Resp Final
Resp Final
Before
IN THE MATTER OF
ANDRONIX CORPORATION
ONER
V.
UNION OF INDIA
NDENT
IN THE MATTER OF
V.
UTTAR PRADESH
CCOUNSEL
OUNSELAAPPEARING
PPEARING OB
ON BEHALF
N EHALF THERR
OF OF ESPONDENTS
ESPONDENTS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS......................................................................................................4
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.......................................................................................................5
TABLE OF CASES..................................................................................................................7
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...........................................................................................11
STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................................................................12
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS................................................................................................14
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED....................................................................................................15
IS SATISFIED.....................................................................................................22
B. UAV REGULATIONS 1.0 ARE NOT ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA........26
[B1]THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.........................................26
SECURITY..............................................................31
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
No. Number
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
LIST OF TREATIES:
1. https://indiankanoon.org/
2. https://www.scconline.in/
3. http://manupatra.in/
4. https://www.livelaw.in/
5. http://www.legalservicesindia.com/
6. https://barandbench.com/
7. https://ssrana.in/News/CL%20Connect%20NewsLetter/2017/23/India-DGCA-
releases-draft-regulations-on-the-civil-use-of-drones.htm#fn11.
8. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Cuius_est_solum,_eius_est_usque_ad_coelum_et_ad_inferos#cite_note-2
9. https://www.icao.int/safety/UA/UASToolkit/Pages/Toolkit-Guidelines.aspx
1. Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism‘, 68(4) Stanford Law Review
729, 748 (April 2016).
2. AnupamChander&Uyen P. Le, Data Nationalism, Emory Law Journal, Vol. 64, No.
3, 2015
3. Telstra Cyber Security Report, 2017
4. Sri Krishna Committee Report, 2018.
TABLE OF CASES
INDIAN CASES
SNO. NAME OF THE CASE CITATION PG.NO
1. A.K. Mukherji v. Prodip Ranjan Sarbadhikary AIR 1988 Cal 259 19
And Ors.
2. Academy of Nutrition Improvement v. Union of WP(C) 80 of 2006 20
India
3. Air India v. Nargesh Meerza AIR 1981 SC 1829. 17
4. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib (1981) 1 SCC722,741 17
5. Ameronissa v. Mehboob AIR 1953 SC 71 28
6. Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd vs Union Of India And 1995 AIR 1340 23
Ors
7. Association of Drugs and Pharmaceuticals, 2002 (2) ALD 609 20
Manufacturers, A.P. v.A.P. Health, Medical,
Housing and Infrastructure Development
Corporation, Hyd. and Anr.
8. Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner of Income AIR 1959 SC 149 23
Tax, Delhi & Rajasthan
9. British India Steam Navigation Company Ltd. (AIR 1964 SC 1451) 18
V. Jagjit Singh
10. Budhan Chaudhary v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 191 28
11. Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. v. Chandrima (2000) 2 SCC 465. 17,26
Das & Ors
12. Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. (1990) 4 SCC 449 20
State of Uttar Pradesh
13. Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri vs The Union Of India 1951 AIR 41 23
And Ors
14. Daryao v. State of U.P AIR 1961 SC 1457 20
15. David John Hopkins v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1997 Mad 366 19
16. Deena Dayal v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 20
1155
17. Directorate Of Film Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Appeal (civil) 1892 of 2007 20
Jain & Ors
18. Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. (1975) 2 SCC 148 24,29,
32
19. Hans Muller of Nurenberg v. Superintendent, 1955 AIR 367 19
Presidency Jail, Calcutta and Ors.
20. Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit (1964) AIR 1140 18,19
Singh, Additional Collector of Customs and Ors.
21. Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd.), And Anr. v, (2017) 10 SCC 1. 27,32,
Union Of India And Ors. 33,37
22. K. Thimmappa v. Chairman Central Board of AIR 2001 SC 467 17
Directors SBI
23. Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J&K (1980) 4 SCC 1 17
24. Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal AIR 1953 SC 404 28
25. Kharak Singh v. The state of U.P and ors 1963 AIR 1295 36
26. Louis De Raedt v. Union of India 1991 AIR 1886 19,27
27. M.P Sharma Singh & others v. Satish Chandra & 1954 AIR 300 35,36
Others,
28. Madhu Limaye v. Supdt Tihar jail Delhi 1975 AIR (SC) 1505 28
29. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 23,
32,34
30. Mukesh Kumar Ajmera v. State of Rajasthan AIR (1997)RAJ 250 33
31. Mylapore Club v. State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr Appeal (civil) 4531 of 2003 23
32. Om Kumar v. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 3689, 3702 22
33. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1964 SC 72. 24
34. People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of AIR 1991 SC 207. 34
India
35. Power Measurement Ltd. vs U.P. Power 2003 (2) AWC 1642 B 18
Corporation Ltd
36. R.C.Cooper v. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 564 17
37. R.K.Garg v. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 2138 17
38. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1995) AIR SC 264 32
39. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 740 24
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INTERNATIONAL CASES
60. Associated Picture House v. Wednesbury (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA), 22
Corporation 682-683
61. Campbell v. MGN [2004] UKHL 22 29,37
62. Council of Civil Service Unions. v. Minister for (1984) 3 All ER 935, 951 22
the Civil Services
63. De Freitas v. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of (1999) 1 A.C. 69, 80 22
Agriculture, Fisheries, Land and Housing
64. Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [1992] 2 AC 1 22
65. Hinman v. Pac. Air Lines Transp. Corp. 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 30
1936)
66. Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v. Evans 191 So. 2d 126, 128 30
67. Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 29,37
68. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. (1910) 220 US 61 17
69. U.S v. Knotts 460 U.S. 276 (1983) 29
70. United States v. Causby (1946)28 US 256 30
71. Uzun v. Germany App no 35623/05, IHRL 38
1838 (ECHR 2010)
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Counsel for the Respondent, most humbly and respectfully, submits that this Hon’ble
Apex Court of India has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this instant writ petition filed
under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India, 19501. It is further submitted that all procedural
requirements have been adhered to in the prescribed manner. The present memorandum sets
forth the facts, contentions and arguments in the present case.
1
32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ), Parliament may by
law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 )
(4) The right guaranteed by this Art. shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Andronix Corporation reputed world-wide for its end-to-end drone/ unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) solutions, is a private limited company incorporated in Cayman Islands with
its majority shareholders (60%) as Chinese venture funds and the remaining 40% with two
United States promoters (20% each). The data gathered by Andronix drones are sent back to
servers located in China, where they are analysed in extremely granular ways, pursuant to
which detailed reports containing their analysis is sent to respective clients.
2. The State of Uttar Pradesh impressed with the quality of output offered by Andronix, and
appreciating the immense potential offered by the application of UAV technologies, executed
a five-year contract with Andronix in 2016. Under this contract, Andronix was to assist the
State of Uttar Pradesh by deploying its UAV technology in event of natural disasters, law
enforcement, and inspection of repair and maintenance operations in government properties
and any other case as the government may deem fit from time to time.
3. The Uttar Pradesh government bureaucracy formulated a policy titled Advance Data-
driven Response Policy which had a stated objective of integrating emerging technologies
like artificial intelligence and deep learning solutions and specifically spelt out the use of
drones to track human movement and capture facial images, and match it with databases of
known offenders for law enforcement and public order concerns.
4. Andronix ran a drone surveillance pilot in certain parts of Allahabad, reporting on near
real-time basis the movement of suspicious individuals and the occurrence of seemingly
suspicious activities. This helped alert law enforcement authorities and take some pre-
emptive steps such as deploying more police personnel on the field and enhancing the
database of suspected persons.
5. But Andronix could not carry out many more activities under this contract because the
regulatory environment in India was not favourable to the technology. However, in August
2018 things started looking up as the Union of India finalised the UAV Regulations and made
it come into effect conditional upon a reg-tech solution, “Digital Sky”, being put in place. In
addition to these regulations, the Union of India also amended the Information Technology
(Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information)
Rules, 2011 with effect from December 30, 2018 mandating that locational and facial data
would qualify as sensitive personal data and that all sensitive personal data of Indian citizens
must be stored in servers located in India.
6. Andronix was not happy with these regulations and the amended IT Rules because they
would operate jointly and severally to hamper ease of doing business for foreign
corporations, as well as hinder next generation innovation in ways that Andronix considered
undesirable. Therefore, Andronix approached the Supreme Court of India challenging the
UAV Regulations as well as the amended IT Rules. At the same time, a citizens’ action
group, Citizens for Digital Privacy, validly incorporated as a non-government organization,
publicly called for a ban on UAV technology in urban settings and densely populated regions
claiming it is violative of privacy, bodily, and property interests. They have now approached
the Supreme Court of India challenging the the amended IT Rules and UAV regulations
(against the Union of India) and the ADRP (against the State of U.P).
ISSUES RAISED
2. WHETHER THE 2018 AMENDMENTS TO THE IT RULES AND THE UAV REGULATIONS 1.0
ARE ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
It is humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Court that the writ petition filed by Andronix
Corporation is not maintainable under the eyes of the law. It is the firm contention of the
Respondents that the Petitioners do not possess the locus standi to file the current petition.
There is no fundamental right violation under Art.14 of the Indian Constitution. It is also the
contention of the Respondents that the right under Art. 19(1) is not applicable in the current
case matter.
2. WHETHER THE 2018 AMENDMENTS TO THE IT RULES AND THE UAV REGULATIONS 1.0
ARE ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?
It is humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Supreme Court that the amendment made to the
Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices And Procedures And Sensitive
Personal Data Or Information) Rules, 2011 in 2018 as well as the UAV Regulations 1.0
introduced in August 2018 are not ultra vires the Indian Constitution. The doctrine of ultra
vires literally means ‘beyond the powers’. The amendments that were introduced to both the
above laws are not beyond the scope of the Constitution of India and were made to protect
and preserve the rights and welfare of the citizens of the country.
It is humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Supreme Court that ADRP policy formulated by the
Uttar Pradesh government is not ultra vires the Constitution of India as it does not infringe
any fundamental right guaranteed under Art.19 or Art.21. Further, as all other fundamental
rights, privacy is also not absolute and is subject to certain restrictions. Public welfare and
security are reasonable restrictions to the right to privacy. Further, the right to privacy is
being curtailed in accordance with “procedure established by law”, a prerequisite of Art.21.
Lastly, public welfare would supersede an individual’s right to privacy and thus, ADRP is not
unconstitutional.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
It is humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Supreme Court that the writ petition filed by Andronix
Corporation is not maintainable in law as [A.] There is no fundamental right violation under
Art.14 of the Indian Constitution and [B.] Art.32 is inapplicable in the current case.
2. Definitions (42) ―foreign company means any company or body corporate incorporated
outside India which—
(a) has a place of business in India whether by itself or through an agent, physically or
through electronic mode; and
(a) Part III of the Constitution enumerates the Fundamental Rights. There are two categories
of Fundamental Rights that comes to light on a close perusal of the Arts which embody them.
One set of rights are available only to citizens such as Arts. 15, 16, 19, etc. Few others are
available to ‘persons’ generally. One such Art. that can be availed by persons generally is
2
Para ¶1, Moot Proposition, Page 1.
3
S2(42), Companies Act, 2013.
4
Aiyar Ramanatha, P., Concise Law Dictionary, LexisNexis Buttersworth Wadhwa Nagpur, 2009
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Art. 14.5 These fundamental rights using the word ‘person’ are by their nature and intent
available only to natural persons.6
(b) The rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution are not absolute in terms. They
are subject to reasonable restrictions and, therefore, in case of a non-citizen also, those rights
will be available subject to such restrictions as may be imposed in the interest of the security
of the State or other important considerations. Interest of the nation and security of the State
is supreme.7 Certain other fundamental rights have been guaranteed by the Constitution only
to citizens and certain disabilities imposed upon the State with respect to citizens only. 8
(c)As per the Indian Constitution, The State shall not deny to any person equality before the
law or the equal protection of the laws 9.Equality before law means that among equals the law
should be equal and equally administered, that like should be treated alike. 10 Equal Protection
of the laws mean subjection to equal law, applying to all in the same circumstances. 11
Therefore, equal law can be applied only to those in similar circumstances.12
(d) Art. 14 does not prohibit reasonable classification. The Supreme Court has laid down the
test to check if a classification is reasonable or not. It has been held in a number of cases that
for a classification to be reasonable,13 it should
ii. The differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved
by the Act
5
State Trading Corporation of India v. Commercial Tax Officer and Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1811
6
Shukla, V.N., Constitution of India, Eastern Book Company, 11th Ed., 2010, p. 35
7
Chairman, Railway Board and Ors. v. Chandrima Das (Mrs.) and Ors(2000) 2 SCC 465.
8
State Trading Corporation of India v. Commercial Tax Officer and Ors.,, AIR 1963 SC 1811.
9
Art 14, Constitution of India, 1950.
10
Jennings, Law of the Constitution, 3rd Ed., p. 49
11
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., (1910) 220 US 61
12
Shukla, V.N., Constitution of India, Eastern Book Company, 11th Ed., 2010, p. 46
13
R.K.Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 2138; Re-Special Courts Bill, AIR 1979 SC 478; Air India v.
Nargesh Meerza AIR 1981 SC 1829; R.C.Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564; Ameeroonisa v.
Mahboob, AIR 1953 SC 91; K. Thimmappa v. Chairman Central Board of Directors SBI, AIR 2001 SC 467
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The Supreme Court held that Art. 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures
fairness and equality of treatment14. This principle was reiterated in Ramana Dayaram Shetty
v. International Airport Authority,15 Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J&K16 and Ajay
Hasia v. Khalid Mujib17
(e) The amendments introduced to the IT Rules, 2011 satiates the requirements of reasonable
classification. It mandated that locational and facial data would qualify as sensitive personal
data and that all sensitive personal data of Indian citizens must be stored in servers located in
India.18 The amendment was introduced to safeguard the privacy and security of the citizens
of India, which is of supreme importance to the Union of India.
(e) The ambit of Art. 14 is restricted to the territory of India, i.e., it can be claimed by persons
within India. It is humbly submitted that a person can approach this Court for remedy only
when a right he is entitled to has been violated. It is pertinent to note that Art. 14 can be
claimed by a foreign company only when the right which it claims as being violated thereby
giving rise to inequality is one which is available to persons generally. However, if a person
approaches this Hon’ble Court and has to rely on a right that is available only to citizens, that
person per se does not have a standing in this Court.19
(f) Fundamental rights, which are available to the citizens of this country, cannot be extended
to non-citizens through Art.14 of the Constitution.20 Art.14 of the Constitution cannot be
pleaded independently and in seclusion to other fundamental rights. The equitable protection
of laws as envisaged in Art. 14 necessarily has to take into consideration 21
(a) An incorporated company cannot claim to be a citizen of India, and hence cannot be
entitled to rely upon the rights guaranteed under Art. 19(1) of the Constitution of
14
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, 284
15
(1979) 3 SCC 498
16
(1980) 4 SCC 1
17
(1981) 1 SCC 722, 741
18
Para 6, Moot Proposition, Page 4.
19
Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, Additional Collector of Customs and Ors., (1964) AIR
1140
20
Power Measurement Ltd. vs U.P. Power Corporation Ltd, 2003 (2) AWC 1642 B.
21
Ibid
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(b) The petitioner is not only a company, but also a foreign company, and as such, is not
entitled to claim the benefits of Art. 19. It is only citizens of India who have been guaranteed
the right to freedom enshrined in the said Art. The plea under Art. 14 cannot be sustained for
the simple reason that in supporting the pleas, inevitably the petitioner has to fall back upon
the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1).24
(c) Art. 19 is available only to the citizens of the country and as such the foreign company is
not entitled to claim the protection of Art. 19 in the garb of Art. 14 of the Constitution.25The
fundamental right to equality does extend to foreigners; however foreigners and citizens
cannot be placed on the same pedestal.26
(d) The next point taken on behalf of the petitioners, that the foreigners also enjoy some
fundamental rights under the Constitution of this country, is also of not much help to them.
The fundamental right of the foreigner is confined to Art. 21 for life and liberty and does not
include the right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business,
as mentioned in Art. 19(1)(g) which is applicable only to the citizens of this country."27
(e) The machinery of Art. 14 cannot be invoked to obtain that fundamental right. Rights,
under Arts. 19(1)(d), (e) and (g) are expressly, withheld to foreigners. 28Foreigners also enjoy
some fundamental right under the Constitution of this country but the same is confined to Art.
21 of the Constitution and does not include the rights guaranteed under Art. 19 of the
Constitution, which are available only to the citizens of this country.
Thus, it is humbly submitted by the Respondents that there is no violation of any of the
fundamental rights of Andronix Corporation.
22
State Trading Corporation Vs. Commercial Officer (AIR 1963 SC 1811), See Also; British India Steam
Navigation Company Ltd. Vs. Jagjit Singh (AIR 1964 SC 1451).
23
Para 1, Moot Proposition, Page 2.
24
Indo China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1140,
25
Ibid
26
A.K. Mukherji v. Prodip Ranjan Sarbadhikary And Ors., AIR 1988 Cal 259; David John Hopkins v. Union of
India & Ors., AIR 1997 Mad 366
27
Louis De Raedt v. Union of India, SCC p 562, para 13
28
Ibid
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(a) It is humbly submitted that vide the above issue, it stands well-established that there is no
violation of any fundamental rights in the current case matter. Although, as an arguendo,
Respondents would like to present an argument on the inapplicability of Art.32 for Andronix
Corporation.
(b) The Supreme Court held that only a person aggrieved can impugn any given piece of
legislation under 32.29The Respondent submits that the Court has held that only if there is a
violation of Fundamental Rights can it step in under the Jurisdiction of Art. 32. 30The court
can be approached under Art.32 to wipe out the violation of Fundamental Rights and genuine
infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gains or private profits or political
motives or any oblique consideration31. The petitioner is raising a mere scholarly objection,
without any locus standi. The Respondent maintains the applicability of the maxim, interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium. Therefore, it is evident that only a person aggrieved can file a
writ Petition under Art. 32.
(c) While it is the duty of the Supreme Court to enforce fundamental rights, it is also a duty to
ensure that this weapon under Art. 32 must not be misused or permitted to misuse by creating
a bottleneck in the Superior Court preventing other genuine violation of Fundamental Rights
being considered by the court. That would be an act or a conduct that would defeat the
purpose of the preservation of the Fundamental Rights.32
(d)Courts do not and cannot act as Appellate Authorities examining the correctness,
suitability and appropriateness of a policy. Nor are courts Advisors to the executive on
matters of policy which the executive is entitled to formulate. Courts cannot interfere with
policy either on the ground that it is erroneous or on the ground that a better, fairer or wiser
alternative is available. Legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy,
is the subject of judicial review. 33In the recent Iodine Salt Case34 it has been held that a writ
petition cannot be maintainable if its sole purpose is to question a policy decision of the
Government.35
29
Hans Muller of Nurenberg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta and Ors., 1955 AIR 367
30
Romesh Thapar v Union of India, AIR 1950 SC 124
31
State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal And Others (2010) 3 SCC 402.
32
Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1990) 4 SCC 449: AIR 1990 SC
2060: JT 1990 (3) SC 685
33
Directorate Of Film Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain & Ors, Appeal (civil) 1892 of 2007
34
Academy of Nutrition Improvement v. Union of India, WP(C) 80 of 2006, 4 July 2011
35
Association of Drugs and Pharmaceuticals, Manufacturers, A.P. v.A.P. Health, Medical, Housing and
Infrastructure Development Corporation, Hyd. and Anr., 2002 (2) ALD 609
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(e) Unless there is prima facie evidence to prove that exercise of discretion has been arbitrary,
unreasonable or mala fide, the Court cannot step into the shoes of the Government to decide
the validity of a policy.36It is a matter of public policy that the Court should not permit
litigations on the same issue raised in perpetuity 37, as no public undertaking will ever succeed
if such a practice is encouraged. Thus, the policy decision of the Government regarding the
amendment to the IT Rules, 2011 cannot be questioned before the court of law.
(f) A person acting for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique
consideration has no locus standi.38 Andronix Corporation has filed this petition under the
garb of stating that the ‘ease of doing business for foreign corporations’ 39 was being
hampered.
Thus, the respondents humbly submit that the writ petition is not maintainable under the eyes
of the law and that it must be dismissed at the threshold by this Hon’ble Apex Court.
2. WHETHER THE 2018 AMENDMENTS TO THE IT RULES AND THE UAV REGULATIONS 1.0
ARE ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the 2018 amendment to the Information
Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or
Information) Rules, 2011 along with the UAV Regulations 1.0 are not ultra vires the
Constitution of India. The arguments for the above issue are subdivided into [A.] 2018
amendment of IT Rules, 2011 is not ultra vires the Constitution of India [B.] UAV
Regulations 1.0 is not ultra vires the Constitution of India.
It is the humble submission of the counsel for Petitioners that the 2018 Amendment that was
made to the IT Rules is violatory of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian
Constitution. The amendment mandated that locational and facial data would qualify as
sensitive personal data and that all sensitive personal data of Indian citizens must be stored
36
State of M.P. and Others vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and Other, (1986) 4 SCC 566
37
Sushila Devi v. Ramnandan Prasad, AIR 1976 SC 177; Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Sm. Deorajin, AIR 1960 SC
941; Daryao v. State of U.P, AIR 1961 SC 1457; Deena Dayal v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1155; Yaro
Khan v. Union of India, WP(C) 2599 of 2007
38
Ramsharan Autyanuprasi v. Union of India, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 251: AIR 1989 SC 549: JT 1988 (4) SC 577.
39
Para 7, Moot Proposition, Page 4
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in servers located in India.40 The main aim of the 2018 amendment 41 to the IT Rules is to
localise sensitive personal data, which essentially translates to the process of localisation of
data. Statutory and governmental bodies have limits upon the acts and activities which they
legally engage in.42
(a) Administrative action in India allegedly affecting fundamental freedoms has always been
tested on the anvil of proportionality. 43Proportionality broadly requires that government
action must be no more intrusive than is necessary to meet an important public purpose.44
(c) The main aim of the 2018 Amendment of the IT Rules 46, is to localise the sensitive
personal data of the citizens of the country and keep it from being misused by foreign
authorities or agencies. The amendment did only what was required to make absolutely
certain that the measures taken to provide benefits to citizens were rationally connected to the
policy.
40
Para6, Moot Proposition, Page 4.
41
Ibid
42
Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [1992] 2 AC 1
43
Om Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 3689, 3702.
44
John Adler, General Principles of Constitutional and Administrative Law, 385 (4th ed., Palgrave Macmillan,
Basingstoke, United Kingdom, 2002).
45
DeFreitas v. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Land and Housing, 1999 1A.C. 69, 80
46
Para 6, Moot Proposition , Page 4.
47
Om Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 3689, 3702.
48
Council of Civil Service Unions. v. Minister for the Civil Services, (1984) 3 All ER 935, 951.
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means that administrative discretion should be exercised reasonably and matters irrelevant to
the subject must be excluded from consideration49
(e) In the instant case, the Union brought in the only to ensure that citizens enjoy manifold
benefits of their data being stored within the safety and borders of their own country rather
being stored away in another country wherein it could easily be put to any form of malafide
use.
(a) An amendment is a form of law50. A statute cannot be struck down merely because the
Court thinks it to be arbitrary or unreasonable. Any such ground of invalidity must be related
to a Constitutional provision, such as, Arts. 14, 19 or 21.Challenge on ground of wisdom of
legislation is not permissible as it is for the legislature to balance various interests 51
(b) The Legislature composed as it is of the elected representatives of the people is presumed
to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good or bad for them and that a
Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the Legislature.52Therefore usually the
presumption is in the favour of the Constitutionality of the statute and the onus to prove that
it is unconstitutional lies upon the person who is challenging it. 53 In the present case,it is upto
Andronix Corporation to prove the ultra vires nature of the amendment. It is for the person
who impeaches the law as violative of the constitutional guarantee to show that the particular
provision is infirm for the reasons stated by him.54
(a) Since Maneka Gandhi’s case55, the Courts have adopted the Wednesbury principle that if
the classification was an arbitrary act of the State under Art. 12 of the Constitution, Art. 14
would strike it down.56 Art. 14 protects us from both legislative and executive tyranny by way
of discrimination.57’Arbitrarily’ means in an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done
capriciously or at pleasure, without adequate determining principle, not founded in nature of
49
Associated Picture House v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA), 682-683
50
Art 13, Indian Constitution, 1950
51
Mylapore Club v. State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr , Appeal (civil) 4531 of 2003
52
State Of Andhra Pradesh vs Mcdowell & Co.And Ors.Etc : 1996 AIR 1627, 1996 SCC (3) 709
53
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri vs The Union Of India And Ors 1951 AIR 41, 1950 SCR 869
54
Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd vs Union Of India And Ors 1995 AIR 1340, 1995 SCC (3) 335
55
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
56
Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J&K, AIR 1980 SC 1992, ¶ 14.
57
Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi & Rajasthan, AIR 1959 SC 149, ¶25.
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things, irrational, not done or acting according to reason or judgment, depending on will
alone.58
(b) The Amendment made was a well thought-out administrative action. There was no
element of whim or ambiguity which would make it fall within the purview of definition of
‘arbitrarily’, as propounded by this Hon’ble Court. Therefore, in the instant case, Art. 14
would not spring into action as its application has been limited by the legitimate and rational
administrative discretion exercised.
(c) Assuming arguendo that administrative discretion was applied in a wrong manner, the
Courts do not go into the merits of the exercise of discretion by the State as the Court cannot
go into the question whether the opinion formed by the State is right or wrong. 59The Court
does not substitute its own views for that of the concerned administrative authority.60
(a) International Conventions61 as well as legal provisions in other countries 62 recognize that
fundamental rights of the people can be restricted in the interest of the security of the state.
Art. 19(2) of the Constitution of India provides that restrictions can be imposed, if there
exists a threat to the security of the state. In Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh63 the Court
has held that the right to privacy can be restricted if there is a compelling state interest to be
served and recognised threat to national security in the nature of compelling state interest.
(b) The Government undertakes data localisation, which helps in enforcing data protection,
secure nation’s security and protect its citizen’s data, better control on transmission of data
outside the country and more under the Companies Act, 2013, the maintenance of books of
account in electronic form64 required copies to be kept in servers physically located in India.
(c) The recent draft amendment proposed to the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, for
regulating e-pharmacies, makes it clear that e-pharmacies web-portals have to be established
in India for conducting its business in India and data generated to be stored locally. The draft
58
Sharma Transport v. Govt. of A.P., AIR 2002 SC 322.
59
Partap Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72. 36
60
Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740.
61
Art. 8, ECHR, 1953 (Adopted on September 3, 1953).
62
Art. 5(2), U K Human Rights Act, 2000 (Adopted on October 2, 2000).
63
Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., (1975) 2 SCC 148
64
Chapter 6, Companies Act, 2013.
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rules states that under no means the data generated or mirrored through e-pharmacy portal
shall be sent or stored by any means outside India.65
(d) It is grounded in the belief that placing data abroad would allow foreign governments to
impinge upon the privacy and security of the data of domestic nationals. 66 This has led to
some countries attempting to keep data from leaving their shores, in order to protect it from
falling into the hands of other governments.67
(e) Data localisation requires companies to store and process data on servers physically
located within national borders. Governments across the globe driven by concerns over
privacy, security, surveillance and law enforcement have been enacting legislations that
necessitate localisation of data. A nation has the prerogative to take measures to protect its
interests and its sovereignty. As a matter of national security, the complete localisation of
critical data prevents any foreign surveillance of India’s internal affairs.68
(f) Overseas transactions of data involve reliance on fibre optic cable networks spread around
the world, which are vulnerable to attacks and perhaps localisation of data may reduce this
security risk.69This data could aid counter-terrorism efforts and may help protect national
security. Further, local storage of data will ensure easier access to data in contradistinction to
foreign storage of data wherein the sovereign power may choose not to grant access to Indian
law enforcement agencies.70Currently, jurisdictional claims against foreign entities are
enforced through Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties.71
It is humbly contended by the counsel for the respondent that the security of the nation is of
prime importance to the Union, and that no decision taken by it will contravene or put that
particular aspect in jeopardy. It is an understood concept that the security of the state is a
fundamental right72 of the citizens of India. The amendment introduced by the Union only
seeks to strengthen the protection of the data of the citizens of the country to prevent it from
65
G.S.R. 817 (E) dated 28th August, 2018 introduced a draft to amend the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules,1945
(“Rules”).
66
Jonah Force Hill, ‗The Growth Of Data Localization Post-Snowden: Analysis And Recommendations For
U.S. Policymakers And Business Leaders‘, The Hague Institute for Global Justice, Conference on the Future of
Cyber Governance 2014, 5 (1 May 2014) as cited in Erica Fraser, ‗Data Localisation and the Balkanisation of
the Internet‘, 13(3) SCRIPTed 359 (December 2016).
67
Anupam Chander and Uyên P. Lê, ‗Breaking the Web: Data Localisation vs. the Global Internet‘ UC Davis
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 378, (April 2014).
68
SriKrishna Committee Report, 2018.
69
SriKrishna Committee Report, 2018.
70
Ibid.
71
Andrew Keane Woods, ‗Against Data Exceptionalism‘, 68(4) Stanford Law Review 729, 748 (April 2016).
72
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1
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misuse. Therefore, it is submitted to this Hon’ble Court that the 2018 Amendment to the IT
Rules, 2011 is not ultra vires the Indian Constitution.
B. UAV REGULATIONS 1.0 ARE NOT ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
UAV’s can be broadly defined as “A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human
operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted
remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload.” 73
The DGCA formulated the UAV Regulations 1.0 in August 2018 and made it come into
effect upon a reg-tech solution “Digital Sky” 74. The key feature of this regulation was the
Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR) for civil use of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
(RPAS) commonly known as drones75.
It is most humbly submitted that DGCA, a governmental regulatory body which formulated
the UAV Regulations 1.0 comes within the definition of state under Art.12 76 . Further the
term ‘law’ includes any ordinances, order, bye-laws, rule, regulation, notification, custom or
usages having in the territory of India 77. Hence the regulations fall within the ambit of
Art.13(3)(a). Therefore it is clear that not only law made by legislature but also an order or
notification which takes away or abridges the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the
Constitution would be void78.
(a)Art.1479 guarantees equality before law to all persons, both citizens and non-citizens of the
country80. Some fundamental rights are available to “any person”, whereas other fundamental
rights can be available only to "all citizens". The statement that equality before the law or
equal protection of the laws within the territory of India is available to any person 81 comes
with a rider that reasonable classification can be made to curtail rights under Art.14. But this
73
https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/uav_roadmap2005.pdf
74
Para 6, Moot Proposition, Page 2
75
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=183093
76
Art12 of Indian Constitution, 1950
77
Art.13(3)(a) o Indian Constitution, 1950
78
Union of India v. Col. L.S.N. Murthy, (2012) 1 SCC 718.
79
Art.14 of Indian Constitution, 1950
80
Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das, AIR 2000 SC 988(2000) 2 SCC 465
81
State Trading Corporation of India v. Commercial Tax Officer and Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1811
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statement nevertheless affirms the belief that certain fundamental rights are available to
foreign persons as well82.Thus, Andronix corporation is vested with the fundamental right of
equality by virtue of Art.14.
(b)The UAV Regulations 1.0 laid down the eligibility of a person to operate drones in ‘Rule 6
of RPAS Requirements’83-
1. Citizen of India
3. A corporate body-
The eligibility criterion definitely singles out Andronix Corporation but not all foreign
companies84. Foreign companies with its principal base in India or with substantial ownership
vested with Indian citizens or those who lease the operation of UAV’s to Indian entities are
permitted to operate UAVs in India and these would be governed by the UAV Regulations
1.0.
(c)Two tests have been provided by the SC overtime, which any law passed by the
government is required to satisfy, in order to fulfill the requirements of Art. 14 of the
Constitution and the UAV Regulations 1.0 are unable to satisfy the requirements so laid
down.
82
Louis De Raedt v. Union of India, SCC p 562, para 13.
83
Rule 6, Requirements for operation of RPAS,2017 http://www.dgca.nic.in/misc/draft%20cars/CAR%20-
%20UAS%20(Draft_Nov2017).pdf
84
S2(42), Companies Act, 2013.
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While Art.14 allows reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation it forbids any
sort of class legislation85. The test of reasonable classification was laid down by SC in
Budhan Chaudhary v. State of Bihar86, which provides that: (1) the classification proposed in
the legislation must be founded on intelligible differentia and that, (2) there must be close
nexus between the classification and the object of the Act.
Principle of Intelligible Differentia and Rational Nexus between Classification and Objective
Sought
The expression intelligible differentia means difference capable of being understood and
should be reasonable and not arbitrary87. It is contended that the law can make and set apart
the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society 88. In the present case, the
government seeks to differentiate amongst foreign companies and not between foreign
persons and Indian persons. Classification between Indian nationals and foreign nationals
would have been arbitrary89 but classification between foreign companies on the basis of
those having Indian nationals involved in their operations and those not having any Indian
hold is a reasonable classification for two reasons-
UAV’s would be flown within Indian boundaries over Indian heads and thus, having
Indians in strategic positions would be the most logical thing to do as they would
understand and negotiate the dynamics of Indian law better.
When the rights of Indian citizens are at stake it is advisable to have a body which
atleast has one of its base in India but Andronix corporation has no base in India.
Therefore, as there is a nexus between the objectives of the regulation and the classification
done, the regulations are not arbitrary or unreasonable.
2. TEST OF ARBITRARINESS
It is humbly contended that the classification on the basis mentioned above is definitely not
arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable. The Counsel also contends that the classification would be
85
Budhan Chaudhary v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 191; See also, Ameronissa v. Mehboob, AIR 1953 SC 71;
Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 404; Vajravellu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy
Collector for Land Acquisition, AIR 1965 SC 1017.
86
AIR 1955 SC 191
87
M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 876 (7th ed., Lexis-Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa Publications, Nagpur,
2016)
88
Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1.
89
Madhu Limaye v. Supdt Tihar jail Delhi , 1975 AIR (SC) 1505
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unfair, unjust or unreasonable only if there had been special hostility towards Andronix
Corporation. If the government had maliciously tried to single out Andronix it would have
been arbitrary but since there is no such substance in the case at hand the UAV Regulations
1.0 drawn by the DGCA are definitely not arbitrary and thus, pass both tests of Art.14.
Therefore, in presence of reasonable restriction to curtail Art.14, the UAV Regulation 1.0 are
not ultra vires the Constitution of India.
(a) Art. 21 of the Constitution of India states that no person shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty except according to a procedure established by law90. It is humbly brought
to the notice of this court that the ambit of Art.21 was expanded to include right to privacy
after the landmark judgement of Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh 91. But the court also laid
down the Doctrine of “reasonable expectation of privacy”92 which said that “if there is an
intrusion in a situation where a person can reasonably expect his privacy to be respected, that
intrusion will be capable of giving rise to liability unless the intrusion can be justified” 93.
Privacy can be most expected at one’s home as that is his personal space. It is doltish to
expect privacy in public places. An individual can have no reasonable expectation of privacy
in his location on public roads94.The Procedures for Operation of RPAS under 13.6.12(i)
states that the privacy of individuals must be protected 95 , this explicitly proves that UAV’s
are not permitted in personal space of an individual and that the aspect of privacy has already
been dealt with in the UAV Regulations 1.0.
(b) The Doctrine of Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos 96 literally means
that a person owns the soil over which he is standing, all the way to heaven and all the way to
hell97. It is explicitly derived from this maxim that every person owns the air space above him
too98. However, as a property owner you only really have the right to the airspace above your
land located in the lower stratum, the precise boundaries of which are not explicitly labelled.
There is unrestricted ownership up to a certain altitude, at which ownership ceases. This is
90
Art.21 of Indian Constitution
91
1975 AIR 1378, 1975 SCR (3) 946
92
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
93
Campbell v. MGN, [2004] UKHL 22
94
U.S v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)
95
Rule 13.6.12(i), Procedures for operation of RPAS in Indian Airspace ; effective from 1 Dec,2018
file:///C:/Users/ADMIN/Downloads/AIPS_2018_164.pdf
96
http://www.lawjournal.mcgill.ca/userfiles/other/8509457-abramovitch.pdf
97
Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v. Evans, 191 So. 2d 126, 128
98
Hinman v. Pac. Air Lines Transp. Corp., 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1936)
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the so called "zone theory." The extent of the zone is designated by such phrases as "lower
stratum," "effective possession," or "actual or prospective user." 99 In the case of United States
v. Causby100 it was expressed that "The air is a public highway” and thus, the DGCA, a
governmental body can make decisions and legislations regarding the same.
Since, no fundamental rights under Art.14 or Art.21 are being violated by the UAV
Regulations 1.0, it is not ultra vires the constitution of India.
(a) Rule 8 of Requirements for operation of RPAS 101 deals with the security and safety aspect
of UAVs. It has been made mandatory under the same that the operator has to ensure that all
security measures as enumerated in the Security Programme (approved by BCAS) are in
place before operation of each flight. Rule 13.6.12 directs that the RPA operator shall prepare
and follow Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for safe operation of RPA 102 while Rule
13.10 of Procedures for Operation of RPAS103 mandates safety risk assessment by the
operator to ensure safe flight and security of the public. To ensure and check that these
measures are adhered to by the operator, the DGCA has smartly introduced the ‘Digital Sky
platform’104 that gives permission for flight after analyzing all data regarding the flight plan,
RPA flights and zone of flight. This avoids clashes between UAVs and consequently serves
public interest.
Protection of public safety-
(b) Rule 9 of Requirements for operation of RPAS105 instructs that the remote pilot operating
larger UAVs shall have attained 18 years of age with thorough ground training and practical
99
https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/
&httpsredir=1&Art.=3130&context=mulr
100
28 U.S. 256 (1946)
101
Rule 8, Requirements for operation of RPAS,2017 http://www.dgca.nic.in/misc/draft%20cars/CAR%20-
%20UAS%20(Draft_Nov2017).pdf
102
Rule 13.6.12, Procedures for operation of RPAS in Indian Airspace ; effective from 1 Dec,2018
file:///C:/Users/ADMIN/Downloads/AIPS_2018_164.pdf
103
Rule 13.10, Procedures for operation of RPAS in Indian Airspace ; effective from 1 Dec,2018
file:///C:/Users/ADMIN/Downloads/AIPS_2018_164.pdf
104
Para 6, Moot Proposition, Page 2
105
Rule 9, Requirements for operation of RPAS,2017 http://www.dgca.nic.in/misc/draft%20cars/CAR%20-
%20UAS%20(Draft_Nov2017).pdf
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training. Rule 10106 of the same instructs that maintenance of the UAVs must be in
accordance with the manufacturers prescribed procedure. Mentioning the categories of
RPA107 like weight, height of flight, etc. coupled with conditions of flight only in daytime
with a restriction of height to 400ft and within Visual Line of Sight (VLOS) inter alia
strengthens the safety and security measures 108. These negate the risk of public safety threats
due to collisions or improper handling of UAVs. These conditions also lead to protection of
life and liberty guaranteed under Art.21 to all persons as well.
(c) The restriction of certain strategic and military areas under Rule 13.4 of Procedures for
operation of RPAS109 is to protect National security and thus, cannot be deemed as violating
the constitution. Further, the information sought to issue the UIN (Unique Identification
Number) to the operator110 is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
(d) Previously on October 7, 2014 the DGCA had issued a public notice banning the use of
UAV’s in Indian Territory. But later by 2018, the government recognized the need and
importance of UAVs and decided to formulate UAV Regulations for safe operation of UAVs
in the Indian Territory.
(e) Para 5 of the moot proposition explicitly talks about the benefits of drones in preventing
crimes, nabbing suspicious people, helping during disasters and adverse situations. Andronix
had operated drones to help police regulate traffic and spot missing people as well 111. Thus,
drones have proved to be beneficial for governance, public order and security. To ensure
further operations, the DGCA had crafted the Regulations 1.0. These regulations are
advantageous for public order and security.
The Counsel for the Respondents humbly concludes that UAV Regulations 1.0 are not ultra
vires the constitution of India as they do not infringe any fundamental rights and are infact
beneficial to the state.
106
Rule 9, Requirements for operation of RPAS,2017 http://www.dgca.nic.in/misc/draft%20cars/CAR%20-
%20UAS%20(Draft_Nov2017).pdf
107
Rule 3, Requirements for operation of RPAS,2017 http://www.dgca.nic.in/misc/draft%20cars/CAR%20-
%20UAS%20(Draft_Nov2017).pdf
108
Rule 13.3, Procedures for operation of RPAS in Indian Airspace ; effective from 1 Dec,2018
file:///C:/Users/ADMIN/Downloads/AIPS_2018_164.pdf
109
Rule 13.4, Procedures for operation of RPAS in Indian Airspace ; effective from 1 Dec,2018
file:///C:/Users/ADMIN/Downloads/AIPS_2018_164.pdf
110
Rule 6.2, Requirements for operation of RPAS,2017 http://www.dgca.nic.in/misc/draft%20cars/CAR%20-
%20UAS%20(Draft_Nov2017).pdf
111
Para 5, Moot Proposition, Page 2
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It is most reverently submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the Counsel
for the Respondents firmly believe that the ADRP (Advance Data driven Response Policy)
formulated by the Uttar Pradesh government is not ultra vires the Constitution of India
because [A.] right to privacy conferred to every individual by virtue of Art.21and Art.19 is
not being violated and [B.] public welfare will override privacy of an individual.
(a) Art. 21 of the Constitution of India states that no person shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty except according to a procedure established by law112. It is humbly brought
to the notice of this Hon’ble supreme court that the ambit of Art.21 was expanded to include
right to privacy as a fundamental right after the judgements of Govind v. State of Madhya
Pradesh113, Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu114and Maneka Gandhi v. UOI 115. Like any other
fundamental right the right to privacy also cannot be treated as an absolute right 116 and is
subject to certain restrictions. Thus, a person cannot have absolute autonomy over his/her
body117; ‘’absolute’’ being the key word here.
(b) In Mukesh Kumar Ajmera v. State of Rajasthan 118 , it was observed: "Right to privacy and
liberty are not absolute rights. A law imposing reasonable restrictions upon it for compelling
interest of State must be held to be valid.” In Govind v State of Madhya Pradesh119 , Mathew,
J. stated that,“privacy-dignity claims deserve to be examined with care and to be denied only
when an important countervailing interest is shown to be superior. If the Court does find that
a claimed right is entitled to protection as a fundamental privacy right, a law infringing it
must satisfy the compelling State interest test. Then the question would be whether a state
interest is of such paramount importance as would justify an infringement of the right.
112
Art.21 of Indian Constitution
113
1975 AIR 1378, 1975 SCR (3) 946
114
AIR 1995 SC 264
115
1978 AIR 597, 1978 SCR (2) 621
116
Sharda v. Dharmpal, (2003) 4 SCC 493
117
Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd.), And Anr. v, Union Of India And Ors., Writ Petition (Civil) No 494 Of 2012
118
AIR 1997 RAJ 250
119
1975 AIR 1378
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(d) It is evident from all above precedents that right to privacy, though a fundamental right is
not absolute and can be restricted in the view of larger state/ public interest. Thus, the counsel
for the respondents humbly contend that the ADRP does not violate the right to privacy as it
has been formulated to enable better governance, enhance public policy measures,
operationalise law enforcement and public order and security. 121 These lines from the
proposition clearly prove that since the ADRP was formulated in the interest of the state and
public at large it can be classified as a restriction of right to privacy.
(e) The “important countervailing interest” 122 being talked about is the ADRP itself. In X v.
hospital Z123 the Supreme Court held that “The right of privacy is not treated as absolute and
is subject to such action as may be lawfully taken for the prevention of crime or disorder or
protection of health or morals or protection of rights and freedoms of others.” This reaffirms
the fact that the ADRP is constitutionally valid as the policy paves way to match databases of
known offenders124 and consequently curb crimes, which is an exception to privacy as
mentioned in the above stated case.
120
Writ Petition (Civil) No 494 Of 2012
121
Para 4 of moot proposition
122
Gobind v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1975) 2 SCC 148
123
(1998) 8 SCC 296 ;para 26
124
Para 4 of moot proposition
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(f) Further, the Counsel humbly submits that ADRP curtails right to privacy in conformity
with the “procedure established by law” as per Art.21 of the constitution 125. ICCPR of which
India is a signatory also provides that it is duty of the state to protect the liberty of the people
and it can be restricted, only in accordance with procedure established by law126.
(g) The SC in Maneka Gandhi127, has laid down a “triple test” for any law to be considered to
be in accordance with the ‘Procedure established by law’:
(1) The law must prescribe a procedure
(2) the procedure must satisfy the requirements of Arts. 14 and 19
(3) it should be just, fair and reasonable.
The ADRP satisfies all three requirements. It has been substantially proven earlier about how
Art.19 is not being violated at all and in furtherance of the same the Counsel also contends
that public order, public welfare and state security are fair, just and reasonable grounds to
curtail the right to privacy. With regard to Art.14 there are two tests laid down by the
Supreme Court of India which every law is required to satisfy in order to fulfill the
requirements of Art.14. The two tests are:-
Test of reasonable classification
Test of arbitrariness
‘Reasonable classification’ does not come into play as there is no classification being done
between people in the ADRP. The facts do not mention any sort of classification or
segregation between the people. It is most humbly submitted that the ADRP is not arbitrary
because it has been observed that "arbitrariness by Art. 14 is the arbitrariness or
unreasonableness in discriminating between one person and another and if there is no
discrimination, there is no arbitrariness in the sense of Art.14" 128. The question whether an
impugned act is arbitrary or not, is ultimately to be answered on the facts and in the
circumstances of a given case 129. The ADRP has been formulated for betterment of
governance and protection of public order and security 130, this explicitly proves
reasonableness and the non-arbitrary nature of the policy.
125
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 207.
126
Art. 9, ICCPR(Adopted by United Nations General Assembly on December 16, 1966).
127
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
128
P.K. Tripathi, The Fiasco of Overruling, A.K. Gopalan and worse. Cited by Mahendra P. Singh
in Comparative Constitutional Law at p. 480.
129
Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. (1991) 1 SCC 212.
130
Para 4 of moot proposition
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(a) The Counsel for the Respondents is critical of the recognition being given to right of
privacy. The submission has several facets. They are:-
(b) In Kharak Singh v. the State of UP and Ors132 it was held that the right of privacy is not a
guaranteed right under our Constitution and therefore the attempt to ascertain the movement
of an individual which is merely a manner in which privacy is invaded is not an infringement
of a fundamental right guaranteed by Part III.”
(c) The above case affirms the belief of the counsel by stating that a mere attempt to ascertain
and track human movement by drones under the ADRP policy of the UP Govt. 133 in the
present case at hand does not lead to an infringement of privacy. It is essential to note an
eight-judge134and six-judge135 bench of the Supreme Court had clearly come to the conclusion
that the right to privacy is not fundamental. These two judgments explicitly stated that there
was no fundamental right to privacy in the Constitution, which as the written text of the
Constitution will show, is a matter of fact.
(d) An Art. published in the Harvard Law review136 by a professor of law at Georgetown
university mentions that “The list of privacy counterweights is long and growing. The recent
additions of social media, mobile platforms, cloud computing, data mining, and predictive
131
M.P Sharma Singh & others v. Satish Chandra & Others,1954 AIR 300, 1954 SCR 1077
132
1963 AIR 1295, 1964 SCR (1) 332
133
Para 4 of moot proposition
134
M.P Sharma Singh & others v. Satish Chandra & Others, 1954 AIR 300, 1954 SCR 1077
135
Kharak Singh v. The state of U.P and ors, 1963 AIR 1295, 1964 SCR (1) 332
136
Julie E Cohen, “What Privacy Is For”, Harvard Law Review (2013), Vol. 126
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analytics now threaten to tip the scales entirely, placing privacy in permanent opposition to
the progress of knowledge.”137
(e) According to this critique, the paramount national need for knowledge, innovation and
development cannot be discarded and must be factored in. They are based on the need to
provide economic growth and social welfare to large swathes of the society., The ADRP also
strives to integrate artificial intelligence, deep learning solutions, facial recognition solution,
internet-of-things, ubiquitous sensors, advanced data analytics and other sunrise technologies
for public welfare and better governance 138. Thus, this progress of knowledge which is the
need of the nation cannot be overlooked due to certain inconsistencies with privacy.
(f) Furthermore, the Counsel would like to bring to light to this Hon’ble Supreme Court that
Data protection act,1998139 which deals with handling of personal data steers clear of using
the term “privacy” in any provision. This strengthens the belief of this counsel that privacy
has been deliberately left out to ensure that the State is not stripped of its powers to act for
welfare of the public.
Thus, since the ADRP is being formulated for better governance, public security and order
and to curb crimes in the state, it is definitely in consonance with the “state interest test” and
would definitely fall within the purview of reasonable restrictions of right to privacy.
Moreover, since it has been substantially proved that privacy is not an absolute right, there
cannot be a violation of Art.21 or Art.19(1)(a), proving that ADRP is not ultra vires the
Constitution of India.
(a) When it comes to conflict between infringement of privacy and public interest, reasonable
care must be taken to choose as to what is more important. Individual interest cannot override
larger public interest140. The maxim “salus populi est suprema lex”141which means public
welfare is the highest law must be maintained in the democracy. Jurisprudentially also,
Bentham gave the ‘pain and pleasure theories’142. Hence, the Government must take into
account the pleasure of larger number of people and should try to inflict lesser pain. The
137
ibid
138
Para 4 of moot proposition
139
Nappinai, N.,S., PRIVACY & THE CONSTITUTION, retrieved from
https://cis-india.org/internetgovernance/privacy-and-the-constitution
140
Shankarlal Agarwalla v. State Bank of India, AIR 1987 Calcutta 29
141
https://blog.ipleaders.in/right-to-privacy-judgment-impact/#_ftn5
142
https://www.slideshare.net/shreya_0305/benthams-theory-of-law
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ADRP is also one such effort of the UP Govt to ensure public welfare by tracking down
criminals to curb crimes which would consequently ensure greater pleasure to larger
population.
(b) The Directive Principles of State Policy under Art.38 143 mandates that the state has to
work towards promotion of welfare of the people. ADRP is one such effort of the state to
ensure public order, security and also regulate crimes 144. The Constitution is founded on the
bedrock of the balance between Part III and Part IV 145 and thus, these principles though not
enforceable in law146 cannot be overlooked.
(b) The Doctrine of “reasonable expectation of privacy”147 was derived from the Doctrine of
“zone of privacy”148. In case of Campbell v. MGN149 , the court held that if “there is an
intrusion in a situation where a person can reasonably expect his privacy to be respected, that
intrusion will be capable of giving rise to liability unless the intrusion can be justified”. It is
common knowledge that the drone surveillance undertaken by the ADRP is not going to be in
a person’s house but in public places or streets. The expectation of privacy outside home is
less and not quite reasonable too, so this when coupled with legitimate state interest of public
welfare and security amounts to a justification for intrusion of privacy.
(c) Doctrine of Legitimate/ Compelling State interest is the highest standard of scrutiny which
is to be adopted to check justified intrusion of privacy. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid
down a threefold requirement for State’s interference with the fundamental rights. While the
State may intervene to protect legitimate state interests150,
(2) the nature and content of the law which imposes the restriction must fall within the zone
of reasonableness mandated by Art. 14, and
(3) The means which are adopted by the legislature must be proportional to the object and
needs sought to be fulfilled by the law.151
143
Art.38 of Indian Constitution
144
Para 4 of moot proposition
145
Granville Austin, Cornerstone of a Nation (Indian Constitution) 75 Oxford India (1999).
146
Art.37 of Indian Constitution
147
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
148
https://barandbench.com/legitimate-state-interest-test-aadhaar/
149
[2004] UKHL 22
150
Justice K.S.Puttaswamy v UOI, 2017 SCC Online 996.
151
ibid
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(d) All these 3 requirements are duly met by the ADRP policy. Usage of drones to prevent
crimes , capturing of facial data to catch offenders and suspects and the larger aim of
ensuring public order, security and welfare explicitly prove the reasonableness of the
restriction and also ensure the consonance of the means and object to be achieved by the
policy.
(e)Art. 8 of the ECHR, 1950152 provides that interference in privacy by a public authority
could be justified in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country. This Art. of the convention was upheld in Uzun v Germany153.
(a) It is human nature to resist change but with the rapidly changing world and evolving
technology, moving forward with time becomes the need of the hour. Hence, in the legal
world also we need to look beyond precedents and evolve and adapt laws and rights with
changes in technology. The ADRP is a perfect start to this. It integrates artificial intelligence,
deep learning solutions, facial recognition solution, internet-of-things, ubiquitous sensors,
advanced data analytics and other sunrise technologies for public welfare and better
governance154.
(b) In Rohit Shekhar vs Shri Narayan Dutt Tiwari & Anr 155, it was stated that: “78. The level
of privacy protection thus may also depend upon the context in which the established
standards are applied and the manner in which the right to privacy is challenged.” The
context of privacy in this issue overlaps with welfare of the state at large and thus, the level
of protection for such individual privacy would be less in the present case at hand.
(a) When the policy has an objective of integrating all new and advanced technologies, it will
definitely have a great data protection base as well. After the case of Unique Identification
Auth. of India and Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation 156, it has become evident that no
data can be shared without the consent of the individual in writing. This regulation would
152
Art.8 ,ECHR ,1950
153
App no 35623/05, IHRL 1838 (ECHR 2010), 2nd September 2010, European Court of Human Rights
[ECHR]
154
Para 4 of moot proposition
155
2012(12) SCC 554
156
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) No(s).2524/2014 in the Supreme Court
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ensure that the data is not passed to any third party and that it is being used for the stated
objective of governance, welfare and curbing crimes only. Collection of facial and biometric
data has often been quoted as one of the means of violating privacy but such data is essential
to ensure uniqueness, a key to this policy. To match databases of offenders facial data is
crucial and thus, collection of such data is pivotal to the ADRP policy.
(b) The counsel for the respondents firmly believes that ADRP is not ultra vires the
Constitution of India as it does not infringe any fundamental right under Art.19 or Art.21.
further, the counsel has substantially proven about how public welfare and state interest
would prevail over an individual’s privacy. To conclude, the ADRP is a technologically
advanced policy formulated for providing greater pleasure and lesser pain to the citizens by
curbing crimes and ensuring better governance. Such great objectives must not be neglected
for a right that does not explicitly find a place in the constitution.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE in light of issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is humbly
prayed before this Hon’ble Court to:
AND/OR pass any other order/orders as this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the
circumstances of the given case and in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
And for this act of kindness and justice the Respondents shall be duty bound and forever
pray.