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COMPARATIVE KURDISH
POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
ACTORS, IDEAS, AND INTERESTS
Edited By Emel Elif Tugdar and Serhun Al
Comparative Kurdish Politics in the Middle East
 Emel Elif Tugdar · Serhun Al
Editors

Comparative Kurdish
Politics in the Middle
East
Actors, Ideas, and Interests
Editors
Emel Elif Tugdar Serhun Al
Department of Politics İzmir University of Economics
and International Balçova-İzmir, Turkey
University of Kurdistan Hewler
Erbil, Iraq

ISBN 978-3-319-53714-6 ISBN 978-3-319-53715-3 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53715-3

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017940378

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction
on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and
information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication.
Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied,
with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have
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Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Contents

Part I Actors

1 Iraqi Kurdistan’s Statehood Aspirations and Non-Kurdish

Actors: The Case of the Turkomans 3
Emel Elif Tugdar

2 Kurdish Political Parties in Syria: Past Struggles

and Future Expectations 27
Bekir Halhalli

Part II Ideas

3 Human Security Versus National Security: Kurds, Turkey

and Syrian Rojava 57
Serhun Al

4 Kurdish Nationalist Organizations, Neighboring States,

and “Ideological Distance” 85
F. Michael Wuthrich

v
vi Contents

5 Statehood, Autonomy, or Unitary Coexistence?

A Comparative Analysis of How Kurdish Groups
Approach the Idea of Self-Determination 113
Cenap Çakmak

Part III Interests

6 Islam and the Kurdish Peace Process in Turkey

(2013–2015) 137
Ina Merdjanova

7 Ethnic Capital Across Borders and Regional Development:

A Comparative Analysis of Kurds in Iraq and Turkey 163
Serhun Al and Emel Elif Tugdar

8 In Search of Futures: Uncertain Neoliberal Times,

Speculations, and the Economic Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan 185
Umut Kuruuzum

9 The Stateless and Why Some Gain and Others not: The
Case of Iranian Kurdistan 201
Idris Ahmedi

Conclusion 227

Index 233
 Editors and Contributors

About the Editors

Emel Elif Tugdar holds the position of Assistant Professor and Chair
in Department of Politics and International Relations at University of
Kurdistan Hawler in Erbil/Kurdistan Region of Iraq. She holds a Ph.D.
in Political Science from West Virginia University (USA). Her research
agenda includes ethnopolitics, human rights, and politics of gender
with a major focus on the Middle East, specifically Turkey and Iraqi
Kurdistan. Her email address is: [email protected].
Serhun Al is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political
Science and International Relations at Izmir University of Economics,
Turkey. He holds a doctorate degree in Political Science from the
University of Utah, USA. His research interests include politics of iden-
tity, ethnic conflict, security studies, and social movements. His pri-
mary geographical focus is on Turkey and the Kurds in the Middle East.
He has widely published in journals such as Ethnopolitics, Studies in
Ethnicity and Nationalism, Nationalities Papers, Globalizations, Journal
of International Relations and Development, and Journal of Balkan and
Near Eastern Studies. His email address is: [email protected].

vii
viii Editors and Contributors

Contributors

Idris Ahmedi holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Stockholm

University, where he worked as a senior lecturer until 2015. He has
been a visiting scholar at the Department of Government at Georgetown
University, Washington D.C., and a tutor at the Department of Security,
Strategy and Leadership at the Swedish Defense University. Currently, he
serves as Senior Lecturer In Political Science at the School of Natural
Sciences, Technology and Environmental Studies, Södertörn University.
He is also a member of the International Expert Group of the Olof
Palme International Center (2016–2017). His email address is idris.
[email protected].
Cenap Çakmak received his Ph.D. from Rutgers University in Global
Affairs. He currently works as Professor of International Law and Politics
at Eskisehir Osmangazi University, Turkey. Dr. Çakmak’s research inter-
ests include international criminal law, human rights, and international
affairs. His email address is [email protected].
Bekir Halhalli received his B.A. in International Relations from The
American University of Cyprus in 2011 and his M.A. focused on Kurdish
Question and Turkish Foreign Policy from the same University in 2013.
He was an (Erasmus) exchange Ph.D. student at Comenius University
in Bratislava, Slovakia in 2014–2015. He is currently completing his
Ph.D. in International Relations at Sakarya University. He has publica-
tions written in English and Turkish in peer-reviewed academic jour-
nals, as book chapters and conference papers. He is also author of “Arab
Spring and The Kurds: The Paradox of Turkish Foreign Policy”. His cur-
rent research interests include International Relations Theories, Turkish
Foreign Policy in the Middle East and Kurdish Question. His email
address is [email protected].
Umut Kuruuzum is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of
Anthropology in London School of Economics and Political Science. His
research interests include political economy and cultural anthropology
with a focus on Iraqi Kurds. His email address is [email protected].
Ina Merdjanova is a Senior Researcher and an Adjunct Assistant
Professor in Religious Studies at the Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity
College Dublin. She had held visiting fellowships at Oxford University,
Birmingham University, the Center for Advanced Studies in the
 Editors and Contributors ix

Humanities at Edinburgh University, the Woodrow Wilson International

Center for Scholars in Washington DC, the Netherlands Institute for
Advanced Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences, the Central
European University in Budapest, Radboud University in Nijmegen
and Aleksanteri Institute at Helsinki University. Her recent publica-
tions include Religion as a Conversation Starter: Interreligious Dialogue
for Peacebuilding in the Balkans (with Patrice Brodeur; Continuum
2009), and Rediscovering the Umma: Muslims in the Balkans between
Nationalism and Transnationalism (Oxford University Press 2013). Her
email address is [email protected].
F. Michael Wuthrich is a Visiting Assistant Professor and Academic
Director of the Global & International Studies Programs at the
University of Kansas. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from
Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey in 2011. His articles have appeared
in the International Journal of Middle East Studies, Middle East Journal,
and Turkish Studies, among others. His book National Elections in
Turkey: People, Politics, and the Party System was published by Syracuse
University Press in July 2015. His email address is [email protected].
 List of Figures

Fig. 7.1 K.R.G.’s ranking in Turkey’s export 176

xi
 List of Tables

Table 2.1 The political parties within the ENKS 41

xiii
 Introduction

Today, around 30 million Kurds across Iraq (5.5 million/17.5% of total

population), Syria (1.7 million/9.7%), Turkey (14.7 million/18%), and
Iran (8.1 million/10%) politically and socially play a significant role in
contemporary Middle East politics. Kurds are the fourth-largest ethnic
group in the region after Turks, Persians, and Arabs. Despite their differ-
ent dialects such as Kurmanji and Sorani, Kurds speak Kurdish which is
an Indo-European language. In terms of religious affiliation, Kurds are
predominantly Sunni Muslims. Despite their large population and mas-
sive cultural, political, and economic influence in the Middle East, Kurds
do not have an independent state yet. As an ethnic group and a nation
in the making, Kurds are not homogenous and united but rather the
Kurdish Middle East is home to various competing political groups, ide-
ologies, and interests. The main goal of this volume seeks to unpack the
intra-Kurdish dynamics in the region by looking at the main actors, their
ideas, and political interests across Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
Although Kurds have not always been in the spotlight of the inter-
national community and regional affairs, there have been two signifi-
cant events that put the Kurds at the center of international scholarly
and public attention. First was the Gulf War in the early 1990s, where
the United States and the Iraqi Kurds became coalition partners against
the Saddam regime. After the Gulf War, the Kurdish question in the
Middle East became one of the fundamental issues of international
affairs. The US-Iraqi Kurds partnership led to an official federal status
known as the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq after the Saddam
regime was toppled in 2003. Today, after more than a decade, Kurds
xv
xvi Introduction

are again in the headlines of international media, think-tanks, academic

circles, and ­government agendas due to their fight against the notori-
ous ­Salafi-jihadist Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and being the
major partners of the international coalition against the ISIS. While the
Peshmerga forces in Iraqi Kurdistan have stopped the Islamic State’s
expansion in northern Iraq, the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (known
as YPG) has cleared northern Syria from ISIS. The increasing attention
on the Kurds can be easily told through skyrocketing academic and media
publications on their role in regional affairs and international relations.
Thus, fundamental questions about the actors, ideas, and interests rele-
vant to the Kurdish politics in the Middle East continue to attract schol-
arly attention.
However, many tend to homogenize Kurds as one single actor in the
region with a collective goal of greater Kurdistan. Moreover, many exist-
ing studies analyze the Kurdish politics in the Middle East through the
lens of their relationship with external actors including the capitols that
they are attached to (i.e., Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus, and Ankara). Yet,
few studies analyze domestic affairs of the Kurds from a comparative per-
spective across Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. This is a significant gap in
the literature and needs further research since Kurds do not constitute
one single actor but they consist of many different actors with various
alliances, conflicts, ideas, and interests.
We aim to address these questions with historically grounded, theo-
retically informed, and conceptually-relevant scholarship that prioritizes
comparative politics over international relations. In a nutshell, this edited
volume seeks to explore the Kurdish World in the Middle East within its
own debates, conflicts, and interests.
The theme of Part I is “Actors” in the Kurdish World. In Chap. 1,
Emel Elif Tugdar discusses the role of ethnoreligious diversity in Iraqi
Kurdistan and its effects on state-formation. Particularly, she focuses on
Turkomans as actors in Iraqi Kurdistan’s state-formation. She argues
that although Turkoman integration in the Kurdish state-building has
been complex, respect and tolerance for this minority group in Iraqi
Kurdistan has promoted ethnoreligious diversity in the region. In Chap.
2, Bekir Halhalli introduces the competing Kurdish actors and political
parties in Syria along with their past struggles and future expectations.
He argues that the Kurdish political presence in the post-2011 upris-
ing against the Assad regime has not been homogenous and he draws
 Introduction xvii

the map of demands, similarities, differences, and the organization styles

of the rival Kurdish groups in Syria. In Chap. 3, Serhun Al analyzes the
role of Turkish and Kurdish Islamic actors in the peace-building efforts
in Turkey during the so-called “Kurdish Opening” (2013–2015). She
argues that the utilization of Islam between the Turkish Directorate of
Religious Affairs (known as Diyanet) and the Kurdish Islamic actors
significantly differed and affected the course of the peace process.
The theme of Part II is “Ideas” in the Kurdish Middle East. In
Chap. 4, Michael Wuthrich discusses the nature of nationalist idea
among Kurds from a human security perspective. He particularly argues
that nationalism for the Kurds functions as a security provider for their
physical and cultural safety from external threats due to their traumatic
historical experiences in the region. In Chap. 5, Cenap Çakmak analy-
ses competing for Kurdish nationalist projects in the Kurdish Middle
East and unpacks how different ideological and political agendas offer
contending ideas with regards to the establishment of an ideal Kurdish
nation. In Chap. 6, Ina Merdjanova puts the idea of self-determination
among Kurds under scrutiny. He particularly focuses on the approaches
and understandings of pro-Barzani, pro-Ocalan, and pro-Islamist groups
toward the idea of self-determination. Thus, the chapter investigates how
the idea of self-determination has been utilized and framed by pro-Kurd-
ish groups in their political discourses.
Part III focuses on “Interests” in the Kurdish political space. In
Chap. 7, Serhun Al and Emel Elif Tugdar discuss the role of Kurdish
identity from a political economy perspective. The notion of ethnic capi-
tal is particularly applied as a mechanism for reducing transaction costs
in cross-regional or cross-border trade and commerce in the Kurdish
Middle East. As the ethnic consciousness of pro-Kurdish identity
becomes more consolidated in the region, Al and Tugdar argue that this
is likely to boost the economic interests of Kurdish individuals for more
trade and labor market activities within the Kurdish ethnic and cultural
space. In Chap. 8, Umut Kuruzum analyzes the role of multinational oil
companies and global capitalist trends with regards to the political inter-
ests for Kurdish independence and statehood in Iraq. In Chap. 9, Idris
Ahmedi observes the political gains of Iranian Kurds and comparatively
analyzes why they lag behind compared with the Kurds in other parts of
the Kurdish Middle East. He particularly emphasizes the role of power
and resources in terms of Kurdish mobilization capacities and the role of
socially shared ideas of Persian national interests among the Kurds.
xviii Introduction

Overall, this edited volume introduces the dynamics and c­ omplexities

of the intra-Kurdish politics in the broader Kurdish World. As the
Kurdish political space in the Middle East is conducive to many com-
peting Kurdish actors, rivalries, alliances, ideologies, interests, and future
outlook, this comparative study seeks to unpack this complex intra-
Kurdish dynamics within the themes of actors, ideas, and interests. In
the end, the book has three major objectives: (1) to introduce scholars
of Comparative Politics and Middle East Studies to pertinent theoretical
approaches with the help of a series of case studies regarding the Kurds;
(2) to advance the understanding of causal mechanisms of internal
dynamics underlying the contemporary Kurdish politics in the Middle
East; and (3) to encourage further research that draws on the same
models or modifying them with a focus on particularly stateless nations.
PART I

Actors
 CHAPTER 1

Iraqi Kurdistan’s Statehood Aspirations

and Non-Kurdish Actors: The Case
of the Turkomans

Emel Elif Tugdar

Introduction
State-building in the Middle East has been a popular topic in politi-
cal science literature since 9/11. The interest of Western powers in the
region has increased in parallel with security concerns under the name of
“spreading democracy.” Thus, the concept of state-building has acquired
political, economic, and social dimensions, all of which are required to
explain the state-building patterns in the Middle East. This chapter will
examine some of the key theories of state-building and how certain the-
ories have been applied to the Middle East and Iraq. I will then con-
sider how these thematic areas relate to the core focus of the analysis: the
state-building efforts in Iraqi Kurdistan.
I will concentrate on sociopolitical factors and, in particular, the role
of the Turkoman people in this process. The northern part of Iraq, which
is known as Iraqi Kurdistan, is a region rich in ethno-religious diversity.

E.E. Tugdar (*)

University of Kurdistan Hawler, Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, Iraq

© The Author(s) 2018 3

E.E. Tugdar and S. Al (eds.), Comparative Kurdish Politics
in the Middle East, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53715-3_1
4 E.E. Tugdar

However, the role of the Kurds in state-building, for example, has been
well researched. The Turkomans are the third-largest ethnic group in
Iraq, yet we know relatively little about their role in constructing a suc-
cessful Iraqi Kurdistan. This chapter aims to take a closer look at this
group as their participation is vital in a number of different areas. As the
Turkomans are politically very active, we are interested in their attitudes
and role in Kurdish state-building. This chapter will examine demo-
graphic and related political questions, religious, cultural and ethnic mat-
ters, the role of language, and the vital connection to Turkey. The central
argument presented here is that, while there are a number of complex
problems for Turkoman integration (in addition to current issues related
to ISIS, economic recession, and the refugee crisis), in many of these
areas, there are also several reasons for optimism within a KRG that has
often shown both tolerance and respect for the Turkoman population.

State-Building in the Context of Middle East

In general, the process of building a state has three dimensions: politi-
cal, economic, and social. Although the first condition of building a state
is easy to analyze, measuring emotions is not reliable and not possible.
Charles Tilly (1975), who is a well-known scholar of state-building the-
ory, defines the concept of “state” as consisting of relatively centralized,
differentiated organizations with officials that successfully claim control
over the means of violence within a population in a large territory. This
definition constitutes the political dimension of state-building. Chandler
(2006) also argues that state-building refers to the process of construct-
ing institutions of governance that can provide citizens with physical and
economic security.
Carment et al. (2007) argue that, nowadays, state-building typi-
cally occurs as a response of the international community to a state fail-
ure due to the consequences of underdevelopment and violent conflict.
Thus, state-building is perceived as a post-conflict, failed state approach.
Hayami (2003) claims that the biggest challenges involved in the restora-
tion of a failed state relate to economic development. The global commu-
nity’s effort to contribute to state-building from an economic perspective is
a neoliberal state-building approach. The neoliberal approach emphasizes
the importance of free markets and private sector growth in a state for suc-
cessful state-building. Blowfield (2005) argues that post-conflict economies
are built around core neoliberal principles, such as the right to make profit,
 1 IRAQI KURDISTAN’S STATEHOOD ASPIRATIONS AND NON-KURDISH … 5

the universal good of free trade, freedom of capital, supremacy of private

property, the superiority of markets in determining price and value, and
privileging of companies as citizens and moral entities. Furthermore, he
claims that this approach explains the nature of post-occupation state-
building in Iraq. In his view, by taking just the example of Iraq into con-
sideration, we can judge the applicability of the neoliberal state-building
approach to the cases in the Middle East.
In fact, Francois and Sud (2006) claim that focusing solely on a neo-
liberal approach to economic growth has failed to produce a cogent
explanation in post-conflict states. Clapham (2002) also argues that it is
expensive to maintain a state economically and socially as it requires solid
material sources in order to build and maintain legitimacy. Thus, frag-
ile, newly built states, in particular, need substantial material resources in
order to build political support as well. The political legitimacy and inde-
pendence of a rebuilt state require a form of “social contract” respond-
ing to national political priorities (Doner et al. 2005).
Indeed, Wesley (2008) focuses on the era of decolonization and
claims that building a state is not only done via the infrastructure and
economy but also through the development of emotional attachment
among different ethnic and racial groups, which is related to our argu-
ment for Kurdistan. Without the process of emotional attachment,
Wesley (2008) contends that “positive sovereignty” cannot be reached.
Thus state-building is a combination of economy, polity, and society.
Tilly (1993) specifies four core activities of state-building in modern
Europe: state-making by neutralizing domestic competitors in the terri-
tory claimed by the state; war-making by deterring the rivals in the ter-
ritory of the state; protection of the ally of the ruler against the external
and internal rivals in the territory; and extraction of resources from the
population in support of the other three activities.
In relation to Wesley’s (2008) arguments, Safran’s (1992) ideas
on language and state-building can also be considered as an emotional
attachment to the state. Safran (1992) links the concepts of ethnicity
and language to the process of state-building in his analysis of France,
Israel, and the Soviet Union. Similarly, in their analysis of China, Zhou
and Ross (2004) argue that the Chinese language and its dialects have
been used to regulate power of the state in history. Laitin (2006) points
out that in the case of Africa “state rationalization” has not been suc-
cessful as small tribes have their own linguistic practices, which weaken
6 E.E. Tugdar

“nationalization” and, accordingly, the state-building process. Safran

(1992) argues that the importance of languages comes from the fact that
they can be manipulated, elevated, and transformed in the interest of the
state.1
Another form of attachment to the state suggested by Wesley (2008)
is territorial belonging. According to Richards (2014), attachment to a
given territory is another aspect of identity for people. Thus, state-build-
ing requires internal legitimacy, one of which is territorial attachment.2
Wright (1998) proposes that emotional attachment to a territory used
to be a behavior characteristic of medieval states. This attachment was
the main motivation for wars as well.3 According to Goemans (2006),
this emotional attachment is actually used by political elites to socialize
the public in order to encourage them to defend the state in return for
even their sacrifices. Penrose (2002), who associates attachment to terri-
tory to a sense of nationalism, also claims this practice to be part of the
eighteenth-century understanding of state-building.
State-building in the Middle East has well-pronounced economic and
political dimensions and the social dimension is becoming more impor-
tant. Furthermore, a fourth dimension can be added to state-building in
the Middle East: international impact. Cousens (2005) maintains that
state-building has become an important item on the international agenda
in recent years due to the following three main factors: first, states
learned that building peace after civil wars is necessary for peace imple-
mentation; second, by the 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the emergence of fragile or failed states became a serious problem; third,
9/11 provoked the concern that weak states create fertile grounds for
terrorism. Accordingly, state-building, particularly in the Middle East,
has been given serious attention by the international community. In fact,
Katzenstein et al. (2000) argue that international security has become
autonomous and predominantly regional since decolonization. Anderson
(1987) believes that state-building in the Middle East has always been a
reaction to international pressure and not genuine domestic political and
economic developments.
Consequently, the topic of state-building in the Middle East has
become a vital area of scholarly debate. It gained prominence, in par-
ticular, after 9/11 with the intervention of Western forces in the region
and the proliferation of violence and terrorism caused by weak and
failed states. Various strategies and approaches to state formation in the
 1 IRAQI KURDISTAN’S STATEHOOD ASPIRATIONS AND NON-KURDISH … 7

Middle East have been tried. Byrd (2005) contends that in the case of
Afghanistan, a neoliberal approach has been applied. The international
community has also focused on the reconstruction and economic devel-
opment, not only the restoration of security. Lu and Thies (2013) also
look at state-building in the Middle East from the economic and political
perspective as they argue that Middle East state-building is politically and
economically dependent on oil reserves in the region.
In Iraqi Kurdistan, the economic aspect of state-building is undoubt-
edly very important. Since 2003, there have been some major infrastruc-
ture projects overseen by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG),
including investment in new roads and modern airports. Other prom-
ising developments include rapid improvements in information technol-
ogy and communications with better access to the Internet and mobile
phone provision. Moreover, there has been a concerted effort from
the KRG to go beyond a centrally controlled public economy with the
active encouragement of investment through tax incentives and indi-
vidual enterprise.4 Nevertheless, the current prospects for economic
development and state-building in this area are hampered by the threat
from ISIS which, along with the consequences of the war, has fuelled
the influx of around 1.6 million refugees and internally displaced per-
sons into Iraqi Kurdistan. This has reduced the possibilities of investment
and the economy went into recession in 2014. This dimension of state-
building will play a key role in the future and more research is required,
bearing in mind these recent developments. However, a further in-depth
analysis of these economic factors is beyond the scope of this particular
examination. As stated above, the fundamental aim of this chapter is to
focus on the sociopolitical aspects of state-building.5

Ethno-Religious Diversity of Iraq

Iraq is one of the most diversely populated countries in the world. The
most important distinctive feature of the Iraqi population is its variety of
religious and ethnic groups, such as Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens, Assyrians,
and Yazidis as well as various sects of Christianity and Islam.
According to reports by Minority Rights Group International,
approximately 96% of the Iraqi population consists of Muslims.6 Thus,
the biggest divisions are among the Muslim population, based on Shi’a
Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and ethnic Kurdish minorities that are also Sunni.
8 E.E. Tugdar

Similar reports show that 10% of the population is composed of ethnic

Shabaks, Turkmens, Kurds, Palestinians, Roma, Christians, Yazidis, and
Baha’i’s.7
Current Iraqi legislation acknowledges this diversity and provides a
solid legal framework for the protection of minorities. Article 3 of the
Iraqi Constitution states that “Iraq is a country of many nationalities,
religions and sects.” Article 2 points to the religious rights of minori-
ties by stating that the “constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of
the majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights
of all individuals to freedom of religious belief and practices, such as
Christians, Yazidis, and Mandaeans.” Additionally, Article 121 guaran-
tees “the administrative, political, cultural and educational rights for the
various nationalities, such as Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians and all other
groups.”
Language is another important feature of ethno-religiously divided
states. The Iraqi Constitution recognizes that Iraq is a country of mul-
tiple nationalities, religions, and sects with two official languages, which
are Arabic and Kurdish. However, other languages are also legally pro-
tected. The languages mentioned in the constitution are Turkoman and
Syriac.8
As “Iraqi Kurdistan” is a federal region within Iraq, all national legal
protections of ethno-religious minorities are valid in its territory. As
stated by Iraq’s federal constitution, Kurdistan’s institutions exercise
legislative and executive authority in many areas, such as the budget,
police and security, education and health policies, natural resource man-
agement, and infrastructural development. As stated by the Department
of Foreign Relations, “The Kurdistan Regional Government also works
together with the federal Iraqi government to ensure the application of
the Iraqi Constitution, and to cooperate with the federal government on
other areas which concern all regions of Iraq.”9 To ensure the participa-
tion of minorities in Iraqi politics and the public domain in general, the
constitution introduced a quota system. Thus, in the Iraq’s national par-
liament, the Council of Representatives, 8 out of 325 seats are reserved
for minority groups: five to Christian candidates from Baghdad, Ninewa,
Kirkuk, Erbil, and Dahuk; one to Yazidis; one to Sabean-Mandaeans; and
one to Shabaks.10 On the other hand, the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament also
has a quota system to promote minority participation, and it reserves 11
seats: 5 seats to Christians, 5 to Turkoman and 1 to Armenians.11
 1 IRAQI KURDISTAN’S STATEHOOD ASPIRATIONS AND NON-KURDISH … 9

The Impact of Ethno-Religious Diversity on Kurdish

State-Building Turkomans
“Wherever Kurds are, Turks exists as well…we need to learn living together…”

Hasan Turan
Turkoman Member of Iraqi
Council of Representatives12
Turkoman can be considered as a generic name, covering ethnic
Turkmens and Turkic-speaking communities in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and
Central Asia. Petrosian (2003) argues that there is a conceptual lack
in the literature to describe who Turkomans are. In history, the first
mass flow of Oghuz-Turkoman origin tribes to Iraq is associated with
the Seljuk invasions. However, it is well known that the penetration of
some Turkic groupings to Iraq took place in the time of the Caliphate
and even before.13 These different flows became geographical factors
that the main mass of Turkomans merged into other ethnic formations.
The Turkmen groups who went far away to the West became isolated
from their Middle Asian kinsmen in an ethnic, cultural, and even linguis-
tic sense. Thus, today, we see two clearly divided peoples with the same
ethnic name.14
Petrosian (2003) explains these two different Turkoman groups as:
(1) Turkomans, who are a common denomination of the Turkic eth-
nic continuum from Central Asia, including Iran, Iraq, and Turkey and
(2) Turkmen, which is a term designating the ethnic Turkmens in the
Republic of Turkmenistan and adjoining areas, as well as the Turkoman
inhabitants in Iran. This definition also includes the remnants and
descendants of the old Turkoman ethnic elements resided in Iraq during
and after the ninth century AD.15
I use the term “Turkoman” to refer to the Iraqi Turks. In Iraq,
Turkoman settlements are located mainly in the northeastern and cen-
tral provinces of Iraq such as Kirkuk, Mosul, Sulaimanyah, Erbil, Diyala,
Khilla, and Baghdad.16 Turkomans live in an original and peculiarly
long corridor area, beginning at the villages of Shibik and Rashidiya
and covering the towns of Tel-Afar, Erbil, Kirkuk, and the settlements
of Altin-Kyopru, Daquq, Tuz Khurmatu, partly including Bayat, Kifri,
Qara-Tepe, Kizil Rabat, Khanekin, Shahriban, al-Mansuriye, Deli Abbas,
Kazaniya, and Mendeli town, which creates a natural ethnic border
10 E.E. Tugdar

between Arabs and Kurds.17 Thus, the great majority of the Turkoman
population resides in the Kurdistan region, which makes their contribu-
tion to state-building a significant factor.

State-Building in Kurdistan and the Role

of Turkomans

Turkomans are the third largest ethnic group in Iraq after Arabs and
Kurds. As of 2011, the Iraqi Turkmen population is estimated to be at
around 3 million, which constitutes 8.57% of the Iraqi population, tak-
ing into account all available estimates of towns and villages that they live
in.18 Thus, this demographic reality could be expected to contribute to
the state-building ambitions of Iraqi Kurdistan. Hasan Turan, a Member
of the Iraqi Council of Representatives, notes that in the Middle East,
wherever Kurds live, Turks are always their neighbors, which is taken to
mean that this close coexistence is consequential for whatever Kurds do
or plan to do.19
Although, the subject of population is a significant issue for the pro-
cess of state-building in Kurdistan, many political elites of Turkoman
origin claim that the population data is not reliable in the Turkoman
areas that belong to Kurdistan: specifically Erbil and Kirkuk. Minister
of Justice, Sinan Celebi, points out that the number of Turkomans
used to be 250,000 when there were not many Kurds in Erbil in the
1960s. Today, he claims that the population estimate of Turkomans is
750,000 in Erbil. Celebi’s argument points to an abnormal demographic
increase, which he links to the assimilation policies from the Kurdish
side.20 However, Celebi’s information conflicts with the data on the
Erbil population, which is around 1 million. Nonetheless, Celebi’s ideas
do highlight the fact that many Turkomans claim themselves as Kurds.
His advisor, Dr. Soran Shukur, claims that the reason for this uncer-
tain demographic change is related to the quota system in the elec-
tions through which the Turkomans currently have five representatives
in the Kurdistan Parliament.21 In other words, through assimilation, the
Turkomans improve their political influence.
The role of the Turkomans within the KRG presents a reality of mixed
democratic gains and achievements. There have been some significant
 1 IRAQI KURDISTAN’S STATEHOOD ASPIRATIONS AND NON-KURDISH … 11

benefits for the Turkomans under the Kurdish-dominated KRG, such

as minority rights in areas, including education (see below). However,
the Turkomans have to contend with the same, broad systemic problems
that face other groups, including the Kurds themselves. The political sys-
tem in the KRG is still in its infancy and, consequently, there are short-
comings. For instance, the President of the KRG, Mamoud Barzani, has
enjoyed a term of office longer than the stipulated eight years. He was
granted two years extension by the parliament in 2013, but has stayed in
power partly due to the support of the USA, Turkey, and Iran who see
Barzani as a stabilizing force. There are a number of concerns about cor-
ruption: the Barzani family not only holds key posts in power (including
both President and Prime Minister) but also they own key media outlets
and large companies. Kurdistan has also been experiencing economic dif-
ficulties for the first time in many years and many public workers have
not been paid, sparking a series of protests aimed at the President. In
early 2016, Turkomans were involved in anti-Barzani protests in vari-
ous parts of the region, but Kirkuk Turkomans have been particularly
vociferous.22
Nevertheless, the success of state-building in Iraqi Kurdistan will not
just be dependent on whether the Turkomans and other groups can have
confidence in the overall shape and legitimacy of the political system. It
will be dependent on the extent to which they are given a proportion-
ate stake in political power. As indicated, the Turkomans do have a small
presence in the KRG parliament and they also have the opportunity to
participate in local government in cities, such as Erbil. In addition, they
have a hidden representation due to a willingness of some Turkoman
political parties to form alliances with other parties, including Shi’a
Arab organizations. This willingness of both Turkoman political parties
and interest groups to cooperate and integrate in some areas with other
groups, particularly in the KRG, has given them slightly more influ-
ence than they would otherwise have had.23 The city of Kirkuk is a more
problematic proposition. The stronger sense of division here between the
Turkomans and the Kurds means that the political future of this city may
be fraught with problems if fair, power-sharing arrangements are not put
in place.
As mentioned above, religion constitutes an important part of the
culture in Iraqi Kurdistan. From this perspective, the presence of Sunni
Turkomans in the region appears as an advantage for state-building.24
12 E.E. Tugdar

Shi’ite Turkomans amount to around 35% of all the Turkomans in

the region.25 In the first decades of the twentieth century, Turkomans
have been living in areas where the Zab and Hazer rivers meet. These
groups were also found in Tel-Afar and Kirkuk. The majority of the
Turkoman population lives in Erbil, and they are followers of the Hanafi
school of the Sunni Sect.26 This major similarity between the Kurds and
Turkomans can be considered as an initial positive step toward state-
building in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Aydin Marouf, Member of Parliament in the KRG and representa-
tive of the Iraqi Turkoman Front, argues that Turkomans do not politi-
cize the Shia and Sunni divisions among themselves. However, due to
Saddam-era policies, the Shia Turkomans fled to Karbala, which is a town
considered to be holy for Shias, and lost their ethnic heritage to their
religious identity.27 On the other hand, Dr. Soran Shukur, advisor to
the Minister of Justice, claims that this division is a Turkish perspective
held in the country of Turkey itself. Thus, there is no division among
the Turkomans as their ethnic identity is more significant than their reli-
gion.28 Although this points to contradictory views on the division of
the Turkomans, we can state that, in Kurdish areas at least, similar reli-
gious beliefs between the Turkomans and Kurds are likely to encourage
integration.
Indeed, Dr. Shukur’s argument can be extended to the views of the
Kurds themselves toward religion and governance which is vital in terms
of the place of the Turkomans in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurds have dis-
played some willingness to separate religion from the state and have
shown some tolerance for other religions. The phrase “I am first a Kurd
and second a muslim” has been frequently used by political and mili-
tary elites. This attitude is partly rooted in a long history of persecution
that has helped the Kurds understand the value of tolerance and fairness.
There is also a long tradition of dividing religion and the state in Kurdish
history.29 In June 2012, the KRG officially stated that schools would
now not be permitted to favor one particular religion. In practice, this
means that ideas from different religions are taught in schools. This kind
of policy is extremely rare in a region known for strict adherence to par-
ticular religious beliefs.30
In May 2015, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) passed a
law to protect the rights of religious minorities and, especially since
2014, the KRG has agreed to provide a safe haven for various reli-
gious minority groups trying to escape from advancing ISIS terrorists.
 1 IRAQI KURDISTAN’S STATEHOOD ASPIRATIONS AND NON-KURDISH … 13

Although there have been cases of religious discrimination in Iraqi

Kurdistan, recent efforts to promote tolerance stand in stark contrast to
the activities of the Iraqi Government which has been involved in serious
discrimination based on religious affiliation.31 Thus, from a Turkoman
perspective, a majority Sunni affiliation may help them to strengthen ties,
but those who do not have the same beliefs as the Kurds may not neces-
sarily be excluded from life in KRG territory. This development of reli-
gious tolerance may be crucial for state-building in the long term.
On top of the religious similarities, the cultural integration of the
Kurds and Turkomans has also been a reality in the region. Since the
1950s, connections via cultural exchanges have created a new dimen-
sion in their relationship as the Kurds started to migrate from villages to
the city center of Erbil, where the majority of Turkomans used to live.
As Muslims are allowed to marry within the same religion, Turkomans
and Kurds established strong bonds with each other by starting fami-
lies. Today, Turkoman and Kurdish families, who have family ties, share
a very similar culture except for their language. Dr. Mahmood Nashat,
consultant to the Parliament for Turkoman affairs, refers to this cultural
integration as “becoming Erbilian.” However, he claims that there is
a huge division among Turkomans around Iraq because of that strong
integration of Kurds and Turkomans in Erbil.32
Due to the reasons mentioned above, the Turkomans of Erbil, in par-
ticular, do not hesitate to call themselves “Kurds.” The children of the
families with a mixed background generally prefer to call themselves
“Kurds” as well. Moreover, Turkomans not only know how to speak
Kurdish but also use it in their daily lives. Language is a major element
in the development of an ethnic community’s political consciousness and
a tool of state-building. Safran (1992) argues that the reason behind this
fact is that languages have often been manipulated, elevated, and trans-
formed in the interest of the state.33 Dr. Mahmood Nashat, states that
the language-oriented integration among the Kurds and Turkomans of
Erbil has created a new group of people, which he calls the “Kurdmen.”34
From this perspective, language is likely to be a driving force for state-
building in Iraqi Kurdistan in terms of Turkoman–Kurdish relations.
The crucial role that language will play in the success of state-building
in Iraqi Kurdistan is closely linked to its official recognition and place
within the education system. Following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s
regime, education was thoroughly reformed in Iraq. In the KRG, years
of oppression provoked a turn toward a more open and democratic
14 E.E. Tugdar

system of education, concerned with human rights. Language was a

vital element in this new system. As indicated, the Turkoman language
is recognized as an official language in Article 4 of the Iraqi constitution.
More importantly, the article states that citizens have the right to learn in
the Turkoman language.35
Toward the end of 2014, the leader of the KRG, Mamoud Barzani,
approved a law which recognizes the Turkoman language as an offi-
cial language in areas where that ethnic group constitutes at least 20%
of the population. There are already around 16 schools in Irbil and
Sulaymaniyah that deliver teaching in Turkoman and this law also
extends to other organizations, such as hospitals and courts (http://
unpo.org/article/17666). In these schools, Kurdish and English are
seen as compulsory additional languages in the curriculum. There are
also opportunities for Kurds to learn the Turkoman language along with
the choice of other languages in the region. Furthermore, the Turkoman
minority is represented within the KRG Ministry of Education which
helps to ensure that the rights established in law are actually imple-
mented in practice. It is a policy in Iraq as a whole to provide official
textbooks in as many languages as possible and the Turkomans are also
provided for in this sense.
Handbook of Social Justice in Education, p. 178. Therefore, in many
cases, the Turkoman language is protected and this is vital to the state-
building process in Iraqi Kurdistan.
However, while the Turkomans living in other parts of Kurdistan,
specifically in the disputed areas, such as Kirkuk, remain loyal to their
mother tongue, some feel an affiliation with the Arabic language. The
head of the Turkmeneli Political Party, Riyaz Sarikahya, claims that the
majority of the Turkomans in Kirkuk do not know Kurdish as their offi-
cial language is Turkomani (a version of Turkish) and Arabic is their sec-
ond major language. Furthermore, Sarikahya, who points to the major
similarities between the Kurdish and Turkoman cultures, expresses his
concern about the protection of the Turkoman language in Erbil.36
Arshad Al-Salihi, the President of the Iraqi Turkoman Front and a mem-
ber of the Council of Representatives in Iraq, claims that, as a result of
these similarities between the Kurdish and Turkoman cultures and the
advantage of being part of the Kurdish community, Turkomans in Erbil
change their identities and only speak Kurdish.37 This suggests that, by
making a strategic move to integrate with the Kurds, the Turkomans
may, in fact, be losing touch with their own ethnic identity. Nevertheless,
 1 IRAQI KURDISTAN’S STATEHOOD ASPIRATIONS AND NON-KURDISH … 15

while, the issue of language in this particular context appears to be a dis-

advantage from the Turkoman perspective, in reality, this integration,
which can even be called indirect assimilation, is likely to be a positive
driving force for state-building in the Kurdistan region.
As we have seen, the relationship between the Turkomans and the
Kurds has had and still has its fair share of difficulties. Nevertheless, the
emotional attachment to self-determination is something the Kurds value
greatly and the broad acceptance (if not always) that minority groups in
their region have similar attachments and aspirations is vital. While the
Kurds are inevitably the dominant people in the region, they recognize
the powerful emotional attachments that the Turkomans have in terms
of territorial belonging, ethnic identity, language, and religious sta-
tus, and this is recognized in both law and practice. Moreover, we have
seen that this emotional attachment also extends to the sharing of tradi-
tions and cultures in cases, such as Erbil. However, while the relation-
ship of the Turkomans to the Kurdish state is crucial, the true source of
Turkoman loyalty and emotional belonging is often seen as the neigh-
boring state of Turkey.
The close relations between Turkey and the Turkomans of Iraq may
prove to be the major obstacle to the Turkomans making an effective
contribution to Iraqi Kurdistan’s state-building process. Compared to
the Kurds, the Turkomans appear to be weak as they have been divided
among religious groups: some are Sunni and others are Shia; some are
secular with no Islamic beliefs; some are extremists, while others are
moderates.38 The nationalist Turkomans are loyal to Turkey, which
makes it easier to be manipulated from the outside. This disloyalty to
Kurdistan is likely to occur when the Kurdish or Iraqi governments treat
Turkomans unequally although they are the third largest group in Iraq.
As mentioned before, the Iraqi Constitution recognizes Arabs and Kurds
as the two big groups that “own” the country. This understanding has
been the same since the Saddam-era, which opened doors for interfer-
ence from Turkey under the name of “protection” from the “mainland.”
On the other hand, Turkoman representatives from many parts of the
Kurdish region deny this close relationship with Turkey. Arshad Al-Salihi,
the President of the Iraqi Turkoman Front, which is centered in Kirkuk,
claims that they never actually feel the presence of Turkey.39 Similarly,
Riyaz Sarikahya complains that Turkey actually has a Kirkuk policy but
not a Turkoman policy in Iraq. Thus, although the nationalist front in
the mainland declares a cultural possession of Kirkuk, politically Turkey
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