its invasion of Ukraine.76 Concurrently, the EU’s
emphasis on resilience and, in particular, reduced energy dependence, marks an implicit rejection of
prewar efforts to use expanded economic integration as a lever to encourage Russian reform.
Indeed, the two most influential drivers of the EU’s engagement with Russia prior to 2022 have
adopted more-confrontational stances since the war began. In their official statements, national
strategies, sponsorship of EU restrictions, and national policies, Germany and France have repeatedly
demonstrated that productive engagement in Russia is no longer feasible. Although Chancellor of
Germany Olaf Scholz has suggested that Europe’s long-term security “cannot be achieved in
opposition to Russia,” he has maintained that “for the foreseeable future, Putin is jeopardizing this
security.”77 In its first publicly released National Security Strategy, Germany characterized Russia for
the first time as “for now the most serious threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area” and
directed a major military expansion and modernization program that places German foreign policy on
more defense-oriented footing (see Chapter 3).78 From the first days of war, Germany has emphasized

73
Vanessa Cuevas Herman, “Russia,” fact sheet, European Parliament, April 2024, p. 2.
74
European Commission, “Sanctions Adopted Following Russia’s Military Aggression Against Ukraine,” webpage, undated-c;
Delegation of the EU to the Russian Federation, “The European Union and the Russian Federation,” webpage, November 23,
2022.
75
Andrew Radin and Clint Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, RAND Corporation, RR-1826-OSD, 2017,
pp. 9–14.
76
Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber and Tom Balmforth, “Russia Demands NATO Roll Back from East Europe and Stay Out of
Ukraine,” Reuters, December 17, 2021.
77
Olaf Scholz, “Policy Statement by Olaf Scholz,” transcript of address given at the German Bundestag, German Federal
Government, February 27, 2022a.
78
German Federal Government, Integrated Security for Germany: National Security Strategy, June 2023, pp. 11–12.

17
that “nothing is off the table” when it comes to sanctions, and the country has stopped importing
Russian pipeline-delivered natural gas and crude oil, severing its most important link to Russia and the
foundation of its strategy of interdependence.79 Although some German experts have suggested that
policymakers in Berlin hold on to hopes for future reengagement and have under-resourced its defense
commitments, Berlin’s response to date represents a major turnaround in German attitudes and
policies—a commitment of political capital and institutional resources that would be difficult to
reverse.80 The same applies to France, which, under President Macron, went from seeking a new
security architecture that would provide Russia with security guarantees to doing whatever it takes
prevent Russia from winning.81
Underlining this change has been a new characterization of Russia as a direct threat to European
countries’ territorial integrity. In countries already concerned about Russian military intentions, such
as Poland and the Baltics, the war has surfaced preexisting fears that the Kremlin might one day
attempt to quickly seize territory and impose a fait accompli before NATO has time to respond. This
shift in focus from countering Russian hybrid operations to territorial defense has driven a renewed
effort to prepare national and NATO forces for a potential future large-scale conflict, as discussed
further in Chapter 4. Yet even countries formerly skeptical of the notion that Russia might incite a
war with NATO have revised their assessments. “We have to consider the possibility of Vladimir
Putin attacking a NATO member one day or another,” German Minister of Defence Boris Pistorius
said in early 2024, estimating that Russian reconstitution might enable such a scenario “within five to
eight years.”82 Other German officials have underscored the importance of strengthening the
Bundeswehr as part of a broader effort to bolster NATO defenses and deter Russian provocations. “If
we don’t show that we are capable of defending ourselves, Putin will have no reason to back down
from an attack on NATO,” explained Germany’s foreign intelligence chief in early 2024.83
The change in European threat perceptions has driven adjustments in EU and bilateral defense
policy (see Chapter 3), an expansion in EU sanctions, and a new focus on promoting national and
regional resilience, particularly in the energy sector. As of July 2024, the EU has adopted 14 main
sanction packages and several smaller packages to address disinformation and sanction evasion. In
contrast to the years following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, during which the EU periodically
updated its list of sanctioned individuals and entities but generally deferred from implementing new
packages, the EU has continually added new restrictive measures over more than two and a half years
of fighting. As of July 2024, over 1,700 individuals and 500 sanctioned entities have been listed for EU

79
Scholz, 2022a; “Germany Says It Is No Longer Reliant on Russian Energy,” BBC, January 18, 2023; John Ainger, “Germany
Wants EU Push to End Last 20% of Russia Energy Imports,” Bloomberg, May 28, 2024.
80
Stefan Meister and Wilfried Jilge, After Ostpolitik. A New Russia and Eastern Europe Policy Based on Lessons from the Past,
German Council on Foreign Relations, April 2023; Stefan Meister, “Germany and Russia’s War of Aggression Against Ukraine:
The Third Year,” Russian Analytical Digest, No. 312, April 22, 2024, pp. 6–10; Susan Stewart, Consolidating Germany’s Russia
Policy: Refine Existing Approaches and Clarify Trade-Offs, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, June 2023;
Maria Martinez, “German Defence Budget for 2025 ‘Significantly’ Less Than Sought, Minister Says,” Reuters, July 8, 2024;
“Germany’s New National Security Strategy Is Strong on Goals, Less So on Means,” The Economist, June 15, 2023.
81
“Macron Says New Security Architecture Should Give Guarantees for Russia,” Reuters, December 3, 2022; Leila Abboud,
“Emmanuel Macron Reaches for ‘Whatever It Takes’ on Ukraine,” Financial Times, February 27, 2024; Célia Belin, “Macron the
Hawk,” Foreign Affairs, April 5, 2024.
82
Thomas Wieder, “Germany’s Rearmament Will Take Time,” Le Monde, February 18, 2024.
83
Wieder, 2024.

18
sanctions, travel bans, asset freezes, and unavailability of funds measures related to the war in Ukraine.
EU measures have targeted political parties; armed forces and paramilitary groups; banks and financial
institutions; media organizations; corporations from the military, defense, energy, aviation,
shipbuilding, machine building, IT, telecoms, and insurance sectors; and companies involved in
sanctions circumvention. According to EU estimates, these individual sanctions amount to €28 billion
in immobilized assets.84
The scale of EU sanctions on the financial sector demonstrates the extent to which European
countries have demonstrated a new willingness to de-integrate the European and Russian economies
since the war began. Over 70 percent of Russia’s banking system’s assets have been sanctioned, and ten
major Russian banks have been cut off from the SWIFT system and banned from using the alternate
System for Transfer of Financial Messages.85 The EU has prohibited dealings with securities and
money market instruments issued by the Russian government and various financial entities, banned
new loans and credits to these entities, and frozen Russian reserves in the EU by prohibiting
transactions with the Central Bank of Russia. Additional measures include banning the trade of
securities of Russian publicly controlled companies, supplying euro-denominated banknotes,
providing crypto wallets, managing trusts for Russian beneficiaries, and accepting large deposits from
Russian nationals, along with excluding Russia from public contracts and credit rating services in the
EU. To further reduce Russia’s access to capital, the EU has banned contributions to Russian Direct
Investment Fund co-funded projects, as well as the investment in or provision of related financing and
services to Russian energy, mining, and quarrying section entities, and prohibited public financing or
financial assistance for trade or investment in Russia.86
EU trade restrictions now encompass 60 percent of prewar trade, per the European
Commission.87 Real trade with Russia has fallen from $279 billion in 2021 to $89 billion in 2023, or
less than 2 percent of the EU’s total foreign trade (see Figure 2.2). In addition to tightening prewar
restrictions on arms and dual-use goods and technologies, the EU has enacted wide-ranging
restrictions reducing or prohibiting interactions with sectors across the Russian economy. These
include
• suspensions of political, cultural, and scientific cooperation programs with the Russian
government and of the EU-Russia visa facilitation program
• bans on the sale, supply, or transfer of goods and technologies, as well as the provision of
technical or financial assistance that might enhance Russia’s military and industrial capacities
or be used in the energy, aviation, and space industries or for maritime navigation
• bans on imports from Russia of gold, diamonds, iron and steel products, and other revenue-
generating goods
• closure of EU airspace to Russian airlines and an entry ban on Russian-flagged vessels to EU
ports and locks

84
European Commission, “Achievements of the von der Leyen Commission: Solidarity with Ukraine,” fact sheet, November
2024d, p. 5.
85
European Commission, 2024d, p. 5.
86
For details, exemptions, and derogations from the investment restrictions, see Council of the European Union, 2014g.
87
European Commission, 2024d, p. 5.

19
 • bans on most Russian and Belarusian freight road operations in the EU and restrictions on
trucks with Russian trailers and semi-trailers
• suspension of broadcasting activities of 24 media outlets preparing for, supporting, or
justifying the war in Ukraine and participating in manipulation, disinformation, and
propaganda activities
• prohibitions on Russian citizens and residents holding any posts in the governing bodies of
critical infrastructures and critical entities
• prohibitions on new investments in the Russian energy sector, including projects related to oil
exploration and production
• a complete ban on the export of goods and technology used for oil and natural gas exploration
and production or for oil refining and liquefaction of natural gas
• bans on the import of Russian coal, crude oil, and many petroleum products
• prohibitions on the trade, brokering, or transport to third countries of Russian crude oil
exceeding the price cap
• bans on the sale or provision of tankers or natural gas storage capacity to Russian entities.88
Since 2022, Brussels has continually refined its sanctions in an effort to close loopholes and offset
Russian adaptations. For instance, the EU’s 11th round of sanctions included a port ban on tankers
engaging in ship-to-ship transfers of Russian oil at sea, a deceptive practice intended to circumvent
prohibitions on the import of Russian crude and petroleum products into the EU or to enable sales of
these products above the price cap agreed on by the EU. In an effort to harmonize disparate European
policies and reduce opportunities for Russian exploitation, in April 2024, Brussels issued a directive
criminalizing sanctions violations and establishing EU-wide minimum rules for sanctions
enforcement.89
The EU has also led its members in an unprecedented push to reduce their reliance on Russian
fossil fuels. In addition to the restrictions described above, the EU’s REPowerEU plan, adopted in
March 2022, aims to accelerate the clean transition and diversify European energy sources to increase
the supply of non-Russian hydrocarbons.90 Under the plan, the EU has paired changes in existing laws
and policies with expanded cooperation with alternate energy suppliers.
For example, the European Commission has committed to increase the capacity of Azerbaijan’s
Southern Gas Corridor to at least 20 billion cubic meters annually by 2027 compared with 8.1 billion
cubic meters delivered in 2021.91 The EU also revised its Renewable Energy Directive, increasing the
2030 binding target for the share of renewables in the EU’s overall energy consumption from 32

88
For details, exemptions, and derogations from restrictions related to the energy sector, see Council of the European Union,
2014g, Articles 2–2d, 3, 3b, 3c, 3eb–ec, 3f–3i, 3k, 3m–n, 3o–q, 4, 5n, and 5p. Council of the European Union, “Council Adopts
Full Suspension of Visa Facilitation with Russia,” press release, September 9, 2022h.
89
European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive (EU) 2024/1226 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 April 2024 on the Definition of Criminal Offences and Penalties for the Violation of Union Restrictive Measures and
Amending Directive (EU) 2018/1673, April 24, 2024.
90
European Commission, REPowerEU Plan, COM(2022) 230 final, May 18, 2022a.
91
European Commission, “EU and Azerbaijan Enhance Bilateral Relations, Including Energy Cooperation,” July 18, 2022b.

20
percent to 42.5 percent.92 To prevent EU companies from outbidding each other when seeking to
replace Russian natural gas, the European Commission launched a joint purchasing of natural gas at
the EU level.93 Individual EU countries have also launched efforts to decrease their reliance on Russian
fossil fuels. Most notably, Germany canceled the Nord Stream 2 project and has invested in LNG
terminals.94 Consequently, in 2022 alone, imports of Russian natural gas as a percentage of EU natural
gas inland consumption fell by more than 13 percentage points to 23 percent (see Figure 2.3). The
2023 data, when released, will likely show a further decrease.
Such far-reaching measures would not be possible without EU-wide political consensus on
relations with Russia. Indeed, such consensus is indicated by the change in European Parliament
voting records. In 2019, less than two-thirds of EU parliamentarians voted for a resolution stating that
Russia “can no longer be considered a ‘strategic partner,’” despite having labeled Russia a “strategic
challenge” three years prior.95 In a vote a week after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February
2022, 94 percent of parliamentarians voted to condemn “in the strongest possible terms Russia’s illegal
invasion of Ukraine” and to demand tougher sanctions on Russia.96 That November, 83 percent voted
to approve a resolution recognizing Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and calling on the EU to
further isolate Russia internationally, including by reducing national diplomatic ties and EU contacts
with official Russian representatives and state-affiliated institutions.97
However, the EU’s adoption of a strong and consistently confrontational policy toward Russia
belies broader variations in public sentiments toward the country. Favorable views of Russia have
declined significantly compared with a 2018 baseline, but the extent of the decline—and the intensity
of public sentiments—varies broadly by country. At one end of the spectrum sits Poland, where one
poll found that only 2 percent of the population reported favorable views of Russia in 2022—and only
1 percent in 2023 (see Figure 2.1). Similar trends can be observed in Finland and Sweden, where the
change in sentiment contributed to the countries’ historic decisions to seek admission to NATO. Yet
almost 40 percent of citizens of Bulgaria and Cyprus still hold positive views of Russia, although
attitudes in countries like Italy, Belgium, and Greece have begun to trend upward (see Figure 2.4).

92
European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive (EU) 2023/2413 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 18 October 2023 Amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and Directive 98/70/EC as Regards
the Promotion of Energy from Renewable Sources, and Repealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652, October 18, 2023.
93
European Commission, “EU Energy Platform: Commission Launches First Call for Companies to Jointly Buy Gas,” press
release, April 24, 2023a.
94
For the overview of LNG investments, see Michał Kędzierski, “At All Costs. Germany Shifts to LNG,” Centre for Eastern
Studies, April 28, 2023.
95
Alexandra Brzozowski, “Russia Can’t Be Considered Strategic Partner of EU Anymore, MEPs Say,” Euractiv, March 13,
2019a.
96
European Parliament, “Invasion of Ukraine: MEPs Call for Tougher Response to Russia,” press release, March 1, 2022a.
97
European Parliament, “European Parliament Declares Russia to Be a State Sponsor of Terrorism,” press release, November
23, 2022b.

21
 Figure 2.4. Positive Views of Russia in the European Union Countries

SOURCES: Features data from EU, “Special Eurobarometer EB045EP: EP Spring 2024 Survey: Use Your Vote -
Countdown to the European Elections,” database, April 17, 2024; EU, “Special Eurobarometer EB041EP: EP Spring
2022 Survey: Rallying Around the European Flag | Democracy as Anchor Point in Times of Crisis,” database, June 22,
2022.

By and large, however, countries with the greatest sympathies for Russia—such as Bulgaria,
Cyprus, and Greece—have not organized to challenge the EU’s approach or to preserve areas of
engagement. In part, this may be because their populations are relatively small and, therefore, less
influential, while at the same time, they are economically tied with the EU. For example, although 40
percent of Bulgarians reported in 2023 viewing Russia more as an ally or partner than a rival or
adversary, Bulgaria holds only 17 seats in the 720-seat European Parliament.98 Moreover, more than
60 percent of Bulgaria’s foreign exchange occurs within the EU (compared with less than 4 percent
with Russia), and it receives 3.4 times more in EU funds than it contributes to the EU budget.99
Consequently, Sofia may perceive little incentive to go to political war with Brussels over relations
with Russia. In other countries where pro-Russian sentiments are strong, political leaders have sought
to buck popular pressure and demonstrated new support for the EU. Since 2022, the formerly pro-
Russian, Euroskeptic Italian government has transformed into a vocal advocate for assistance to
Ukraine and reaffirmed Italy’s commitment to the EU and NATO.100 Given the political capital
invested in that firm position, reverting it now might be difficult to justify, even if the public
sentiments slightly bounced back in 2023.

98
Jana Puglierin and Pawel Zerka, Keeping America Close, Russia Down, and China Far Away: How Europeans Navigate a
Competitive World, European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR/499, June 2023, p. 11.
99
European Commission, “EU Spending and Revenue: Data 2000–2022,” spreadsheet, July 31, 2023b; Eurostat, “EU Trade
Since 1999 by SITC,” database, last updated November 18, 2024f.
100
Teresa Coratella, “Italy’s Challenging Divorce from Russia,” European Council on Foreign Relations, March 9, 2022;
Raimondo Lanza, Putin’s Friends? The Complex Balance Inside Italy’s Far-Right Government Coalition, French Institute of
International Relations, November 28, 2022.

22
 As of August 2024, Hungary is the main outlier. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,
Hungary joined other European states in voting for EU and United Nations condemnation of Russia’s
actions. Budapest has refused to allow arms shipments destined for Ukraine to transit Hungarian
territory and demanded partial exemptions from some categories of EU sanctions.101 Even as the EU’s
assistance to Ukraine has expanded and it has enacted additional restrictions on trade and engagement
with Russia, Hungary has spoken out against and blocked some aid, questioned sanctions imposed on
Russia, and breached Russia’s diplomatic isolation.102
Hungary’s stance toward Russia and insistence that it should “stay out of the war,” as Hungarian
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has pledged to his constituents, reflect both the country’s long-standing
tension with Brussels over rule of law and human rights issues as well as greater popular sympathies
toward Russia.103 A much larger share of Hungarians, relative to EU-wide averages, retain positive
views of Russia (see Figure 2.4). In a 2023 Pew Research Center poll, for instance, only 33 percent of
Hungarians surveyed stated that they believe Russia poses a major military threat to its neighbors,
with over one-quarter of Hungarians maintaining that Russia is not a threat.104 Yet Budapest’s public
position has been mostly symbolic or opportunistic; although Hungarian officials emphasize their
disapproval of EU and other European policies and have called for greater diplomatic engagement
with Russia, they have been unable to alter the general course of the EU’s policy. Rather, Hungary has
used the threat of a veto to extract concessions from Brussels but has ultimately fallen in line under
pressure. The EU bypassed Prime Minister Orbán’s resistance to Ukraine’s application for
membership in part because the Hungarian leader tacitly agreed to a compromise that allowed him to
miss a critical vote.105 Working with Slovakia, Hungary has blocked billions of partial reimbursements
through the European Peace Facility (EPF) to EU member states for military aid sent to Ukraine.
However, it has not succeeded in reducing the flow of weapons; to the contrary, in June 2024, EU
foreign affairs ministers completed a deal to bypass Hungary by channeling funds from €210 billion of
the Russian Central Bank’s paralyzed assets.106
Two and a half years since the full-scale invasion in 2022, the Russia-Ukraine war has caused a
paradigm shift in European attitudes and policies. The significance of this change is apparent in the
duration and scale of its trade restrictions and the depth of its reductions in Russian energy use.107

101
Hungary used its status as a landlocked country to require and use exemptions from restrictions on Russian fossil fuels. See
Kate Abnett, Jan Strupczewski, and Ingrid Melander, “EU Agrees Russia Oil Embargo, Gives Hungary Exemptions; Zelenskiy
Vows More Sanctions,” Reuters, May 31, 2022; Justin Spike, “Hungary Forces New Energy Deals with Russia amid Ukraine
War,” Associated Press, April 12, 2022.
102
Alexander Baunov, “Russia Sees Signs of Diplomatic Rehabilitation in Orbán Visit,” Carnegie Politika, July 10, 2024.
103
For an analysis of Hungary’s “taking foreign policy decisions hostage” in the country’s conflict with Brussels over the rule of
law, see Patrick Müller and Peter Slominski, “Hungary, the EU and Russia’s War Against Ukraine: The Changing Dynamics of
EU Foreign Policymaking,” in Claudia Wiesner and Michèle Knodt, eds., The War Against Ukraine and the EU: Facing New
Realities, Palgrave Macmillan, April 30, 2024.
104
Moira Fagan, Laura Clancy, Sneha Gubbala, and Sarah Austin, “Poles and Hungarians Differ over Views of Russia and the
U.S.,” Pew Research Center, October 2, 2023.
105
Nicolas Camut, Hans Von Der Burchard, and Clea Caulcutt, “Orbán’s Walkout Was Planned, Macron Says,” Politico,
December 15, 2023.
106
Edit Zgut-Przybylska, “The Kremlin’s Growing Influence in Orbán’s Hungary,” Politico, May 23, 2024; Jorge Liboreiro, “EU
Bypasses Hungary to Send €1.4 Billion in Military and Industrial Aid to Ukraine, Borrell Says,” Euronews, June 24, 2024.
107
European Commission, 2024d, p. 5.

23
European policies have demonstrated an intent to pair symbolic gestures of opposition to the
Kremlin’s policies with meaningful changes in the economic, institutional, and people-to-people
frameworks that sustained engagement with Russia prior to the war. Despite opposition from some
European countries, the overall effect has been both the adoption of a confrontational stance in the
near term and preparations to sustain this policy over the long term.

Conclusion
The war in Ukraine has upended decades of European policy toward Russia. Table 2.2
summarizes several novel elements of the European response to the war and compares them with a
preconflict baseline. Between 2014 and 2022, European attitudes and policies toward Russia varied
significantly and by region, leading the EU and NATO to adopt ambiguous policies intended to
accommodate member states’ differing preferences and preserve the flexibility to tilt toward greater
engagement or confrontation as desired. Despite continued concerns over Russian policies toward
Crimea and Donbas, European countries generally preferred to continue engagement and cooperation,
as reflected in the gradual recovery of trade and public attitudes. This trend likely would have
continued had Russia not chosen to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The war decisively tilted
the balance in Europe toward a path of confrontation rather than engagement with Russia.

Table 2.2. Summary of Trends in Europe’s Orientation Toward Russia

2014–2021 2022–June 2024

Declared stance • The EU identified Russia as a • The EU declared Russia a long-term
strategic challenge. and direct threat.
• NATO conditioned a return to • NATO Strategic Concept identified
business as usual with Russia on a Russia as “the most significant and
change in Russia’s policy on Crimea. direct threat.”
• The EU demanded Russia’s
unconditional withdrawal from Ukraine.
Policies and • NATO increased deterrence activities • The EU adopted 14 sanction packages
resources but continued military-to-military of unprecedented scale.
engagement. • The EU aimed to rapidly reduce
• The EU enacted limited sanctions and dependence on Russian energy.
unevenly implemented policies to • EU-Russia trade fell by two-thirds from
push back, contain, and engage. 2021–2023, to less than 2% of EU
• EU-Russia trade and public foreign trade.
sentiments gradually recovered. • Public sentiments about Russia fell to
historic lows.
SOURCES: NATO, 2022d, p. 4; European Commission, 2022a.

Will Europe’s confrontational policy toward Russia last? As demonstrated by the fact that the EU
has not published a formal policy to guide EU-Russia relations, European states have not articulated a
clear vision for a future relationship. Although allies agreed at the Washington Summit to “develop
recommendations on NATO’s strategic approach to Russia,” the alliance has yet to promulgate a new

24
policy.108 However, the majority of European states have also not demonstrated an interest or
confidence in the feasibility of engagement as a means to establish stable relations with Russia in the
future.109 Even countries like Hungary, Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Italy that harbor more favorable views
toward Russia have not presented options to repair severed economic and political linkages and restore
relations.110 Maybe even more importantly, EU countries’ political and economic interests lie
predominantly within the Union: Even before 2022, most of their foreign trade took place within the
EU (above 60 percent in most cases), whereas trade with Russia was counted in the low single digits.111
The political costs of reengaging Russia have only increased as the EU has sought to establish a
collective framework for members’ relations with the country and eastern member states have
conveyed their determination to oppose defections. Although some Western European states like
Portugal or Spain may be interested in reengaging Russia, the prospect of provoking a political clash at
the EU level that could impose opportunity costs on their ability to pursue other priorities likely will
disincentivize major challenges. Consequently, as long as the European mainstream is willing to
confront Russia, the policy is likely to persist because the Russia sympathizers’ incentives to derail it
are weak. Meanwhile, German or French policymakers might still be grappling with the failure of their
long-standing efforts toward a cooperative relationship with Russia, but they invested too much
political capital in confronting the aggressor to backtrack without a dramatic shift in Russia’s behavior.
As European efforts to reduce reliance on Russian energy continue and as alternate trade networks
are established, the incentives to restore relations are likely to diminish further. Even if potential
political shifts in Europe would lead to the weakening of sanctions and Russia’s isolation, it is not
certain that European companies would restore cooperative relations with Russia. The longer the EU
sanctions regime is in place, the more stable the new equilibrium and the weaker the incentive to revert
back to the old equilibrium. For example, sanctions and the REPowerEU plan force the EU countries
to find new energy suppliers. Although pipeline-delivered hydrocarbons might always be cheaper than
seaborne, there is value to the stability and security of supplies and a cost to changing suppliers.
Without a radical change in Russia’s behavior, concerns about prospective future EU sanctions likely
will discourage European companies from going back to Russian fossil fuels. Furthermore, this push
against Russian hydrocarbons complements the broader, long-standing EU effort to increase the share
of green energy in the mix. Finally, the infrastructure and mechanisms that are currently developed to
meet the EU demand would preclude the return of excessive dependency on Russian hydrocarbons.
For their part, European capitals have underlined that they can still—and are prepared to—restrict
relations further. Statements by European leaders suggest that the sanctions package adopted in May
2024, their 14th since the war began, will not be the last one.112

108
NATO, 2024g.
109
Kadri Liik, The Old Is Dying and the New Cannot Be Born: A Power Audit of EU–Russia Relations, European Council on
Foreign Relations, ECFR/476, December 2022, p. 1.
110
Liik, 2022, p. 17.
111
In 2021, only the neighboring Baltic states and Finland exceeded the 5 percent threshold for total foreign trade with Russia.
See Eurostat, 2024f.
112
Kateryna Hodunova, “Work on 15th Sanctions Package Against Russia to ‘Start Immediately,’ Finnish FM Says,” Kyiv
Independent, June 24, 2024.

25
Chapter 3

Will Europe Build Great Capability and

Exercise Greater Strategic Autonomy?

The convergence of European perceptions of Russia as a threat has revived old debates over how
best to provide for Europe’s collective security. Since NATO’s formation in 1949 and the concurrent
movement toward greater Western European economic, political, and military integration, European
leaders and strategists have debated the extent to which national resources, authorities, and policies
should be subordinated to multinational organizations. In seeking to articulate common interests,
these discussions are often intertwined with debates over the extent to which European leaders
should—and can—rely on U.S. defense commitments and the extent to which European and U.S.
interests align. Advocates of greater strategic autonomy argue that Europe must prepare to act
independently to ensure its interests are represented on the global stage and to hedge against
uncertainty over the United States’ future direction.113 These advocates have called for Europeans to
develop bilaterally and through institutions like the EU a greater capacity for autonomous action by
increasing defense spending and cooperation, coordination, and integration outside transatlantic
frameworks like NATO.114 For others, the debate over European strategic autonomy appears either
futile or misguided because they doubt European countries’ ability or willingness to independently
develop the military forces required to deter external aggression and because they view the United
States as a vital partner in ensuring European interests are secured.115
In this chapter, we examine how the war in Ukraine has influenced European attitudes and
policies related to strategic and operational autonomy. To capture the breadth of the debate, we define
operational autonomy as the ability of European states to defend themselves with reduced or no U.S.
assistance and strategic autonomy as the ability to pursue collective interests on the world stage.116 As in

113
For a compilation of commentaries, studies, and reports from international think tanks on the issue of European strategic
autonomy before Russia’s full-scale invasion, see Marcin Grajewski, “The EU Strategic Autonomy Debate,” European
Parliamentary Research Service, PE 690.532, March 30, 2021.
114
For the most significant articulation of this concept by a standing government official, see Élysée, “President Macron Gives
Speech on New Initiative for Europe,” September 26, 2017. For illustrative arguments for greater European defense autonomy,
see Nick Witney, Building Europeans’ Capacity to Defend Themselves, European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2019; Nicole
Koenig, “Time to Go Beyond the Meta-Debate on EU Strategic Autonomy in Defence,” Jacques Delors Centre, Hertie School,
December 4, 2020.
115
See, for example, Hugo Meijer and Stephen G. Brooks, “Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its
Security If the United States Pulls Back,” International Security, Vol. 45, No. 4, Spring 2021; Mariusz Błaszczak, “Europe’s
Alliance with the US Is the Foundation of Its Security,” Politico, November 25, 2020; Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, “Europe
Still Needs America,” Politico, November 2, 2020; Pauli Järvenpää, Claudia Major, and Sven Sakkov, European Strategic
Autonomy: Operationalising a Buzzword, International Centre for Defence and Security, October 2019.
116
For a discussion of the challenge of defining the concept, see Frédéric Mauro, Europe’s Strategic Autonomy: That Obscure
Object of Desire, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, October 2021.

26
previous chapters, we compare the EU and member states’ rhetoric and policies before and after the
start of the Russia-Ukraine war. In particular, we examined official national and EU statements and
guidance related to strategic autonomy, defense capability development, and responsibility sharing
with the United States; the development of, and participation in, initiatives to increase defense
cooperation outside the auspices of the transatlantic alliance; and trends in national defense spending
and DIB policy. We compare trends in the years preceding and following the invasion in the section
conclusion.

Prewar Positions
For most of the 1990s and 2000s, European defense policy was characterized by disinvestment
and reliance on the United States. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the end of the
Cold War, European capitals turned toward the task of stabilizing and re-integrating former
communist countries and developing a pan-European project founded on soft power. Although the
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, peacekeeping missions in Africa, and, after 2001, out-of-area
operations in Afghanistan and in support of the U.S.-led Global War on Terror continued to generate
demand for European military capabilities, defense expenditures declined precipitously and attention
shifted from preparations for large-scale conventional conflict to peacekeeping, stability,
counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency operations.117 Debates over whether Europe needed to retain
an Atlanticist defense and foreign policy or whether it should establish a more independent, or
Europeanist, strategy continued, but in practice European capitals relied on U.S. defense
commitments to deter external threats.118
Yet even as the resources committed to European militaries declined, political efforts to strengthen
the EU’s role in continental defense and security policy continued. Over the 1990s and early 2000s,
member states defined an array of military functions the EU could undertake under the umbrella of
crisis management operations and codified a set of structures and tasks for what would become the
bloc’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security Defence Policy.119 The conflicts in
the Balkans drew attention to the EU’s deficiencies in conflict prevention, crisis management, and
other security and defense issues and raised questions about the availability of NATO member
countries’ assets and capabilities in scenarios in which the Alliance was not directly engaged militarily.
At the Cologne European Council in 1999, member states declared their intent to “give the European
Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common
European policy on security and defence,” set the goal of developing capabilities for autonomous
military action, and established the new post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy to further the EU’s ability to speak with “one voice” on security matters, among other

117
For changes in European military expenditures, see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military
Expenditure Database, undated.
118
Jan Techau, The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe, Carnegie Europe, September 2015.
119
Robert E. Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion—or Competitor? RAND Corporation, MR-
1463-NDRI/RE, 2002.

27
initiatives.120 Four years later, the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy, which,
for the first time, defined the EU’s security environment and identified security challenges and
implications for the community.121 Notably, the United States strongly opposed strengthening the
EU’s defense capabilities out of concern that it could lead to a decoupling of European decisionmaking
from NATO, duplication of efforts at a time of scarce resources, and potential discrimination against
non-EU NATO members.122 Following the creation of the European Defence Agency and EU
Battlegroup in 2004, the political momentum behind EU defense efforts also declined over the mid-
2000s amid the European debt crisis and member states’ infighting over revisions to the European
Constitution and the Treaty of Lisbon.
European attitudes toward their collective defense obligations began to shift over the 2010s.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea revived dormant concerns about Moscow’s ambitions and Europe’s
readiness to deter, and if necessary, defend against, hybrid and conventional threats—all at the same
time that the emergence of the Islamic State, increase in migration from North Africa and the eastern
Mediterranean, and growing evidence of Russian interference in European domestic politics and
intrusions in national infrastructure heightened concerns about Europe’s defense capability and
capacity to respond to conventional and hybrid threats. Together, these trends highlighted countries’
sense of vulnerability and prompted a reexamination of European capabilities and architectures for
collective defense—all while the United States’ efforts to rebalance its attention and resources to the
Indo-Pacific region introduced new uncertainty about U.S. commitments.123 But progress toward
reviving European defense institutions and modernizing European armed forces continued to lag
behind the rhetoric as European capitals disagreed over the urgency of the task, the nature of the
pacing challenge, and the role of the United States.
After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, European members joined the United States in reaffirming
the principle of collective defense and strengthening NATO. In a strongly worded declaration released
during the Wales Summit in September 2014, allies announced that “Russia’s aggressive actions
against Ukraine,” in conjunction with “growing instability in our southern neighbourhood,” had
“fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace” and reaffirmed the
importance of security and defense cooperation.124 During the summit, leaders approved a new
NATO Readiness Action Plan, a package of measures to adapt and strengthen the alliance’s posture;
enhance the NATO Response Force; and improve the coherence of allied military exercises,

120
Cologne European Council, Annex III: European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security
and Defence, 150/99, June 4, 1999, p. 2. These decisions followed the 1998 St. Malo Declaration, in which the UK and France
agreed on the need for the EU to develop the ability for autonomous decisionmaking and action, including the use of credible
military force, in the event that international crises arose that threatened EU interests but for which NATO was not involved.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, “Joint Declaration on European Defence,” December 4, 1998.
121
Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, December 13, 2003.
122
See, for instance, Madeleine K. Albright, ‘The Right Balance Will Secure NATO’s Future,” Financial Times, December 7,
1998.
123
For European reactions to the announcement of a U.S. “pivot” to Asia in 2011 and subsequent U.S. policy shifts, see Robert
D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine, Lost Decade: The US Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power, Oxford University Press,
June 11, 2014, pp. 107–108.
124
NATO, 2022h.

28
investments, and operations, among other measures.125 In recognition of the need to balance the costs
among members, allies also pledged to spend a minimum of 2 percent of their gross domestic product
(GDP) on defense by 2024, to dedicate more than 20 percent of their defense budgets on major
equipment and related research and development costs, and to meet NATO readiness guidelines.
The 2014 Wales Defence Investment Pledge represented the first of several initiatives to
strengthen the Alliance’s posture along its eastern flank and to establish and track progress toward an
improved ability to respond to a large-scale crisis or conflict in Europe (see Table 3.1). Yet European
militaries’ progress toward realizing NATO’s capability goals often lagged behind the rhetoric and
support for new crisis management, and cooperative security mechanisms remained mixed. In 2016,
for instance, NATO declared a new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force operationally capable
despite evidence of outstanding capability gaps. At the time, only the United States possessed the
requisite enabling forces, and only seven allies—France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Turkey, and
the UK—were capable of leading the task force’s land element.126 Although average defense spending
increased in the years following Russia’s de facto annexation of Crimea, only eight allies reached the 2
percent spending guideline by 2021 compared with 3 percent when the pledge was announced in
2014, according to NATO estimates.127 The United States, which comprised 51 percent of the
Alliance’s combined GDP, accounted for 69 percent of combined defense expenditures.128

125
NATO, “NATO’s Readiness Action Plan,” fact sheet, December 2014.
126
Seth G. Jones, Rachel Ellehuus, and Colin Wall, Europe’s High-End Military Challenges: The Future of European Capabilities
and Missions, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2021, p. 8.
127
NATO, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2021, 2022a, p. 42.
128
NATO, 2022a, p. 42.

29
 Table 3.1. Timeline of Major NATO Enhancements, 2014–2021

Date Initiative
2014 At the 2014 Wales Summit, allies agreed to implement the Readiness Action Plan, a package
of measures to increase military presence and activity in the territory of eastern allies and
strengthen long-term military posture and capabilities. Under the plan, allies agreed to create
a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, composed of approximately 5,000 forces, and to
establish eight multinational NATO headquarters, known as NATO Force Integration Units, on
the territory of eastern allies.
2015 The first six NATO Force Integration Units were activated in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, and Romania.
2016 NATO declared the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force operationally capable. Two
additional NATO Force Integration Units were activated in Hungary and Slovakia. At the
Warsaw Summit, allies agreed to establish a rotational-forward presence in the territories of
eastern and southeastern member nations.
2017 NATO established four multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland
under a new Enhanced Forward Presence initiative. Allied defense ministers adopted a
package of capability targets to guide investments.
2018 The NATO Readiness Initiative called for 30 heavy or medium maneuver battalions, 30 kinetic
air squadrons, and 30 major naval combatants to be ready to use within 30 days. NATO
defense ministers agreed to increase the NATO Command Structure by around 1,200
personnel.
2019 Allied chiefs of defence approved a new military strategy and recognized space as a new
military domain. Allies agreed to adopt baseline requirements for resilient civilian
telecommunications. In cooperation with the European Organisation for the Safety of Air
Navigation, NATO established the Rapid Air Mobility mechanism to ease air movement across
national borders.
2020 The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) presented a new strategic framework
titled the Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA).
2021 The North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved a NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept to guide
and focus allied investments and capability development.
SOURCES: Features information from NATO, 2014; NATO, “Defence Ministers to Agree NATO Readiness Initiative,”
June 7, 2018, updated June 8, 2018a; NATO, “NATO Chiefs of Defence Discuss Future Alliance Adaptations,” May 22,
2019b; NATO, NATO: Ready for the Future: Adapting the Alliance (2018–2019), 2019a.

European defense spending and contributions to NATO remained low even as concerns about the
United States’ commitment to the Alliance increased after 2016 (see Figure 3.1).129 Fears of potential
U.S. abandonment resurfaced after the first Trump administration declined to endorse NATO’s
doctrine of collective defense, labeled the EU as a U.S. “foe,” imposed tariffs on European exports, and
expressed sympathy for President Putin.130 Even before the Russian annexation of Crimea, many

129
Although some allies expressed private concerns after the Obama administration announced its intent to “pivot” to Asia in
2011, Washington’s vocal support for NATO enhancements and enlargement, its maintenance of a large military footprint in
Europe, and its continued engagement on transatlantic issues reassured allies that a fundamental reduction in U.S. commitments
was not forthcoming. Blackwill and Fontaine, 2014, pp. 107–114.
130
Susan B. Glasser, “How Trump Made War on Angela Merkel and Europe,” New Yorker, December 17, 2018; Anna
Dimitrova, “The State of the Transatlantic Relationship in the Trump Era,” Fondation Robert Schuman, February 4, 2020.

30
European publics had questioned the United States’ commitment to their interests. In a survey
conducted in 2013, 65 percent of EU member country respondents reported that they believed the
United States took the interests of other countries like their own into account “not at all” or “not too
much” when making decisions.131 By 2018, favorability toward the United States had slipped further.
That year, over 76 percent of EU respondents reported similar sentiments. Among German and
French respondents, the rate was 80 and 81 percent, respectively.132

Figure 3.1. Defense Expenditures in 2014 and 2021 as a Share of Gross Domestic Product

SOURCE: Features data from NATO, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2021),” March 31, 2022c.
NOTE: Figures for 2021 are estimates.

European leaders divided over how to prepare for a potential reduction in U.S. assistance. Some,
particularly those in countries that perceived the greatest threat from Russia, sought to accommodate
new U.S. demands and to prioritize a bilateral relationship with the United States over cooperation in
multilateral frameworks like NATO. For example, Poland offered up to $2 billion in financial
incentives to encourage the United States to station an armored division permanently on Polish
territory, a move interpreted by some members as a potential test of the 1997 NATO-Russia
Founding Act.133 Yet others pushed for Europe to prepare to operate collectively but outside the
transatlantic alliance. In a 2017 address, President Macron called on regional leaders to “re-establish a
sovereign, united and democratic Europe” by, among other aims, building “a common intervention

131
Pew Research Center, Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project 2013 Spring Survey Topline Results, July 18, 2013.
132
Pew Research Center, Topline Questionnaire: Pew Research Center Spring 2018 Survey, October 1, 2018.
133
David M. Herszenhorn, “Warsaw to Trump: Let’s Make a Military Deal (Without NATO),” Politico, May 30, 2018; Zoya
Sheftalovich, “US Considering Building ‘Fort Trump’ in Poland,” Politico, September 19, 2018.

31
force, a common defense budget and a common doctrine for action.”134 In a controversial interview two
years later, he urged Europe to “wake up” to the prospect of U.S. withdrawal from the continent and
prepare to operate without transatlantic security guarantees.135 Declaring NATO “brain dead,” he
called for European leaders to accelerate the development of national defenses, elevate the EU as the
primary forum for European defense policy, and assert a more independent role in international affairs
to mediate between the United States and China and “stop the world from catching fire.”136
Although few other European leaders joined the French call to develop a European alternative to
NATO, a growing number of EU and European officials had begun to reevaluate the United States’
reliability—and, with this change, to also reconsider the EU’s traditional emphasis on soft power.
“With friends like that, who needs enemies?” then–European Council President (and current Polish
Prime Minister) Donald Tusk tweeted after U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal was
announced. “But frankly EU should be grateful. Thanks to him [President Trump] we got rid of all
illusions. We realise that if you need a helping hand, you will find one at the end of your arm.”137 “The
times in which we could rely fully on others—they are somewhat over,” Chancellor Merkel
pronounced after a tense G7 meeting, adding “we Europeans must really take our fate into our own
hands.”138 A year later, Merkel surprised international observers by publicly endorsing a French
proposal to establish a common European army through the EU.139
European leaders’ anxieties about the United States’ future role in Europe lent momentum to an
ongoing effort to expand the EU’s role in defense and security policy that were rekindled following the
2008 crisis in Georgia and accelerated after the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Determined to increase
European capacity to defend European interests, the EU focused on building new mechanisms to
leverage the institution’s regulatory and budgetary power to promote greater national military
cooperation and integration. “As Europeans we must take greater responsibility for our security,” the
EU’s 2016 global strategy directed, noting the need for improvements in capability, defense industrial
production, exercises, and planning.140 The following year, it established
• the European Defence Fund to support collaborative defense research and development and
strengthen the European defense industry
• the Military Planning and Conduct Capability, a permanent military command and control
structure to enable more rapid and coherent military responses by member states in crisis or
conflict

134
Élysée, 2017.
135
“Emmanuel Macron in His Own Words,” 2019.
136
“Emmanuel Macron in His Own Words,” 2019.
137
Megan Specia, “E.U. Official Takes Donald Trump to Task: ‘With Friends Like That’…,” New York Times, May 16, 2018.
138
Alison Smale and Steven Erlanger, “Merkel, After Discordant G-7 Meeting, Is Looking Past Trump,” New York Times, May
28, 2017.
139
Maïa De La Baume and David M. Herszenhorn, “Merkel Joins Macron in Calling for EU Army to Complement NATO,”
Politico, November 13, 2018.
140
EU, 2016, pp. 11, 19–20.

32
 • the Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO) on security and defense, a legal framework
for joint military investment in equipment, research, and development.141
PESCO’s passage in 2017 was all the more remarkable because it required overcoming Franco-
German disagreements over the initiative’s design that had stymied progress on the initiative since it
was first introduced a decade earlier.142 Together with the other initiatives like the Common Annual
Review of Defence, PESCO’s passage reflected a new determination among EU member countries to
“reinforce the E.U.’s strategic autonomy to act alone when necessary, and with partners whenever
possible,” as an EU public statement described.143
But even as European leaders vowed to build a European capacity to defend European interests,
funding for new military procurement, defense innovation, and military mobility initiatives remained
modest and member states’ participation in EU-led initiatives was uneven.144 Differing attitudes
toward Russia and differing preferences over how to prioritize among the challenges confronting
Europe produced mixed support for new EU programs. The Central and Eastern European members
most concerned about Russia proved skeptical of EU-led efforts, were less likely to participate in EU
initiatives like PESCO than their Western counterparts, and were more likely to seek exemptions
from EU regulations intended to discourage reliance on foreign arms suppliers.145 In part, this
reflected a greater desire to buy available, off-the-shelf, often U.S.-origin systems to redress known
capability gaps instead of systems from Western European countries like France and Germany, which
were already endowed with large defense industries that would also benefit from intra-EU
collaborative projects. Poland, for instance, expressed concern that the EU’s efforts to promote defense
industry consolidation would advantage French and German competitors and harm Poland’s own
defense sectors.146 Others feared that the shift toward promoting European strategic autonomy might
reinforce protectionist trends that would benefit industrial powers like France and Germany while
weakening the position of countries like Spain, Poland, and the Netherlands.147

141
EEAS, “Defending Europe: The European Defence Fund,” fact sheet, undated-a; Council of the European Union, Council
Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 Establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and Determining the
List of Participating Member States, December 11, 2017; EEAS, “Permanent Structured Cooperation – PESCO: Deepening
Defence Cooperation Among EU Member States,” fact sheet, November 2021.
142
While Germany advocated for membership in PESCO to promote the broadest member involvement in the bloc’s collective
defense, France argued for resources to be concentrated among an “avant-garde” cohort of more-capable members that could
deliver more quickly. Michal Baranowski and Martin Quencez, “An Inclusive PESCO Moves Forward Despite Remaining
Concerns,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, undated.
143
Steven Erlanger, “E.U. Moves Closer to a Joint Military Force,” New York Times, November 13, 2017; Jean-Claude Juncker,
“State of the Union Address 2017,” September 12, 2017.
144
As of 2021, 20 of the then–46 PESCO projects had received no national financial resources. Jacopo Barigazzi, “EU Military
Projects Face Delays, Leaked Document Shows,” Politico, July 12, 2021; Stefan Lehne, “The Comeback of the European
Commission,” Carnegie Europe, April 24, 2023; Claire Mills, EU Defence: The Realisation of Permanent Structured Cooperation
(PESCO), House of Commons Library, September 23, 2019, pp. 15–16.
145
Jonata Anicetti, “EU Arms Collaboration, Procurement, and Offsets: The Impact of the War in Ukraine,” Policy Studies, Vol.
45, Nos. 3–4, 2024, p. 444.
146
Baranowski and Quencez, undated.
147
José Ignacio Torreblanca, “Onwards and Outwards: Why the EU Needs to Move from Strategic Autonomy to Strategic
Interdependence,” European Council on Foreign Relations, August 24, 2023.

33
 Although rattled by signs that the United States might disengage from the continent, many
European leaders also remained hesitant to pursue reforms that could be interpreted as either
discrediting NATO or distancing Europe from the transatlantic alliance.148 Indeed, the EU itself
continued to recognize NATO’s primary role in collective defense and sought to improve
coordination between the two institutions.149 A first-ever EU-NATO declaration released in 2016
established a “transatlantic strategic partnership” and pledged to boost cooperation.150 That
December, EU and NATO ministers endorsed a package of 42 actions to advance interoperability
through cooperation on developing defense standards; establish parallel and coordinated military
exercises; and encourage the coherence and complementarity of EU and NATO defense planning
processes, among other measures.151 Over subsequent years, NATO and EU ministers approved
additional measures to expand cooperation on military mobility, counterterrorism, joint exercises and
training, and promotion of the role of women in peace and security.152 Even then, some member states
worked to ensure EU enhancements would not come at the expense of NATO’s capacity or
credibility. Although the Baltic states welcomed co-funding initiatives like the European Defence
Fund, they pressed for the EU to include “third countries” like the United States and maintained that
EU enhancements should not be viewed as alternatives to transatlantic cooperation.153 As a 2018 joint
communiqué by Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary on PESCO stated, “We need to deliver by
developing concrete capabilities in a timely manner that could meet NATO requirements as well.”154
In a speech to the Bruegel economic policy think tank in September 2020, European Council
President Charles Michel declared that strategic autonomy would be the “aim of our generation.”155
But six years after the Ukraine crisis began, Europe had made little progress toward realizing this
objective. Heightened concerns over Russian intentions, combined with frustration with the United
States, provided an opportunity to expand the EU’s role in shaping continental deterrence and defense
policy and spurred new interest in the idea of building Europe’s capacity to act without the United
States. In so doing, the EU sought to transcend the traditional division of responsibility in which the
EU assumed leadership of economic, social, and regulatory issues and NATO led matters of collective
defense and deterrence. But even as allies took steps to increase their defense spending and promote
greater European integration outside the transatlantic alliance, they proved unwilling to dedicate the
resources required to execute their ambitions or to concentrate their attention and resources on
alternatives to transatlantic cooperation. Member states fell short of EU benchmarks for collaborative

148
Tania Lațici, Understanding EU-NATO Cooperation: Theory and Practice, European Parliamentary Research Service, PE
659.269, October 2020, pp. 10–11; Błaszczak, 2020; Kramp-Karrenbauer, 2020.
149
Lațici, 2020, pp. 4–5.
150
NATO, “Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the
Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” press release, July 8, 2016, updated December 5, 2017.
151
NATO “Statement on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration Signed by the President of the European Council, the
President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” press release,
December 6, 2016.
152
NATO, “NATO-EU Relations,” fact sheet, July 2018b; Lațici, 2020, pp. 4 and 6.
153
Anicetti, 2024, p. 448.
154
Anicetti, 2024, p. 447.
155
Charles Michel, “Strategic Autonomy for Europe: The Aim of Our Generation,” transcript of speech given at Bruegel,
European Council, September 28, 2020.

34
procurement initiatives and NATO goal posts for overall spending.156 The migration crisis of 2015
and 2016, the rule of law backsliding in Hungary and Poland after 2015, Brexit, the outbreak of the
COVID-19 pandemic, and continued tensions with the United States precluded the consensus
required to secure major institutional reforms and diverted the EU’s discussion of strategic autonomy
from defense matters to migration, public health, and economic and social issues.157

Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War, 2022–2024

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 rattled European leaders and lent new
momentum to debates regarding Europe’s responsibility and readiness to provide for its own defense.
Confronted with the realities of a large-scale, high-intensity conflict in the region, European
governments have committed new attention and resources to bolstering national defenses, enhancing
coordination on defense production and procurement, and improving the capacity of existing
multinational organizations to manage collective security needs. But even as the war has elevated
voices calling for greater European operational autonomy, it has showcased the continent’s continued
reliance on U.S. security guarantees and cooperation. The result has been a general effort to improve
Europe’s readiness and capacity to defend against foreign aggression—and greater skepticism of
prewar proposals to exercise strategic autonomy by shifting resources from transatlantic to European
institutions and developing the EU’s capacity to influence global developments independently.
European defense spending has surged since the start of the war in Ukraine. Within a month of
Russia’s invasion, six European countries—Belgium, Germany, Italy, Norway, Romania, and
Sweden—unveiled plans to increase defense spending, with the majority of European countries
following suit by year’s end.158 Reversing decades of policies that prioritized reductions in defense
spending, Chancellor Scholz announced the creation of a new €100 billion ($107 billion) special fund
to expand and modernize the Bundeswehr, which is part of larger pledge to overhaul German defense
policy and respond to what the chancellor characterized as a Zeitenwende, or an “epochal tectonic
shift.”159 Recognizing “the watershed moment that Russia’s war of aggression signifies,” Germany’s
first-ever national security strategy, released in June 2023, affirmed Berlin’s intent to strengthen the
EU, “consolidate[e] the European pillar of NATO,” and increase German contributions to the
security of the European continent.160 Yet even countries already committed to high defense spending
pledged to increase their contributions to collective defense. For example, new legislation in Poland
mandated that the country spend 3 percent of GDP annually, exceeding the 2 percent threshold
Warsaw had previously pledged to meet.161

156
Bergmann, Toygür, and Svendsen, 2023, p. 11.
157
Lehne, 2023; Suzana Anghel, Beatrix Immenkamp, Elena Lazarou, Jerôme Saulnier, and Alex Benjamin Wilson, On the Path
to “Strategic Autonomy”: The EU in an Evolving Geopolitical Environment, European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 652.096,
September 2020.
158
Christina Mackenzie, “Seven European Nations Have Increased Defense Budgets in One Month. Who Will Be Next?”
Breaking Defense, March 22, 2022.
159
Scholz, 2022a; Olaf Scholz, “The Global Zeitenwende,” Foreign Affairs, December 5, 2022b.
160
German Federal Government, 2023, pp. 5–6.
161
Ana-Roxana Popescu, “Poland to Increase Defence Spending to 3% of GDP from 2023,” Janes, March 4, 2022.

35
 Although countries’ commitments have varied in terms of spending targets and projected
implementation timelines, European defense spending has continued to grow. Of the 27 EU member
states, 20 increased their defense expenditures in 2022—six by more than 10 percent.162 Although EU
data for 2023 is not yet available, data collected by the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute shows that regional defense and security outlays have increased by 16 percent from 2022 and
2023, driving the continent’s spending to the highest levels observed since the end of the Cold War.163
Concurrently, the number of European NATO members meeting the 2 percent of GDP threshold
has climbed year over year, increasing over five times between 2021 and 2024 (see Figure 3.2).
Although large Western European countries like the UK and Germany still make up the greatest
proportion of total European defense spending, countries bordering or near Russia and Ukraine have
experienced some of the most dramatic increases in spending as measured by percentage of annual
GDP. For example, Lithuania state budget guidelines foresee spending of at least 3 percent through
2025 and Poland is reaching approximately 4 percent of GDP in 2024 and projected to reach 5
percent in 2025.164

Figure 3.2. Number of European NATO Members Meeting the 2 Percent Pledge

SOURCE: Adapted from NATO, 2022c.

NOTE: Numbers for 2024 are estimates.

The shift in European defense spending has been accompanied by a new sense of urgency to
rebuild defense capabilities, foster collective resilience, and promote European cooperation and
integration on defense and security. At the Versailles Summit in March 2022, European leaders

162
European Defence Agency, Defence Data 2022: Key Findings and Analysis, 2023b, p. 5.
163
Tamsin Paternoster, “Military Spending in Western and Central Europe Higher Than End of Cold War, Data Shows,”
Euronews, April 22, 2024.
164
“Poland to Spend 5% of GDP on Defence in 2025, Says Foreign Minister,” Reuters, July 13, 2024; “Lithuania Pledges to
Spend at Least 3% of GDP on Defence,” Reuters, March 21, 2024.

36
declared their intent to collectively rearm; reduce European defense, energy, and other resource
dependencies; and increase the bloc’s ability to act autonomously.165 Although the Versailles
Declaration affirmed that NATO “remains the foundation of collective defence for its members,” it
also charted a program to build “[a] stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defence
[that] will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security.”166 Toward this end, member
states agreed to the following broad portfolio of activities:
• Increase defense expenditures “substantially” and develop capabilities within the EU “in a
collaborative way.”
• Develop incentives for collaborative investments in joint projects and joint procurement of
defense capabilities.
• Strengthen the European defense industrial and technological base.
• Accelerate ongoing efforts to enhance military mobility.
• Phase out European dependency on Russian gas, oil, and coal imports.167
That month, the Council of the European Union adopted the Strategic Compass, a joint strategy to
strengthen the bloc’s defense and security policy that had been under negotiation since 2019.168
Quickly rewritten to account for the conflict, the final Strategic Compass omits earlier suggestions for
selective engagement with Russia and instead echoes the Versailles Declaration in noting that a “more
hostile security environment requires us to make a quantum leap forward and increase our capacity
and willingness to act, strengthen our resilience and ensure solidarity and mutual assistance.”169
Although some member states, in particular France, had previously pushed for the document to
outline the EU’s global role, the final text refocuses attention on the continent and, in particular, its
eastern flank.170
To realize this ambition, the EU has adopted a more assertive stance in leveraging existing
regulatory and budgetary powers to support defense objectives. This shift is exemplified in the EU’s
adaption of the EPF, an off-budget instrument for financing offshore military activities and assistance
to EU partners originally designed to support African and African Union peace support operations.171
Within days of the invasion, EU ministers voted to reverse the existing “everything-but-arms” policy
and use EFP funds to reimburse member states that supplied Ukraine with lethal military

165
European Council, Versailles Declaration, March 11, 2022b.
166
European Council, 2022b. For a similar statement affirming the EU’s complementarity to NATO, see Council of the
European Union, “A Strategic Compass for a Stronger EU Security and Defence in the Next Decade,” press release, March 21,
2022d.
167
European Council, 2022b.
168
Council of the European Union, 2022e.
169
For a discussion of the draft Strategic Compass’ revision, see Nicole Koenig, Putin’s War and the Strategic Compass: A Quantum
Leap for the EU’s Security and Defence Policy? Jacques Delors Centre, Hertie School, April 29, 2022, p. 2.
170
Koenig, 2022, p. 2; Council of the European Union, 2022e, p. 9.
171
Daniel Fiott, “In Every Crisis an Opportunity? European Union Integration in Defence and the War on Ukraine,” Journal of
European Integration, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2023, p. 451.

37
assistance.172 In a similar effort to adapt existing mechanisms for new operational requirements, the
EU has used EFP funding to establish its European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of
Ukraine (EUMAM). Built using frameworks developed for counterterrorism training missions in
African countries, EUMAM is the EU’s first-ever program to provide military training for the
purpose of territorial defense.173 (Notably, a similar proposal to train Ukrainian forces in 2014 had
failed to secure sufficient EU member support).174 Statements by EU officials underline that Brussels
is seeking to expand its defense capabilities. “Europeans have been debating how to make the EU more
security-conscious, with a unity of purpose and capabilities to pursue its political goals on the world
stage,” then–High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice
President of the European Commission Josep Borrell Fontelles wrote in March 2022, noting “[w]e
have now arguably gone further down that path in the past weeks [since Russia’s full-scale invasion]
than we did in the past decade.”175
Likewise, the EU has taken a more active stance toward directing European defense research,
development, production, and procurement. Under the EU’s first-ever defense industrial strategy, the
European Commission is seeking to incentivize member countries to collaborate and to buy European,
setting the ambitious goal that at least 50 percent of member states’ procurement budgets by 2030
(and 60 percent by 2035) will go to EU-based suppliers.176 As member states’ assistance to Ukraine
has grown, and as European ammunition and equipment stocks have decreased, the EU has launched
new initiatives to facilitate common procurement and incentivize member states to invest in long-term
improvements in production capability, capacity, and resilience. In July 2022, the Commission put
forward a proposal for a new regulation establishing the European Defence Industry Reinforcement
Through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), which the European Parliament and Council
adopted in September and October that year and entered into force on October 27, 2023.177
Described by one analyst as a “test balloon,” EDIRPA represents an EU effort to use financial
incentives to help fill capability gaps revealed by the war while encouraging joint procurement and
promoting integration of the European defense industry.178 Similarly, European difficulties in meeting
Ukrainian requests for ammunition generated support for what became, in March 2023, the Act in
Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), an EU regulation “[a]imed at enabling ramp-up of
ammunition production capacity across Europe.”179

172
Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/338 of 28 February 2022 on an Assistance Measure Under the
European Peace Facility for the Supply to the Ukrainian Armed Forces of Military Equipment, and Platforms, Designed to Deliver
Lethal Force, February 28, 2022c.
173
Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués and Francesca Leso, “Geopolitical EU? The EU’s Wartime Assistance to Ukraine,” Journal of
Common Market Studies, April 17, 2024, p. 8.
174
As cited in footnote 7 in Johansson-Nogués and Leso, 2024, p. 134.
175
EEAS, “Europe in the Interregnum: Our Geopolitical Awakening After Ukraine,” March 24, 2022.
176
Sophia Besch, “Understanding the EU’s New Defense Industrial Strategy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
March 8, 2024.
177
Sebastian Clapp, European Defence Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), European
Parliamentary Research Service, PE 739.294, November 2023.
178
Sophia Besch, “EU Defense and the War in Ukraine,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 21, 2022.
179
European Commission, “ASAP: Boosting Defence Production,” webpage, undated-a.

38
 At the moment, both EDIRPA and ASAP are short-term funds, and analysts have suggested that
their budgets are insufficient to close existing capability gaps on their own.180 Yet these criticisms
should not detract from the fact that the initiatives themselves demonstrate how far member states’
attitudes toward Commission involvement in defense policy have shifted since the start of the Russia-
Ukraine war. Whereas prior EU attempts to coordinate members’ DIB policies were derailed by
allegations of institutional “overreach,” Brussels’ efforts to boost domestic production and encourage
joint procurement now enjoy widespread support among member states.181 Even after the 2014
Crimea crisis, countries like Poland, Estonia, and Finland remained skeptical of EU defense
procurement initiatives, which they alleged would benefit large defense firms concentrated in France,
Germany, or Italy at their own, smaller defense sectors’ expense.182 Yet since 2022, these same
countries have called on the EU to play a larger role in joint military procurement and defense
industry collaboration; even traditionally frugal states like Finland and Estonia went so far as to back
financing proposals that would require issuing common debt.183 A similar transformation is apparent
in Italy, where Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and her governing coalition, once considered
Euroskeptics, have emerged as vocal advocates for the EU to establish a strong common defense policy
and pursue novel financing solutions to support its new defense initiatives.184 “With these initiatives,”
one European analyst suggests, “the EU, conceived initially as a peace project, and technically
forbidden to directly procure or deliver defense equipment, is breaking internal taboos and pursuing a
new, creative approach to defense policy.”185
Yet the EU’s defense policies are dependent on the consent of its member states, which remain
divided over the benefits of delegating additional authorities to EU institutions and of expanding the
EU’s role in providing for collective security more generally. On the one hand, Europeans have
demonstrated a new unity and commitment to rebuilding European defense capacity, and they have
reached for EU tools to collectively tackle production and procurement challenges. On the other hand,
the war has demonstrated that the EU is unready to mount a strong military response when external
threats arise and is dependent on NATO and members’ national capabilities to provide for the
protection of its citizens.186 Even then, European militaries lack the requisite command and control,
strategic lift, sustainment, and other enabling capabilities required to project power and maintain

180
Ester Sabatino, “EU’s Grand Defence Industrial Plans Risks Fizzling for Lack of Money and Unclear Procedures,”
International Institute of Strategic Studies, March 18, 2024.
181
Aurélie Pugnet, “EU Defence Funding Plan Faces Uncertainty Ahead of Summit,” Euractiv, June 25, 2024; Aurélie Pugnet,
“EU Countries Team Up to Cancel Bloc’s Ammunition Production Boost Plan,” Euractiv, June 14, 2023; Sabatino, 2024.
182
Besch, 2022. Indeed, larger member states like Germany, France, Italy, and Spain “have been more successful than smaller
ones in securing particularly large amounts of [EU] funding, and the largest ones have also participated in multiple consortia over
time” (Francesco Giumelli and Marlene Marx, “The European Defence Fund Precursor Programmes and the State of the
European Market for Defence,” Defence Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2023).
183
Ben Hall and Richard Milne, “Hawkish Macron Finds Favour in NATO’s Frontline States,” Financial Times, March 30,
2024.
184
Leonard, 2024, p. 269. See, for example, Donato Paolo Mancini, “Italy’s Meloni Backs EU Bonds to Finance Defense
Investments,” Bloomberg, June 26, 2024.
185
Besch, 2022.
186
Jolyon Howorth, “The EU’s Chair Was Missing at the Ukraine Table,” European View, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2022; Mitchell A.
Orenstein, “The European Union’s Transformation After Russia’s Attack on Ukraine,” Journal of European Integration, Vol. 45,
No. 3, 2023, p. 335.

39
operations over time—let alone to lead and conduct large-scale multinational operations without the
United States.187 The UK’s withdrawal from the EU has exacerbated these shortfalls, although the
country has pursued greater defense cooperation with the Union since the start of the Russia-Ukraine
war.188 European difficulties in equipping Ukrainian armed forces while rebuilding their own
stockpiles have underlined the depth of existing production and capability shortfalls, raising doubts
about whether even the historic increase in defense spending since 2022 is sufficient to overcome these
gaps and meet new capability goals.189 Even as they have generally supported EU efforts to promote
defense cooperation, some frontline states in Northern and Eastern Europe have continued to express
concern that EU initiatives could alienate the United States or undermine concurrent efforts to
strengthen NATO.190 Indeed, Washington has raised concerns about perceived EU defense
protectionism and calls on Brussels to ensure EU efforts are “complementary to and interoperable
with NATO.”191
Moreover, meeting the EU’s ambitious objectives to increase member states’ investment in
European producers presents unwelcome challenges for its member states most concerned about the
Russian threat. The EU’s emphasis on building and buying European-origin systems requires member
states to spend their funds on long-term capacity improvements rather than acquiring foreign-origin
(often U.S.) systems that are either already available or are perceived as likely to deliver more quickly.
And indeed, one study based on Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data has suggested
that the war in Ukraine has increased member states’ reliance on non-EU suppliers that either can
provide off-the-shelf solutions or are perceived as faster and more predictable than European
producers.192 Between February 2022 and June 2023, more than three-quarters of EU member state
acquisitions were purchased outside the EU, with U.S. equipment representing 63 percent of

187
Colin Wall and John Christianson, Europe’s Missing Piece: The Case for Air Domain Enablers, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, April 2023; Ben Barry, Henry Boyd, Bastian Giegerich, Michael Gjerstad, James Hackett, Yohann Michel,
Ben Schreer, and Michael Tong, The Future of NATO ́s European Land Forces: Plans, Challenges, Prospects, International Institute
of Strategic Studies, June 2023; Sean Monaghan, Eskil Jakobsen, Sissy Martinez, Mathieu Droin, Greg Sanders, Nicholas
Velazquez, Cynthia Cook, Anna Dowd, and Maeve Sockwell, Is NATO Ready for War? An Assessment of Allies’ Efforts to
Strengthen Defense and Deterrence Since the 2022 Madrid Summit, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2024. The
EU has recognized many of these shortfalls; see European Defence Agency, The 2023 EU Capability Development Priorities,
2023a.
188
Luigi Scazzieri, EU-UK Co-Operation in Defence Capabilities After the War in Ukraine, Centre for European Reform and
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, June 2023.
189
See, for example, Aleksandar Djokic, “Europe’s Defence Dilemma: How Much More Money Needs to be Spent?” Euronews,
April 17, 2024; Daniel Michaels, “Europe Is Boosting Military Spending. It’s Still Not Enough,” Wall Street Journal, February
14, 2024; John Paul Rathbone, “European Defence Spending ‘Lacks Urgency,’” Financial Times, February 13, 2024; Sarah
White, “Dassault Chief Warns Europe’s Defence Industry Will Take Decades to Build,” Financial Times, March 6, 2024.
190
See, for example, “Poland’s Foreign-Policy Priorities in the East and in the EU,” Strategic Comments, Vol. 29, No. 3, May
2023; Republic of Estonia Government, Estonia’s European Union Policy Priorities 2023–2025, 2023.
191
White House, “U.S.-EU Summit Joint Statement,” October 20, 2023b. These conditions echo similar concerns raised
following the creation of PESCO. See Alexandra Brzozwski, “Question Marks over Third Country Participation in EU Military
Projects,” Euractiv, November 8, 2019b.
192
Anicetti, 2024, p. 451.

40
purchases.193 Countries like Poland, Czechia, and the Baltic states have stressed the importance of
building capability quickly over developing long-term continental production capacity.194
Given these limitations, there has been a marked shift in discussions of European autonomy; these
discussions have shifted away from creating European alternatives and instead moved toward building
“a more European NATO in Europe,” as then–Finnish President Sauli Niinistö stated in a national
address.195 “I am convinced that greater European strategic responsibility is the best way to reinforce
transatlantic solidarity,” explained Vice President Fontelles, “It is not either EU or NATO: It is both
EU and NATO.”196 In adopting the Strategic Compass, the European Council sidestepped the debate
over strategic autonomy by committing to both “reinforce” cooperation with NATO and “boost”
partnerships with the United States and other like-minded nations while recognizing that “wider
geopolitical trends call for the EU to shoulder a greater share of responsibility for its own security.”197
Although the strategy aims to “make the EU a stronger and more capable security provider” and
proposed the creation of a new EU Rapid Deployment Capability for rescue, evacuation, and the
“initial phase of stabilization operations,” it does not provide clear guidance on when or how the EU
could conduct military operations independently and does not provide additional guidance on
implementing the EU’s mutual defense assistance clause.198 EU statements and documents published
since 2022 have similarly stressed the importance of developing complementary capabilities and
policies with NATO, as well as continued cooperation with the United States.199
Compared with its prewar rhetoric, even France has moderated its criticism of NATO and
reframed EU security initiatives as complements, rather than alternatives, to the transatlantic alliance.
For Paris, the war has dispelled hopes of establishing a modus vivendi with Moscow and reinforced
the importance of fostering European strategic autonomy to deter, rather than pursue, limited
cooperation with Russia.200 In March 2022, President Macron declared the invasion of Ukraine the
“start of a new era” necessitating a “renewed European effort to reduce its dependence on other
continents and to be able to decide for itself.”201 That October, France took a symbolic step toward
realizing its vision for a pan-European security framework when 44 regional leaders, including both
non-EU and non-NATO states, gathered for the first meeting of the European Political
Community.202 Yet, as the war in Ukraine has continued, French officials have adopted a new stance

193
Besch, 2024.
194
Anicetti, 2024, p. 444.
195
Sauli Niinistö , “New Year’s Speech,” transcript, President of the Republic of Finland, January 1, 2024. For similar statements
by a former Secretary General of the European Parliament, see Klaus Welle, Secretary General, European Parliament, transcript
of interview with Alfredo Marini, Wilfried Martin Centre for European Studies, November 22, 2023.
196
EEAS, 2022.
197
Council of the European Union, 2022e, p. 4.
198
Council of the European Union, 2022d; Koenig, 2022, p. 5.
199
See, for example Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation by the President of the European Council, the President of
the European Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, signed at Brussels, Belgium,
January 10, 2023.
200
David Cadier, “France and Central Europe Are Converging on Security,” Carnegie Europe, February 27, 2024.
201
Emmanuel Macron, “Address to the Nation,” transcript of address, Élysée, March 2, 2022.
202
Laurence Norman, “European Leaders Hold Summit to Test Out a Larger Political Community,” Wall Street Journal,
October 6, 2022.

41
that stresses the importance of strengthening NATO by promoting greater unity of effort with the
EU.203
Moreover, European members have dedicated new political attention and resources to realizing
NATO’s collective security aims. In what NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg described as
amounting to “the biggest overhaul [of] our collective defense since the end of the Cold War,” allies
agreed at the June 2022 Madrid Summit to approve a new strategic concept and accelerate
implementation of DDA by building more forward-deployed combat formations, increasing the
readiness of NATO and national forces, and prepositioning more equipment, among other initiatives
(see Table 3.2).204 Concurrently, NATO’s new strategic concept has sought to reassert forward
defense as the primary organizing principle for the alliance’s defense strategy, posture, and planning, a
point underlined by NATO officials’ repeated statements that the Alliance will defend “every inch” of
its territory.205 In 2023, allies continued the momentum by approving a new family of strategic,
regional, and domain deterrence and defense plans and recharacterizing the 2 percent standard as a
“minimum” target.206 As prior RAND analysis has noted, the regional plans “change NATO’s
approach from forward presence to forward defense,” in a step toward realizing the Alliance’s pledge
to “protect every inch of NATO territory.”207
European member support has enabled NATO to reassert its status as the continent’s preeminent
security framework. Since 2022, allies have certified the combat readiness of eight forward-deployed
battlegroups, strengthened existing air and sea missions, and begun to realize their commitment to
exercise emerging capabilities by convening Steadfast Defender, the largest NATO military exercise
since the end of the Cold War.208
Yet implementing the new regional plans and realizing the Alliance’s other ambitions may take
years, if not decades. Delivering DDA objectives requires revising SACEUR’s authorities to activate
and deploy NATO forces precrisis. Although SACEUR can now initiate “enhanced vigilance
activities” in the context of heightened tensions, reaching further agreement on whether and how to
revise existing crisis authorities and transfer of authority protocols will likely require protracted
negotiations to overcome allies’ differing national preferences and risk tolerances.209 Although Finland

203
See, for example, Maïa De La Baume and Pauline De Saint Remy, “War in Ukraine Is ‘Electroshock’ for NATO, Says
Emmanuel Macron,” Politico, March 17, 2022; Ministère de L’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères, “EU-NATO—France
Welcomes the Strengthening of EU-NATO Ties,” January 11, 2023; Cadier, 2024.
204
Jens Stoltenberg, transcript of doorstep statement delivered at 2022 NATO Summit, North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
June 29, 2022b; NATO, “Madrid Summit Declaration,” press release, June 29, 2022.
205
NATO “Madrid Summit Declaration Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in Madrid 29 June 2022,” press release, June 29, 2022, updated July 22, 2022j; NATO, “Vilnius Summit
Communiqué Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
Vilnius 11 July 2023,” press release, July 11, 2023; NATO, 2024g.
206
NATO, 2023.
207
Marta Kepe, “From Forward Presence to Forward Defense: NATO’s Defense of the Baltics,” RAND Blog, February 14,
2024.
208
Monaghan et al., 2024.
209
David A. Ochmanek, Anna M. Dowd, Stephen J. Flanagan, Andrew R. Hoehn, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Michael J. Lostumbo,
and Michael J. Mazarr, Inflection Point: How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence, RAND
Corporation, RR-A2555-1, 2023, p. 154.

42
and Sweden have a long history of military cooperation with the Alliance and were assessed to be more
interoperable with NATO than some existing members, it will take time to fully integrate the new
members into the alliance.210

Table 3.2. Timeline of Major NATO Enhancements, 2022–2024

Date Initiative
February 2022 • NATO Response Force activated for the first time.
• Highest-readiness element began deployment to Romania.
March 2022 • Allies announced plans to establish four additional enhanced Forward Presence (eFP)
multinational battlegroups in Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria to “reinforce
Allied deterrence and defense.”
May 2022 • The first of NATO’s new eFPs were established in Romania.
• Finland and Sweden submitted applications to join NATO.
June 2022 • Allies agreed to transition to a New NATO Force Model composed of three tiers of
forces held at graduated readiness, ranging from 10 to 180 days, to well over 300,000
personnel; to scale up existing multinational battlegroups to brigade-sized formations;
and to pre-position military equipment, stockpiles, and facilities in frontline countries.
• A new strategic concept was adopted.
October 2022 • Allies established a Resilience Committee, a senior advisory body responsible for
establishing strategy, policy, planning guidance, and coordination of national and
NATO resilience and civilian preparedness initiatives. It reports directly to the NAC.
February 2023 • A new initiative to strengthen space-based surveillance and intelligence for the
Alliance was announced.
April 2023 • Finland became the Alliance’s 31st member upon depositing its instrument of
accession to the North Atlantic Treaty with the U.S. Mission in Brussels.
June 2023 • 25 allied and partner countries concluded exercise Air Defender 2023, the largest
multinational air force deployment in NATO history.
July 2023 • Allies approved the first comprehensive NATO defense plans since the end of the
Cold War.
• The Allied Reaction Force was established.
• Improvements to NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence posture were
announced.
• The headquarters of Multinational Division North in Ādaži, Latvia, declared full
operational capability.
September 2023 • NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy was selected as the Allied Reaction Force’s
interim headquarters.
October 2023 • Multinational Battle Group Slovakia was awarded combat-ready status.
January 2024 • Steadfast Defender 2024, a five-month exercise involving 90,000 forces from all 32
allied nations, began; it marked NATO’s largest exercise since the Cold War.
March 2024 • Sweden became the Alliance’s 32nd member upon depositing its instrument of
accession to the North Atlantic Treaty with the U.S. government in Washington, D.C.
• Headquarters Multinational Division Northeast in Elbląg, Poland, declared full

210
Nicholas Fiorenza and Andrew MacDonald, “Milestone: Sweden Joins NATO,” Janes, March 19, 2024.

43
Date Initiative
operational capability.
• The Latvian Military Base at Lielvārde was activated as the third NATO base to host
allied fighter detachments conducting the Baltic Air Policing mission.
May 2024 • The newly established Maritime Centre for Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure
reached initial operational capability.
July 2024 • Allies agreed to an Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge to strengthen transatlantic
defense industrial cooperation and restock arsenals amid continued Ukrainian need.
• NATO announced plans to establish NATO Security Assistance and Training for
Ukraine (NSATU) to plan, coordinate, and arrange delivery of security assistance.
• Allied Air Command declared a new U.S. ballistic missile defense site in Poland,
dubbed “Aegis Ashore,” operational.
• A new Allied Reaction Force stood up to replace the NATO Response Force and
provide the SACEUR with all-domain rapidly deployable forces.
SOURCES: Features information from Monaghan et al., 2024; Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Public
Affairs Office, “NATO Allies Send Reinforcements to the Eastern Flank,” Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe, March 13, 2022; Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Public Affairs Office, “NATO Allies Complete
Largest Multinational Air Force Deployment in NATO History,” Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, June 27,
2023; Tod D. Wolters, transcript of statement on the activation of the NATO Response Force, Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe, February 25, 2022; Allied Air Command Public Affairs Office, “Latvian Air Base Becomes Third
NATO Air Policing Base in the Baltic Sea Region,” Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, March 2, 2024;
NATO, “Allied Leaders Adopt New NATO Defence Industrial Pledge,” July 10, 2024, updated July 11, 2024e; NATO,
“NATO Missile Defence Base in Poland Now Mission Ready,” July 10, 2024d; Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe Public Affairs Office, “Stand Up of Allied Reaction Force Marks a New Era for NATO,” Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe, July 1, 2024.

The more substantial challenge facing allies, however, remains how to translate new political
commitment into lasting improvements in allied force structure and capabilities. Prior research has
found that NATO capability gaps extend across domains and include shortfalls in naval forces, air
enablers, air defense, and “battle-decisive ammunition.”211 Although the creation of eight reinforced
battalions represents a sizable improvement over prewar baselines, the achievement pales in
comparison with the NATO force model’s objective of establishing 100 land brigades, 1,400 combat
aircraft, and 250 large surface ships and submarines at high readiness.212
Germany’s challenges are illustrative of the barriers European countries will need to surmount to
meet national, EU, or NATO capability objectives. For Germany to continue meeting the 2 percent
threshold, for example, Berlin will need to either create a new special fund or increase the annual
defense budget—projected to be €52 billion in 2024—by an estimated €20–35 billion, a prospect that
would in turn likely require revising the country’s constitutional limit on defense expenditures.213
Under pressure to fund other priorities, including the net zero energy transition, and constrained by
Germany’s constitutional debt limit for defense expenditures, German political leaders are divided

211
Monaghan et al., 2024; Barry et al., 2023.
212
Wojciech Lorenz, “NATO Regional Defence Plans Key to Credibility of Deterrence,” Polish Institute of International
Affairs, September 26, 2023.
213
Wieder, 2024; Jana Puglierin, “Turning Point or Turning Back: German Defence Policy After Zeitenwende,” European
Council on Foreign Relations, March 19, 2024.

44
over how to replace the current fund. The decision will likely be postponed until after the 2025
election.214
Even if a budget solution is reached, German military leaders and parliamentarians caution that
the Bundeswehr is unlikely to meet the initial goal of ensuring the military’s combat readiness by
decade’s end.215 Although nearly 70 percent of the special fund has already been allocated, the majority
of orders will not be delivered until the late 2020s.216 Even then, German defense analysts estimate
that the majority of current spending will cover fixed costs, with an additional €100 billion of spending
required by 2028 to address major inventory shortfalls.217 Then there remains the problem of manning
an expanded force. In 2023, the Bundeswehr shrunk as retirements and resignations outpaced
recruitment efforts.218 After a more ambitious plan to reestablish compulsory service encountered
opposition from military leaders and left-leaning elements of the governing coalition, German officials
announced in 2024 the country would soon reintroduce a “selective form of military service based on a
voluntary principle but containing obligatory elements if necessary.”219
Governments across Europe are confronting similar challenges. Despite increased defense
spending, Czechia, France, Italy, Romania, the UK, and other countries have missed recruiting targets
since 2022 and seen the overall size of their militaries shrink, continuing a trend begun before 2013.220
In an effort to recruit more forces and boost retention, they have offered new retention and
conscription incentives that increase overall personnel costs and could divert resources from other
readiness and modernization initiatives.221 To address their force deficit, other countries like the
Netherlands and Denmark are considering easing standards or implementing new forms of
conscription.222 Poland, which expects to meet its recruitment goals for 2024 early as it seeks to
effectively double the size of the land forces, may be an exception, although the extent of its planned
growth and modernization in and of themselves poses an array of challenges.223
European capitals also continue to disagree over the best way to implement proposals to increase
cooperation and bolster European defenses. France’s advocacy of an increasingly assertive policy

214
Sabine Siebold and Maria Martinez, “Infighting over Budget Imperils Germany’s Defence Upgrade,” Reuters, June 10, 2024.
215
Siebold and Martinez, 2024.
216
Wieder, 2024.
217
Siebold and Martinez, 2024.
218
Laura Kayali and Joshua Posaner, “Europe’s Soldiers Keep Quitting, Just When NATO Needs Them,” Politico, March 18,
2024.
219
Guy Chazan and Sam Jones, “Germany to Launch Limited Military Service in Push to Be ‘War Ready,’” Financial Times, June
12, 2024.
220
Sam Jones and John Paul Rathbone, “Wanted: New Soldiers for Europe’s Shrinking Armies,” Financial Times, June 25, 2024.
221
Kayali and Posaner, 2024; Michael Kahn, “Eastern Europe’s Armies Struggle to Enlist Young People with War Not Far
Away,” Reuters, August 9, 2024.
222
Jones and Rathbone, 2024.
223
In July 2024, the Polish government raised recruitment limits for 2024 to 44,550 because it expected to meet an original
34,550 target by the end of the third quarter of the year (Wojciech Kubik, “Więcej Polaków pójdzie w kamasze. MON szykuje
zmianę przepisów,” Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, May 31, 2024; Rada Ministrów, Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 17 lipca
2024 r. zmieniające rozporządzenie w sprawie określenia liczby osób, które w 2024 r. mogą być powołane do czynnej służby wojskowej,
oraz liczby osób, które mogą pełnić służbę wojskową w rezerwie w ramach odbywania ćwiczeń wojskowych, Sejm of the Republic of
Poland, July 23, 2024). For discussion of challenges, see Robert Czulda, Poland’s Military Modernisation—Still Many
Challenges Ahead,” Casimir Pulaski Foundation, March 6, 2023.

45
toward Russia has brought the country closer with Poland and other Eastern European states, even as
it has placed the country out of step with Germany’s priority of averting further escalation. French and
German leaders have traded barbs over the adequacy of the other’s military support and the prospect
of committing ground forces to Ukraine.224 France, on one side, and Germany, Poland, and the Baltics
on the other have also publicly quarreled over the extent to which European countries should
prioritize investments in the European DIB over the speed of procurement, with France disapproving
of decisions to procure U.S.-, Israel-, and South Korea–origin equipment.225
In contrast to the period 2014–2022, Southern European countries generally have accepted, even
supported, efforts to prioritize the Russian threat to the EU and NATO. Yet as the war in Ukraine
has continued, some member states have begun to raise concerns that the EU’s Southern
neighborhood could become underfunded, and they have pushed for reassurances that frameworks
like the EPF will be used “in a manner that preserves the global geographical scope of the Facility.”226
Concerns about the United States’ long-term commitments to Europe remain high, driven both
by evidence of protectionist movements within the United States and European countries’ heightened
awareness of their dependence on U.S. security contributions. European leaders reacted strongly to a
statement by then–U.S. President Donald Trump claiming that he would, if re-elected, “encourage”
Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” to any NATO members who did not spend enough on
defense.227 Likewise, delays in funding for U.S. military assistance to Ukraine have raised concerns
that congressional opponents could restrict any future president’s ability to deliver on security
obligations.228 At the fourth summit of the European Political Community in July 2024, UK and EU
leaders from across the continent “discussed how Europe can muster the unity and military muscle to
check Russian aggression and keep Ukraine afloat” should the United States reduce its role on the
continent.229

Conclusion
In her State of the Union address in September 2023, President of the European Commission
Ursula von der Leyen declared that the world had “seen the birth of a geopolitical Union – supporting
Ukraine, standing up to Russia’s aggression, responding to an assertive China and investing in
partnerships.”230 Indeed, the Russia-Ukraine war has created a new consensus among European

224
Philippe Ricard and Thomas Wieder, “On Ukraine, France and Germany Can’t Agree to Speak with One Voice,” Le Monde,
March 11, 2024.
225
Besch, 2022.
226
Łukasz Maślanka, “An EU War Chest: The Success and Uncertain Future of the European Peace Facility,” Centre For
Eastern Studies [Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich], July 10, 2023.
227
Kate Sullivan, “Trump Says He Would Encourage Russia to ‘Do Whatever the Hell They Want’ to Any NATO Country
That Doesn’t Pay Enough,” CNN, February 11, 2024; “Trump’s NATO Remarks Met with Biden, EU Backlash,” Deutsche
Welle, February 11, 2024.
228
Giovanna De Maio and Célia Belin, “Europe’s America Problem,” Foreign Affairs, August 23, 2024; Jill Lawless, “European
Leaders Discuss Ukraine, Concerns About Direction of U.S. at U.K. Summit,” PBS News, July 18, 2024.
229
Laurence Norman and Max Colchester, “Prospect of Trump’s Return Hangs over European Security Summit,” Wall Street
Journal, July 18, 2024.
230
Ursula von der Leyen, “2023 State of the Union Address,” September 13, 2023.

46
countries over the need to rebuild European defenses and cooperate in strengthening collective defense
capabilities and institutions. The war has highlighted the scale of existing capability gaps and spurred
sustained increases in European spending on a scale not observed since the end of the Cold War.
Europe’s awakening has created an opportunity for the EU to assert greater influence and leverage its
regulatory powers to shape European defense cooperation, particularly by creating incentives for joint
production and procurement.
Table 3.3 summarizes several novel elements of the European response to the war and compares
them with a preconflict baseline. The war has not spurred the development of new defense concepts or
the creation of an alternative architecture for the defense of Europe. Likewise, even as Europeans have
affirmed the need to build resilience and develop greater indigenous capacity, no unifying vision to
achieve greater strategic autonomy has emerged. Europeans remain divided over the extent to which
they should pursue defense policies independently of the United States, even as they agree that U.S.
commitments cannot be assumed indefinitely. In practice, however, a general awareness that even the
largest and most capable European militaries likely will continue to struggle to respond to external
challenges without significant U.S. assistance has contributed to a general reticence to investment in
defense policies that could be perceived as supplanting NATO prerogatives or that might alienate
Washington. The EU has relied primarily on existing frameworks, institutions, and funding
mechanisms, in part because member states have coalesced around the idea that the EU should seek to
complement NATO-led defense initiatives. As a result, any European movement to pursue
operational or strategic autonomy from the United States is likely to be limited.

Table 3.3. Summary of Trends in European Autonomy Concepts and Policies

2014–2021 2022–August 2024

Declared stance • The EU recognized the need to • The EU declared Russia a “long-term
improve its ability to “act and direct threat.”
autonomously.” • The NATO Strategic Concept
• European NATO members pledged identified Russia as “the most
greater responsibility sharing. significant and direct threat.”
• France’s push to de-emphasize
NATO gained little support.
Policies and • NATO issued new authorities and • Defense spending has surpassed
resources strategic concepts, but low spending projections.
limited capability gains. • Divisions occurred over whether to
• EU attention waned after the 2014– prioritize procurement speed or
2017 push to improve defense indigenous production.
production and cooperation. • The EU asserted a greater role in
coordinating national defense policy
but has not enacted structural
reforms.
SOURCE: Features information from Council of the European Union, 2022e; NATO, 2022d.

These limitations should not, however, obscure the significance of changes in European defense
policy since 2022. Driven by change in attitudes toward Russia, fears of the prospect of an expansion
of the war in Ukraine or future Russian recidivism, as well as the realization of the scale and severity of

47
European defense shortfalls, European capitals have mobilized to enact historic increases in defense
spending and begin constructing the policies, institutions, and funding mechanisms required to sustain
their rearmament, promote integration and cooperation, and advance the capabilities required to
mount a collective defense.

48
Chapter 4

Will Europe Accelerate Ukraine’s

Integration?

The war in Ukraine has compelled European countries to reconsider the region’s boundaries and
its relations with former Soviet republics like Ukraine that have not been fully integrated into the
political or security architecture. Whereas Ukrainian attitudes toward the EU and NATO have
fluctuated since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia’s full-scale invasion has decisively shifted
the country in a pro-European and pro-Western direction. Since 2022, Ukrainian leaders have sought
to reaffirm Ukraine’s European identity and pushed for rapid accession into the EU and NATO.231 At
the same time, the conflict has dramatically underscored Russia’s opposition to Ukraine’s integration
and elevated the stakes of any European decision.
Has the war changed European attitudes toward Ukraine’s place within the European security
architecture? In this chapter, we examine the war’s consequences for Ukraine’s relations with the EU
and NATO and assess the implications for the country’s integration into the existing European
security architecture. Although other institutions like the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe exercise significant influence over the regional order, the EU and NATO remain the two
foremost organizations responsible for managing collective economic, political, and security issues.
Since their formation, the EU and NATO have operated as drivers of Europe’s continued economic,
social, and military integration and, after 1991, re-integration. By extension, examining their changing
relations with Ukraine can provide insight into European attitudes on how best to promote stability
and security in the broader region.

Prewar Positions
Deliberations over Ukraine’s integration into European institutions well preceded the current
conflict. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany, the
European community embarked, in concert with the United States, on a program to reform and
enlarge the EU and NATO. Through political, economic, and, in the case of NATO, military
integration, the United States and its European allies sought to encourage post-communist states to
implement democratic and economic reforms that might foster stability and growth along Europe’s
eastern flank.232 During the 1990s, the EU enacted treaty, budgetary, and policy reforms to prepare for

231
See, for example, “Ukraine’s Zelenskiy Issues Fresh Plea for Patriots, EU Accession, NATO Entry,” Reuters, April 28, 2024.
232
An assessment of whether NATO and EU enlargement contributed to the current conflict is beyond the scope of this study.

49
enlargement and, in 2004, welcomed ten new Central, Eastern, and Southern European members.233
Concurrently, NATO underwent two waves of enlargement and established the Membership Action
Plan (MAP), a mechanism to help aspiring members prepare for admission without prejudging their
eligibility or committing to their accession.234
With their expansion eastward and southward, the EU and NATO gained new neighbors and
confronted new questions about how to engage post-Soviet states like Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova
that Russia considered part of its historical zone of influence.235 In July 1994, Ukraine became the first
former Soviet republic to sign a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, which
established an institutional framework for the relationship that included regular ministerial-level
meetings, parliamentary exchanges, and working-level committees tasked with issues spanning from
nuclear nonproliferation to legal reforms and economic development.236 Although Ukrainian popular
support for NATO and EU accession remained mixed, the Ukrainian government in 1996 declared
its intent to pursue full membership in the EU and began to explore legislative reforms required to
align with EU standards.237
Despite Ukrainian overtures, EU officials and member states harbored reservations about bringing
Ukraine into the bloc. In 1999, the EU upgraded its relations with Ukraine by publishing a Common
Strategy to strengthen the “strategic partnership” and define prerequisites for “Ukraine’s successful
integration into the European economy [that] will also help Ukraine assert its European identity.”238
Yet Ukraine’s democratic regression over the late 1990s and early 2000s raised concerns that the
country was unready to implement the political and economic reforms required to meet the formal
criteria for membership. Some members also worried that the large, populous, but relatively poor
country would absorb a significant portion of the EU’s development funds, diverting resources from
other members and restricting funding for other priorities.239 As part of a broader program to stabilize
neighboring countries and stave off crises that might spill over its borders, the EU continued to
encourage reforms that might help Ukraine and other former Soviet countries Georgia and Moldova
evolve into credible candidates for membership. It settled on a policy of “integration, not accession”

233
Finland and Sweden jointed NATO in 2023 and 2024, respectively. An earlier wave of enlargement had occurred in 1995
with the accession of Austria. Poland, Czechia, and Hungary joined in 1999, and Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia joined in 2004.
234
NATO, “Membership Action Plan (MAP) Approved by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of
the North Atlantic Council,” press release, April 24, 1999, as updated July 27, 2012.
235
Radin and Reach, 2017.
236
European Commission, “EU/Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement,” June 21, 1994.
237
Paul Kubicek, “The European Union and Democratization in Ukraine,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 38, No.
2, 2005, pp. 275–276; Roman Solchanyk, Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
2000, p. 94. Throughout this period, elite and popular sentiments toward both the notion of European identity and EU
membership remained divided (Stephen White, Ian McAllister, and Valentina Feklyunina, “Belarus, Ukraine and Russia: East or
West?” British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 12, No. 3, August 2010).
238
European Council, European Council Common Strategy on Ukraine, December 11, 1999.
239
Kubicek, 2005, p. 283.

50
that left open the possibility of eventual membership negotiations but did not commit the bloc to a
specific path.240
European members were similarly divided over whether to extend an invitation for Ukraine to
participate in NATO’s MAP. Although the United States reportedly debated admitting the country
to the Alliance as early as 1993, NATO had generally settled on a policy of engagement without
membership intended to enable discussions and cooperation with Ukraine on major security issues of
mutual concern, such as the presence of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil, and demonstrate the
principle that any democratic European state should be free to choose its affiliation, but without
committing to a path that might further isolate Russia.241 In 1994, Ukraine became the fifth country
to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, and in 1997, the Alliance established mechanisms
like the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the
International Peacekeeping and Security Centre in Yavoriv, and the NATO Information and
Documentation Center in Kyiv to promote cooperation and understanding of the Alliance’s purpose,
activities, and requirements for membership.242 In addition to its active participation in Partnership
for Peace activities, Ukraine formed and deployed a combined Ukrainian-Polish peacekeeping
battalion to Kosovo and, in 2000, hosted Cooperative Partner, the then–largest ever exercise of
NATO and partner forces held in a former Soviet state.243 But even after two additional rounds of
NATO enlargement in 2004 and 2008 pushed the Alliance’s boundaries to Ukraine’s borders, many
European countries—France and Germany, in particular—harbored reservations about Ukraine’s
ability to meet membership requirements and the potential negative ramifications for ongoing efforts
to improve relations with Russia.244 Although many new Central and Eastern European allies joined
the United States in arguing for consideration of Ukraine, NATO settled on a compromise
solution.245 At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, the Alliance recognized Ukraine and Georgia’s “Euro-

240
Commission of the European Communities, Wider Europe—Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern
and Southern Neighbours, March 11, 2003; Gwendolym Sasse, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited
for the EU’s Eastern Neighbours,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 2, March 2008.
241
M. E. Sarotte, Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate, Yale University Press, 2021, p. 160.
242
Rebecca R. Moore, “Ukraine’s Bid to Join NATO: Re-Evaluating Enlargement in a New Strategic Context,” in James
Goldgeier and Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, eds., Evaluating NATO Enlargement: From Cold War Victory to the Russia-Ukraine
War, Palgrave Macmillan, February 25, 2023. See also: Partnership and Co-operation Agreement Between the European
Communities and Their Member States, June 14, 1994.
243
Stephen White, Julia Korosteleva, and Roy Allison, “NATO: The View from the East,” European Security, Vol. 15, No. 2,
2006, pp. 170–171. Ten NATO and six partner countries participated in the military exercise. Russia also attended as an
observer.
244
Two of Ukraine’s neighbors (Romania and Slovakia) joined NATO in 2004, while Poland and Hungary joined in 1999. The
Partnership for Peace program offers participants a path for membership but neither commits partners to pursue this option nor
guarantees their accession. NATO, “Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document,” March 27, 2024a; NATO,
“Partnership for Peace: Invitation Document Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the
North Atlantic Council,” press release, January 11, 1994. On opposition to Ukrainian membership in NATO, see Dušica
Lazarević, “NATO Enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia: Old Wine in New Bottles?” Connections, Vol. 9, No. 1, Winter 2009,
p. 45. For examples of Russian threats, see Vladimir Putin, transcript of speech delivered at the Munich Security Conference,
President of Russia, February 10, 2007; Luke Harding, “Putin Issues Nuclear Threat to Ukraine over Plan to Host US Shield,”
The Guardian, February 13, 2008.
245
Łukasz Jureńczyk, “Poland’s Support for Ukraine’s Aspirations to NATO Membership,” Security: Theory and Practice
[Bezpieczeństwo: Teoria i Praktyka], No. 3, 2023; Lazarević, 2009, pp. 45–46.

51
Atlantic aspirations,” and issued an unprecedented declaration that the countries would become
members in the unspecified future but declined to offer a MAP.246
The events of 2013 and 2014 tested the feasibility of continuing to encourage Ukraine’s cultural,
economic, and political alignment with Europe without providing a path to formal membership into
European economic or security institutions. First, the Euromaidan revolution, which erupted in
response to then–Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision not to sign a political association
and free trade agreement with the EU focused political attention within Ukraine and internationally
on the country’s relations with Europe. The Russian annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Donbas
strained the notion that the EU and NATO could promote stability in countries outside their borders
and heightened anxieties about Russia’s aspirations in the common neighborhood. At the same time,
the crises moved Ukraine to take a more assertive stance toward membership in both organizations. In
2014, the new Ukrainian coalition government signaled that securing an Association Agreement with
the EU and a path to membership in NATO were its top foreign policy priorities.247 “There is no
alternative to Euro-Atlantic integration,” then–Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko declared
following a 2014 parliamentary vote to end Ukraine’s nonaligned status.248 In 2017, President
Poroshenko announced Ukraine would seek a MAP with the ambition of fulfilling the Alliance’s
criteria by 2020.249 Two years later, a constitutional amendment codified Ukrainian accession to the
EU and NATO as a strategic goal.250
The EU responded by increasing engagement with Ukraine but resisted the pressure to reconsider
the country’s readiness for membership. In a demonstration of solidarity with Ukraine, the EU
expanded its financial and technical assistance to the country, increasing spending beyond the levels
previously established for other nonmember states.251 In a reflection of the new scale and breadth of
the assistance provided, the EU Commission in 2014 established the Support Group for Ukraine, a
novel organization of EU and national officials tasked with mediating between Kyiv and Brussels and
coordinating EU, national, and international activities.252 As prior analysis has noted, the Support
Group for Ukraine had the secondary effect of building institutional knowledge about Ukraine;
fostering new connections among the EU, Ukraine, and European donor countries; and mobilizing
political support for reform within and outside Ukraine.253

246
NATO, “Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008,” press release, April 3, 2008, updated July 5, 2022i.
247
David M. Herszenhorn, “Facing Russian Threat, Ukraine Halts Plans for Deals with E.U.,” New York Times, November 21,
2013.
248
Michael Birnbaum, “Ukraine Parliament Votes to Take Step Toward NATO, Angering Russia,” Washington Post, December
23, 2014.
249
“Poroshenko: Ukraine Seeking NATO Membership Action Plan,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 10, 2018.
250
“Ukraine President Signs Amendment on NATO, EU Membership,” Associated Press, February 19, 2019.
251
For a comparison, see Kataryna Wolczuk and Darius Žeruolis, Rebuilding Ukraine: An Assessment of EU Assistance, Chatham
House, August 2018, pp. 8–10.
252
Wolczuk and Žeruolis, 2018, pp. 11–14; Kataryna Wolczuk, “State Building and European Integration in Ukraine,”
Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 60, No. 6, 2019.
253
Maryna Rabinovych and Anne Pintsch, “From the 2014 Annexation of Crimea to the 2022 Russian War on Ukraine: Path
Dependence and Socialization in the EU-Ukraine Relations,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 62, No. 5, September
2024; Antoaneta L. Dimitrova and Rilka Dragneva, “How the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Its Consequences
Necessitated Adaptation and Drove Innovation in the EU,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 61, No. 6, November 2023.

52
 In addition to enacting these stabilization measures, the EU also took steps toward greater
political association and economic integration. Under the Association Agreement signed in 2014, the
EU recognized Ukraine as a European country; committed the parties to strengthening political,
economic, and legal cooperation; and established a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area as well
as regular ministerial, expert, and presidential summit meetings.254 Unlike the 1994 Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement, which identified areas for cooperation to promote Ukrainian reforms, the
EU now provided for direct technical assistance in designing and implementing the country’s
reforms.255 Over the following years, the EU reduced tariffs on Ukrainian industrial and agricultural
goods, extended macrofinancial and humanitarian assistance, and provided technical support for
public administration reforms and state capacity building programs.256 Accordingly, trade between the
EU and Ukraine grew steadily (see Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1. European Union-Ukraine Trade Balance, 2013–2022

EU Imports EU Exports

30,000

25,000
Value in Millions (Euros)

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
SOURCE: Adapted from European Commission, European Union, Trade in Goods with Ukraine, May 16, 2024c.

Even as the EU and member states sought to deepen economic and political relations with
Ukraine, the bloc continued to deflect the question of eventual Ukrainian membership. The instability
in Ukraine, which followed closely on the heels of crises in Libya, Syria, and Iraq, as well as the
emerging migrant crisis, strained the EU’s capacity and cohesion. Russia’s increased assertiveness also
heightened EU member states’ sense of insecurity and contributed to a widespread perception that the
bloc’s policy toward neighboring countries was ill-suited to the challenges it now faced.257 As former

254
EEAS, “EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: ‘Quick Guide to the Association Agreement,’” undated-b.
255
For the limits of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, see Paul J. Kubicek, “The European Union and Ukraine: Real
Partners or Relationship of Convenience?” in Paul J. Kubicek, ed., The European Union and Democratization, Routledge, 2003, p.
156.
256
For the EU’s efforts to tie state building and European integration after 2014, see Wolczuk, 2019.
257
Mark Furness, Thomas Henökl, and Tobias Schumacher, “Crisis, Coordination and Coherence: European Decision-Making
and the 2015 European Neighbourhood Policy Review,” European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 24, No. 4, December 2019,

53
Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt remarked, the union’s “ring of friends” had become a “ring of
fire.”258 The overall effect was a reduction in the EU’s ambitions. After a period of enlargement
followed by indecision, a 2015 EU review of the bloc’s European Neighbourhood Policy outlined a
narrower model for engaging countries like Ukraine in which the EU and member states would focus
on addressing core interests related to stability and security, such as border control and
counterterrorism, while reducing cooperation on previous priorities like democratic reforms.259
The events of 2014 also highlighted the sharp distinction between NATO and non-NATO
members. As discussed in Chapter 2, member states disagreed over whether Russia presented an
active threat to Europe, as well as over whether and how to maintain some level of engagement with
Russia. Although NATO officials continued to identify Ukraine as a “valued partner” and repeatedly
characterized Russia’s actions as a “fundamental challenge” to the Alliance’s “goal of a Euro-Atlantic
region whole, free, and at peace,” they quickly clarified that NATO defense obligations did not extend
to partner countries.260 Instead, NATO deepened its engagement with Ukraine after 2014 with a
focus on bolstering the country’s capacity to withstand external and internal threats independently.
Among the new initiatives unveiled during the 2014 Wales Summit were a package of programs
intended to strengthen the ability of Partnership for Peace countries like Ukraine to defend
themselves against external threats and to work alongside NATO forces.261 Working through
established frameworks like Ukraine’s Annual National Programme and new mechanisms like the
Comprehensive Assistance Package, which was established in 2016, NATO also sought to increase
joint training and exercises and establish new linkages with the Ukrainian defense and security sector,
with the ultimate objectives of building Ukrainian capability, encouraging defense and security sector
reforms, and improving interoperability with NATO forces.262
Although some member states—Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, in particular—pressed
for greater support to Ukraine, entanglement concerns meant both NATO and the EU limited their
assistance to nonlethal defense capabilities.263 For example, the EU declined a Ukrainian request to
provide an armed police mission in the Donbas region and, instead, established the European Union
Advisory Mission to advise and train the country’s civilian security sector and build local capacity.264
However, growing interaction with Ukraine, combined with continued Ukrainian requests for
membership, did lead NATO to clarify its stance on Ukrainian membership. In June 2021, NATO

pp. 449–450, 456–457; Nikki Ikani, “Change and Continuity in the European Neighbourhood Policy: The Ukraine Crisis as a
Critical Juncture,” Geopolitics, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2019, p. 24.
258
Carl Bildt, “Europe Surrounded Not by a Ring of Friends—but by a Ring of Fire,” Statesman Laureate Lecture delivered at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 29, 2015.
259
European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Review of the
European Neighbourhood Policy, November 18, 2015.
260
Moore, 2023, p. 383.
261
NATO, 2022h.
262
Moore, 2023, pp. 383–386.
263
For example, Henry Foy, “Poland Ready to Back a US Move to Arm Ukraine,” Financial Times, February 9, 2015.
264
Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2014/486/CFSP of 22 July 2014 on the European Union Advisory Mission
for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine), July 22, 2014e.

54
declared that Ukraine would eventually join the Alliance through the MAP process, although it did
not propose a timeline.265

Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War, 2022–2024

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has spurred the EU and NATO to deepen cooperation
with Ukraine and to reconsider the prospect of formal integration into the region’s political and
security institutions. Whereas the 2014 crisis reinforced the line between member and nonmember
countries, the EU has since 2022 provided Ukraine unprecedented access to funds and other support
previously reserved for member countries. Within days of the Russian invasion, the EU ministers
activated the union’s Integrated Political Crisis Response and authorized use of approximately 90
percent of funds from its EPF for members’ purchase and delivery of lethal and nonlethal aid to
Ukraine.266 As of April 2024, the EU has made $12 billion in EPF funds available, as well as another
$2.2 billion for the joint procurement and delivery of artillery ammunition and $535 million to
strengthen EU defense industrial capacities in ammunition production.267 In addition, the EU has
established new tools to sustain this assistance as the war stretches on, including
• the EU’s Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine, which has trained approximately
52,000 Ukrainian soldiers as of May 2024
• the Ukraine Facility, a set of funding mechanisms to provide direct financial support, technical
assistance, and incentives for other public and private investment in Ukrainian recovery,
reconstruction, and development.268
Beyond this military support, the EU has mobilized existing funding instruments for economic
and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. In March 2022, the EU for the first time activated its Temporary
Protection Directive, an emergency provision that allows Ukrainian refugees to enter any EU member
state and to access work, health care, and education without a visa or formal asylum request. By
November 2023, an estimated 4.2 million people had registered for temporary protection under the
mechanism, which has been extended until March 2026.269 To support member countries hosting
Ukrainian refugees, the EU also relaxed restrictions on the use of its cohesion policy funds and
identified approximately €17 billion in funds earmarked for cohesion and post-pandemic recovery that
could be reallocated to support refugee housing, education, health care, and childcare.270 An April
2022 Council regulation granted access to another €420 million in remaining funds from prior home
affairs funds and established a mechanism for member states, as well as public and private donors, to

265
NATO, 2022e.
266
Delegation of the EU to the United States of America, “EU Assistance to Ukraine (in U.S. Dollars),” April 24, 2024.
267
Delegation of the European Union to the United States of America, 2024.
268
EUMAM, “European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine,” fact sheet, September 2024.
269
Council of the European Union, “Ukrainian Refugees: Council Extends Temporary Protection Until March 2026,” press
release, June 25, 2024c.
270
European Council and Council of the European Union, “EU Response to Russia’s War of Aggression,” webpage, December
13, 2024.

55
contribute to a new asylum, migration, and integration fund.271 Additional financial, materiel, and
industrial support followed. As of April 2024, EU financial institutions and member states had
contributed over $53 billion in financial, budgetary, humanitarian, and emergency assistance and
nearly $38 billion in military assistance.272
The expansion in EU assistance to Ukraine has been accompanied by new political support for
Ukrainian candidacy. For many EU and European leaders, Russia’s full-scale invasion highlighted the
danger of the bloc’s strategy of leaving potential members’ status ambiguous and underscored the
importance of developing a proactive strategy toward enlargement.273 For the first time, EU leaders
began to characterize Ukrainian integration as a geopolitical necessity in the face of Russian regional
aggression.274 EU and national leaders therefore moved quickly to clarify Ukraine’s membership
within the European community and to signal that the EU would not bow to Russian pressure.
Ukraine “is one of us and we want them in the European Union,” President von der Leyen told
reporters shortly before Ukraine submitted its membership application on February 28, 2022.275 From
Versailles the following month, the European Council affirmed it would “without delay” seek to
“further strengthen our bonds and deepen our partnership to support Ukraine in pursuing its
European path. Ukraine belongs to our European family.”276 Behind the scenes, several Central and
Eastern European member countries—in particular Poland, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—lobbied Brussels to accelerate the process for considering
membership requests to demonstrate solidarity and ease access to funds reserved for member
countries.277
Support for Ukrainian membership built as the war progressed. Initially, the Netherlands,
Germany, and France argued against the creation of new procedures for Ukraine, citing the
importance of equitable treatment of all EU aspirants and concerns over potential Russian
retaliation.278 “[J]oining the EU is not something that can be done in a few months, but . . . it involves
an intensive and far-reaching transformation process,” German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock
cautioned in a press conference.279 But as Ukraine demonstrated its capacity to withstand the Russian
invasion, French and German officials appear to have determined that unequivocal support for

271
Council of the European Union, 2022g; Council of the European Union, “Ukraine: €17 Billion of EU Funds to Help
Refugees,” press release, April 4, 2022f.
272
Delegation of the EU to the United States of America, 2024.
273
Sam Fleming and Henry Foy, “The ‘Monumental’ Consequences of Ukraine Joining the EU,” Financial Times, August 5,
2023.
274
See, for example, Charles Michel, “Enlargement Then and Now: A Geopolitical Investment in Peace and Security,” transcript
of speech delivered for the 20th anniversary of the 2004 European Union Enlargement, European Council, April 29, 2024.
275
Méabh Mc Mahon, “Ukraine Is One of Us and We Want Them in EU, Ursula von der Leyen Tells Euronews,” Euronews,
February 27, 2022.
276
European Council, “Informal Meeting of the Heads of State or Government, Versailles, 10–11 March 2022,” webpage,
February 2, 2024.
277
See, for example, President of the Republic of Poland, “Support of Ukraine’s Swift Candidacy to the EU,” February 28, 2022.
278
“There Is No Fast Track Procedure for EU Membership, Dutch PM Says,” Reuters, March 10, 2022; David M.
Herszenhorn, “Leaders Rebuff Zelenskyy’s Latest Pitch to Join EU,” Politico, March 25, 2022; “Ukraine Bid to Join EU Will
Take Decades Says Macron,” BBC, May 9, 2022.
279
Victor Jack, “Ukraine’s Zelenskyy Ups Pressure on EU with Plea for Immediate Membership,” Politico, February 28, 2022.

56
Ukraine was necessary to deter future instability. Following a June 2022 visit to Ukraine, Germany
pledged to back Ukraine’s membership bid and to work to accelerate the candidacy of other aspiring
members.280 In the country’s first-ever publicly released national security strategy, Germany affirmed
its support for “further EU integration, cohesion, and enlargement to include the Western Balkan
states, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and, in the longer term, Georgia” while stipulating that
concurrent reforms within the EU would be essential to deliver on the Union’s promises.281 Where
French leaders had previously feared that enlargement would reduce the EU’s cohesion and limit its
aspirations, French officials began to characterize enlargement as an opportunity to advance internal
reforms and build a more powerful and autonomous European bloc.282
In a historic step, European leaders voted in December 2023 to open accession talks with Ukraine
after the European Commission reported that Ukrainian democratic and rule of law reforms had
progressed.283 Demonstrating the extent of the wartime shift in attitudes toward Ukraine, supporters
of Ukrainian membership cooperated to revise traditional procedures to suppress a Hungarian threat
to veto the vote over concerns about Ukrainian treatment of Hungarian minorities and progress on
anti-corruption reforms.284 Despite pressure from Ukraine and some member countries, however, the
European Commission resisted pressure to accelerate the accession timeline, instead advising that a
decision on when to start formal talks should be delayed until after Ukraine adopted laws on political
asset declarations, lobbying, anti-oligarch measures, and guarantees protecting national minorities,
part of a seven-step package to determine Ukraine’s readiness for membership.285 In late June 2024,
the European Council approved a negotiating framework, paving the path for the first accession
conference to open on June 25, 2024.286
Yet outstanding questions about how to prepare EU institutions, policies, and budgets for
eventual membership remain unresolved and could protract membership negotiations. If admitted,
Ukraine would become the bloc’s poorest member and its fifth largest population.287 The war’s
damages will increase the anticipated cost of its integration, potentially overwhelming the EU’s budget
and redistribution process and endangering other funding priorities. The country’s large agricultural
sector poses a particular challenge. If admitted, Ukraine likely would become the greatest recipient of

280
Töglhofer, 2024.
281
German Federal Government, 2023, p. 13.
282
Joseph de Weck, “Why Macron Is Now Embracing EU and NATO Enlargement,” Internationale Politik Quarterly, June 29,
2023; Cadier, 2024; Emmanuel Macron, transcript of closing speech delivered at GLOBSEC 2023 Bratislava Forum, Élysée,
May 31, 2023.
283
General Secretariat of the Council, “Council Conclusions on Enlargement,” General Affairs Council, Council of the European
Union, December 12, 2023; European Commission, Ukraine 2023 Report, November 8, 2023c.
284
Matina Stevis-Gridneff and Steven Erlanger, “Hungary Blocks Ukraine Aid After E.U. Opens Door to Membership,” New
York Times, December 14, 2023.
285
European Commission, 2023c.
286
European Council and Council of the European Union, “EU Opens Accession Negotiations with Ukraine,” press release,
June 25, 2024.
287
The war has complicated efforts to estimate Poland’s population. According to United Nations estimates, the total
population of Ukraine in 2024 is approximately 37.9 million. By contrast, the EU’s five most populated countries in 2023 based
on Eurostat data were Germany (84.4 million), France (68.2 million), Italy (58.9 million), Spain (48.1 million), and Poland (36.8
million). United Nations Population Fund, “World Population Dashboard: Ukraine,” webpage, undated; Eurostat, “Population
Change: Demographic Balance and Crude Rates at National Level,” database, last updated November 8, 2024e.

57
Common Agricultural Policy funding, which currently encompasses nearly a quarter of EU
expenditures, at the same time that it would remain a net beneficiary of EU funds.288 To balance the
funding equation, other European countries would either have to accept a reduction in their payments
or agree to increase the agricultural budget—raising secondary questions about whether to reduce
other programs or increase member contributions. As one analysis of the financial challenges posed by
EU enlargement summarizes, “either the pie grows and the overall budget for such support increases,
or farmers each get a smaller slice of the pie.”289
Moreover, Ukraine’s national priorities and expectations for the EU will differ from past
applicants. A postwar Ukraine will need to simultaneously rebuild destroyed infrastructure, revive
industrial production of nonmilitary goods, and reconstitute its military forces simultaneously.
Achieving these objectives will likely require persuading refugees that have resettled within the EU to
return home, as well as potentially attracting additional immigrant labor. However, joining the EU
will reduce legals barriers for Ukrainian nationals to either remain or seek work outside the country,
potentially worsening the country’s demographic decline. Already, Ukraine reportedly has engaged in
exploratory talks with EU officials on future migration rules designed to encourage citizens to return
to the country.290
Although cooperation between the EU and Ukraine has grown rapidly, there is still no consensus
among members about the implications of Ukrainian accession for the bloc’s governance structures or
budgetary priorities. With the notable exception of Hungary, most EU and national leaders have
expressed confidence in Ukraine’s ability to implement the reforms required to meet the EU’s
accession criteria. However, recent debates over postaccession backsliding in Hungary and Poland
have also contributed to calls for defining more-specific standards for enforcing economic and rule of
law conditions that could exacerbate tensions among existing members. Similarly, Ukraine’s
application has revived debates over the adequacy of European Parliament and Council procedures to
preserve cohesion while ensuring equitable representation of all members. In one camp, France and
Germany have conditioned support for Ukrainian membership on implementation of institutional
reforms, such as reducing the number of commissioners and members of European Parliament and
removing national vetoes, intended to increase the union’s capacity to act, promote political
integration, and advance transparency and anti-corruption measures within EU institutions, among
other objectives.291 Although French and German officials argue such measures are necessary to
preserve the Union’s legitimacy as its membership expands and diversifies, others allege that the
reforms are intended to reduce the influence of new members. Poland, for instance, has led a coalition
of Eastern and Central European countries concerned that the proposed reforms prioritize political
integration over representation and could reduce newer and poorer member countries’ influence

288
In 2022, Common Agricultural Policy expenditures were 23.5 percent of the EU budget. European Commission, “CAP
Expenditure,” webpage, undated-b.
289
Kribbe and Middelaar, 2023.
290
Barbara Moens and Jacopo Barigazzi, “Ukraine Wants EU’s Next Migration Rules to Encourage Returns,” Politico, January
24, 2024.
291
Franco-German Working Group on EU Institutional Reform, Sailing on High Seas: Reforming and Enlarging the EU for the
21st Century, September 18, 2023.

58
within the EU.292 Nordic member states, meanwhile, have continued to oppose treaty reforms out of
concern for preserving national decisionmaking over taxation and fiscal policy.293 Notably, the
Northern and Eastern states that traditionally have opposed treaty amendments represent some of the
most vocal support for swiftly granting Ukrainian membership. In 2022, for instance, Czechia,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Sweden, among other member
states, publicly came out against proposals by President Macron, then–Italian Prime Minister Mario
Draghi, President von der Leyen, and EU Parliament President Roberta Metsola to amend the EU
treaties.294
Even vocal proponents of granting Ukraine membership have raised concerns about the
implications for their own status within the EU. On the one hand, Ukraine’s entry would shift the
balance of power within the bloc in favor of Eastern European countries most concerned about
Russian ambitions. However, these same countries are among those most likely to bear the
consequences of any economic reshuffling required to absorb a new member, as well as an attending
change in EU decisionmaking rules.295 For instance, Ukrainian accession would shift Poland’s relative
GDP rank within the EU, resulting in a reduction in the resources it receives under the Common
Agricultural Policy and potentially transforming Poland from the largest net recipient of EU funds to
an overall net payer.296 Franco-German proposals that would reduce individual members’ power would
also weaken Poland’s ability to use its veto to influence EU decisions.
At present, the EU has not advanced significant proposals to account for the prospect that
Ukraine might fulfill its membership criteria and has not agreed to current proposals for a phased
integration into the EU without securing non-EU security guarantees. The EU has also never
conducted membership negotiations with a country at war, let alone one that lacks NATO security
guarantees.297 Under Article 42.7 of the Treaty of Lisbon, member states are obligated to “aid and
assist” a fellow member to defend against external aggression “by all the means in their power.”298 With
the exception of neutral countries like Austria, Ireland, and Switzerland, enforcing this mutual defense
clause in the event of a territorial conflict likely would require NATO involvement, an assumption in
keeping with the bloc’s traditional deference to the transatlantic alliance for questions of continental
defense and deterrence to NATO.299 Ukraine therefore raises broader questions about member
countries’ willingness to expand and resource a greater EU role in continental defense and security.
By contrast, the war has not fundamentally altered NATO’s stance on eventual Ukrainian
membership. Russia’s full-scale invasion altered the terms of the debate among allies but has not yet
produced majority support for eastward enlargement. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion,
NATO leaders have maintained that the Alliance’s foremost commitment remains to defend its own

292
Virginie Malingre, “EU Enlargement: France and Germany Attempt to Control Discussion,” Le Monde, September 19, 2023.
293
Nicolai Von Ondarza and Minna Ålander, After the Conference on the Future of Europe: Time to Make Reforms Happen,
German Institute for International and Security Affairs, August 2022.
294
Alice Tidey, “Explained: Why EU Countries Are at Odds over Treaty Changes,” Euronews, May 11, 2022.
295
Ilke Toygür and Max Bergmann, “The EU Isn’t Ready for Ukraine to Join,” Foreign Policy, July 17, 2023.
296
Brudzińska, 2023.
297
When the EU admitted Cyprus in 2004, hostilities between Greece and Turkey had been suspended for three decades.
298
Official Journal of the EU, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, C 202, June 7, 2016, pp. 389–405.
299
Besch and Ciaramella, 2023.

59
members, and they have sought to prevent NATO from becoming a direct party to the conflict. At the
same time, however, NATO has also refused to bow to Russian pressure to take the prospect of
Ukrainian membership off the table. Over the two and half years since the war began, NATO
statements have become more explicit in affirming Ukraine’s right to choose its own association. In
2022, allies voiced support for Ukraine’s “inherent right . . . to choose its own security arrangements”
but declined to mention NATO membership directly.300 One year later, allies agreed in Vilnius that
Ukraine’s “future is in NATO” and affirmed that an invitation to join the Alliance would be extended
once “Allies agree and conditions are met.” In a demonstration of the uniqueness of the Ukraine-
NATO relationship, allies also agreed to waive the need for a MAP on the grounds that “Ukraine has
become increasingly interoperable and politically integrated with the Alliance, and has made
substantial progress on its reform path.”301
Despite Ukrainian demands for greater clarity, individual NATO members largely have
maintained the same rhetorical stance. Hungary and Slovakia have continued to express opposition,
with both Hungarian and Slovakian leaders going so far as to publicly allege that admission would
trigger a world war.302 On the other end, the Central and Eastern European states most invested in
enhancing the security of the Alliance’s eastern flank have conditioned their support for eventual
Ukrainian entry by calling for a pathway to membership “once conditions allow.”303 And in the middle,
former skeptics of NATO enlargement like Canada, France, Germany, and the Netherlands have
publicly affirmed their support for eventual Ukrainian membership, albeit without stipulating
conditions or a timeline for accession.304 The balance within NATO has tilted in favor of the principle
of preserving NATO’s flexibility to grant Ukraine’s request for membership without reducing the
Alliance’s room to maneuver.
Nonetheless, the war has driven NATO to increase its support to Ukraine and to deepen areas of
existing engagement. Between 2022 and 2023, the Alliance increased its delivery of nonlethal aid to
Ukraine and established a multiyear program to help rebuild the country’s security and defense sectors
and promote adoption of NATO standards.305 Through NATO, European members have also
sought to institutionalize the wartime relationship and to use crisis engagements to promote common
standards and build Ukraine’s long-term readiness for membership. In 2023, allies agreed to upgrade
the NATO-Ukraine Commission into the NATO-Ukraine Council, in which Ukraine now sits as an
equal participant.306 The enhanced joint body both facilitates crisis consultations between NATO and
Ukraine and enables routine dialogue to assess and “support Ukraine’s progress on interoperability as

300
NATO, 2022j.
301
NATO, 2023.
302
Seb Starcevic, “Kyiv’s NATO Membership Would ‘Guarantee WW3,’ Slovak PM Says,” Politico, July 11, 2024.
303
President of the Republic of Poland, “Statement by the Leaders of the Bucharest Nine,” June 6, 2023.
304
Élysée, “Globsec Summit in Bratislava,” June 1, 2023; Prime Minister of Canada, “Ukraine and Canada Joint Declaration,”
June 10, 2023; Philippe Ricard and Cédric Pietralunga, “France Resolves to Support Ukraine’s NATO Membership,” Le Monde,
June 20, 2023; Embassy of Ukraine in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, “Political Dialogue Between Ukraine and the
Netherlands,” April 30, 2024; Agreement on Security Cooperation and Long-Term Support Between the Kingdom of Belgium
and Ukraine, signed at Brussels, Belgium, May 28, 2024.
305
NATO, “Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Council Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the
Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council in Washington, D.C. 11th July 2024,” July 11, 2024, updated July 15, 2024f.
306
NATO, “NATO-Ukraine Council,” May 13, 2024b.

60
well as additional democratic and security sector reforms.”307 At the Washington Summit the
following year, allies established NSATU to coordinate national donations and training and “place
security assistance to Ukraine on an enduring footing, ensuring enhanced, predictable, and coherent
support.”308 NATO statements have underlined that the Alliance is not changing its stance toward the
conflict and will remain a nonparty to the conflict, although it will use the assistance framework to
bring Ukrainian procurement in line with NATO best practices, continue to develop joint
interoperability requirements, and advance progress toward eventual integration of Ukraine’s defense
and security forces with NATO’s.309

Conclusion
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine presented the European community with a choice of one
among four potential paths: (1) to abandon the prospect of Ukrainian integration; (2) to maintain the
current approach of engagement without formal integration into collective political and security
apparatuses; (3) to accelerate Ukraine’s integration by building a path to membership within one or
both of the region’s primary organizations, the EU and NATO; or (4) to push for rapid EU and/or
NATO enlargement.
Notwithstanding the EU’s decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, European
rhetoric and policies since 2022 have hewed closer to the third option than the fourth. Table 4.1
summarizes the adaptation in European views on potential integration since the war in Ukraine began.
In response to Russia’s invasion, Europeans have reevaluated the geopolitical implications of
enlargement and provided Ukraine access to additional EU resources beyond those typically available
to nonmember countries. Similarly, NATO’s assistance to Ukraine exceeds prewar models for
support to Ukraine and other partners, although it has built on a foundation established in response
to the 2014 Crimea crisis.
Despite growing defense cooperation, political, financial, and strategic factors likely will continue
to disincentivize EU or NATO expansion to Ukraine. Within the EU, member countries do not
agree on whether the bloc should revise or reprioritize its enlargement principles, as would be required
to fast-track Ukrainian accession, and discussions for how to resolve outstanding procedural, legal,
and budgetary questions are nascent. As the war drags on and the costs to Ukraine and donor
countries accumulate, resolving the practical and budgetary realities of integrating may become more
challenging. Although the majority of European leaders have voiced support for the principle of
Ukrainian membership, actualizing this pledge will require careful diplomacy and sustained political
attention to preserve EU unity and identify solutions that bridge members’ differing national interests.

307
NATO, 2024g; NATO, 2023.
308
NATO, 2024g.
309
NATO, 2024g; NATO, 2024f.

61
 Table 4.1. Summary of Trends in European Positions on Ukrainian Integration

2014–2021 2022–June 2024

Declared stance • NATO affirmed an “open door” • EU enlargement was characterized
policy, but European members as a geostrategic imperative.
oppose Ukraine membership • EU members displayed strong
absent substantial reforms. support for rapid Ukrainian
• EU affirmed support for Ukrainian accession.
sovereignty. • NATO increased aid to “build a
bridge” to membership.
Policies and resources • NATO affirmed support for • EU officials have resisted pressure
Ukraine’s sovereignty and to fast-track Ukrainian membership.
territorial integrity, but it did not • EU members were divided over the
move to establish a MAP. need for pre-expansion reforms.
• The EU signed an association • NATO dropped the MAP
agreement with Ukraine and requirement, but few members
increased economic and social support Ukrainian ascension given
sector engagement. entanglement concerns.

The shift in attitudes toward Ukrainian membership in the EU contrasts with the status of
debates over NATO candidacy. The war has highlighted, rather than resolved, members’ escalation
concerns. Whether NATO can and chooses to move forward with membership likely will depend on
the outcome of the conflict and the conditions of a postwar settlement. In the interim, European states
and supranational organizations have used alternative mechanisms to demonstrate support and
coordinate policy, even as they have shied from formal integration.

62
Chapter 5

Charting Europe’s Future Course

In this report, we examined how Europe has responded to the war by recalibrating its approach
toward Russia; developing new concepts and committing new resources to collective defense; and
reassessing the costs and benefits of integrating Ukraine into regional security, political, and economic
frameworks. Below, we summarize our primary findings and discuss their implications for Europe’s
strategic future—and, in turn, future opportunities and challenges for U.S. defense cooperation.
Given the possibility that future events in Ukraine, Europe, and the United States could still alter the
trends described in previous chapters, we also highlight nine plausible factors that would require
reassessment of these implications.
The chapter ends with a list of recommendations for DAF, DoD, and the U.S. government
stemming from our analysis.

Findings and Implications

Our research resulted in the following findings and implications:
• The European shift away from engagement with Russia is likely irreversible absent a
significant change in Russian leadership, domestic politics, and external behavior. The
duration of European restrictions, including ongoing efforts to expand and tighten sanctions,
and progress toward developing alternatives to Russian energy have reduced incentives to
restore prewar economic engagement. Although some countries may use their bilateral ties
with Moscow as leverage in negotiations with Brussels, the European majority has
demonstrated a consistent ability and resolve to suppress challenges and maintain their new,
more confrontational approach. Although intra-European disputes may increase the
political—and, for the EU, budgetary—costs of maintaining or expanding restrictive
measures, a wholesale EU or cross-European normalization of relations is unlikely in the
medium term.
• The war has energized Europeans to improve their operational flexibility, but any
movement toward strategic autonomy from the United States is likely to be limited. On
the one hand, the war in Ukraine has motivated member states to strengthen the EU’s powers
to promote defense integration among member countries. On the other hand, the war has also
heightened European awareness of the importance of the United States and the transatlantic
alliance and raised new questions about the prospect that Europe can, in the near term, build
sufficient capability to defend their territory and citizens without the United States’ support.
NATO’s resurgence since 2022 underlines that Europeans continue to view the transatlantic
alliance as critical to ensuring their security and are unsure that Eurocentric alternatives are

63
 necessary or can be constructed in time or at scale. Rather than develop an alternative
architecture, European states have redoubled efforts to improve EU-NATO coordination and
to leverage the EU’s unique authorities and resources to address national deficiencies and
support NATO priorities.
• Europeans have recognized the need to improve their ability to act with reduced U.S.
support but are likely to still depend on the U.S. security role in the medium term given
the scale of their existing production and capability gaps. The multiyear increases in
European defense spending and increased political attention to building national and collective
defenses mark a significant departure from pre-2022 trends. Yet disagreements among
European countries over whether to prioritize indigenous production or speed of procurement
are likely to continue, potentially contributing to inefficiencies and hampering efforts to
advance defense integration.
• Although the EU has sought a greater defense role, the substantial reforms that would
enable Brussels to direct collective military action are unlikely in the medium term
because of national differences and the immaturity of existing proposals. The war has
encouraged Europeans to pursue greater cooperation within existing frameworks, but it has
not galvanized new defense concepts or the creation of an alternative architecture for the
defense of Europe. Instead, European, EU, and NATO leaders have taken steps to strengthen
existing institutions by developing new capabilities, institutionalizing procedures and
relationships built over the course of the war, and adapting existing funding and coordination
mechanisms to support collective defense goals. Novel organizations like the EU’s EUMAM
and NATO’s NSATU represent creative adaptations of existing frameworks and largely
operate within existing institutions.
• European engagement with Ukraine is generally one-directional and falls short of
standards for de facto defense integration. To meet Ukraine’s warfighting needs, Europeans
have extended unprecedented aid and developed new frameworks and funding mechanisms to
sustain support in the near term. These wartime interactions can advance interoperability and
familiarity between European and Ukrainian forces. Given that Ukraine’s resources must be
committed to the present fight, the question of how Ukraine may or can contribute to its
European partners’ defenses—a key element for true integration—is untested.
• Ukraine’s formal integration through the EU and NATO is unlikely in the near term. EU
membership negotiations are likely to continue to highlight practical challenges and
differences among EU members. However, defense cooperation with Ukraine is likely to
continue to grow.

Factors That Could Alter This Analysis

The findings discussed above reflect changes in European attitudes, policies, and organizations
from February 2022 through July 2024. Because the war is still ongoing, it remains possible that
changes in battlefield, regional, or international dynamics could still alter the trajectory of observed
trends and require reconsideration of some of this study’s findings. In particular, we highlight nine
factors that could alter the Russia-Ukraine war’s consequences for Europe’s future strategic

64
orientation. To clarify similarities among specific factors, we organize them into three categories: (1)
those related to the course of the war, (2) those related to the ending of the war, and (3) external
diplomatic and political factors. Our approach to managing the uncertainty stemming from the future
trajectory of the war is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1 of the summary volume of this report
series, The Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War.310

The Course of the War

Russia’s Use of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine

Russian nuclear exercises and public statements have raised the specter of potential nonstrategic
nuclear weapons use in Ukraine, although analysts disagree over the likelihood and pathways that
could cause Moscow to break the nuclear taboo.311 Public reports suggest that U.S. officials have
considered the prospect of Russian nuclear weapons use if Moscow perceived that its position in
Ukraine is at imminent risk of collapse or a direct threat to the Russian state.312
Russian detonation of a nuclear weapon or device, regardless of whether conducted as a
demonstration or as part of broader attack on Ukrainian forces, would be a consequential event with
global implications. For Europe, the resulting security dilemmas would underline the nuclear
imbalance between EU member states and Russia and highlight long-standing disagreements about
states’ interest in assisting (and obligation to assist) the defense of nontreaty partners. The responding
deliberations would underscore the reality of the EU’s limited defense capacity and institutional
experience, reinforcing NATO’s role as the primary security institution on the continent and
decreasing support for strategic concepts premised on reducing U.S. involvement. It may also
encourage revisions in EU-UK collaboration on defense, given the UK’s nuclear arsenal. Across
Europe, the nonnuclear power majority would likely look to France, the UK, and the United States
for leadership, shifting the balance away from the position of the countries close to Russia that have,
since the start of the war, asserted increasing influence within the EU and NATO.
Whether such an unprecedented event would break or strengthen European unity is uncertain. In
choosing to use nuclear weapons, Russia might calculate that fears of further escalation might induce
the United States or its European allies to reduce their support to Ukraine or even to press Kyiv into
accepting an early settlement favorable to Russia. Given differing national risk tolerances, strategic
cultures, and perceived stakes in Ukraine, it is possible that a nuclear crisis would deepen fissures

310
Bryan Frederick, Alexandra T. Evans, Mark Hvizda, Alisa Laufer, Howard Wang, Samuel Charap, Krystyna Marcinek,
Howard J. Shatz, Khrystyna Holynska, David A. Ochmanek, Omar Danaf, Brett Zakheim, and Kristen Gunness, The
Consequences of the Russia-Ukraine War, RAND Corporation, RR-A3141-1, 2025.
311
For a dataset of Russian nuclear activities and threats during the Russia-Ukraine war’s first 18 months, see Heather Williams,
Kelsey Hartigan, Lachlan MacKenzie, and Reja Younis, Deter and Divide: Russia’s Nuclear Rhetoric, and Escalation Risks in
Ukraine, Center for Strategic and International Studies, undated. For examples of varied assessments of the probability of nuclear
use, see Liviu Horovitz and Lydia Wachs, Russia’s Nuclear Threats in the War Against Ukraine: Consequences for the International
Order, NATO and Germany, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, April 2022; Bryan Frederick, Mark Cozad,
and Alexandra Stark, Escalation in the War in Ukraine: Lessons Learned and Risks for the Future, RAND Corporation, RR-
A2807-1, 2023.
312
Jim Sciutto, “Exclusive: US Prepared ‘Rigorously’ for Potential Russian Nuclear Strike in Ukraine in Late 2022, Officials
Say,” CNN, March 9, 2024.

65
among Europeans over whether the wisdom of continued confrontation with Russia and raise new
pressures to accommodate Russian demands. However, it is also plausible that such an attack would
harden European attitudes by reducing confidence in the feasibility of future cooperation with Russia.
Confronted with a clear and imminent threat, Europeans might band closer together. This could
induce Europeans to sever remaining ties with Russia, accelerate rearmament, and reconsider national
and NATO nuclear posture.313 However, how specific countries would react to such an
unprecedented event is uncertain, as is whether nuclear use would reinforce existing regional factions
or drive a reorganization along new political lines.
How the United States and NATO choose to respond to nuclear use in Ukraine would also shape
the event’s long-term ramifications. Since the start of the conflict, U.S. and European leaders have
emphasized that Russian nuclear use will be met with “severe consequences” but have not committed
to a specific response.314

NATO Directly Intervenes in the Russia-Ukraine War

As discussed in previous chapters, NATO has sought to deter an attack on allied territory,
improve the Alliance’s capacity to respond if threatened, and enable individual members to continue
providing bilateral assistance to Ukraine, while avoiding actions that might incite a Russian attack.
Allies have consistently emphasized that NATO is a defensive alliance, although interpretations of
what might constitute an armed attack have varied among members, and in March 2022, allies ruled
out NATO troop deployments.315 Nevertheless, several general pathways to direct NATO
intervention are feasible, ranging from
• an inadvertent death of NATO officials or personnel in or operating near Ukraine
• a preemptive Russian operation arising from a misinterpretation of NATO activities
• a deliberate Russian decision to conduct limited attacks on NATO territory to pressure
Western governments to end support to Ukraine or deliver Ukrainian concessions.316
In theory, significant Russian escalation within Ukraine—potentially including nuclear or expanded
chemical use—could also lead NATO member states to perceive that the situation within the country
presented an intolerable risk to the security of allied territory or citizens. Indeed, some countries—
including France, Poland, and the Baltics—already have raised the prospect of deploying national or

313
Already, Russian nuclear threats during the war in Ukraine, including reported deployments of Russian nuclear weapons to
the Kaliningrad region and Belarus, have led Poland to express new interest in hosting nuclear weapons under NATO’s nuclear-
sharing policy. “Poland’s Bid to Participate in NATO Nuclear Sharing,” Institute for Strategic Studies, September 2023.
314
“NATO Warns Russia of ‘Severe Consequences’ in Case of a Nuclear Strike,” Reuters, September 27, 2022.
315
In communiqués following the Vilnius (2023) and Washington (2024) Summits, allies affirmed that “NATO does not seek
confrontation and poses no threat to Russia.” NATO, 2023; NATO, 2024g. For earlier examples of NATO messaging, see Jens
Stoltenberg, transcript of speech delivered at the Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, March 9, 2022, updated March 12, 2022a; Alexandra Brzozowski,” NATO Rules Out No-Fly Zone over
Ukraine,” Euractiv, March 4, 2022. On NATO statements that it would not deploy air or ground forces to Ukraine, see Liz Sly
and Emily Rauhala, “NATO Proposes a Major Force Expansion in Europe to Address the Long-Term Threat Posed by Russia,”
Washington Post, March 16, 2022.
316
Frederick, Cozad, and Stark, 2023.

66
NATO ground forces to Ukraine, although they have faced strong opposition from other NATO
members, including Germany and the United States.317
The ramifications of NATO involvement for Europe’s strategic orientation would vary depending
on the circumstances surrounding the NAC decision, including European perceptions of alternative
courses of action, the state of Russian military forces, the scale of European damage, and the course of
the conflict. Each of these conditions would also have differing implications for the trajectory of
European policies toward Russia, defense policy and spending, integration with the United States, and
relations with Ukraine and would require reconsideration of these report’s findings.
Nevertheless, several implications are likely. First, establishing the required NAC consensus
would mean that European leaders had abandoned hope that engagement could promote regional
security and stability. Current members that question the severity or immediacy of the Russian threat
would therefore have either revised their stance or been disempowered. Depending on the scale and
circumstances of the attack, some European leaders may push for simultaneous negotiations with
Russia in an attempt to limit the conflict. However, their ability to mobilize European support for a
negotiated settlement would be contingent on how the resulting conflict unfolds, including the severity
of the fighting and NATO forces’ operational success.
Given the scale of the resulting conflict and the risk of escalation beyond Ukraine’s borders,
NATO member countries would substantially increase resources and authorities for defense
production, procurement, and stockpiling beyond observed levels and, through the transfer of
authorities to NATO military command, vastly expand defense integration and cooperation. A
Russia-NATO conflict would test existing frameworks for EU-NATO complementarity and likely
require organizational and procedural adaptations. European relations with the United States would
depend on the conflict’s course and outcome, including the United States’ ability to manage
differences in risk tolerance and account for variations in damage incurred by different members.
NATO involvement in the conflict would render many of the political obstacles to Ukrainian
integration into the military alliance obsolete. Whether the war would accelerate or ensure Ukraine’s
integration into the EU is less certain, however. The experience of common costs could encourage EU
members to suspend or revise criteria for membership. Alternately, the costs of their own
reconstruction could make European members more wary of admitting a new member that would
require significant postconflict investment.

317
Lipika Pelham and Lou Newton, “NATO Allies Reject Emmanuel Macron Idea of Troops to Ukraine,” BBC, February 27,
2024; “Poland Should Not Rule Out Sending Troops to Ukraine, Says Foreign Minister,” Reuters, May 27, 2024; Matthias
Gebauer, Marina Kormbaki, Christian Reiermann, Christoph Schult, and Konstantin von Hammerstein, “The Fear of the Great
War” [“Die Angst vor dem großen Krieg”], Der Spiegel, May 26, 2024.

67
The Ending of the War

Ukraine Regains Internationally Recognized Borders

Since the start of the war, Ukrainian leaders have affirmed the aim of reestablishing the country’s
2014 borders.318 An assessment of the conditions that could enable Ukraine to reclaim its territory
and defeat or evict Russian forces is beyond the scope of this study, but such an outcome likely would
present new opportunities and dilemmas for European leaders beyond those discussed in this report.
On the one hand, the defeat or substantial degradation in Russian military forces could soften
European anxieties about provoking Russian retaliation and could expand or solidify support for
Ukrainian membership in NATO. EU involvement in postwar reconstruction activities could also
accelerate Ukraine’s accession timeline by facilitating adoption of EU standards. Indeed, the joint EU-
Ukraine-World Bank reconstruction planning efforts already emphasize opportunities to “transform
[the] country on its path to the EU.”319 On the other hand, the practical and financial challenge of
rebuilding Ukraine once the war ends could heighten debates among EU members over the Union’s
fiscal and budgetary readiness to absorb a new net-recipient country. European concerns about
Ukraine’s ability to fulfill obligations made during wartime, or even new European demands or
expectations for Ukrainian reimbursement of major donors, could also strain relations between
Brussels and Kyiv and prolong negotiations.
Whether European leaders attempt to repair relations with Russia likely would depend on
whether the Kremlin renounces its claim to Ukrainian territory and adheres to the terms of any
settlement. Since 2022, European leaders have consistently emphasized that any rapprochement
would be conditional on changes in Russian behavior, and they would be predisposed to view postwar
Russian rearmament as evidence of recidivist ambitions. Although European countries are likely to
maintain at least aspects of their hard-line policies toward Russia, a historical sensitivity to the risks of
imposing overly punitive policies against defeated countries could lead influential countries like
Germany to argue for limited reengagement, particularly on trade and economic issues, even as other
countries, such as Poland, the UK, and the Baltics, remain opposed.
Depending on the condition of Russian forces following a Ukrainian victory, political interest in
sustaining high defense spending could decrease in some countries if European leaders assess that
Russia would be incapable of threatening EU or NATO territory or if European populaces pressed
their governments to rededicate attention and resources to other problems that have been subsumed
by the emergency in Ukraine, such as migration and climate change. Differences in how countries
perceive the scale and immediacy of the Russian threat, and the lessons they take from Europe’s failure
to follow through on its commitments after 2014, could produce new tensions within the EU and
NATO. Although fears of Russian encroachment are likely to remain high in Eastern and Northern
countries, Southern European countries like Spain and Italy are more likely to prioritize other
national and EU issues.

318
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, “Everything Started with Crimea and Will End With It—Liberation of the Peninsula from
Occupation Is Necessary,” transcript of speech delivered at the Second Crimea Platform Summit, President of Ukraine, August
23, 2022.
319
European Commission, “Updated Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Assessment Released,” press release,
February 14, 2024a.

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Russian-Imposed Regime Change in Ukraine
A scenario in which Russia achieves a military breakthrough and establishes a new government in
Kyiv would make many of the trends described in this report obsolete. The new government would
almost certainly withdraw Ukraine’s application for EU membership, denounce previous requests for
NATO membership, terminate existing partnerships with both institutions, and challenge or deny its
obligation to abide by the terms of repayment for any EU loans extended over the course of the war.
Would Europeans seek to repair relations with Russia and engage the new leadership in Kyiv?
Russia’s victory in Ukraine—and attending westward movement of Russian forces—would likely
harden European’s negative views and heighten preexisting concerns of Russian subversion in former
Soviet states like Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.320 Fears that an emboldened Russia might
next target other border countries, such as Moldova or Georgia, or even attempt a limited incursion
into NATO territory would likely drive European states, particularly in Eastern and Northern
Europe, to expand defense spending, accelerate DIB investments, and expand cooperation. This would
follow the longer trend in Europe’s response to Russian provocations: a consistent movement toward
greater investment in resilience over time.321
Outliers could emerge, but they would face strong pressure from other European countries to
align with the regional majority and could risk significant economic and political repercussions.
Countries like Slovakia and Hungary, which have refused to divest from Russian energy suppliers and
have pushed the EU to reconsider their stance on negotiations, or Austria, which has not sent arms to
Ukraine and maintains broad economic ties with Russia, might seek to reestablish prewar bilateral
interactions or even push for a relaxation in EU sanctions.322 Yet these outlier countries would also
recognize that other EU countries, including major powers like France and Germany, would penalize
their recognition of Russian de facto territorial gains.323 Similar to Hungary’s current strategy, they
might choose to lodge symbolic protests while providing tacit support for the European majority’s
hard-line preferences.

Ukrainian Government Accepts Cessation of Hostilities Without Territorial

Settlement
The protraction of the fighting has underlined the possibility that neither Ukraine nor Russia may
achieve their maximalist objectives and will instead be compelled to access a ceasefire without a
comprehensive political solution. In such a scenario, Russian forces would likely remain on Ukrainian
territory, but the intensity of the fighting would be reduced or intermittent. Such a scenario would test

320
“Macron Warns Europe That Putin Won’t Stop with Ukraine and Urges Strong Response,” Radio France Internationale,
March 14, 2024; Richard Milne and Marton Dunai, “Russia Could Attack a NATO Country Within 3 to 5 Years, Denmark
Warns,” Financial Times, February 9, 2024.
321
For example, the 2009 gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine accelerated EU energy diversification efforts (Commission of
the European Communities, The January 2009 Gas Supply Disruption To The EU: An Assessment, July 16, 2009; Guy Chazan
and Peter Spiegel, “EU Struggles to Wean Former Soviet Bloc Off Russian Energy,” Financial Times, November 27, 2013).
Similarly, after the 2007 Russia’s cyberattack on Estonia, NATO established the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence (NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, “About Us,” webpage, undated).
322
Gabriel Gavin and Victor Jack, “Hungary Urges Ukraine to OK Russian Oil Loophole,” Politico, August 22, 2024; Matthew
Karnitschnig, “How Austria Became Putin’s Alpine Fortress,” Politico, June 5, 2023.
323
Gavin and Jack, 2024; Karnitschnig, 2023.

69
European leaders’ commitment to sustaining high defense levels by reducing the urgency of producing
sufficient equipment to meet Ukraine’s current rates of expenditure while reviving debates over
countries’ willingness to sustain the costs indefinitely. Fatigued European publics could also press their
governments to reprioritize other economic and social issues. Reactions to these domestic pressures
are likely to vary among countries. Some may perceive a stalemated conflict as likely to drain Russian
resources and slow its rate of reconstitution, reducing the urgency of European rearmament.
Conversely, others may perceive an opportunity to outpace Russian modernization and sustain or even
increase defense expenditures.
As discussed previously, Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO is unlikely while the conflict
continues. Ukraine may seek immediate entry into the EU as part of broader negotiations with Russia
and European intermediaries. Yet the Ukrainian government’s inability to govern its full territory
would introduce thorny challenges for EU membership negotiations that would likely prolong the
process, although the continued risk of a new outbreak of fighting would exacerbate European
concerns about direct entanglement in the conflict.

External Diplomatic and Political Factors

Extremist Victories in Elections of Key European Union States

The 2024 European Parliament elections demonstrate emerging challenges to the political center
in Europe and a continued rightward shift in national and EU politics.324 Concurrently, some
antimilitarist or Euroskeptic far-left parties, such as Germany’s Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, have
organized to reduce European assistance to Ukraine, a position similarly championed by far-right
parties like France’s National Rally.325 Although Russia has fostered ties with far- and ultra-right
parties sympathetic to its antiliberal vision, it historically has sought to exploit fissures within the
European politics by supporting fringe elements on both ends of the political spectrum.326 The
Kremlin would therefore likely see some benefits if, in future national or EU elections, European
citizens voted to empower far-right or far-left parties.
If the political center crumbled, some of the trends described in this report may become less
salient. Existing skeptics of continued European aid to Ukraine like Prime Minister Orbán and
Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico might redouble their efforts to cut off European aid to Ukraine

324
Matina Stevis-Gridneff, “In E.U. Elections, the Center Holds, but the Far Right Still Wreaks Havoc,” New York Times, June
9, 2024; Luke McGee, “Europe’s Center Ground Is Shifting Further to the Right,” CNN, June 9, 2024.
325
Guy Chazan, “Germany’s Far-Left Disrupter Claims Credit for Limiting Aid to Ukraine,” Financial Times, August 21, 2024;
Joseph Ataman, “Marine Le Pen Promises French Far Right Will Rein in Aid to Ukraine, Slams Soccer Star Mbappé,” CNN,
July 5, 2024.
326
Mikhail Zygar, “Russia’s War on Woke,” Foreign Affairs, January 2, 2024; Ksenia Luchenko, “Conservatism by Decree: Putin
as a Figurehead for the Global Far-Right,” European Council on Foreign Relations, March 1, 2024; Alina Polyakova, Markos
Kounalakis, Antonis Klapsis, Luigi Sergio Germani, Jacopo Iacoboni, Francisco de Borja Lasheras, and Nicolás de Pedro, The
Kremlin’s Trojan Horses 2.0: Russian Influence in Greece, Italy, and Spain, Atlantic Council, November 2017; Etienne Soula and
David Salvo, “Russia Is Still Finding Willing Partners Throughout Europe,” German Marshall Fund, February 13, 2024.

70
and press Kyiv to accept a negotiated settlement.327 Even within Poland, one of Ukraine’s most vocal
supporters, far-right and ultra nationalist politicians have called for Warsaw to block Ukraine’s
admission to the EU or to condition entry on exhuming Polish victims of the Volyn massacres.328 An
expanded cadre of far-right leaders might also impose new conditions on humanitarian or economic
assistance to the country. Likewise, far-left parties may press for reductions in military assistance and
seek to refocus the EU’s attention on economic, labor, and climate issues.
However, whether newly empowered far-left or far-right parties would fundamentally revise the
EU’s stance toward Russia is unclear. An “overwhelming” majority of parties explicitly condemned
Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, although elements of both the far left and far right indicated
qualified sympathy for Russian perspectives.329 Over the course of the war, favorable views of Russia
and Putin have declined among the European right, and far-right leaders are divided over the degree to
which they believe European security interests can be served through outreach to Russia.330 In Italy,
for example, Prime Minister Meloni has emerged as a staunch advocate for support to Ukraine and,
despite prewar tensions, sought to preserve Italy’s relations with the EU. Similarly, analysis of far-left
parties’ foreign policy positions since the start of the war suggests increased support for more-assertive
policies toward Russia, with parties affiliated with Radical New Left and Democratic Socialist parties
expressing particular opposition to Russian policies on antifascist principles.331 Although far-left
leaders likely would press for a reduction in EU-NATO cooperation, cut national defense spending,
and reexamine participation in joint procurement and other defense cooperation initiatives, far-right
political leaders may increase defense spending and continue national DIB expansion.

Ukraine Receives Additional U.S. Security Guarantees Following the End of the
War
Since the start of the war, Ukraine has called on the United States and other partners to provide
legally binding security guarantees to deter and, if necessary, defeat future Russian attacks. In July
2023, leaders of the G7 countries issued a joint declaration describing a framework for negotiating
new bilateral security cooperation and assistance commitments for Ukraine.332 Since then, Ukraine has
signed ten-year security agreements with 20 partners, including all G7 members and, as of July 2024,

327
Henry Ridgwell, “European Right-Wing Politicians Call for ‘Preserving Nation-State in Europe’ and End to Ukraine Aid,”
Voice of America, April 18, 2024.
328
Confederation of Liberty and Independence [Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość], “Admitting Ukraine to the European
Union Is an Absurd Idea!” [“Przyjęcie Ukrainy do Unii Europejskiej to pomysł absurdalny!”], November 9, 2023; Martin
Fornusek, “Polish Official: Ukraine ‘Cannot Dream’ of EU Without Resolving Volyn Victims’ Exhumations,” Kyiv Independent,
November 7, 2023.
329
Andreas Fagerholm, “Sympathy or Criticism? The European Far Left and Far Right React to Russia’s 2022 Invasion of
Ukraine,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 76, No. 6, 2024.
330
Moira Fagan and Laura Clancy, “Among European Right-Wing Populists, Favorable Views of Russia and Putin Are Down
Sharply,” Pew Research Center, September 23, 2022; Rosa Balfour and Stefan Lehne, Charting the Radical Right’s Influence on
EU Foreign Policy, Carnegie Europe, April 2024; Tony Barber, “Europe’s Hard-Right Parties Differ in Important Ways,”
Financial Times, April 27, 2024.
331
Adam Holesch, Piotr Zagórski, and Luis Ramiro, “European Radical Left Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Ukraine:
Shifts in Assertiveness Towards Russia,” Political Research Exchange, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2024.
332
White House, “Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine,” press release, July 12, 2023a.

71
the United States.333 Under its ten-year bilateral security agreement, the United States has outlined
plans to expand and routinize bilateral cooperation and committed to high-level consultations in the
event of “a future Russian armed attack . . . to determine appropriate and necessary measures to
support Ukraine and impose costs on Russia.”334 However, the U.S.-Ukraine agreement—and the
other G7 bilateral accords—falls short of a binding mutual defense agreement, such as that enshrined
in NATO’s Article 5. Analysts have suggested that in the future, Washington could outline more-
specific goals, expand or institutionalize the agreement, or strengthen its legal basis.335 An expanded
security commitment could be used to convey U.S. determination to outlast Russian hostilities or to
induce Ukraine to participate in settlement negotiations.336 U.S. security guarantees could also be
established to encourage Russian adherence to the terms of a ceasefire or postwar settlement.
The ramifications for Europe are difficult to anticipate and would likely vary depending on the
extent of U.S. commitments, the military balance at the time, and the state of the European and
Russian DIBs. Most notably, a U.S. security guarantee would represent an expansion in the United
States’ security role and could thereby help reduce European anxiety about the strength of the United
States’ commitment to the region. Given recent memories of the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action and evidence of political resistance within the United States (see next
section), such a demonstration may not be sufficient to dispel European fears that future U.S.
presidential administrations would renege on U.S. commitments or that congressional opposition
could stymie or delay assistance. Similarly, U.S. security guarantees would lower one obstacle on
Ukraine’s path to EU membership but would not resolve other contentious issues likely to protract
negotiations.

The United States Withdraws from European Alliance Commitments

The prospect that the United States might reduce its security commitments already looms over
European debates over defense spending, strategic autonomy, and the war in Ukraine. President
Trump’s ambivalent attitude toward NATO, combined with his repeated criticism of perceived
European free riding, has raised concerns that he might either reduce U.S. commitments to NATO,
condition U.S. assistance on evidence of Europe taking on an increased share of the burden, or take
steps toward withdrawing the United States from the Alliance.337 Although polling suggests
Americans continue to hold largely favorable views of NATO, annual Pew Research Center polls
suggest that the number of U.S. adults who see a benefit to NATO membership has declined in
recent years amid the resurgence of a protectionist thread in domestic political debates.338 As part of a

333
Mykhailo Soldatenko, “Getting Ukraine’s Security Agreements Right,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 8,
2024.
334
White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Ukraine Bilateral Security Agreement,” fact sheet, June 13, 2024.
335
See, for example, Eric Ciaramella, Envisioning a Long-Term Security Arrangement for Ukraine, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, June 2023; Mykhailo Soldatenko, “What Will Security Commitments to Ukraine Look Like?” Lawfare,
August 4, 2023; Soldatenko, 2024.
336
Ciaramella, 2023; Soldatenko, 2023; Soldatenko, 2024.
337
Michael Hirsch, “Trump’s Plan for NATO Is Emerging,” Politico, July 2, 2024.
338
Richard Wike, Moira Fagan, Sneha Gubbala, and Sarah Austin, Growing Partisan Divisions over NATO and Ukraine, Pew
Research Center, May 8, 2024, pp. 19–21.

72
broader push for U.S. retrenchment, U.S. lawmakers have pressed for the United States to
substantially resize its footprint and reduce or cut off funding for the Alliance.339 Competing interests
in the Indo-Pacific region, defense budget constraints, and wider fiscal pressures could lead the United
States to reconsider its security role in Europe.340
The United States’ abdication would cast European militaries’ shortfalls in stark light and present
European leaders with a tough choice: attempt to reduce their insecurity by accommodating Russian
demands or accelerate rearmament by dramatically increasing national and multinational spending,
likely at the cost of social programs and longstanding fiscal policies. Some countries with more
traditionally favorable attitudes toward Russia may attempt to bargain bilaterally with Moscow,
undermining the cohesion required to maintain—let alone continue expanding—the EU’s restrictions
on relations with Russia and efforts to jumpstart European defense production and cooperation. Yet
many other countries, particularly the frontline states that feel the most threatened by Russia, are
likely to remain skeptical of engagement given the perceived incompatibility of their interests with
Russia’s. As during the period from 2016 to 2020, Eastern European countries may offer new
economic inducements, such as offers to offset the cost of U.S. infrastructure or personnel, in an
attempt to preserve elements of the U.S. presence in their countries.341 They may also band together
with other like-minded countries, such as the UK, Sweden, and Finland, to establish new
multinational frameworks outside EU or NATO auspices. Although defense spending across the
continent would likely be highly uneven, countries along Russia’s borders might accelerate
rearmament in an attempt to outpace Russian reconstitution and counter the perception that the
United States’ disengagement has created a new window of opportunity to settle old scores.342
The United States’ withdrawal would validate those who have long called for Europe to exercise
greater strategic autonomy. Yet European countries’ differing responses would likely make developing
consensus around a new security architecture extremely difficult, and it is unclear whether they would
be able to establish the unity required to assert influence on the global stage. The implications for
Ukraine’s EU membership are also unclear and likely dependent on the state of Ukrainian forces and
territory at the time of U.S. withdrawal. If Ukraine has withstood the Russian invasion, some
members may push for rapid EU enlargement as a demonstration of resolve despite U.S. engagement.
However, others may push for Brussels to husband its resources, leading to an inward turn for EU
politics.

Destabilization of Russia
Since the start of the war, some analysts have cautioned that the conflict’s accumulating human
and economic costs could deepen regional fissures, galvanize popular discontent, or embolden
challengers to the Putin regime.343 The short-lived mutiny led by Wagner Group leader Yevgeny

339
Giulia Carbonaro, “Full List of Republicans That Voted to Defund NATO,” Newsweek, June 5, 2024.
340
For a discussion of potential paths, see Emma Ashford and MacKenna Rawlins, “American Roulette: Scenarios for US
Retrenchment and the Future of European Defense,” Stimson Center, July 8, 2024.
341
For precedent, see Herszenhorn, 2018; Sheftalovich, 2018.
342
Ashford and Rawlins, 2024.
343
See, for example, Thomas Grove and Yaroslav Trofimov, “Prigozhin Is Gone, but the Causes of Russia’s Growing Instability
Persist,” Wall Street Journal, August 24, 2023; Maksim Samorukov, “Putin’s Brittle Regime,” Foreign Affairs, April 25, 2024.

73
Prigozhin illustrated the tensions the war has already created within the Russian system, although
experts continue to disagree over the extent to which the incident is indicative of the Putin regime’s
resilience or fragility.344 Regardless, the incident offers, as one observer has noted, a “reminder that
political threats in autocracies often emerge unpredictably, and political change often occurs in a
nonlinear fashion in these settings.”345
How European countries would respond to the destabilization of Russia is uncertain given the
dearth of serious public discussion of the prospect since the late 1990s. European leaders almost
certainly would view instability in Russia with trepidation, but the extent and nature of their
adaptations would depend on whether Putin retained control, the composition and political
orientation of any new government that might arise, the implications for the war in Ukraine, the
severity of the risk to the Russian Federation’s territorial integrity, and the status of Russia’s nuclear
arsenal. Differing risk tolerances and attitudes toward Russia may also lead to disagreements over
whether such instability could present opportunities to establish a more favorable military balance.
Europeans would likely look to the United States to take the lead, particularly in an event in which
control of Russia’s nuclear weapons becomes uncertain. However, a scenario in which Putin were
replaced with another member of his inner circle would likely not drive major variations in European
policies toward Russia given the likelihood that the new leadership would either continue or intensify
the regime’s autocratic practices. Indeed, some of the loudest criticism of Russia’s war efforts have
emanated from ultra-right nationalist figures, who have urged the Kremlin to adopt more-aggressive
policies in Ukraine and a more confrontational policy toward Europe and the United States.346 EU
leaders have made clear that a relaxation of sanctions and a reset of EU-Russia relations would require
a fundamental reorientation in Russian foreign policy and is not dependent on the regime.347 Similarly,
a geographically limited rebellion or a failed mutiny likely would not drive a change in European
policy, although it might absorb Russian resources and attention that otherwise might be used abroad.
However, a breakdown of public order, such as the resurgence of separatist movements or the
outbreak of civil conflict, would likely trigger fears of state collapse and the creation of a political
vacuum on Europe’s borders. In such a scenario, some European leaders may be incentivized to reduce
pressure on the regime and to pursue limited cooperation to ensure the security of the country’s
nuclear forces. However, Europeans have very limited options for responding to such an event; lifting
sanctions, for example, would not produce meaningful near-term changes in Russian economy or
otherwise help to redress the immediate drivers of instability. Furthermore, countries with more-
unfavorable views of Russia, such as Poland or the Baltic countries, likely would argue for continued
pressure to further weaken Russia’s capacity to threaten NATO territory.

344
For varied discussion of the implications of the mutiny, see Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “The Russia Stability Tracker,” Center
for a New American Security, November 2023. For examples of broader disagreements, see Julian G. Waller, “Putin the
Resilient,” Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2024; Samorukov, 2024.
345
See Tim Frye, quoted in Kendall-Taylor, 2023.
346
See, for example, Yuliya Chernova, “In Russia, Far-Right Nationalists Offer Rare Criticism of Kremlin’s War Effort,” Wall
Street Journal, August 22, 2022; “Russian Nationalist, Kremlin Critic Girkin Sentenced to 4 Years in Prison,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, January 25, 2024.
347
Meister, 2022.

74
Recommendations
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has accomplished something that U.S. diplomacy alone
could not for years: a multiyear increase in overall defense spending, a push to decouple from Russian
fossil fuels, a renewed energy to equip and modernize NATO, and a degree of cohesion among the
majority of European allies unobserved in several decades. Defying prewar expectations, European
capitals are dedicating substantial resources, political attention, and political capital to translating
visions for collective defense into a practical policy agenda, even as political statements have often
outpaced states’ ability to implement defense reforms. However, significant obstacles to achieving
European goals remain, including outstanding questions about their ability to sustain large defense
budgets and to maintain political momentum over the long term. As EU, NATO, and European
policymakers work to translate common strategies into specific policies, national differences likely will
be exposed. The unpredictability of U.S. domestic political processes will continue to cause
uncertainty about the United States’ role in the region that could fray the alignment currently
apparent in U.S. and European strategy.
Encouraging greater European responsibility sharing has been a consistent component of U.S.
defense policy toward the region for over seven decades. European countries must take the lead in
addressing the political, economic, and practical obstacles to improving their defense capabilities.
However, our analysis highlights that the United States has a role to play in sustaining European and
transatlantic unity and reinforcing positive trends in European defense spending, capabilities, and
initiatives. The United States should also seize the window of opportunity to leverage the benefits of
new defense investments and initiatives to advance its strategic and operational objectives in the
region. We have identified several recommendations for how the United States can mitigate the risk of
backsliding, help to focus European investments and capability development to align with U.S.
priorities, and prepare to incorporate potential European improvements into U.S. planning.

Recommendations for the U.S. Government

We make the following recommendations for the U.S. government:
• Expand U.S. consultations and coordination with the EU on defense matters to
demonstrate U.S. commitment to the principle of complementarity and redress allies’
concerns that investments in EU defense capability will alienate the United States.
European concerns about potential negative U.S. reactions have decreased the amount of
support for some EU initiatives intended to promote DIB reforms and European capacity
building. Although senior U.S. officials have lent rhetorical support for EU programs, the
United States can do more to help institutionalize EU-NATO cooperation. This could
include pressing Turkey and Cyprus to enable more formalized collaboration between the EU
and NATO. In addition, establishing routine mechanisms for U.S.-EU consultation and
coordination would also help both sides work through political, economic, and administrative
obstacles. The United States could request an increase in the frequency and level of the
recently established U.S.-EU Security and Defense Dialogues and could use its position
within the NAC to encourage the establishment of a routine schedule of consultations with

75
 the EU Political and Security Committee on a broad set of defense and security matters.348
Although the NAC and Political and Security Committee have been meeting informally since
2016 and more formally since 2022 to coordinate Ukraine assistance, a more structured
dialogue with clearly established objectives would benefit both parties. Meetings between these
two bodies provide a rare opportunity to align activities and redress outstanding concerns.349 A
more routine schedule would help to advance collaboration, sustain momentum, decrease
unnecessary redundancies in NATO and EU activities, and reduce the risk of conflict between
the institutions. Regular consultations between ambassadors to NATO and the EU would
also provide the United States greater visibility into intra-EU political debates. Alternatively,
consultations between the European Commission and NATO International Military Staff
would help to bureaucratically anchor the two organizations.
• To help to ensure U.S. and European initiatives are aligned, continue and consider
improving information-sharing with non–Five Eye allies regarding Russian intent,
capabilities, and potential courses of action. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine created a
general awareness among European countries that Russia poses a potential military threat to
the territorial integrity of NATO and EU member countries. However, European allies
continue to disagree about Russia’s specific capacity and intent to threaten European and U.S.
interests, as well as its pace of reconstitution. Consistent information-sharing can help to
promote a common European understanding of the challenge and to align defense cooperation
and capabilities development as Russian capabilities and activities evolve. Since 2022, the U.S.
intelligence community has sought to improve the sharing of intelligence and information with
U.S. allies and partners, but policy, procedural, and cultural factors continue to impose
limitations and delays.
• Encourage the creation of an EU fund to support member states’ implementation of
initiatives aligned with NATO resilience priorities. Improvements in the resilience of allied
critical infrastructure can benefit U.S. forces operating in the theater by ensuring access to off-
base resources needed to sustain operations. Such investments can also support U.S. efforts to
maintain or revise basing, access, and host nation support agreements by demonstrating U.S.
commitment to local communities’ safety and reducing opportunities for Russia or other
adversaries to use threats against critical infrastructure to influence internal deliberations.
• Continue to encourage the development of institutional economic and industrial
relationships between U.S. allies in Europe and the Pacific region and cooperation
through non-NATO frameworks. The war in Ukraine has fostered new security ties
between Europe and Japan, South Korea, and Australia as European countries realize
potential opportunities to access military equipment and diplomatic support. To date, U.S.
efforts have emphasized how European political and military contributions may help advance
U.S. competition objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. However, the United States should
also consider opportunities to develop connections between the regional networks to advance

348
At time of writing, the U.S.-EU Security and Defense Dialogues have met once a year since their establishment in 2022.
Sebastian Sprenger, “First-Ever Defense Talks Between US, EU Near amid Ukraine War,” Defense News, April 19, 2022.
349
For a similar recommendation, see Mathieu Droin, “NATO and the European Union: The Burden of Sharing,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, January 17, 2023.

76
 both theaters’ resilience to external and internal challenges. Given the EU’s role in shaping
DIB policy and its ability to help fund European acquisitions, EU joint procurement and DIB
initiatives may be better suited than NATO frameworks to institutionalize defense
cooperation and establish common standards. The United States could, for example,
encourage the EU to study the potential benefits and trade-offs of extending invitations to
select Indo-Pacific countries to participate as third states in select PESCO projects to
encourage the joint production of capabilities for which there is currently no European
provider.350

Recommendations for the U.S. Department of Defense

We make the following recommendations for DoD:
• Increase and regularize dialogues with the European Defence Agency and other EU
institutions to encourage the interchangeability of new systems, particularly munitions,
developed through new European joint development and procurement programs. The
United States has traditionally encouraged European allies to purchase American systems to
enhance interoperability and ensure capability. Given the extant shortfalls in U.S. and
European defense production and the apparent need to revive the transatlantic industrial base,
however, the United States should encourage European defense spending and procurement
from European sources. If sustained, increased European defense investments in research,
development, and procurement may enhance European contributions to NATO, support
other multinational operations with the United States, and supplement U.S. production in the
event of a major contingency that drains U.S. stockpiles and stresses the United States’ ability
to produce. However, routine coordination through such forums as the armaments directors’
meetings is required to establish common military standards, technical specifications, and
practices.
• Identify areas in which European producers may be well or best suited to address U.S.
capability and stockpile gaps. Genuine interoperability goes both ways, and new European
defense initiatives may provide novel solutions for capability and capacity gaps for a potential
future contingency in which U.S. demand exceeds national production or transport capacity.
Although European stocks and production capacity are currently stretched thin, U.S. planners
should monitor their growth and identify whether European producers are developing
components, equipment, or weapons that could augment U.S. supplies, particularly in the
event of an early wartime surge. Leveraging this opportunity requires identifying and
communicating U.S. needs that could be met in a major contingency, as well as consideration
of multiyear orders to incentivize production; these needs should be identified and
communicated to major European producer countries and in European-led joint production
forums. In identifying what non-U.S. origin equipment, munitions, and other support could

350
As of August 2024, Canada, Norway, and the United States already participate as third states. The UK was invited to
participate in a project in 2022 and Canada in 2023. EEAS, “Questions & Answers: Third States’ Participation in PESCO
Projects,” May 23, 2023. Japan and South Korea reportedly have expressed interest in increased defense industrial cooperation
with the EU; see “EU Seeks Defence Industry Partnerships with Japan, South Korea, Says Nikkei,” Reuters, June 23, 2024.

77
 be leveraged—and what adaptations might be required—DoD, DAF and U.S. Air Forces in
Europe should consider opportunities to use European stocks or production lines to reduce
logistical barriers to implementing concepts for distributed air operations in Europe.
• To help preserve European cohesion, work through NATO forums to identify “common
denominator” requirements useful for responding to variety of hostile actions, including
measures short of war. NATO’s new deterrence and defense plans represent an important
step toward identifying capabilities, posture, and exercise requirements. Yet some Southern
European members that are currently facing greater challenges from migration have already
expressed reticence to focus NATO resources on the Russia threat out of concern that
NATO may divert resources from counterterrorism requirements. Future crises, such as a
resurgent migrant crisis, a substantial increase in terrorist attacks, a public health emergency,
or climate change, could divert attention or galvanize opposition from needed investments. To
prepare for a variety of futures and to preserve support from European members already
concerned that the Alliance is neglecting other threats, DoD can assist NATO in identifying
high-return investments and communicate their usefulness for a variety of contingencies. By
clarifying how NATO is preparing to address all members’ priorities, the United States can
help to preserve cohesion, encourage equitable contributions from all members, and
strengthen political consultations between members on issues vital to the Alliance.
• Continue to cooperate with the EU on regional and security issues beyond Russia that
preoccupy Southern members, such as migration, counterterrorism, and climate change.
Local crises can generate friction among European countries and weaken the consensus
required to tackle major obstacles to building European defense capacity and resilience. To
reduce or avert concerns that EU and NATO leaders’ focus on Russia is allowing other
problems to fester, the United States should pursue opportunities to cooperate with European
allies to redress drivers of insecurity.

Recommendations for the U.S. Air Force

We make the following recommendations for USAF:
• Assess and communicate to European allies the potential munitions, maintenance, and
spare parts requirements that might differ from demand signals created by the Russia-
Ukraine war. The Russia-Ukraine war has energized Europeans to increase defense
procurement, modernize their DIBs, and reexamine the forces required for a potential future
high-intensity conflict. Given the time required to build new force structure and
infrastructure, the decisions EU and European leaders make over the next few years are likely
to shape the forces available for decades to come. Yet there is a risk of over-learning from the
Russia-Ukraine war. Current European efforts to boost production emphasize the need to
either supply Ukraine or backfill European donors’ inventories. However, a potential future
conflict between NATO and Russia likely would generate different operational needs,

78
 particularly for air forces, given their more limited use in the current conflict.351 A comparison
of future and current needs can help to ensure that these production lines are established
before they are needed. This should include consideration of how best to prepare for
prolonged conflicts and potential adjustments in stockpiles of assets like fuel and spare parts,
as well as transportation and distribution networks.
• Increase information-sharing related to the drivers of U.S. Air Force operational
requirements in other theaters, particularly the Indo-Pacific region. Despite the United
States’ forceful response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, European allies remain
concerned that political, financial, and strategic factors could lead the United States to reduce
its commitments to European security. Although European leaders generally recognize their
dependence on the United States, uncertainty about the United States’ future role in the
region historically has weakened transatlantic political ties and complicated efforts to align
U.S. and European defense and industrial policy. Uncertainty about the future U.S. role and
the availability of U.S. forces also contributes to tensions among Europeans and could hamper
efforts to build the indigenous capabilities required to improve European responsibility
sharing. Making U.S. policy and posture decisions more predictable by clarifying the rationale
behind them can help to rightsize expectations, avert or reduce future tensions, and inform
European force structure and acquisitions decisions. The Russia-Ukraine war has created a
window of opportunity to shape long-term European investments.

351
Mark Hvizda, Bryan Frederick, Alisa Laufer, Alexandra T. Evans, Kristen Gunness, and David A. Ochmanek, Dispersed,
Disguised, and Degradable: The Implications of the Fighting in Ukraine for Future U.S.-Involved Conflicts, RAND Corporation, RR-
A3141-2, 2025.

79
Abbreviations

ASAP Act in Support of Ammunition Production

COVID-19 coronavirus disease 2019
DAF U.S. Department of the Air Force
DDA Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area
DIB defense industrial base
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
EDIRPA European Defence Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act
EEAS European External Action Service
eFP enhanced Forward Presence
EPF European Peace Facility
EU European Union
EUMAM European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine
G7 Group of Seven
GDP gross domestic product
LNG liquefied natural gas
MAP Membership Action Plan
NAC North Atlantic Council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRC NATO-Russia Council
NSATU NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine
PESCO Permanent Structure Cooperation
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
UK United Kingdom
USAF U.S. Air Force
USAFE U.S. Air Forces in Europe

80
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 P R O J E C T A I R FO R C E

T
he Russia-Ukraine war has compelled European leaders to ask fundamental questions
about European security and defense, confront the realities of modern interstate conflict,
and reassess the tools available to manage the current emergency and defend against
future threats. Since the war began, European nations working collectively through the
European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and sub-regional coalitions
have come together in opposition to Russia’s invasion and in defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty. It remains
to be seen, however, whether the war will drive broader changes in European understandings of the
threat to their collective interests and what is required to ensure their collective defense.

RAND researchers examined the consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war and how U.S. allies in Europe
understand and pursue their security. To assess whether the conflict is likely to drive long-lasting changes
in European security priorities, investments, and relations, the researchers analyzed the conflict’s effects
on (1) European attitudes toward relations with Russia; (2) European collective security strategies,
institutions, and resources; and (3) prospects for increased integration with Ukraine.

$42.00

ISBN-10 1-9774-1453-2
ISBN-13 978-1-9774-1453-3
54200

www.rand.org 9 781977 414533

RR-A3141-5