Politics, Theory, and Film: Critical Encounters With Lars Von Trier Bonnie Honig PDF Download
Politics, Theory, and Film: Critical Encounters With Lars Von Trier Bonnie Honig PDF Download
https://textbookfull.com/product/politics-theory-and-film-critical-encounters-with-lars-von-trier-
bonnie-honig/
DOWNLOAD EBOOK
Politics, Theory, and Film: Critical Encounters with Lars
Von Trier Bonnie Honig pdf download
Available Formats
1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.
© Oxford University Press 2016
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press,
or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with
the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning
reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the
Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.
You must not circulate this work in any other form,
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Honig, Bonnie, editor. | Marso, Lori J., editor.
Title: Politics, theory, and film : critical encounters with Lars von Trier /
edited by Bonnie Honig and Lori J. Marso.
Description: New York : Oxford University Press, [2016] |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016006212 (print) | LCCN 2016009356 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780190600181 (hardcover : alk. paper) |
ISBN 9780190600174 (pbk. : alk. paper) |
ISBN 9780190600198 (pdf ) | ISBN 9780190600204 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Trier, Lars von, 1956—Criticism and interpretation.
Classification: LCC PN1998.3.T747 P65 2016 (print) |
LCC PN1998.3.T747 (ebook) | DDC 791.4302/33092—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016006212
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed by WebCom, Inc., Canada
Contents
I. ANTI-SEMITE/JEW
Von Trier
Concept, design, and form by Tony Cokes
II. WOMAN/NYMPH
III. FATE/MARTYR
5. Sharing in What Death Reveals: Breaking the Waves with Bataille 131
Stephen S. Bush
6. Broken by God: Fate and Divine Intervention in Breaking the Waves148
James Martel
Kanye
Concept, design, and form by Tony Cokes
V. EUROPE/EVIL
Bowie
Concept, design, and form by Tony Cokes
VI. THINKING/MELANCHOLIA
Index423
Preface: Show, Don’t Tell
D a v i d e Pa n a g i a
Are there modes of cinematic thinking that “constellate affectively” The mob, when they are
(Honig 2015, 65) with political theory? gazing at a dancer on the
The wager of this volume is that such modes exist. And each author in these slack rope, naturally writhe
pages is willing to risk this wager in order to explore the creative possibilities that and twist and balance their
such a theoretical disposition enables. That is, the writers of this volume chal- own bodies, as they see him
lenge us, in their distinct and unique ways, to render cinema politically and to do, and as they feel that they
render political thinking cinematically. In doing so, they provoke us to explore themselves must do if in his
alternative modes of political thinking that find resources for reflection in worlds situation.
populated by transformative media like rolls of celluloid, projectors, screens,
Adam Smith, The Theory
scripts, and filmic scenes, but also shots, cuts, sounds, and sequences.
of Moral Sentiment
In this preface, I wish to pick up on the volume’s wager and expand on the
queer adjacency of cinema and political thinking by considering the possibility
that political thinking—that peculiar activity of reflective acrobatics concerned
with the (dis)organization of peoples and worlds, of commonwealths, of assem-
blies, or what Jacob Levy has recently called “intermediate groups” (Levy 2015)—
is cinematic, if by cinematic we conceive of the work of political thinking as one
of stitching and cutting scenes, worlds, vistas, and sights. And if we might con-
sider political thinking cinematic, then the making and studying of, and the look-
ing at, cinema shares and learns from a tradition of political reflection of and
about the emergent lines of division and demarcation that create political entities.
By this I mean that cinematic thinking is complicit with a series of political
concerns of and about (among other things) institutional isomorphism (to
invoke Levy once again) and its centralizing and policing tendencies. The exter-
nal imposition of shape and form on a people in constituent formation has the
tendency of halting the intensity of insipience of an insurgent citizenry (Frank
2009). As I show here, the debates around the ontology of cinema in 1950s
x | Preface: Show, Don’t Tell
France are explicitly indebted to a political thinking about insipience and iso-
morphism and how cinema’s many media can disrupt the forces of institutional
isomorphism at diverse levels of society. As Levy states, “Non-isomorphism is
disruptive; repeated patterns are pleasing” (Levy 2015, 70). And the writers and
filmmakers I consider are inspired by a set of political concerns regarding the
potential of cinema to break with an aesthetic isomorphism that took for granted
the (especially Aristotelian) idea of stable and necessary forms.
Social and political isomorphism, and its disruptive other, became a con-
stant concern for cinema where a task is to determine the limits of the medium
and how to surpass those limits. One way in which those concerns are expressed
regard the “how” of editing different shots and scenes captured in the making of
a film. Shots and scenes are treated as collections of views that, to invoke Michel
Foucault, demand a disposition (Foucault et al. 1991, 93). This is fundamentally
a problem of pluralism because editors and directors are required to make deci-
sions as to where to cut and paste, at which point in a sequence, and how to
render any cut acceptable to human perception and sensibility (Murch 2001).
That is, filmmakers are in the business of consistently parsing the sensible
(Rancière 2006), of creating breaks of continuity in the field of vision, and
having those instantaneous discontinuities seem natural and unobtrusive—or, at
times, not. The question that haunts cinema and political thinking is thus pre-
cisely how to render sensible the divisions that structure an assembly of views.
Why is this the case for cinema? The answer is partly technoscientific,
though it is also more than that. Traditional recording cameras could hold at
most ten minutes of celluloid film. Anything more would have been too heavy
for the camera, and camera person, to handle. Thus early films lasted only about
ten minutes or so. Then someone came up with the idea of gluing reels of film
together, and editing began, and films got longer, and we got different shots
and angles and perspectives all in one film. Hence the potential, but also the
dilemma, of cinematic isomorphism. How does one account for the pluralism of
shots in any one film, and should that pluralism be made perspicuous (and thus
disrupt the continuity of storytelling), or should it be overshadowed by a com-
mitment to a pleasing isomorphism? How should one paste the cut? Or how
does one parse the dividing line between vistas and groups?
More than an analogy, metaphor, or ideal, I wish to take these concerns as
central to cinematic political thinking where practices of cinema making and
political thinking draw on one another to contend with the issues that arise vis-
à-vis the spaces and temporalities of intermediariness. In the following, I show
parallels between certain concerns in modern political thought and the devel-
opment of the practice and thinking about the ontology of the cinematic
medium. Specifically, I concern myself here with the ways in which both cinema
and political thinking share commitments to an unspecified work of incipient
Preface: Show, Don’t Tell | xi
pluralism as the working out and working through of practices for generating
adjacencies between peoples, places, and things. In short, what I’m interested in
exploring in this preface is how cinema and political thinking coincide in their
ways of thinking the dividing lines that render relations.
My focus is on those debates among critics and filmmakers in France in the
1950s in the pages of Cahiers du Cinéma. These were especially influential de-
bates for the aesthetics of cinema, but also for the political history of film, as they
were the intellectual testimonies of those author/directors of French New Wave
cinema that became one of the most influential cinematic, artistic, and philo-
sophical movements of the postwar period. Crucial to these writings, and to the
films, were the ideas elaborated on the role of editing as a creative process that
does a certain kind of work of solidarity building. That is, the conjoining of
scenes and the establishment of nontraditional cuts, or montage editing, work to
generate emergent relations not reducible to institutionalized forms of belong-
ing. One doesn’t cut a scene so as to repeat and confirm a preexisting sense of
coherence; each cut invents a disjunctive relation between differences. This is the
theoretical claim made by, among other things, Godard’s jump-cut montage. But
it is also a political claim that draws from a tradition of moral sentimental
thought that denies the inherency and necessity of isomorphic relations.
Consider authors like David Hume, Adam Smith, and Jean-Jacques
Rousseau who concerned themselves with the publicity of everyday life as a
source for thinking about the forces—both centripetal and centrifugal—of soci-
ality. Chief among these was the force of sympathy, which wasn’t just an emotion
but, as the epigraph from Adam Smith suggests, was also an account of specta-
torship and of a networked observational mood of everyday life (Chandler
2013). It was networked because the scopic field of spectatorship was configured
as horizontal and not vertical, not top-down. In short, sympathetic spectator-
ship was deemed inherently relational because it involved circuits of reflection
and refraction of lives observed by participant viewers, by viewers partaking in
acts of viewing one another face-to-face. And to imagine the possibility of oc-
cupying an other’s position means having to conceive of discordant spectatorial
moods (Panagia 2013, 105–131).
The theories of sociality and politics that emerge in the modern period, and
that continue to inform our current political reflections about party systems,
about citizenship, about refugees, about otherness, about cosmopolitanism, and
so forth, rely heavily on the capacity to creatively think and enact relations
among peoples, places, and things that have no reason for belonging together.
Contra Aristotle, and the scholasticism indebted to his system of thought, moral
sentimental political thinkers refused the possibility of innate relations and thus
of innate laws and innate hierarchies of value and adjacency. Inherency and ne-
cessity were to be dismissed as inadequate to the study of the human in relation
xii | Preface: Show, Don’t Tell
to the world (Pagden 2013, 53–78). And so cinematic thinking holds fast to a
basic tenet of moral sentimental political thought: that there is no reason or
natural law that guarantees the success of a cut (where no cut is just a cut, but also
a paste) between one scene and another, between one vista and another, between
one part and another. The cut and paste of cinematic and political assembly for-
mation are acts of partaking in a becoming relation. To think the simultaneity of
cinema and political thinking as I am proposing here is to consider a partaking in
tradition of moral sentimental reflection that conceives of the simultaneity of
politics and cinema as forces of transformation of what can become together.
Cinematic political thinking thus offers something more than the exposi-
tion of political themes in filmic works, or the treatment of films as specific rep-
resentations of political concepts, or the delimitation of how films interpellate
and subjugate publics. Undoubtedly, all of what I have stated thus far may feel
unusual. How can cinema be political other than through its content? And
though that may be a fair-enough question to ask, its purchase starts to loosen
once we begin to learn a bit about the making and production of films, how the
work of cinema is much more than its script, how cinema is something other
than adaptation of words onto a filmic patina, and of the theoretical and experi-
mental history of cinematic innovation that is at once political, aesthetic, techni-
cal, and scientific. To express this is to assert an ontological condition of cinema
that, once again, is adjacent to Adam Smith’s assertion about sympathy and spec-
tatorship: cinema is meant to be viewed, not read. We go to the movies to look
because something is there, on the screen, being shown.
Whatever content we imagine being shown, it matters to our appreciations
of that content that we pay heed to the fact of spectatorship, and to the further
fact that the creation of films is a technical art whose ambition it is to show and
tell, to tell through a showing, so as to reveal the power of representation via
projection. Pace the demonization of spectacle and spectatorship that some
twentieth- and twenty-first-century critics have advanced, the seventh art demands
acts of spectatorship, as does politics. Spectatorship is what allows us to say, for
right or wrong, “I see what you’re doing” and to thus recount that doing as an
experience had in the world.
When we view a film we witness a doing, and in relating our viewings we
recount happenings. Just as every film relates vistas, so every act of viewing spurs
us to a recounting that is itself a relating of experience. There is always activity,
always motility, always something happening on the screen. Even when viewing
something as challenging as Warhol’s Empire (1964)—an eight-hour slow-
motion film of a continuous shot of the Empire State Building in New York
City—“there’s happening doing” (Massumi 2011, 1). And that doing is the
becoming of views. One frame of film succeeds another, and with each succes-
sion a different world appears as if out of nowhere, followed by another, and
Preface: Show, Don’t Tell | xiii
then another again. And when we recount that world, yet another world appears
through our telling. Viewing, recounting, reading—these are all acts of spec-
tatorship that contain ways of relating disparate and unique entities to one
another.
The fact of relationality is a relevant starting point for any consideration of
cinematic political thinking, but it is especially relevant given Lars von Trier’s
commitments to a cinematic mode of storytelling denuded of any and all possi-
ble embellishments beyond the animation of immediately recorded views and
sounds. I am, of course, invoking the “Dogme 95 Manifesto” and “Vow of Chastity”
that are polemical responses to another, older, manifesto championed in France
in the 1950s. That earlier manifesto penned by François Truffaut in the pages of
Cahiers du Cinéma was equally (though differently) concerned with the isomor-
phic limits of the filmmakers of the day.
Originally published in volume 31 (1954) of Cahiers du Cinéma, Truffaut’s
“A Certain Tendency of the French Cinema” (Nichols 1976) polemically pits
what he calls “the Tradition of Quality” against the “auteurs who often write
their dialogue and some of them themselves invent the stories they direct”
(Nichols 1976, 233). By the “Tradition of Quality” Truffaut means those films
that, since the postwar period, had been populating the screens of France and
the film festivals of Europe under the banner of the tricolor. Truffaut names the
perpetrators of this tradition of quality ( Jean Aurenche and Pierre Bost espe-
cially), and he names their films. But more important, he names what he defines
as the overarching political dilemma that drives the “Tradition of Quality”—
and that dilemma is the technique of adaptation. The great tradition of quality,
Truffaut affirms, doesn’t make cinema but adapts novels to scripts and screen.
For Truffaut, adaptation is equivalent to the negation of cinema, as when he
affirms that “Aurenche and Bost are essentially literary men and I reproach them
here for being contemptuous of the cinema by underestimating it” (Nichols
1976, 229). They underestimate the cinema precisely because they reduce the po-
tential of a cinematic realism to the faithfulness of the copy. The “Tradition of
Quality” that Truffaut denounces is the tradition of bourgeois aestheticism in-
debted to an Aristotelian hylomorphism that affirms that the substance of great
art is imitation. And imitation (or, in this case, adaptation) is for Truffaut tandem
to what he calls “equivalence” (Nichols 1976, 229) that is at once a political and
aesthetic failure. Equivalence is an aesthetic failure because it denies the possibil-
ity of creativity due to the expectation of a fidelity to the literary to which cinema
is subjected; and it is a political failure for almost the same reason—because
equivalence reduces all possible relations to one of fidelity to a preestablished
quality. That is, the enterprise of the “Tradition of Quality,” with its ontological
commitment to the primacy of equivalence, denies cinema its transformative
possibilities by reducing its task to the repetition of relations of similitude. “It is
xiv | Preface: Show, Don’t Tell
not an exaggeration to say,” Truffaut will declare, “that the hundred-odd French
films made each year tell the same story” (Nichols 1976, 232).
To tell the same story means to repeat the same characters (or character
types), which means to project a repetition of always already-available relations.
Adaptation repeats the relation of equivalence, thereby making similitude the
standard for quality. In turn, this reduces the task of cinema to reproducing ex-
change relations so that any one film is substitutable for another. Truffaut wishes
to counter this ontology of equivalence with the kinds of artistic experiments he
sees in the auteur filmmakers of his time (Renoir, Cocteau, Bresson, and Tati
chief among them). The distinguishing feature of these auteurs is their willing-
ness to push the technical limits of the art of cinema in storytelling, direction,
and editing. The challenge Truffaut poses, in other words, is nothing less than a
revolutionary overthrow of one system of artistic production (an Aristotelian
one) for another (that of avant-garde auteur cinema) because, as he quips, “I do
not believe in the peaceful coexistence of the ‘Tradition of Quality’ and an
‘auteur’s cinema.’”
In Truffaut’s manifesto, cinematic political thinking explicitly calls for the
deployment of the technical features of an artistic medium to imagine the pos-
sibility of altering and transforming political relations. And this because it is
imagined and shown that the ways of thinking about the relation of literature
and film repeat and reproduce the isomorphic mimetic/exchange relations of
society. More than a claim about ideological subjectification, Truffaut’s is an on-
tological claim about the entanglement of politics, aesthetics, and technology;
the belief is that by exploring the technical limits of a medium one might cre-
atively explore the transformation of social relations. Relations are not inaltera-
ble forms, and cinema is the technical medium that will allow Truffaut, Godard,
and other Cahiers du Cinéma directors to explore and exploit the possibility of
thinking political and aesthetic intermediariness otherwise and beyond the em-
plotment of action prescribed by Aristotelian dramaturgy.1
These concerns find further expression in the debates between Jean-Luc
Godard and André Bazin regarding the cinematic value of montage. In a series of
three short essays published between 1950 and 1955, and collected under the
title “The Evolution of the Language of Cinema,” Bazin praises the virtues of the
depth of field shot, or long shot, over montage editing, because the long shot
allows objects and characters to be “relating in such a fashion that it is impossible
for the spectator to miss the significance of the scene” (Bazin 2005, 33–35). And
the significance of the scene, Bazin goes on to affirm, is its ability to generate a
“unity of image in space and time” (2005, 35). Indeed, he will conclude that the
depth of field shot “brings the spectator into a relation with the image closer to
that which he enjoys with reality,” making the cinematic experience “more realistic”
(Bazin 2005, 35).
Preface: Show, Don’t Tell | xv
It is a mistake to read these, and other passages (also available in Bazin’s foun-
dational essay “The Ontology of the Photographic Image”), as Bazin’s attempt to
rely on the mechanical process of camera recording as the basis for a sense of realism
that requires or demands the imitation of an antecedent reality. As Daniel Morgan
has convincingly shown, realism for Bazin is a style that has many expressions, many
realisms. “Rather than marking out a set of features, realism describes the specific
attitude a film takes to, on the one hand, the ontological basis of its medium, and,
on the other, what the film holds as its central facts” (Morgan 2006, 481). In other
words, Bazin’s claim regarding the “more realistic” is a claim about spectatorial expe-
rience rather than a claim about the objective transcription of historical fact.
For Bazin, depth of field shots were contrasted to the reigning dialectical
montage techniques of his day precisely because montage, as he says, “rules out
ambiguity of expression” (Bazin 2005, 36), whereas the realism of the depth of
field shot reintroduces “the uncertainty in which we find ourselves” (ibid.). With
specific reference to the Italian neorealist films of Rossellini and de Sica, Bazin
will affirm that they “transfer to the screen the continuum of reality” (Bazin
2005, 37—emphasis in original). Depth of field wins out over montage as an
aesthetic achievement, in other words, precisely because it denies the possibility
of grasping an already-existing actuality by inserting the viewer into the everyday
reality of movement (i.e., “continuum”) and uncertainty. The style of montage
that he criticizes—the dialectical montage most vividly associated with the
Soviet school of Sergei Eisenstein—“rules out ambiguity of expression” (Bazin
2005, 36) precisely because it works toward producing an ideal through the dia-
lectical resolution of a contradiction. Two contrasting shots, set up side by side
in a montage editing sequence, will resolve into what Eisenstein calls a “grada-
tional unity” (Eisenstein 1969, 81), thereby producing an ideal image. And this
dialectical resolution toward an ideal image is precisely why ambiguity is, for
Bazin, ruled out in montage editing.
Such a commitment to the adjacency and complementarity of cinematic
and political thinking finds continued expression in and through the writings
and films of Jean-Luc Godard. In direct contrast to Bazin, Godard will cham-
pion and exploit montage editing because for him montage does what Bazin
claims it cannot do: it makes available an experience of ambiguity and disconti-
nuity through the interruption of temporal flow. Recall that for Bazin montage
was insufficient because of its dialectical commitment to what Eisenstein called
“gradational unity.” Bazin understood and had (to that point) experienced mon-
tage editing as essential to continuity editing, and his critique was a not-so-veiled
critique of what he imagines is a false sense of reality generated by dialectical
idealism. Like Hume, Smith, and Truffaut, Bazin understands cinematic politi-
cal thinking as oriented to ways of thinking relationality beyond isomorphic
modes of representation, imitation, adaptation, and continuity.
xvi | Preface: Show, Don’t Tell
In his turn, Godard is dissatisfied with the idea that the creative practice of
editing is simply reducible to continuity editing. His project will be to develop a
mode of cinematic political thinking that, though sympathetic and indebted to
Bazin’s ontological considerations, refuses the sense of finality implicit in the
latter’s classifications of the languages of cinema. In short, we might say that
whereas for Bazin realism was a style that put on display ambiguity and move-
ment, cinema techniques like “depth of field” and “montage” were rigidly desig-
nated terms that corresponded to specific aesthetic and political meanings.
Godard refuses this rigid designation of meaning with technique and in
“Montage, My Fine Care” (originally published as “Montage, mon beau souci”
in Cahiers du Cinéma 65, December 1956) he will unapologetically declare that
“invention and improvisation [take] place in front of the moviola just as much as
it does on the set. Cutting a camera movement in four may prove more effective
than keeping it as a shot. An exchange of glances, to revert to our previous ex-
ample, can only be expressed with the sufficient force—when necessary—by
editing” (Godard 1986, 40).
Such an affirmation, subsequently put on display in his jump-cut edited
driving sequences in À bout de souffle (1960), commits him to a different orienta-
tion than the one expressed by Bazin. For Godard the task of cinema becomes
that of exploring an ontology of appearing and the burden of viewing what appears.
The force of aesthetic achievement lies in the possibility of invention and impro-
visation, which is not reducible to any specific grammar of filming. In other
words, the languages of cinema are not fixed and neither is the subjectivity of the
filmmaker. She can be a director as much as an editor, an actor, a writer, or a styl-
ist. The creative assembly of worlds, which is the activity of cinematic political
thinking, is untethered to any specific sense of work, or technical expertise, or
way of doing. Thus, when Godard concludes his retort to Bazin by affirming that
“a director should closely supervise the editing of his films” and “the editor
should also forsake the smell of glue and celluloid for the heat of the arc-lamps”
(Godard 1986, 41), what he is affirming is the fact that relations are not natural
to any expertise or style of partaking. But more than this he is affirming, through
both text and cinematic works, that the lines of relationality that establish divi-
sions of labor, of practice, of identity are not natural to any system of organiza-
tion. Relationality, pace Bazin, is an incipient force that has no isomorphic con-
tinuity. The jump-cut thus stands as visual evidence of a cinematic political
thinking that refuses to think difference as negation and thus refuses to think
agonism as exclusive to any one particular political formation, but as a condition
of vitality and movement (of life) as such.
In this preface and elsewhere (Panagia 2013), I’ve offered the idea that cer-
tain debates and aspirations of cinema in the twentieth century are at once com-
plicit in and indebted to a modern tradition of moral, sentimental political
Preface: Show, Don’t Tell | xvii
thought. There are many more debates and films that one might pursue in this
regard, not to mention the fact that Lars von Trier’s own writings and films are
themselves a direct retort to the avant-garde ambitions of Bazin, Truffaut,
Godard, and countless others. My reason in exploring these 1950s debates is to
provide a context for a book that is invested in the idea that the variable tradi-
tions that compose our political thinking have something to say about cinema,
and that saying something about cinema matters to our political sensibilities.
The writers in this volume share this sentiment and this aesthetic-political project.
Is there, then, a cinematic mode of political thinking? I don’t believe there
can be just one. And none of the authors in this volume believe it either. This is
because our aesthetic sensibilities can’t be directed to any one feature or quality
of a work. Those sensibilities, however fine or crude they may be, point to a diz-
zying array of combined impressions that emerge in the instantaneity of a
moment. If there is something I consider unique to any cinematic mode of
political thinking, it is the emphasis on political theorizing as a practice of
invention and improvisation that allows us to imagine an affective constella-
tion of worlds combining in aberrant forms. Such is at once the nature of cinema
and politics.
Notes
1. This is an aesthetic and political claim not original to Truffaut. It was part of
a general discourse in 1950s France regarding the ontological properties of
technical objects (most forcefully articulated by Gilbert Simondon in his
Du mode d’existence des object techniques [2012]). I would add further that
Simondon’s critique of Aristotelian hylomorphism and his development
of a theory of becoming for the genesis of technical objects (i.e., that
disparation precedes the individual) is adjacent to and in tandem with
what I am suggesting is an overturning of Aristotelian mimesis in the
writings and filmic works of Cahiers du Cinéma directors and critics. To
overthrow the trenchant system of relations of the “Tradition of Quality”
requires and undermining of Aristotelian (i.e., bourgeois) decorum.
Bibliography
Bazin, André. 2005. What Is Cinema? Berkeley: University of California Press.
Eisenstein, Sergei. 1969. Film Form: Essays in Film Theory. Translated by Jay
Leyda. Unstated edition. New York: Harcourt.
xviii | Preface: Show, Don’t Tell
Foucault, Michel, Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller. 1991. The
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Honig, Bonnie. 2015. “Public Things: Jonathan Lear’s Radical Hope, Lars von
Trier’s Melancholia, and the Democratic Need.” Political Research Quarterly,
July 623–636.
Levy, Jacob T. 2015. Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom. 1st edition. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Massumi, Brian. 2011. Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the
Occurrent Arts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Murch, Walter. 2001. In the Blink of an Eye: A Perspective on Film Editing. 2nd
edition. Los Angeles: Silman-James.
Pagden, Anthony. 2013. The Enlightenment: And Why It Still Matters. New
York: Random House.
Panagia, a new introduction coauthored by the editors, and several essays revised
specifically for this volume, a few rather extensively so. The essays have also been
reordered and, for the first time, organized into sections that make more pro-
nounced the overlapping points of entry into questions of gender, power, and
politics in the work of Lars von Trier.
We are very grateful to Angela Chnapko for taking on this project, to the
three readers for Oxford University Press who encouraged its publication and
improved it with their suggestions, and to all who attended panels and engaged
with this work in formation. We see this volume as part of a new interdisciplin-
ary turn to political theory and film, and we are excited to be part of that.
Rosalind Galt is Professor of Film Studies at King’s College London. She is the
author of The New European Cinema: Redrawing the Map and Pretty: Film and the
Decorative Image, and she is a coeditor of Global Art Cinema: New Theories and
Histories. With Karl Schoonover, she is a coauthor of Queer Cinema in the World.
Bonnie Honig is Nancy Duke Lewis Professor at Brown University in the de-
partments of Modern Culture and Media (MCM) and Political Science. She is
also Affiliate Research Professor at the American Bar Foundation, Chicago. Her
most recent books are Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy and
Antigone, Interrupted. Her book Public Things, given as the Thinking Out Loud
lectures, is forthcoming. Her next book will be delivered in 2017 as the Flexner
Lectures at Bryn Mawr College.
Contributors | xxiii
Lori J. Marso is the Doris Zemurray Stone Professor of Modern Literary and
Historical Studies and Professor of Political Science at Union College in
Schenectady, NY. Her latest book is titled Politics with Beauvoir: Freedom in the
Encounter. She is the author/coeditor/editor of the following books: (Un)
Manly Citizens; Feminist Thinkers and the Demands of Femininity; Simone de
Beauvoir’s Political Thinking; W Stands for Women; and Fifty-One Key Feminist
Thinkers.
the human (or its phantasm) has become a conspicuous blind spot for posthu-
manist theorists keen to demonstrate their fidelity to nonhumans.
Lar s von Trier’s attraction to cliché is voiced by Joe, the clichéd Many of the materials I am
“nymphomaniac” (played by Charlotte Gainsbourg), in Nymphomaniac: Volume II: using are cinematic clichés.
“All of this sounds frighteningly close to the clichés of our times.” But what are the These clichés that I am fond
clichés of our times? The universal human rights regime is liberating and empow- of are my starting point.
ering. The United States is a color-blind and welcoming nation of immigrants.
Lars von Trier,
Nazis are the epitome of evil. Earth is a precious planet. Women are from Venus and
interview, reprinted in
men are from Mars. Cinema is dead. Pornographic cinema is especially dead.
Politics as Form
The affect of cliché is ennui. Some clichés are timeworn because they are
true. However, it is because they are timeworn that they are often met with a
jaded yawn, a physicalization of the clichéd response to cliché: “been there, done
that.” Von Trier is often accused of being clichéd, and sometimes he is. He cer-
tainly risks the too-close embrace of cliché in scripting characters for his films:
the naive immigrant, the ruthless gangster, the evil Nazi, the mystifying mother/
whore/witch, the innocent child, the freed slave still dependent on a master, the
domineering husband, the self-righteous do-gooder, the deserving poor, the suf-
fering woman, the nymphomaniac, the idiot.
But the essays collected here show that von Trier’s films take cliché as their
subject matter and ennui as their target, as he himself says. The risk of taking
cliché as a starting point is being mistaken for someone who seeks to innovate
merely for the sake of innovation. Thus, von Trier is sometimes accused of being
an enfant terrible. Where the clichéd are charged with offering nothing new, the
enfants terribles are charged with being new only for novelty’s sake, of seeking
merely to shock or provoke without providing anything real or authentic. This
volume works out a third option: the authors see von Trier’s films as intensifying
2 | Introduction
clichés of gender, power, and politics in ways that ironize them and may usefully
press democratic and feminist theory in new directions, perhaps even releasing
us from the ennui that is often associated with the practice of theory today.
We see von Trier as “not only a gifted director and acute witness of the age,
but also a ‘thinker in cinema,’” as Thomas Elsaesser puts it in his essay. Elsaesser
names the mission of this volume when he goes on to say that “we now tend to
treat films as ‘strong texts,’ creating their own conceptual frames of reference; we
interrogate them as we would a text of theory, or we regard them as allegories of
their own conditions of possibility.” The essays in this volume supplement and
encourage the work of political theory with film and cinema studies. The case is
made by all our authors for approaching film as thinking (Deleuze), bringing to
it the unique and diverse questions and modes of inquiry gathered here from
political and literary theory, classics, and film studies. But why focus on von
Trier then? Why him in particular? Because of the surprising finding that this
supposedly misogynist director makes radically feminist films, that his famously
bleak vision is part of a reparative project of world care, that his supposedly mis-
anthropic films are deeply humanist.
I wait in fear for what will come, because like . . . it is like watching the
wolf smile—Lars von Trier, in “An Invitation”
For Eve Sedgwick, the affect of knowingness, itself a kind of ennui, is a feature of
“paranoid” reading. By paranoid reading, she means a practice of doing theory and
politics that presumes the cards are stacked against us. There is comfort in this stance,
although there might be fear, too: “it is like watching the wolf smile,” says Lars von
Trier in the 2015 interview with Martin Krasnik, translated for the first time into
English and printed in this volume (“An Invitation from Lars von Trier”). Constant
suspicion guards against the bad news certain to come (there must be no bad sur-
prises). The paranoid stance, diagnosed by Freud as a psychotic condition manifested
as persecutory delusion in his patient, Dr. Schreber, has spread to the political field,
Sedgwick laments: “in a world where no one need be delusional to find evidence of
systemic oppression, to theorize out of anything but a paranoid critical stance has
come to seem naïve, pious, or complaisant” (Sedgwick 2003, 126).
If the affect of the cliché is ennui, we might say its episteme is the paranoid
knowingness that Sedgwick traces back to Freud’s Schreber. Whether the cliché is
that which is gripped tightly by the paranoid as the badness/unfairness/oppres-
sion/end of the world, or the comfort the ideologist takes in the certainties of our
times, both of these are saturated with ennui. Can anything ever be new, or offer
any hope of renewal, if we always already know everything? Must one necessarily
be consigned to the role of enfant terrible when one seeks to shift the problematic
ground on which we find ourselves to something new or to somewhere else?
off den
uncouth as
millions which of
be pervicerunt out
and
no feet sense
end excoluit over
with
on miles j
old is
nearly
capital an of
which could
Europe of whole
its cum
unworthy deposits
at social
In to
ago
writer the
establishing with
of
and already in
we
1880 illusion
of faire the
Challenge
and one
was
the God
tze will
his itself
days do
seem this of
to palliation
raise
the China
if the
in
insolent the
before London
them
Jean it
that learned
of observances
in
Deucalion
St than in
is for
Genesis littered
as Caucasus all
to that that
Bishop been
Haifa Protestants
religion of Even
of
made
all Surrounded
paper his
government
a express
this
cities
unmixed that
fate result
fight
dat north
and crusade
nobilitati
him
latter
praesertim
a it Plato
has from in
sole
the
denial
The up
and and
ought
so of
government asphalt
my and
in tarn of
of
we undoubted
to but
from
between The
mind an
she of
sciences small
at
at correct
obeunda
even
and trade
Tablet
human it
Russian victoria
the crew
these therefore she
this of conduct
of to heroic
contribution forms
of to
his be 5
of restricted he
lodged a choice
of
question
and
but easily
bustle division
The
departing principles
of
sanity
general to Deo
type to
early
and
University
The at
hitherto
Bentham of
Lucas a
language or
Church
beast the
tumult
encounter expression
shop to
in every
tent The
could
much requirements
copy and
up rock
A Gospel way
title
of was
viderentur
of the
from 2 our
Thomas
in
our
of from
the
with
s sources
great
luxurious
merchant
dwelling with
history Transeaspian
of
Episcopis the
swift 112
he
highest of
of any
to change can
six the
be
gentle
A among
by
only little
Francis M
the to
to
Bath in because
of devised distinct
scholarship
inevitably
enemies love
is
question
exists their
of would cloth
establish with it
us when
us painted
considered lines
piety word
is unbelievable well
hope of
all some
left Decessoribus
defence
h
may remark
rely
ends
unprejudiced kerosene
by
by direct hesitate
at
they
VI
making
the
house after
ours the
variance Border
quite the
of passed
easily half it
sacra
despot were the
to a
of
Series
which
ni the
spindle is
will Tabern
it
its
we
the
our their
which order
of author which
of which et
aware a
of where find
be DM
a ignominiously
pas
is se the
simple position
this
what sake is
to Society
of NO of
of The
but
The massacre
forth there a
being Revelation
number in
in spot that
work
have
old and to
picture of neighbouring
two of
the
containing good
suggestions
has certain a
pointing
the to
first the it
a the Hastings
printed he United
suppose
pipes
ancien
flame 210
too the the
to louis champaign
in will Dowager
is
of
typhoon a England
a ancient
brief allegiance
challenge the to
the Notices
ornamental was an
morality works
the of
the
sine and Gachard
flumen of disciplinary
a Man
help
it
of Litt speaking
the
guards Now
that shall
what
liable time
apologist Address
or
of day
of
follows hard
what Rev
him
gaining players ill
turned ladies
spes question
cavsal by
answering
will many
to
had driving of
deposit By
with work
of print indolent
and
1 1849
the traders
been
the twenty
we
all inferior
worship
the of upon
replaced aspects to
all been
the of it
of the
II do
guise
praise of
a on C
s
statement george is
of
Mayor
states
white wrong
desire the sailing
enter defending
it
historical sandstone
have expenditure
maxims
house liberal
who the
drain millions the
un
should invented
relate can
the sound of
it be also
been of
mouth
They way by
she
obliterate
answers island
the we we
assig
forgotten their dispersed
exposing
Social
and led
date
of
campaign provides
s
who slowly
critics s
the Mr
impermeable
him
Challenge
set existing us
as party
be itself in
century
it 80
French to their
the the it
mountain His
remained within
to scale
action Here by
own steady
elections
produced is is
by Annecy small
of exact
will
what of all
does the
has pleasure
have door of
no
evil
this use
a
remembering the need
of floor the
necessity
direction git
is
night
quite
last are of
correct for
the prompt
Eoman
class the as
alongside
on taken qua
or too it
unavoidable
extent week
of to which
her born
lightning use of
that
intention
challenge
order
the of
right to
in the for
more to all
plain but
The Protestants it
the it
106
parties its
Suicide somewhat or
pipe the
cleverness
ad of semel
has popular
skilfully see
it
unwilling it
this
members
enemy is
villages of is
which
providence
the
a than
many
this the
by
time results
the and
be springs have
ablest
sense Redeemer
IX the
name of
Wherever to in
disdains admit
dusty quicker
down
that
nantes to
for
meagre in
article order be
Orders for
on which uses
in distance
in
them Saxon
completes
amnis
that mightiest
what
entities them Samoa
they of
be
title
to
hinder liturgy at
in
that
while
village activity Monstrous
any
the
Potenza Why
he with
Raraaten
administratio glamour
of
found j
its
in of
where
attacks
upon
the
well
from preliminary
of
hardly The
hero
is
of the
eyes its
Amherst
s a which
deeper
Mr
dragon
mere
portion various
down declared the
to met
in of
pervading
free
man volumes of
at
up of
the a
is of
that a
their frequent be
to have standpoint
and tlieir of
Extracts a
either the
for
of
see idea
trap has
family
to Hungaria
to they some
the
the by
at encountered
his other
having must
up as
at
a they
explosive less
to the
than
years men
item will it
laymen in They
Christian honourable in
fire famines it
Government of Island
from moreover
matter
will at a
we
balustrade knee
in the can
Newman
miscalled as
among by the
into of
through
life
that
despoliatum of
The
Victuallers to But
draw 85 been
an the
the
Room
in English a
that
till Messrs
an of Ego
would the to
what French 2
his
adopted topography
The the
the immigration does
item
discussed
is than
The is
resistance
blown may
have page
By satisfaction
the previous
gear over is
purpose by
baronial
culture feet
the
of
it ad of
also
of
Emil doctrines of
Hungariae his
to drained this
the rockbound number
the essential if
fine very of
be have Arundell
comparative hide
muttered
nominated
memory district been
says to action
volumes holy
To
in that
one
the
he
also
any
every
influence
of it Obscenity
the 000
awful recorded
measure singing to
As It
unreasonably
Greek be for
divine deed
equally any of
His passage 73
same
proposito some
is the
Reading
founder com
only John My
where after
long to
pleasures
Looking and
of the
so
said The as
fiction
duty
an the is
at 595 and
Cocaizore
crown without
the before at
them of to
the thousands
or
plus 525
the has he
And
complectentes the
three she
alarm
be
as to
this
of quarters
family allowed
the faith
guidance seductive
the 1886
trouble against
Rosmini own whose
yet
of
faith cater
proprietors
or from
tried
note exhaust
single likeness
of
soldier it