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20 Emergency Preparedness 3rd Course - W.TROMM

The document outlines the objectives and components of emergency preparedness and response for nuclear accidents, emphasizing the need for flexible planning and effective management strategies. It details the phases of emergency management, including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery, and highlights the role of decision support systems like JRodos in facilitating real-time decision-making during nuclear emergencies. Key goals include saving lives, minimizing health effects, and ensuring public trust while preparing for the resumption of normal activities post-incident.

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Camila Figueredo
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
41 views58 pages

20 Emergency Preparedness 3rd Course - W.TROMM

The document outlines the objectives and components of emergency preparedness and response for nuclear accidents, emphasizing the need for flexible planning and effective management strategies. It details the phases of emergency management, including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery, and highlights the role of decision support systems like JRodos in facilitating real-time decision-making during nuclear emergencies. Key goals include saving lives, minimizing health effects, and ensuring public trust while preparing for the resumption of normal activities post-incident.

Uploaded by

Camila Figueredo
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 58

Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21

Joint ICTP-IAEA 2nd course on Scientific Novelties in


Phenomenology of Severe Accidents in Water Cooled Reactors

Challenges in Propagation of Severe Accidents and Mitigation of


their Consequences
20. Emergency Preparedness and Response

Th. Walter Tromm, Programme Nuclear Waste Management, Safety and Radiation Research

KIT – The Research University in the Helmholtz Association www.kit.edu


DiD Level 5

The objective is the mitigation of radiological consequences of


significant releases of radioactive materials, by using off-site
emergency response.

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Emergency Planning
 Planning for emergency situations and therefore the
resources allocated for such situation, are based on
credible scenarios, but many uncertainties exist in a real
situation at beginning.
 Nuclear emergency plans must therefore be flexible, and
able to be extended to beyond reasonably credible
scenarios.

The general objectives of emergency planning are:


 Reduce the risk or mitigate the consequences of the
accident at its source
 Prevent serious deterministic health effects (e.g., death)
 Reduce the likely stochastic health effects (e.g., cancer) as
much as reasonably achievable
Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
A Model of Emergency Management
The Four Components model
 Prevention and mitigation: Prevent accidents from
occuring in the first place or mitigate the impact of
potential accidents.
 Preparedness: Prepare to respond to all types of
accidents:
 developing and exercising emergency response plans
 Response: Respond effectively to minimize
consequences.
 Implementing emergency mitigating equipment and
public protective actions during an accident
 Recovery: Remediate the situation and return to normal.
 cleaning up after an accident
Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Goal of Emergency Planning
 The goal of emergency preparedness is to ensure
that an adequate capability is in place within the
operating organization and at local, regional and
national levels and, where appropriate, at the
international level, for an effective response in a
nuclear or radiological emergency.
 This capability relates to an integrated set of
infrastructural elements that include, but are not
limited to: authority and responsibilities; organization
and staffing; coordination; plans and procedures;
tools, equipment and facilities; training, drills and
exercises; and a management system.

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Goals of Emergency Response
1. to regain control of the situation and to mitigate
consequences;
2. to save lives;
3. to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects;
4. to render first aid, to provide critical medical treatment and
to manage the treatment of radiation injuries;
5. to reduce the risk of stochastic effects;
6. to keep the public informed and to maintain public trust;
7. to mitigate, to the extent practicable, non-radiological
consequences;
8. to protect, to the extent practicable, property and the
environment;
9. to prepare, to the extent practicable, for the resumption of
normal social and economic activity.
Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Emergency management cycle

Procedia Engineering 32:25–37

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Accident phases and emergency management

Pre-event Threat Release Normality


Recovery phase in all areas
phase phase phase

hours / days / weeks ... months ... years / decades

Control of activity levels in the environment


Early actions: Necessity;
imposition, lifting, efficiency

Advice for preventing contamination


Management of contaminated food- and feedstuffs
Management of contaminated urban+agricultural areas

Rehabilitation of areas for


returning to normal living

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
JRODOS : Real-time online decision support
system for nuclear emergency management
What a decision support system can deliver to decision
making teams in case of a severe nuclear accident
JRodos as an example for a modern DSS
Tasks, input data, output
Simulation models and application examples
JRodos users; an emergency centre with JRodos
Conclusions on a DSS

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
JRodos users world wide (2020)

■ RODOS installation 2018 – 2021 Installation in ASEAN countries


■ RODOS installation – ongoing 2019 – 2022 Installation in 6 Gulf states
2020 – 2023 Installation in 6 West-Balkan states
■ RODOS local users

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Possible tasks of a decision support system for
off-site nuclear emergency management
Provide consistent and comprehensive information at local,
regional and national levels, for all accident phases
During real event (housing and displaying of relevant information
about the release, the weather, the contamination; forecast of health,
agricultural and economic impacts with and without the application of
countermeasure)
When preparing for a possible future event (creating scenarios and
background material for planning, exercises and training)
Assist decision makers in evaluating different measures
against a range of quantitative and qualitative criteria
Promote a common emergency management frame aiming
to move away from national solutions

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Key features of RODOS
Real-time On-line Decision Support system

Multi-user operation in national/regional emergency


centres for off-site nuclear emergency management

Provision of information for decision-making


on local / national / regional / European scales,

in the early and later phases of an accident,

for all relevant emergency actions and countermeasures.

Wide IT applicability - HP-UX and Linux (RODOS),


Microsoft Windows, Linux and Mac OS (JRodos)

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Atmospheric transport and deposition -
phenomena considered in JRodos

inversion layer

height

dependent
atmospheric turbulence
wind

wet
deposition
dry
deposition
release to
atmosphere
contamination – radioactive particles and gases

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
From release to radiation exposure of people,
for airborne accidental releases from nuclear
power plants
Transport through the atmosphere
and deposition on natural and man-made
surfaces
External pathways Internal pathways
•  - irradiation from radioactivity •inhalation of activity in cloud
on ground and man-made •inhalation of activity
surfaces resuspended from ground
•  - irradiation from radioactivity •ingestion of contaminated food
in cloud and drinking water

Release to
atmosphere
Transport of deposited radioactive material
through environment and biosphere

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
JRodos: Tasks, input data, output
Radiological Monitoring Data Meteorological and Release Data

Ranked List simulation Environmental


of Contamination of
of Feasible radiological
Strategies Air, Ground, and
situation
of Long- Food, Potential
Term Doses
data
Counter- simulation
evaluation base
of counter-
measures of counter-
measures
measure
and con-
strategies
sequences

Areas, Organ Doses, People affected by


Countermeasures, Health Effects, Effort, Costs

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Phases of an event (adapted from NERIS SRA)
PREPAREDNESS PRE-RELEASE EMERGENCY RESPONSE LONG TERM
PHASE / THREAT PHASE
PHASE
Urgent Response Phase Early Response Transition Phase
Phase
Nuclear and Implementation Precautionary and Early protective Lifting of Early Resumption of
Radiological of Early urgent protective actions and other countermeasures normal living
Emergency counter- actions response actions conditions
Implementation of
Planning measures
transition phase
Stakeholder countermeasures
participation
Preparing long term
Education and remediation
training, Including
Exercises
R&D
Normal Exposure Existing, planned
Situation Emergency Exposure Situation Exposure
Planned Exposure Situation
Situation Normal Exposure
Situation
Hours - days Days - weeks Weeks - years

Declaration of End of Emergency Termination of


Emergency Response phase Emergency

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Threat phase: Available information
Alert message (not in Chernobyl)
Status of NPP (not fully understood, partly unknown, unknown...)
Inferred potential evolution of the accident
First estimations of potential source term (uncertain: amount of and timing of
release)
Meteorological data and radiological data
On-site measurements of weather; confirmation that a release is not already
occurring
Prognostic meteorological data (if available)
Uncertain: Future development of weather, in particular when discrepancies
between measurement and weather forecast
Preparedness: Emergency plans and procedures, listings of teams and
equipment etc.

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Threat phase: Emergency management
Early phase countermeasures are most effective when implemented
early before the release
Evacuation initiated and completed before cloud arrival; sheltering during
whole cloud passage; prophylactic intake of stable iodine

Shall early phase countermeasures be issued, and, if yes, is it likely to


complete them before a possible release is likely to start?

Shall other measures be issued, and where (limiting access to areas,


closing down public services etc.)

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Threat phase: Support provided by a DSS
Collects all data in one place and
provides information in a consistent way
Performs dose assessments
Provides results in terms of maps and
time functions on activity concentrations,
doses, dose rates
Proposes area to initiate early
countermeasures, simulates early
countermeasures to estimate the
performance of individual or combined
measures

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Release phase: Available information
Status of NPP and potential evolution of the accident
Source term knowledge
(best) Release occurs exclusively via monitored escape route
(some) Recordings from external monitors close to the building (some
help) or farther away (considerable uncertainties)
Little to none (disastrous)
Dose rates and other data from radiological monitoring
On-site meteorological data and prognostic weather data
Emergency management requires prognostic information
Activity concentrations, doses and potential areas for decisions about
early phase and early late phase (e.g. food) countermeasures in the
environment (~100 km) of the accident location

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Release phase: Support available from DSS
As for the pre-release phase
Data collection, simulation of activity concentrations and
countermeasures (early)
Two different types of information: Measurements and predictions
Bringing both together is important, because:
Measurements only represent a situation at one time at one given
location ("on-site")
Required are data representing larger time periods and areas
Data assimilation can combine both monitoring and modelling

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Early countermeasure simulation model EmerSim

• Indicates areas where individual doses would exceed


intervention levels for evacuation, sheltering and the
intake of iodine tablets

Result as example:
Day of exceeding
intervention level for
distribution of iodine
tablets, children (up to
12 years)

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Early countermeasure simulation model
EmerSim
Possibility to test early phase countermeasures,
example with effective protective actions

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Hypothetical release example, Vietnam, time dependend
I-131 soil contamination by dry+wet deposition

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Arrival time for this artificial case,
Vietnam

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Shelter areas

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Iodine prophylaxis children

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Areas for food ban

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Marine water concentrations

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Marine environment food
concentrations

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
137Cs concentration ( Bq/m3) in upper water layer due
to atmospheric fallout 12-24 March 2011, FDNPP

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Simulation with numerical weather

Cs-137 calculated with RODOS model


Cs deposition from monitoring ATSTEP, using data from mesoscale
http://energy.gov/news/10194.html meteorological Weather Research
U.S. Department of Energy Forecast model WRF

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Post-release phase: Available information
Status of the NPP (release has stopped)
Radiological monitoring (radiological situation is stable)
Identify nuclide vector
Identify hot spots
Confirm footprint of the cloud
Supervise doses in the population and in rescue teams
Prognostic information is still needed
Time evolution of activity concentrations, doses and potential areas to
initiate late phase countermeasures (relocation, decontamination, food
banning) wherever necessary

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Post-release phase: Support from a DSS
As for the other phases
Data collection, simulation of activity concentrations and countermeasures
(early and late)
Support monitoring (in inhabited and agricultural areas)
Data assimilation (in inhabited and agricultural areas)
Simulation of recovery phase actions
Evaluation of actions to identify the most effective ones

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Food chain and dose model, terrestrial - FDMT

Radionuclides in the atmosphere


Dry and wet
deposition

Contamination of ground and vegetation


Transfer in
food chains
External
exposure Contamination of food products
Inhalation Ingestion

Radiation exposure of humans

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
JRodos recovery phase models

Recovery phase
Accident phase
Long-term post-accident
Threat Release Transition phase
phase phase phase Rehabilitation of areas for
returning to normal living
hours / days / weeks ... months ... years / decades
DepoM + FDMT / DepoM-PP + FDMT
Areas where European Commissions maximum permitted levels of
radioactive contamination for marketed food are exceeded

AgriCP
Countermeasures in agricultural areas

ERMIN
European model for inhabited areas
(decontamination, relocation)

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Inhabited areas
RESIDENTIAL NON - RESIDENTIAL RECREATIONAL
Houses, housing estates.. Public buildings, offices, shops... Parks, countryside, woods...

Buildings
Indoors

Trees /
Shrubs
Precious Objects
Soil, grass
and plants

Roads /
Paved Areas
Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
ERMIN for inhabited areas
European Model for Inhabited Areas calculation

• Contain dynamic activity transport models as an integral


part; this enables a flexibility in the simulation of the effects
of late-phase actions on contamination and dose levels and
the associated waste and costs that was previously not
possible

• Countermeasure
strategies can be
defined and tested

• Supports selection
process

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Applying ERMIN to Okuma town office and
the environmental setting

Mesh size
100 m

Purple: model project area by JAEA Green:calculation area

Calculating area of
environmental media by using GIS Input data into ERMIN

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Radiation Dose (indoor) from Contamination
Decontamination Decontamination

Public individual dose(indoor)[µSv/h]


Surface contamination[Bq/m2]

Road
Road
Roof
Roof
Soil (small area)
Soil (small area)
Soil (large area)
Soil (large area)

contamination(137Cs) Air dose rate (indoor)

Roof
Identify contribution of
Environmental medias
to Radiation Dose

Soil Road

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Radiation Dose (outdoor) from Air Dose Rate
Public individual dose(outdoor)[µSv/h] Decontamination Decontamination

Road

Air dose rate [µSv/h]


Roof
Soil
Soil

Air dose rate (outdoor)


Air dose rate
roof
The results show the trends
94% of radiation dose is semi-quantitatively.
contributed from soil

soil road

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Integrated Additional Exposure
Precondition Calculation Result
normal living conditions

Integrated additional exposure[mSv]


Indoor: 16 h
Outdoor: 8 h 10 mSv
Decontamination

1year

Without
CM
indoor:16 h outdoor:8 h With CM

Reduction effect of integrated additional


exposure by decontamination

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Evaluation and adjustment of the protection
strategy

Proposed areas
for
countermeasures
are defined by
using DSS
calculations

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
JRODOS as DSS
• JRODOS is applicable in all phases of an emergency
• It contains models for the atmospheric and aquatic pathways
• It can be installed centrally and used remotely from as many users as
necessary – dependent on the power of the servers in the RODOS
centre
• Customisation is possible to national conditions applying national
criteria for evacuation, sheltering and iodine distribution
• In former H2020 research project, uncertainty handling and source term
reconstruction capabilities were added (e.g. ensembles of
meteorological and source term data)
• System is freely available and KIT offers support contracts

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
JRodos: RUG - Rodos User Group

• A user’s group for the RODOS system was established


• To provide a platform through which the members of the RUG can
communicate their views, needs and comments and exchange their
experience.
• To share experience gained while integrating RODOS in the national
emergency management arrangements, and to enable RUG members to
enhance their own arrangements.
• To identify best practices, to share technical know-how and organisational
solutions, software developments and data bases and their implementation,
and to provide mutual support, particularly on a regional basis.
• To share practice and solutions related with use of RODOS for training and
in exercises.
• To provide a forum through which the members of the RUG can network
with each other, independent of the RUG’s activities.

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
IAEA Requirements
 To achieve the Emergency Preparedness and
Emergency Response goals, the IAEA has set 26
Requirements that must be met.
 This set of 26 requirements comprises in total 165
more specific requirements, describing the objective
and guidance on how to fulfill each requirement.
 The Requirements are listed in the General
Safety Requirements: IAEA GSR Part 7.
 The Requirements are divided in three categories:
 General Requirements, contains in total 31 requirements
 Functional Requirements, contains in total 105 requirements
 Requirements for Infrastructure, contains in total 29
requirements

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Emergency Planning Zones

Suggested emergency zones and radius sizes for NPPs

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Radiological Incident Phases

periods of time to carry out protective actions:


 Early Phase
 Intermediate Phase
 Late Phase

These may differ in each country, according to their own


regulations or needs.

The phases cannot be represented by precise periods of time –


and may even overlap –, but to view them in terms of activities,
rather than time spans, can provide a useful framework for
emergency response planning.
Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Operational Intervention levels
• IAEA definition: Operational Intervention Levels (OILs)
for Reactor Emergencies (EPR-NPP-OILs (2017))
• OILs are operational criteria that allow the prompt implementation of
protective actions and other response actions on the basis of monitoring
results that are readily available during a nuclear or radiological
emergency.
• ‘Operational’ refers to the need for the OILs to be practical and reflect the
realities of the response to an emergency, such as the need for the
measured quantities to be representative, easily measurable and readily
available during a nuclear or radiological emergency.

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Default OILs (IAEA)

OIL 1 – evacuation

OIL 2 – sheltering

OIL 3 – general
emergency, food

OIL 4 – detection of a
release

OIL 7 – food and water


restrictions

OIL 8 – protection of
thyroid

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Exposure Pathways

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Preventing and Limiting Exposure ( I )

 Evacuation: The best strategy for preventing serious


exposures, if feasible, is to evacuate people from the area
before the radioactive materials arrive.
 Sheltering: Placing barriers between the radioactivematerials
and people is effective for some releases.
 Respiratory protection: Breathing through any of a variety of
materials – facemasks, tissues, towels, or other cloth – offers
significant protection against the inhalation of particles.

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Preventing and Limiting Exposure ( II )

 Relocation: If large amounts of radioactivity persist in the


area, sheltering is not a sufficiently protective measure,
and people must be moved from the area until it is
decontaminated.
 Potassium iodide (KI) blockage: Iodine uptake by the body
can be blocked by the ingestion of stable iodine prior to, or
immediately after, exposure.
 Decontamination of people: Decontamination includes
removing contaminated clothing and washing off external
contamination.

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Preventing and Limiting Exposure ( III )

 Decontamination of land and buildings: significant off-site


economic costs of a major accident will be for attempted
decontamination and for property that is unusable because it
cannot be sufficiently decontaminated.
 Protection of the food chain: Ingestion of contaminated food
and water can account for nearly half of the aggregate
population’s exposure to radioactivity. Food-chain
interventions are thus crucial to emergency response efforts
directed toward delayed health effects.
 Medical treatment: Finally, there is a need for medical efforts
to alleviate consequences. Medical care entails screening
and follow-up capabilities and the possibility of deploying a
significant medical infrastructure.

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Radiation in Daily Life

units in microSievert
Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Levels of Radiation Dose

Units in microSievert

Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Summary
 The general objectives of emergency planning and
preparedness are to reduce the risk or mitigate the
consequences of a radiation accident at its source and to
prevent health effects.
 To generate reliable programs for emergency planning and
preparedness, there exist a series of requirements that
delineate the organizational structures and their functions.
 The requirements also help defining emergency planning
zones for monitoring and control, and the actions to be carried
out in each of those geographical areas, based mainly on
dose expected.
 Protective actions have to be performed in an ambience of
constant communication and clear cut functions among all
organizations dealing with the emergency at hand.
Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Thank you for your attention

Th. Walter Tromm


Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
Programme Nuclear Safety Research

[email protected]

06/06/2019 Th. Walter Tromm Joint ICTP-IAEA 3rd course, 30/04/21 Programme Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research

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