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 Palgrave Studies in European
Political Sociology

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Carlo Ruzza
Department of Sociology and Social Research
University of Trento
Trento, Italy

Hans-Jörg Trenz
Department of Media, Cognition and Communication
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“This book offers a very comprehensive analysis of the social foundations of contemporary European party
systems. Knutsen artfully assembles data from the European Values Study to describe the persistence and
change in the social base of voting behavior. The book demonstrates that social structural influences have
not faded away as predictors of voting behavior, but the nature of some alignments has changed over time.
This is a very valuable addition to the European voting behavior literature.”
–Professor Russell J. Dalton, University of California, Irvine, USA

“Knutsen’s meticulous probing into public political opinion and partisan choices in 18 European democ-
racies conveys detailed insights into the structure of popular beliefs and partisan alignments at the end of
the first decade of the new millennium. He is careful to highlight both common patterns pertaining across
the entire set of postindustrial polities as well as persistent differences between groups of countries.
Political cleavages are crystallized around structural social divides, albeit they are most sharply configured
around party families that did not exist in the post-World War II order. And, pace much talk about
political dealignment, it is in the most advanced postindustrial polities that show the strongest structuring
of the vote. Knutsen’s study may serve as foundation from which much fruitful research can be launched.”
–Professor Herbert Kitschelt, Duke University, USA
Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology addresses contemporary
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More information about this series at

http://www.springer.com/series/14630
 Oddbjørn Knutsen

Social Structure,
Value Orientations
and Party Choice in
Western Europe
Oddbjørn Knutsen
Department of Political Science
University of Oslo
Oslo, Norway

Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology

ISBN 978-3-319-52122-0 ISBN 978-3-319-52123-7 (eBook)
https://doi.org/ 10.1007/978-3-319-52123-7

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 CONTENTS

1 Introduction and Presentation of the Research Problems 1

2 The Data Set and the Party Systems of the 18 Countries 33

3 Socio-structural Variables and Value Orientations 59

4 Party Choice and Social Structure 111

5 Party Choice and Value Orientations 195

6 The Impact of Social Structure and Value Orientations

Compared 241

7 Conclusions 265

Appendix 1 275

Literature 281

Index 299

v
 LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 1.1 Causal model for explaining party choice 9

Fig. 4.1 Rokkan’s model of electoral fronts for the Nordic countries:
The functional–economic axis 143
Fig. 4.2 Scatterplot for the explanatory power (Nagelkerke’s
pseudo-R2) of all socio-structural variables and the effective
number of parties 180
Fig. 5.1 Scatterplot for the explanatory power (Nagelkerke’s
pseudo-R2) of all value orientations and the effective number
of parties 232
Fig. 6.1 Scatterplot for the explanatory power (Nagelkerke’s
pseudo-R2) of social structure and value orientations, and the
effective number of parties 244
Fig. 6.2 Decomposition of pseudo-variance in the dependent party
choice variable according to two different principles 254

vii
 LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1 The grouping of the countries into regions 34

Table 2.2 Percentages with a party choice (pc) 39
Table 2.3 Political parties grouped into party families’ Nordic
countries 41
Table 2.4 Support for parties in the various party families according
to the surveys 49
Table 2.5 Comparative patterns regarding degree of advanced
industrialism 50
Table 2.6 Effective number of electoral political parties (ENEP) and
party system polarisation 53
Table 3.1 Erikson/Goldthorpe class schema and the name of the
social classes used in this work 68
Table 4.1 Illustration of the statistical measures based on the rela-
tionship between party choice and gender in the Finnish
data from EVS 2008 112
Table 4.2 Party choice and gender: Correlations 119
Table 4.3 Party choice and age: Correlations 126
Table 4.4 Party choice and religious denomination: Correlations 137
Table 4.5 Party choice and urban–rural residence. Correlations 146
Table 4.6 Party choice and education: Correlations 152
Table 4.7 Correlations between party choice and social class 161
Table 4.8 Average support for the part families within the various
social classes and kappa values for the various party families 162
Table 4.9 Social structure and party choice: Comparison of correla-
tions (Squared root of Nagelkerke’s R2) 173
Table 4.10 The impact of social structure on party choice measured by
Nagelkerke’s pseudo-R2 179

ix
x LIST OF TABLES

Table 5.1 Strength of the correlations between value orientations and

party choice. Eta coefficients ranked. Strength of the cor-
relations between value orientations and party choice 200
Table 5.2 Correlation between party choice and value orientations
Ranked according to the strength of the correlations within
each country Correlation between party choice and value
orientations 221
Table 5.3 The explanatory power of Old Politics and New Politic
value orientations on party choice measured by
Nagelkerke’s pseudo-R2 227
Table 5.4 Total explanatory power of value orientations on party
choice 231
Table 6.1 Total explanatory power social structure and value orien-
tations. Nagelkerke’s R2 243
Table 6.2 The impact of social structure and value orientations on
party choice compared 246
Table 6.3 Decomposition of the explanatory power of social structure
and value orientations on party choice 256
Table 6.4 The proportion of the compounded component based on
decomposition of the explanatory power of social structure
and Old Politics and New Politics value orientations sepa-
rately on party choice 259
 LIST OF APPENDIX TABLES

Appendix Table 3.1 Religion denomination. Distributions according

to countries 98
Appendix Table 3.2 Urban–rural residence. Distributions and means
according to countries and regions 100
Appendix Table 3.3 Education level. Distributions according to
countries and regions 101
Appendix Table 3.4 Erikson and Goldthorpe classes. Distributions
according to countries and regional means 102
Appendix Table 3.5 Value orientations and countries. Means 105
Appendix Table 3.6 Average correlations between value orientations
and socio-structural variables, ranked according
to the strength of the correlations 106
Appendix Table 3.7 Explanatory power (R2) from regression analyses
of various models of socio-structural variables on
value orientations 108
Appendix Table 4.1 Party families and gender. Average PDI and lor
for all countries and for the various regions 183
Appendix Table 4.2 Party families and age. Average PDI and lor for all
countries and for the various regions 185
Appendix Table 4.3 Party families and religious denomination.
Average PDI and lor for all countries and for the
various regions 186
Appendix Table 4.4 Party families and urban–rural residence. Average
PDI and lor for all countries and for the various
regions 188
Appendix Table 4.5 Party families and education. Average PDI and lor
for all countries and for the various regions 189

xi
xii LIST OF APPENDIX TABLES

Appendix Table 4.6 Explanatory power of different social structural

variables from multinomial logistic regressions. 191
Appendix Table 5.1 Party choice and religious–secular values. Means
scores for the various party families 234
Appendix Table 5.2 Party choice and economic left–right values.
Means scores for the various party families 235
Appendix Table 5.3 Party choice and environmental values. Means
scores for the various party families 236
Appendix Table 5.4 Party choice and libertarian-authoritarian values.
Means scores for the various party families 237
Appendix Table 5.5 Party choice and immigration orientation. Means
scores for the various party families 238
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Presentation

of the Research Problems

1.1 INTRODUCTION
Traditional explanations for why voters prefer the party they vote for have
been found in socio-structural variables such as social class, religion,
urban–rural residence and region. These are the structural variables that
are included in the famous Lipset–Rokkan model for party cleavages in
industrial societies. During recent decades, there have been major changes
in social structure and also how social structure determines people’s voting
behaviour.
Political issues and value orientations are considered to be more impor-
tant for individual voter’s preferences in advanced industrial societies. This
has partly been explained by the decline of social cleavages and partly by
the fact that voters have become more politically sophisticated or cogni-
tively mobilised.
There have also been shifts in the political preferences of the mass
publics in value orientations, for example, from religious to secular values
and from more authoritarian to libertarian values. It has been hypothesised
that value orientations and political issues have become more important
determinants of party choice and also that values and issues have become
important intervening variables between social structure and party

© The Author(s) 2018 1

O. Knutsen, Social Structure, Value Orientations and Party Choice
in Western Europe, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52123-7_1
2 1 INTRODUCTION AND PRESENTATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEMS

preferences. The impact of socio-structural variable could increasingly be

an indirect effect via value orientations.
The current work is a comparative study of 18 West European countries
with data from 2008–2010. The main research problems are:

1. How do (a) social structure and (b) value orientations influence

party choice in advanced industrial democracies?
2. To what extent is the impact of social structure transmitted via value
orientations?
3. To what extent is the impact of value orientations on party choice a
causal effect when controlling for prior structural variables?

Research problems 1b and 1b are examined in detail in Chapters 4 and 5

where they are devoted more space than the two other research problems.
The reason for this is that the nature of the topics requires considerable
space. The more concrete research questions that are addressed are: a) the
comparative strength of the correlations with party choice, and b) the
location of the parties grouped into party families on the structural vari-
ables and the value orientations. In particular, the second topic requires
much space for a comparative analysis of 18 countries. The two other
research questions are examined in a single chapter (Chapter 6) where
three types of voting are differentiated. Two of these reflect the types
relevant to these research questions.
This chapter is organised as follows.
First, in Section 1.2, the notions of stable alignment, dealignment and
realignment are discussed on the basis of relevant literature. Preference
formations and party choice in advanced industrial societies are then
reviewed on the basis of the important works of Ronald Inglehart and
Herbert Kitschelt (Section 1.3). Section 1.4 outlines the notions cognitive
mobilisation and political sophistication and how these might be expected
to be relevant for the research problems in this work. Section 1.5 outlines
some details regarding the theoretical framework concerning the main
variables in this work: social structure, value orientations and party choice.
Section 1.6 discusses the explanatory macro-level variables that are used to
explain the empirical patterns. Section 1.7 discusses methodological and
statistical considerations, first and foremost related to the fact that the
dependent variable – party choice – is a nominal-level variable that might
be difficult to analyse in a cross-national context, while Section 1.8 out-
lines the organisation of the book.
 1.2 STABLE ALIGNMENT, DEALIGNMENT AND REALIGNMENT 3

1.2 STABLE ALIGNMENT, DEALIGNMENT AND REALIGNMENT

Since the 1970s there has been considerable change in the electoral
behaviour of voters. Rather than stable alignment, researchers began talk-
ing about dealignment and realignment. One important perspective in
Lipset and Rokkan’s well-known work (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) was the
persistent impact of social structure on party choice, which they called the
“freezing of party alignments”. This stable alignment was – according to
the authors – caused by the persistent impact of the socio-structural
variables that they focused upon in their seminal essay – and party choice.
Later research has documented considerable decline in the impact of at
least some of the structural variables that they considered important. In
the literature there has been a focus on “defreezing” of party alignments,
structural or secular dealignment (Dalton et al. 1984) and the decline of
cleavage politics (Franklin et al. 1992). There has also been discussion of
possible realignments associated with the advanced industrial societies or
post-industrial societies. These concepts have also been used in important
and more recent contributions focusing on post-industrial dealignment
and realignment perspectives (Kitschelt and Rehm 2015).
The discussion of changes in social cleavages is then frequently dis-
cussed using the terms dealignment and realignment (Dalton et al. 1984).
Here dealignment and realignment will be discussed within the framework
of the impact of socio-structural variables and value orientations.
Dealignment means first and foremost that the impact of the structural
variables has become smaller. Voters do not vote according to their location
in the social structure to the same degree as previously, and issues and values
do not have large explanatory power and/or do not contribute to stable
support for the various parties. The increased instability in the party system is
frequently associated with and considered to be caused by dealignment. The
functional model which Dalton et al. (1984) associated with the dealign-
ment process indicated a decline of the social and political roles of the
political parties and a decline of the role of party identification. Kitschelt
and Rehm (2015: 183) associate the post-industrial dealignment perspective
with an occupational diversification that makes the organisation of collective
interests increasingly difficult, accelerated social mobility and breakdowns of
stable social networks, neighbourhoods and social “milieus”. As to perspec-
tives related to voting, dealignment is coupled to the increased importance of
voting on the basis of perceived competence of parties and politicians and
issue ownership, and not so much with voting on the basis of position issues.
4 1 INTRODUCTION AND PRESENTATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEMS

Realignment implies the eclipse of old cleavages and the rise of new
ones. There is first a dealignment from the old cleavages and then a new
alignment related to the new cleavage structure. While Lipset and Rokkan
focused on the national and the industrial revolutions, Dalton et al. (1984:
455–456) couple the realignment perspective to a social cleavage model
that incorporated a third post-industrial revolution which might create a
new basis of social cleavages.
There are several kinds of cleavages and conflict lines that have been
focused in the literature on realignment: New structural cleavages and
value-based conflict lines have to a larger degree than in typical industrial
society – according to some researchers – become more important. As to
structural cleavages, we might differentiate between new structural clea-
vages and transformation of the impact of the traditional structural vari-
ables on party choice.1
Gender and new “horizontal” structural divisions within the new mid-
dle class are examples of such new structural divisions.2 These horizontal
divisions might be public versus private sector location (Knutsen 2001,
2005) or various work logics according to a competing framework (Oesch
2006a, 2006b).
Gender is a borderline case between this category and the next
because previously (and partly at present) there was a traditional gender
gap where women voted more frequently for Christian and Conservative
parties, while they increasingly vote for leftist parties more frequently
than men.
In addition to gender, the most pronounced example of transformation
of social cleavage variables is possibly related to education and social class.
Increasingly, the higher educated strata and the new middle class vote for
leftist parties, in particular New Leftist parties, while part of the working
class votes for the rightist parties, in particular the New Rightist parties.
Values and issues related to New Politics are frequently stated as the main
explanations for this changing relationship between important class vari-
ables and party choice (Kitschelt 1994, 1995; Knutsen 2006a: 4–5).
The impact of issues and value orientations has been shown to be
increasing. That which is most frequently focussed upon in the literature
is the rise of issue voting, but there are also important perspectives based
on New Politics literature related to the increased importance of political
value voting. These perspectives are quite similar since – to a large degree –
they are both based on approaches with multidimensional policy spaces
that reflect issues or values.
 1.2 STABLE ALIGNMENT, DEALIGNMENT AND REALIGNMENT 5

This increased impact of issues and values is considered to be a causal

effect when prior structural variables are controlled for and is first and
foremost associated with the so-called cultural or New Politics dimension
(s). However, more general perspectives have also been formulated where
Old Politics values have become more important compared with the
equivalent socio-structural variables. This is discussed later.
Most of the literature associates the eventual increased impact of issues
and values on party choice with the New Politics orientations (Inglehart
1984, 1997: Chapter 8; Dalton et al. 1984). However, many of the
arguments imply that all types of issues and values – both Old and New
Politics – might increase since they are based on structural factors such as
increased level of education and political knowledge, and increased expo-
sure to the mass media. There might then be an increase in the impact of
all value orientations (Borre 2001: 134–136). Old Politics values were in
typical industrial societies strongly anchored in social structure, and there-
fore, the causal impact of these values on party choice was small, but in
advanced industrial societies this has changed and Old Politics values are
not so strongly anchored in social structural variables, but have significant
causal impact on party choice (Knutsen 1988).
Another type of realignment is one which follows from the changes in
social structure. Ecological realignment implies that changes in party sup-
port follow directly from the changes in social structure. Ecological rea-
lignment contributes not only to change the support of the various parties
but also to change political agenda and party strategies. Parties try to
appeal to some of the new expanding social groups.
For Kitschelt and Rehm (2015: 180–182) the post-industrial realign-
ment perspective implies that parties act strategically and realign with the
evolving preference distribution in the population induced by changing
occupational and socio-demographic group sizes. Given the high level of
cognitive mobilisation and sophistication of many post-industrial voters
who can discriminate between the programmatic positions of the parties
and the multidimensionality of the space on salient competitive issue
dimensions, party systems tend to fragment through programmatic diver-
sification. Post-industrial party systems are, therefore, highly fragmented if
the electoral system allows this, and voters gravitate to parties with posi-
tions and appeals that are closest to the voter’s preferences in a multi-
dimensional space. The post-industrial realignment perspective may then
generate cross-nationally quite distinct party system configuration and
multidimensional space.
6 1 INTRODUCTION AND PRESENTATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEMS

1.3 PREFERENCE FORMATION AND PARTY CHOICE IN

ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES
The impact of issues, values and “ideology” are important factors for
explaining voter’s party choice. Given that the impact of social structure
has declined and given than there has been large changes in the social
structure, some authors have argued that the impact of issues and values
are expected to increase, both in an absolute sense and relative to socio-
structural factors. The reduced role of party identification and social
identifications like class identification can also explain the increased role
of issues, values and ideology to explain party choice. These identities are,
however, not examined here.
The changes from industrial to advanced or post-industrial societies have
produced shifts in the formation of the political preferences in the popula-
tion. Most well known is perhaps the Silent Revolution which Ronald
Inglehart focussed upon in his major earlier works, and Herbert Kitschelt’s
works on a new libertarian–authoritarian conflict dimension that accumulate
the economic left–right dimension in advanced industrial societies.
Many years ago Ronald Inglehart (1984) formulated a couple of inter-
esting perspectives that can be taken as a point of departure. His main
perspective was (a) a change from a class-based to a value-based pattern of
polarisation or conflict structure and (b) two key hypotheses which he
called an issue polarisation hypothesis and a group polarisation hypothesis.
Here we broaden these perspectives by including all central structural
variables and all central political value orientations, while Inglehart mainly
focused social class (social structure) and the materialist/post-materialist
value orientations. The perspectives implied both a hypothesis about
structural dealignment and as we shall see – realignment – and value
realignment that according to his view was underlying the electoral change
in advanced industrial democracies.
The main perspective in Inglehart’s work is that traditional left–right class
voting has declined which, to a large degree, is caused by the rise of the
materialist/post-materialist value orientations as a major determinant for
political attitudes, identities and party choice. People with post-materialist
values want social change, identify with the left and vote for New Left parties
and thereby undermine the old order with a radical working class and a
conservative new middle class. However, Inglehart also formulated two
more concrete hypotheses that can be a fruitful departure for this work,
namely an issue polarisation hypothesis and a group polarisation hypothesis.
 1.3 PREFERENCE FORMATION AND PARTY CHOICE IN ADVANCED . . . 7

The issue polarisation hypothesis was related to the rising importance of

New Politics and the materialist/post-materialist issue and value dimension.
The increased importance of this dimension was compared to not only the
economic left–right dimension in particular, but also the role of religion.
These Old Politics dimensions would become less significant over time.
The group polarisation hypothesis indicating that a new group polarisation
had developed parallel to the old class cleavage. This new “axis of group
polarisation” was coupled to the rising importance of political issues that
reflected a shift in value priorities along the materialist/post-materialist
dimension. The social basis of the new support for the parties and policies
of the left tended to come disproportionally from middle-class sources
because the New Leftist voters had post-materialist values, and post-materi-
alists were disproportionally higher educated and new middle-class people.
The group polarisation hypothesis implies two important perspectives:
(a) The traditional pattern where the upper and middle class supported
the right and the workers supported the leftist parties may be weakened
and even reversed. The rise of the materialist/post-materialist dimension
can also explain the decline of class voting in post-industrial society. The
new middle class and the better-educated strata are most likely to support
“the post-material left”. As post-materialist issues become more impor-
tant, this stimulates a materialist counter-reaction whereby some of the
working class side with conservative or bourgeois parties to reaffirm the
traditional materialist emphasis on economic growth, military security and
law and order (Inglehart 1984: 28, 1997: 252–256).
(b) Value orientations will play an important intermediate role for
explaining the “new” impact of social structure on party choice. It is –
according to Inglehart – the materialist/post-materialist orientations that
explain the changing impact of class variables on party choice.
If the perspective is broadening somewhat, we can discuss Inglehart’s
perspective as a change from social structural determinants of party choice
to values and basic political issues as the major determinants of party
choice. Not only social class but all socio-structural variables have become
weaker determinants of party choice over time, and value orientations will
play a greater role in the future.
The two hypotheses (issue and group polarisation) can also be broadened
to include several structural variables and value orientations. Issue and value
orientations will be increasingly important for people’s identities and party
choice, and a large part of the impact of the socio-structural variables will be
transmitted via these value orientations. The impact of social structure on
8 1 INTRODUCTION AND PRESENTATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEMS

party choice will then – in advanced industrial societies – be explained by

various value orientations that are important for individual’s political identi-
ties and party choice. Inglehart discusses the decline of conventional left–
right class voting, but his group polarisation hypothesis can also be inter-
preted as a realignment hypothesis where social structural variables increas-
ingly will influence party choice in new ways which deviate from the
traditional in typical industrial societies, and where value orientations will
be central intermediate variables between social structure and party choice.
In Kitschelt’s (1994, 1995) important works on the strategies of the
parties on the left and radical right, a major theoretical part comprises the
preference formations and changing conflict dimensions in advanced
industrial democracies. Kitschelt argues for a new libertarian–authoritarian
conflict dimension that has become increasingly important and comple-
ment the economic left–right dimensions with regard to party competi-
tion. Kitschelt argues that the two dimensions are separate but that the
main competition takes place along an orthogonal axis from left-libertar-
ian to right-authoritarian values. The libertarian–authoritarian dimension
is fairly similar to Inglehart’s materialist/post-materialist dimension
(Kitschelt 1994: 28–29).
Central in his theoretical perspective on political preference formations
in advanced industrial societies are social transactions in work settings
characterised by labour markets and authority relations, and interactive
processes among people on everyday life that generate beliefs and disposi-
tions on which people act (Kitschelt 1994: 12–30).
Central in the social transaction processes are market locations, and
Kitschelt emphasises social class, public versus private sector employment
and sectors of jobs and assets that are orientated towards international
competition versus domestic and local markets. These processes are most
important for economic left–right orientations, and the higher educated
strata, part of the new middle class, public sector employees and those who
work in the domestic market sector will have leftist orientations.
The interactive processes relate to daily environment of work organisa-
tions and the sphere of social consumption. Work environment and
opportunities to participate in communicative social processes are impor-
tant factors in this respect. Work experiences that offer job autonomy and
involve communicative skills foster preferences for social reciprocity and
individual creativity, and libertarian values. In contrast, authoritarian
values are fostered in work environments where the work is routine,
steered from above and where the rewards are monetary earning external
 1.3 PREFERENCE FORMATION AND PARTY CHOICE IN ADVANCED . . . 9

to the social process. The work situation that individuals encounter in

their daily occupation tasks are then central for developing preferences for
libertarian or authoritarian values, and Kitschelt indicates that education
and gender are important socio-structural determinant for this dimension.
Higher educated people typically work in settings where they have greater
control over their job environments and women tend to be overwhel-
mingly employed in people-processing organisations. These groups have,
therefore, libertarian values and tend to support the New Left, while lower
educated strata and men to a larger degree tend to have authoritarian
values and support the Radical Right.
The relationship between social structure, conflict dimensions (which is
called value orientations here) and party choice is central in Kitschelt’s
approach. His approach is mainly a spatial one where social groups and
parties and their strategies are located in a two-dimensional space, but
underlying this is a model of preference formation where social structure
and value orientations are central.
The basic causal model that underlies this work is shown in shown in
Fig. 1.1.
It should be underscored that both social structural variables and value
orientations are multidimensional and comprises several variables. The
impact of social structure is both direct on party choice and indirect via
value orientations. Ingleharts group polarisation hypothesis and
Kitschelt’s model for the relationship between social stricture, the two
conflict dimensions and party choice and party strategies can be under-
stood as being focussed on the indirect effect from social structure via
value orientations to party choice.

Value orientations

Socio structural
variables Party choice

Fig. 1.1 Causal model for explaining party choice

10 1 INTRODUCTION AND PRESENTATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEMS

The second main research questions can be understood as the

indirect effect of social structure on party choice via value orientations,
while the third research problem is the strength of the impact of value
orientations when social structure is controlled for (indicated by the
arrow from value orientations to party choice in the model). These
types of voting will be referred to as cleavage voting and pure value
voting below, respectively.
The impact of social structure on party choice is frequently referred to
as cleavages. According to this conceptualisation a cleavage basically
reflects broadly based and long-standing social and economic divisions
within society, and the political cleavage structure is thought of in terms of
social groups, the loyalties of individuals to their social group and how
these loyalties influence party choice and political action (Franklin et al.
1992: 5).
Throughout this book, we use the notion of cleavages in this way.
Newer conceptualisations tend to reserve the cleavage concept to the
indirect effect from social structure via value orientation to party choice.
In Sections 6.4 and 6.5, the cleavage concept is used in this way when the
strength of this indirect effect (research problem 2) is tested. Otherwise,
we will use the notion deep-seated cleavage or full-grown cleavage for this
indirect effect.

1.4 COGNITIVE MOBILISATION AND POLITICAL

SOPHISTICATION
The theory of cognitive mobilisation implies that issue and value voting
will increase over time. According to this perspective advanced industrial
societies have produced a tremendous expansion of secondary and higher
education and a diffusion of greater quantities of political information via
the electronic media. This has raised the political resources and cognitive
skills of large segments of the population in advanced societies.
The process of cognitive mobilisation has two separate parts (Dalton
2014: 21–25): the ability to acquire political information and the ability
to process political information. There has been an enormous expansion
of mass media and the public have obtained a greater ability to process
political information. More people also have the resources and skills
necessary to deal with the complexities of politics and to reach their
own political decisions, and do not have to rely on external cues or
 1.4 COGNITIVE MOBILISATION AND POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION 11

heuristics. Cognitive mobilisation, therefore, reduces many people’s need

to rely on parental influence, party identification and other cues for
making political decisions. Socio-structural location is also a case in this
respect: Cognitive mobilisation works against the stable social cleavages
and the dominance of large, disciplined organisations and has contribu-
ted to a shift from social group to value and issue politics and a change
from social group to value and issue-based conflicts (Dalton et al. 1984:
18–19, 474).
Dalton has developed a model comprising party identification and
cognitive mobilisation. The groups of highly cognitive mobilised with-
out a party identification – the so-called apartisans – are politically
involved and sophisticated citizens who are unattached to any political
party. This group votes regularly and places greater weight on issues and
values when they cast their vote. However, their voting pattern might
also be more variable and reflecting the changing context of the elections
and the political strategies of the political parties (Dalton 1984, 2014:
198–204).
Cognitive mobilisation and political sophistication are similar concepts
and a process of cognitive mobilisation has raised the public overall level of
political sophistication. Cognitively mobilised voters have clear positions
on political issues and values, can discriminate between the political par-
ties’ programmatic positions in a multidimensional space and make poli-
tical choices on the basis of these calculations.
Research has shown that issue- and value-based voting varies strongly
with levels of political sophistication (Lachat 2008; Macdonald et al.
1995: 467–470). Therefore, if the cognitive mobilisation theory is correct,
issue and value voting should increase due to the increased cognitive
mobilisation and political sophistication among the electorate.3 It can
also be argued that cognitive mobilisation is relevant to cleavage voting.
Cognitively mobilised voters have values that are formed from their struc-
tural position; these voters vote according to these values.
Most of the literature associates the eventually increased impact of
issues and values on party choice with the New Politics orientations
(Dalton et al. 1984). However, many of the arguments based on cognitive
mobilisation imply that all types of issues and values – both Old and New
Politics – might increase since the arguments are based on structural
factors such as increased level and education and political knowledge,
and increased exposure to mass media. Consequently, there could be an
increase in the impact of all value orientations (Borre 2001: 134–136).
12 1 INTRODUCTION AND PRESENTATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEMS

1.5 SOCIAL STRUCTURE, VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND PARTY

CHOICE
1.5.1 The Party Choice Variable
Much of the research on the impact of socio-structural variables on party
choice, dichotomise the dependent party choice variable into leftist and non-
leftist parties, and the findings about a fairly strong decline in the impact of
social structure on party choice is based on this approach. In a previous work on
the impact of the socio-structural model based on Eurobarometer data for
eight West European countries from the 1970s to the late 1990s, I found
(Knutsen 2004a: chapter 7) a market difference in the decline of socio-struc-
tural variables depending on how the party choice variable was treated. The
average decline based on the dichotomous party choice variable was 46%, while
the decline based on all parties treated as separate categories was only 17%.
There is obviously considerable impact of the socio-structural variables that are
still present, but tends to cut across the left–right division of parties. Similar
differences were found for class voting in particular when it was analysed using
different treatments of the dependent variable (Knutsen 2006a).
The traditional way of examining the impact of socio-structural variables
on party choice is to use a dichotomous dependent party choice variable. In
this work dichotomisation is not used but the whole party system is analysed;
all significant parties are included as separate categories. Given that the
impact of social structure declines considerably less when the left–right
division of parties is replaced with a nominal-level party choice variable
where all significant parties are included as separate categories, it could be
that the relationship between social structure and value orientations has
interesting intermediate effects on party choice
In the previous works mentioned earlier (Knutsen 2004a, 2006a), the
party choice variable was based on the party choice variable where all
parties were treated as separate categories and party choice was also
based on a dichotomous left–right party choice variable. Due to lack of
space the dichotomous approach has been dropped in this work.

1.5.2 Social Structure

It is now a conventional view that the impact of social structure on voting
behaviour is declining in advanced industrial democracies. Another per-
spective is that the impact has changed due to changes in the preferences of
 1.5 SOCIAL STRUCTURE, VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND PARTY CHOICE 13

the voters and changes in the conflict structure. It is evident that both
dealignment and realignment processes are taking place in advanced
industrial democracies, and it is also obvious that the way of treating the
dependent party choice variable is important in this respect as indicated by
the perspectives of Inglehart and Kitschelt. The realignment perspective
might first and foremost be related to the class variables, but – as we have
seen – the perspectives from Kitschelt’s work indicate that several socio-
structural variables might be relevant in this respect.
By including value orientations as intermediate variables, it is possible
to examine how much of the impact of social structure is transmitted via
value orientations and how much that is not. Works by Daniel Oesch
(2013) and Rune Stubager (2013) have, for example, showed empirically
that the New Politics party conflict between the New Left and Radical
Right can be considered as a deep-seated cleavage related to class variables
(social class and education), libertarian–authoritarian values and support
for the New Left versus the Radical Right.

1.5.3 Value Orientations

Politically relevant value orientations are multidimensional. This work
takes issue with the notion of two dimensions, an economic left-right
and a so-called cultural dimension. These dimensions are sometimes also
referred to as Old and New Politics dimensions, respectively.
Old Politics is frequently coupled to the structural variables in the
Lipset–Rokkan model for cleavages in industrial societies. Lipset and
Rokkan did not emphasis value orientations as distinct conflict lines, but
indicated that values might be part of given cleavages. The most important
value orientations that can be considered as equivalent to these structural
cleavages and which emerged from industrial societies were economic left–
right values related to economic redistribution and the size of the welfare
state, and religious–secular (moral) values. The religious–secular values
seem mistakenly to have been ignored in some of the most recent litera-
ture conflict dimensions in advanced democracies.
The moral value dimension and economic left–right values are often
referred to as “Old Politics” because they capture the essence of the tradi-
tional lines of conflict in industrial society. In contrast, “New Politics” refers
to value conflicts emerging from post-industrial society. More specifically,
New Politics-related value dimensions involve conflicts over a more modern
set of issues related, for instance, to environmental quality, alternative life
14 1 INTRODUCTION AND PRESENTATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEMS

styles, social and political participation, minority rights and social equality.
Some observers have argued that the tranquillity of West European electoral
politics has been disrupted by the rise of new social movements and a
number of Green, New Left and Radical Rightist political parties. These
developments have led to a debate over the possibility of a partisan realign-
ment on the basis of new politics issues and values.
One approach to New Politics values is Inglehart’s materialist/post-
materialist dimension. This is a comprehensive dimension which includes
as materialist values both values that tap economic and physical security,
and post-materialist values that both tap belongingness (such as participa-
tory values) and aesthetical values (such as environmental protection and
emphasis on ideas instead of money).4 Kitschelt’s libertarian–authoritarian
dimension is very similar, although it is not measured with the same set of
indicators across surveys in the same way and with indicators that clearly
tap value orientations in the same way as Inglehart’s indicators,
Other approaches differentiate between different New Politics orienta-
tions on the basis of both theoretical discussions and empirical analyses
(mainly factor analyses). A basic differentiation within New Politics orien-
tations is between libertarian–authoritarian values and environmental
values. Theoretically, it can be argued that these values tap different
orientations. While the first dimension taps orientations towards autho-
rities and different child-rearing values, the other taps orientations that
reflect different trade-offs related to concern for the environment versus
economic growth, productivity and economic efficiency. Various analyses
have shown that these values do tap different dimensions (Knutsen 1995a;
Knutsen and Kumlin 2005). In recent publications, Kitschelt has added a
third dimension related to his economic left–right and libertarian–author-
itarian dimensions, namely one that reflects orientations towards immigra-
tion and multiculturalism (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014, 2015: 180–181).
The data material used in this work is rich in the sense that it contains
many value indicators which measure the relevant social and political value
dimensions. It is, therefore, possible to examine the dimensionality of
politically relevant value orientations in greater detail than in many other
comparative surveys.
Comparative studies that examine the relationship between value orien-
tations and party choice and do not restrict the analyses to two dimensions
in addition to those mentioned above are Gunther and Hsin-chi (2007) and
Moreno (1999, 2016). Important studies of individual countries which
examine more than two dimensions include Middendorp’s well-known
 1.5 SOCIAL STRUCTURE, VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND PARTY CHOICE 15

study of ideology in the Netherlands (Middendorp 1991), and Shalom

Schwartz et al.’s (2010) important study of the relationship between perso-
nal and political values and voting. Schwartz et al. identify eight “core
political value” dimensions that are examined in relation to personal values
and party choice. The election surveys in Norway and Sweden also contain a
large number of political issues and value indicators which have produced
multidimensional spaces based on dimensional analyses.
Schwartz, a leading researcher on value orientations, defines the follow-
ing regarding the idea of two dimensions in value research: “Two dimen-
sions can hardly capture the richness of individual and cultural differences
in values. For this purpose, a more finely tuned set of basic values is
needed” (2006: 173). This applies decisively both to basic personal values
and to basic political values.
The idea of Old and New Politics value orientations: A basic idea in the
literature on New Politics is that the value orientations included in New
Politics – whether one or several – will be increasingly more important in
explaining party choice, whereas the Old Politics orientations that will fade
away with the class and religious structural cleavages (Inglehart 1990:
chap. 9, 1997: 252–266).5 This work do not have longitudinal data, but
focus on the relative importance of Old and New Politics orientations and
determine which of the macro-level variables that are correlated with this
relative importance of these value orientations.6
Value competition and positional competition: The existence of several
significant value orientations that are important for the voter’s choice of
political parties in a multiparty system insert special issue or value dimension
competition between the political parties (Green-Pedersen 2007). The par-
ties would like to have the issues and values they emphasise as dominating
the political agenda, and they will, of course, try to convince the voters that
their position on a given dimension is the best. They therefore compete in
two ways: (a) in having the issue dimension that they primarily focus upon to
be dominant, for example, in an election campaign,7 and (b) for different
party positions on the given issue dimension(s). As to the first point, some
parties, for example, focus on economic issues; others focus on religious
issues or the environment, whereas yet others focus on law and order, or
refugees and immigrants. Issue competition does not imply that political
parties will each select and emphasise one or a few issue dimensions and then
just ignore the others. The central aim of a political party in issue competi-
tion is to get other parties to pay attention to those issues that it would like to
see dominating electoral competition, but in most cases they will also
16 1 INTRODUCTION AND PRESENTATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEMS

formulate positions on the other dimensions (Green-Pedersen 2007: 609).

As Green-Pedersen (2007: 612) remarks: “This does not mean that the two
types of competition are necessarily unrelated, and growing issue competi-
tion does not necessarily mean less positional competition, but rather that
party competition becomes considerably more complex.” Green-Pedersen
(2007: 618–623) shows that the emphasis of issue dimensions varies system-
atically between various party families on the basis of the programmes of the
political parties.

1.6 EXPLANATORY MACRO-LEVEL VARIABLES

In order to explain many of the comparative findings in this work, a few
macro-level variables are used, namely advanced industrialism and frag-
mentation and polarisation of the party system. This study does not
examine changes over time, but there are significant differences between
the 18 Western European countries concerning these macro variables to
test hypotheses about the impact of degree of advanced industrialism on
various aspects on conflict structure.

1.6.1 Advanced Industrialism and Post-industrialism

The notion of advanced industrial society is used here to tap an important
social structural dimension that is used as a macro-level framework. Other
terms that are used to mean more or less the same are “advanced capital-
ism” (Beramendi et al. 2015), “post-industrial societies” (Bell 1973) and
“rich democracies” (Wilenski 2002). Frequently, these notions are used
interchangeably even in the same works. Bell (1973) used the notion the
“post-industrial society” to indicate a structural transformation from the
production of a good to the production of services, and where knowledge
and technology play an important role in the economy. The advanced
industrial societies have de-industrialised and “tertiarised”, producing
considerable changes in the occupational structure. Similarly, there have
been large increases in the education level in the population. Oesch
(2015) uses the notion of education and occupation upgrading for the
large upward trends in education and occupation patterns.
Deindustrialisation, meaning that a smaller portion of the workforce is
working in the manufacturing sector of the economy, is also a major
transformation trait. Technological change has eroded the numbers of
production workers and office clerks, and the service economy has worsened
 1.6 EXPLANATORY MACRO-LEVEL VARIABLES 17

the job and mobility prospects of production workers, semiskilled clerks,

owners of small stores and independent artisans. On the other hand, there
has been strong job growth in highly skilled, high-quality professionals in
the private and public service sectors.
The increase in standard of living and wealth is also a major character-
istic of advanced industrial societies. Here, national GDP per capita and
the size of the working population in the service sector are used as
indicators of advanced industrialism. The first is an indicator of “rich
democracies”; the other as an indicator of post-industrialism according
to Bell. Here we consider both as indicators for advanced industrialism.
The main hypotheses are that advanced industrialism induces prefer-
ence formations and conflict structure, and that party system characteris-
tics do the same, in particular related to the conflict structure.
This work does not examine the impact of the economic recession that
started in 2008 on value orientations and party choice. It can be objected
that the economic recession would have an impact on the findings, and
that can be the case. However, a thorough work on values and the
economic crises concluded that basic value orientations did not change
during the recession, but various social and political attitudes did, and to
some degree also the relationship between values and attitudes (Voicu,
Mochmann and Dülmer 2016).

1.6.2 Party System Polarisation

Party system polarisation can be defined as the distance between the parties
in a party system on central policy dimensions. The theoretical expectation
for why the degree of polarisation in party systems might influence the size
of the impact of social structural and value orientation on voting choice is
fairly straightforward: Individuals should be better able to compare the
political parties and recognise which party is best positioned to represent
them. It may also become easier for citizens to choose a party and form an
identification with that party if parties are more distinct.
More detailed arguments (see Knutsen and Kumlin 2005: 157–161)
for why party system polarisation might increase the impact of value
orientations on party choice are as follows. First, if party representatives
use overarching values or ideological concepts in a consistent manner,
more citizens may be stimulated to do likewise. If parties present coherent
issue packages that are explicitly tied together, then more voters should
learn to use such value-laden concepts themselves. Second, polarised party
18 1 INTRODUCTION AND PRESENTATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEMS

conflict may also make it easier for citizens to choose on the basis of values.
According to Zaller’s (1992: 44–45) model of opinion formation, it is
easier for people to make value-based political choices if they possess a rich
supply of “cueing information”. This information is about the relationship
between their values and the incoming information.
A third mechanism has to do with affective responses to polarised party
conflicts. Frequently used orientations tend to become emotionally stron-
ger: People feel stronger about opinions and attitudes that they express
and use often. In turn, we also know that emotionally strong orientations
are typically more accessible in voters’ minds compared to less intense
orientations. More clearly polarised ideological party conflict may thus
increase the electoral impact of values by making values more emotionally
charged and more accessible in citizen’s minds. Voters in intense cam-
paigns and in setting with polarisation of parties’ ideological positions
make more sophisticated decisions and rely less.
Some of the arguments for why party system polarisation increases party
identification (see below) can also – somewhat reframed – be used as
theoretical arguments for why party system polarisation will increase the
impact of value orientations on voting (Lupu 2015: 334–336).
Voting based on value orientations will increase as parties become increas-
ingly salient in political discourse. When parties agree on policies, they become
irrelevant to citizens. But when they disagree, partisan conflict becomes more
heated and parties seem to be more important. Polarisation clarifies party
positions for the mass publics, which in turn influences the importance and
salience of parties. This would increase voting based on values.
A rationalistic perspective takes as a point of departure that citizens
evaluate parties over time to form a “running tally” and chose the party
that is most likely to benefit them. Citizens calculate their net utility from
supporting a particular party and evaluate this based on their expected
gains from supporting other parties. When parties are close together, the
net benefit from supporting one party over the other is small, but when
differences between the parties are large, the net benefit for voting for the
party that in beneficiary is also large, all else equal.
The arguments above are related to the impact of value orientations on
party choice. It could be argued that this also applies to positions in the
social structure, in particular when socio-structural position is transmitted
via value orientations. Socio-structural positions and interests can more
easily lead to distinct choice of political parties for many of the same
reasons as those formulated for value orientations.
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