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 PALGRAVE STUDIES IN
EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS
Series Editors: Michelle Egan, Neill Nugent
and William E. Paterson

EUROPEAN DISINTEGRATION
A Search for Explanations

Hans Vollaard
Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics

Series Editors
Michelle Egan
American University
Washington, USA

Neill Nugent
Manchester Metropolitan University
Manchester, UK

William E. Paterson
Aston University
Birmingham, UK
Following on the sustained success of the acclaimed European Union
Series, which essentially publishes research-based textbooks, Palgrave
Studies in European Union Politics publishes cutting edge research-driven
monographs. The remit of the series is broadly defined, both in terms of
subject and academic discipline. All topics of significance concerning the
nature and operation of the European Union potentially fall within the
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importance of the EU as a political, economic and social phenomenon.

More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14629
 Hans Vollaard

European
Disintegration
A Search for Explanations
Hans Vollaard
Utrecht University
Utrecht, The Netherlands

Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics

ISBN 978-1-137-41464-9    ISBN 978-1-137-41465-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-41465-6

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 Preface and Acknowledgements

When I both started and finished writing this book, my then home town
of Leiden in the Netherlands was celebrating its relief from a Spanish-­
Habsburg siege in 1574. Leiden’s relief constituted a significant boost for
an uprising that sought to defend local privileges in the Low Countries
against the influence of the centralising Habsburg Empire. Eventually, the
northern part of the Low Countries left this vast, multilayered, polycen-
tric, and multinational empire. An independent confederative republic
resulted from this “Nexit”, which was at that time a loosely organised, but
economically competitive, actor at the global level. Not least because of
the university established in Leiden in 1575 as a reward for its endurance,
the Netherlands became a centre of knowledge of military engineering,
growing tulips, protestant theology, and, also, political science. It is no
wonder that the disintegration of a large European empire is an event that
is still celebrated annually in Leiden, with two parades, aubades, music
shows, a church service, and a large fair. With a certain fervour, Leiden’s
residents sing sixteenth-century hymns that refer to a glorious fight for
freedom. All of this made me wonder whether or not similar festivities
would one day be held to commemorate the disintegration of another
vast, multilayered, polycentric, and multinational polity, the European
Union. Or would the European Union be remembered with melancholy
and regret, like the Austrian-Hungarian Empire that only seemed like a
pretty decent place to live for a wide variety of people with the benefit of
hindsight? I suppose this would depend on whether the European Union
fell apart as a result of vociferous independence movements or as a result

v
vi PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

of a slow sinking into oblivion. The normative assessment of the European

Union will also, undoubtedly, shape the way it would be remembered.
As a political scientist, I do not take a position in favour of or against
the disintegration of the European Union. Nevertheless, I am quite happy
to see that public attention to the subject has increased over the past sev-
eral years. I devoted one of the chapters of my PhD dissertation to the
subject of European disintegration (defended in 2009), but I initially
shelved the topic in favour of others. Colleagues argued that I would not
be able to pursue a fundable research project on something that had not
yet occurred. I have continued to hear that remark repeated when I wrote
this book at the request of Palgrave Macmillan (I therefore remain grateful
to Steven Kennedy for the invitation to write the book). With the looming
Brexit that has changed. However, as will be explained in this book, disin-
tegration is not just a matter of a member state leaving the European
Union. It is not simply a Grexit or Brexit. Disintegration also involves the
withholding of resources, pulling out from (certain) decision-making pro-
cesses, and decreasing compliance with EU law, whether by member state
governments or businesses, individuals, and sub-state authorities. These
partial withdrawals have been seen before in the history of the European
Union and that of its predecessors. Without developing the analytical
tools to describe and explain political phenomena, such as European dis-
integration, their very occurrence might be missed. These tools are neces-
sary to sharpen our focus on the crucial factors and actors at play in this
kind of large-scale processes. Many have also quipped that I might be too
late—finishing this book after the European Union had already come to
an end. My standard response was that books analysing the fall and decline
of the Roman Empire centuries ago are still written and sold successfully
today. Seeing as the European Union is still here, I hope that the insights
presented in this book may be of help in our efforts to better understand
its evolution.
I would like to express my gratitude to the many people who contrib-
uted directly or indirectly to these insights. In particular, I would like to
mention, in alphabetical order, Stephan Auer, Hester van de Bovenkamp,
Michael Burgess, Annegret Eppler, Jan Erk, Erik Jones, Sandrino Smeets,
Amy Verdun, Douglas Webber, and Jan Zielonka, as well as the publisher’s
anonymous reviewers for their inspiration and constructive comments.
Furthermore, I am also grateful for the opportunities to present my work
on various occasions, including seminars at Maastricht University, INSEAD
Fontainebleau, and Leiden University, as well as on panels at the
 PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
   vii

c­onferences of the Council of European Studies in Paris, the ECPR

Standing Group on the European Union in Trento, and the NIG annual
conference in Maastricht. I would also like to say special thanks to Jessica
Kroezen for her editing. Finally, my gratitude goes out to those who
showed patience with me in finishing this book, Imogen Gordon Clark of
Palgrave Macmillan, and even more so my beloved wife, Hester van de
Bovenkamp. I hope this book will contribute to a fruitful debate on
European disintegration.

Utrecht, The Netherlands Hans Vollaard

 Contents

1 Introduction   1

2 Neo-functionalism and European Disintegration  11

3 Realism, Intergovernmentalism, and European

Disintegration  31

4 Federalism and European Disintegration  61

5 Comparative Imperialism and European Disintegration  85

6 Towards a Proper Explanation of European

Disintegration 119

7 How European Integration Started Despite Ever-Present

Disintegrative Forces 147

8 How European Integration Has Continued, Despite

the EU’s Limited Locking-in Capacity 165

ix
x Contents

9 The External De-consolidation of Member States

Increases Dissatisfaction with the EU 197

10 Disintegration or Not? 227

Epilogue 253

References 261

Index 263
 Abbreviations

AfD Alternative für Deutschland

AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CEECs Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
COREPER Comité des Répresentants Permanents (Committee of
Permanent Representatives)
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSOs Civil Society Organisations
EC European Communities
ECB European Central Bank
ECHR European Court of Human Rights
ECJ European Court of Justice
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EDC European Defence Community
EEA European Economic Area
EEC European Economic Community
EEU Eurasian Economic Union
EFTA European Free Trade Area
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
EU European Union
EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community

xi
xii ABBREVIATIONS

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

G8 Group of Eight
G20 Group of Twenty
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GNP Gross National Product
ICT Information and Communication Technologies
IMF International Monetary Fund
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
KKE Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas (Communist Party of
Greece)
LAOS Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós (Popular Orthodox Rally)
MNEs Multinational Enterprises
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs Non-governmental Organisations
OCA Optimum Currency Area
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PASOK Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima (Panhellenic Socialist
Movement)
R&D Research and Development
SEA Single European Act
SIS Schengen Information System
SU Soviet Union
SYRIZA Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás (Coalition of the Radical
Left)
UK United Kingdom
UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party
UN United Nations
USA United States of America
VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for
Freedom and Democracy)
WEU Western European Union
WTO World Trade Organization
 List of Tables

Table 6.1 The systemic components of the bounding-bonding

mechanism134
Table 6.2 Conceptualisation and explanation of European
disintegration136
Table 10.1 To exit or not 236

xiii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1   The Need for Explanations of European

Disintegration
How far in advance would you really be able to tell that the European
Union (EU) is disintegrating or has disintegrated? Would you actually be
aware of European disintegration if it were to occur? Is it just a matter of
formally dissolving the EU or is it a process that is out of the control of
decision-makers? What should you look for as an indication of the current
state of European (dis)integration at this moment? And which factors do
you think are fundamental to explaining the present and future course of
European (dis)integration? These are crucial questions for any political
observer of EU politics, whether they work as a risk manager, a journalist,
a policy strategist, or a political scientist. These questions have become
particularly relevant since the outbreak of the debt crises in the Eurozone
and the Brexit referendum. The scenario of European disintegration has
featured prominently in public debates, but confusion about the fate of
the EU and the process of European integration more generally abounds.
Some argued that the expulsion of Greece, for example, would have
strengthened the Eurozone, as it would limit the economic disparities
within the European monetary union and as such the need for financial
transfers between member states reluctant to share. Others contended that
a possible Grexit would precipitate the departure of other member states

© The Author(s) 2018 1

H. Vollaard, European Disintegration, Palgrave Studies in European
Union Politics, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-41465-6_1
2 H. VOLLAARD

from the Eurozone due the pressure of the financial markets betting on
further exits. Some perceived the rescue of the Euro as essential to main-
taining the political underpinnings of the entire process of European inte-
gration. Others advocated the dissolution of the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU), as the solution required to preserve the Euro—a sizeable
EU budget, EU taxes, and EU transfers—would only fuel the Eurosceptic
call for the dissolution of the entire EU. Some have thought of the debt
crises as just part of a series of recurring crises in the process of European
integration, whereas others have considered it to be a fundamental crisis of
European integration.
Contradictory analyses of the state of the EU and European integration
more generally have also cropped up in other discussions. Will the end of
British EU membership allow the EU to act more coherently in light of
less disagreement on issues such as the Euro, social policy, Schengen, and
foreign policy? Or would a Brexit cripple the EU’s influence in interna-
tional politics, making membership less attractive to present and future
member states? And do the attempts to constrain so-called “welfare tour-
ism” help to maintain support for the EU within the Eurosceptic parts of
the population, or do they constitute a step towards the end of the free
movement of persons in the internal market, a fundamental element of the
European integration process thus far? Is the rise of Euroscepticism at the
level of the European Parliament and some national parliaments a sign of
the end of the EU or of the growing involvement of even anti-system par-
ties and citizens in EU politics? Is a stronger EU essential to the process of
European integration, or can it do without (Zielonka, 2014)? Scenarios of
the EU’s future range from full-scale federalisation, a stronger core Europe
with some exits, muddling through with the present EU’s institutions, a
combination of the EU becoming paralysed, neglected, and obsolete, to
its complete collapse (see, for instance, European Commission, 2017;
King Baudouin Foundation et al., 2013; Krastev, 2012; Rabobank, 2017).
Confusion and contradictions are thus rife in perspectives on the course of
European (dis)integration.
Academic analysis can help us to move beyond the cursory reflections
of the day. It enables us to make explicit the various ways of thinking
about European disintegration, and it can offer us a better understanding
of the definition, indicators, factors, mechanisms, outcome and likelihood
of European disintegration. First and foremost, academic analysis helps us
to make sense of political dynamics by being selective. Theories are an
important tool in this respect. They structure our observations of
 INTRODUCTION 3

­ henomena like European disintegration, order existing knowledge and

p
steer our attention, sensitise us to the structural dynamics below the sur-
face of daily events reported in the media, raise research questions for
subsequent inquiry, executed in a systematic, coherent, consistent, and
thorough manner (Peters, 1998, p. 110; Rosamond, 2000, p. 4, 9). In
this way, theories could help us to recognise and explain European disin-
tegration in a more orderly fashion, showing us what choices can be made
more and less easily (cf. Peters, Pierre, & Stoker, 2010). To be sure, theo-
ries may be proven wrong. It is, therefore, important to present theories
in the form of testable statements to see whether they hold up to empirical
evidence. This book adopts an explanatory approach, and will not discuss
whether or not political developments like European disintegration are a
good or a bad thing.
Given the confusion in the public debate on European disintegration,
now is the right time to seek academic reflection on the subject. So, which
theories are currently available to explain European disintegration? At first
glance, there are next to none, even in the field of EU studies (Eppler &
Scheller, 2013a; Glencross, 2009, p. 2; Jones, 2016; Webber, 2013;
Zielonka, 2014). Theories of regional integration or more specifically of
European integration have largely focused on just that: integration, not
disintegration. A variety of recent challenges to European integration have
certainly been studied, but they have not provided an explanation of
European disintegration either. Analyses of Euroscepticism have primarily
discussed its definition and origins, rather than its disintegrative potential
(Brack & Startin, 2015, p. 241; Leconte, 2010). Enlargement studies
have explored the relationship between widening and deepening as well as
the impact of European integration on candidate and new member states.
Thorough reflection on the EU’s overstretched absorption capacity has
been limited, however (though see Delhey, 2007; Toshkov, 2017;
Vobruba, 2003). And even though enlargement has led to a profound
examination of differentiated integration, it only refers to a situation in
which not all member states join in in future efforts to forward the process
of European integration, not how enlargement could instead lead to less
integration (see, e.g., Leuffen, Rittberger, & Schimmelfennig, 2012).
Many analyses have also been executed on the financial, legitimacy, mon-
etary, economic, and refugee crises the EU experienced. They yet rather
explored the impact of these crises on policies, policy-making process,
institutional relations, citizens’ opinions and identities, and divisions
between and within member states than the very existence of the EU
4 H. VOLLAARD

(Falkner, 2016; Fossum & Menéndez, 2014; Rittberger & Schimmelfennig,

2015; Trenz, Ruzza, & Guiraudon, 2015).
EU studies, or the study of international relations, comparative politics,
political history, and political economy more generally, may be excused for
their limited attention to European disintegration given the fact that
European integration has always increased in terms of institutions, compe-
tences, policy areas, and legislative output. It has also continuously wid-
ened its geographical scope, with the exception of Algerian departments
of France (1962) following Algeria’s independence in 1962, Greenland
(1985) after it obtained home rule from Denmark, and the island of Saint
Barthélemy (2012) in the aftermath of its secession from the French over-
seas department of Guadeloupe. Continuous integration has even been
the case in the context of the Eurozone crisis: the EU has gained more say
in national economic policies and Croatia joined in 2013 as the union’s
28th member state. Problematic, however, is the fact that most present-­
day EU theories would likely fail to recognise disintegration if it were
occurring because they have shifted their focus from grand-theorising the
transformation of the entire EU system towards exploring bits and pieces
of EU governance, and the impact of European integration on EU mem-
ber states (Taylor, 2008, p. 109). Thus, students of the EU have lost sight
of the big picture in the context of (dis)integration. And what cannot be
properly recognised and described cannot be properly explained.

1.2   The Search for an Explanation of European

Disintegration
One of the few publications with the explicit goal of conceptualising
European disintegration is therefore a most welcome contribution (Eppler
& Scheller, 2013b). The authors emphasise the multi-dimensional nature
of European (dis)integration, from its economic, institutional, and territo-
rial aspects, to socio-cultural and legal ones. Integration in one dimension
may not be accompanied by integration in another. On the contrary, too
much integration in one dimension (for instance, institutional) could pro-
voke disintegration in another (for instance, socio-cultural). Given its
multi-dimensional nature, it is necessary to clearly explain the kind of
European disintegration this book seeks to explain. This book focuses on
the disintegration of the EU understood as a system of interactions through
which authoritative allocations of values are made and i­mplemented (cf.
Easton, 1965). As such, it takes an explicitly political understanding of
 INTRODUCTION 5

European disintegration, which involves aspects of allocation of values

such as the EU’s legislative output, the scope of its policies, its compe-
tences, its institutions, the involvement and sense of belonging among its
members (states and citizens), and the size of its territory (cf. Lindberg,
1971). Integration concerns the making of a system of authoritative allo-
cations from other systems of authoritative allocations, whereas disintegra-
tion is the unmaking of such a system. This book offers a search for the
most fruitful explanation of the disintegration of the EU.
Notwithstanding the scholarly neglect of European disintegration, the
literature on European integration and also on international cooperation
and comparative politics may yet be fruitful sources to conceptualise and
explain it. The classic grand theories of intergovernmentalism and neo-­
functionalism on the making of the EU can be turned “on their heads” to
define and explain European disintegration, the unmaking of the Euro-­
polity (cf. Webber, 2013). These will be discussed in Chaps. 2 and 3 in
combination with related theories of international cooperation such as
comparative regionalism and (neo-)realism. In the subsequent chapters,
European disintegration is explored from a comparative perspective. In
the end, the EU may be unique with respect to its exact shape and form,
but not with regard to the disintegrative mechanisms it is subject to.
Explanations of the rise and fall of federal systems, empires, and states will
therefore be reviewed. The book discusses each explanation of how disin-
tegration has been understood: how should it be conceptualised, what are
indicators of disintegration, and can it take place at the same time as inte-
gration? In addition, the book presents what the various accounts perceive
to be the most important factors explaining disintegration.
This book does not include a comparative analysis of disintegrating cur-
rency areas. The perspective of the optimum currency area (OCA) has
informed many contributions on the sustainability if not end of the EMU
and the EU itself. Even before the launch of the EMU a rise of disintegra-
tive conflicts on economic policies within the EU was foreseen (Feldstein,
1997). The OCA perspective indicates the economic preconditions under
which it would be beneficial for countries to give up monetary indepen-
dence and join a monetary union (Artis, 2002). It suggests that if mem-
bers’ economic structures do not resemble each other sufficiently, external
shocks and single monetary policies will impact differently across the mon-
etary union’s area. Mobility of labour and capital, mutual budgetary
­support, and flexible prices and wages could absorb these asymmetric
shocks. OCA-based accounts may indicate why the EMU would face more
6 H. VOLLAARD

difficulties than other currency areas such as the USA, why peripheral
countries such as Greece would fit less easily into the current EMU, and
why diverging economic structures may aggravate the EMU’s problems
(Eichengreen, 2010, 2012; Sadeh, 2012). OCA-based accounts may thus
point at some crucial factors that can promote the survival or (partial) dis-
solution of the EMU. Nevertheless, the OCA perspective cannot fully
explain the process of making and unmaking of what has been foremost a
political project (Eichengreen, 2012; Feldstein, 2012; McKay, 1999;
Sadeh, 2012; Sadeh & Verdun, 2009). Moreover, it cannot account for
instances of disintegration before the launch of the single currency, or for
disintegrative moves in member states that have not been fully participat-
ing in the EMU, such as the UK. For the sake of parsimony, a more
encompassing theory would therefore be preferable.
Predicting the fate of any political organisation is a daunting task, as the
case of the eminent federalism expert William Riker illustrates (McKay,
2004). In the late 1980s, he predicted that Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
and the Soviet Union would remain stable for the foreseeable future
because of their centralised nature. He was proven wrong soon after—as
were many other scholars. However, the benefit of hindsight does not
necessarily provide clarity either. Explanations of the inevitability and also
the extent of the disintegration of the Soviet Union—assuming it does not
still live on today as the Russian Federation—are still a matter of debate
(Motyl, 2001). This also holds true for older instances of disintegration.
Until now, at least 210 very diverse factors have been put forward to
explain the decline and fall of the ancient Roman Empire (Demandt,
1984). Explaining European disintegration, the goal of this book, will be
no less a subject of debate. Nevertheless, the overview provided in this
book not only allows us to distinguish alternative conceptualisations and
explanations of European disintegration, but also to seek the most promis-
ing one by evaluating their respective theoretical premises and empirical
strength. All explanations are derived from general theories of regional
integration and political systems. These theories are not EU specific. The
empirical evidence offered by the single case of the EU does not necessar-
ily invalidate these theories. Criticism is therefore first targeted at the theo-
ries’ premises. For example, some suffer from a biased perspective on the
outcome of disintegration. Territorial states should not be assumed to
remain the predominant political format. A development towards loosely
organised complex networks of overlapping jurisdictions is also a possibil-
ity (Zielonka, 2006). Other theories have too narrow an understanding of
 INTRODUCTION 7

the complex processes of (dis)integration, or an incomplete view of how

the manifold relevant factors interrelate in these processes. As a result,
they cannot offer a proper description or an adequate explanation of how
integration or disintegration has unfolded in the past or would unfold in
the near future.
As it appears to be the most promising theory to analyse the multifac-
eted process of political disintegration, the final explanatory framework,
inspired by the work by Stefano Bartolini (2005) on the formation of
states and nations in European history, is discussed more extensively in
Chaps. 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 in an effort to demonstrate how it avoids the
theoretical problems inherent in other explanations, how it makes political
observers aware of the crucial mechanisms of European disintegration,
and how it gives us an indication of where the EU is heading. A complete
breakdown soon appears to be unlikely. No other member state is expected
to follow the UK withdrawing from the EU. The lack of more attractive
alternatives to the EU prevents member states from leaving. Nevertheless,
Euroscepticism and dissatisfaction about the EU’s social-economic bene-
fits are rife. The EU’s very structure is rather inhibitive to voice the dis-
satisfaction with proper effect. Without the option of full exit and effective
voice, the EU therefore faces the disintegrative challenge of member states
seeking partial withdrawals such as deteriorating compliance with EU law,
renationalisation of EU competences, and limitations on EU budget con-
tributions. This will sap the sustainability as the EU’s capacity to enforce
its rule and to strengthen the social-economic benefits for its member
states, business, and citizens, which have been fundamental for EU sup-
port. The EU will thus be limping ahead with many rather grudgingly
accepting it as the least unattractive option.

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 CHAPTER 2

Neo-functionalism and European

Disintegration

2.1   Introduction
Neo-functionalism is one of the classic theories of European integration.
Its main proponents, Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg, launched it in the
1950s and 1960s. Emblematic of the scientific approach and theoretical
focus of the time, neo-functionalism sought to systematically explain the
causes, process, and consequences of non-coercive regional integration
across the entire world by formulating verifiable hypotheses. Since the
mid-1970s, it has often been declared defunct, mainly because it has failed
to explain the course of regional integration in Europe. Nevertheless, its
key concept of “spillover” continues to pop up, also in recent analyses of
the European Union in crisis (King Baudoin Foundation et al., 2013;
Lefkokridi & Schmitter, 2014; Niemann & Ioannou, 2015;
Schimmelfennig, 2014; Vilpišauskas, 2013). In addition, neo-­functionalists
have also discussed—albeit to a limited extent—European disintegration
(Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970; Niemann & Bergmann, 2013; Schmitter,
1971). This provides more than sufficient reason to explore the potential
of neo-functionalism to explain European disintegration. After outlining
the main ideas of neo-functionalism on integration, this chapter discusses
its understanding and explanation of disintegration. An evaluation of the
potential of neo-functionalism to provide a framework for analysing
European disintegration follows. The chapter rounds off with the lessons
learned from a neo-functionalist take on European disintegration.

© The Author(s) 2018 11

H. Vollaard, European Disintegration, Palgrave Studies in European
Union Politics, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-41465-6_2
12 H. VOLLAARD

2.2   Neo-functionalism and Integration

Neo-functionalism provides a clear contrast to realist approaches to inter-
national politics (see Chap. 3). Instead of considering states to be primary
actors, as realists do, neo-functionalists adopt a pluralistic perspective in
which non-state actors like interest groups may act autonomously from
within states and across state borders. Instead of perceiving states as the
only relevant actors in international politics, neo-functionalists thus expect
non-state groups and supranational institutions to play an influential role
too. Instead of power being the most important consideration, functional
linkages and interests constitute the key drivers of international politics in
neo-functionalist thought. Instead of power relations being determined
exclusively by relative state capacities, power relations can change within
and across states due to altering coalitions, shifting expectations, changing
loyalties and learning on the part of state and non-state actors. In short,
neo-functionalism is a theory in which political integration can move
“beyond the nation-state” (1964), as of one of Haas’ most famous books
is entitled. Both as a political framework and actor, the state becomes
increasingly interlocked and enmeshed in larger political schemes. From
the various interpretations of regional integration neo-functionalists have
provided over the past 50 years, regardless of whether they refer to the
entire “grand” process of regional integration or only parts of it, “spill-
over” can be distilled as its key concept.
Neo-functionalists distinguish various types of spillover that are the
result of different underlying causal mechanisms. The following distinc-
tion is based on one of the latest extensive exposés of neo-functionalism
(Niemann, 2006, Chap. 1). Functional spillover takes place when the goals
of an integrated policy issue lead to further integrative steps, due to the
perceived functional interconnections of policy issues. For example, the
completion of an internal market also involved the free movement of per-
sons, for which EU-level measures on the issues of visas, asylum, immigra-
tion, and police cooperation were perceived to be necessary. Political
spillover refers to the process in which national elites, such as interest
groups and political parties, learn to see European cooperation as means
of serving their interests and subsequently establish transnational groups
to push for European solutions. Social spillover is the impetus for European
integration because of socialisation through increasing interactions and
connections between national (state) actors and the accompanying shift in
mutual expectations, norms, interpretations of reality, activities, or even
 NEO-FUNCTIONALISM AND EUROPEAN DISINTEGRATION 13

loyalties towards the European centre. Cultivated spillover concerns supra-

national actors such as the European Commission who actively engage
state and non-state actors to seek the integration of a certain policy domain
also to increase their own say, and as a result, integration continues beyond
the initial preferences of these actors. In response to criticism of neglecting
the international setting of the European integration process, recent neo-­
functionalist accounts also highlight exogenous spillover. External threats
and shocks such as the end of the Cold War and economic competition
from Japan, the USA, or China, regional responses to globalisation, and
the requirement to take positions vis-à-vis others after a certain period of
“internal” integration are assumed to generate more integration (Niemann,
2006, pp. 32–34; see also Schmitter, 1971, p. 244). Similar to functional
spillover, exogenous spillover is basically a matter of decision-makers’ per-
ceptions (Niemann, 2006, p. 51). Neo-functionalists initially presented
spillover as an almost automatic, self-reinforcing, and irreversible process,
but they have since become more focused to spell out the conditions
under which the various types of spillover take place (Niemann &
Schmitter, 2009, p. 57ff).
Even if neo-functionalists generally explain the dynamics of integration
after its launch, they have also discussed the conditions of a viable launch.
Since neo-functionalism concerns regional integration, it presumes geo-
graphical proximity of the states involved. Furthermore, the influential
role attributed to non-state actors presupposes a pluralistic society, at the
national and also increasingly at the regional level. In pluralistic societies,
non-state actors such as interest groups and political parties can find coun-
terparts in other states more easily with whom they can fight for a com-
mon cause across territorial borders. A certain measure of compatibility of
the participating states in terms of basic values, mutual expectations, and
decision-making procedures, a shared sense of relevance reflected by pre-­
existing networks of transactions, and a high level of economic develop-
ment have also been argued to increase the integrative potential of a region
(Haas, 1968, pp. 268–287). Integration schemes that not only involve a
set of mutual agreements but also involve supranational agents are
expected to integrate more than those without because they can cultivate
further integration (Haas & Schmitter, 1964, p. 713). Additionally, func-
tional spillover is particularly likely to occur in situations in which policy
issues are not easily isolated from each other. A technocratic and depoliti-
cised approach in the initial phase of integration, even if it concerned
potentially sensitive issues such as energy or the basic materials for arma-
ments, could avoid the immediate provocation of anti-integrative forces.
14 H. VOLLAARD

A start to an integrative scheme like this would facilitate an incremental

process of integration that would grant non-state and state actors the time
they need to learn to focus on European solutions and to be socialised in
the context of European norms and realities. It would also allow suprana-
tional institutions to gain the strength required to cultivate European
integration by accumulating the power to determine the policy agenda,
enhancing internal cohesion, attracting the involvement of national elites
to form supportive coalitions and socialising them, and brokering integra-
tive deals (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, pp. 60–61). Due to the close
links between policy issues in Western societies in general and the wide
range of issues incorporated in the European integration process, there is
a great deal of functional integrative pressure on adjacent policy issues,
despite the fact that member states might not have anticipated it (cf.
Pierson, 1996, pp. 137–139). Growing cross-border transactions would
subsequently stimulate demand from societal actors to regulate these
transactions by establishing further cross-border integrative arrangements
(cf. Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998). Activated by this demand, state
actors could accept further integration if they perceive the benefits of inte-
gration today as being greater than the costs of anticipated functional spill-
over in the future (meaning an additional or greater loss of sovereignty),
or if they are completely unaware of the possibility of spillover due to the
often limited time horizons they face (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009,
p. 58).
The description thus far may give the impression of an incremental
process in which integration leads relatively smoothly to more integration.
However, conflicts, controversies, and crises are not unexpected in a plu-
ralistic approach like neo-functionalism. Even more so, crises are perceived
as a means of strengthening integration, as they make clear the need to
take things one step further. Ongoing spillover also involves a larger set of
dramatic-political actors beyond the technocratic policy elites, who could
eventually challenge the former actors to redirect their expectations, activ-
ities, or even loyalties at the European level (Schmitter, 1969). Particularly
after French president Charles de Gaulle was able to stagnate European
decision-making in the 1960s as a result of his sovereigntist reservations
towards supranational rule, neo-functionalists have attempted to factor in
countervailing forces into their accounts of regional integration (Haas,
1967, p. 316). Haas (1967, p. 328) acknowledged that in the initial phase
of integration, the rather fragile technocratic spillover process is “suscep-
tible to reversal” as pragmatic acceptance of European problem-solving
 NEO-FUNCTIONALISM AND EUROPEAN DISINTEGRATION 15

schemes cannot easily withstand the resistance from “dramatic-political”

actors committed to ideology or nationalism, particularly if national self-­
confidence in problem-solving increases (Haas, 1967, pp. 327–328; 1971,
p. 31). The European integration process could bear national countervail-
ing forces more effectively after supranational institutions were able to
strengthen their cultivating powers, and learning and socialisation pro-
cesses shifted at least some national elites’ orientations towards European
integration (cf. Niemann, 2006, p. 51).
Even if cultivating powers and processes of socialisation are consoli-
dated, spillover will not necessarily result in progressive integration imme-
diately, according to another neo-functionalist interpretation. Instead,
integration in one policy area can evoke protective countermeasures in an
adjacent policy area with stagnation in the spillover process as a result
(Corbey, 1995). Only if policy rivalry between member states becomes
counterproductive is pressure for further integration steps expected to fol-
low. Additionally, the longer spillover processes have to evolve and the
more policy issues that are implicated, the more complex integrative steps
are because of the growing number of actors involved. If integration sub-
sequently enters too quickly into politically sensitive policy areas, counter-­
factors such as nationalist resistance can arise among actors not oriented
towards European integration (see also Niemann & Schmitter, 2009;
Schmitter, 1971). This might be called integrative overstretch or
“Überintegration” (Scheller & Eppler, 2013, p. 295). In addition to
nationalism, spillover might also be limited by member states’ diversity or
a changing external environment, resulting in a dialectic process between
the “logic of integration” and the “logic of disintegration” (Tranholm-­
Mikkelsen, 1991, p. 17).
Despite various attempts to take domestic politics into account in their
explanations of integration, neo-functionalists struggle to factor in issues
of identity at the mass level (Hooghe & Marks, 2008). As integration
involves more than economic interest groups and has become increasingly
salient to EU citizens in their daily lives since the 1990s, political entrepre-
neurs could mobilise tensions “between rapid jurisdictional change and
relatively stable identities” (Hooghe & Marks, 2008, p. 13). A call for a
“post-functionalist” approach has followed. Recent neo-functionalist
accounts hypothesise that sovereignty consciousness, domestic constraints
such as lack of administrative capacity or Euroscepticism, and mutual
diversity among member states constrain spillover effects (Niemann, 2006,
p. 47). The question is to what extent. Despite manifest reluctance at the
16 H. VOLLAARD

mass level to provide loans and guarantees to debt-laden fellow member

states in the context of the Eurozone crisis, functional spillover has taken
place from a monetary union towards a fiscal and banking union; culti-
vated spillover has been exerted by supranational agencies such as the
European Central Bank, while the common will among governments to
solve the Euro crisis collectively point at social spillover (Schimmelfennig,
2014; Vilpišauskas, 2013). With strategies such as avoiding referenda,
electing pro-Euro-parties to government, and delegating to supranational
agencies, the outcomes of non-integration and integration in certain pol-
icy areas may still be explained by neo-functionalism, but not
disintegration.
Neo-functionalists have increasingly detailed the conditions under
which the various types of spillover occur, resulting in an increasingly hard
to test set of hypotheses (Saurugger, 2014, p. 49). But what would the
expected end state of integration be in the eyes of a neo-functionalist? And
how could the degree of integration, the dependent variable, be mea-
sured? Haas wanted foremost to explain why and how states voluntarily
cede sovereignty and set up new conflict resolution mechanisms with their
neighbours (Haas, 1971, p. 6). Yet he did indicate where that might lead:
“[t]he end result of a process of political integration is a new political com-
munity, superimposed over the pre-existing ones” (Haas, 1958, p. 16).
Regional integration would thus not necessarily involve the complete
replacement of national states, but Haas did expect national political actors
to shift their expectations, activities, and also loyalties to the centre of the
new community. He has been criticised for his understanding of the end
goal, since by excluding any other outcome, it suffers from a teleological
if not normative bias (Groom, 1978). Haas’ new political community has
often been understood as some sort of super state (Schmitter, 1996,
p. 137). If so, neo-functionalism would not move beyond the state.
However, another key neo-functionalist, Lindberg, has been more cau-
tious and only speaks of the establishment of a new political decision-­
making centre towards which actors shift their activities and expectations,
but not their loyalties (Lindberg, 1963). He distinguishes a multitude of
dimensions of political integration—from the scope of policy areas
affected, the demand flow for European regulation from relevant actors,
and the resources available to regional decision-makers to comply with
European legislation—which do not necessarily develop in the same
­direction and are not necessarily explained by the same logic (Lindberg,
1971). These dimensions indicate whether or not integration has moved
 NEO-FUNCTIONALISM AND EUROPEAN DISINTEGRATION 17

on within a certain time frame without assuming a certain end goal. In

principle, political integration could thus also lead to a wide variety of
functional, overlapping, and competing integrative schemes at various lev-
els, rather than one cohesive, federative system (cf. Puchala, 1971, p. 276ff;
Schmitter, 1996, p. 130ff).
Despite its focus on the rational pursuit of material interests and its
neglect of identity, neo-functionalism has affinities with social constructiv-
ism and sociological institutionalism (Risse, 2005; Saurugger, 2014).
Indeed, preferences and interests are not necessarily fixed, as they can be
modified by the mechanisms of learning and socialisation intrinsic in the
process of European integration (social spillover). European integration
also involves the transfer of loyalties to a new political community, at least
according to the earlier writings of Ernst Haas. In neo-functionalist and
related theories, there has been emphasis on the mechanism of becoming
European by doing European (see also Deutsch et al., 1957; Fligstein,
2008). By working in supranational institutions or increasing cross-border
contacts and interactions, foreign others might even become part of a new
“us”, a new European identity (Nelsen & Guth, 2015, p. 24). This iden-
tity does not necessarily conflict with the national identity. People can and
do have multiple loyalties and identities, although those living in federal
states more easily adopt additional identity layers than their fellow citizens
in unitary and centralised states (Risse, 2005). Neo-functionalists consider
disintegration to be increasingly unlikely because over time processes of
socialisation and learning are expected to lead to more integration
(Niemann, 2006, p. 51).

2.3   A Neo-functionalist Explanation

of Disintegration Evaluated

Even if neo-functionalism neglects disintegration somewhat by largely

expecting integration to continue, its evaluation could still offer insight
into conceptualising and explaining disintegration more fruitfully. The
substantial revisions to and severe criticism of neo-functionalism offer
more than sufficient material to consider. Elaborating on their attempts to
include countervailing forces into their account of regional integration
processes, neo-functionalists put forward the concept of “spillback”,
which refers to “a situation in which there is a withdrawal from a set of
specific obligations. Rules are no longer regularly enforced or obeyed. The
scope of Community action and its institutional capacities decrease”
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XIII
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66

knowledge

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2 British

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