Simone de Beauvoir s Philosophy of Individuation

The Problem of the Second Sex Laura Hengehold

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Collection Highlights

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Second Edition Laura E. Gómez

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 Simone de Beauvoir’s
Philosophy of Individuation

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5481_Hengehold.indd ii 04/08/17 5:00 PM
 Simone de Beauvoir’s
Philosophy of
Individuation
The Problem of The Second Sex

LAURA HENGEHOLD

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 Edinburgh University Press is one of the leading university presses in the UK.
We publish academic books and journals in our selected subject areas across the
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For more information visit our website: edinburghuniversitypress.com

© Laura Hengehold, 2017

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The right of Laura Hengehold to be identified as the author of this work has been
asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, and the
Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498).

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 Contents

Acknowledgements vii
List of Abbreviations ix

1 Introduction: Blocked Singularities 1

Phenomenology 4
Sense and the Event 6
Historicity of the Problem 11
2 The Problem of Sexist Sense 25
Representation and the Creation of Concepts 26
Transcendence – Components of the Concept 34
Conceptual Personae and the Pre-philosophical Plane 42
3 Lived Experience 58
Consciousness and Habit 59
Varieties of Immanence 66
Maternity 72
Work 77
Narcissism, Love and Mysticism 82
4 The Freedom of Others 95
‘Pyrrhus and Cineas’ 98
The Ethics of Ambiguity 103
Recognition and Communication 108
Transindividuality 112
Back to Mitsein 117
5 Territories and Assemblages 129
Philosophical and Literary Problems 130
Ambiguities of Sex 135
Universal or Just Common? 149

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 vi | beauvoir’s philosophy of individuation

6 Virtual Conflicts 162

Ethics and Politics from the milieu 163
Equal how? 172
Whose History? Which Event? 181
What can Institutions do? 189
7 Conclusion 199

Works Cited 216

Index 237

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 Acknowledgements

Maybe every book is a silent conversation that picks up where

voices leave off. A book’s singularity evolves according to multiple
temporalities and I am sure many of my interlocutors did not know
they were responding to one another by way of a problem that only
appeared after many years, any more than they knew how much
they sustained me in the act of writing. This book emerged between
Cleveland and Paris and thus, between my networks in both cities.
It works in part because of its gaps and failures, which are also the
author’s responsibility after friends have done everything possible
to enhance its powers.
First, I want to recognise Case Western Reserve University for
making possible the sabbatical year during which this book was
written. I also want to thank Maggie Kaminski, John Orlock, and
Peter Knox of the Baker-Nord Center for the Humanities at CWRU
for enabling me to present portions of this manuscript at several
international Deleuze Studies conferences and for a research grant
to finalise the manuscript. Anne Van Leeuwen’s thoughtful and
imaginative approach to phenomenology gave me faith that this
project had a future. She and Cheryl Toman enabled my sabbati-
cal in countless practical ways; as did Shannon French, who gave
her extraordinary administrative gifts to run our department in my
absence. I am lucky to have such enthusiastic and supportive col-
leagues. Last but not least, Megan Weber offered moral support
and outstanding editorial assistance.
My students were essential stimuli to thinking, particularly
Tony Yanick, whose passion for Deleuze made it possible for me
to justify over half a year working through Difference and Rep-
etition; Jason Walsh, thanks to his determination to understand
Spinoza and materialist philosophy of history; and k.c. Layton,

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 viii | beauvoir’s philosophy of individuation

for numerous thoughtful conversations testing both of our invest-

ments (or lack thereof) in the molar concept of ‘woman’. Brent
Adkins and Andrew Cutrofello know how deeply I am indebted
to them, not only for carefully reading all or most of this manu-
script and others, but also for patiently and cheerfully enduring,
via email, the near-daily roller coaster of my affects. In addi-
tion, Ryan Johnson, Audrey Wasser, Joe Hughes, and especially
Jeff Bell were generous with their reading time and expertise on
Deleuze, while I thank Ewa Ziarek and two anonymous read-
ers at Edinburgh University Press for encouragement and specific
improvements regarding the Introduction. I also benefited from
the conversations, questions and ambiance at the Deleuze Studies
conferences, even if I cannot remember or name everyone who
contributed a few molecules.
To Seloua Luste Boulbina, Brahim Tissini and Sylvain Tessier
for friendship and provocation in Paris, mille fois merci. To Kyoo
Lee, who like the incorporeal event moves in all directions at once
but is rarely actualised in a geographical state of affairs, there
are not enough languages to express my appreciation for your
experimental spirit. And likewise to colleagues and friends in
Cleveland: particularly Kenny Fountain, Renee Holland-Golphin,
Matt Bakaitis, Andrew Dessecker and Joe Cairnes. Whether or
not they know it, my family is an imperceptible part of this proj-
ect, so I do not want to overlook whatever support we have been
and may yet be for one other. Finally, for her optimism, her sincer-
ity, and her extraordinary professionalism, I am deeply grateful
to have worked with Carol Macdonald at Edinburgh University
Press, as well as with James Dale and Christine Barton, who
brought this text to material fruition.

Excerpt(s) from The Second Sex by Simone de Beauvoir and

translated by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier,
translation copyright © 2009 by Constance Borde and Sheila
Malovany-Chevallier. Used by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, an
imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of
Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.

From The Second Sex by Simone de Beauvoir, translated by Borde/

Malovany-Chevallier.
Published by Jonathan Cape.
Reprinted by permission of The Random House Group Limited.

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 Abbreviations

References are to English texts and translations. In some cases,

corresponding pages to the original French edition are given after
a / (slash) and publication data may be found in Works Cited.

AO Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (L’Anti-Œdipe)

BN Sartre, Being and Nothingness
DR Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (Différence et répétition)
EA Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity (‘Pour une morale de
l’ambiguïté’)
FC Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance
FM Nzegwu, Family Matters
IC Nancy, The Inoperative Community
IPC Simondon, L’Individuation Psychique et Collective
LS Deleuze, The Logic of Sense (Logique du sens)
MDD Beauvoir, Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter
PC Beauvoir, ‘Pyrrhus and Cineas’ (‘Pyrrhus et Cineás’)
PL Beauvoir, Prime of Life (La force de l’âge)
SS Beauvoir, The Second Sex (Le deuxième sexe, 2 vols)
TE Sartre, Transcendence of the Ego
TFW Bergson, Time and Free Will
TP Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (Mille plateaux)
WIP Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? (Qu’est-ce que
la philosophie?)

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 Chapter 1

Introduction: Blocked
Singularities

‘One is not born, but rather becomes, woman’ (SS 283/2:13). ‘On ne
naît pas femme, on le devient.’ Simone de Beauvoir’s statement puts
becoming at the heart of her ontology. However, we tend to focus
on what becoming a woman might mean, taking the meaning of
becoming as self-evident. We are not born philosophers either, and
just as womanhood may be something we never actually achieve,
becoming a philosopher is not something that happens once and
for all. A focus on becoming unsettles even our confidence as to
what ‘being born’ might mean.
Concepts are points of passage for becoming. Concepts may
name discrete entities such as pianos or musical notes. But pianos
are occasions for notes to repeat themselves from one concert or
chord to the next, while the memory and desire for music encour-
age the continual movement of people and instruments around
the globe. Pianos also take time to be built and to be tuned so
that they are more than mute pieces of furniture, and they break
down if left unused or untended. Those becoming philosophers
are the people who can’t help but notice that just as notes blend
into one another and objects gradually shift from one category to
another, acting back on the other things they encounter, concepts
themselves change colour and meaning depending on the light and
on their environment. But unlike a piano, or even the concept of
piano, which might belong to a particular technological era and
vanish with it, philosophical concepts have an intemporal capacity
to enter and slip out of any historical milieu.
Along with discrete bodies, buildings, words, or emotions, we
grapple with the continual change, modulation, or interruption of

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 2 | beauvoir’s philosophy of individuation

environments and media, even the media of our own physiology

and language. Whether or not humankind is the measure of all
things, one’s choice of a measure is shaped by the quality of one’s
encounter with the given. Measures are selected from the flow of
ongoing experiences and events, but the clock and the scale are so
familiar that they make change seem as standardised and infre-
quent as the beings who undergo change. My body, always add-
ing and losing cells, is a way station in the becoming of water or
nutrients that might also irrigate a field or be frozen in a glacier.
My kitchen is filled with plastic boxes that were once petroleum
and could yet become part of a landfill on which housing is built.
The molecules that make up plastic are currently organised to
store portions of food; but, entering into combination with other
dishes, their contents may unlock the movement of verbal signifi-
cance over a meal.
Every noticeable phase of a thing’s existence lasts for a certain
duration and is conceptually ‘cut’ from a longer transformation,
even if it is a very, very slow one.1 And every experience holds its
quality only for so long, whether or not we reflect on our state
of mind or remain focused on the (more or less) stable phenom-
ena around us. Words, gestures, feelings appear and evolve; so do
the stacks of paper in my apartment, overlapping, criss-crossed,
clipped, for which I am apparently a means of reproduction. The
shifts between becomings and the beings with which they are iden-
tified in language and intention are fraught with indeterminacy.
As Toril Moi has pointed out, none of us is ever a woman to the
exclusion of other social or natural identities, capacities and aspi-
rations; 2 none of us is ever just a philosopher, either.
Simone de Beauvoir is increasingly taken seriously as a philoso-
pher. This is, in part, because her training in philosophy and her
references to the history of philosophy were recognised by mem-
bers of the profession in numerous countries. She could be situated
with respect to similar thinkers at a certain historical moment. But
one also wonders what kind of philosopher Beauvoir could have
become for us if we had thought about the history of philosophy
– including its contemporary practice – in a non-linear fashion
whereby biography and works do not accompany one another
chronologically, and influences do not always precede their effects.
If history is a way of delimiting and connecting becomings, then
it is hard to say exactly when concepts are born in the flow of
significance and from whom. Maybe this is why Socrates identified
himself merely as a midwife.

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 introduction: blocked singularities | 3

Debra Bergoffen, Eleanore Holveck, Sara Heinämaa and Anne

Van Leeuwen read Beauvoir as a phenomenologist because this
is the tradition from which she draws her named sources, the
tradition in which her friends wrote philosophy, and the tradi-
tion of ideas to which her own contributions seem most similar.3
Other scholars, such as Eva Lundgren-Gothlin, Jo-Ann Pilardi,
and Nancy Bauer, read Beauvoir’s phenomenology as peculiarly
Hegelian, because of the nineteenth-century philosopher’s pres-
ence in The Second Sex [1949], and because Beauvoir engaged in a
more extensive dialogue with Hegel than did her colleagues.4 But
Toril Moi reads Beauvoir as an ordinary language philosopher,
in accordance with an English philosophical tradition with which
Beauvoir would have had no direct acquaintance. The Second Sex,
according to Moi, clarifies meanings and exposes the irrational
assumptions behind our use of everyday terms like ‘woman’ just as
Gilbert Ryle or Ludwig Wittgenstein might have called for.5
One need not draw on a common philosophical heritage or
library of names to explicate the concepts of a philosopher or phil-
osophical school. This book reads Beauvoir’s concepts according
to the definition of philosophy laid down by Gilles Deleuze, even
though he did not become famous until her career was almost fin-
ished. 6 Reading Beauvoir with Deleuze gives more weight to the
ontology of ‘becoming’ announced in The Second Sex. It allows
us to bring her text into relation with more events that cannot
easily be traced to linear cause-effect relations, events that emerge
only in retrospect, including events in the international history
of feminist movements.7 Moreover, this reading reveals another
philosophical side to Beauvoir’s corpus, one Margaret Simons
identified with Bergson and Leibniz in Beauvoir’s student writ-
ings, although I argue that it extends to texts, including novels,
late in her career. Even as a text of existential phenomenology,
The Second Sex simply makes more sense, relates to the rest of
her work, and is able to do more when we understand philosophy
the way Deleuze did, rather than the way Beauvoir’s precursors
or contemporaries did.
Approaching The Second Sex as an exercise in the creation of
concepts also allows us to resolve some problems in Beauvoir’s
reception. Like versions of the phenomenological reading that
focus on literature, this approach renders Beauvoir’s reluctance to
call herself a philosopher less controversial or mysterious. It lets us
see a reciprocal experimental process at work in Beauvoir’s think-
ing and the course of her unconventional personal relationships:

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 4 | beauvoir’s philosophy of individuation

her bisexuality, her principled non-monogamy, and the support

and acknowledgement she gave to other philosophers in her life.
It elaborates the stakes involved in resisting historicism among
philosophers, including feminist philosophers from different geo-
graphical regions whose historical relations of influence have not
and may never settle into a single story. By focusing on concepts
rather than on universals, finally, it allows us to tackle the critiques
of Beauvoir’s supposed universalism and the manifest universalism
of some movements she influenced, critiques that have emerged
internationally over the last thirty years, particularly from women
in the African diaspora.
While some feminists have investigated Deleuze’s notion of
becoming-woman, this reading of Beauvoir helps us to think more
clearly about future events in which women’s thinking, like the
thinking of others, becomes philosophical. My goal in this text
is not to make Beauvoir a Deleuzian but, above all, to trace a
problem or process of becoming that implicates both thinkers.
Such a project subtly transforms Deleuze by forcing his concepts
to respond to the exigencies of at least one woman’s quest for
creativity. In Anti-Oedipus [1972], Deleuze and Guattari discuss
Nietzsche’s identification with ‘every name in history’ insofar
as he was a bundle of becomings rather than a given being (AO
21/28). What I want to understand is the process through which
Beauvoir’s own life and concepts were generated, differentiated
from others, and participate in the differentiating and becoming
of concepts that Deleuze identifies with philosophy ‘itself’, apart
from any individual thinker.

Phenomenology

But first, what does it mean to read The Second Sex as a work of
phenomenology? Phenomenology is a philosophical project devel-
oped by Edmund Husserl toward the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Husserl aspired to a rigorous description of the conditions
linking humans to their world and thereby making knowledge and
action possible. The meaning or significance of any phenomenon,
he argued, could only be accounted for in terms of a consciousness
that was ‘intentional’, oriented towards or about something, and in
terms of its relationship to a world whose givenness facilitated and
resisted these intentions. Phenomenology focuses on the quality of
experience as the result of typical, habitual encounters between

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 introduction: blocked singularities | 5

conscious beings and their perceptions, hopes, memories, objects

of knowledge and everyday practices. The structure of experience,
he believed, was the basis for eventual knowledge claims. As he
reformulated the project over the course of his career, Husserl
moved from describing this structure to justifying his conclusions
compared to the claims of existing disciplines. Thus phenomenol-
ogy, especially after its first phase, was also a struggle against the
tendency towards naïve empiricism and unacknowledged intellec-
tual prejudices in logic, mathematics, psychology and the human
sciences.
Eleanore Holveck persuasively describes The Second Sex as a
phenomenological text whose two volumes correspond respec-
tively to the two reductions or shifts of intellectual perspective rec-
ommended by Husserl.8 Reduction is the reflective act by which
we set aside our everyday, inherited beliefs about the nature of the
mind and the world, beliefs that often incorporate bits of meta-
physical, scientific, and folk terminology and assumptions (which
he calls the ‘natural attitude’), and thereby attend more closely
to the nature of the encounter between living experience and its
objects or meanings.9 Husserl’s phenomenology requires us to
render experience manageable by ‘reducing’ it to the relationship
between consciousness and its world (this, he called the phenom-
enological and later the transcendental reduction). Until late in his
career, he also believed we must further reduce the elements of that
relationship to their most typical or ideal forms (a process called
the eidetic reduction).
Like many of Husserl’s works, The Second Sex begins by
bracketing the natural sciences’ understanding of some ‘object’
– in this case, ‘woman’ – and by challenging the natural attitude
that leads both scientists and ordinary readers to accept the real-
ity of entities as they are described by science.10 For example,
The Second Sex examines discourses like biology, psychology
(psychoanalysis), and economics (historical materialism) that
claim knowledge about women and claim to explain women’s
social inferiority. In Volume One: Facts and Myths (Les Faits et
les Myths), Beauvoir shows that these disciplines are not rooted
in the basic structure of human experiences of sensation, imagi-
nation and reason. Rather, these disciplines reflect the experi-
ences in which men engage with their world, as well as some of
men’s unjustified biases. In other words, the tacit notion of mas-
culinity is part of the ‘natural attitude’ prejudicing the sciences.
Thus Holveck writes:

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 6 | beauvoir’s philosophy of individuation

One of the most important contributions of The Second Sex for

feminists today is that it argues for all time that no scientific the-
ory, in Husserl’s broad sense of Wissenschaft, about what males
and females ‘are’, can be used to justify treating men and women
unequally. A scientific theory presupposes that rational, reflective
human beings are trying to achieve universal knowledge.11

The phenomenological reduction focuses our attention on the

relationship between consciousness and its world, rather than
on preconceived metaphysical or empiricist beliefs about the
contents of that world, much less everyday cultural or psycho-
logical prejudices. In doing so, it reveals that women’s appear-
ance as an empirical social and scientific phenomenon is strongly
conditioned by the meaning or sense [sens, Sinn] of womanhood
and sexual difference in Western societies. In Hegelian terms, this
meaning posits woman as ‘Other’ to the very model of subjec-
tivity considered foundational for human experience and knowl-
edge. Beauvoir also discovered that such disciplines ignored the
evidence of women’s own experience and their own reflection on
the structure, values, ideas and activities comprising that experi-
ence. This is what Beauvoir proceeds to describe in Volume Two:
Lived Experience (L’Expérience Vécue). Beauvoir’s hope, accord-
ing to Holveck, is to re-ground the sciences in a structure of con-
sciousness that is genuinely universal, rather than biased towards
the masculine. This means including effects of sexual difference
among the aspects of intersubjectivity that are necessary condi-
tions for human experience and knowledge.

Sense and the event

Given Beauvoir’s frequent philosophical exchanges with Sartre

and Merleau-Ponty, this is a remarkably persuasive account of
The Second Sex, and one that Holveck further reinforces by
looking at specific aspects of Beauvoir’s novels that could be
interpreted as phenomenological thought experiments. I do not
wish to discount the phenomenological approach to Beauvoir’s
thought. Indeed, I draw on phenomenological readings of Deleuze
such as those by Joe Hughes and Len Lawlor that allow both
historically linear and non-linear encounters with Beauvoir to
be identified.12 Sense and repetition enable Beauvoir’s phenom-
enology to become something other than the description of lived

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 introduction: blocked singularities | 7

experience or the pursuit of a more impartial universal science.

We might be able to experiment with alternatives if we could
analyse the meaning of this absolute Other and the spans of time
or the repetitive encounters and acts in which women seem to be
frozen as the Other.
For Husserl, sense was the target of intentional consciousness in
its relationship to the world. Husserl wanted to replace the classic
opposition between subject and object with a bipolar relationship,
stretched between ego and world or between the activity of noe-
sis (intentionality) and its noetic correlate (the meaning at which
intentionality aims; i.e. the tree or the tune being remembered). In
works by Deleuze such as Difference and Repetition [1968] and
The Logic of Sense [1969], sense is less an individual meaning
than what makes it possible for a proposition to refer to speakers
(‘manifestation’), states of affairs (‘denotation’), or other proposi-
tions (‘signification’) and for these propositions to then be true or
false (LS 12–18/22–8).13 Put differently, sense is what a proposition
expresses (as a whole) rather than what it refers to. Sense allows us
to understand why a speaker would mention something in the first
place. In Difference and Repetition, sense results from the repeti-
tion of pre-personal habits that structure the experience of time,
as well as from the breakdown of such structures. The Logic of
Sense explores the conditions under which sense collapses, such as
schizophrenia, and the logical paradoxes that sustain sense, such
as those found in the fiction of Lewis Carroll.
Deleuze’s notion of habit owes much to the ‘genetic’ phenom-
enology with which Husserl replaced his earlier, ‘static’ focus on the
objects of conscious intentional acts; a perspective that trickled into
published works only towards the end of Husserl’s life.14 Genetic
phenomenology responds to the question: how did a consciousness
capable of sense emerge in the first place? Husserl realised this was
an increasingly important question as he tackled the problems of
justifying knowledge and explaining the temporality of conscious-
ness itself, as well as fleeting objects of consciousness. He could not
explain sense without the passive synthesis of the capacity to hold
them in mind.15
But Deleuze also traces the study of sense to the ancient Sto-
ics. Husserl links sense to horizons, which implies some kind of
external limit (the back of the house which is hidden from us). But
this spatial connotation is misleading, although for Deleuze, too,
sense is a dimension of being. However, it is more like an invisible
surface in the world of intentionality, with one side turned toward

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 8 | beauvoir’s philosophy of individuation

things and one side touching language. Following the Stoics,

Deleuze describes sense as an ‘event’: ‘on the condition’, he says,
‘that the event is not confused with its spatio-temporal realiza-
tion in a state of affairs’ (LS 21–2/33–5).16 Sense is an existentially
orienting network of relations linking linguistic meaning (which
Deleuze calls the level of effects) and states of affairs involving
bodies (which he calls the level of causes). So while a proposition
may describe an event in which physical causes lead to physical
effects, the physical world also ‘causes’ events in language and lan-
guage, in turn, allows us to separate the physical world into bodies
that affect one another.
In A Thousand Plateaus [1980], Deleuze and Guattari describe
the organisation of becomings into a world of stability and change
as a process of stratification, and point to the flows of inorganic
matter, living matter and signs as some of the most important
flows from which phenomena emerge.17 Only certain minerals
form rock or metal ores under certain temperature conditions;
only some texts are adopted into the canon of philosophy after
having been the object of sufficient responses or commentaries;
and citizens must pass through various anatomical, cultural and
psychological filters to pass as ‘women’ among their peers. These
stable tendencies are selected by a form of sense that is not just
‘intentional’ for consciousness but also produced ‘unintentionally’.
From a Deleuzian standpoint, the meaning of gender and the bod-
ies, attitudes and behaviour necessary to identify gender in a given
historical situation are events, and the event of their actualisation
ties together innumerable bodily moments as an effect crowns its
causes.18 While Husserlian phenomenology begins with deliberate
reflection, the act of a professional philosopher setting aside his
professional and everyday habits (the epoché), Deleuzian philoso-
phy begins with habit itself and with disorienting experiences of
nonsense or shocks in which those habits prove unrecognisable.19
We can read The Second Sex as the result of deliberate curi-
osity about the biased conditions of current ‘knowledge’ about
women or the masculinism of the social and natural sciences. But
we can also read it as Beauvoir’s response to the repeated failure
to recognise herself and the freedom of her singularity in the habit-
ual, historical imago men believe they encounter in women. ‘If I
want to define myself’, Beauvoir writes, ‘I first have to say, “I am
a woman”; all other assertions will arise from this basic truth. A
man never begins by positing himself as an individual of a certain
sex . . .’ (SS 5/1:13–14).

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 introduction: blocked singularities | 9

In other words, women’s lives and thinking have no becoming

apart from their sex, while men’s are assumed to evolve ‘in the
middle’ of multiple becomings. ‘An autonomous freedom’ like all
others, women must struggle against being ‘frozen’ as objects for
a consciousness other than their own and must struggle to ‘tran-
scend’ and intend’ only by identifying with an alien consciousness
(SS 17/1:31).
The Second Sex, therefore, effects a ‘destratification’ from
woman and from the plane on which she is defined as Other –
for in its pages, Beauvoir finds herself floating between ontologi-
cal tendencies, becoming apparently incompatible things at one
time, but nonetheless swimming ‘upstream’ against the current
that would assign her a certain fixed place. Beauvoir uses the non-
sense running through these ontological strata to heat or shake up
their remaining sediment and to disturb the seeming self-evidence
of sexual and social categories. As Bauer puts it, she reveals ‘the
extent to which being a woman poses a philosophical problem –
which is to say, a problem for and of philosophy’.20
According to The Second Sex, the inhibition and self-conscious-
ness imposed on women’s public activities and personal enjoyment
through informal phenomena like street harassment; advertising
reminders to reduce weight, enjoy motherhood more, or to buy
better and better cleaning supplies; or, in some societies, formal
surveillance by morality police are instances of provocative non-
sense that arise again and again in apparently rational interactions
with others who are proud to be ‘modern’. In 1949, moreover,
such disparities were far more entrenched in Western European
and North American societies than they are today.
Men’s efforts to control women’s fertility even when they have
no interest in supporting or caring for children, men’s and wom-
en’s disproportionate scepticism regarding the value of claims or
proposals uttered in a female voice, and the deliberate imposi-
tion of archaic mores on women in societies fuelled by innova-
tion and exchange constitute a kind of ‘sexist sense’. This sense
connects women’s intentionality to possible objects and condi-
tions the way women’s speech and statements about them are
judged true or false. The social and individual habits responsible
for generating and reproducing womanhood as social ‘Other’
impose a representational screen, separating women from the
singularity of their own freedom and generally putting it at the
service of male becoming – even if women are affected to dif-
ferent degrees and not all men can take equal advantage of its

5481_Hengehold.indd 9 04/08/17 5:00 PM

 10 | beauvoir’s philosophy of individuation

effects. These representations make it seem as if women’s way of

being is eternal and unchangeable, an irreversible product of his-
tory if not of nature. For many women, such experiences involve
physical violence, but the impact of nonsense on the woman
thinker is also violent, in the same way that, according to Fanon,
‘for a man whose only weapon is reason there is nothing more
neurotic than contact with unreason’.21
In fact, Anne Van Leeuwen brings the phenomenological read-
ing of Simone de Beauvoir very close to Deleuze when she inter-
prets The Second Sex in terms of the concept of ‘ambiguity’.22
Ambiguity refers to the indeterminacy or undecidability of a given
phenomenon or action’s meaning. In many contexts, this means
ambiguity is a matter of uncertainty as to what phenomenon or
action one is dealing with at all.
Like Holveck, Van Leeuwen reads The Second Sex as an inquiry
into the ‘sense’ that determines men’s relations to women. But
she points out that Husserlian sense is always something doubly
ambiguous, first because the world of which it is the sense is ambig-
uous (never given a priori), and second because that world is never
‘fixed’ or ‘accomplished’ – sense changes as humans engage with the
world and with each other, and thereby the world also changes.23
In Deleuzian terms, ambiguity means that a given encounter or
situation is unique, as well as intrinsically multiple and caught in
multiple processes of stratification. Not only is the scientific view
of women ‘true’ only within the horizons of a sexist historical situa-
tion, Van Leeuwen suggests, but it can also be contested and revised
as new situations emerge, providing new evidence and altering the
identity and interests of the intentional subject.
The early Husserl would have understood this sense as the (static)
object of an intentional act, perhaps one absorbed unthinkingly by
men and women into their ‘natural attitude’.24 Later Husserl would
have regarded it as a dynamic, changing world of a dynamic, evolv-
ing consciousness. For Deleuze, however, sense is required to form
a ‘world’ in the first place. Indeed, sense itself involves a recipro-
cal process of problematisation (the first form of ambiguity) and
dramatisation (the second form of ambiguity), the undoing of old
strata and the congealing of new ones, virtuality and actuality.
These two levels would be an ambiguity within sense, although
too much focus on their unity, Deleuze would argue, might danger-
ously collapse the dynamic process of sense-creation into a static
transcendental, which is why he relentlessly asserts the multiplicity
of all becomings and assemblages.

5481_Hengehold.indd 10 04/08/17 5:00 PM

 introduction: blocked singularities | 11

Historicity of the problem

It may seem anachronistic to read Beauvoir in light of Deleuze

unless we are on the lookout for anachronic as opposed to chrono-
logical events; that is, events that challenge our notion of what
counts as a meaningful or interesting chronology.25 However, since
both Beauvoir and Deleuze consciously responded to Husserl, one
can also draw bridges between their becomings using ordinary
narrative history.
Having read his Logical Investigations [1900–1] and other
early writings focused on consciousness and its categories of
intentional experience, Sartre went to Berlin in 1933/4 to study
Husserl more carefully at the French Institute (PL 112). Several
years later, after encountering phenomenology independently from
Sartre, Merleau-Ponty visited the Husserl archives in Louvain and
was granted posthumous access to some of the unpublished manu-
scripts in which Husserl had been reworking his earlier presenta-
tion of phenomenology to explain how such categories emerged
historically and in the life of individual consciousness.26
Sartre’s Transcendence of the Ego [1937] criticised aspects of
Husserl’s turn to transcendental philosophy found in the text Ideas
I [1913].27 Husserl, Sartre believed, had been wrong to ‘double’
the spontaneity of impersonal consciousness with a ‘transcenden-
tal ego’ when the only ego to be found in consciousness was, like
everything else, an object for consciousness. But at the time Sartre
visited Berlin, Husserl had already begun investigating the genetic
processes through which such categories and structures entered
the circuit between consciousness and its world, although little
of this material appeared in published texts during his life. These
investigations included analyses of phenomena such as temporal-
ity, embodiment and intersubjectivity. Consulting these unpub-
lished manuscripts shortly after Husserl’s death made it possible
for Merleau-Ponty to consider his Phenomenology of Perception
[1945] a work with essentially Husserlian commitments although
it differed significantly from published Husserl texts, as well as
from Sartre’s reading of Husserl.28
Beauvoir followed Sartre’s studies at a distance and read Hus-
serl’s On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal
Time [1928], as well as the Cartesian Meditations [1929], which
Husserl recommended as an introduction to phenomenology,
despite potential conflicts with his unpublished views on intersub-
jectivity.29 She also consulted the relevant secondary scholarship

5481_Hengehold.indd 11 04/08/17 5:00 PM

 12 | beauvoir’s philosophy of individuation

by Emmanuel Lévinas and Eugen Fink. All her philosophical

texts, particularly The Ethics of Ambiguity [1947] and The Sec-
ond Sex, contain distinctive terminology associated with phe-
nomenology. Beauvoir’s positive review of The Phenomenology
of Perception shows that she was exposed to the intersubjective,
bodily and historical phenomenology Merleau-Ponty attributed
in that text to Husserl’s Ideas II and the Crisis of European
Sciences.30 Sara Heinämaa argues that whether her knowledge
was first or second hand, Beauvoir’s understanding of embodi-
ment owes a great deal to ideas found in Husserl manuscripts
that were, in part because of the intervening war, only published
several decades later.
On the other hand, it is not necessary for us to draw a detailed
causal connection between Deleuze and Beauvoir via Husserl,
Merleau-Ponty or Sartre. For even before she encountered any
of these phenomenological thinkers, Beauvoir was fascinated
as a student with two other philosophers of paramount interest
to Deleuze: Bergson and Leibniz.31 In Memoirs of a Dutiful
Daughter [1958], she reports enthusiastically ‘recognize[ing]
her own experience’ in ‘Bergson’s theories about “the social ego
and the personal ego”’ (MDD 207).32 In her diaries, as Margaret
Simons discovered, Beauvoir associates Bergson and Leibniz with
the problem of the Other, the problem that seems to have served
as a leitmotif through her many years of literary and philosophi-
cal work.
In their biographical origin, Beauvoir’s questions about Oth-
erness are related to the relative value of qualitative experience,
which she seems to associate with literature, and to the problem
of ‘indiscernibles’ – namely, how two items identified by the same
concept can be distinguished.33 This latter problem derives from
Leibniz, for whom every existing entity, if it is truly numerically
distinct, ultimately has a slightly different, distinctive concept
known only by God.34 Kant, on the other hand, argued that space
as general form of outer human intuition allowed items to be
numerically distinct while thought under the same ‘universal’ con-
cept. Kant allowed God to be removed from the picture; he also
relieved epistemology of any need to consider ‘inner differences’
that elude our spatial perception and existing concepts.35 Beauvoir
wanted to preserve that singularity, which Bergson associated with
becoming rather than being.36
As her work matured, Beauvoir clearly became more aware of
the myriad ways in which institutions treat people as ‘indiscernible’

5481_Hengehold.indd 12 04/08/17 5:00 PM

 introduction: blocked singularities | 13

beings under this or that ‘universal’ rather than singular becom-

ings. Representation ‘blocks’ becoming by opposing beings to one
another in a perceptual or conceptual matrix. People themselves
often collude with their erasure and that of others. The notion of
oppression from The Ethics of Ambiguity, for example, describes
such a situation (EA 81–96/117–39). The denial of singularity is
Beauvoir’s reason for objecting to the utilitarianism of economic
liberalism as well as Marxist-Leninism (EA 99–114/143–66).
Towards the end of her life, Beauvoir studied the effacement of
older people’s singularity by social institutions and by their dis-
tance from an increasingly young population.37 The Second Sex
emerges from a similar concern, for the becoming of half of the
human race seems subjugated to a system of representation that
does violence to both sexes’ capacity for sense and meaning.
Now, one might easily object that Beauvoir does not discuss
Husserl, Leibniz or Bergson in The Second Sex (and rarely in
her other published writings). In fact, when discussing the Other
she often refers to G. W. F. Hegel, whom Deleuze accuses of tak-
ing representation as an image of thought to its most pernicious
extreme.38 Hegel does focus on movement and becoming, rather
than on being, but he focuses only on the becomings of those
beings that can be conceptually opposed to one another, which
(Deleuze might argue) leaves much of reality outside the picture.
For Hegel, what is most real is the particular insofar as it con-
tains universal moments – in other words, the particular musical
tone or train carriage, not just isolated, but in relation to every
other musical tone, musical instrument and means of transport
that could be envisioned, as well as the social and historical insti-
tutions that resulted in pianos, concert halls, train stations and
containerisation.
But Beauvoir also read Hegel in combination and often in ten-
sion with Kierkegaard.39 For Kierkegaard, what is most real is the
deliberate effort to identify and appreciate whatever distinguishes
this instant or encounter from every other, and to hold onto that
singularity in faith despite the fact that, he believed, it can never be
identified in concepts. For Deleuze, like Kierkegaard, the ‘things’
that stand out as most real are these ways of repeating.40 Becom-
ings are ways of repeating that gradually reveal singularity. Only
as becomings, Beauvoir commented, could women be compared
with men (SS 45–6/1:72). She is committed to Kierkegaard’s ethi-
cal task of individuating, or discovering and creating distinction
from others who might seem to fall under a common universal.

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 14 | beauvoir’s philosophy of individuation

The published texts Beauvoir would have been able to read

by Husserl in the 1930s downplayed intersubjectivity, when they
did not give a downright solipsistic portrait of the phenomeno-
logical enterprise. Although Husserl did consider intersubjectivity
a background condition for individual experience, as Merleau-
Ponty discovered in Louvain, and some of Husserl’s unpublished
texts did grapple with the problem of human uniqueness, they
are ambiguous and less well known even today.41 Sartre seems
not to have engaged with them at all. Since Beauvoir consistently
rejected Hegel’s pursuit of a timeless universal standpoint, it
appears that what she took from Hegel was his robust discussion
of intersubjective and historical aspects of human becoming and
obstacles to becoming, including affects of desire and aggression
that threaten to overturn the boundaries of selves in opposition.
Thus I believe that Beauvoir recruited Hegel to pursue an interest
in intersubjectivity that originated with Bergson and Leibniz and
was whetted, but probably not solved, by her own engagement
with Husserl’s ideas.42
The next chapter rereads the Introduction to The Second Sex
closely to assess the plausibility of considering Beauvoir’s philoso-
phy as an act of critique in Deleuze’s sense. By this I mean it does
not just analyse a phenomenon such as ‘sexist sense’ but explains
its emergence.43 In doing so, philosophy also emerges along its own
‘line of flight’ to pose problems and to create concepts. Deleuze
understands philosophical concepts as forming and extending a
plane of relations among themselves (an absolute plane of imma-
nence, rather than immanence to consciousness) (WIP 35–6/38–9).
This chapter examines Beauvoir’s concepts, such as ‘transcendence’,
in light of Deleuze’s criteria for philosophical invention, including
the reterritorialisation of ideas by other thinkers such as Bergson,
Leibniz and Sartre and the construction of conceptual personae.
The plane formed by such concepts, which Beauvoir loosely terms
‘existentialist morality’, might enable women to escape the system
of representation that poses them as the social Other; the state of
immanence within which they struggle to transcend.
The third chapter reads Volume 2 of The Second Sex as a
description of the passive syntheses and habits that build up a
truly problematic experience of the world for women. Neverthe-
less, the community in which women participate both willingly
and inadvertently requires this sense of them. When Beauvoir
tries to understand why women have not formed a revolutionary
class against men as a group, her answer involves the claim that

5481_Hengehold.indd 14 04/08/17 5:00 PM

 introduction: blocked singularities | 15

‘their opposition took shape within an original Mitsein’; a term

from Heidegger that means literally ‘being-with’ (SS 9/1:19). For
Beauvoir, the critique of representation would involve a critique
of the Mitsein in coupled heterosexual life and in society at large.
Mitsein would be an example of stratification in which select
forms of human coexistence appear as unchanging natural forms.
What could this Mitsein do if it were rethought as an assemblage
along Deleuzian lines? Could its habits be recomposed around the
value of reciprocity? This chapter also touches on the difficulty
of identifying habits that are complicit with or resistant towards
‘sexist sense’ in the midst of a qualitative multiplicity fusing an
indefinite number of social practices.
The fourth chapter situates Beauvoir’s demand for freedom on
behalf of women in The Second Sex with respect to the ethics
of the ‘appeal’ from ‘Pyrrhus and Cineas’ [1944] and her for-
mulation (in ‘Pyrrhus and Cineas’ and The Ethics of Ambigu-
ity) of freedom as dependent in some ways on the freedom of all
others. In this chapter, I want to understand how the plane of
immanence defining Beauvoir’s thought as singular seems to pass
through and be defined through the free becoming of others. I ask
how The Second Sex lets us critique or understand the genesis of
Mitsein with an eye to creating new assemblages, particularly
those involving reciprocity. This is not an idea one finds anywhere
in Deleuze. However, we may find something similar in Bergson’s
last writings and in the concept of ‘transindividuality’ proposed
by philosopher of technology Gilbert Simondon, who had an
unmistakeable influence on Deleuze and Guattari.
If philosophy involves the formulation of problems in response
to a shocking, compelling or nonsensical experience, even the
experience of witnessing others’ suffering, this does not mean
that everyone, even everyone who suffers, will formulate the same
problems. The fifth chapter suggests that there need be no one
form of sexist sense, oppressing women everywhere on the globe,
for it to be worthwhile to problematise one or some of those forms
in a way that suggests how others might understand the singular
problems confronting them. Deleuze and Guattari explicitly stated
that they did not expect becoming-woman would have anything
to do with feminism, for feminism is a movement on behalf of
‘molar’ women – fully constituted beings rather than ‘molecu-
lar’ multiplicities in the process of composition or decomposition
(TP 275–6/337–9). Was a ‘molar’ women’s movement the only way
that Beauvoir’s Idea could have been actualised? To what extent

5481_Hengehold.indd 15 04/08/17 5:00 PM

 16 | beauvoir’s philosophy of individuation

does the Idea involve becomings for which ‘becoming-woman’

would not even be the first or most important name?
Any new system of representations produced as solutions to
a philosophical problem has its own incongruities that may lead
to the formulation of other problems. The sixth chapter will con-
sider side effects and difficulties that this way of reading Beauvoir
might force us to anticipate. For example, according to Deleuze,
no becoming or thought can be conceived apart from a hierarchy
of forces and interpretations. Such hierarchies are necessary for
beings and their transformations or interactions to be noticeable
in the first place. Is there a place for this fundamental inequality
in Beauvoir’s egalitarianism and her expectation that ‘authentic’
individuals and institutions, those fostering the freedom of all,
will also be egalitarian? What becomes of the notion of justice
in the thought of both Beauvoir and Deleuze? Finally, how does
Beauvoir herself understand ‘events’, including the repetitions
and processes leading to sexism, feminist social movement, or
women’s equality?
We usually think of events as neutral moments or changes in a
series, which can only be recognised against a backdrop of conti-
nuity. As mentioned above, Deleuze suggests that the meaningful
relationship between speakers, states of affairs, and other state-
ments is also an event (LS 19/30–1). In fact, he then reverses the
equation and asks whether the only real events might not be rela-
tionships of sense! Thus Deleuze identifies two series of time – the
time of mute bodies and states of affairs, and the time of the events
in which they are linked and become available for reflection and
communication to others. The first time series (Chronos) is a kind
of perpetual, thick present, a duration; while the second series
(Aion) is the changing or becoming itself, facing both past and
future. Both are perspectives on the same time: one with respect to
irreversibility and the other with respect to reversibility; one with
respect to the beings in an encounter and the other with respect to
the encounter itself, in which elements dissolve.
According to the Stoics, we have no control over bodies and
their states of affairs; we do not even have adequate knowledge
of them – what we can control, however, is the events through
which we connect them. And since events often affect our bodies
unpleasantly, the best we can do is to conceive of a second event in
which we would be the cause of that unhappy event, changing it
from one we suffer passively to one we actively embrace and bring
about. The body

5481_Hengehold.indd 16 04/08/17 5:00 PM

 introduction: blocked singularities | 17

wills now not exactly what occurs, but something in that which
occurs, something yet to come which would be consistent with
what occurs, in accordance with the laws of an obscure, humorous
conformity: the Event. It is in this sense that the Amor fati is one
with the struggle of free men. (LS 149/175)

Deleuze calls this will ‘counter-actualisation’ (contre-effectuation).

It does not just resignify that ‘first’ unpleasant event but re-enacts
it, repeats it (in French, the word répétition also means ‘rehearsal’)
so as to alter its sense, and ‘retrospectively’ brings about a better
event, better because free. Causes of an identified event do not nec-
essarily exhaust themselves in their effects but coexist with those
effects, as parents coexist with and continue to affect the children
whom they have shaped, sometimes in ways they find problematic
and deeply moving. At this point, the effect becomes a cause, or
parents and children become both causes and effects in cumulative
ways. They rewrite their own narratives, at the same time that they
are affected by their larger social environment and act back on it.
For in fact there is no event except insofar as multiple, differing
repetitions have built up a context in which actors, meanings and
states of affairs relate to each other.
In Prime of Life, Beauvoir claims that during World War II,
‘history burst over me’ or collapsed and tore her away from the
comforting comprehensiveness of studying Hegel; ‘I dissolved into
fragments’ (L’Histoire fondit sur moi, j’éclatai’) (PL 295/381). We
can also choose to think of lives, no less than history, as non-linear,
marked by normal stretches and significant turning points (DR
188–9/244–5). A philosophy cannot be read entirely apart from
a life – or an author’s other acts of creativity – not to find which
comes first, or to reduce later events to earlier ones, but to see
later events as co-contributors to earlier ones, which only ‘come
into their own’ from a standpoint that might even be impersonal,
outside that life.
Of what event is The Second Sex a part, if not a history of
progress in the actualisation of freedom? In other words, in what
process or ‘becoming’ do the concepts of this book mark a dis-
tinctive turn, differentiation or deviation? To what trauma might
it correspond as a counter-actualisation?44 The Second Sex has
generally been read as a moment in the history of feminism – an
enduring moment, to be sure, one that only burst over women’s
heads some ten to twenty years after its publication, a moment
that constantly changes, moreover, due to repeated re-evaluations

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 18 | beauvoir’s philosophy of individuation

and reinterpretations. Some feminist scholars have reclaimed

The Second Sex as a moment in the history of phenomenological
philosophy, perhaps the emergence of a thread in the qualitative
multiplicity of that movement allowing sexual difference to become
an enduring source of questions and claims. But Beauvoir’s text
also marks a turn in the history of liberal theories and institutions,
a transformation in the meaning of equality and liberty as essential
elements of ‘modern’ attitudes towards government and power,
in which Hegel himself plays a significant but perhaps not eternal
role. And what other histories have we not even noticed emerging
or bursting over us?
According to Beauvoir, ‘There is no other justification for
present existence than its expansion toward an indefinitely open
future’ (SS 16/1:31). Thinking about history neither as a tale of
modern progress nor as a repetition of the (same) past makes it
conceivable to participate in an open history of philosophy, and to
participate in history on the side of philosophy’s becoming, with-
out having to take a break from either feminism, as Janet Halley
suggests, or philosophy, as Gayle Salamon mused more recently.45
At the same time, it acknowledges that the risks of such breaks
are inevitable. Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche suggests that there
would be an ‘active’ and a ‘reactive’ way to take such breaks,
which would mean that abandoning the morality of a particular
discursive practice might not require us to abandon ethics, prefer-
ence, or selectivity altogether. We need not be ‘women’ or even,
perhaps, self-consciously feminist to pursue planes populated with
concepts that liberate women, nor need we identify with the ‘West’
to defend the frightening creativity associated with differentiations
of sex and desire.
My reading of Beauvoir is motivated by the stubbornness of
singularity. My gamble that Beauvoir’s ideas can be freer through
Deleuze responds to her own stubborn advocacy for the singu-
larity of others, insofar as they, too, resist being easily represent-
able and recognisable. For these reasons, I have tried to select only
those ideas from the vast phylum of Deleuze’s writings, alone and
with Guattari, that enable me to push Beauvoir in this direction,
or release her, as the case may be, while freeing the reader from
the task of absorbing a vast terminology. Beauvoir, on the other
hand, wrote at the crossroads of many ambiguous ideas, texts and
schools of phenomenological thought whose respective legacies are
still being worked out today. I have tried to give a coherent portrait
of the phenomenology to which she and Deleuze responded, and

5481_Hengehold.indd 18 04/08/17 5:00 PM

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