Treyes vs Larlar (G.R. No. 232579 September 8, 2020) granting the same.

granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court,
citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the
Facts: On May 1, 2008, Rosie Larlar Treyes (Rosie), the wife of petitioner decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for
Treyes, passed away. Rosie, who did not bear any children with petitioner such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or
Treyes, died without any will. Rosie also left behind seven siblings, i.e., the possession, as in this case:
private respondents Antonio, Emilio, Heddy, Rene, Celeste, Judy, and
Yvonne. At the time of her death, Rosie left behind 14 real estate properties, Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of
situated in various locations in the Philippines, which she owned together the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and
with petitioner Treyes as their conjugal properties (subject properties). not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of
property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
Subsequently, petitioner Treyes executed two Affidavits of Self- possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial
Adjudication dated September 2, 2008 and May 19, 2011. The first court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication was registered by petitioner Treyes with the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
Register of Deeds (RD) of Marikina City on March 24, 2011, while the Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is
second Affidavit of Self-Adjudication was registered with the RD of San defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
Carlos City, Negros Occidental on June 5, 2011. In these two Affidavits of protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
Self-Adjudication, petitioner Treyes transferred the estate of Rosie unto proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right,
himself, claiming that he was the sole heir of his deceased spouse, Rosie. or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
The private respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint dated July 12, heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
2013 (Complaint) for annulment of the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
cancellation of TCTs, reconveyance of ownership and possession, partition,
and damages against petitioner Treyes, the RD of Marikina, the RD of the In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the
Province of Rizal, and the RD of the City of San Carlos, Negros Occidental declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an
independent civil action.
Issue: Whether a prior determination of the status as a legal or compulsory
heir in a separate special proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary civil Nevertheless, the Court likewise added in Ypon that there are
action seeking for the protection and enforcement of ownership rights given circumstances wherein a determination of heirship in a special
by the law of succession. proceeding is not a precondition for the institution of an ordinary civil
action for the sake of practicality, i.e., (1) when the parties in the civil
HELD: In the Case of Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon v. Ricaforte, et al. and case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already
Preceding Cases, [xxx] the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and (2) when a
heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally terminated
RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from and cannot be re-opened:
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding law, are entitled to one-half of the inheritance of the decedent. Thus, in
for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of filing their Complaint, they do not seek to have their right as intestate heirs
practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily established, for the simple reason that it is the law that already establishes
submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their that right. What they seek is the enforcement and protection of the right
evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently granted to them under Article 1001 in relation to Article 777 of the Civil
rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been Code by asking for the nullification of the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication
instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot that disregard and violate their right as intestate heirs.
be re-opened.
To stress once more, the successional rights of the legal heirs of Rosie are
In Bonilla, et al. v. Barcena, et al., the Court held that: not merely contingent or expectant — they vest upon the death of the
decedent. By being legal heirs, they are entitled to institute an action to
"[F]rom the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs protect their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession and are thus
become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the
real parties in interest in the instant case. To delay the enforcement of such
rights and obligations of the decedent, x x x [t]he right of
the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even rights until heirship is determined with finality in a separate special
before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the proceeding would run counter to Article 777 of the Civil Code which
testate or intestate proceedings." recognizes the vesting of such rights immediately — without a moment’s
interruption — upon the death of the decedent.
The Civil Code identifies certain relatives who are deemed compulsory heirs
and intestate heirs. They refer to relatives that become heirs by virtue of Henceforth, the rule is: unless there is a pending special proceeding for
compulsory succession or intestate succession, as the case may be, by the settlement of the decedent’s estate or for the determination of
operation of law. heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary
civil action to declare the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for
In the instant case, Article 1001 states that brothers and sisters, or their recovery of property, or any other action in the enforcement of their
children, who survive with the widow or widower, shall be entitled to one- ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, without the necessity
half of the inheritance, while the surviving spouse shall be entitled to the of a prior and separate judicial declaration of their status as such. The
other half: ruling of the trial court shall only be in relation to the cause of action of
the ordinary civil action, i.e., the nullification of a deed or instrument,
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the and recovery or reconveyance of property, which ruling is binding only
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance between and among the parties.
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. (953-837a).

Hence, subject to the required proof, without any need of prior judicial
determination, the private respondents siblings of Rosie, by operation of
 course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity
would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage." 14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore
the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules
vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code. 16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS. the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of
the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning"
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate
law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
and its Maekara.

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when,
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be
the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction
petitioner. x x x which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." 20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for 11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
immediate dismissal of the petition." 8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or
the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution,
and not Fujiki. the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10- considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree
SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action which is "for the x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12 proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13 Thus, Section 2(a) action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void correction of entry] x x x."27
marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be
absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x." 38
and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition. 28 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should
Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
authenticated as required under Section 5 29 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the
"immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision. Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
and Maekara
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review. 30 comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She
comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31 would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be The Issues Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage (1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which
VoidableMarriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
this Court explained:
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during (3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not
be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance,
the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The Ruling of the Court
The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and
the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to We grant the petition.
the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse
and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover,
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
status or right of a party or a particular fact." 37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in
the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
I.For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment
as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. 49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50 decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary
trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor, 53 the setting of
pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59 Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the II.Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the
the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in
of such citizen. a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence. verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial
Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a
person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment
final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62 of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he
is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most intimate human relation, but be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing
also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. 69 the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between
These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial Marinay and Maekara.
capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouse’s right in a a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law. and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds
for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation,
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, 85 and the investigation of the public
the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in
35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, 78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
of protecting his marriage. parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party
and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
bigamous marriage in the civil registry. situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the laws of his or her country. The second
III.In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a
"trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce. notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency
with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of
from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the
laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of
extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91 records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The recognition of a foreign
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the
country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be Philippine archipelago."
discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of
correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011
free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in
have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as
a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Primary Holding: The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the RTC's decision and
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has ordering the reinstatement of the petition for further proceedings.
the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have  Legal Doctrine Applied: The Court applied the principle of comity of nations, lex
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a nationalii (Article 15 of the Civil Code), and the rules of evidence regarding proof of
criminal prosecution for bigamy. foreign judgments (Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of
the Rules of Court).
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment  Constitutional Analysis: The Court recognized the constitutional protection of marriage
on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or but emphasized that this protection does not extend to bigamous marriages, which are void
on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code.
judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a  Statutory Interpretation: The Court interpreted Article 35(4) of the Family Code
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage (bigamous marriages are void) and Article 26 of the Family Code (effect of foreign divorce
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to decrees). The Court also interpreted Rule 108 of the Rules of Court regarding cancellation
the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code. or correction of entries in the civil registry.
 Precedent Analysis:
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is o Juliano-Llave v. Republic: The Court cited this case to support the argument that
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy.
 o Corpuz v. Santo Tomas: The Court cited this case to support the argument that the JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPACT & SIGNIFICANCE
recognition of a foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.
o Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee: The Court cited this case to show that Philippine  Legal Precedent Established: This case establishes that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees since 1922. apply to petitions for recognition of foreign judgments nullifying marriages on the ground
o Republic v. Orbecido: The Court cited this case to explain the legislative intent of of bigamy where one party is a foreign citizen. It also clarifies that the prior spouse has
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. standing to file such a petition under Rule 108.
o Van Dorn v. Romillo: The Court cited this case to support the principle that a  Impact on Philippine Law: This decision clarifies the procedure for recognizing foreign
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in her own country. judgments related to marital status, particularly in cases involving bigamy and foreign
 Policy Considerations: The Court considered the policy of efficiency, the protection of citizens. It provides a more streamlined process for recognizing such judgments, avoiding
party expectations, and respecting the jurisdiction of other states. The Court also considered the need for relitigation.
the public policy against bigamy.  Effects on Future Cases: This ruling will influence future cases involving the recognition
of foreign judgments related to marital status, particularly in cases involving bigamy and
Ratio Decidendi (Reasoning) foreign citizens. It provides a clear framework for determining the applicability of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC and the standing of parties to file such petitions.
 Practical Implications: This decision simplifies the process for Filipinos involved in
 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply to a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment marriages with foreign citizens that are subsequently nullified abroad due to bigamy. It
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. allows the Filipino spouse to more easily obtain recognition of the foreign judgment in the
Applying A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC would require relitigating the case, defeating the purpose Philippines, enabling them to remarry or otherwise resolve their marital status.
of recognizing foreign judgments. The Court stated, "To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC  Doctrinal Significance: This case reinforces the principle of comity of nations and the
applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and importance of recognizing foreign judgments that are consistent with Philippine public
the parties should follow its provisions... This is absurd because it will litigate the case policy. It also clarifies the relationship between A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and Rule 108 in the
anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is 'to limit context of foreign judgments.
repetitive litigation on claims and issues.'"  International Relevance: The case highlights the importance of private international law
 The petitioner, as the spouse of the prior marriage, has the personality to file a petition to principles in resolving cross-border legal issues related to marriage and divorce.
recognize the foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage on the ground of  Legislative Impact: While the decision does not directly call for legislative action, it may
bigamy. The Court reasoned that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in inform future legislative debates on issues related to divorce and the recognition of foreign
maintaining the integrity of the marriage and protecting property relations. The Court stated, judgments
"There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There
is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage 1. Facts and Course of the Case
in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage."
 The Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for In 2004, Ruby Ng (“Ms. Ng”) a Filipino citizen married Akihiro Sono (“Mr. Sono”), a Japanese
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of national in Quezon City, Philippines. After moving to Japan, their relationship turned sour. The
Court. The Court stated, "Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of spouses successfully secured a “divorce decree by mutual agreement” in Japan some time in 2007. A
fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction Divorce Certificate was issued by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines as proof of said divorce.
of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court." The Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila provided an Authentication Certificate and a Certificate
 The Court distinguished this case from Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan of Notification of Divorce. Likewise, the City Civil Registry Office of Manila released a Certification,
City, Negros Occidental, stating that Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign guaranteeing that the Divorce Certificate provided by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines was
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign filed and recorded in its Office. The fact of divorce was duly recorded in the Civil Registry of Japan
country. as exhibited by the original copy of the Family Registry of Japan bearing the official stamp of the
Mayor of Nakano-Ku, Tokyo, Japan, and supported by its corresponding English translation.[1]
Concurring/Dissenting Opinions

 The decision was unanimous. Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concurred.
 Thereafter, Ms. Ng filed a Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of The Court also pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be
capacity to remarry before the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”). The RTC granted the petition and recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the
ratiocinated that there was a valid divorce obtained by Ms. Ng abroad. national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Since our courts do not take judicial notice of
Displeased by the lower court’s verdict, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by foreign laws and judgments, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
the Office of the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration of the RTC’s Decision which was national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.
denied by the RTC.
The Court emphasized that ‘the burden of proving’ the pertinent Japanese law, as well as the
2. Issue of the Case foreign spouse’s capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon the petitioner. And then, the Court remanded
the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant law
on divorce.
The pivotal issues for the Court’s resolution are first, whether the trial court erred in judicially
recognizing the divorce decree jointly obtained by mere agreement between the spouses without
undergoing an adversarial proceeding before a foreign court of competent jurisdiction; and second, The contents of this newsletter are for informational purposes only and should not be considered
whether Ng has sufficiently proven the divorce decree and the Japanese law on divorce. legal advice. For personalized legal advice, feel free to reach us directly. We are here to assist with
any of your legal concerns.
3. SC ruling on Divorce Validly Obtained Abroad

(1) Previous SC ruling on Similar Cases

G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO – LETICIA
In deciding the issue, the Supreme Court acknowledged numerous cases involving similar facts DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO – MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA,
such as in Republic vs Manalo[2], Minori Fujiki vs Marinay[3], Medina vs Michiyuki Koike[4], RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO
Racho vs Seiichi Tanaka[5], Galapon vs Republic[6], In re: Ordaneza vs Republic[7], Republic vs
Bayog-Saito[8], Basa-Egami vs Bersales[9]. DEL ROSARIO, respondent..

Thereafter, the Supreme Court updheld the decision of the trial court in this case. It declared that BUENA, J.:
altogether, the similar cases wherein the foreign divorce was recognized in Philippine Courts
uniformly embody the jurisprudential rule that the foreign divorce by mutual agreement, as applicable May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance
in Japan, is within the ambit of Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Family Code of the Philippines, and as annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
such, may be judicially recognized in the Philippines. deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any
of the heirs?
Refusing to recognize a foreign divorce validly obtained abroad will result in a situation wherein
the Filipino spouse will remain tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to remarry. Article Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision1 of public
26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:
marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws
allow divorce.[10]
"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside
and another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of
(2) Proof of the Divorce Decree and the National Law of the Alien defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059
and reinstate TCT No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.
"So ordered." "1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is
prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial separation of
an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. property between them, the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;
11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani,
Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's "2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited by
estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children
received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu "3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be
thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the Six children.1âwphi1.nêt regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the
deceased."
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-
Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, alia:
share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving
only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No. 35988.
Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where "It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond
second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of
Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot2 to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot.3 estate of a deceased person. XXX

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, "X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the
Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on
1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"
Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of Rule
5
In a complaint filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the
herein private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the facts of the case."
employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear
that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 1987 6 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.
cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher.
Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in
fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired. this wise:

In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to "XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in
advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against
Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property. "A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil
actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996
holding:8 "XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under
particular fact." the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate
court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:
established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to
establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal "Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first settle the
pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo
granted generally upon an application or motion."9 determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject property
owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further: provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying
an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is
"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an
prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, advance inheritance."12
and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is
instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs.
without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary Borromeo13 and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the
actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its
proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it
petition or motion upon notice."10 is procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived".15

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement six children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court, acting in its general
of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the that although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.16
have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
the person raising the questions and on the heir.
"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have
provision11 contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court.17 (emphasis supplied)
proceedings".
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. 18 The net estate of the decedent must be
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by
of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it.
With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be RTC ruled that the sale is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. Although the deed of sale
established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as an extension of advance
legitimes.19 inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased.”

A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that CA reversed and set aside the lower court.
the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of
Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these well- Issue:May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for
entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the
advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's decedent to any of the heirs?
estate.1âwphi1.nêt
Held:No. The Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under
SO ORDERED. the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate
court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del
Case Digest: Natcher vs. CA, Heir of Graciano Del Rosario Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

Facts: An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application
Sps. Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land located of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
in Manila. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely:
Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
Graciana’s estate. Doctrine/s:

On 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an “Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of An action is a formal demand of one’s right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court
Real Property with Waiver of Rights”. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The
portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square term “special proceeding” may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or
meters registered under Graciano’s name. right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required
unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon
an application or motion.”
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,
Graciano sold his land to his wife Patricia. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife
Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs. G.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009

Private respondents filed a complaint alleged that upon Graciano’s death, petitioner Natcher, through LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-
the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, making it appear that Graciano executed a BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN, Petitioners,
Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation and the vs.
issuance of title in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY,
complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired. LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER, Respondents.

DECISION
PUNO, C.J.: In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Shari’a District Court reconsidered its order of
dismissal dated November 22, 2005.17 The district court allowed private respondents to adduce further
This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Shari’a District Court, evidence.18 In its second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Shari’a District Court ordered
Fourth Shari’a Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 20061 and September 21, 2006.2 the continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial
conference.19
On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montañer,
Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. 3 Petitioners Alejandro Montañer, Jr., Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:
Lillibeth Montañer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montañer-Dalupan are their children. 4 On May 26,
1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died.5 I.

On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT – MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION OVER
Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.
District Court.6 The said complaint was entitled "Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and Liling M.
Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montañer, II.
Lillibeth K. Montañer, Alejandro Kho Montañer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montañer," and
docketed as "Special Civil Action No. 7-05."7 In the said complaint, private respondents made the
following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT – MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE
Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan JURISDICTION OVER "THE ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO
is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montañer is the daughter of the decedent; and MONTAÑER, SR." WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY
(6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent. 8 Private TO BE SUED.
respondents prayed for the Shari’a District Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the
partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the III.
decedent.9
RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the Shari’a COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-
District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., because he was a PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING FEES.
Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and (3)
private respondents’ complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation between IV.
Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.10

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT—MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE

On November 22, 2005, the Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint. The OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE
district court held that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION FOR
the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims.11 RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS
FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A "NOTICE OF HEARING."
On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 12 On December 28,
2005, petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for V.
reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing. 13 On January 17, 2006, the Shari’a District Court denied
petitioners’ opposition.14 Despite finding that the said motion for reconsideration "lacked notice of
hearing," the district court held that such defect was cured as petitioners "were notified of the RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT—MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
existence of the pleading," and it took cognizance of the said motion. 15 The Shari’a District Court also OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL
reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration.16 ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT
RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM
ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION PRESCRIBED UPON THE private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent. 24 These include the
DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995. following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the
appointment of an administrator of the said estate.
In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Shari’a District
Court must be given the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the decedent is a We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have jurisdiction
Muslim in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction.20 over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that Montañer, Sr. is
not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject matter does not
Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer 25 or a motion to dismiss. 26 Otherwise, jurisdiction
would depend almost entirely on the defendant 27 or result in having "a case either thrown out of court
or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem.28 Indeed, the "defense of lack of jurisdiction
Petitioners’ first argument, regarding the Shari’a District Court’s jurisdiction, is dependent on a which is dependent on a question of fact does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its
question of fact, whether the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this argument is jurisdiction."29
the premise that there has already been a determination resolving such a question of fact. It bears
emphasis, however, that the assailed orders did not determine whether the decedent is a Muslim. The
assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for the purpose of resolving this issue. The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss. 30 In the case at bar, the Shari’a
District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the
allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District Court has the authority to hear and
Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination
Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Shari’a District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District Court determines that the deceased
over the settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims: was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. — (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original Special Proceedings
jurisdiction over:
The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second argument, that the proceeding before the Shari’a
xxxx District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous
understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, proceeding before the Shari’a District Court, where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs or
probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings
regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property. before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of
the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules)
The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition. 21 The designation given by parties to their particular fact." This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the
own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the said designation. Rather settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim. 31 In a petition for the issuance of letters of
than rely on "a falsa descriptio or defective caption," courts are "guided by the substantive averments administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death
of the pleadings."22 of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which would allow
them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the
decedent.32 Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and,
Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court as a subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his
"Complaint" for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of heirs, if such is the case in fact.
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim, 23 such as the fact of
Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party
contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the private respondents, defendant in a civil action 33 applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the
and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very properties sought to be deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding
settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively,
in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues another for the of hearing in cases where "a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" 34 necessarily has definite especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory
adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant. 35 On the other hand, a special proceeding, judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein." 48 In these exceptional
"by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact," 36 has one definite party, who cases, the Court considers that "no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities," and for this
petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities.49
In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of
action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Shari’a District Court of an opportunity to
determine all the assets of the estate, 37 pay its liabilities,38 and to distribute the residual to those determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent
entitled to the same.39 alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its process to ensure
conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because of a lapse in
Docket Fees fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice.

Petitioners’ third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of docket fees, In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because
is untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents’ petition in the proceeding before the court a the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules on
quo, which contains an allegation estimating the decedent’s estate as the basis for the conclusion that notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not affected. 50 The
what private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners’ argument essentially purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process, 51 for the court to determine
involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within
whether private respondents paid the correct assessment of the docket fees. which to file a reply or opposition.52 In probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is not the absence
of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard." 53 In the case
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial at bar, as evident from the Shari’a District Court’s order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners’ counsel
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. 40 If the party filing the case paid less than the correct received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an
amount for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since
responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court. 41 In such a case, the Shari’a District Court reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration in the same order,
the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a party’s reliance on the petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the said motion in a hearing. Taken together,
clerk of court’s insufficient assessment of the docket fees. 42 As "every citizen has the right to assume these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was
and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them duly observed.
in accordance with law," the party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of court’s
insufficient assessment.43 However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.44 Prescription and Filiation

In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of court’s assessment of the docket fees. Petitioners’ fifth argument is premature. Again, the Shari’a District Court has not yet determined
Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination of whether whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a special proceeding for
private respondents correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of court’s assessment. the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including
prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said
Exception to Notice of Hearing proceeding.54 The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs
of the decedent.55 In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an
affirmative answer to the question of whether the Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the
Petitioners’ fourth argument, that private respondents’ motion for reconsideration before the Shari’a estate of the decedent.
District Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances in the
present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules require every written motion to be
set for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all parties concerned. 45 The IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Shari’a District Court, dated
Rules also provide that "no written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without August 22, 2006 and September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.
proof of service thereof."46 However, the Rules allow a liberal construction of its provisions "in order
to promote [the] objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and [ G.R. No. 232579, September 08, 2020 ]
proceeding."47 Moreover, this Court has upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice
DR. NIXON L. TREYES, PETITIONER, VS. ANTONIO L. LARLAR, REV. FR. EMILIO L. Subsequently, petitioner Treyes executed two Affidavits of Self- Adjudication dated September 2,
LARLAR, HEDDY L. LARLAR, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. 200812 and May 19, 2011.13 The first Affidavit of Self-Adjudication was registered by petitioner
Treyes with the Register of Deeds (RD) of Marikina City on March 24, 2011, while the second
DECISION Affidavit of Self-Adjudication was registered with the RD of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental on
June 5, 2011. In these two Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, petitioner Treyes transferred the estate of
Rosie unto himself, claiming that he was the sole heir of his deceased spouse, Rosie.14
CAGUIOA, J:.
As alleged by the private respondents, they sent a letter dated February 13, 2012 to petitioner Treyes
Under the Civil Code, when the brothers and sisters of a deceased married sister survive with her requesting for a conference to discuss the settlement of the estate of their deceased sister, Rosie. The
widower, the latter shall be entitled by law to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters private respondents maintain that they never heard from petitioner Treyes regarding their
to the other half1 The Civil Code likewise states that this successional right of the legal heirs is vested request.15 Undaunted, the private respondents again wrote to petitioner Treyes on April 3, 2012,
in them from the very moment of the decedent's death.2 requesting for the settlement of their sister's estate, but this request fell on deaf ears.16

Given that successional rights are conferred by the Civil Code, a substantive law, the question to be The private respondents then alleged that sometime during the latter part of 2012, they discovered to
resolved here by the Court is whether a prior determination of the status as a legal or compulsory heir their shock and dismay that the TCTs previously registered in the name of their sister and petitioner
in a separate special proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary civil action seeking for the protection Treyes had already been cancelled, except TCT No. M-43623 situated in Tanay, Rizal and TCT No.
and enforcement of ownership rights given by the law of succession. The Court now definitively T-627723 situated in Cabuyao, Laguna. New titles had been issued in the name of petitioner Treyes
settles this question once and for all. on the basis of the two Affidavits of Self-Adjudication.17

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari3 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court Hence, the private respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint18 dated July 12, 2013 (Complaint)
(Rules) filed by petitioner Dr. Nixon L. Treyes (petitioner Treyes) assailing the Decision4 dated for annulment of the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, cancellation of TCTs, reconveyance of
August 18, 2016 (assailed Decision) and Resolution5 dated June 1, 2017 (assailed Resolution) ownership and possession, partition, and damages against petitioner Treyes, the RD of Marikina, the
promulgated by the Court of Appeals, Cebu City (CA)6 in CA-G.R. SP Case No. 08813, which RD of the Province of Rizal, and the RD of the City of San Carlos, Negros Occidental. The case was
affirmed the Resolution7 dated July 15, 2014 and Order8dated August 27, 2014 issued by public docketed as Civil Case No. RTC-1226.
respondent Hon. Kathrine A. Go (Go), in her capacity as presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court
of San Carlos City, Branch 59 (RTC) in favor of private respondents Antonio L. Larlar (Antonio),
Rev. Fr. Emilio L. Larlar (Emilio), Heddy L. Larlar (Heddy), Rene L. Larlar (Rene), Celeste L. Larlar In their Complaint, the private respondents alleged that petitioner Treyes fraudulently caused the
(Celeste), Judy L. Larlar (Judy), and Yvonne L. Larlar (Yvonne) (collectively, the private transfer of the subject properties to himself by executing the two Affidavits of Self-Adjudication and
respondents). refused to reconvey the shares of the private respondents who, being the brothers and sisters of Rosie,
are legal heirs of the deceased. Aside from asking for the declaration of the nullity of the Affidavits of
Self-Adjudication, the private respondents also prayed for the cancellation of all the TCTs issued in
The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings favor of petitioner Treyes, the reconveyance to the private respondents of their successional share in
the estate of Rosie, the partition of the estate of Rosie, as well as moral damages, exemplary damages,
As culled from the records, the essential facts and antecedent proceedings are as follows: attorney's fees, and other litigation expenses.19

On May 1, 2008, Rosie Larlar Treyes (Rosie), the wife of petitioner Treyes, passed away.9 Rosie, As alleged by petitioner Treyes, his household helper, Elizabeth Barientos (Barientos), was
who did not bear any children with petitioner Treyes, died without any will.10 Rosie also left behind supposedly aggressively approached on October 18, 2013 by two persons who demanded that she
seven siblings, i.e., the private respondents Antonio, Emilio, Heddy, Rene, Celeste, Judy, and receive a letter for and on behalf of petitioner Treyes. Barientos refused. As it turned out, the said
Yvonne. letter was the summons issued by the RTC addressed to petitioner Treyes in relation to the Complaint
filed by the private respondents.20
At the time of her death, Rosie left behind 14 real estate properties,11 situated in various locations in
the Philippines, which she owned together with petitioner Treyes as their conjugal properties (subject Petitioner Treyes, through counsel, then filed an Entry of Special Appearance and Motion to Dismiss
properties). dated October 25, 2013 (first Motion to Dismiss), asking for the dismissal of the Complaint due to
lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner Treyes.21 Eventually, however, a re-service of
summons was ordered by the RTC in its Order dated May 12, 2014.22 On June 5, 2014, petitioner SO ORDERED.33
Treyes was personally served with another Summons23 dated May 12, 2014 together with a copy of
the Complaint.24 The CA held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner Treyes'
second Motion to Dismiss. Since the Complaint primarily seeks to annul petitioner Treyes' Affidavits
Petitioner Treyes then filed another Motion to Dismiss25 dated June 20, 2014 (second Motion to of Self-Adjudication, which partakes the nature of an ordinary civil action, the CA found that the RTC
Dismiss), arguing that the private respondents' Complaint should be dismissed on the following had jurisdiction to hear and decide the private respondents' Complaint. Further, the CA held that since
grounds: (1) improper venue; (2) prescription; and (3) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. the case was an ordinary civil action, the proper venue is San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. Lastly,
the CA held that the action of the private respondents is not barred by prescription.
In its Resolution26 dated July 15, 2014, the RTC denied for lack of merit petitioner Treyes' second
Motion to Dismiss. Nevertheless, the RTC held that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the Petitioner Treyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration34 dated September 26, 2016, which was
Complaint's third cause of action, i.e., partition: subsequently denied by the CA in its assailed Resolution.35

x x x A perusal of the Complaint shows that the causes of action are 1) the Annulment of the Affidavit Hence, the instant Petition.
of Self Adjudication; 2) Reconveyance (3) Partition; and 4) Damages. Hence, the Court has
jurisdiction over the first, second and fourth causes of action but no jurisdiction over the third cause of The private respondents filed their Comment36 dated May 16, 2018 to the Petition, to which
action of Partition and the said cause of action should be dropped from the case.27 petitioner Treyes responded with his Reply37 dated September 17, 2018.

Unsatisfied with the aforesaid Resolution of the RTC, petitioner Treyes filed an Omnibus The Issue
Motion28 dated July 28, 2014 (1) to reconsider the Resolution dated August 15, 2014 and (2) to defer
filing of Answer.
The central question to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA was correct in ruling that
the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
In response, private respondents filed their Opposition29 dated August 19, 2014 to the Omnibus denied petitioner Treyes' second Motion to Dismiss.
Motion of petitioner Treyes dated July 28, 2014, to which petitioner Treyes responded with his
Reply30 with leave dated August 27, 2014.
The Court's Ruling
In its Order31 dated August 27, 2014, the RTC denied the Omnibus Motion and directed petitioner
Treyes to file his responsive pleading within 15 days from receipt of the Order. In the instant case, petitioner Treyes maintains that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying its second Motion to Dismiss, arguing, in the
main, that the RTC should have dismissed the private respondents' Complaint on the basis of three
Petitioner Treyes then filed before the CA a petition for certiorari32 dated October 28, 2014 under grounds: a) improper venue, b) prescription, and c) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and,
Rule 65 with urgent prayer for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of corrolarily, lack of real parties in interest. The Court discusses these grounds ad seriatim.
preliminary injunction, asserting that the RTC's denial of his second Motion to Dismiss was
committed with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
I. Improper Venue
The Ruling of the CA
Citing Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules,38 petitioner Treyes posits that the correct venue for the
settlement of a decedent's estate is the residence of the decedent at the time of her death, which was at
In its assailed Decision, the CA denied petitioner Treyes' petition for certiorari. The dispositive No. 1-C, Guatemala Street, Loyola Grand Villas, Loyola Heights, Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City.
portion of the assailed Decision of the CA reads: Hence, petitioner Treyes maintains that the settlement of her estate should have been filed with the
RTC of Quezon City, and not at San Carlos City, Negros Occidental.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated dated (sic) August 27, 2014, and the
Resolution dated July 15, 2014 are AFFIRMED. The Court finds and holds that the Complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground of improper venue
on the basis of Rule 73 because such Rule refers exclusively to the special proceeding of settlement of
estates and NOT to ordinary civil actions. Invoking Rule 73 to allege improper venue is entirely The Court stresses that Rule 74 pertains exclusively to the settlement of estates, which is a special
inconsistent with petitioner Treyes' assertion in the instant Petition39 that the Complaint is not a proceeding and NOT an ordinary civil action.45
special proceeding but an ordinary civil action.
As well, this argument of petitioner Treyes invoking prescription on the basis of Rule 74 is
Moreover, the Court finds that improper venue as a ground for the dismissal of the Complaint was again wholly inconsistent with his main theory that the instant Complaint is not a special proceeding
already deemed waived in accordance with the Omnibus Motion Rule. but an ordinary civil action for annulment of the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, cancellation of
TCTs, reconveyance of ownership and possession, and damages.46
According to Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except with respect to the grounds of (1) lack of Moreover, as clarified by the Court in Sampilo, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,47 the provisions of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription of the Rule 74, Section 4 barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the
action. In turn, Rule 15, Section 8 states that a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition is applicable only: (1) to persons who have
proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and (2) when the provisions of
deemed waived. Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent
have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
Hence, under the Omnibus Motion Rule, when the grounds for the dismissal of a Complaint under
Rule 16, Section l40 are not raised in a motion to dismiss, such grounds, except the grounds of lack of Both requirements are absent here as it is evident that not all the legal heirs of Rosie participated in
jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription, are deemed waived. the extrajudicial settlement of her estate as indeed, it was only petitioner Treyes who executed the
Affidavits of Self-Adjudication.
In the instant case, prior to the filing of the second Motion to Dismiss, the first Motion to Dismiss was
already filed by petitioner Treyes asking for the dismissal of the Complaint solely on the ground of In this regard, it is well to note that it is the prescriptive period pertaining to constructive trusts which
lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner Treyes.41 The defense of improper venue was finds application in the instant case.
already very much available to petitioner Treyes at the time of the filing of the first Motion to
Dismiss. Under the Rules, raising the ground of improper venue would not have been prejudicial to To digress, the Civil Code identifies two kinds of trusts, i.e., express and implied. Express trusts are
petitioner Treyes' cause as raising such defense could not have been deemed a voluntary created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties while implied trusts come into being by
appearance.42 Hence, there was no valid reason to justify the failure to invoke the ground of improper operation of law.48 As explained by recognized Civil Law Commentator, former CA Justice Eduardo
venue in the first Motion to Dismiss. Stated differently, as the issue of improper venue was not raised P. Caguioa, "[e]xpress and implied trusts differ chiefly in that express trusts are created by the acts of
in the first Motion to Dismiss, then this ground is deemed already waived and could no longer be the parties, while implied trusts are raised by operation of law, either to carry a presumed intention of
raised in the second Motion to Dismiss.43 the parties or to satisfy the demands of justice or protect against fraud."49

II. Prescription An implied trust is further divided into two types, i.e., resulting and constructive trusts.50 A resulting
trust exists when a person makes or causes to be made a disposition of property under circumstances
Petitioner Treyes also argues that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the which raise an inference that he/she does not intend that the person taking or holding the property
Complaint since the period for the filing of the Complaint had already supposedly prescribed. should have the beneficial interest in the property.51

The Court likewise finds this argument to be without merit. On the other hand, a constructive trust exists when a person holding title to property is subject to an
equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he/she would be unjustly enriched if he/she
The basis of petitioner Treyes in arguing that the Complaint is already barred by prescription is Rule were permitted to retain it.52 The duty to convey the property arises because it was acquired through
74, Section 4 of the Rules,44 which states that an heir or other persons unduly deprived of lawful fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake, through a breach of a fiduciary duty, or through the wrongful
participation in the estate may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts at any time within two disposition of another's property.53
years after the settlement and distribution of an estate.
An example of a constructive trust is found in Article 1456 of the Civil Code,54 which states that "[i]f
property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes." In Marquez the subject properties, by virtue of their being siblings of the deceased, must be enforced by annulling
v. Court of Appeals,55 the Court held that in a situation where an heir misrepresents in an affidavit of the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication and ordering the reconveyance of the subject properties.
self-adjudication that he is the sole heir of his wife when in fact there are other legal heirs, and
thereafter manages to secure a certificate of title under his name, then "a constructive trust under Hence, as correctly held by the RTC in its Resolution60 dated July 15, 2014, the RTC has jurisdiction
Article 1456 [i]s established. Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust over the subject matter of the Complaint, considering that the law confers upon the RTC jurisdiction
enrichment."56 This is precisely the situation in the instant case. over civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro
In this situation, it has been settled in a long line of cases that "an action for reconveyance based on an Manila, or where the assessed value exceeds P50,000.00 for civil actions in Metro Manila.61
implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years from the issuance of the Torrens title [in the name
of the trustee] over the property."57 The 10-year prescriptive period finds basis in Article 1144 of the The Case of Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon v.
Civil Code, which states that an action involving an obligation created by law must be brought within Ricaforte, et al. and Preceding Cases
10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
Petitioner Treyes cited Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon v. Ricaforte, et al. 62 (Ypon), as well as the cases
In cases wherein fraud was alleged to have been attendant in the trustee's registration of the subject that preceded it, i.e., Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario63 (Yaptinchay), Portugal
property in his/her own name, the prescriptive period is 10 years reckoned from the date of the v. Portugal-Beltran64 (Portugal), and Reyes v. Enriquez65 (Reyes) to buttress his main argument that
issuance of the original certificate of title or TCT since such issuance operates as a constructive notice since the private respondents have yet to establish in a special proceeding their status as legal heirs of
to the whole world, the discovery of the fraud being deemed to have taken place at that time.58 Rosie, then the ordinary civil action they instituted must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Accordingly, it is clear here that prescription has not set in as the private respondents still have until In Ypon, which contains analogous factual circumstances as the instant case, the therein petitioners
2021 to file an action for reconveyance, given that the certificates of title were issued in the name of filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages against the therein
petitioner Treyes only in 2011. respondent. The therein petitioners alleged that, with the decedent having died intestate and childless,
and with the existence of other legal heirs, the therein respondent invalidly executed an Affidavit of
Therefore, considering the foregoing discussion, the ground of prescription raised by petitioner Treyes Self-Adjudication and caused the transfer of the certificates of title covering the properties of the
is unmeritorious. decedent to himself. The RTC dismissed the complaint holding that it failed to state a cause of action
since the therein petitioners had yet to establish their status as heirs.
III. The Necessity of a Prior
In sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the complaint, the Court in Ypon held that:
Determination of Heirship in a Separate Special Proceeding
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that
The Court now proceeds to discuss the centerpiece of petitioner Treyes' Petition – that the RTC has no they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-
jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the subject matter of the private respondents' Complaint because Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title
the determination of the status of the legal heirs in a separate special proceeding is a prerequisite to an issued in the latter's favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property instituted by the legal heirs. consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a
decedent's lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in
an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the
the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs determination of who are the decedent's lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding
cause of action.59 for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this
case:
In the instant case, it is readily apparent from the allegations in the Complaint filed by the private
respondents that the action was not instituted for the determination of their status as heirs, as it was Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made
their position that their status as heirs was already established ipso jure without the need of any in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
judicial confirmation. Instead, what the Complaint alleges is that the private respondents' rights over
possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and may be defined as "an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship particular fact."69 In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or
in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. motion.70
Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which
a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a In Pacific Banking Corp. Employees Organization v. Court of Appeals,71 the Court made the crucial
wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding:
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which one seeks
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from
made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated special proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by one against another, while the
in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x[.] latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact. Where a party-litigant seeks to recover
property from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity
matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in calling for an appointment of guardianship.72
a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case
of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir Hence, the main point of differentiation between a civil action and a special proceeding is that in the
to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was former, a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right which the party claims he/she
for the recovery of property. 66 is entitled to,73 such as when a party-litigant seeks to recover property from another,74 while in the
latter, a party merely seeks to have a right established in his/her favor.
Nevertheless, the Court likewise added in Ypon that there are circumstances wherein a determination
of heirship in a special proceeding is not a precondition for the institution of an ordinary civil action Applying the foregoing to ordinary civil actions for the cancellation of a deed or instrument and
for the sake of practicality, i.e., (1) when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the reconveyance of property on the basis of relationship with the decedent, i.e., compulsory or intestate
issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and (2) succession, the plaintiff does not really seek to establish his/her right as an heir. In truth, the plaintiff
when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally terminated and cannot be re- seeks the enforcement of his/her right brought about by his/her being an heir by operation of law.
opened:
Restated, the party does not seek to establish his/her right as an heir because the law itself already
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of establishes that status. What he/she aims to do is to merely call for the nullification of a deed,
heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had instrument, or conveyance as an enforcement or protection of that right which he/she already
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the possesses by virtue of law.
issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special
proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-
opened. 67 Moreover, it is likewise noted that ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity of a document,
nullity of title, recovery of ownership of real property, or reconveyance are actions in
personam.75 And thus, they only bind particular individuals although they concern rights to tangible
Ordinary Civil Actions vis-à-vis Special Proceedings things.76 Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.77 Hence, any
decision in the private respondents' ordinary civil action would not prejudice non-parties.
In the main, Ypon, citing certain earlier jurisprudence, held that the determination of a decedent's
lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding, precluding the RTC in an To emphasize, any holding by the trial court in the ordinary civil action initiated by the private
ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance from making the same. respondents shall only be in relation to the cause of action, i.e., the annulment of the Affidavits of
Self-Adjudication executed by petitioner Treyes and reconveyance of the subject properties, and shall
According to Rule 1, Section 3(c) of the Rules, the purpose of a special proceeding is to establish a only be binding among the parties therein.
status, right, or particular fact. As held early on in Hagans v. Wislizenus,68 a "special proceeding"
At this juncture, the Court now deems it proper and opportune to revisit existing jurisprudence on the In the instant case, Article 1001 states that brothers and sisters, or their children, who survive with the
requisite of establishing one's heirship in a prior special proceeding before invoking such heirship in widow or widower, shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, while the surviving spouse shall be
an ordinary civil action. entitled to the other half:

The Transmission of the Rights of Heirs at Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter
the Precise Moment of Death of the shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
Decedent under the Civil Code half. (953-837a).

That the private respondents do not really seek in their Complaint the establishment of their rights as Hence, subject to the required proof, without any need of prior judicial determination, the private
intestate heirs but, rather, the enforcement of their rights already granted by law as intestate heirs respondents siblings of Rosie, by operation of law, are entitled to one-half of the inheritance of the
finds basis in Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights of succession are transmitted decedent. Thus, in filing their Complaint, they do not seek to have their right as intestate heirs
from the moment of the death of the decedent. established, for the simple reason that it is the law that already establishes that right. What they seek is
the enforcement and protection of the right granted to them under Article 1001 in relation to Article
The operation of Article 777 occurs at the very moment of the decedent's death – the transmission by 777 of the Civil Code by asking for the nullification of the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication that
succession occurs at the precise moment of death and, therefore, the heir is legally deemed to have disregard and violate their right as intestate heirs.
acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance at that very moment, "and not at the time of
declaration of heirs, or partition, or distribution."78 As correctly explained by Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (Justice Bernabe) in her
Separate Opinion, "a prior declaration of heirship in a special proceeding should not be required
Hence, the Court has held that the "[t]itle or rights to a deceased person's property are immediately before an heir may assert successional rights in an ordinary civil action aimed only to protect his or
passed to his or her heirs upon death. The heirs' rights become vested without need for them to be her interests in the estate. Indeed, the legal heirs of a decedent should not be rendered helpless to
declared 'heirs.'"79 rightfully protect their interests in the estate while there is yet no special proceeding."84

In Bonilla, et al. v. Barcena, et al.,80 the Court held that: To stress once more, the successional rights of the legal heirs of Rosie are not merely contingent or
expectant — they vest upon the death of the decedent. By being legal heirs, they are entitled to
institute an action to protect their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession and are thus real
"[F]rom the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his parties in interest in the instant case. To delay the enforcement of such rights until heirship is
property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, x x x [t]he right of the heirs to the determined with finality in a separate special proceeding would run counter to Article 777 of the Civil
property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the Code which recognizes the vesting of such rights immediately — without a moment's interruption —
testate or intestate proceedings."81 upon the death of the decedent.

In fact, in partition cases, even before the property is judicially partitioned, the heirs are already The Originating Case of Litam, et al. v.
deemed co-owners of the property. Thus, in partition cases, the heirs are deemed real parties in Espiritu, et al.
interest without a prior separate judicial determination of their heirship.82 Similarly, in the summary
settlement of estates, the heirs may undertake the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the decedent
amongst themselves through the execution of a public instrument even without a prior declaration in a The doctrine relied upon by petitioner Treyes, laid down in Ypon, Yaptinchay, Portugal, and Reyes,
separate judicial proceeding that they are the heirs of the decedent.83 If there is only one legal heir, traces its origin to the 1956 case of Litam, et al. v. Espiritu, et al.85 (Litam).
the document usually executed is an affidavit of self-adjudication even without a prior judicial
declaration of heirship. It then behooves the Court to closely examine this originating case to see whether the development of
jurisprudence, finding its current reincarnation in Ypon, is faithful to the Court's ruling in Litam.
The Civil Code identifies certain relatives who are deemed compulsory heirs and intestate heirs. They
refer to relatives that become heirs by virtue of compulsory succession or intestate succession, as the In Litam, a special proceeding, i.e., Special Proceeding No. 1537, for the settlement of the Intestate
case may be, by operation of law. Estate of the deceased Rafael Litam (Rafael), was instituted by one of the supposed sons of the
latter, i.e., Gregorio Dy Tam (Gregorio). It was alleged that the children of Rafael, Gregorio and his
siblings, were begotten "by a marriage celebrated in China in 1911 with Sia Khin [(Khin)], now What is thus apparent from the Court's Decision in Litam is that the CFI was not found to be at fault
deceased" and that Rafael "contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa in appreciating evidence and examining the issue of the alleged heirship of the petitioners in resolving
Rivera [(Marcosa)], Filipino citizen." In Special Proceeding No. 1537, Marcosa denied the alleged the ordinary civil action. To reiterate, the Court even concurred with the CFI's appreciation of
marriage of Rafael to Khin and the alleged filiation of Gregorio and his siblings, and prayed that her evidence on the heirship of the petitioners therein that were presented during trial. The Court made no
nephew, Arminio Rivera (Arminio), be appointed administrator of the intestate estate of Rafael. In pronouncement whatsoever that since Gregorio and his siblings had not previously obtained a
due course, the court issued the letters of administration to Arminio, who assumed his duties as such, declaration of heirship in a special proceeding, then they should not be considered real parties in
and, later, submitted an inventory of the alleged estate of Rafael. interest. The Court could not have made such pronouncement because Gregorio and his siblings had
utterly failed to prove that they were the heirs of Rafael.
During the subsistence of the special proceeding, Gregorio and his siblings filed an ordinary civil
action complaint, i.e., Civil Case No. 2071, against Marcosa and Arminio in the same court hearing What the Court only held was that it was improper for the CFI to have included in the dispositive
the special proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent, praying for the portion of its Decision a definite and categorical judgment as to Marcosa's status as being the "only"
delivery of the decedent's properties possessed by Marcosa and Arminio to the administrator of the heir as it was not the object and purpose of the ordinary civil action, which prayed in the main for the
estate of Rafael, as well as damages. reconveyance of the subject properties therein, and wherein a separate special proceeding, i.e., Special
Proceeding No. 1537, was already pending that focused precisely on the contentious issue of whether
After trial, the Court of First Instance (CFI) issued its judgment dismissing Civil Case No. 2071 and or not there was an earlier marriage of Rafael to Khin, and whether Gregorio, et al. were the issue of
declaring the properties in question to be the exclusive, separate and paraphernal properties of said marriage.
Marcosa. The CFI further declared that Gregorio and his siblings "are not the children of the deceased
Rafael Litam, and that his only heir is his surviving wife, Marcosa Rivera."86 Thus, the Court's ruling in Litam was that in an ordinary civil action for reconveyance of property, the
invocation of the status of the parties as heirs in the complaint does not preclude the determination of
It must be noted that the Court, in upholding the aforementioned judgment of the CFI, did not call for the merits of the said ordinary civil action despite the pendency of the special proceeding for the
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2071 because it corollarily involved the issue of heirship in an settlement of the intestate estate of Rafael. What was held to be improper by the Court in Litam was
ordinary civil action. The CFI did not hold whatsoever that Gregorio and his siblings were not real the making by the RTC of a conclusive, definite, and categorical declaration in the ordinary civil
parties in interest and that their complaint failed to state a cause of action because their complaint action regarding Marcosa being the "only" heir of the decedent when there was already pending
invoked the issue of heirship. before it a special proceeding tackling the contending issues of heirship posed by Gregorio, et al.

In fact, it must be noted that the Court even affirmed the CFI's judgment in the ordinary civil action, Hence, a closer look at Litam reveals that the underlying foundation of the doctrine invoked by the
and discussed at length and pronounced its findings as to the status of Gregorio and his siblings as petitioners is inapt.
heirs, holding that they "have utterly failed to prove their alleged status as children of Rafael Litam by
a marriage with Sia Khin." In plain terms, the Court, in upholding the CFI Decision, affirmed the Jurisprudential Support on the Institution of
dismissal of the ordinary civil action, not because it touched upon the issue of heirship, but because an Ordinary Civil Action by Legal Heirs
the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence proving their heirship and that the evidence on arising out of a Right based on Succession
record actually proved that they were not heirs of Rafael. without the Necessity of a Previous Judicial
Declaration of Heirship
The Court found issue with the CFI's Decision only insofar as it made a categorical pronouncement in
its dispositive portion that Marcosa was the "only" heir of the decedent, ordering a slight modification To be sure, even prior to the promulgation of Litam which, as already explained, does not actually
in the CFI's Decision: support the doctrine that a determination of heirship in a prior special proceeding is a prerequisite for
the resolution of an ordinary civil action, the Court had already pronounced that the legal heirs may
Likewise, we are of the opinion that the lower court should not have declared, in the decision commence an ordinary civil action arising out of a right based on succession without the necessity of
appealed from, that Marcosa Rivera is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper a previous and separate judicial declaration of their status as such.
in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceeding
No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation As early as 1939, the Court En Banc, in De Vera, et al. v. Galauran88 (De Vera), held that:
of the project of partition.87
Arsenio de Vera, as surviving spouse of the deceased Isabel Domingo, acting for himself and as petitioners therein filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of a parcel of land on the basis of
guardian ad litem of six minors heirs, instituted an action against Cleotilde Galauran in the Court of their being heirs. The lower court dismissed the action on the ground that the petitioners therein did
First Instance of Rizal for the annulment of a deed of sale of a registered parcel of land. It is alleged in not have legal capacity to sue because "judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an
the complaint that Arsenio de Vera and his wife Isabel Domingo, now deceased, have mortgaged their heir may have legal capacity to bring the action to recover a property belonging to the deceased."102
property to the defendant to secure a loan received from him, but said defendant illegally made them
sign a deed which they then believed to be of mortgage and which turned out later to be of pacto de The Court En Banc reversed the lower court's dismissal of the action and unequivocally held that as
retro sale; and that the six minor children named in the complaint are the legitimate children and an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship
legitimate heirs of the deceased Isabel Domingo. A demurrer was interposed by the defendant is necessary:Another ground on which the dismissal is predicted is that the complaint states no cause
alleging that the plaintiffs have no cause of action, for they have not been declared legal heirs in a of action because while it appears in the complaint that the land was transferred to one Guadalupe
special proceeding. The demurrer was sustained, and, on failure of plaintiffs to amend, the action was Saralde, deceased wife of Defendant Alejandro Quito, there is no allegation that said Alejandro Quito
dismissed. Wherefore, this appeal. and his daughter Aida, a co-Defendant, had been [judicially] declared heirs or administrators of the
estate of the deceased. Because of this legal deficiency, the court has concluded that Plaintiffs have no
Unless there is pending a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, the cause of action against Defendants because there is no legal bond by which the latter may be linked
legal heirs may commence an ordinary action arising out of a right belonging to the ancestor, without with the property.
the necessity of a previous and separate judicial declaration of their status as such.89
This conclusion is also erroneous. The rule is that, to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action on
It must be noted that the Court's pronouncement in De Vera, citing Hernandez, et al. v. Padua, et a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint should be considered, and considering the
al.,90 Uy Coque, et al. v. Sioca, et al.,91 Mendoza Vda. de Bonnevie v. Cecilio Vda. de facts herein alleged, there is enough ground to proceed with the case. Thus, it appears in the complaint
Pardo,92 and Government of the Philippine Islands v. Serafica,93 is a decision of the Court En that Guadalupe Saralde is the wife of Alejandro Quito, the Defendant, and as said Guadalupe has
Banc which cannot be overturned by a ruling of a Division of the Court. The Constitution provides already died, under the law, the husband and his daughter Aida are the legal heirs. We have already
that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered En Banc may be said that in order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial
modified or reversed except by the Court sitting En Banc.94 declaration of heirship is necessary. It was therefore a mistake to dismiss the complaint on this
ground.103
Subsequently, in 1954, the Court En Banc promulgated its Decision in Cabuyao v. Caagbay, et
al.95 (Cabuyao). In the said case, the lower court dismissed a case filed by an alleged lone To reiterate, once again, the Court's holdings in Cabuyao and Marabilles that an heir may assert
compulsory heir of the decedent for quieting of title covering the property inherited by the plaintiff his/her right to the property of the decedent without the necessity of a previous judicial declaration of
from the decedent. The lower court dismissed the aforesaid complaint because "'no action can be heirship are decisions of the Court En Banc that cannot be reversed by a ruling of a Division of the
maintained until a judicial declaration of heirship has been legally secured.'"96 Court. Ypon, Yaptinchay, Portugal, and Reyes, which are all decisions of the Court's Divisions, in so
far as they hold that a prior special proceeding for declaration of heirship is a prerequisite for the
In reversing the order of the lower court, the Court En Banc noted that "as early as 1904, this Court assertion by an heir of his/her ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession in an ordinary civil
entertained, in the case of [Mijares v. Nery] (3 Phil., 195), the action of an acknowledged natural child action, did not, as they could not, overturn the Court En Banc's holdings in De Vera, Cabuyao,
to recover property belonging to his deceased father — who had not been survived by any legitimate Atun, and Marabilles that heirs should be able to assert their successional rights without the necessity
descendant — notwithstanding the absence of a previous declaration of heirship in favor of the of a previous judicial declaration of heirship.
plaintiff x x x"97 and held that "[t]he right to assert a cause of action as an alleged heir, although he
has not been judicially declared to be so, has been acknowledged in a number of subsequent cases."98 Similarly, in Morales, et al. v. Yañez,104 which involved an ordinary civil action for the recovery of
certain parcels of land, the Court held that the enforcement or protection of rights of heirs from
In 1955, the Court En Banc reiterated the foregoing holding in Atun, et al. v. Nuñez, et encroachments made or attempted may be undertaken even before their judicial declaration as heirs is
al.,99 (Atun) holding that "[t]he rule is settled that the legal heirs of a deceased may file an action made in a special proceeding:
arising out of a right belonging to their ancestor, without a separate judicial declaration of their status
as such[.]"100 Appellants contend, however, that for Defendant to acquire a vested right to Eugeniano's property, he
must first commence proceedings to settle Eugeniano's estate — which he had not done, There is no
Similarly, in Marabilles, et al. v. Sps. Quito101 (Marabilles) which was also decided by the Court En merit to the contention. This Court has repeatedly held that the right of heirs to the property of the
Banc a month before Litam and involves a factual milieu comparable to the instant case, the deceased is vested from the moment of death. Of course the formal declaration or recognition or
enforcement of such right needs judicial confirmation in proper proceedings. But we have often Subsequently, the Court dealt with the same issue in Baranda, et al. v. Baranda, et al.,111 wherein the
enforced or protected such rights from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial therein petitioners, claiming to be the legitimate heirs of the decedent, filed a complaint against the
declaration. Which can only mean that the heir acquired hereditary rights even before judicial therein respondents for the annulment of the sale and the reconveyance of the subject lots. While the
declaration in testate or intestate proceedings.105 lower court initially ruled in favor of the therein petitioners, the appellate court reversed the lower
court's ruling because, among other reasons, the therein petitioners are not real parties in interest,
In Gayon v. Gayon,106 in denying the argument posed by the defendants therein that they cannot be having failed to establish in a prior special proceeding their status as heirs.
made defendants in a suit filed against the decedent because "heirs cannot represent the dead
defendant, unless there is a declaration of heirship,"107 the Court held that the heirs may be sued even The Court reversed the appellate court's ruling and held that the legal heirs of a decedent are the
without a prior declaration of heirship made in a special proceeding: parties in interest to commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to the
deceased, without separate judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said decedent, provided only
Inasmuch, however, as succession takes place, by operation of law, "from the moment of the death of that there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate:
the decedent" and "(t)he inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which
are not extinguished by his death," it follows that if his heirs were included as defendants in this case, There is also the issue of the capacity to sue of the petitioners who, it is claimed by the private
they would be sued, not as "representatives" of the decedent, but as owners of an aliquot interest in respondents, are not the proper parties to question the validity of the deed of sale. The reason given is
the property in question, even if the precise extent of their interest may still be undetermined and they that they are not the legitimate and compulsory heirs of Paulina Baranda nor were they parties to the
have derived it from the decent. Hence, they may be sued without a previous declaration of heirship x challenged transactions.
x x.108
It is not disputed that Paulina Baranda died intestate without leaving any direct descendants or
In Bonilla, et al. v. Barcena, et al.,109 an ordinary civil action was instituted by a surviving spouse to ascendants, or compulsory heirs. She was survived, however, by two brothers, namely, Pedro and
quiet title over certain parcels of land. When the surviving spouse passed away during the pendency Teodoro, and several nephews and nieces, including the private respondents, as well as petitioners
of the action, the lower court immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot Flocerfina Baranda, Salvacion Baranda, and Alipio Baranda Villarte, children of two deceased
be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue. The Court reversed the lower court's brothers and a sister. The above-named persons, together with Pedro Baranda, who was not joined as
ruling, holding that the right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before a petitioner because he is the father of the private respondents, and the children of another deceased
judicial declaration of heirship in a special proceeding. Thus, the lower court should have allowed the sister, are the legitimate intestate heirs of Paulina Baranda.
substitution by the heirs of the deceased even without any prior judicial determination of their status
as heirs: The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are the following:

The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the []Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of articles.
the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of
his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their
rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining []Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces, who are the
factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or children of the descendant's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita,
contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial and the latter per stirpes
declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. When Fortunata Barcena,
therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not []Art. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the
extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus ascending.
acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is,
therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for []In the collateral line it takes place only in favor of the children or brothers or sisters, whether they be
the deceased plaintiff.110 of the full or half blood.[]
As heirs, the petitioners have legal standing to challenge the deeds of sale purportedly signed by Title or rights to a deceased person's property are immediately passed to his or her heirs upon death.
Paulina Baranda for otherwise property claimed to belong to her estate will be excluded therefrom to The heirs' rights become vested without need for them to be declared "heirs". Before the property is
their prejudice. Their claims are not merely contingent or expectant, as argued by the private partitioned, the heirs are co-owners of the property.
respondents, but are deemed to have vested in them upon Paulina Baranda's death in 1982, as, under
Article 777 of the Civil Code, "the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the In this case, the rights to Gregoria Lopez's property were automatically passed to her sons —
death of the decedent." While they are not compulsory heirs, they are nonetheless legitimate heirs and Teodoro, Francisco, and Carlos — when she died in 1922. Since only Teodoro was survived by
so, since they "stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or suit," are entitled to protect their children, the rights to the property ultimately passed to them when Gregoria Lopez's sons died. The
share of successional rights. children entitled to the property were Gregorio, Simplicio, Severino, and Enrique.

This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in interest to Gregorio, Simplicio, Severino, and Enrique became co-owners of the property, with each of them
commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased, without separate entitled to an undivided portion of only a quarter of the property. Upon their deaths, their children
judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said decedent, provided that there is no pending special became the co-owners of the property, who were entitled to their respective shares, such that the heirs
proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate."112 of Gregorio became entitled to Gregorio's one-fourth share, and Simplicio's and Severino's respective
heirs became entitled to their corresponding one-fourth shares in the property. The heirs cannot
In Marquez v. Court of Appeals,113 the therein petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance and alienate the shares that do not belong to them.117
partition with damages, alleging that both the Affidavit of Adjudication and Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos executed by the therein private respondents were invalid as the other heirs of the decedent were In 2017, the Court promulgated Capablanca v. Heirs of Pedro Bas, et al.118 In the said case, the
excluded in the execution of the said instruments. While the issue on real party in interest was not decedent Norberto Bas (Norberto) purchased a piece of land and took possession. Similar to the
made an issue in the said case, the ruling of the lower court was upheld by the Court, declaring that instant case, Norberto died without a will and was succeeded by a collateral relative, i.e., his niece and
both the Affidavit of Adjudication and the Donation Inter Vivos did not produce any legal effect and only heir, Lolita Bas Capablanca (Lolita). Subsequently, Lolita learned that a TCT had been issued in
did not confer any right whatsoever despite the lack of any determination in a special proceeding as to the names of the therein respondents on the basis of a reconstituted Deed of Conveyance. Hence, just
the heirship of the therein petitioners. as in the instant case, a collateral relative, i.e., Lolita, filed a complaint before the RTC of Cebu City
for the cancellation of the titles covering the property once owned by the decedent. While the RTC
In the 2013 case of Pacaña-Contreras and Pacaña v. Rovila Water Supply, Inc., et al.,114 which was ruled in favor of Lolita, the appellate court reversed the RTC's ruling. The appellate court, citing the
decided around five months after Ypon, the therein petitioner heirs filed an action for accounting and case of Yaptinchay, held that there is a need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of heirship in
damages against the therein respondents. The latter filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the therein order to resolve petitioner's action for cancellation of titles of the property.
petitioners are not real parties in interest to institute and prosecute the case, just as what is alleged in
the instant case. While the lower court denied the motion to dismiss, the appellate court, In reversing the ruling of the appellate court, the Court, again through Justice Leonen, emphatically
citing Litam and Yaptinchay, reversed the lower court and dismissed the case because "the (therein) held that no judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may assert his or her
petitioners should first be declared as heirs before they can be considered as the real parties in interest. right to the property of the deceased:
This cannot be done in the present ordinary civil case but in a special proceeding for that
purpose."115 Arguing that their declaration as heirs in a special proceeding is not necessary pursuant
to the Court's ruling in Marabilles, the therein petitioners' petition was granted by the Court which The dispute in this case is not about the heirship of petitioner to Norberto but the validity of the sale
reversed and set aside the appellate court's ruling. of the property in 1939 from Pedro to Faustina, from which followed a series of transfer transactions
that culminated in the sale of the property to Norberto. For with Pedro's sale of the property in 1939, it
follows that there would be no more ownership or right to property that would have been transmitted
In 2014, the Court, through Senior Associate Justice Marvic M. V. F. Leonen (Justice Leonen), to his heirs.
promulgated its Decision in Heirs of Gregorio Lopez v. Development Bank of the
Philippines,116 wherein the therein petitioners discovered that one of the heirs executed an affidavit
of self-adjudication declaring himself to be the decedent's only surviving heir. The therein petitioners x x x What petitioner is pursuing is Norberto's right of ownership over the property which was passed
instituted an ordinary civil action for the nullification of the affidavit of self-adjudication. In to her upon the latter's death.
upholding the nullification of the affidavit of self-adjudication, the Court held that the rights to a
deceased person's property are immediately passed to his or her heirs upon death. The heirs' rights This Court has stated that no judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may
become vested without need for them to be declared "heirs": assert his or her right to the property of the deceased. In Marabilles v. Quito:
The right to assert a cause of action as an heir, although he has not been judicially declared to be so, if proceeding. Clearly, therefore, it cannot be said in the instant case that the private respondents were
duly proven, is well settled in this jurisdiction. This is upon the theory that the property of a deceased not able to present evidence as to their status as heirs and that the determination of their status as heirs
person, both real and personal, becomes the property of the heir by the mere fact of death of his was seriously contested by petitioner Treyes.
predecessor in interest, and as such he can deal with it in precisely the same way in which the
deceased could have dealt, subject only to the limitations which by law or by contract may be In relation to the foregoing, considering that the private respondents' action is founded on their birth
imposed upon the deceased himself. Thus, it has been held that "[t]here is no legal precept or certificates, the genuineness and due execution of the birth certificates shall be deemed admitted
established rule which imposes the necessity of a previous legal declaration regarding their status as unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the
heirs to an intestate on those who, being of age and with legal capacity, consider themselves the legal facts.122 In the instant case, the records show that there was no specific denial under oath on the part
heirs of a person, in order that they may maintain an action arising out of a right which belonged to of petitioner Treyes contesting the birth certificates. Therefore, the genuineness and due execution of
their ancestor" [x x x] A recent case wherein this principle was maintained is Cabuyao vs. the subject birth certificates are deemed admitted.
[C]aagbay.119 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, despite the promulgation of Ypon, Yaptinchay, Portugal, Reyes, and other cases upholding the
Similar to the above-stated case, the private respondents in the instant case did not file their rule that a prior determination of heirship in a special proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary civil
Complaint to establish their filiation with Rosie or apply for the determination of their right as action involving heirs, such rule has not been consistently upheld and is far from being considered a
intestate heirs, considering that the law already vested in them, as siblings of the decedent, their status doctrine. To the contrary, a plurality of decisions promulgated by both the Court En Banc123 and its
as intestate heirs of Rosie. Rather, the private respondents sought to enforce their already established Divisions124 firmly hold that the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in interest to commence
right over the property which had been allegedly violated by the fraudulent acts of petitioner Treyes. ordinary civil actions arising out of their rights of succession, without the need for a separate prior
judicial declaration of their heirship, provided only that there is no pending special proceeding for the
In the instant Petition, petitioner Treyes argues that the cases of Marquez v. Court of Appeals, settlement of the decedent's estate.
Baranda, et al. v. Baranda, et al., and Heirs of Gregorio Lopez v. Development Bank of the
Philippines find no application in the instant case because the parties in the aforesaid cases were able As similarly viewed by Justice Bernabe, the "more recent strand of jurisprudence correctly recognize
to present evidence as to their status as heirs and that the determination of their status as heirs was not the legal effects of Article 777 of the Civil Code, and thus, adequately provide for remedies for the
contested. heirs to protect their successional rights over the estate of the decedent even prior to the institution of
a special proceeding for its settlement"125
This argument is not well taken.
By this Decision now, the Court so holds, and firmly clarifies, that the latter formulation is the
In the instant case, the Court notes that in substantiating the fact that the private respondents are doctrine which is more in line with substantive law, i.e., Article 777 of the Civil Code is clear and
siblings of Rosie, and thus intestate heirs of the latter by operation of law, they attached their unmistakable in stating that the rights of the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
respective birth certificates proving that they are indeed siblings of Rosie.120 of the decedent even prior to any judicial determination of heirship. As a substantive law, its breadth
and coverage cannot be restricted or diminished by a simple rule in the Rules.
Rule 132, Section 23 of the Rules states that documents consisting of entries in public records made in
the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. To be sure, the Court stresses anew that rules of procedure must always yield to substantive
law.126 The Rules are not meant to subvert or override substantive law. On the contrary, procedural
The Court has held that a birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie evidence of rules are meant to operationalize and effectuate substantive law.
filiation and a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained in such
public document. This is pursuant to the rule that entries in official records made in the performance Hence, even assuming arguendo that the Rules strictly provide that a separate judicial determination
of his duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.121 of heirship in a special proceeding is a precondition in an ordinary civil action wherein heirship is
already established by compulsory succession or intestacy and is only sought to be enforced, which,
To be sure, upon meticulous perusal of the petitioner Treyes' pleadings, it is clear that the status of the as already discussed at length, is not the case, the Rules must still yield to the specific provisions of
private respondents as siblings of Rosie was not even seriously refuted by him. He also does not make the Civil Code that certain relatives of the decedent attain their status as either compulsory or intestate
any allegation that the birth certificates of the private respondents are fake, spurious, or manufactured. heirs and that their successional rights are transmitted and enforceable at the very moment of death
All he says is that there must first be a declaration of the private respondents' heirship in a special without the need of such separate judicial determination.
Indeed, the Rules shall always be construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.127 hereby DENIED. The Decision dated August 18, 2016 and Resolution dated June 1, 2017
promulgated by the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, Nineteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP Case No. 08813
Hence, it would be highly inimical to the very purpose of the Rules to dispose of matters without the are hereby AFFIRMED.
unnecessary and circuitous procedures created by a misreading of the requirements of said Rules, i.e,
they still require a separate and lengthy special proceeding for the solitary purpose of establishing the SO ORDERED
private respondents' status as legal heirs of Rosie, when their heirship has already been deemed
established by virtue of civil law, with petitioner Treyes not seriously and substantially refuting that
the private respondents are siblings of the decedent. If the Court will subscribe to petitioner Treyes'
arguments and grant the instant Petition, it would sanction superfluity and redundancy in procedure.
To accept petitioner Treyes' stance will necessarily mean that, moving forward, heirs will not even be
able to extra-judicially and summarily settle the estate of a decedent without a prior judicial
declaration of heirship in a special proceeding. Ironically, even petitioner Treyes' Affidavits of Self-
Adjudication would be legally baseless as he himself has not previously established in a prior special
proceeding his status as the husband and heir of Rosie.

Recapitulation

Given the clear dictates of the Civil Code that the rights of the heirs to the inheritance vest
immediately at the precise moment of the decedent's death even without judicial declaration of
heirship, and the various Court En Banc and Division decisions holding that no prior judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary before an heir can file an ordinary civil action to enforce
ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession through the nullification of deeds divesting property
or properties forming part of the estate and reconveyance thereof to the estate or for the common
benefit of the heirs of the decedent, the Court hereby resolves to clarify the prevailing doctrine.

Accordingly, the rule laid down in Ypon, Yaptinchay, Portugal, Reyes, Heirs of Gabatan v. Court of
Appeals, and other similar cases, which requires a prior determination of heirship in a separate special
proceeding as a prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil action to enforce ownership rights
acquired by virtue of succession, is abandoned.

Henceforth, the rule is: unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the
decedent's estate or for the determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may
commence an ordinary civil action to declare the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of
property, or any other action in the enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue of
succession, without the necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration of their status as
such. The ruling of the trial court shall only be in relation to the cause of action of the ordinary civil
action, i.e., the nullification of a deed or instrument, and recovery or reconveyance of property, which
ruling is binding only between and among the parties.

Therefore, the Court is in total agreement with the CA that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner Treyes' second Motion to
Dismiss.