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Music at Hand
OXFORD STUDIES IN MUSIC THEORY
Series Editor Steven Rings

Studies in Music with Text, David Lewin

Music as Discourse: Semiotic Adventures in Romantic Music, Kofi Agawu

Metric Manipulations in Haydn and Mozart: Chamber Music for Strings, 1787–1791,
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Nineteenth-Century Music, Janet Schmalfeldt

Tonality and Transformation, Steven Rings

Audacious Euphony: Chromaticism and the Triad’s Second Nature, Richard Cohn

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 Music at Hand

Instruments, Bodies, and Cognition

Jonat han D e S ouza

1
 1
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and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: De Souza, Jonathan, 1982–
Title: Music at hand : instruments, bodies, and cognition / Jonathan De Souza.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2017] |
Series: Oxford studies in music theory | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016039254| ISBN 9780190271114 (hardcover) |
ISBN 9780190271145 (oxford scholarly online) | ISBN 9780190271138 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Music—Performance—Psychological aspects. |
Music—Psychological aspects.
Classification: LCC ML3838 .D32 2017 | DDC 784.1/1—dc23 LC record available
at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016039254

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America

This volume is published with the generous support of the AMS 75 PAYS Endowment
of the American Musicological Society, funded in part by the National Endowment
for the Humanities and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.
For Heather
CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ix
About the Companion Website xi

Introduction 1
1. Beethoven’s Prosthesis 6
2. Sounding Actions 28
3. Idiomaticity; or, Three Ways to Play Harmonica 51
4. Voluntary Self-​Sabotage 83
5. Compositional Instruments 109
6. Horns To Be Heard 145

References 169
Index 187
AC K N OW L E D G M E N T S

While writing this book, I benefited from many conversations—​some long and
ongoing, others very brief. In particular, I wish to thank Emily Abrams Ansari,
Shawn Allison, Andrea Bohlman, Seth Brodsky, Chelsea Burns, Mark Butler,
Christine Carter, Eric Clarke, Nicholas Cook, Arnie Cox, Emily Dolan, Kimberly
Dority, Helen Fielding, Michael Figueroa, Abigail Fine, Michael Gallope, Luis-​
Manuel Garcia, Robert Gjerdingen, Jessica Grahn, Shannon Heald, Mark
Hopwood, Bryn Hughes, Sarah Iker, John Jenkinson, Ingrid Johnsrude, Alisha
Lola Jones, Mariusz Kozak, Trent Leipert, Anabel Maler, Jairo Moreno, Roger
Moseley, Katie Overy, Marcelle Pierson, Scott Richmond, Matt Schneider, Kris
Shaffer, August Sheehy, Peter Shultz, Pete Smucker, Daniel Smyth, Martha
Sprigge, Steve Van Hedger, Lee Veeraraghavan, Dan Wang, Kevin Watson, and
Mark Yeary. I am also grateful to the Press’s anonymous reviewers, to reading
groups at the University of Chicago and the University of Western Ontario, and
to audiences who responded to portions of this book at conferences and colloquia
hosted by Cornell University, the University of Glasgow, Memorial University
of Newfoundland, Northwestern University, the University of Toronto, and Rice
University. These interlocutors’ questions and comments have greatly enriched
my thinking. Tips from Bob Kessler and John Kregor shaped Chapters 3 and 4,
respectively. And I have learned much from my musical collaborators, includ-
ing LeRoy Bach, David Brackley, Lance Brown, Mim Eichmann, Doug Lofstrom,
Dan Lopata, Mark Kluemper, Dan Pearce, Ed Sullivan, Hans Vanderhill, and the
late Ed Hall.
This project first emerged at the University of Chicago, and I would like to
think that it bears the mark of that place. Faculty members and fellow students
at Chicago both challenged and encouraged me; Thomas Christensen, Berthold
Hoeckner, Steve Rings, and especially Larry Zbikowski served as perceptive, gen-
erous mentors. The book has taken its present form at the University of Western
Ontario, where my students and colleagues form a stimulating artistic and aca-
demic community. At Chicago, my work was supported by fellowships from the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Mellon
Foundation. At Western, Dean Betty Anne Younker and the chair of my depart-
ment, David Myska, facilitated a term away from teaching that helped me com-
plete the manuscript.
Suzanne Ryan has been a wonderfully enthusiastic, patient editor. Along with
Steve Rings (in his role as series editor), she helped me develop and define the book.
x T Acknowledgments

At the Press, Adam Cohen, Jamie Kim, and Andrew Maillet promptly answered
questions about various publication-​related details, and project manager Damian
Penfold guided the book through the production process. C. F. Peters Corporation
and Breitkopf & Haertel gave permission to reproduce musical excerpts by John
Cage and Helmut Lachenmann, respectively.
My brother-​in-​law Scott Brandon created the motion-​capture images in his
lab at Queen’s University, and my father, Greg De Souza, produced the videos for
the companion website. My parents, sisters, and in-​laws also provided babysit-
ting, birthday cake, and other much-​needed diversions. Growing up in a home
filled with instruments made me a musician, and this background still colors my
interests as a music theorist: my father’s father played harmonica (the focus of
Chapter 3), while my mother’s mother played organ (discussed in Chapters 2 and
5). Likewise, I am inspired by the musicality of my incredible daughters, Rilla and
Audra. But most of all, I want to thank Heather, my partner in music and in life.
She has both supported me personally and contributed to the book’s content, offer-
ing critical insights on bowing patterns in Bach, brass performance, piano peda-
gogy, and countless other topics. I could not have written this book without her.
A B O U T T H E C OM PA N IO N W E B SI T E

www.oup.com/​us/​musicathand
Like many texts in music theory and analysis, Music at Hand invites readers
to listen, watch, and play. The book’s companion website presents audiovisual
examples, comprising performances by the author, motion-​capture videos, and
music-​analytical animations. These online examples are indicated in the text with
the symbol . To access the website, enter the username [Music5] and password
[Book1745].
Much of the music discussed in the book, however, is not represented on the
companion website. In such cases, recordings can generally be found in libraries
and online. And readers of all levels of musical expertise are encouraged to try out
examples at an instrument, as the website unfortunately cannot replicate the feel-
ing of fingers on a keyboard or lips on a harmonica.
Music at Hand
Introduction

Music is fleeting. It disperses as it is heard. And though I sometimes feel its vibra-
tions, I cannot touch, cannot see, and cannot hold them. Because of this, music
has often been considered the most abstract, most metaphysical art. Yet at the
same time, music is bound up with physical things: upright pianos and electric
guitars, tambourines, turntables, violas, bagpipes, microphones, headphones, and
iPhones, sitars, French or English horns, marimbas, flutes of metal, bone, or wood.
And all of these, in turn, are bound to human bodies.
Music at Hand investigates music’s corporeal grounding. This, in itself, is not
especially original, for questions of embodiment are hardly new to music stud-
ies. In the 1990s, for example, some musicologists asked about music’s role in the
history of the body (e.g., Leppert 1993; McClary and Walser 1994). Attending to
the embodiment of sexual and racial differences, their work recognized music as
“one of the means by which people learn about their bodies—​how to move, how to
feel, how (finally) to be” (McClary 1998, 87). Contemporaneous theorists, drawing
on psychology and philosophy, argued that embodied knowledge shapes musical
concepts (more about this in Chapter 1). These perspectives, which are often com-
bined, are complementary: where the first showed how music mediates bodies, the
second clarified how bodies mediate music. A third, related approach considered
aspects of musical organization and meaning that may be felt by performers but
not always heard by listeners. Suzanne Cusick (1994, 18–​20), for example, dis-
cussed a moment from one of J. S. Bach’s organ preludes that creates a sense of
physical imbalance for the player. For this style of “embodied music theory,” musi-
cal sound and text are supplemented by performing bodies.1
Though inspired by these precedents, Music at Hand has a slightly different
task: it emphasizes that performing bodies themselves are supplemented by instru-
ments. That is to say, certain forms of musical embodiment are possible only
with instrumental mediation.2 As such, I am specifically interested in musicians’

1. Modes of analysis that focus on performers’ bodies have been deployed by various scholars, includ-
ing Fisher and Lochhead (2002), Le Guin (2006), Rockwell (2009), Montague (2012), Yearsley
(2012), and Bungert (2015). This research participates in a broader musicological trend, theorized in
Nicholas Cook’s Beyond the Score (2014), that conceives of music as performance rather than text.
2. These kinds of musical embodiment are by no means universal, since there are musicians who
do not play instruments and musical cultures that do not make them (Kartomi 1990, xvii–​xviii).
Nonetheless, humans have used musical instruments since prehistoric times (see De Souza 2014).
2 T Music at Hand

engagements with concrete objects, rather than musical gesture in general.3 Insofar
as players’ actions take shape around keys, fingerboards, mouthpieces, and so on,
it is necessary to examine how instruments are structured, how they make actions
audible and sounds manipulable. Here the book can be understood as a music-​
theoretical counterpart to recent research, inspired by media theory and history
of science, on instruments’ epistemological significance (e.g., Dolan 2013, 10–​13;
Tresch and Dolan 2013; Moseley 2015). From this viewpoint, musical knowledge is
grounded not in bodies alone, but in an interplay of techniques and technologies.
A theory of musical bodies, then, requires a theory of musical technics. This
uncommon word “technics” refers to technical matters in general.4 It corresponds to
the German Technik or the French la technique, which, depending on context, can
be translated as either “technique” or “technology.” The ambiguity can productively
bring these elements together, revealing their commonalities, their complemen-
tarity. Every technology, in this view, is associated with some technique. Technics,
moreover, is an inclusive concept. It encompasses seemingly disparate objects and
practices, from laptop computers to prehistoric hand axes, from the tools of indus-
try and warfare to those of art and play. Accordingly, “music technology” would
go beyond electronic devices and recording technology to include instruments and
forms of musical writing. And “musical technique” would involve performing skills
but also listening skills. Indeed, this book insists that such skills are closely con-
nected, that the acquisition of instrumental technique—​a process of bodily “tech-
nicization”—​affects the ways that players perceive, understand, and imagine music.
To support these theoretical claims, the book marshals diverse musical
examples—​classical and popular, old and new. It also mixes several modes of per-
formance analysis.5 I examine specific recorded performances (many of which are
improvised), while also reading scores in terms of their performative possibilities.
I reflect on my own experiences as a multi-​instrumentalist, while also exploring
pieces and instruments that I cannot play, which I approach from the outside.
And though I have not conducted formal fieldwork or interviews, I often consider
statements by expert performers. Each of my case studies, of course, is historically
and culturally specific. As such, I often have recourse to scholarship from music
history and ethnomusicology. (In fact, though the examples reflect my own exper-
tise in Western music, ethnomusicology offers some important antecedents to my
approach.)6 Yet my main goal is not to illuminate the musical cultures or social

3. Robert Hatten’s approach to musical gesture, for example, is predicated on an expansive definition of
the concept (2004, 93–​95). By contrast, I tend to follow a distinction made by the psychologist David
McNeill (1992, 78), who separates spontaneous communicative gestures from skilled forms of object
manipulation. From this perspective, playing “air guitar” is gestural, but playing a real guitar is not.
4. Prominent writings on technics include Lewis Mumford’s Technics and Civilization (1934) and Bernard
Stiegler’s Technics and Time series (1998, 2009, 2011). Gallope (2011) discusses technics and music.
5. For recent methodological reflections on performance and analysis, see Cook (2014, ch. 2) and the
collection of essays titled “Performance and Analysis Today” in Music Theory Online 22/​2, intro-
duced by Barolsky and Klorman (2016).
6. Aspects of my work are anticipated in John Blacking’s reflections on human musicality, which engaged
both musical instruments and the anthropology of the body (1973, 17–​21), in John Baily’s (1977) study
of body-​instrument interaction in the performance of Afghan lutes, and in Bell Yung’s (1984) work on
kinesthetic and choreographic aspects of music for the qin, a seven-​string Chinese zither.
 Introduction T3

contexts from which these examples are drawn. Instead, their juxtaposition allows
generalizations about instrumental performance to emerge. Musical and analyti-
cal variety thus serves as a methodological feature. With this in mind, the book
might be imagined as a kind of collage.
This collage of music and ideas mixes disciplines, too, relying most consistently
on cognitive science and phenomenology. While I engage with experimental research
from music psychology, I am equally interested in theoretical work related to embod-
ied cognition. Embodied cognition—​like “embodied music theory”—​distinguishes
itself from approaches that treat mind and body as independent entities. To be spe-
cific, embodied cognition principally reacts against a computational conception of
mind, which emerged in the mid-​twentieth century. According to this model, bodily
input is converted into “nonperceptual” data, and the brain deals in abstract symbolic
representations that are essentially independent of the senses. Proponents of embod-
ied cognition, by contrast, argue for the integration of perception and cognition,
body and mind.7 Claiming that knowledge and experience are based in the body’s
sensorimotor capacities, they draw on behavioral studies, brain imaging, cognitive
anthropology, and so forth. This discourse, then, provides a repository of theoretical
concepts and empirical evidence about the relations among mind, body, and world.
Meanwhile, phenomenology—​a philosophical tradition inaugurated by Edmund
Husserl—​offers a first-​person standpoint that complements cognitive studies.8 This,
again, involves a blend of theory and observation. On one level, phenomenology is a
descriptive method, a set of techniques for analyzing lived experience. Husserl exam-
ines things as they appear to consciousness, attending to the correlation of object
and subject, to individual senses, to real or imaginary shifts in temporal and spatial
perspective. His reflections on the sound of a violin provide a characteristic example:
The tone of a violin with its objective identity is given through perspectives, it has
its changing forms of appearance. They differ according as I approach the violin
or recede from it, according as I am in the concert hall itself or listen through its
closed doors, and so forth. No way of appearing claims to rank as giving its data
absolutely, although a certain type, appearing as normal within the compass of my
practical interests, has a certain advantage; in the concert hall, at the “right” spot,
I hear the tone “itself ” as it “really” sounds. (Husserl [1913] 2012, 83)

Briefly put, the phenomenologist develops variations on experience, much as a

musician might compose variations to explore a familiar theme.9 Such techniques
7. Embodied cognition does not necessarily invalidate findings of the symbolic-​processing approach.
Theoretical work in this relatively new area often aims to show how earlier results can be reinter-
preted in terms of sensorimotor grounding, moving toward methodological synthesis (Barsalou
2010). Note also that these two streams of cognitive science have long inspired music theorists: for
example, Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff ’s A Generative Theory of Tonal Music (1983) adapts hierar-
chical structures from Noam Chomsky’s computationalist linguistics, whereas Lawrence Zbikowski’s
Conceptualizing Music (2002) adapts work on embodied metaphor from later cognitive linguistics.
8. For example, Varela, Thompson, and Rosch combine cognitive science with phenomenology in The
Embodied Mind (1991). There is even a journal, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, devoted
to this methodological pairing.
9. Here I am indebted to Don Ihde’s use of phenomenological variations in his work on the phenome-
nology of sound (2007) and technology (2009, 16–​19). For a practical introduction to the technique,
see Ihde (1986).
4 T Music at Hand

can be separated from Husserl’s transcendental philosophy. For example, David

Sudnow’s Ways of the Hand (1978)—​a book that describes how the author learned
to play jazz piano—​employs these methods without explicitly discussing phenom-
enological theory. When analyzing my own experiences as a performer, I continue
this style of applied phenomenology.
I also deal with phenomenology at a philosophical level, where experience
is linked to ontology. Here my principal interlocutors are later figures: Martin
Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-​ Ponty. Neither wrote much about music—​
Heidegger was more interested in poetry, Merleau-​Ponty in painting—​and some
commentators have critiqued their treatment of sound (Dyson 2009, 85–​95;
Cimini 2012). But I am mainly concerned with other aspects of their thought,
namely Heidegger’s account of technology and Merleau-​Ponty’s philosophy of
the body. For Merleau-​Ponty, “the body is our general means of having a world”
([1945] 2012, 147). That is to say, my body—​unlike external things that come and
go—​is always here for me. It is felt directly, imbued with affect and kinesthetic sen-
sation. My body makes perception possible. Merleau-​Ponty’s Phenomenology of
Perception, then, does more than celebrate somatic self-​awareness. Its attention to
bodily experience supports ontological claims that challenge computationalism’s
emphasis on disembodied informational patterns. In this view, we do not simply
have bodies. We are bodies.
To some, these interdisciplinary commitments might seem to lead away from
music theory proper. But I would argue, on the contrary, that this type of meth-
odological synthesis is characteristic of the field. The history of theory is full of
musician-​scholars who took inspiration from contemporaneous science, philosophy,
mathematics, linguistics, and so on. Furthermore, this particular triad—​music the-
ory, cognitive science, and phenomenology—​is central to a well-​known essay by the
influential theorist David Lewin.10 In “Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes
of Perception,” Lewin contends that theories of musical perception should consider
production as well as listening. When we play the final movement of Beethoven’s
“Appassionata” Piano Sonata, he writes, “we are not matching the fingers and posi-
tions of our right hands to a preconceived ‘perception’ of the theme; rather we are in
the act of perceiving the theme as we move the parts of our bodies to play it” (1986,
382, emphasis in original). As one way of responding to Lewin’s phenomenology, the
present book builds on his work in mathematical music theory, constructing trans-
formational models of various instrumental interfaces.
Certain aspects of these models will interest mainly readers with a background in
transformational theory. Yet this analytical apparatus also exemplifies something that
music theory can bring to interdisciplinary conversations. While Lewinian formalism
fixes aspects of musical performance, it also makes them legible for close analysis. It
has helped me to listen more carefully and to think more rigorously about performa-
tive actions and instrumental spaces. In this regard, the associated musical excerpts
and technical diagrams might be compared to the data and statistics presented in the

10. As Brian Kane (2011) has demonstrated, Lewin’s phenomenology relies on a particular interpreta-
tion of Husserl (associated with West Coast phenomenology), even as he anticipates certain post-​
Husserlian developments. For an applied phenomenology of musical listening, see Clifton (1983).
 Introduction T5

results section of a psychology article. They test intuitions about particular pieces and
performances. They reveal expected or unexpected patterns, confirming or denying
musical hypotheses. That is to say, in the wealth of musical detail gathered by analysis,
music theory seeks a kind of evidence. Such evidence might support claims about
“intra-​musical” principles (e.g., conventions of tonal harmony or form in classical
music). But it might equally speak to broader humanistic and scientific concerns,
involving cultural history, cognitive processes, representations of gender, race, and
disability, or the co-​constitution of bodies and technologies. Music-​analytical results
are admittedly partial, provisional, and susceptible to bias. Nonetheless, I cannot help
but believe that music, if we listen to it truly, can teach us about the world. With this
in mind, I have tried to keep the book’s analytical discussions accessible to nonspe-
cialist readers, who may find the audiovisual materials on the companion website
particularly useful.

The book’s opening chapters theorize connections among body, instrument, and
sound. Chapter 1 takes performances by the deaf Beethoven as an instance of
body-​instrument interaction. It shows how instrumental practice gives rise to
distinctive patterns of auditory-​motor coactivation in players’ brains, which may
be reanimated in perception and imagination. Elaborating on this general frame-
work, Chapters 2 and 3 examine particular instrumental interfaces. They focus,
respectively, on sound production and instrumental space, on how instruments
translate action into sound and how they distribute musical materials physically.
Chapter 3 also introduces transformational tools that are used throughout the rest
of the book. Its analyses—​which compare various styles of harmonica playing—​
suggest that idioms emerge at the nexus of instrumental “sweet spots” and players’
embodied habits.
Processes of instrumental alteration are explored in Chapter 4. When musi-
cians alter their instruments, they open up new possibilities for sound and per-
formance. But a series of analyses related to guitar improvisation indicate that this
process, by disrupting established auditory-​motor mappings, can also affect play-
ers’ perception.
The final two chapters ask how composers and listeners relate to instruments.
Chapter 5 focuses on the music of J. S. Bach, considering how instrumental idioms
may function as a resource for composers. Ultimately it argues that composition
is deeply intertwined with instrumentation. Turning to listeners who do not play
instruments, Chapter 6 reflects on the interplay of sound and source in Haydn’s
use of valveless horns. If historically situated audiences recognize schematic tex-
tures referring to instruments—​if, for example, they can hear virtual horns in a
string quartet or piano piece—​this implies that their perception also reflects mul-
tisensory associations centered on instruments. Like performance, then, listening
would be both embodied and conditioned by technology.
CHAPTER
One
Beethoven’s Prosthesis

More than a decade after Ludwig van Beethoven’s death, his secretary Anton
Schindler remembered the composer at play:

Beethoven was very fond, especially in the dusk of the evening, of seating himself at
the piano to improvise, or he would frequently take up the violin or viola…. In the
latter years of his life, his playing at such times was more painful than agreeable to
those who heard it…. The most painful thing of all was to hear him improvise on
stringed instruments, owing to his incapability of tuning them. The music which
he thus produced was frightful, though in his mind it was pure and harmonious.
(Schindler 1841, 174–​76)

This intimate scene of musical pleasure is also, poignantly, a scene of breakdown.

Deafness does not simply block Beethoven’s hearing. It alters his music-​making too.
Later accounts, unlike Schindler’s, often romanticize this disability, claiming
that it benefited Beethoven’s music.1 Hearing loss, in this view, distanced the
composer from the perceptible materiality of sound and inducted him into an
ideal, spiritual musicality. His late string quartets came to represent the belief,
historicized by Carl Dahlhaus, that absolute music “ ‘dissolves’ itself from the
sensual” (1989, 17). Understanding music as an unmediated expression of the
Will, this discourse metaphysically opposes “pure musicality” and “mere tech-
nique.” Beethoven’s music, it argues, has nothing to do with instruments or
manual skill.
Yet Beethoven enjoyed the physical practice of instrumental music despite
his hearing loss. He continued to play privately and probably continued to
write music at the keyboard (Ealy 1994, 273). Perhaps this is unsurprising,
given his background as a composer-​pianist and a renowned improviser.
Still, what was it like for Beethoven to perform music that he could feel but
not hear?
I want to use this scene not to demonstrate Beethoven’s exceptionalism, but to
explore cognitive processes that are common among hearing instrumentalists. The
scene, on a certain level, suggests a kind of phenomenological reduction. In music
scholarship, this Husserlian technique has been prominently associated with
“reduced listening,” a mode of purely aural perception in which sounds are freed

1. K. M. Knittel (1998) traces this view to Richard Wagner’s 1870 Beethoven essay. For further discus-
sion of Wagner’s influence here, see Goehr (1998, 123) and Kane (2014, 114–​16), and for a general
discussion of Beethoven and disability, see Straus (2011).
 Beethoven’s Prosthesis T7

Figure 1.1 Ludwig van Beethoven, Piano Sonata no. 8 in C minor, “Pathétique,”
op. 13, mvt. i, end of m. 10.

from their worldly sources.2 By contrast, Beethoven’s experience highlights every-

thing that reduced listening excludes—​kinesthetic, tactile, visual, and technologi-
cal aspects of performance. Asking about Beethoven, then, is a way of asking a
broader question: How do bodies and instruments condition musical experience?

Listening with the Body

Beethoven might have imagined music while resting in an armchair or strolling

through the city. But in Schindler’s anecdote, the composer moves his arms, wrists,
and fingers, pressing keys, pulling a bow across strings. Insofar as the story con-
nects Beethoven’s bodily actions and his inner hearing, it resonates with argu-
ments that present musical experience as essentially embodied.
Consider a brief excerpt from Beethoven’s “Pathétique” Sonata, shown in
Figure 1.1. The melody hovers, then descends through a chromatic scale, over the
dominant harmony that closes the piece’s slow introduction. It is a striking move,
for several reasons. It falls more than two octaves, a distance that effectively covers
the introduction’s entire melodic range. At the same time it picks up speed, cul-
minating in a series of one-​hundred-​twenty-​eighth notes that are commonly per-
formed in a free accelerando. This melody, then, gives a sense not only of musical
movement, but of musical momentum. It does not simply descend. It plummets.
My description of the passage is obviously metaphorical, and it plays with an
opposition of “high” and “low” pitches that pervades Western musical discourse.3
Yet this spatial mapping, however familiar, is far from universal. For example,
Sundanese musicians from West Java describe pitch relationships in terms of
size and tension (van Zanten 1986, 85). High notes are “small” or “pulled”; low
notes, “large” or “slack.”4 Many music theorists—​drawing on work by the cognitive

2. The most influential proponent of this method is the French composer Pierre Schaeffer, to whom
I return in Chapter 6.
3. As Lawrence Zbikowski notes, the high/​low metaphor is not limited to theoretical language. It also
supports “text painting,” where composers use musical motion to represent ascent or descent (2002,
63–​74).
4. These theoretical metaphors obviously relate to the construction of instruments. On pitch-​related
metaphors in other musical traditions, see Cox (1999), Zbikowski (2002, 67–​68), and Eitan and
Timmers (2010).
8 T Music at Hand

Figure 1.2 Diagram of the verticality schema (after Zbikowski 2002, 69).

linguist George Lakoff and the philosopher Mark Johnson (1980)—​argue that
such linguistic metaphors are made possible by underlying conceptual metaphors.
For Lakoff and Johnson, metaphoric processes of cross-​domain mapping are basic
to thought and action. And empirical research indeed shows that the conceptual
mapping between pitch height and vertical position can affect perception and
motor performance.5 For example, in stimulus-​response compatibility experi-
ments, participants—​with or without formal musical training—​respond more
quickly and accurately when higher pitches are paired with higher visual stimuli
(Rusconi et al. 2006; Lidji et al. 2007). Conceptual metaphors are theoretically
founded on “image schemas,” gestalts abstracted from sensorimotor perception.6
The orientational metaphor of pitch height would engage a verticality schema
(illustrated in Figure 1.2), a pattern that remains invariant throughout countless
experiences of up-​and-​down. For a Western listener, the passage from Beethoven’s
“Pathétique” might evoke such experiences: running down stairs, riding a roller
coaster, dropping a stone, or watching an Olympic diver. For a Javanese listener,
it might more readily suggest a process of expanding or loosening. In both cases,
the conceptual metaphor for pitch is culturally specific, while also grounded in
embodied experience.
Phenomenological terms can help clarify the meaning of “embodied experi-
ence” here. Edmund Husserl distinguishes between two German words for “body,”
Körper and Leib ([1909] 1973, 42–​55). On one level, the human body is a mate-
rial object. My hand and the piano are both concrete things, both physical bodies
(Körper). This is, in fact, a precondition for their interaction: without this common
substantiality, my fingers and the keys could not touch. Yet at the same time, my
own body differs from external objects, because I experience it as a lived body

5. Eitan and Timmers review experimental research on pitch and space (2010, 405–​6). Empirical
research also suggests connections between the motor system and the perception of rhythm. Bodily
movement seems to facilitate different metrical interpretations of an ambiguous rhythmic pattern
(Phillips-​Silver and Trainor 2005, 2007). And functional magnetic resonance imaging studies show
that beat perception engages a network of motor-​related areas in the brain, involving the basal gan-
glia, premotor cortex, and supplementary motor area (Grahn 2009).
6. Image schemas were introduced by Johnson (1987). Rohrer (2005) discusses neurobiological evi-
dence consistent with the theory. Music-​theoretical applications of the concept have been explored
by Saslaw (1996), Brower (1997–​98), Cox (1999), Mead (1999), Zbikowski (2002), Adlington (2003),
Johnson and Larson (2003), Straus (2011, 107–​12), and Larson (2012).
 Beethoven’s Prosthesis T9

(Leib). It is always present for me, imbued with kinesthetic sensations, and I move
it directly. Image schemas are based on this level of lived embodiment.
Husserl also extends the doubling to other people’s bodies. I might see your
hand as a material object or as a living hand like my own. Later phenomenolo-
gists, notably Maurice Merleau-​Ponty, develop this theme further, conceiving of
intersubjectivity as a kind of intercorporeality. We understand each other—​and
the world we inhabit together—​via shared sensorimotor capacities. This resonates
with recent investigations of a “mirror-​neuron system,” which is involved in both
performing and perceiving actions.7 Along these lines, Arnie Cox has proposed
that metaphors of musical verticality (and musical meaning in general) involve
“mimetic motor imagery”: that is, imitation, either real or imagined, of perform-
ers’ movements and sonic patterns (1999, 108).8
All of this suggests a preliminary interpretation of Beethoven’s late improvisa-
tions. Building on the cognitive perspective that approaches metaphor as a basic
structure of thought grounded in image-​schematic structures, the composer’s
actions can be understood as kinesthetic analogues for the sounds in his mind, as
embodied representations. If listeners perceive actual sound in terms of imagined
movement, Beethoven would instead perceive actual movement in terms of imag-
ined sound. The muscular exertions of his hands, arms, and feet would mirror
the music’s melodic, temporal, or textural outlines. Moving at the keyboard for
Beethoven would be like dancing to a silent soundtrack, like a kind of musical
mime that actualizes motor imagery already involved in musical listening.9
Though this interpretation accounts for some cultural influences, it does not
yet address the role of practiced techniques or musical technologies. It does not
yet consider Beethoven as a pianist or violinist. In the earlier-​cited experiments,
musicians had more complex associations between pitch and space than partici-
pants without musical training (Rusconi et al. 2006; Lidji et al. 2007). Besides map-
ping pitch height to vertical position, they also connected higher pitches with the
right and lower ones with the left—​as on a piano keyboard.10 Studying performers,
then, may nuance theories of musical embodiment, by highlighting the effects of
bodily skill.
Cognitive neuroscience can help reveal musician-​ specific connections
between listening and playing. In one representative study, experimenters played
familiar piano melodies for a group of student pianists (Haueisen and Knösche
2001). Though they listened while sitting still, the pianists exhibited significant

7. Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2008) examine the mirror-​neuron system in general, while Overy and
Molnar-​Szakacs (2009) discuss its relation to music.
8. Mariusz Kozak argues that an overemphasis on musical mimesis is problematic. If listeners merely
imitated performers, then their own bodies would be inessential to musical understanding, and
listening would be only “quasi-​embodied” (2015, 1.6). As an alternative, Kozak examines ways in
which listeners’ nonperformative movements organize musical experience, combining Merleau-​
Ponty’s phenomenology with motion-​capture analysis.
9. Cox’s (2006) discussion of subvocalization also fits suggestively with Beethoven’s habit of “growl-
ing” instead of singing (Schindler [1860] 1966, 125).
10. This mapping also affects action: for example, experienced pianists have great difficulty playing on
a reversed keyboard (Laeng and Park 1999).
10 T Music at Hand

activation in the contralateral primary motor cortex (M1), as measured by mag-

netoencephalography (MEG). In another, amateur and professional violinists
tapped left-​hand fingerings for Mozart’s Violin Concerto in G major, KV. 216
(Lotze et al. 2003). Though this performance was silent, functional magnetic res-
onance imaging (fMRI) showed activation in the right primary auditory cortex
and left auditory association area. (Unsurprisingly, this activation was stronger
for professionals.) But when the same violinists imagined playing the piece with-
out also moving their fingers, the auditory-​motor coactivation disappeared, lead-
ing the authors to conclude that “the motor and auditory systems are coactivated
as a consequence of musical training but only if one system (motor or auditory)
becomes activated by actual movement execution or live musical auditory stim-
uli” (1817). These studies showed distinctive patterns of auditory-​motor coactiva-
tion in musicians’ brains.11 Note that this connection is bidirectional: sounding
music elicits activity in motor areas, and action elicits activity in auditory areas.
This auditory-​motor coupling might be figuratively described as a link between
the ear and the hand.12
Such results—​and embodied listening more generally—​can be explained via
Lawrence Barsalou’s theory of perceptual symbol systems (1999). As a proponent
of “grounded cognition,” Barsalou argues that cognition is based on sensory expe-
rience, not disembodied computational processing. In his account, perception
activates sensorimotor areas in the brain: visual areas capture aspects like shape
and color; auditory areas capture aspects like pitch and timbre; others involve pro-
prioceptive states, bodily movement or action, emotion, and so forth. The brain,
then, takes in distinct perceptual components, forming sense-​specific represen-
tations. At the same time, different sensory modalities are coordinated through
“convergence zones” that record patterns of coactivation (Damasio 1989). And
such patterns may be reactivated through top-​down processing to support mental
simulations that, Barsalou claims, ground even the most abstract concepts and
categories.
This empirical and theoretical work suggests another approach to Beethoven’s
improvisations. Early in his life as a pianist, Beethoven practiced common scales
and melodic gestures, idiomatic textures and chordal patterns. He developed
modally specific memories for their physical actions and sounding results, as any
competent pianist does. These coordinated sensory representations supported

11. For further evidence of auditory-​motor coupling in pianists, see Bangert, Haeusler, and Altenmüller
(2001), Drost et al. (2005), Bangert et al. (2006), Lahav, Saltzman, and Schlaug (2007), and Chen,
Rae, and Watkins (2011). Margulis et al. (2009) extend such research to violinists and flutists.
12. In general, instrumentalists’ brains have a larger than average hand area in the motor cortex
(Altenmüller and Gruhn 2002, 72). Yet there are also specific differences, depending on the instru-
ment. Professional violinists, for example, have larger areas for left-​hand fingers but not for the
left thumb or right-​hand digits (Elbert et al., 1995). And players who make music with other body
parts—​feet, mouth, and so forth—​have corresponding differences in auditory-​motor integration.
For example, Schulz, Ross, and Pantev (2003) found that trumpet players develop strong connec-
tions between the auditory cortex and the lip area in the primary somatosensory cortex (but not
the corresponding area for the index finger). Neural reorganization, finally, is more pronounced in
players who began to study their instrument in childhood.
 Beethoven’s Prosthesis T 11

musical schemas and concepts that he could reactivate and creatively recombine.
While improvising, for example, Beethoven could imagine a melody and realize
it with his hands. Yet since auditory-​motor coactivation goes both ways, mov-
ing his hands on the keyboard would activate auditory regions in his brain. This
suggests that Beethoven’s actions would also enhance auditory simulations after his
hearing loss.13 This conclusion is consistent with reports from musicians with sig-
nificant hearing loss, who describe powerful experiences of auditory imagery dur-
ing performance (Miller 2011). And it goes some way to explaining a statement by
Beethoven himself: “when I am playing and composing, my affliction still hampers
me least; it affects me most when I am in company” (quoted in Ealy 1994, 273).
The music Beethoven “heard” at the piano, then, would parallel the “phantasmal
voices” sometimes experienced by people who become deaf after learning to speak—​
people who “hear” simulated speech while lip-​reading.14 Perceptual symbol systems
theory would readily accommodate this auditory-​visual integration. As a general the-
ory of coordination between the brain’s sensory systems, the model equally accounts
for visual-​motor coactivation in expert dancers watching dance and in musicians
watching other instrumentalists (Calvo-​Merino et al. 2005; Behmer and Jantzen
2011). However, even as this account of multisensory integration extends image-​
schematic and motor-​mimetic perspectives from music theory, it prompts further
questions. How are body-​sound relations mediated? How is playing an instrument
different from singing or dancing?

Instrumental Affordances

Embodied aspects of Beethoven’s “inner hearing” challenge a spiritualism that

often haunts Romantic visions of the deaf composer. Yet fixating on Beethoven’s
body can lead to other philosophical problems. First, to promote body over mind
would court a materialism that is just as dualistic as the idealism it inverts. Both
positions treat one term in the mind/​body binary as essential and the other as
accidental. Both positions, then, would inhabit the black-​and-​white world that
Jacques Derrida calls “the metaphysics of presence.”15 This kind of metaphysics

13. Barsalou (1999, 586) emphasizes that such simulations must remain partial, and this is philosophi-
cally significant. Claiming that simulations can be complete would effectively reduce perception to
the thought of perceiving, falling into an idealism that Merleau-​Ponty critiques in The Visible and
the Invisible (1968, 29–​43).
14. Oliver Sacks discusses these phantasmal voices in his Seeing Voices: A Journey into the World of the
Deaf (1989, 5–​7).
15. As Derrida explains, this metaphysics involves “the enterprise of returning ‘strategically,’ ideally, to
an origin … held to be simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-​identical, in order then to think
in terms of derivation, complication, deterioration, accident, etc. All metaphysicians, from Plato to
Rousseau, Descartes to Husserl, have proceeded in this way, conceiving good to be before evil, the
positive before the negative, the pure before the impure, the simple before the complex, the essen-
tial before the accidental, the imitated before the imitation, etc.” (1988, 93). Derridean deconstruc-
tion, in part, examines the inherent contradictions of such thinking, extending earlier critiques of
metaphysical presence by Heidegger (2010, 21–​25).
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Opinion

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subtle

the who river

can delivered

on and

even gypsum is