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India and the European Union
in a Turbulent World

Edited by
Rajendra K. Jain
India and the European Union
in a Turbulent World
 Rajendra K. Jain
Editor

India and the

European Union in
a Turbulent World
Editor
Rajendra K. Jain
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi, Delhi, India

ISBN 978-981-15-3916-9    ISBN 978-981-15-3917-6 (eBook)

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 To My Parents
for always inspiring and supporting me
 Introduction

The world today is in geopolitical flux and in disarray. The 2008 financial
crisis and the economic rise of Asia underlined the redistribution and dif-
fusion of power and the emergence of a more multipolar world with the
G8 giving way to the more representative G20. The postwar liberal world
order established by the West—which was ‘neither liberal nor worldwide
nor orderly’ (Haass 2018)—is under unprecedented strain. It has been
eroded largely because the political, economic and security fundamentals
that undermined it are invalid, and there is no consensus on other global
issues (Tharoor and Saran 2020a: xii).
The world has entered a period of profound change and uncertainty
with the unpredictable behaviour of the Trump Administration, the rise
and growing assertiveness of China, Brexit, a divided Europe, a re-emerg-
ing Russia, an even more disturbed Middle East, and the backlash against
globalization. These developments, according to Foreign Minister
S. Jaishankar, have had/are likely to have a six-fold impact. Firstly, with
the broader distribution of power, the world has become increasingly mul-
tipolar with emerging powers demanding a greater voice in world affairs
and institutions. Secondly, the rise of nationalism is resulting in greater
economic friction as well as a ‘stronger multipolarity with weaker multilat-
eralism’ in many domains. Thirdly, the world is likely to witness a fallback
on balance of power as its operating principle which usually produces
‘unstable equilibriums’. The world will also witness ‘a proliferation of
frenemies … allies who publicly turn on each other or competitors who
are compelled to make common cause on issues’. Fifthly, we are likely to

vii
viii INTRODUCTION

witness the emergence of ‘a more transactional ethos [that] will promote

ad hoc groupings of disparate nations who have a shared interest on a
particular issue’. Finally, the combination of these developments will
encourage ‘more regional and local balances with less global influence on
their working’ (Jaishankar 2019).
The current world order, the emerging powers argue, needs to reflect
current economic and geopolitical realities. It has proven difficult to either
change or incrementally reform existing international institutions since
they have in-built rules that prevent the dilution of their influence and
role. However, emerging powers like India do not seek to overturn the
existing international order. They ‘do not want to contest the basic rules
and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more
authority and leadership within it’ (Ikenberry 2011: 57). New Delhi does
not seek to replace the existing international governance institutions with
new ones, but it seeks admission to increase its influence and protect its
interests. Thus, what New Delhi really seeks is a more inclusive multilater-
alism and a more inclusive world order.
In the first chapter, Pramit Pal Chaudhuri examines the reactions and
responses of India and the European Union to President Donald Trump’s
policies and assesses their impact on India-EU relations. Neither India nor
the EU Member States, he argues, were pleased with the Trump
Administration’s unilateralism and hostility to the international order’s
three primary components: multilateral institutions, the postwar military
alliance structure and their legitimizing values. The weakening of the
US-Europe relationship and Brexit, he maintains, has meant that India
and the EU have come much closer together in recent years on a number
of policy issues integral to the international order. The EU’s India Strategy
3.0 (November 2018) was driven by Brussels’ desire for middle power
cooperation to compensate for the unilateral actions of the United States
and China. It de-emphasizes the Broad-Based Trade and Investment
Agreement and lays stress on greater cooperation with like-minded coun-
tries like India and Japan in areas like climate change, terrorism, maritime
security, and support for multilateral institutions like the United Nations
and the World Trade Organization.
The EU joint communication on China (March 2019) and its mecha-
nisms to screen Chinese FDI and technology acquisition indicate how the
European Union is slowly aligning itself with the American approach
towards China. However, the EU, Pramit concludes, contributes very lit-
tle to India’s critical security needs. India continues to struggle to bring
 INTRODUCTION ix

Europe into the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, unlike Europe, only the United
States remains a credible partner in attempts to balance against China.
India, Pramit maintains, remains much more of ‘a realpolitik practitioner’
than the EU would like to be. New Delhi’s heterogeneity of thought and
policy signifies that it requires a lot of attention to be able to work with
EU on policy terms. Both Brussels, which lacks a common strategic cul-
ture, and New Delhi are reluctant to make such an investment in each other.
After tracing the evolution of the postwar ‘liberal order’, Patryk Kugiel
argues that the unilateral policy of President Donald Trump, an increas-
ingly assertive China and a resurgent Russia have combined to put the
postwar liberal order into crisis. He goes on to critically evaluate the posi-
tion of the European Union and India on four critical elements of the
liberal order—a rules-based order and multilateralism, free trade and glo-
balization, the promotion of democracy and human rights, and non-pro-
liferation. While India and EU have similar approaches towards many
global issues, he argues, structural and ideological differences tend to hin-
der cooperation. Thus, while they may not be ideal partners in preserving
the liberal order, they are nevertheless indispensable for its sustenance and
reform. In conclusion, Patryk argues that India and the EU apparently
have a broad convergence of views on the liberal international order, but
there are differences in detail largely because of historical legacies and
because they are at different levels of development. While India and the
European Union may not be ideal partners in preserving the liberal inter-
national order, they are, he concludes, nevertheless, indispensable for its
reform. They are, he argues, apparently ‘the best partners to work together
towards a new post-Western order, which would still be “rules-based”, but
not necessarily “liberal”’.
In the next chapter, Anna Wróbel argues that the World Trade
Organization (WTO) is confronting an existential crisis, which has consid-
erably weakened its role in global trade governance and accentuated the
symptoms of dysfunctionality of the multilateral trading system. The WTO
has lost not only its effectiveness in trade negotiations, but could lose its
ability to settle trade disputes, especially with the United States having
blocked the possibility of processing appeals in trade disputes by not filling
the vacancies in the Appellate Body. The chapter seeks to answer the ques-
tion whether the WTO is still an effective instrument for the realization of
trade interests of its members, especially the European Union and India.
The chapter examines the negotiating positions of the EU and India
towards the Doha Round, evaluates proposals made by the EU and India
x INTRODUCTION

to revitalize the multilateral trading system and highlights the elements of

convergence and divergence in their proposals for reform of the WTO. It
concludes that both the European Union and India have high stakes in the
stability and predictability of the rule-based multilateral trading system.
However, a WTO reform requires the involvement of all major powers,
including the United States.
Karina Jędrzejowska argues that the Asian financial crisis (1997–1998)
and the global financial meltdown (2007–2009) revealed serious deficien-
cies in global financial governance. The failure to provide credible crisis
prevention and crisis management mechanisms fostered the development
of alternative regional and plurilateral financial arrangements as well as the
emergence of new global financial actors and arrangements (e.g. the
Financial Stability Forum and its successor, the Financial Stability Board).
The chapter assesses the role of the European Union—a union of highly
developed countries—and a major emerging market (India) in the gover-
nance of international financial institutions, namely the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group and the Bank for International
Settlements. It examines their compliance with global financial regula-
tions, especially the Basel process as well as the convergence and diver-
gence in their interests in the governance and reform of the global financial
system. Global financial governance, she concludes, will have to contend
with key challenges including the rise of China, the shift towards unilateral
and bilateral governance mechanisms advocated by certain countries and
South-South financial governance.
Prior to the Brexit referendum (June 2016), Pramit Pal Chaudhuri
argues, UK-India trade for nearly two decades was static signifying the
lack of supply chain linkages. However, Indian foreign direct investment
in the United Kingdom has been greater than the rest of Europe, and the
UK has cumulatively been the single largest source of FDI in India. Britain,
according to a top Indian foreign diplomat he cites, was of consequence
largely because of the size of the Indian diaspora and because it had a veto
in the United Nations Security Council. India, Pramit argues, did not sup-
port Brexit and viewed it largely as a negative development. Brexit was
largely seen as undermining the influence and strength of Europe as a
whole, fostering global instability and insofar as it weakened the West-
centric international order; it tended to increase China’s international
influence. Brexit, he concludes, has had two key implications for Indian
foreign policy. Firstly, it has led to a recognition that New Delhi should
adopt a more proactive stance regarding weak trade ties and declining
 INTRODUCTION xi

immigration. Secondly, India has to revisit its policy towards the European
Union, strengthen links with France and Germany, and make a serious
effort at forging closer ties with secondary European countries, including
those of Central Europe.
Authored by one of India’s key negotiators of the Broad-Based Trade
and Investment Agreement (BTIA), Dinkar Khullar, former Ambassador
to the European Union, provides a succinct analysis of the salient aspects
as well as the points of convergence/divergence in the negotiations that
started in June 2007 and went on till April 2013, when they came to a
standstill. The author discusses the mismatch of respective perceptions and
ambitions, the different procedural mechanisms of the two sides and how
the two sides dealt with the difficult issues like agriculture, automobiles,
wines and spirits, services, intellectual property rights, sustainable devel-
opment and human rights. He examines the reasons behind India’s termi-
nation of Bilateral Investment Treaties with many Member States of the
EU. He discusses the issue of confidentiality in negotiations, the role of
civil society and the impact of Brexit on the BTIA. Khullar is somewhat
sceptical about an early conclusion of the BTIA, especially given the strong
reservations about FTAs at the higher levels of the Government of India.
If and when a free trade agreement with the EU is signed, he concludes, it
would be ‘a sui generis one’. He urges the Union to look for a balanced
and realistic outcome rather than an overly ambitious one.
India and the European Union confront similar challenges of interna-
tional terrorism, terrorist networks and global Islamic fundamentalism.
Bhaswati Mukherjee examines the evolution and the degree of coopera-
tion with the European Union and key Member States in counter-terror-
ism. She discusses Indian efforts for a Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism and India-EU cooperation in counter-terrorism
since the Lisbon Summit (2000). The October 2017 joint statement on
cooperation in combating terrorism, she maintains, was a significant
breakthrough. She goes on to examine evolving cooperation through the
joint working groups on counter-terrorism with the EU and several
Member States. India and the European Union, she argues, have come a
long way in bypassing Pakistan as an impediment to cooperation and that
India is becoming a key partner for the West in developing a common
approach towards combating terrorism.
Manpreet Sethi argues that the European Union has been a key propo-
nent of non-proliferation whereas India was an outlier until a decade ago.
The divergent views on nuclear issues kept the two sides estranged over
xii INTRODUCTION

many decades. The India-EU strategic partnership gradually led to a bet-

ter understanding of each other’s positions on security matters, including
non-proliferation. Subsequently, India’s accommodation into the non-
proliferation regime was made possible with the support of European
countries. The chapter examines the issues that historically had kept them
apart and identifies the changed circumstances today. It identifies potential
areas of cooperation since the two entities have the clout to make a differ-
ence to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. This, the author argues, is
doubly important at a time when the United States appears to be with-
drawing from global issues, and China seeks to impose its own rules.
In Chap. 9, Bhaswati Mukherjee examines the evolution of a multi-
faceted and multi-dimensional relationship between India and the
European Union on human rights. She discusses their contrasting
approaches towards UN’s human rights mechanisms, including the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights and its successor—the Human
Rights Council. She assesses the nature and the reasons why India agreed
to an informal human rights dialogue. She analyses the role of India, the
EU and Pakistan during the 1994 UN Human Rights Council and assesses
the impact of the strategic partnership on human rights, the role of civil
society, and the linkage between human rights and the Broad-Based
Investment and Trade Agreement. In recent years, the human rights
debate within the EU underwent a fundamental change with the rise of
populism. The schism within Europe is becoming an increasingly toxic
debate between sovereignty of the individual in West Europe versus sover-
eignty of the nation in Eastern Europe. In conclusion, the chapter looks at
the EU’s 2018 India Strategy approach towards human rights and trade
and suggests a way forward.
In the next chapter, Vijeta Rattani argues that the climate agenda of
India and European Union is rooted in their own broader foreign policy
and developmental priorities. While the former has sought to set bench-
marks and strategies for the global community to follow in the form of the
European Trading Scheme and the European Climate Change Programme,
the latter has slowly but surely arisen as a credible climate change actor.
This chapter looks at the approach and the role of India and European
Union towards the 2015 Paris Agreement and the Paris Rule Book
adopted in Katowice Summit in 2018. It also examines how India and the
EU domestically implement and collaborate to meet their international
commitments and suggests a roadmap for the future.
 INTRODUCTION xiii

In the concluding chapter, Sheetal Sharma seeks to address some of the

core issues and the challenges posed by legal and illegal migration as well
as the movement of refugees in India and Europe. The author seeks to
make a comparison between the scenario, mechanisms and success
achieved by India and Europe in coping with the influx of migrants. In
spite of economic and infrastructural limitations, India provided shelter to
over 10 million East Pakistani refugees during the 1971 Bangladesh crisis.
Europe however confronted an unprecedented challenge with the arrival
of over a million refugees in 2015. European responses, the author argues,
raised fundamental issues about the values and the human rights espoused
by Europe, the erection of national barriers, the rise of Islamophobia as
well as fears about the socio-cultural threat and the burden on social secu-
rity systems posed by migrants and refugees.
China has emerged as ‘the most prominent normative challenger’ of
the existing international order (Tharoor and Saran 2020a: 192, 250).
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is seen by many in India as an impor-
tant instrument in building the Chinese narrative of the inevitability of a
Chinese hegemonic order based on political authoritarianism and illiberal
values. Thus, the values that India and the European Union share become
important in the context of ‘an alternative authoritarian and state-con-
trolled model that President Xi Jinping is propagating today’ (Sibal
2019: 77).
Growing convergence between India and the European Union at the
October 2017 summit was spurred by eroding European romanticism
that greater engagement with and facilitating China’s rise would eventu-
ally lead to internal, democratic reform and the gradual acceptance of
Western values. From being the lone critic of the Belt and Road Initiative
at the time of the BRI summit in Beijing (May 2017), India’s concerns
why it disliked the BRI began to be echoed a few months later by others,
including Europe, Japan and the United States.
The outbreak of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) will fur-
ther exacerbate the drawbacks of the existing world order. The pandemic
has highlighted the ‘waning legitimacy’ of international institutions, which
suffer from politicization, manipulation, a lack of representation, indepen-
dent leadership and purpose (Tharoor and Saran 2020b). It signified ‘the
unmistakeable demise of Pax Americana’, exposed the social and gover-
nance vulnerabilities of the West, and further widened the divide between
North and South Europe over economics, and Western and Eastern
Europe over values’ (Saran 2020). The coronavirus may have, in fact,
xiv INTRODUCTION

heralded the sudden onset of what Ian Bremmer calls ‘a “G-Zero” world—
one that is at once multipolar, leaderless, and likely besieged by renewed
geopolitical conflict’ (Bremmer 2011). The pandemic is leading to ‘a
smaller, meaner kind of world’ since in all polities, there is already ‘a turn-
ing inward, a search for autonomy and control of one’s own fate’ (Menon
2020; Borrell 2020).
The European Union, which in the past had tended to be seen by India
as an undervalued partner, is now increasingly part of most conversations
in fields like the economy, technology, standards, best practices, develop-
ment, defence and security. The renewed focus on Europe is the result of
changing geopolitics, India’s own priorities, Europe’s growing relevance
in the post-Brexit era, China’s expanding footprint in the continent, Brexit
and the search for alternatives to the loss of the UK as the gateway to
Europe. All these developments have compelled India to revisit, re-exam-
ine and rethink its own policies towards Europe and search for alternatives
to Britain. This realization has been accompanied by a more proactive
engagement of Europe—concentration on Germany, France and Spain,
the Nordic countries as well as Central and Eastern Europe, which had
hitherto received inadequate attention because of limited historical ties,
weak people-to-people links and marginal economic cooperation.
The US-China geopolitical contest and trade war is taking the world
towards a new Cold War. The uncertainties of a more turbulent world
have made both India and the European Union look towards each other
and towards like-minded partners with similar values, international out-
look and adherence to international law to strengthen multilateralism and
a rules-based world order.

References
Borrell, J. (2020). The Post-Coronavirus World is Already Here. ECFR Policy
Brief 320. Retrieved May 30, 2020, from https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/the_
post_coronavirus_world_is_already_here.pdf.
Bremmer, I. (2011). A G-Zero World: The New Economic Club will Produce
Conflict, Not Cooperation. Foreign Affairs, 90(2), 2–7.
Haass, R. (2018, March 21). Liberal World Order, R.I.P. Project Syndicate.
Ikenberry, G. J. (2011). The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism
after America. Foreign Affairs, 90(3), 56–62, 63–68.
 INTRODUCTION xv

Jaishankar, S. (2019, October 1). Remarks at the Atlantic Council, Washington,

DC. Retrieved October 5, 2019, from https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-
Statements.htm?dtl/31895/External+Affairs+Ministers+remarks+at+Atlantic+
Council+Washington+DC+on+1+October+2019.
Menon, S. (2020, March 20). How the World will Look After the Coronavirus
Pandemic. Foreign Policy.com. Retrieved May 25, 2020, from https://for-
eignpolicy.com/2020/03/20/world-order-after-coroanvirus-pandemic/.
Saran, S. (2020, April 27). Order at the Gates: Globalisation, Techphobia and the
World Order. Raisana Debates. Retrieved May 10, 2020, from https://www.
orfonline.org/expert-speak/order-at-the-gates-globalisation-techphobia-
and-the-world-order-65227/.
Sibal, K. (2019). India and the European Union: Perceptions and Misperceptions.
In R. K. Jain (Ed.), Changing Indian Images of the European Union: Perception
and Misperception (pp. 61–78). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.
Tharoor, S., & Saran, S. (2020a). The New World Disorder and the Indian
Imperative. New Delhi: Aleph Book Company.
———. (2020b, March 28). The New World Disorder. Raisana Debates. Retrieved
May 7, 2020, from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-new-
world-disorder-63803/.
 Contents

1 India, the European Union and the World Order  1

Pramit Pal Chaudhuri

2 India, the European Union and the Postwar Liberal Order 27

Patryk Kugiel

3 India, the European Union and Global Trade Governance 59

Anna Wróbel

4 The European Union and India in Global Financial

Governance 75
Karina Jędrzejowska

5 Brexit and India-UK Relations 91

Pramit Pal Chaudhuri

6 India-EU Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement:

Process, Issues, Prospects109
Dinkar Khullar

7 India, the European Union and Counter-­Terrorism:

Shifting Paradigms, New Cooperation127
Bhaswati Mukherjee

xvii
xviii Contents

8 India-EU Partnership for Security: Through the Prism of

Nuclear Non-proliferation147
Manpreet Sethi

9 India and the European Union: A Dialectical Approach to

Human Rights167
Bhaswati Mukherjee

10 India, the European Union and Climate Change: The

Paris Agreement and After187
Vijeta Rattani

11 Indian and European Responses to Migration and

Refugee Crises205
Sheetal Sharma

Index219
 Notes on Contributors

Rajendra K. Jain was formerly Professor and Chairperson at the Centre

for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has
been Director, Europe Area Studies Programme, JNU and the first Jean
Monnet Chair in India (2010–2015). He has also been Adjunct Research
Professor, Monash European and EU Studies Centre, Monash University,
Melbourne (2010–2015). He was formerly Visiting Professor, Asia-
Europe Institute, University of Malaya (2010) and Visiting International
Fellow, Monash Europe and EU Centre, Melbourne (2009). He was
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Fellow at the University of
Constance and Visiting Fellow at the School of Slavonic and East European
Studies, University of London (1993) and the Foundation for Science and
Politics/Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (1995), Ebenhausen, Germany.
He has been Visiting Humboldt Foundation Professor at Freiburg,
Leipzig and Tuebingen universities and at the Maison des Sciences de
l’Homme, Paris (2008, 2010, 2013). He has also been visiting professor
at the universities of Sofia, Warsaw and UPFM Barcelona. He was Adjunct
Professor (Research), Monash University (2010–2015) and Indian
Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR) Professor of Contemporary India,
Leuven University (2015). He is the author/editor of over 30 books and
has written 150 articles/chapters in books. He has most recently pub-
lished Changing Indian Images of the European Union: Perception and
Misperception (Palgrave 2019) and India, Europe and Pakistan (Knowledge
World, 2018).

xix
xx NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Karina Jędrzejowska is Assistant Professor, Department of Regional and

Global Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies,
University of Warsaw. She is a graduate of the University of Manchester
(MsC Globalization and Development, 2008), Warsaw School of
Economics (M.A. in Finance and Banking, 2007), and an M.A. in
International Relations from the Institute of International Relations,
Warsaw University (2005). Since April 2017, she is a Governing Board
Member and Treasurer of the World International Studies Committee
(WISC). She is co-editor of the forthcoming The Future of Global Economic
Governance: Challenges and Prospects in an Age of Uncertainty (2020).
Dinkar Khullar studied Economics at St Stephen’s College, New Delhi
(1970–1973) and thereafter obtained a Master’s degree from the Delhi
School of Economics. Prior to joining the Indian Foreign Service in 1978,
he taught Economics at St. Stephen’s College for three years. Between
1978 and 1999, he worked in India’s Embassies in Moscow, Rome and
Seoul, interspersed with assignments in India in the Ministry of External
Affairs, Ministries of Finance and Commerce and the Office of the Prime
Minister. He was the Ambassador of India in Azerbaijan and Bulgaria. He
later served as Ambassador and Permanent Representative of India to the
UN Offices and International Organizations in Vienna, Austria
(2009–2012) and Ambassador of India to Belgium, Luxembourg and the
European Union at Brussels (2012–2013). He occupied the position of
Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs, with responsibility for India’s
relations with Europe, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Canada
and Eurasia (2013–2014).
Patryk Kugiel is Senior Analyst in the Asia-Pacific Programme at the
Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Warsaw. He is a specialist
on South Asia and international development cooperation. His research in
PISM focuses on the foreign policy of India and Pakistan, the secu-
rity situation in South Asia, US and EU policies towards the region;
implications of India’s rise on the global order as well as the develop-
ment cooperation policy of Poland and the EU. He is the co-editor of
India-Poland Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Vistas for Future
Cooperation (2014) and author of India’s Soft Power: A New Foreign Policy
Strategy (2017).
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xxi

Bhaswati Mukherjee has had a distinguished career of over 38 years in

the Indian Foreign Service. She served as First Secretary, Permanent
Mission of India to the UN, New York (1986–1989) and Deputy Secretary
(United Nations, Political), Ministry of External Affairs, (1984–1989).
She was formerly Ambassador to the Netherlands (2010–2013) and
Permanent Representative to UNESCO, Paris (2004–2010). She was for-
merly Chef de Cabinet to the UN Assistant Secretary General for Human
Rights and Special Assistant to UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Centre for Human Rights, (subsequently renamed as Office of
High Commissioner for Human Rights) Geneva (1991–1997). She was
Joint Secretary (Europe West, EU and Commonwealth), Ministry of
External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi (1999–2004), during
which she piloted institutional linkages with the European Union. She
helped to shape and chaired from the Indian side several India-EU
Working Groups including on Counter Terrorism (three separate working
groups with France, UK and EU respectively) and India-EU Joint Working
Group on Consular Issues as well as the India-EU Joint Commission. She
has recently published India and the EU: An Insider’s View (2018).
Pramit Pal Chaudhuri is a Distinguished Fellow and Head, Strategic
Affairs at Ananta Aspen Centre and the Foreign Editor of the Hindustan
Times. He writes on political, security and economic issues. He was a
member of National Security Advisory Board of Government of India
from 2011–2015 and is a member of the Asia Society Global Council and
the Aspen Institute Italia, the International Institute of Strategic Studies,
and the Mont Pelerin Society.
Vijeta Rattani is Technical Expert on the issues of environment, climate
change and natural resource management in Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)—the Indo-German Bilateral Cooperation Agency.
Earlier, she was heading the climate team at the Centre for Science and
Environment. Her work profile includes tracking, analyzing and writing
on different aspects of climate change including global climate negotia-
tions, adaptation. She has been a regular contributor to Down to Earth
magazine. She obtained her PhD from JNU focussing on climate politics
from the European Union perspective. She has been a Visiting Scholar at
the Freie University of Berlin, Vrije University Brussels, Bremen
International Graduate Institute of Social Sciences, University of Bremen,
University of Bonn, and University Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium. She is the
recipient of a German Academic Exchange Service fellowship during her
PhD research.
xxii Notes on Contributors

Manpreet Sethi is Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New
Delhi where she heads the project on nuclear security. Over the last two
decades, she has been researching and writing on nuclear energy, strategy,
non-proliferation, disarmament, arms and export controls and ballistic
missile defence. She is the recipient of the prestigious K Subrahmanyam
award, an honour conferred for excellence in strategic and security
studies. She lectures regularly at establishments of Indian Armed
Forces, Police and Foreign Services. She has been a Member of the
Prime Minister’s Informal Group on Disarmament (2012) and sev-
eral Track II initiatives. She has been Member of Executive Board of
Indian Pugwash Society and is a Consultant with the global Nuclear
Abolition Forum and Asia Pacific Leadership Network. Her publica-
tions include Code of Conduct for Outer Space: Strategy for India (2015)
and editor of Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World (2009), Global
Nuclear Challenges (2009) and Nuclear Power: In the Wake of
Fukushima (2012).
Sheetal Sharma is Assistant Professor, Centre for European Studies,
School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
She is coordinator of the Jean Monnet Module on Society, Culture, and
Social Change in Europe. She was previously lecturer at the Institute
of Technology and Management, Gurgaon, India. Her research inter-
ests include social and cultural issues in contemporary Europe and
India and their historical roots, multiculturalism and diversity, the
methodology of the social sciences, and gender issues and the empow-
erment of women. She has written a number of book chapters and
journal articles and is the author of Legal Profession and Women: A Study
in Professions and Gender (2006).
Anna Wróbel is Assistant Professor, Department of Regional and Global
Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University
of Warsaw. She holds a PhD on the policy of liberalization of international
trade in services. A Member of the Polish Association of International
Studies, she is also the co-editor of The Dragon and the (Evening) Stars:
Essays on the Determinants of EU-China Relations (in Polish) (2013) and
The Future of Global Economic Governance: Challenges and Prospects in an
Age of Uncertainty (2020).
 Abbreviations

AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

ASB Accounting Standards Board
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BASIC Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BIS Bank of International Settlements
BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BTIA Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement
CCIT Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism
CEAS Common European Asylum System
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CFT Countering the Financing of Terrorism
COP Conference of Parties
CPPNM Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DDR Doha Development Round
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
EBA European Banking Authority
EEAS European External Action Service
EEC European Economic Community
EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EIOPA European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
ESMA European Securities and Markets Authority

xxiii
xxiv Abbreviations

ETS Emission Trading System

EU European Union
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
FTA Free Trade Agreement
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCF Green Climate Fund
GDP Gross domestic product
GI Geographical indication
GSP Generalised Scheme of Preferences
GWOT Global War on Terrorism
HRC Human Rights Council
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IAIS International Association of Insurance Supervisors
IASB International Accounting Standards Board
IB Intelligence Bureau
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IFI International Financial Institutions
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards
IMF International Monetary Fund
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
IOM International Organization for Migration
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPR Intellectual property rights
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISSBs International financial institutions and international standard-
setting bodies
ITEC Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation
JAP Joint Action Plan
JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
JeM Jaish-e-Mohammad
JS Joint Secretary
JSA Jal Shakti Abhiyan
JWG Joint Working Group
LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba
LoC Line of Control
MFN Most favoured nation
MNRE Ministry of Natural and Renewable Energy
 Abbreviations  xxv

MSMEs Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
NAFCC National Adaptation Fund on Climate Change
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NAPCC National Action Plan on Climate Change
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDB New Development Bank
NDCs Nationally Determined Contributions
NNWS Non-nuclear weapon states
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NTBs Non-tariff barriers
NWS Nuclear weapon states
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
P5 Permanent Five
R2P Responsibility to Protect
R&AW Research and Analysis Wing
RBI Reserve Bank of India
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RTAs Regional trade agreements
SAPCC State Action Plans on Climate Change
SCR Security Council Resolution
SDT Special and differential treatment
SPIPA Strategic Partnership on the Implementation of the Paris
Agreement
SPS Sanitary and phytosanitary standards
TBT Technical barriers to trade
TCPO Town and Country Planning Organisation
TDI Trade defence instruments
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN United Nations
UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC United Nations Security Council
VDPA Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO World Trade Organization
 CHAPTER 1

India, the European Union and the World

Order

Pramit Pal Chaudhuri

The election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States has
posed a major challenge to the Atlantic Alliance and the post-World War
II international order. A Europe used to the special bonding of an Atlantic
Alliance has been buffeted by Trump’s preference for a robust unilateralist
foreign and trade policy. India, more distant from the US, has perceived
some geopolitical benefits in Trump’s unorthodox ways in regard to
China. But the weakening of the US-Europe relationship, along with
upheavals like Britain’s vote to leave the European Union, has meant that
India and the European Union have come much closer together in the
past five years on a number of policy issues integral to the international
order. This trend was already evident before either Trump or Brexit, but
American external polices have accelerated the coming together of India
and the EU.

P. Pal Chaudhuri (*)

Distinguished Fellow and Head, Strategic Affairs at Ananta Aspen Centre,
New Delhi, India
Foreign Editor, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, India

© The Author(s) 2020 1

R. K. Jain (ed.), India and the European Union in a Turbulent
World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3917-6_1
2 P. PAL CHAUDHURI

Views of the World Order

Neither India nor the EU Member States were pleased with the Trump
Administration’s unilateralism and hostility to the international order’s
three primary components: multilateral institutions, the postwar military
alliance structure and their legitimizing values (International Institute of
Strategic Studies 2018). But they had significant differences over which of
the American President’s actions was more objectionable and the reasons
why they disliked these actions. New Delhi’s relationship with Washington
had far less depth and background than the Atlantic Alliance and there was
thus less for Trump to disrupt in terms of bilateral ties. Moreover, com-
mon values were seen by the Europeans as the unique element of their
bond with the Americans and values were almost completely missing in
the US President’s pronouncements and policy. In the India-US relation-
ship, values were largely a rhetorical exercise as far as New Delhi was
concerned.
That India is less invested in preserving the postwar international order
is in large part because it has been a marginal player in that order for most
of India’s independent history. It initially rejected key economic elements
of that order and broadly saw its own economic and political development
best accomplished by minimizing international interaction. While this has
changed significantly since the opening up of the economy and the end of
the Cold War between 1989 and 1991, New Delhi continues to engage
with the international system cautiously (Kliman and Fontaine 2012).
India is far more sanguine about Trump’s attempts to delegitimize the
international system, so long as they do not go beyond a certain point, for
two reasons. One, India sees the decision-making bodies of the interna-
tional system as weighted against its own representation, whether the
United Nations Security Council or bodies like the Nuclear Suppliers
Group. Trump-style attacks are therefore seen as useful in shaking up the
status quo. Two, lndia supports a soft balance of power structure in the
Indo-Pacific region as necessary to put limits on Chinese geopolitical
assertiveness. The present international order is seen as incapable of doing
so, in part because China sits at the high table of most multilateral bodies
and there is nothing like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
in the western Pacific (Rajagopalan 2017; Paul 2018). The European
Union is seen as having negligible levers of influence in the Indo-Pacific
and no willingness to use the few levers, almost all economic, it has against
 1 INDIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WORLD ORDER 3

China. Trump’s China policy has proven to be remarkably forceful with its
sweeping imposition of tariffs and barriers on technology.
Two elements of the international order—climate and maritime secu-
rity—have seen the maximum amount of India-EU cooperation. In the
case of climate change, this was greatly enhanced following the Trump
Administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Both in terms of
the EU and with individual European countries, there has been consider-
able cooperation on the climate front (Khandekar 2018). India has also
raised existing maritime security cooperation with France and Britain, and
has even had its first naval actions with French warships flying the EU flag.
However, there has been a minimal degree of overlap on the issue of trade
and almost none in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, though both
multilateral systems have been deliberately targeted by Trump. New Delhi
and Brussels have sought to uphold the sanctity of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) against unilateral American trade actions. However,
India is a minor player in global trade and among the more protectionist
WTO members. Many of Trump’s grouses against India are also shared by
the European Union (Peterson Institute for International Economics 2003).
New Delhi has been indifferent to the fate of NATO, a key target of
Trump’s ire and a major source of concern for the EU. The one overseas
military operation that Trump wants to wind up which worries India—the
US military action in Afghanistan—is a war most Europeans also believe
should come to an end. The nascent military arrangements India has
invested in, whether the India-US-Japan trilateral or the Quad, are all
about the Indo-Pacific, where India sees the EU is seen as having little or
no role. The Trump Administration has remained fully supportive of these
efforts, if anything seeing India as the less aggressive participant in all three.
New Delhi and Brussels have both opposed the American abrogation of
the nuclear agreement with Iran and the subsequent imposition of US
sanctions. India lacks the economic wherewithal to defy the United States
on the sanctions and so has largely acquiesced, preferring to negotiate
temporary exemptions directly with Washington. European attempts to
set up parallel financial mechanisms to get around the US sanctions were
supported by India but proved abortive. The two sides were on the same
side but lacked the capability to do much about the US’s actions
(Emmott et al. 2019, 9 May).
On Trump’s decision to cancel the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty, however, India and the EU were not on the same page. New
Delhi saw the INF Treaty through the prism of China and the fact the
4 P. PAL CHAUDHURI

treaty had allowed China a near monopoly in missiles of that range in the
western Pacific. Brussels saw it in terms of a breakdown of the post-Cold
War consensus on non-proliferation and destabilizing to their region.
India, a long-standing former sufferer of multilateral nuclear technology
sanctions, is generally cynical about the multilateral non-proliferation and
arms control regime.
Where the EU and India differ the most is the importance they place
on the ‘liberal’ prefix that is sometimes attached to ‘international order’.
Arguably, nothing distinguishes the Atlantic Alliance from similar arrange-
ments in the world more than the commonality of the United States and
the Union when it comes to values. This is a much weaker element even
with the five treaty alliances of the United States in the Indo-Pacific.
Constitutional democracy is well entrenched in the Indian polity today
but India remains ambivalent about liberalism and all that it entails, both
at home and abroad. Indian attitudes regarding liberalism are an ever-­
changing landscape though present trendlines show Indians becoming
more liberal in their economic views but less tolerant on social issues
(Meinardus 2019). Being ambivalent about the universal applications of
liberal democracy is one reason India does not support its export. Privately,
most Indian commentators will argue democracy is alien to the cultures of
both China and the Arab world. Therefore, the question of exporting
democracy to elsewhere has never been part of India’s foreign policy. New
Delhi prefers to emphasize that the world order should be ‘rules-based’
but not necessarily that it be ‘democratic’ at the nation-state level (Muni
2009; Press Trust of India 2019). While the Union was as enthusiastic
about democracy promotion as the United States in the aftermath of the
Cold War, that sentiment in Brussels has waned as other issues have
assumed priority and interventions in places like Libya have turned sour.
Trump’s enthusiasm for dictators and right-wing populists has shocked
Europeans but has been treated with indifference by Indians.
The international order has many elements and the Trump
Administration has wielded at least a verbal axe on most of its foundations.
India and the EU agree on the importance of only some of the pillars of
that order, but this has been enough to accelerate cooperation between
the two. India will seek ‘coalitions of the willing’, say senior Indian diplo-
mats, to rally around specific pillars of the international order.1 Another
reason for limited India-EU cooperation is continuing uncertainty by
both sides whether Trump’s policy will necessarily remain US policy after
 1 INDIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WORLD ORDER 5

his presidency is over. Even the mercurial US President’s views on the

world, as discussed below, have changed over the years.

Campaign Views
On the campaign trail through 2016, Trump laid out a worldview that ran
counter to the prevailing foreign policy consensus in Washington and the
major Western capitals. He made three major overlapping claims that posi-
tioned him even outside the mainstream of his own Republican Party. As
one of his early political backers explained after Trump’s inaugural address
and its America First theme, ‘Trump is repudiating the establishment con-
sensus. He is part of neither its rightwing nor its leftwing’ (Gingrich 2016).
Firstly, he expressed a preference for unilateral foreign policy action in
the context of an extremely narrow view of the national interest, labelled
as ‘America First’. While a belief in unilateralism is widespread among
conservative American politicians, in Trump’s case it encompassed a repu-
diation of almost all US bilateral and multilateral commitments, including
those in trade, defence and immigration and even bodies that the United
States had itself created.
Secondly, Trump claimed that American allies were exploiting the
United States by not shouldering their fair share of the costs of the alli-
ance. Unprecedented for a postwar US President, Trump expressed scep-
ticism about the utility of even NATO. He even remarked that the
European Union was created to take advantage of the US.
Thirdly, Trump espoused a crude version of mercantilism which saw
US trade deficits as signs of America’s wealth leaking out to other coun-
tries. He was critical of almost all multilateral trading arrangements as
being biased against the United States. Trump’s worldview was a throw-
back to a nineteenth-century American conservativism and consistent with
his own statements going back to the 1980s (The Economist 2016, 9
November; Sanger and Haberman 2016; Wright 2016). In other words,
unlike other postwar American presidents, Trump did not believe ‘a world
of expanding democracy and free markets’ was in American interests and
did not believe that the relatively low costs of the American alliance struc-
ture and investments in international institutions constituted a geopoliti-
cal ‘bargain’ (Kahl and Brands 2017).
6 P. PAL CHAUDHURI

Symbolic Acts
During his first year in office, President Trump acted on some of his prom-
ises, but in a manner that seemed to indicate he was mostly interested in
symbolic victories. The most striking action was on trade policy. Right
after his inauguration, Trump withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Four months later, he initiated a review of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). Trump maintained an unrelenting criticism, in
speeches and on social media, of the trade surpluses of a number of coun-
tries, including China and Germany, were running with the United States.
None of this caused too much alarm. The Trans-Pacific Partnership was
already in limbo because of Congressional opposition and Trump incor-
porated many of its new elements into the amended NAFTA. The US
leader made only a few passing references to the EU, India and the larger
international trading system. He even allowed a joint statement critiquing
‘protectionism’ at the G-20 summit in March (Schneider-Petsinger 2017).
On American overseas military commitments, Trump also seemed
more bark than bite. In July 2017, in a speech in Warsaw, he declared that
a strong Europe was in everyone’s interest. He called upon Europeans to
contribute ‘billions’ more because of him (Trump 2017). The following
month he publicly committed to sending more troops to Afghanistan
though he insisted their primary role would be counterterrorism.
There were a number of policy areas where Trump did turn the US ship
of state in a different path. The most obvious were in regard to West Asia.
In October 2017, the US president refused to certify Iran’s compliance
with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the formal name
of the agreement which had been negotiated between the West and Iran
over restrictions on the latter’s nuclear programme. But Trump did not
impose any actual costs on Iran; he merely called upon the US Congress
to consider sanctions. In December 2017, Trump announced the recogni-
tion of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and promised to move the US
Embassy to that city. Most European governments joined the majority in
the United Nations to censure the American move. India, which already
recognized Palestine but had developed a close relationship with Israel,
abstained. On both these issues, Trump was not out of line with main-
stream Republican views. Barack Obama had never been able to secure a
consensus in favour of his Iranian agreement during his presidency. Again,
neither of these decisions fundamentally affected regional stability.
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