Tactical Nuclear Weapons as a barrier to Indian Cold Start Doctrine

Shazia Soomro, Sumaya, Amina, Zainab & Muhammad Ibrahim

The vulnerable strategic stability has been a cause of concern for the whole region
because of the two nuclear weapon states’ continuous rivalry with each other. Both states are not
leaving a single chance to harm each other. The whole South Asia has been stuck due to these
two nations’ confrontation. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has
almost become ineffective due to confrontation between India and Pakistan. And if these two
states again indulge into war with each other, it will prove to be disastrous for the whole South
Asian region (Farooque Ahmed Leghari & Muhammad Ramzan Pahore, 2019). There is a great
need for the other regional states to influence India and Pakistan and ask them to sit together and
continue dialogue as it seemed to be the only way for the resolution of the long standing disputes
between the two countries (Imtiaz Ahmed Khan, Altaf Hussain Abro & Farooque Ahmed
Leghari, 2021).

India and Pakistan’s changed military doctrines have made many analysts worried about
the situation of South Asia. The major concern among the security analysts is the short time
period in the decision making process on the two sides because the state can miscalculate and
lead to accidental war. Dr Pervez Iqbal Cheema, Professor and Dean at National Defense
University, Islamabad, said in this connection, “I am not sure, one thing may lead to another and
eventually they cross the threshold, you still may not know because the record of these two
countries is not good” (Expert Informant, Interview, 13 November 2015) & (Farooque Ahmed
Leghari, Marufa Akhtar & Shelly Jonny, 2023) & (Farooque Ahmed Leghari, Imran Ali Noonari
& Muhammad Ali Pasha Panhwar, 2020).

The psyche to check each other’s nerves is not a good game. It seems visible all times
that India and Pakistan remain busy to check each other’s limits (Farooque ahmed Leghari &
Ravichandran Moorthy, 2017). If one looks at past crises before the arrival of the ‘Cold Start
Doctrine’ on the Indian side and the introduction of ‘Tactical Nuclear Weapons’ on Pakistani
side, one comes to know how much serious the situations were in 1987, 1990, 1999 and 2002
(Farooque Ahmed Leghari, Ravichandran Moorthy, Pervez Ahmed Mahesar & Hameed Mahesar,
2016). Pakistan’s decision to get tactical nuclear weapons have stopped Indian intentions of
launching limited conventional war against it but if India further takes measures to counter this
Pakistani move, it will bring instability in the region (Sultan 2012: 163) & (Farooque Ahmed
Leghari, Muhammad Ramzan Pahore & Muhammad Ali Pasha Panhwar, 2020).
 After the start of Indian Cold Start Doctrine in 2004, both states faced another crisis in
2008 when the terrorists attacked Mumbai but we did not see Indians using this doctrine against
Pakistan (Farooque Ahmed Leghari, Ashfaque Ali Banbhan & Hussain Abbas, 2020). This
incident infuriated India as it started threatening Pakistan with war rhetoric. Though Indians had
been working on Cold Start Doctrine since 2004 but due to its initial stages, they could not go for
a limited war against Pakistan (Farooque Ahmed Leghari, Hussain Abbas & Ashfaque Banbhan,
2020). The nuclear factor worked during the crisis period as the restraint was witnessed on
Indian side because Indians did not opt for the option of war against Pakistan (Farooque Ahmed
Leghari & Ravichandran Moorthy, 2015). The US diplomacy also seemed effective which
stopped the two states from pursuing war options (Farooque Ahmed Leghari & Ravichandran
Moorthy, 2015). This crisis did not have a dimension of a full-fledged conventional war because
there was no major military mobilization on the two sides of the border but it created a fear on
Pakistan’s side that India might go for a limited war against it (Farooque Ahmed Leghari,
Ravichandran Moorthy, 2018). In this connection, Experts informants argued that Indian Cold
Start Doctrine was in its initial phases in 2008 and it was the reason why Indians did not opt for a
limited war against Pakistan (Farooque Ahmed Leghari, Irfan Hussain Qaisrani & Shaukat,
2020). The severity of crisis was noticed during Mumbai crisis as there was an extreme anger on
the Indian side. India also mobilized some of its forces at some places on Indo-Pak border but it
was not a war mobilization (Farooque Ahmed Leghari, Humera Hakro & Muhammad Ramzan
Kolachi, 2019). In this connection, Pakistan’s Ex Ambassador Akram Zaki argued about the
severity of the situation prevailed during Mumbai crisis:

India attempted an air attack on Mureedke but our response was very swift and we told
the Americans that we (Pakistanis) have their flights in target and we (Pakistanis) will shoot it
down so ask them to go back. They (Indians) came in with the intention of bombing; we locked
their plan and we (Pakistanis) told them (Americans) that this is their plan and we will shoot
them down, if they are not going to move back. If they (Indians) would not have gone back, we
(Pakistanis) have shot them down then it would have been a major crisis (Zaki, A., Expert
Informant, Interview, 11 November 2015).

Above said lines of Zaki meant that India under extreme pressure from its public planned
launching airstrikes into Pakistan but failed to do so. Furthermore Professor (R) Dr Zafar Iqbal
Cheema, President, Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad, said, “Nuclear deterrence played a very
effective role in defusing the crisis between India and Pakistan during 2008 crisis” (Cheema, Z,
I., Expert Informant, Interview, 13 November 2015).

India and Pakistan again faced another crisis in 2016 when insurgency and protests
reached at its height in Indian held Kashmir after the killing of Indian militant leader Burhan
Wani at the hands of Indian forces. The tense situation led to Indo-Pak clashes on the border. The
situation between the two states started worsening. The terrorist attack on Indian military
headquarters in Uri, Kashmir on 17 September 2016 which resulted in death of 19 Indian soldiers
fuelled fire to already adverse situation prevailing between India and Pakistan. India threatened
Pakistan of a revenge. Pakistan feeling an Indian threat started preparing to face any Indian
misadventure. India claimed of launching “Surgical Strikes” inside Pakistani controlled territory
of Azad Kashmir on 29 September 2016. According to Indian official claims, its forces entered
into Azad Kashmir and destroyed six terrorist launch pads and killed 40 terrorists. Pakistan
rejected Indian claim of launching surgical strikes inside Azad Kashmir. International media did
not borrow Indian claim of surgical strikes and witnessed heavy firing between the two sides on
the night of 29 September 2016. While the defense analysts such as Ayesha Siddiqa speaking to
BBC Urdu, said that Indian forces entered inside Azad Kashmir’s territory, but it was about 200
meters and not two kilometers as claimed by Indian politicians (BBC Urdu 30 September 2016).

Another crisis occurred between India and Pakistan in 2019 when 44 Indian soldiers lost
their lives in a suicide attack in Pulwama, Indian held Kashmir. The responsibility for the
terrorist attack was claimed by a militant group Jaish e Mohammad. India once against following
the old same tradition accused Pakistan of supporting militant insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan
denied Indian accusation.

Indian Air Force Aircrafts entered into Pakistani territory and claimed of bombing
terrorist headquarters in Balakot, Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa province. Pakistan clarified the world
community that Indian Air Force has violated its sovereignty but when chased by Pakistan Air
Force, Indian aircrafts were in a rush to escape three explosives on the plain areas of Balakot
where no any loss of life and property has been experienced. Pakistan also clarified India that it
will give an adequate response to India (Ashfaq Ahmed, Farzad Cheema, Farooque Leghari,
2021).

The next day witnessed Pakistan Air Force targeting plain areas inside Indian held
Kashmir. The reason behind targeting plain areas other than the military installations was just to
communicate the message that Pakistan had the capability to give an adequate response to India.
When Indian Air Force Aircraft entered into Azad Kashmir with an intention to target Pakistani
Air Force Aircrafts, it lost one of its aircraft. One of Indian Pilot was also arrested by Pakistani
soldiers who was released by Pakistan as a good will gesture on the next day.

After this dog fight between Indian and Pakistani Air Force, India threated Pakistan of
missile strikes but it did not opt for that option on the insistence of the international community.
The international community including the US played an important role in averting war between
the two states during this crisis.

, Pakistan’s belief had been strengthened that Indians are not going for a limited
conventional war against Pakistan in presence of Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons. Indian
claim of launching surgical strikes in 2016 and air strikes in 2019 also confirmed one thing that
Indians are now thinking of other options for tackling Pakistan other than the option of full-
fledged or limited conventional war. By looking at last two crises, it seems visible that Pakistan’s
commendable progress in its nuclear weapons program has left Indians with limited military
choices against Pakistan. Both states are involved in sub conventional warfare in which they
support the insurgent and militant groups to create trouble for each other. In this connection,
Pakistan’s Ex Ambassador Akram Zaki said: “The nuclear weapons are preventing the direct
attack while providing space for the indirect attack so you can see the new type of warfare has
been started. You know, what they are doing in Baluchistan and at other places” (Zaki, A., Expert
Informant, Interview, 11 November 2015).

India and Pakistan’s previous positions on the nuclear weapons have been changed after
the arrival of Cold Start Doctrine and Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the region. Pakistan has
moved back from its previous position in which it called nuclear weapons as weapons of last
resort and now narrates that it will use tactical nuclear weapons against Indian soldiers crossing
Pakistan’s border with an intention of launching a limited war. Indians have also brought change
in their official position regarding the use of nuclear weapons against Pakistan and said that India
will retaliate with massive nuclear retaliation if Pakistan uses tactical nuclear weapons against its
forces either on Indian or Pakistani side. Indians further clear their position that they do not
differentiate in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and any attack from Pakistan’s side both
with strategic or tactical nuclear weapons will be considered in the same category and will be
responded with massive nuclear retaliation.

The new doctrinal changes on Indian and Pakistani sides are alarming. Indian ‘Cold Start
Doctrine’ which allows Indian military to initiate war within 72 to 96 hours makes time factor
compressed. This Indian strategy has made Pakistan feel worried because now it needs to remain
prepared all the times to respond to any such situation where India attacks Pakistan under the
shadow of Cold Start Doctrine. In this connection, Lieutenant General (R) Pakistan Army, Khalid
Ahmed Kidwai said, “Limited war is something that is not controllable by one side when the two
parties are fighting, one can’t decide that the fight will be limited” (Kidwai, K, A., Expert
Informant, Interview, 19 November 2015).

Though the tactical nuclear weapons have stopped India from going after Pakistan with
an intention of limited war under its Cold Start Doctrine but these developments make the
situation more vulnerable because the time period has been compressed in Indo-Pak military
calculations. Now the present situation puts the militaries on the two sides on all time alert
because war can start any time. In this connection, Dr Joseph Samuel Nye, Distinguished
Professor at Harvard University said, “the nuclear weapons produced caution but there was
always some danger of miscalculation” (Expert Informant, Email Interview, 9 February 2016).
No one knows if the war starts what will be its final results. The situation is very critical at the
both conventional and strategic layers. There is need to change the thinking otherwise it will be
difficult to deal with the things in the proper way. Cold Start Doctrine is not going to serve
Indian interests.

Both states have faced crises one after another with the gap of only few years. India has
lowered its conventional layer by introducing the ‘Cold Start Doctrine’ which has created serious
security concerns for Pakistan. On the other side, we see Pakistan lowering its strategic layer to
the tactical level with introducing tactical nuclear weapons. The situation has become very
difficult as the two states are not understanding each other and not leaving a single chance to
harm each other. As India has formed Independent Battle groups (IBGs) which are empowered to
attack Pakistan within 72 to 96 hours if any terrorist attack occurs from Pakistani side. In this
connection, Dr. Maria Sultan, Director General, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
(SASSI), Islamabad, said, “No war will be thrust on Pakistan just because India wants a limited
war” (Sultan, M., Expert Informant, Interview, 5 November 2015). This indicates that the power
to start war or to take action against Pakistan has been transferred from the Indian elected
government to Indian military. This is not a good step. Indian military can opt for an adventure
against Pakistan.

In this connection, any kind of that adventure could result into a misadventure as Pakistan
said that it will not allow Indians to fight a war on Pakistani territory. Pakistan has threatened to
use the tactical nuclear weapons against Indian troops crossing its border.

Furrthermore, in connection to the above discussion, Dr Pervez Iqbal Cheema, Professor

and Dean at National Defense University, Islamabad, argued that limited war is not possible
between the nuclear weapon states and both India and Pakistan should admit this fact as there has
been no such example in the past, it was seen during bipolar era than even Americans talked
about fighting conventional war against USSR under nuclear umbrella but could not materialize
it and in connection to the above example India and Pakistan should restrain from opting the
option of war as the two states are deeply involved in bitter relations and any war between the
two can lead to a nuclear exchange and “the nuclear war is a suicidal war, where nobody is going
to win (Cheema, P.I, Expert Informant, Interview, 13 November 2015).

To sum up, Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons have proved to be a barrier in the way of
Indian Cold Start Doctrine. In the presence of these weapons on Pakistan’s side, Indian option of
launching a limited war against Pakistan is almost impossible to be converted into a reality.

References

The U.S Grand Strategy in South Asia in a Changing World Order, Farooque Ahmed
Leghari, Marufa Akhtar & Shelly Jonny, Book Chapter, Emerging World Order After the Russia
Ukraine War, Edited by Dr Muqtedar Khan, New Lines Institute, Washington DC, the United
States, Pages 27-33, March 9, 2023.

Nuclear Deterrence: A Complete Failure at Kargil. Farooque ahmed Leghari &

Ravichandran Moorthy, Research on Humanities and Social Sciences 5 (5), (IISTE), Pages105-
108, April, 2015.

Diplomacy and Democracy avert Indo-Pak crisis 1986-87, Farooque ahmed Leghari &
Ravichandran Moorthy, International Affairs and Global Strategy 30, (IISTE) Pages18-21, April,
2015.

Diplomacy Averts 1990’s Crisis between India and Pakistan: A Critical Analysis,
Farooque Ahmed Leghari, Ravichandran Moorthy, Pervez Ahmed Mahesar & Hameed Mahesar.
The Government: Research Journal of Political Science, Vol. V, 2016, Department of Political
Science, University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan.

Nuclear Deterrence or Diplomacy: Managing the India-Pakistan Crises, Farooque ahmed

Leghari & Ravichandran Moorthy, e-Bangi, Jorunal of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 12,
No. 3 (2017), 004 ISSN: 1823-884x. Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, University
Kebangsaan Malaysia.

Pakistan China Economic Relation and its Geo Political Implications: A Study with
Special Focus on China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Farooque Ahmed Leghari,
Ravichandran Moorthy. Research Journal of Social Sciences.Vol. 16, 2018. Faculty of Social
Sciences University of Sindh, Jamshoro.
 Nuclear Proliferation and Pakistan, Farooque Ahmed Leghari, Humera Hakro &
Muhammad Ramzan Kolachi. Progressive Research Journal of arts and Humanities (PRJAH),
Vol. 01, Issue 01, November, 2019.

Indo Pak Crisis in wake terrorist attack on Indian Parliament, Farooque Ahmed Leghari
& Muhammad Ramzan Pahore. Research Journal of Social Sciences.Vol. 17, 2019. Faculty of
Social Sciences University of Sindh, Jamshoro.

Low Yield Nuclear Weapons and Indian Option for Limited War, Farooque Ahmed
Leghari, Irfan Hussain Qaisrani & Shaukat. Global Political Review. March, 2020.

Preparing for the future war: India and Pakistan’s changing military doctrines. Farooque
Ahmed Leghari, Ashfaque Ali Banbhan & Hussain Abbas. Global Strategic and Security Studies
Review, Vol 3. 2020.

Role of Diplomacy and Deterrence in Managing Pakistan India Crisis: A Case Study of
Post Bombay Attacks Crisis. Farooque Ahmed Leghari, Hussain Abbas & Ashfaque Banbhan.
Global Regional Review. V. 3, September, 2020.

Prospects of Limited War between India and Pakistan. Farooque Ahmed Leghari,
Muhammad Ramzan Pahore & Muhammad Ali Pasha Panhwar. Asian Journal of International
Peace and Security. Vol. 4 (2), 2020.

Nuclear Signaling in South Asia. Farooque Ahmed Leghari, Imran Ali Noonari &
Muhammad Ali Pasha Panhwar. Asian Journal of International Peace and Security. Vol. 4 (1),
2020.

China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): Geo Political and Geo Economics Analysis.
Amir Jan, Muhammad Ramzan Pahore & Farooque Ahmed Leghari. Asian Journal of
International Peace and Security. Vol. 4 (1), 2020.

Indian Air Force Evolving Counterforce and Counter Value Capabilities and Emerging
Challenges for Pakistan’s Security. Ashfaq Ahmed, Farzad Cheema, Farooque Leghari. Asian
Journal of International Peace and Security. Vol. 5 (1), 2021.

Investor Protection and Agency Theory in Corporate Governance in Pakistan. Imtiaz

Ahmed Khan, Altaf Hussain Abro & Farooque Ahmed Leghari. Progressive Research Journal of
Arts and Humanities (PRJAH). Vol. 4 (1), 2021.