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 Edited by
Vicki L. Birchfield and Alasdair R. Young

TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY AMONG THE

UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION,
AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE
 Triangular Diplomacy among the United States,
the European Union, and the Russian Federation
 Vicki L. Birchfield
Alasdair R. Young
Editors

Triangular Diplomacy
among the United
States, the European
Union, and the
Russian Federation
Responses to the Crisis in Ukraine
Editors
Vicki L. Birchfield Alasdair R. Young
Sam Nunn School of International Sam Nunn School of International
Affairs Affairs
Georgia Institute of Technology Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, GA, USA Atlanta, GA, USA

ISBN 978-3-319-63434-0    ISBN 978-3-319-63435-7 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-63435-7

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017952173

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
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exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Acknowledgments

This volume grew out of a Jean Monnet workshop organized by the

Center for European and Transatlantic Studies at the Georgia Institute of
Technology on May 1–2, 2015. The workshop was supported under the
European Union’s Erasmus+ Program (Jean Monnet Center of Excellence
2014–1842). The contributions to this volume reflect the views only of
the authors, and the European Commission cannot be held responsible
for any use which may be made of the information contained herein.
Some of the participants in that workshop did not end up contributing
to the volume—Dina Khapaeva, Nikolay Kopsov, Jeff Mankoff, and
Richard Whitman—but their insights and comments contributed greatly
to the volume. We are grateful to Aarij Abbas, Simeon Bruce, Joshua
Jacobs, Zoe Larrier, Allison Stanford, and Daniel Yoon for their research
and editorial assistance. We would also like to thank Marilu Suarez for
providing excellent logistical support for the workshop and the Sam Nunn
School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech for funding some of our
research assistants. We are grateful to Scott Brown, Richard Whitman, the
Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics series editors, and an anony-
mous reviewer for their comments on the manuscript. We also owe a debt
of gratitude to Palgrave’s Politics editorial team—Ambra Finotello and
Imogen Gordon Clark—for their support and encouragement. All short-
comings remain our own.

Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Vicki L. Birchfield

Georgia Institute of Technology, GA, USA Alasdair R. Young

v
 Contents

1 Introducing Triangular Diplomacy  1

Alasdair R. Young and Vicki L. Birchfield

2 Empirical Scene Setting: The Contours

of the Crisis and Response 21
Alasdair R. Young and Vicki L. Birchfield

3 Outsourced Diplomacy: The Obama

Administration and the Ukraine Crisis 55
Deborah Welch Larson

4 ‘Crowdfunded Diplomacy’? The EU’s

Role in the Triangular Diplomacy Over
the Ukraine Crisis 77
Hiski Haukkala

5 Democracy and Progressive Modernity

in Constructions of Community: Europe,
the United States, and the Russian ‘Other’ 95
Grainne Hutton, Sara Morrell, and Jarrod Hayes

vii
viii CONTENTS

6 Russia Plays the (Triangular) Sanctions Game119

Christopher Patane and Cooper Drury

7 Ukraine and Triangular Diplomacy: Kyiv’s

Legitimacy Dilemmas in the Midst of the Crisis143
Valentina Feklyunina and Valentyna Romanova

8 Whose International Law? Legal Clashes

in the Ukrainian Crisis169
Mikulas Fabry

9 Triangular Diplomacy and Europe’s Changing

Gas Network: From “Trying-­Angles” to Stable
Marriage189
Adam N. Stulberg

10 Conclusions: Comparison and Triangulation217

Vicki L. Birchfield and Alasdair R. Young

Index227
 Abbreviations

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

CE Council of Europe
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
ECU Eurasian Customs Union
EEAS European External Action Service
EEU Eurasian Economic Union
EPP Eastern Partnership Program
EU European Union
EUAM European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security
Sector Reform Ukraine
G7 Group of Seven
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IMF International Monetary Fund
KIIS Kyiv International Institute of Sociology
MH17 Malaysian Airlines Flight 17
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFIUs NATO Force Integration Units
NRF NATO Response Force

ix
x ABBREVIATIONS

OHCHR Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human

Rights
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UK United Kingdom
UN SC United Nations Security Council
UN United Nations
UNGA UN General Assembly
US United States
VEB Volkseigener Betrieb
VJTF Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
WTO World Trade Organization
 List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Triangular diplomacy in the Ukraine crisis 8

Fig. 2.1 Spectrum of EU member states’ attitudes toward Russia 30
Fig. 6.1 Changes in Monthly Public Approval since the Onset
of Sanctions 133

xi
 List of Tables

Table 1.1 Economic interdependence, 2013 4

Table 1.2 Comparing the transatlantic partners 6
Table 2.1 Minsk agreements summary and comparison 40
Table 2.2 EU and US restrictive measures as of the end of 2016 44
Table 2.3 Restrictions on doing business in Crimea 45

xiii
 CHAPTER 1

Introducing Triangular Diplomacy

Alasdair R. Young and Vicki L. Birchfield

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the subsequent conflict

in eastern Ukraine represent both the greatest security challenge to west-
ern Europe since the end of the Cold War and a profound challenge to
international norms. Focusing on the short-term response to the annexa-
tion of Crimea and subsequent conflict, this volume explores the interac-
tions between the US, the EU and Russia. These three powers represent

This chapter is part of a wider project, which has been funded with support from
the European Commission (Jean Monnet Center of Excellence 2014-1842). It
reflects the views of only the authors, and the Commission cannot be held
responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained herein.
We are grateful to Aarij Abbas, Simeon Bruce, Joshua Jacobs, Zoe Larrier,
Allison Stanford and Daniel Yoon for their research and editorial assistance.
Earlier versions were presented to the ‘Triangular Diplomacy and the Crisis in
Ukraine: The European Union, The United States and the Russian Federation’
Jean Monnet Workshop at the Georgia Institute of Technology, 1–2 May 2015,
and to the ISA’s 57th Annual Convention, March 16–19, 2016, Atlanta,
Georgia. We are grateful to Scott Brown, Richard Whitman and the other
participants for their comments.

A.R. Young (*) • V.L. Birchfield

Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology,
Atlanta, Georgia, USA

© The Author(s) 2018 1

V.L. Birchfield, A.R. Young (eds.), Triangular Diplomacy among
the United States, the European Union, and the Russian Federation,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-63435-7_1
2 A.R. YOUNG AND V.L. BIRCHFIELD

the vertices of the triangle in ‘triangular diplomacy,’ with Ukraine as the

‘object’ in the middle.
This volume is distinctive in two particular ways. First, it is explicitly
comparative, considering how the US and the EU responded to the same
crisis, although the stakes were different for each and the nature of the
problem was not necessarily understood in the same ways (see Chap. 5). It
thus contrasts a conventional, if exceptional, great power—the US—with
a very non-traditional foreign policy actor—the EU, which is typically
depicted as distinctive in terms of capabilities, organization and motiva-
tions. This volume, therefore, sheds light on what kind of international
actor the EU is and helps to inform foreign policy analysis more broadly.
The Ukraine crisis is a particularly appropriate case as it presents an espe-
cially critical test for the EU’s foreign policy as it concerns aggression by
its neighboring great power—Russia.
The second distinctive feature of this volume is its ‘360-degree’ per-
spective.1 Rather than focusing on the perspective of a single party in a
bilateral relationship or even the contending perspectives of a bilateral
pair, this volume engages with both how the US and the EU each regard
the other in its dealings with Russia, and also how Russia and Ukraine
perceive the motivations and effectiveness of the western powers. This
360-degree perspective is enhanced by considering the interactions of the
parties in cross-cutting, thematic issues of particular relevance to the crisis
and response.
Investigating the crisis in Ukraine through the lens of ‘triangular diplo-
macy’ helps to elucidate the complexity of crisis response when the three
core actors have very different relationships with the affected party, as well
as varying perceptions of the nature of the crisis. As a heuristic device the
concept of triangular diplomacy probes the parameters and consequences
of foreign policy behavior and reactions in ways that would be missed by
analyses of only bilateral and multilateral engagements. To be clear, this
volume does not seek to provide a definitive account of an unfolding,
high-stakes story. Rather, it takes a snapshot—roughly the two-and-a-half
years after the annexation of Crimea—to shed light on foreign policy
choices of great powers at a time of crisis.
This introduction aims to set the stage analytically for the other contri-
butions. It begins by making the case for studying the EU’s foreign policy
from a comparative perspective. It then sets out the triangular diplomacy
framework. The chapter concludes by introducing the other contributions
to the volume.
 INTRODUCING TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY 3

Comparing the EU as a Foreign Policy Actor

One of our analytical ambitions for this volume is to shed light on the EU
as a foreign policy actor by comparing its policy choices and policy effec-
tiveness in response to the Ukraine crisis with those of the US. The exist-
ing literature on the EU as a foreign policy actor, in the words of Niemann
and Bretherton (2013: 263), has tended to be ‘EU-introverted (or even
Eurocentric).’ The literature tends to emphasize that the EU is a sui
generis foreign policy actor. This depiction entails an implicit comparison
of the EU with traditional foreign policy actors, most commonly the
US. This literature focuses on what kind of foreign policy actor the EU
is—a civilian power (Duchêne 1973), normative power (Manners 2002)
or market power (Damro 2012), among others (for a review see Peterson
2012). These depictions emphasize the distinctiveness of the EU’s power
resources and/or its identity.
There is another, even more voluminous, strand of the literature that
describes specific EU foreign policies. This literature tends to be particu-
larly ‘EU-introverted’ (Niemann and Bretherton 2013: 263), lacking even
implicit comparison to the policies of other actors. There are, however, a
few exceptions that explicitly compare EU policies to those of other actors,
but these primarily concern external policies in which the EU is most
‘state-like’, such as climate change (see, e.g., Kelemen and Vogel 2010),
regulatory cooperation (Drezner 2007) and promoting norms through
preferential trade agreements (Postnikov 2014). There are two notable
exceptions with respect to traditional foreign policy.2 Möcklie and Mauer
(2011) compare American and European foreign policies toward the
Middle East. Although empirically rich, this work is largely descriptive,
and the EU qua the EU is only a peripheral actor. The other exception is
Brown (2014), who contrasts the different perceptions of China’s rise in
the EU and the US in order to explain differences in their policies toward
China. To an extent, our argument is a nice complement to Brown’s; simi-
lar perceptions of threat lead to similar responses. Comparison, thus, helps
to illuminate the EU’s foreign policy choices and begins to contextualize
how distinctive a foreign policy actor the EU is.
Comparison is particularly useful in assessing foreign policy effective-
ness (Niemann and Bretherton 2013: 268). The literature on EU foreign
policy effectiveness, whether reflexively or not, echoes Laatikainen and
Smith’s (2006: 16–19) distinction between internal and external effective-
ness. One strand of the literature, reflecting the limited centralization of
4 A.R. YOUNG AND V.L. BIRCHFIELD

foreign policy authority in the EU, focuses on the EU’s ability to agree
and sustain common positions, what Laatikainen and Smith called internal
effectiveness and which is frequently referred to as ‘coherence’ (Niemann
and Bretherton 2013: 267). As Hiski Haukkala argues in Chap. 4, the
EU’s coherence in response to Russia’s aggression was unexpectedly high.
Given EU coherence/internal effectiveness, the next question is
whether the EU is also externally effective. Much of the EU foreign policy
literature concerned with external effectiveness uses goal attainment as the
metric of effectiveness (Jørgensen et al. 2011: 603; see Dee 2013: 28–31).
Goal attainment, however, may be an unrealistic objective. Foreign poli-
cies frequently fail, at least for some considerable time, to achieve their
objectives because the goal is ambitious, the problem is intractable or
other actors are uncooperative (Jørgensen et al. 2011: 604). Influencing
the behavior of another great power when the policy in question is seen as
affecting a core interest of the state, as is the case with Russia and the crisis
in Ukraine (see Chap. 6), is a particularly tall order. Reference to goal
attainment in such cases, therefore, may yield an unfairly harsh assessment
of effectiveness. Comparison with another foreign policy actor, therefore,
helps to contextualize how demanding the policy objective is, thus permit-
ting a more nuanced assessment of effectiveness (see also Niemann and
Bretherton 2013 (eds)).

The Challenges of Comparison

Although the case for comparing the responses of the EU and the US to
the crisis in Ukraine is strong, there are some analytical challenges to the
comparison. Two sets of differences particularly stand out (see Table 1.1).
First, the EU and US vary considerably in their power resources relative to
Russia. As Mearsheimer (2014) and Walt (2014) contend, Russia is not a

Table 1.1 Economic interdependence, 2013 (US$ billion)

Trade partner Exports to Russia Imports from Russia Inward stock of FDI in Russia

EU 224.1 135.0 242.7

US 11.2 16.7 13.2
World 527.3 315.0 565.7

Sources: Trade data from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics; world FDI stock from UNCTADSTAT; US
FDI stock based on own calculation from USTR (2016); EU FDI stock based on own calculation from
Commission 2016-DG Trade (convert from euros to dollars using IRS’s yearly average exchange rate)
 INTRODUCING TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY 5

peer competitor to the US. It is a regional power. In particular, this reflects

the relative military capabilities of the two countries. Although the US has
military superiority, its forces are relatively remote after the draw-down of
its forces in Europe after the end of the Cold War, although the Pentagon
redeployed heavily armed troops to eastern Europe beginning in January
2017. European forces, by contrast, are relatively close to Russia. Taken
together, the EU’s member states have considerable armed forces, but the
EU does not have a centralized army and there is much duplication, and
there is considerable doubt about their combat readiness (Cooper 2003;
Soesanto 2015). European forces are nearer to Russia than American
ones, but weaker.
In economic terms, by contrast the EU is much more important to
Russia than is the US. The EU is by far Russia’s most important trade
partner (see Table 1.1). In 2012, Russia’s trade with the EU was 14 times
greater than that with the US. In 2013, crude oil, natural gas and petro-
leum products accounted for 68 percent of Russia’s total exports.3 Seventy-­
one percent of its gas exports went to the EU (Commission 2014: 2).
Much is made of EU’s dependence on Russian natural gas. That depen-
dence, however, varies sharply among the member states, with some—
such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia—getting
all of their natural gas from Russia, while others—such as Denmark,
France, the Netherlands, Romania and the UK—get less than 20 percent
of their natural gas from Russia (Commission 2014: Annex 1). Moreover,
the EU is a vital export market for Russia. This interdependence is a source
of both influence and vulnerability for both the EU and Russia, while the
US is largely on the sidelines (see Chap. 9).
The second major set of differences between the EU and the US as
foreign policy actors concerns how foreign policy is made. Foreign policy-­
making in the US, at least in the macro-sense, is relatively straightforward.
Responsibility for foreign policy is centralized at the federal level.
Moreover, under both the Constitution and secondary legislation, the
president enjoys considerable authority to respond to crises such as that in
Ukraine (see Chaps. 2 and 3). The situation is very different in the EU,
where foreign policy decision-making remains primarily in the hands of
the member states, although they can and do take collective decisions
(White 2001; Chap. 4). Because of the pooled nature of decision-making
in the EU, all of the member state governments must agree, meaning that
any one member state can block common action. Thus, there are many
more veto players in the EU’s foreign policy process than there are in the
6 A.R. YOUNG AND V.L. BIRCHFIELD

Table 1.2 Comparing the transatlantic partners

EU US

Geostrategic Near peer Not near peer

Capabilities Military capacity Limited, but proximate Substantial, but remote
compared Economic capacity Significant, but highly Low with low
to Russia interdependent interdependence
Foreign Locus of authority Decentralized with Highly centralized
policy- pooled decision-making
making Veto players Many veto players Few veto players
capacity (at central level)

US’s. All else being equal, therefore it is much easier for the US to decide
to act. In addition, the EU’s member states retain considerable foreign
policy autonomy, as was exercised by the French and German govern-
ments in engaging Russia and Ukraine in efforts to resolve the conflict
through the Normandy Process (see Chaps. 2 and 4). Thus, the US and
the EU are very different in terms of the material and decision-making
capabilities (Table 1.2). Nonetheless, their policy choices look remarkably
similar.

Introducing the Triangular Diplomacy Frame

This volume’s second analytical ambition is to make the case that some-
times apparently bilateral relationships are actually more complicated,
involving interaction with other actors, and that recognizing this dynamic
can help to explain foreign policy choices. We contend, therefore, that it is
useful to analyze the interaction among bilateral relationships. There are
extensive literatures on the US–Russia (e.g., Roberts 2014; Stent 2012),
the EU–Russia (e.g., Haukkala 2010; for a review, see Schmidt-Felzmann
2015) and the US–EU relations (e.g., McGuire and Smith 2008; Peterson
and Pollack 2003; for a review, see M. H. Smith 2015), but these are
treated as largely discrete bilateral relationships. The existing literature on
the Ukraine crisis reflects this tendency. It either focuses on distinct bilat-
eral relationships—mostly the EU–Russia and the US–Russia, but also
Ukraine–Russia (Menon and Rumer 2015; Sakwa 2015)—or tends to
conflate the EU and the US as the ‘West’ (Wilson 2014). Cross and
Karolewski (2017) share our aspiration to use the Ukraine crisis to inform
 INTRODUCING TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY 7

our understanding of the EU as an international actor. Their s­ pecific aim

is somewhat different, however—they ask ‘whether and to what extent the
Russia–Ukraine crisis serves as a critical juncture and catalyst for shaping
the EU’s power’—and they focus on only the EU’s response. In this vol-
ume, we explicitly consider how the three bilateral relationships interact.
In doing so, this volume is an initial response to Michael H. Smith’s
(2015: 580) call for greater scholarly attention to transatlantic diplomatic
coordination.
Analysis of the interaction among bilateral relationships seems to be
remarkably rare in the international relations literature. Berridge (2005),
in his textbook on diplomacy, has two chapters devoted to bilateral diplo-
macy, which is explicitly defined as ‘limited to two parties’ (108), and one
on multilateral diplomacy, which is effectively about formal organizations
(156–69). This focus is echoed by the contributions to Niemann and
Bretherton (2013 (eds)), which consider EU effectiveness in either bilat-
eral relationships or international institutions (270). It is also echoed in
The Sage Handbook of European Foreign Policy (Jörgensen et al., eds,
2015), which has ten chapters on EU foreign policies toward specific
countries of regions and three on relations with different multilateral insti-
tutions. Hill (2016: 183) identifies ‘other states’ foreign policies’ as one of
five main global-level factors that might influence an actor’s foreign policy,
but he reduces this constraint to the ‘hierarchy of states’ and the discus-
sion warrants just over a page (191–2). Thus the interaction among more
than two parties other than in multilateral settings is rare in the literature.
We contend that the crisis in Ukraine illustrates that a focus on only either
bilateral relationships or multilateral institutions misses an important part
of the story.
There are three edited volumes that come close to our ambitions. One
is Möckli and Mauer’s (2011), which focuses on European–American rela-
tions and the Middle East, but its primary focus is on the European–
American relationship and what American and European policies toward
the Middle East reveal about that relationship. The volume only touches
upon transatlantic cooperation in the context of the Quartet, the 1990–91
Gulf War and Iran’s nuclear program, and even then the ‘target’ is largely
inanimate. Another is Wouters et al. (2015), which explores the ‘triangu-
lar relationship’ between the EU, China and the developing world. It,
however, stresses the absence of an EU–China leg to the triangle (p. 14).
The third volume is Hallenberg and Karlsson (2006: 2), which examines
relations among the EU, the US and Russia and explicitly asks whether a
8 A.R. YOUNG AND V.L. BIRCHFIELD

‘strategic triangle’ exists among the three. Their primary concern, ­however,
is whether the EU is sufficiently developed as an international actor to be
considered a pole in such a strategic triangle. Our volume is related to, but
goes beyond, these earlier efforts.
We deploy the framework of triangular diplomacy as a heuristic device
to capture the interaction between the EU, the US and Russia in the
Ukrainian crisis. These three powers represent the vertices of the triangle
in ‘triangular diplomacy,’ with Ukraine as the ‘object’ in the middle
(see Fig. 1.1). The idea, therefore, is to capture transatlantic cooperation
in putting pressure on Russia. Our analytical approach, therefore, refer-
ences the US’s policy of ‘triangular diplomacy’ in the 1970s when it
sought to develop relations with China as a counter to the Soviet Union.4
The use of the ‘triangle’ metaphor to refer to great-power balancing
among the US, China and Russia has resurfaced lately (see Gordon and
Schneider 2014; Kotkin 2009).5 Smith (2015: 580) refers to ‘great power
triangles’ to describe the EU and the US, as established powers with
shared interests in containing or socializing the rising powers.
Our approach, however, seeks to capture a policy dynamic different
from that pursued by then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. For
Kissinger (and more recently) triangulation meant using closer relations
with one party to enhance leverage with the third party (Gordon and
Schneider 2014). This is also the sense of ‘triangular’ used by Hallenberg

Fig. 1.1 Triangular diplomacy in the Ukraine crisis

 INTRODUCING TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY 9

and Karlsson (2006: 1). We, by contrast, are describing cooperation

between two parties to affect a specific behavior of the third. Kissinger
(1979: 712) explicitly excluded such cooperation against one apex of the
triangle from his understanding of triangular diplomacy.6 In addition, our
approach does not imply balance of power motivations for the policy (a
point to which we return below).
We understand triangular diplomacy to be coordinated action by two
states (which, in keeping with the triangle metaphor, we refer to collec-
tively as the ‘base’) to change behavior of another state (the ‘target’).
What we are interested in explaining are the foreign policies of the indi-
vidual states. Our argument is that the interaction between the members
of the base causes their foreign policies toward the third state to be differ-
ent than would be the case without that interaction. In addition, the ‘tar-
get’ state is likely to adopt strategies aimed at disrupting that
cooperation.
This is a hard case to make empirically, particularly in the context of a
single case, absent the counterfactual of what would happen if there were
no cooperation. Our authors use detailed process tracing to try to isolate
the impact of interaction on the behavior of the protagonists. Given the
inherent analytical challenges, we do not claim here to demonstrate the
impact of triangulation. Rather, we aim to show that our 360-degree
approach reveals new insights about the Ukrainian crisis and make the case
that the interaction among bilateral relationships warrants more
attention.
In order to help to clarify what we mean by triangular diplomacy, we
situate it in broader literatures. There are three literatures that are particu-
larly relevant: those on strategic partnerships, strategic balancing and
international cooperation. With respect to ‘strategic partnerships,’ the
idea is that there are important countries with which having good rela-
tions might be helpful in addressing common problems (e.g., Carter
2006). This literature, however, is relatively underdeveloped, not going
beyond the potential benefits of a partnership to explore why cooperation
between strategic partners occurs in a particular instance, which is our
focus. It is worth noting that the EU in its relations with its designated
‘strategic partners’ has tended to focus on its bilateral relationships with
them rather than engage in ‘triangulation’ with those partners to address
common problems (Renard 2012). The transition from a focus on the
bilateral relationship to cooperation with respect to a third party is pre-
cisely our concern.
10 A.R. YOUNG AND V.L. BIRCHFIELD

The second pertinent literature concerns strategic balancing, specifi-

cally Kissinger’s meaning of the concept. Like triangular diplomacy, bal-
ancing implies coordination among some parties with respect to another,
but the literature on balancing (including on ‘soft balancing’ (Pape 2005;
Paul 2005)) focuses on the relative power of the participants rather than
trying to affect the specific behavior of one, which is our focus. In strategic
balancing, power is structural, while in our case, it is relational.
The third relevant literature is the extensive literature on international
cooperation. While triangular diplomacy is a form of international coop-
eration, it is different from the focus of the literature. The literature has
tended to analyze the attainment of common goals among all of the par-
ties (Oye 1985: 1), while triangular diplomacy is about cooperation with
another actor in order to change the behavior of a third. The literature on
international cooperation is particularly helpful for capturing cooperation
within the base, but it does not capture the interaction with the target.
Thus, while there are a number of proximate and useful literatures, our
framework of triangular diplomacy is distinctive.
Informed by these proximate literatures, particularly that on interna-
tional cooperation, there are several reasons why states might engage in
triangular diplomacy. Such cooperation can reduce the costs of trying to
change another state’s behavior through burden sharing and/or spreading
the blame. Cooperation helps to amplify the effects of coercive measures,
such as sanctions. Cooperation may also be a way to off-set vulnerabilities
with respect to the target.
Although there are benefits to pursuing triangulation, there are also
costs. Two costs in particular standout: the transaction costs of coordinat-
ing actions and the need to compromise. Given these costs, actors are
more likely to pursue triangulation when the policy preferences of the
members of the base are proximate, reducing the costs of compromise.
Actors are also more likely to pursue triangulation if the effectiveness of
unilateral actions is limited either because of the power of the target or
because the actor’s purchase is limited. Actors are also more likely to pur-
sue triangulation if there are costs to unilateral action, including retalia-
tion or circumvention.
As the contributions to this volume demonstrate, the conditions con-
ducive to the EU and the US cooperating in order to try to influence
Russia’s policy are all present in the Ukraine crisis. Following Russia’s
annexation of Crimea and particularly after the downing of Malaysian
Airlines Flight 17 (MH17), the EU’s (particularly Germany’s) position
 INTRODUCING TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY 11

regarding how to deal with Russia changed, becoming much more similar
to that of the US (Chaps. 4 and 5). In addition, Russia is a powerful coun-
try and therefore difficult to influence, so unilateral action was unlikely to
be successful, particularly as the EU’s most potent lever—energy imports—
was too costly to use (Chap. 9). In the circumstances, cooperation on
sanctions, especially financial sanctions, was particularly important so as to
prevent Russia simply being able to circumvent the sanctions imposed by
one party. Thus, the Ukraine crisis represents a most likely case for the EU
and the US to pursue triangulation.
Given that the Ukraine crisis is a most likely case, we do not make any
claims about when triangulation is likely to be pursued. Rather, we draw
attention to an important, but understudied feature of international rela-
tions. In the conclusion, we reflect on the heuristic of triangular diplo-
macy and consider how the research agenda might be advanced.

Introduction to the Rest of the Volume

While the three bilateral relationships in the Ukraine crisis—the EU–
Russia; the US–Russia and EU–US—provide the sides of our metaphori-
cal triangle, our focal points are the three vertices: the EU, the US and
Russia. Thus, rather than focusing on the bilateral relationship per se, we
focus on how each of the protagonists views the situation and, critically,
the behavior of the other major players. Thus we are in each case inter-
ested not just in why each party is doing what it is doing, but how it per-
ceives the behaviors of the other parties and how the other parties perceive
it. Thus we adopt a 360-degree perspective.
This volume has three complementary types of substantive
contributions:

1. analyses of the foreign policies of the US (Chap. 3), the EU

(Chap. 4) and the Russian Federation (Chap. 6), as well as Ukraine
(Chap. 7);
2. analysis of the internal debates and understandings of the crisis in
the transatlantic partners—the ‘base’ (Chap. 5);
3. analyses of the interactions in cross-cutting issues: international law
(Chap. 8) and energy (Chap. 9).

The overarching aim of the conclusion is to draw together the findings

of the substantive chapters and draw out the implications for foreign ­policy
12 A.R. YOUNG AND V.L. BIRCHFIELD

analysis and, in particular, how we can understand the EU as an interna-

tional actor. The remainder of this chapter provides a more detailed over-
view of the organization and content of each contributing chapter.
The second chapter in the introductory section sets the stage empiri-
cally for the other contributions. It begins by characterizing the signifi-
cance of Russia’s aggression for the transatlantic community. It then
describes (briefly) the chain of events that led to Russia’s intervention in
Ukraine. It also describes the state of the relationships between the EU
and Russia and the US and Russia, including the absence of transatlantic
cooperation with respect to Russia prior to the crisis in Ukraine. The focus
of the chapter is on outlining how the US and the EU have responded to
Russia’s aggression. It addresses three components of that response:
efforts aimed at halting the conflict in Ukraine (including diplomatic ini-
tiatives and the imposition of restrictive measures and economic sanctions
on Ukrainian separatists and Russian officials and firms); measures intended
to support Ukraine (including statements of political support; bilateral
and multilateral economic assistance; non-lethal (thus far) military assis-
tance; trade liberalization); and steps to reassure North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) members bordering Ukraine. It is the first of these
components that are the focus of this volume, so this chapter serves as
scene setting for the subsequent contributions, which go into more detail,
but it also situates that discussion in a broader context. It concludes by
identifying three analytically pertinent questions that motivate the rest of
the volume: why are the EU’s policies so similar to those of the US despite
them being such different foreign policy actors? How has their coopera-
tion affected the policies that they have each pursued? How has that coop-
eration affected the response to the crisis?
The Second Section offers analyses of the principal players and their
respective policies with regard to the immediate outbreak of the crisis.
Deborah Larson’s ‘Outsourced Diplomacy: The US, EU and the Ukraine
Conflict’ starts from the observation that the US has not been directly
involved in promoting a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine crisis; rather it
has pushed for sanctions and sought to isolate Russia. The chapter argues
that the Obama administration effectively ‘outsourced’ the resolution of
the crisis, delegating responsibility to the EU and particularly to Germany.
Larson claims that it did so because it viewed the crisis as mainly affecting
European rather than global US interests. Initially, however, this delegation
was problematic due to the legacies of different European and American
approaches toward Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The
 INTRODUCING TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY 13

downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, however, provoked a shift in

European preferences toward those of the US, facilitating transatlantic
cooperation. The most visible manifestation of this cooperation has been a
united front in maintaining sanctions. This chapter thus illustrates how
(passive) triangulation created an opportunity for US policy (outsourcing)
and how the alignment of preferences facilitates the pursuit of (active) tri-
angular diplomacy.
Chapter 4—“‘Crowdfunded diplomacy’? The EU’s Role in the
Triangular Diplomacy over the Ukraine Crisis” by Hiski Haukkala—
assesses the EU’s performance and situates it in the triangular diplomacy
frame. Haukkala argues that the crisis in Ukraine has been a particularly
challenging issue for the EU, because it has called into question the EU’s
objectives and very modus operandi in its ‘neighborhood,’ spurred inter-
nal soul-searching about the role of its policies in precipitating the con-
flict, and challenged the EU’s actorness and status in global politics. He
contends that the EU has risen to a very difficult occasion: swiftly con-
demning Russia’s actions, imposing a series of gradually tightening sanc-
tions against Russia and channeling political and economic support to
Ukraine. In addition, the EU or, more precisely, some key EU member
states have played the leading role in the political management of the cri-
sis. Haukkala contends that the EU’s response to the crisis, while coordi-
nated with the US, was internally motivated. Moreover, even though the
EU’s policy has not resolved the conflict, the Ukraine crisis has helped the
EU to come of age as an international actor.
Chapter 5 in this section—“Democracy and Progressive Modernity in
Constructions of Community: Europe, the United States, and the Russian
‘Other’”—is explicitly comparative. Grainne Hutton, Sara Morell and
Jarrod Hayes analyze how the foreign policy elites in the ‘base’ of the tri-
angular diplomacy framework—the US, the EU, France and Germany—
frame their relationship with the Russian ‘target’/‘Other.’ They argue that
the elites identify the ‘Self’ differently and use distinct discourses to frame
their condemnation of Russia. President Obama tended to define the Self
in transatlantic terms, while EU and German leaders focused on a
European Self. French leaders, by contrast, tended to present the Self in
national terms. The leaders of all of these polities made prominent use of
the discourse of progressive modernity, which emphasizes Russia’s disrup-
tion of peaceful collaboration, including the violation of international law,
but only the US emphasized the democracy/freedom discourse, which
hinges on the very nature of the Russian Other. The authors argue that
14 A.R. YOUNG AND V.L. BIRCHFIELD

these different emphases are significant because the progressive modernity

discourse suggests that relations with Russia can return to normal once it
changes its behavior, while the emphasis on democracy/freedom suggests
that conflict will endure until Russia itself changes. Thus, they contend
that these differences suggest a fault line within the base that Russia might
be able to exploit.
In Chap. 6—“Russia Plays the (Triangular) Sanctions Game”—
Christopher Patane and Cooper Drury apply the triangular diplomacy
frame from the perspective of the ‘target.’ They examine how the Russian
government has sought to both deflect blame and divide the Europeans
and the EU from the US. They argue that the sanctions have enabled the
Putin regime to blame the West for Russia economic woes, which helps to
explain the regime’s continued strong popularity despite deteriorating
economic conditions. Moreover, they contend that Russia characterizes
the EU’s and US’s sanctions differently. Russia characterizes the EU’s
sanctions as more harmful to the EU than to Russia and being pursued by
a foolish elite that has been duped by the US, as part of a strategy to
undermine European support for sanctions. The US’s sanctions, by con-
trast, are portrayed as an aggressive attempt by the US to weaken Russia.
In their analysis, therefore, the ‘target’ is an active player seeking both to
deflect the political costs of the sanctions and to undermine the coopera-
tion that underpins them.
The final chapter of the second section gives space to the focus of the
conflict. In ‘Ukraine and Triangular Diplomacy: Kyiv’s Legitimacy
Dilemmas in the midst of the Crisis,’ Valentina Feklyunina and Valentyna
Romanova analyze Ukraine’s attempts to influence the triangular diplomacy
pursued by the EU and the US. The framework of triangular diplomacy
supports a particularly nuanced understanding of how Ukraine sought to
navigate the perils of an asymmetrical conflict. Unable to influence Russia’s
behavior directly, Ukraine sought to influence it by appealing to Brussels
and Washington for symbolic, diplomatic and material support. At the same
time, the chapter shows that the Ukrainian authorities and political elites
recognized a substantial difference in the willingness and ability of the EU
and the US to exert pressure on Russia. Wary of the EU’s lack of internal
cohesion and aware of the importance of its economic links with Russia,
Kyiv sought, mostly unsuccessfully, to advocate a more active diplomatic
role for Washington. Importantly, Ukraine consistently called for a greater
solidarity between Brussels’ and Washington’s policies toward Russia.
While Kyiv largely succeeded in communicating its narrative of the crisis,
 INTRODUCING TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY 15

it struggled to convert the discursive success into a diplomatic one. The

perceived inadequacy of the resulting US and EU support for Ukraine and
pressure on Russia undermined pro-EU support within Ukraine.
After considering the primary actors and the various interests and iden-
tities at play in this conflict, Section Three examines how they interact
with respect to two key, cross-cutting issues: the role and limits of interna-
tional law and the importance of energy. The first chapter in this section
poses a central question in its title, ‘Whose International Law? Legal
Clashes in the Ukrainian Crisis.’ Here, Mikulas Fabry examines the role of
international law in the Ukrainian crisis. He demonstrates that the US and
the EU have held uniform views on major international legal issues raised
by Russia’s military intervention, the Crimean referendum, and the
absorption of Crimea into the Russian Federation. This uniformity is nota-
ble because the post-Cold War years saw multiple disagreements both
among the member states of the EU and between EU member states and
the US over the interpretation of legal norms in high-profile cases involv-
ing the actual or potential use of military force. Russia consciously drew
upon some of those contested cases, especially the Kosovo intervention
and recognition, to construct a plausible-sounding legal case for its actions
in Ukraine. Neither the past rifts over cases nor Russia’s attempts to justify
its actions have prevented the emergence of a unified transatlantic legal
view of the crisis in Ukraine. Crucially, this unified view developed in close
coordination rather than fortuitously. There can be little doubt that
American and European leaders sought a strong common position in
order to cast Russia’s legal argument in as unconvincing a light as possible
before the global diplomatic audience. Thus, triangular diplomacy is evi-
dent in the legal contestation of the Ukraine crisis.
Arguably the most complex cross-cutting issue involves the implica-
tions of energy politics and is the subject of the chapter by Adam Stulberg
(Chap. 9), titled “Triangular Diplomacy and Europe’s Changing Gas
Network: From ‘Trying-Angles’ to Stable Marriage.” This chapter expli-
cates the puzzle of strategic restraint in gas relations in the wake of Russia’s
annexation of Crimea through the lens of triangulation. Unlike other
chapters in this volume, however, the three poles of central concern in the
gas trade are Russia, Ukraine and the EU, with the US playing a more
indirect role. The chapter begins by spelling out the distinguishing fea-
tures and logic of strategic energy interaction, and traces the impact of
alternative asymmetric triangular structures on the intensity and duration
of gas conflicts prior to the contemporary crisis. It then examines how the
16 A.R. YOUNG AND V.L. BIRCHFIELD

structure of cross-border gas relations transformed from three interacting

but asymmetric ‘point-to-point’ relationships to a triangle system embed-
ded within a broader regional gas network in the lead up to the conflict.
This transformation effectively created more symmetry and stability within
the strategic gas triangle, as it bolstered energy security for Brussels and
Kyiv while circumscribing Russia’s coercive options. The chapter then
probes the strategic consequences of the transformation of the Europe-­
Eurasian gas network through facilitating more resilient and diversified gas
relationships into and across Europe, including liquid natural gas exports
from the US, despite Russia’s enduring prominence as a commercial sup-
plier. The chapter concludes by exploring the implications for coercive
diplomacy, as well as prospects for mitigating tensions and strengthening
US–Euro–Russian energy governance in the transition to a global gas
network.
Wrapping up the volume in Section Four, the editors in ‘Conclusion:
Comparison and Triangulation’ draw out the implications of the contribu-
tions to the volume for our understanding of the EU as an international
actor and highlight the insights gleaned through the use of the triangular
diplomacy frame. Drawing on the contributions to this volume, the chapter
underlines how considering how bilateral relationships interact—employ-
ing the triangular diplomacy frame—can reveal insights about real world
problems. It addition, it highlights how the 360-degree perspective reveals
several intriguing features of the Ukraine crisis that have been overshad-
owed in more conventional accounts of the crisis—including the relative
roles of the EU and US, the challenges to their cooperation, and Russian
efforts to undermine it. The chapter also problematizes restricting the met-
aphor to the interactions among three parties (the triangle) and considers
its applicability to other cases. It concludes by considering what the Ukraine
crisis reveals about the EU as a foreign policy (and international) actor.

Notes
1. Triangles have 180 degrees, but 180 degrees implies only a bilateral focus.
We, therefore, have plumped for a 360-degree perspective, which is familiar
from business and arguably also captures Ukraine as a reference point.
2. Wouters et al. (2015) (eds) compare the ‘intensity’ of the EU’s and China’s
‘relations’ with different regions of the developing world (see pp. 6–8).
Their comparison focuses on historical ties, geographic proximity and insti-
tutional arrangements.
 INTRODUCING TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY 17

3. Energy Information Administration. Available at: http://www.eia.gov/

todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17231. Accessed June 28, 2015.
4. U.S. Department of State Archives: Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1969–1976.
Vol. 1 (http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/i/21100.htm).
5. Lo (2010) directly critiques the contemporary use of the triangulation on
the grounds that Russia is not really powerful enough to make it an effective
strategy.
6. ‘Triangular diplomacy, to be effective, must rely on the natural incentives
and propensities of the players. It must avoid the impression that one is
‘using’ either of the contenders against the other…’

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