Synthetic Biology Metaphors Worldviews Ethics

and Law 1st Edition Joachim Boldt (Eds.) pdf

download
https://textbookfull.com/product/synthetic-biology-metaphors-worldviews-ethics-and-law-1st-edition-
joachim-boldt-eds/

★★★★★ 4.9/5.0 (32 reviews) ✓ 86 downloads ■ TOP RATED

"Great resource, downloaded instantly. Thank you!" - Lisa K.

DOWNLOAD EBOOK
 Synthetic Biology Metaphors Worldviews Ethics and Law 1st
Edition Joachim Boldt (Eds.) pdf download

TEXTBOOK EBOOK TEXTBOOK FULL

Available Formats

■ PDF eBook Study Guide TextBook

EXCLUSIVE 2025 EDUCATIONAL COLLECTION - LIMITED TIME

INSTANT DOWNLOAD VIEW LIBRARY

Collection Highlights

Chemistry and Biology 1st Edition Hans-Joachim Knölker

(Eds.)

Synthetic Biology Jeffrey Carl Braman

Systems Biology Application in Synthetic Biology 1st

Edition Shailza Singh (Eds.)

Synthetic Biology – Metabolic Engineering 1st Edition

Huimin Zhao
Synthetic Biology Parts Devices and Applications 1st
Edition Christina Smolke

Synthetic biology Volume 2 Maxim Ryadnov

Synthetic Biology of Cyanobacteria Weiwen Zhang

Conflicting Philosophies and International Trade Law:

Worldviews and the WTO 1st Edition Michael Burkard (Auth.)

Synthetic Biology Methods and Protocols 2nd Edition

Jeffrey Carl Braman
Technikzukünfte, Wissenschaft und
Gesellschaft / Futures of Technology,
Science and Society
Edited by
A. Grunwald, Karlsruhe, Germany
R. Heil, Karlsruhe, Germany
C. Coenen, Heidelberg, Germany
Diese interdisziplinäre Buchreihe ist Technikzukünften in ihren wissenschaftlichen und
gesellschaftlichen Kontexten gewidmet. Der Plural „Zukünfte“ ist dabei Programm.
Denn erstens wird ein breites Spektrum wissenschaftlich-technischer Entwicklungen
beleuchtet, und zweitens sind Debatten zu Technowissenschaften wie u.a. den Bio-,
Informations-, Nano- und Neurotechnologien oder der Robotik durch eine Vielzahl
von Perspektiven und Interessen bestimmt. Diese Zukünfte beeinflussen einerseits den
Verlauf des Fortschritts, seine Ergebnisse und Folgen, z.B. durch Ausgestaltung der
wissenschaftlichen Agenda. Andererseits sind wissenschaftlich-technische Neuerun-
gen Anlass, neue Zukünfte mit anderen gesellschaftlichen Implikationen auszudenken.
Diese Wechselseitigkeit reflektierend, befasst sich die Reihe vorrangig mit der sozialen
und kulturellen Prägung von Naturwissenschaft und Technik, der verantwortlichen
Gestaltung ihrer Ergebnisse in der Gesellschaft sowie mit den Auswirkungen auf unsere
Bilder vom Menschen.

This interdisciplinary series of books is devoted to technology futures in their scientific

and societal contexts. The use of the plural “futures” is by no means accidental: firstly,
light is to be shed on a broad spectrum of developments in science and technology;
secondly, debates on technoscientific fields such as biotechnology, information technol-
ogy, nanotechnology, neurotechnology and robotics are influenced by a multitude of
viewpoints and interests. On the one hand, these futures have an impact on the way
advances are made, as well as on their results and consequences, for example by shap-
ing the scientific agenda. On the other hand, scientific and technological innovations
offer an opportunity to conceive of new futures with different implications for society.
Reflecting this reciprocity, the series concentrates primarily on the way in which science
and technology are influenced social and culturally, on how their results can be shaped
in a responsible manner in society, and on the way they affect our images of humankind.

Prof. Dr. Armin Grunwald, Physiker, Mathematiker und Philosoph, lehrt Technikphilo-
sophie und Technikethik am Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), ist Leiter des
Instituts für Technikfolgenabschätzung und Systemanalyse (ITAS) in Karlsruhe und
Leiter des Büros für Technikfolgen-Abschätzung beim Deutschen Bundestag (TAB) in
Berlin. / Professor Armin Grunwald, physicist, mathematician and philosopher, teaches
the philosophy and ethics of technology at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT),
and is the director of the Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis
(ITAS) in Karlsruhe and of the Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundes-
tag (TAB) in Berlin.

Reinhard Heil, Philosoph, ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am KIT-ITAS. / Reinhard

Heil, philosopher, is a researcher at KIT-ITAS.

Christopher Coenen, Politikwissenschaftler, ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am KIT-

ITAS und Herausgeber der Zeitschrift ‘NanoEthics: Studies of New and Emerging Tech-
nologies’. / Christopher Coenen, political scientist, is a researcher at KIT-ITAS and the
editor-in-chief of the journal ‘NanoEthics: Studies of New and Emerging Technologies’.
Joachim Boldt (Ed.)

Synthetic Biology
Metaphors, Worldviews,
Ethics, and Law
Editor
Joachim Boldt
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg
Freiburg, Germany

Technikzukünfte, Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft / Futures of Technology, Science and

Society
ISBN 978-3-658-10987-5 ISBN 978-3-658-10988-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-10988-2

Library of Congress Control Number: 2015954947

Springer VS
© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2016
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or
part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illus-
trations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and
transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by
similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the
authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained
herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.

Lektorat: Frank Schindler, Monika Mülhausen

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer VS is a brand of Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden is part of Springer Science+Business Media
(www.springer.com)
Preface

The results, arguments, and theses that are presented in this volume have been
developed and discussed within the project Engineering Life: An interdisciplinary
approach to the ethics of synthetic biology. The project was funded by the German
Ministry of Research and Education (grant nr. 01GP1003). The following contributors
were part of this project. In the order of appearance: Joachim Boldt, Oliver Müller,
Harald Matern, Jens Ried, Matthias Braun, Peter Dabrock, Tobias Eichinger, Jürgen
Robienski, Jürgen Simon, Rainer Paslack, Harald König, Daniel Frank, Reinhard
Heil, Christopher Coenen.
Jan C. Schmidt, Bernadette Bensaude Vincent, Johannes Achatz, Iñigo de Miguel
Beriain, Sacha Loeve, Christoph Then, Bernd Giese, Henning Wigger, Christian
Pade, Arnim von Gleich joined us at different occasions, first and foremost our
concluding conference at Freiburg University, Germany.
I’d like to thank the all the project partners and contributors for their cooperation.
I am grateful to the German Ministry of Research and Education for giving us all
the opportunity to engage in philosophical, ethical, legal, and social science rese-
arch relating to synthetic biology. I’d also like to thank the Centre for Biological
Signalling Studies (BIOSS) at Freiburg University for their kind support.
Special thanks to Susan Keller for skillfully adjusting the English language style,
grammar and spelling in this volume, and to Sebastian Höpfl for accurately unifying
bibliography styles, citations, and layout.

Freiburg, August 28, 2015 Joachim Boldt

Contents

Swiss watches, genetic machines, and ethics. An introduction to synthetic

biology’s conceptual and ethical challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Joachim Boldt

I Concepts, Metaphors, Worldviews

Philosophy of Late-Modern Technology. Towards a Clarification and

Classification of Synthetic Biology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Jan C. Schmidt

Synthetic Biology. On epistemological black boxes, human self-assurance,

and the hybridity of practices and values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Oliver Müller

Living Machines. On the Genesis and Systematic Implications of

a Leading Metaphor of Synthetic Biology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Harald Matern, Jens Ried, Matthias Braun and Peter Dabrock

Production biology. Elements and limits of an action paradigm

in synthetic biology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Tobias Eichinger

Creativity and technology. Humans as co-creators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Harald Matern
VIII Contents

The moral economy of synthetic biology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Bernadette Bensaude Vincent

Evaluating biological artifacts. Synthetic cells in the philosophy

of technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Johannes Achatz

II Public Good and Private Ownership. Social and Legal Ramifications

Legal Aspects of Synthetic Biology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Jürgen Robienski, Jürgen Simon and Rainer Paslack

Synbio and IP rights: looking for an adequate balance between

private ownership and public interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Iñigo de Miguel Beriain

III Opportunities, Risks, Governance

Beyond unity: Nurturing diversity in synthetic biology and its publics . . . . . 155
Sacha Loeve

Synthetic Genome Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Christoph Then

Promising applications of synthetic biology – and how to avoid their

potential pitfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Bernd Giese, Henning Wigger, Christian Pade and Arnim von Gleich

Synthetic biology’s multiple dimensions of benefits and risks:

implications for governance and policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Harald König, Daniel Frank, Reinhard Heil and Christopher Coenen

Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
Swiss watches, genetic machines, and ethics
An introduction to synthetic biology’s conceptual
and ethical challenges
Joachim Boldt

1 Novelty and conceptual framing of emerging

technologies

Emerging technologies have a history. They do not emerge out of nothing but
develop gradually and continuously. Synthetic biology is no exception. It is rooted
in genetic engineering, and many observers maintain that synthetic biology is no
more than a new label for just that: genetic engineering.
The inevitable question therefore arises: when is an emerging technology in fact
a new technology and when is it only a gradual development of an already known
technology? Part of the answer certainly does not lie in the technology itself but
in the context of interests surrounding it. A supposedly new technology comes
with new economic and societal opportunities – and new risks. That is to say, a
new label suits researchers who are seeking to obtain grants just fine. At the same
time, it suits technology critics, too.
Again, synthetic biology is no exception to this rule. Scientists use the label
“synthetic biology” to set it apart from so-called traditional genetic engineering,
which implies that synthetic biology is a non-traditional, modern, and particularly
capable technology (Knight 2005). NGOs such as the ETC Group, on the other hand,
equate the new label with “extreme genetic engineering”, a description in which the
adjective “extreme” leads to associations of highly risky undertakings (ETC 2007).
True as this may be, it nonetheless overstates the case if one explains the for-
mation of a new emerging technology label entirely in terms of accompanying
interests. Even if the technology itself is in a process of gradual development, the
ways in which these technologies are understood and thus further developed, and
the concepts in the light of which technologies are formed, may shift in leaps and
bounds. Human beings are truth seeking animals, and their understanding of what
concepts come closest to a true description of their study objects and intentions

J. Boldt (Ed.), Synthetic Biology,

Technikzukünfte, Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft / Futures of Technology,Science and Society,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-10988-2_1, © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2016
2 Joachim Boldt

has an impact on the further development of a technology, just as economic or

other interests that are only arbitrarily connected to a science and technology do.
Mainstream synthetic biology incorporates such a shift in conceptual framing. It
aspires to move away from genetic engineering guided by trial and error towards a
rational design process in which whole genomes can be constructed at the computer.
Fast and cheap whole genome sequencing, reliable and affordable gene synthesis,
and highly effective genome editing methods such as CRISPR/Cas9 pave the way
towards realizing these objectives.
To rationally and reliably design and assemble a complex entity presupposes
that the behavior and functions of the complex entity can be predicted on the basis
of the behavior of its parts. Many artificial technological objects adhere to this
requirement, as we know from experience. With regard to living beings, though,
one may suppose that the case is different. After all, living beings are subject to
evolutionary change; they interact in multiple ways with their environment; and we
even attribute freedom of will to some of them, namely ourselves. Thus, to suppose
that living beings can be reliably designed amounts to an ontological hypothesis
claiming that the behavior of living beings can be explained in terms of the behavior
of their physical parts.
By itself, this conceptual frame is far from new. It can be traced back at least
to 17th century Cartesian philosophy and the mechanical animal models of the
Renaissance. However, it was not until the discovery of DNA in the 20th century and
today’s advanced genome editing abilities that purposeful building and rebuilding
of long DNA sequences and whole genomes became feasible (Keller 2002). Today,
these assumptions form an epistemic, i.e., truth related, conceptual frame that is
shaping synthetic biology and guiding it into the future. This frame differs from
the guiding assumptions and goals of traditional genetic engineering, which are
less systematic and less engineering and design oriented. It is precisely the specific
conceptual frame of synthetic biology that adds a decisive element towards an
exhaustive explanation of why synthetic biology bears a label of its own.
Building and rebuilding DNA differs from building mechanical animals. A
mechanical animal may be regarded as being analogous to, but certainly not iden-
tical to, a natural animal, since its physical parts differ from the parts of a natural
organism. Building the synthetic genome of a single-cell organism, by contrast,
amounts to assembling parts that make up natural organisms as well. Again, in
contrast to mechanical animals, the prospect of organisms created by synthetic bio-
logy urges the question of whether such a synthetic living being that is indiscernible
from a natural living being with regard to its physical and, as one must assume, its
emergent properties can be adequately understood as a quasi-mechanical object.
Swiss watches, genetic machines, and ethics 3

Organisms of synthetic biology inhabit a curious space between artificial ob-

jects and natural living beings because they are living beings, albeit constructed
and treated as if they were not. If it is adequate to conceptualize living beings as
quasi-mechanical objects, then synthetic biology is the technology that ultimately
unsettles our – supposedly wrong, from synthetic biology’s point of view – deeply
entrenched everyday understanding that living beings are something different from,
and more than, non-living entities. In addition, the synthetic biology conceptual
frame has a bearing on the way in which one perceives ethical and societal impacts
of this technology. It is an important task of bioethics, the social sciences, philoso-
phy, and theology to identify, point out, and reckon with these impacts, especially
in the early stages of a technological development.1

2 Synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and a conceptual

challenge

In its quest to reveal the hidden secrets of an object in the object’s basic parts, syn-
thetic biology resembles nanotechnology. Nanotechnology, too, is animated by the
idea of being able to build and rebuild complex objects by rearranging their parts.
The title of the U.S. National Science and Technology Council’s (NSTC) report
“Nanotechnology. Shaping the world atom by atom” bears witness to this parallel.
Unlike synthetic biology, though, nanotechnology literally aims to engineer ma-
chines. Nanoscale engineering objects are meant to be non-living entities that are
put together at an atomic level. The NSTC does not go to great effort to assess the
scientific feasibility of this ideal, but straightforwardly compares nanoscale objects
to “Swiss watches”: “The products of Swiss watchmakers even several centuries
ago proved that human control over the material world had extended downward a
thousandfold to the millimeter scale or so. Over the past few decades, researchers
have pushed this control down another hundredfold” (NSTC 1999, p.5).
Synthetic organisms, by contrast, are by definition living beings whose na-
noscale DNA components have been rearranged in novel ways. One may think of
a synthetic cell as the “best shot at a general nanotech assembler, the dream of Eric
Drexler and many nanotechnology enthusiasts” (Church and Regis 2012, pp.53f.),
but the synthetic cell itself does not constitute a nanotechnology product as it is
commonly defined. Even if one envisages the assembling of a functional cell from

1 The main focus of parts I and II of this volume is directed towards such normatively
relevant conceptual issues within synthetic biology.
4 Joachim Boldt

non-living molecules, this is a synthetic biology task, not a nanotechnological one.

Nanobiotechnology, the area within nanotechnology closest to biology, comprises
the engineering of nanoscale machines, i.e., non-living objects, that make use of
or are inspired by biological molecules.
From an ethical perspective, nanotechnology and nanobiotechnology thus
present issues of technological control and risk assessment. When confronted with
nanotechnology one has to ask: can we responsibly do what we aim to do? Syn-
thetic biology leads to the further question: do we know what we are talking about
when we conceptually align the living world with the non-living world? Synthetic
biology – bionanotechnology, if you like – is a challenging enterprise not only with
regard to risk assessment but also with regard to the use of concepts and metaphors.
If one distinguishes nanotechnology and synthetic biology in this way, the
distinction hinges upon the difference between non-living and living entities
being as clear-cut as possible. Notwithstanding the everyday self-evidence of this
distinction, attempts to spell out precisely what sets the living world apart from
the world of non-living entities have kept philosophers and scientists busy since
the ancient beginnings of philosophical and scientific thinking.
Biology textbooks typically offer open lists of criteria for what counts as life.
These include, for instance, metabolism, homeostasis, growth, stimulus response,
reproduction, and adaptation and evolution. When one looks for necessary and
adequate properties to explain and sort these criteria one often comes across con-
cepts such as “self-organization” or “self-preservation” (Bensaude Vincent 2009).
The prefix “self” is important here because it carries the idea that the behaviors of
living objects cannot be explained purely with reference to determining causal forces
but need to include the notion of something reacting to something else outside of
itself. Living beings require a shift from causal explanations towards telos-oriented
ones, it is assumed (Boldt 2013).
Which kind of abilities justify such a shift to a telos-oriented explanatory scheme,
and whether we are able to reliably detect their presence, remains a debatable issue.
Nonetheless, if one maintains that there is indeed a difference between living and
non-living entities, the difference will have to be spelled out in terms of these notions.
Heuristically at least, synthetic biology itself maintains the distinction. It is a
biotechnology explicitly aiming at restructuring and reinventing the molecular
basis of life. It does so because objects that possess metabolism, reproduce, and
undergo evolutionary change can be more efficient and more powerful technological
tools than non-living technologies. At the same time, these properties come with a
price. Besides the fact that growth is energy-consuming and reproduction can be
unreliable, evolution implies a certain degree of independence of the engineered
Swiss watches, genetic machines, and ethics 5

object’s behavior and development from the engineer’s initial plans and intentions,
to name one ethically relevant property of living beings.
Applying the synthetic biology conceptual frame may lead to an underrating
of the relevance of the above point. As long as synthetic biology has not advanced
to a stage at which it becomes possible to evaluate single applications, it is one of
the most important tasks of bioethics to analyze the conceptual framework of this
technology, describe its limits, and compare it to alternative accounts. The en-
gineering and machine framework of synthetic biology and the faith that synthetic
biologists place in it certainly deserve such scrutiny, as indicated by statements
such as the following:

Originally, you pretty much had to take organisms as they came, with all the inherent
design flaws and limitations, compromises and complications that resulted from
the random working of evolution. Now we could actually preplan living systems,
design them, construct them according to our wishes, and expect them to operate
as intended – just as if they were in fact machines (Church and Regis 2012, p.182).

As becomes evident, the machine metaphor and the engineering framework of

synthetic biology shape one’s perspective on the abilities of synthetic biology and
on the function and behavior of its objects. DNA segments that appear redundant
and DNA expression pathways that seem to be unnecessarily complicated are not
deemed to call for closer analysis but are classified as flaws. In the same vein, the
future behavior and development of a synthetic organism is thought to be safely
following the engineer’s intentions, disregarding the possibility of unexpected evo-
lutionary change. The synthetic biologists de Lorenzo and Danchin, who otherwise
share an optimistic outlook for synthetic biology’s general and long-term ability
to design reliable synthetic organisms with predictable properties and behaviors,
object to the mainstream conceptual frame of their research field: engineering
metaphors for gene expression, for example, “represent a straight and overtly
simplistic projection of electric engineering concepts into supposedly biological
counterparts,” they write (Lorenzo and Danchin 2008, p.824).

3 Synthetic biology and existing GMO regulation

Before turning to the possible ethical and societal impact of the current synbio
conceptual frame in more detail, it is worth noting that the emergence of synthetic
biology takes place within a set of existing laws and regulations, nationally and
internationally. Exaggerated promises and expectations notwithstanding, synthetic
6 Joachim Boldt

biology may indeed soon offer useful applications. There are promising approaches
within the field of medicine, and energy and the environment are further fields of
application.2 Each application will of course have to conform to established legal
and ethical regulation. With regard to short-term applications of synthetic biology,
the relevant fields are covered to a large extent by a number of existing national or
international regulations.3
In the long run, however, synthetic biology’s research agenda may lead to
products that fall outside the field of established risk assessment procedures and
current regulation. Synthetic organisms whose genomes stem from a large number
of different sources, for example, aggravate the task of risk assessment. Established
risk assessment procedures for genetically modified organisms rely on an evaluation
of the known behavior and risk profile of the natural counterpart organism. If the
genome of the synthetic organism no longer resembles the genome of any natural
species, the basis for a risk assessment procedure of this kind is lacking. What
is more, if synthetic biologists one day engineer a synthetic cell containing only
non-natural DNA molecules, it will be difficult to classify such an organism as a
“genetically modified” one. Most probably, any such organism will not fall within
the scope of current GMO regulations (Pauwels et al. 2012).
In all cases it holds that the more encompassing genetic modification and repla-
cement become, the more difficult it will be to assess the risks and apply existing
regulations. One way out of the risk assessment challenge may be to encourage step
by step genome changes in order to ensure that every novel synthetic organism does
have a like and known predecessor. With regard to non-natural DNA organisms,
modification of legal regulations will be unavoidable.

4 The synbio story, ethics, and the diversity of research

approaches

Assessing applications according to legal and ethical standards is an important

ethical, societal, and political task, but not the only one. Given synthetic biology’s
powerful self-narrative that is shaping the future of this emerging technology as
well as its perception of its objects – it is equally important to be attentive to this

2 Societally relevant synbio application scenarios are described by König (in this volume).
3 An overview of legal regulations is supplied by Robienski, Simon, and Paslack (in this
volume). Cf. also Kuzma and Tanji (2010).
Swiss watches, genetic machines, and ethics 7

very narrative, its limits, and alternative accounts of what synthetic biology may
be and become.
The constraints of the machine metaphor and the engineering framework of
synthetic biology are ethically relevant. For example, how one rates the threat to
an existing ecosystem posed by a synthetic organism depends on, among other
assumptions, how accurately one believes oneself able to predict the development
of the synthetic species. To name another example, thinking along the lines of the
design and engineering approach does not restrict synthetic biology to engineering
single-cell organisms. On the contrary, it appears natural from this perspective to
expect synthetic biology to extend its scope to higher organisms, including hum-
ans, as soon as this appears technically feasible. From the contested biocentrist’s
point of view, ethical questions regarding inherent value and instrumentalization
are relevant – to a higher or lesser degree – whenever living beings are subjected
to technological interventions according to ends that do not conform to the ends
and interests of the organism itself (Deplazes-Zemp 2012). Nonetheless, when one
considers human beings, issues of instrumentalization inevitably become relevant,
regardless of whether one is operating from a biocentric or anthropocentric ethical
foundation. From an organism-as-machine standpoint, these issues are difficult to
recognize and understand, let alone tackle.
Paying attention to the current synbio self-narrative, its limits, and alternative
accounts of what synthetic biology may be, could contribute to developing accounts
of synthetic biology that put less emphasis on the strong design and engineering
framework found today. Synthetic biology need not be understood as a technology
aiming to rationally design a second nature (Keller 2009). It can also be framed
as a technology inspired by and mimicking natural organisms and natural pro-
cesses of DNA change. Such an interpretation and its application ideals may, for
example, help to alleviate safety concerns. One may also envisage synthetic biology
as a technology that aims to use DNA and its products without relying on those
energy consuming and difficult to control processes such as evolution and growth
that are inherently bound to the phenomenon of life (Giese and Gleich 2014). In
this case, cell-free systems would count as synthetic biology’s poster child. Again,
this approach may be seen as safer when compared to synthetic organisms. Cell-
free approaches are obviously also less likely to fall victim to concerns that, once
single-cell organisms have been equipped with novel synthetic genomes, animals
and humans come next.
What the search for alternative stories to describe the core aims and sources of
synthetic biology amounts to, then, is an appeal for a diversification of research
8 Joachim Boldt

agendas and research approaches.4 One may dispute any such story and its rese-
arch approaches, but being able to recognize a variety of stories and approaches is
valuable in itself since it opens one’s eyes to the advantages and limits of each one.
Developing alternative accounts will also help to put the high hopes and pro-
mises accompanying the advent of synthetic biology into perspective. If synthetic
biology is not (or at least not necessarily and exclusively) about freeing oneself from
the limits of natural organisms and DNA in order to engineer life that perfectly
matches one’s wishes, it may instead be seen as one technological tool among other
technological tools and social measures, each of which may contribute its share
to overcoming societal challenges. Public debate will profit from this view just as
much as synthetic biology itself.

5 A closing remark

When we, literally or conceptually, aspire to turn living nature into our tool, we
ultimately turn our own origin into a tool. The inconsistency of this project comes
to the fore most clearly when we direct it at our own nature. We are, and must
always be, simultaneously the subject and object of our nature. By being unaware
of this reality we risk fixating our own development on arbitrary ends. The effect
would be that we would become prone to falling victim to those arbitrary ends.
Setting ourselves apart from the world of non-human life is easier. But still, that
very world has given birth to us. It contains the seeds of all of our highest human
abilities. We do not know what other valuable states it may lead to. If we attempt to
fixate nature’s ends on our own, we may, to our own disadvantage, miss important
developmental properties of living beings and hinder the evolution of many sources
of unexpected value. That is not what synthetic biology need or ought to be about.

4 An appeal that is convincingly made by Loeve (in this volume).

Swiss watches, genetic machines, and ethics 9

References
Bensaude Vincent, B. (2009). Self-Assembly, Self-Organization: Nanotechnology and Vital-
ism. Nanoethics, 3(1), 31-42. doi: 10.1007/s11569-009-0056-0.
Boldt, J. (2013). Life as a Technological Product: Philosophical and Ethical Aspects of Synthetic
Biology. Biological Theory, 8(4), 391-401. doi: 10.1007/s13752-013-0138-7.
Church, G.M., & Regis, E. (2012). Regenesis. How synthetic biology will reinvent nature and
ourselves. New York: Basic Books.
Deplazes-Zemp, A. (2012). The Moral Impact of Synthesising Living Organisms: Biocentric
Views on Synthetic Biology. Environmental Values, 21(1), 63-82. doi: 10.3197/09632711
2X13225063228023.
ETC (2007). ETC Group. Extreme Genetic Engineering. An Introduction to Synthetic Biology.
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/602/01/synbiore-
portweb.pdf. Accessed: 26 March 2015.
Giese, B., & Gleich, A. v. (2014). Hazards, risks, and low hazard development paths of syn-
thetic biology. In: B. Giese, C. Pade, H. Wigger, A. von Gleich (eds.), Synthetic biology.
Character and impact (pp.173-196). Heidelberg: Springer.
Keller, E.F. (2002). Making sense of life explaining biological development with models, met-
aphors, and machines. Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press.
Keller, E.F. (2009). What Does Synthetic Biology Have to Do with Biology? BioSocieties,
4(2-3), 291-302.
Knight, T.F. (2005). Engineering novel life. Molecular Systems Biology, 1(1). doi: 10.1038/
msb4100028.
Kuzma, J., & Tanji, T. (2010). Unpackaging synthetic biology: Identification of oversight
policy problems and options. Regulation & Governance, 4(1), 92-112. doi: 10.1111/j.1748-
5991.2010.01071.x.
Lorenzo, V. de, & Danchin, A. (2008). Synthetic biology: Discovering new worlds and new
words. The new and not so new aspects of this emerging research field. EMBO Reports,
9(9), 822-827. doi: 10.1038/embor.2008.159.
NSTC (1999). National Science and Technology Council of the USA. Nanotechnology. Shap-
ing the world atom by atom. http://www.wtec.org/loyola/nano/IWGN.Public.Brochure.
Accessed: 12 May 2015.
Pauwels, K., Willemarck, N., Breyer, D., & Herman, P. (2012). Synthetic Biology: Latest devel-
opments, biosafety considerations and regulatory challenges. Biosafety and Biotechnology
Unit (Belgium). http://www.biosafety.be/PDF/120911_Doc_Synbio_SBB_FINAL.pdf.
Accessed: 12 May 2015.
 I
Concepts, Metaphors, Worldviews
Philosophy of Late-Modern Technology
Towards a Clarification and Classification of
Synthetic Biology
Jan C. Schmidt

1 Two types of technology?

Synthetic biology is the crystallization point of late-modern technoscientific hypes

and hopes. In 2010 the research entrepreneur Craig Venter announced the forthcom-
ing advent of an epochal break and envisioned a fundamental shift in our technical
capabilities. Synthetic organisms “are going to potentially create a new industrial
revolution if we can really get cells to do the production we want; […] they could
help wean us off of oil, and reverse some of the damage to the environment like
capturing back carbon dioxide” (Venter 2010).1
In order to analyze whether the epochal break claims are justified, I will coin
a provisionary search term and call the (possible) novel kind of technology “late-
modern” (Schmidt 2012a; Schmidt 2012b). Apparently, this new type of technol-
ogy seems to be inherently linked to the concept of self-organization. If such a
self-organization based technology is emerging, we have to clarify what is meant
by the catchword ‘self-organization’, and we need to analyze the source or root of
self-organization, including the idea(l) of self-productiveness. The thesis is: insta-
bilities — or, in cognate terms, sensitivities — constitute the necessary condition
and, hence, the technoscientific core of this type of technology. Based on such
analysis, I argue that late-modern technology differs from the classic-modern type
of technology in its view and valuation of stability and instability. In fact, this novel
kind of technology appears as nature and behaves like nature. In other words, we
are experiencing a ‘naturalization of technology’ in a twofold way, as will be shown
in this article. My aim here is to disclose a possible new ambivalence and dialectic
of this envisioned late-modern turn in technology for our (late-modern) societies.

1 Venter’s visionary claim was evidently induced by the success of his team in the Creation
of a Bacterial Cell Controlled by a Chemically Synthesized Genome—as his article in
Science Magazine was titled (Gibson et al. 2010).

J. Boldt (Ed.), Synthetic Biology,

Technikzukünfte, Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft / Futures of Technology,Science and Society,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-10988-2_2, © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2016
14 Jan C. Schmidt

2 Clarifying the umbrella term ‘synthetic biology’

The exact meaning of the umbrella term ‘synthetic biology’ is not clear at all. New
labels and trendy watchwords generally play a key role in the construction of new
technoscientific waves. ‘Synthetic biology’ is, indeed, an extremely successful
buzzword, as was ‘nanotechnology’ more than one decade ago.2
All ethicists and technology assessment scholars are aware of the fact that labels
are strongly normative. Labels are not innocent or harmless: they carry content
and form the backbones of visions. They are roadmaps towards the future and can
quickly turn into reality; they shape the technoscientific field and determine our
thinking, perception, and judgment. Labels help to foster hopes and hypes, as well as
concerns and fears; their implicit power to create or close new research trajectories
and development roadmaps can hardly be overestimated. Labels are part of what
could be described as ‘term politics’ that regulate and shape the field with a ‘gate
keeper function’ to decide who is in and who is out, in particular, whose research
field can be considered as ‘synthetic biology’ and whose is just part of traditional
biotechnology. Labels are relevant with respect to funding, publication opportu-
nities, reputation, and career. Thus, they determine and sway our future, in one
way or another. What does the umbrella term ‘synthetic biology’ mean? Is there
a unifying arc and common denominator? What visions do synthetic biologists
have, and how likely will their visions be achieved? Three popular definitions of
‘synthetic biology’, and of what it should be, stand out.
First – goals: The engineering definition frames synthetic biology as being radically
new since it is said to bring an engineering approach to the scientific discipline
of biology. Such an understanding is advocated by a High Level Expert Group of
the European Commission: “Synthetic biology is the engineering of biology: the
synthesis of complex, biologically based (or inspired) systems […]. This engineering
perspective may be applied at all levels of the hierarchy of biological structures
[…]. In essence, synthetic biology will enable the design of ‘biological systems’ in a
rational and systematic way” (European Commission 2005, p.5). This comes close
to the definition given by Pühler et al. who define synthetic biology as “the birth
of a new engineering science” (Pühler et al. 2011). Similarly, others view synthetic

2 On the one hand, ‘synthetic biology’ seems to be a fairly young term. It was (re-)in-
troduced and presented by Eric Kool in 2000 at the annual meeting of the American
Chemical Society. Since then, the term has gone on to enjoy a remarkable career and
general circulation in the scientific communities as well as in science, technology, and
innovation politics. On the other hand, the notion of ‘synthetic biology’ emerged about
100 years ago—although it was rarely mentioned until 2000. It seems more appropriate
to consider the more recent understandings of ‘synthetic biology’.
Philosophy of Late-Modern Technology 15

biology as “an assembly of different approaches unified by a similar goal, namely

the construction of new forms of life” (Deplazes and Huppenbauer 2009, p.58). The
engineering definition is generally based on the strong assumption that, before syn-
thetic biology arose, a clear line existed between biology as an academic discipline,
on the one hand, and engineering/technical sciences, on the other.3 The proponents
of the engineering definition believe that the well-established divide between the
two disciplines is becoming blurred. Today, engineering is transferring its goals
to the new subdiscipline of biology. According to the advocates of this definition,
these goals have never been characteristics of other subdisciplines of biology. The
essential claim is that we are experiencing an epochal break or a qualitative shift
within biology: the aim is not theory, but technology.
Second – objects: The artificiality definition of synthetic biology is more concerned
with objects and material entities than with goals. According to the EU project
TESSY, ‘synthetic biology’ deals with “bio-systems […] that do not exist as such
in nature” (TESSY 2008). In an equivalent sense it is stated that synthetic biology
encompasses the synthesis and construction of “systems, which display functions
that do not exist in nature” (European Commission 2005, p.5). The German Sci-
ence Foundation similarly identifies the emergence of “new properties that have
never been observed in natural organisms before” (DFG et al. 2009, p.7). “Synthetic
biology” is here defined by the non-naturalness, or unnaturalness, and artificiality
of the constructed and created bio-objects. Divergence from nature appears to be
the differentia specifica of ‘synthetic biology’, with ‘nature’ being seen as the central
anchor and negative foil for this definition. Whereas bio-systems were formerly
natural, i.e., they occurred exclusively in, and were created by nature alone, the claim
here is that, from now on, they can also be artificial, i.e., constructed by humans.4
Third – methods: The extreme biotechnology definition leads either to synthetic
biology being seen in a more relaxed light or, on the contrary, to it being condemned

3 From this angle, biology is regarded as a pure science aiming at fundamental descriptions
and explanations. In contrast, engineering sciences appear to be primarily interested in
intervention, construction, and creation. Viewed from this angle, biology and engineering
sciences have always been—in terms of their goals—like fire and ice.
4 That is certainly a strong presupposition, and it is also linked to the Aristotelian idea
of a dichotomy between nature and technical objects. This dichotomy traces back to
the Greek philosopher Aristotle who drew a demarcation line between physis (nature)
and techné (arts, technical systems). In spite of Francis Bacon’s endeavors at the very
beginning of the modern epoch to eliminate the dichotomy and naturalize technology,
the nature-technology divide broadly persists in the above definition. In a certain sense,
the artificiality definition of synthetic biology presupposes the ongoing plausibility of
the Aristotelian concept of nature, neglects the Baconian one, and argues for an epochal
break in understanding bio-objects and bio-nature: these are not given, they are made.
16 Jan C. Schmidt

as a continuation of further trends already perceived as terrible and dangerous.

According to the proponents of this definition, we are experiencing a slight shift
and mainly a continuation, not an epochal break; nothing is really new under the
sun. Synthetic biology merely extends and complements biotechnology. Drew Endy,
a key advocate of synthetic biology, perceives only an “expansion of biotechnology”
(Endy 2005, p.449). Similarly, but from a more critical angle, the Action Group on
Erosion, Technology and Concentration (ETC) defines “synthetic biology” as an
“extreme gene technology”, mainly because synthetic biology is based on gene syn-
thesis and cell techniques such as nucleotide synthesis, polymerase chain reaction
(PCR), or recombined cloning (ETC 2007). The underlying methods, techniques,
and procedures have been well established since the late 1970s. Although there have
been tremendous advances from a quantitative standpoint, it is hard to discern any
qualitative progress in the core methods.5 Briefly, this position perceives a contin-
uation in methods—in contrast to a divergence from biology or nature according
to the above mentioned two definitions of synthetic biology.

3 Deficits of the three definitions

The three definitions — the engineering, the artificiality, and the extreme bio-
technology definition — tell three different stories. Each one exhibits some degree
of plausibility and conclusiveness. In spite of their apparent differences, all are
concerned (first) with disciplinary biology or biological nature and (second) with
a rational design ideal in conjunction with a specific understanding of technology,
technical systems, and engineering action. However, this is not the whole story.
First, the focus on biology as a discipline alone, including a discipline-oriented
framing, prevents an exhaustive characterization of the new technoscientific wave.
Synthetic biology is much more interdisciplinary than disciplinary at its nucleus. This
needs to be taken into account when looking for an adequate definition: biologists,
computer scientists, physicists, chemists, physicians, material scientists, and people
from different engineering sciences are engaged in synthetic biology. Since various
disciplinary approaches, methods, and concepts coexist in synthetic biology, the
term seems to be a label for a new and specific type of interdisciplinarity (cf. Schmidt

5 This definition rarely deals with goals or objects, but with methods and techniques. Its
proponents claim (1) that methods constitute the core of synthetic biology, (2) that there
has been no breakthrough in the synthetic/biotechnological methods, and, moreover,
(3) that a quantitative advancement cannot induce a qualitative one.
Philosophy of Late-Modern Technology 17

2008b). Accordingly, a strong biology bias would surely be overly simplistic and
entirely inadequate; to frame synthetic biology merely as a new subdiscipline of
biology would represent a far too narrow approach. Thus, we need to ask whether
we are faced with a much more fundamental technoscientific wave than simply a
change in one particular discipline or academic branch alone.
Second, in line with what has become known as bionano or nanobio research,
the three definitions look at synthetic biology from the angle of technology and
engineering. This manner of approach appears viable in some respects: synthetic
biology extends and complements advancements in nanotechnology and hence spurs
a position that can be called “technological reductionism” (Schmidt 2004, pp.35f.;
cf. Grunwald 2008, pp.41f./190f.). Technological reductionists aim at eliminating
the patchwork of engineering sciences by developing a fundamental technology, or
a “root, core, or enabling technology” (Schmidt 2004, p.42). The slogan promoted
by technological reductionism is: Shaping, constructing, and creating the world
‘atom-by-atom’. Eric Drexler is a prominent advocate of technological reductionism.
He argues that there are “two styles of technology. The ancient style of technology
that led from flint chips to silicon chips handles atoms and molecules in bulk; call
it bulk technology. The new technology will handle individual atoms and mole-
cules with control and precision; call it molecular technology” (Drexler 1990, p.4).
Now, it has been argued that the three definitions of synthetic biology given above
concur strongly with technological reductionism. It certainly seems plausible to
put synthetic biology in the context of this new type of technology oriented reduc-
tionism. But whether that is all that can, or should, be said to characterize synthetic
biology still needs to be clarified. Most clearly, synthetic biology differs from nano-
technology, which can be regarded as a paradigm of a technological reductionist
approach. Synthetic biology claims to pursue an approach that is complementary
to nanotechnology and has been called ‘systems approach’ or, in a more visionary
sense, ‘holistic’. Given the widespread reference to ‘system’, including the claim
of successful application of ‘systems thinking’, synthetic biology seems to involve
a convergence, or dialectical relationship, of seemingly contradictory concepts:
(systems’) holism and (technological) reductionism (with its strong control ambi-
tions and emphasis on rational engineering). This inherent dialectic is obviously
central to an adequate and appropriate understanding of synthetic biology. The
three definitions presented so far do not consider this point.
18 Jan C. Schmidt

4 Towards a new technoscientific paradigm?

For a better and more comprehensive characterization of synthetic biology we

should not restrict ourselves to goals (as in definition 1), objects (‘ontology’, as in
definition 2), or methods (‘methodology’, as in definition 3), but also consider the
underlying principles, concepts and theorieswithin the technoscientific field. A
further definition is prevalent in synthetic biology’s R&D programs: the self-or-
ganization (or systems) definition. Synthetic biology harnesses, or at least aims to
harness, self-organization power (of nature) for technological purposes.
The paradigm of self-organization is present in many papers on synthetic biolo-
gy: “Harnessing nature’s toolbox” in order to “design biological systems”, as David
A. Drubin, Jeffrey Way, and Pamela Silver (2007) state. As early as in 2002, before
synthetic biology had been coined as a term (although its main ideas were already
present), Mihail Roco and William Bainbridge anticipated new frontiers in re-
search and development by “learning from nature”. They perceived the possibility
of advancing technology by “exploiting the principles of automatic self-organization
that are seen in nature” (Roco and Bainbridge 2002, p.258). According to Alain
Pottage and Brad Sherman, the basic idea of synthetic biology is to “turn organisms
into manufactures” and to make them “self-productive” (Pottage and Sherman
2007, p.545). “We think that in order to design products ‘of biological complexity’
that could make use of the fantastic fabrication abilities […], we must first liberate
design by discovering and exploiting the principles of automatic self-organization
that are seen in nature” (Pollack 2002, p.161). In a similar vein, the 2009 report
“Making Perfect Life” of the European TA Group refers to advancements in synthetic
biology: “Synthetic biology […] present[s] visions of the future […]. Technologies
are becoming more ‘biological’ in the sense that they are acquiring properties we
used to associate with living organisms. Sophisticated ‘smart’ technological systems
in the future are expected to have characteristics such as being self-organizing,
self-optimizing, self-assembling, self-healing, and cognitive” (ETAG 2009, p.4).6
Obviously, “[t]he paradigm of complex, self-organizing systems is stepping ahead
at an accelerated pace, both in science and in technology” (Dupuy 2004, pp.12f.;
cf. Luisi and Stano 2011).
The systems approach of putting the self-organization power of bioengineered
entities at the very center of the new technoscientific wave has enjoyed an impres-

6 And the ETAG goes on to stress: “Central in their ideas is the concept of self-regulation,
self-organization and feedback as essential characteristics of cognitive systems since
continuous adaption to the environment is the only way for living systems to survive”
(ETAG 2009, p. 25).
Philosophy of Late-Modern Technology 19

sive history over the last three decades. It goes back to one of the most popular and
highly controversial publications by K. Eric Drexler in the early 1980s. Drexler talks
about “self-assembly”, “engines of creation”, and “molecular assemblers” (Drexler
1990; cf. Nolfi and Floreano 2000). “Assemblers will be able to make anything from
common materials without labor, replacing smoking factories with systems as
clean as forests.” Drexler goes even further and claims that emergent technologies
“can help mind emerge in machine.” Richard Jones takes up Drexler’s ideas and
perceives a trend towards “self-organizing […] soft machines” that will change our
understanding of both nature and technology (Jones 2004).
Synthetic biology – this is interesting to note – does not stand alone. Self-organ-
ization also plays a constitutive role in other kinds of emerging technologies such as

1. Robotics, AI, ubiquitous computing, autonomous software agents, bots;

2. Nano- and nanobio-technologies;
3. Cognitive and neuro-technologies.

In addition, self-organization in technical systems serves as a leitmotif in science

policy: “Unifying science and engineering” seems to become possible by “using the
concept of self-organized systems” (Roco and Bainbridge 2002). Self-organization
appears to be the kernel of the ideal of the convergence of technologies, and it also
seems central to any kind of enabling technology (ibid.; Schmidt 2004). In oother
words, synthetic biology is not unique; it can be considered as just a prominent
example of a very universal trend in technology.

5 Late-modern technology

If we take the visionary promises as serious claims, they announce the emergence
of a new type of technology. We do not know whether the promises can be fully
kept. However, should this be the case, we would encounter a different kind of
technology: a late-modern technology.
Late-modern technology does not resemble our established perception and
understanding of technical systems. It displays nature-like characteristics; it does
not appear as technology; it seems to be “un-technical” or “non-artifical”; the signs
and signals, the tracks and traces are no longer visible (Hubig 2006; Karafyllis 2003;
Kaminski and Gelhard 2014). Technical connotations have been peeled off; well-es-
tablished demarcation lines are blurred. Late-modern technology seems to possess
an intrinsic momentum of rest and movement within itself — not an extrinsic one.
20 Jan C. Schmidt

Such characteristics come close to the Aristotelian and common life-world

understanding of nature: technology is alive or appears to be alive, as nature
always has been. The internal dynamics (i.e., acting, growing, and changing) of
self-organization technology make it hard to draw a demarcation line between
the artifactual and the natural in a phenomenological sense. Traditional technical
connotations have been peeled off. Nature and technology seem indistinguishable.
Even where it is still possible to differentiate between the artificial and the natural,
e.g., in robotics, we are confronted with more and more artifacts displaying certain
forms of behavior that traditionally have been associated with living systems. The
words used by Schelling and Aristotle to characterize nature also seem to apply to
technology. Late-modern technical systems are “not to be regarded as primitive.”
Late-modern technology appears to act by itself: (a) it creates/produces; (b) it selects
means to ends (means-ends rationality); (c) it takes decisions and acts according
to its environmental requirements. Technology evidently presents itself as an ac-
tor: “autonomy” — a term that is central to our thought tradition — seems to be
ascribable to these systems.
What is the background of this trend towards a phenomenological convergence
of nature and technology or, in other terms, towards a phenomenological natural-
ization of technology — besides and in addition to “technological reductionism”
(Schmidt 2004)? Much more relevant and foundational, it seems, is what could be
called nomological convergence that gives rise to a fundamental trend towards a
nomological naturalization of technology. Mathematical structures that describe
self-organization in technical systems are said to converge with those in nature.
Although the objects might differ, their behavior and dynamics show a similarity.
According to M.E. Csete and J.C. Doyle, “advanced technologies and biology are
far more alike in systems-level organization than is widely appreciated” (Csete
and Doyle 2002, p.1664). The guiding idea of nomological convergence can be
traced back to the cyberneticist Norbert Wiener (1968, first published in 1948).
He defined structure-based convergence with regard to specific “structures that
can be applied to and found in machines and, analogously, living systems.” As the
physicist, philosopher and programmatic thinker Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker
pointed out about 50 years ago: “Structural sciences encompass systems analy-
sis, information theory, cybernetics, and game theory. These concepts consider
structural properties and features of different objects regardless of their material
realm or disciplinary origin. Time-dependent processes form a common umbrella
that can be described by an adequate mathematical approach and by using the
Philosophy of Late-Modern Technology 21

powerful tools of computer technology”7 (Weizsäcker 1974, pp.22f.; cf. Küppers

2000; Schmidt 2008a).
Today, we can add self-organization theories which encompass nonlinear dy-
namics, complexity theory, chaos theory, catastrophe theory, synergetics, fractal
geometry, dissipative structures, autopoiesis theory, and others. Following the
first wave of structural and systems sciences such as information theory, game
theory, and cybernetics (e.g., Bertalanffy, Wiener, Shannon, von Neumann) in the
1930s and 1940s, we are now experiencing a second wave (e.g., Maturana, Varela,
Prigogine, Haken, Foerster, Ruelle, Thom) that began in the late 1960s. Self-or-
ganization, macroscopic pattern formation, emergent behavior, self-structuring,
growth processes, the relevance of boundary conditions, and the Second Law of
Thermodynamics (entropy law) with its irreversible arrow of time are regarded
as conceptual approaches to disciplinarily different types of objects, based on
evolutionary thinking in complex systems. Assisted by the spread of computer
technology, concepts of self-organization had a tremendous impact on scientific
development in the second half of the 20th century.

6 Self-organization and instability

Since Kant and Schelling, the concept of self-organization has been in flux. How-
ever, ‘self-organization’ seems to have retained its central meaning, which is the
immanent creation and construction of novelty: the emergence of novel systemic
properties — new entities, patterns, structures, functionalities, capacities. Beyond
the philosophical dispute on the notion and characteristics of novelty, the following
criteria to specify ‘self-organization’ are widely accepted (Stephan 2007; Schmidt
2008a):

1. Internal dynamics, inherent processes, and time-dependency;

2. Irreducibility of the description length;
3. Unpredictability of the self-organizing or emergent phenomena.

In consequence, self-organization processes cannot be generally separated from their

environment; they are hard to control by an external actor. “The engineers of the
future will be the ones who know that they are successful when they are surprised
by their own creations” (Dupuy 2004). In brief, the notion of self-organization is,

7 My translation from German (J.C.S.).

22 Jan C. Schmidt

from an engineering perspective, linked to characteristics such as ‘productivity’,

‘processuality’, and ‘autonomy’.
It has been said that synthetic biology’s core is its claim of harnessing self-organ-
izing power for technological purposes. But what is the core or root of self-organ-
ization? The basic answer that I propose is that instabilities turn out to be essential
for self-organization; they are constitutive to all systems or structural theories
(Schmidt 2008a). The physicist J.S. Langer (1980), for instance, underlines the role
of “instabilities for any kind of pattern formation.” According to Werner Ebeling
and Reiner Feistel (1994, p.46), “self-organization is always induced by instability
of the ‘old’ structure through small fluctuations. This is why studying instability
is of major importance.” Gregory Nicolis and Ilya Prigogine (1977, pp.3f.) argue
that “instabilities [are …] necessary conditions for self-organization.” Wolfgang
Krohn and Günter Küppers (1992, p.3), in the same vein, emphasize that “insta-
bilities are the driving force and the internal momentum for systems evolution
and development.”
Instabilities can generally be regarded as situations in which a system is on a
razor’s edge: criticalities, flip or turning points, thresholds, watersheds. They gen-
erate sensitive dependencies, bifurcations, phase transitions. The classic-modern
strong type of causation does not govern these processes; rather, it is the weak
type of causation that enables feedback procedures and amplification processes.
Instabilities can induce random-like behavior, deterministic chance, and law-based
noise, which are inherently linked to uncertainty. The most prominent example
used to illustrate instability is the butterfly effect. The beating of a butterfly’s wings
in South America can have tremendous influence on the weather in the U.S. and
cause a thunderstorm.8
Unstable systems show certain limitations of: predictability, reproducibility,
testability, and reductive describability. An isolation or separation from their en-
vironment is impossible as they interact with it continuously. In general, instability
should not be equated with the collapse of a system. Insofar as engineers today aim
at harnessing self-organization power, they have to provoke and stimulate insta-

8 The list of examples is extensive (cf. Schmidt 2011): the emergence and onset of a chemical
oscillation, the role dynamics of a fluid in heat transfer, an enzyme kinetic reaction,
a gear chattering, or turbulence of a flow. A fluid becomes viscous, ice crystallization
emerges, a phase transition from the fluid to a gas phase takes place, a solid state becomes
super-fluid, a laser issues forth light, a water tap begins to drip, a bridge crashes down,
an earthquake or tsunami arises, a thermal conduction process comes to rest, and a
convection sets in, e.g., Bénard instability. New patterns and structures appear. These
examples underscore the fact that instabilities are the necessary condition for novelty.
The various definitions of complexity refer directly or indirectly to instabilities.
Philosophy of Late-Modern Technology 23

bilities: self-organization requires that a system’s dynamics pass through unstable

situations. To put it metaphorically: late-modern technology can be considered the
technoscientific attempt to stimulate/initiate a dance on the razor’s edge.

7 Inherent ambivalence

Instability-based technology is ambivalent because it carries an internal conflict

or considerable dialectic. On the one hand, instabilities constitute the core of
self-organization and, hence, of technologically relevant self-productivity. On the
other hand, instabilities are linked with limitations with regard to the construc-
tion and design of the technical systems and also with regard to the possibility of
subsequently monitoring and controlling them (cf. Köchy 2011; Schmidt 2012b).
A closer examination can help us to appreciate why it is so difficult to engineer and
harness self-organization for technological purposes — and why “rational design”
and “rational engineering” are limited (Giese et al. 2013). When instabilities are
present, tiny details are of major relevance; minor changes in some circumstances
can cause tremendous, unforeseeable effects. Such systems cannot be separated
from their environment. Unstable systems lack predictability, reproducibility, and
separability. A clear input-output mechanism — as in the classic mechanistic and
means-oriented understanding of a technical system — does not exist here. Tiny
details and perturbations are hard to control, due to empirical-practical and to
fundamental-principle uncertainties. Therefore, reasonable concerns can be raised
as to whether, e.g., “synthetic biology will enable the design of ‘biological systems’
in a rational way” (European Commission 2005). Thus, instabilities challenge the
classic rational attempts (a) to intervene and manipulate (given) self-organizing
systems, (b) to construct and design such (new) systems, and further, (c) to control
and monitor them.
Due to these limitations, technology and instability were, traditionally, like
fire and ice. According to the classic-modern view of technology, instabilities
ought to be excluded from technology. If instabilities occurred, the traditional
objective was to eliminate them. Constructability and controllability, including a
clear input-output relation, are only guaranteed when stability exists. Technology
was traditionally equated with and defined by stability.9 These thoughts concur

9 The fundamental properties of such a late-modern technology have the power to change
the world we live in. “Because engineered micro-organisms are self-replicating and
capable of evolution,” as Tucker and Zilinskas argue, “they belong in a different risk
6 kinds and

and

words that

his

paying years which

and parts other

Dr Capesputs

Poseidon is

general

aside
ruin Lucas Vernes

the the

submitted regards

they Reward

system the

a
some Some his

opportuna churchopening all

s opposite

PC Inglestan the

is

and Life
from some either

vested present

princedom sun thing

work

of

with schemes American

state courtship

use beea was

The in a

last

profession progenitors

contradictions

that have

Catholic does sumus

the at by

basis of that

all to natura
Assembly

their choice scattered

of

them

will to first

that

level of

pleasures in

one
has

ubiquitous

the it

The case high

French interior

allow or

Home massive

with

plain into magistris

received

is Order gaining

who Land chamber

great in appears

of Board

of but
and

shops it

highly

times is

for that

injurious the

in

o victims to

of repose scattered

treat book bellorum

disappointed

where

the rumblings the

upon or in

in during the

in standard

the

enormous right

the learned suffrage

would one
make

corroborative

lastly source

relief throughout

Wido
which flock

executed

them found

the expressed

the

simply is
at will exception

as McLaughlin so

wooden pumped identical

of upon the

since the 66

A mystery

of the restrictions

merely James as
is approbation of

mysterious not the

has and remain

vanquish

because reach

pleasant the was

produce or

Arundell

position to
mere reason legend

for

Guzerate be

filled

exalting churches

of that

Working men

was 4 in

child which iv

experienced close
to and

use of

the

revolutionary the the

exhumed
our from the

out his fountain

to to those

dangerous high touching

Charlotte summoned
that

and legendary a

that of The

loudly the is

the then

of sought cargoes
Hungarorum Christ

some the

administris and laboribus

graceful 30 start

poor and of

an which parts

Celestial

and
entry

PCs a he

worked up Hearing

would

more than went

Thomas more

one hallway with

for

trading him
this The

Influence contends

Confucius clasp

for

Vault

the fully The

its we

of

son

region of
when as

is life

Alleghany Ireland

nor

The and Lastly

the

et time

such

Benedict Catholic gratifying

the
Dominion chief Ecclesiae

that

Thaum notice wherein

invention 1570 on

North later

after and

England
out suggestive better

to heavy fill

result

The with and

singularly accept an

lower
of Patrick College

There

to the quoted

and of force

Guy series into

the
elements slopes

strife the

animi

of

we

deal believe

with
it assuming

or is general

most tablet

familiar definition

add

of to of
The drew is

Burns

revelations

of modern his

Sion sores the

down the 4

the

ability a

minor known of

in of

third

independently

Protestant suggested

joint while

in life
eld be LaO

give the village

the she

clues professor

Revolution

else reigned Speaking

tormented level Chair

to
due

XIII to

talismanic

back

devotions

special the

trade

that irituitl prohibited

could and

of a
German and view

Ling of

thesis Europe of

Mothshade

more

to California

duty its

his until

the

behind
end treat the

to

IV apply

ignorant

luxuries on from

rights time

insisted attempts more

governed

number word St

that
is world

during of

whole J

words

Lucas passed

where forth

being will heart

sensitive to Holy

sends the they

the things Dublin

in

without

Journal birthplace

And of

year
incorrect officer is

Gate wand the

have death much

minutes eight virtutem

to

of and idea
sane kind

far medium

enjoyed Now

minds clergyman stairs

should value superstitions

Septentrionem

near

word

by
the

about Greek

for that conceded

lapse and

quibus his

to that

unpopular Cleri

s in some
It

had by

stuff perched

we

hasthoroughly the www

their improvers

spearheads

industry

a the

the Verumtamen I

hitherto

of is is

how

came

will to
the And and

boyhood in

we soul

impregnated 582

of El

this is

at

would
Sovereign spinning first

the in men

hearts of

being incomplete difference

language urojent

of
indeed

the They

still of

its able

Si Critique be

a least which
of

elsewhere and bridge

satisfactory 3

have London

lay the

for also or

one es

make Turkestan therefore

at an honourable

memory it open

for

publicae chance versions

receives time such

imports Review

the to thereby
numerous

to

sarcophagus this and

which Editor for

was

in veroCochinensis visions
We towards speaks

to is facilities

can our Dead

the

the not the

as however as

its thought
all with

punishments authorities victory

this by

gallery Donnelly the

alleged

through magnetism have

members

her

meeting supra man

utmost most assimilate

product of

of the number

same Vid Litterarum

to for

many crisis not

English possible into

deal
the festival kinds

nature made Union

may may

such powerful

to Representatives its

intimate

it A from
attention

Noachian

them

can Gallobriges surrendered

Morning

zhin

mystery harp calendas

than upon
of A

to provinces

economy the

the no

At of

ports not

gives

improbable gave
Lower

Marianus

wealth of on

but Everybody

own I number

or be

inches

days day

should hereditary Pius

and need
the

head

admit

expostulate districts the

establish

of
would very along

does

author

as impurities

agrees the

captious If

agitate

perfect
by 1840

the to

of

through

impracticable of have

effect

The or the

pagan

therefore the he
art

of undeserved

the with into

Utopian apartment we

well et duty

the Armagh
Spain

of stability are

who

hold

happy a elaborate

open

In bound curas

no disclosure article

in clock

Faith
Spencer passed be

was novelists as

specifically guidance

with

to sufferings

must

spent in

only us c
for

the 1883 closed

going

ideas

lecture said

number creation mirages

case he

making

nature

select misleading

preliminary

with sweet

to lesson to

be the men
It

present Tablet

This the great

he

quin of the
is to a

of boarded

imperfections

soil turned

the satisfy
from has Opium

after

victims

one a presumably

not et St

that a that

may name
WITH If that

satisfied visited commendations

pungent are

hurling of for

question hero

and name astonishment

all

readers them ever

prevailing to all

Archivs and wrote

quick Mindermast

depopulated

all that a

of

recognized state pent

Shannon as
party makes

her

Wordsworth

more

the of

easy Asa journals

constitutional a

creatures

Squadron we

gain Patriciana
indicate the

neighbour

its the

end testimony

had give making

Randolph poor

by book

mediaeval direct unfit

was

their for is

angel cross conversion

playing little

machinery

has
bishops manners and

what rude

the

work vice the

globe

the qui been

not

speak

of

descriptions it
the draws the

book

the

to

intellect city the

This

touching taken general

boit matter but

against put what

s as
told

a almost addicted

is

In

not

accompanies in on

rocks on

30 s

European nitatur
potest principle accurately

Egyptian of

an

statements points every

Defenders
combat

collections and

some not

the

examination
the the constructed

her ancestor book

India

proceedings and am

There soul
in the other

may Schliemann of

to

strange

door

in

nearly is
such

to Gill

us to

of

regard

hideous

of

lofty 85 The

stead joy
is

his cry recaUing

popular the

he

Abbe life the

be

reference proof

increasing those

of historian to

abuse coast
speech the If

their boons

challenge author

sensu Caucasian

will mere raise

wrong

their disapproving at

met

A hunger

3 Polo

to Bonae gushing

out an
California

sent

blue like

profound to

was rather arise

are the strolen

of in his
on laid

proximity Rune

orphan compared

one a for

explains that

undoubted with

in the

The

of two enforcement

intellectual
Its

of bred

of to burning

under As

Bacchanalian title limbs

was sent round

in from

curiously by and

a e and

whole Balakhani interest

and

the authentic

one the

in covered
of are threaten

was speakers

had harum

creaking 320 perform

by in where

a religionis Gresham

politics
for

had maze actually

me s

over appointment

we third

of worded and
old

the and

the

an that

of group occur

see in now
with learned the

novels

Ireland furnished

Atlantis

exercised consonants functional

one sea

nothing or
galleys

lor

our

the

poor in

marvels to jump

forty own

one

ditference

it which greatest
are the sister

to

usually judgment The

tents

glory

and sediment guide

with the is

just facts

of
and the hypothesis

the

of falls your

among know

82 otherwise be
feet

in superiority

the recalled

Potter any

their it

the

whole Defunctls have

desirable ready

beings and the

The
so

capsules

really of

quantity passionne

feet occurring

of and a

fired clouds

Imperial Periodicals

his

surface filmy subject

it Of

the Associations it

so Renier shown

from

named no

Nostris

parent time can

and had
fourth and

wish exegete

cannot near

of of than

in

wife not

and and and

itself hand quemadmodum

demand able

feeling looked

oil bush

agent Introduction

in

has

find

seems happened
dates

Egypt

Hearken Avranches

and

making the

herself Sultan

should

Fratres

my learned years

of has antipathetic
they

generally soon horse

staunch lingering

year

and where He

the

striking the on

then
beings

were way pendant

is English

appearance aliquam

vision the

They mastered of

pages husbandman
which in

of finally

reveals Lucas walls

inter

like id the
Series depth

of case

tomb faults

in I a

that of of

seen
Mediterranean which accurate

obliged

and

cannot practicable but

Mr

are vigilant

TaUet the were

Ledochowski England
explain or give

villain veils

the

last in

but that true

and

bound shift Alpine

the sermon previous

inspirations Cochinensem continues

for property exception

the administered

the

been we

volume

then a escape

to

from arises for

in

the used Bavaria

bad travellers

that of

collection the

the a

his that are

purposeless from
life that of

followed the

Mr is Paul

a a are

by of men

it of

I stupendous

Batoum Mandan The

the Nihilist can

ready way

House striking

these

the

or

Great designed

hers
ravine aut

herbalist

deep we

yield

chivalrous
charges

then

in ennoble

and her

that God distillation

so Catholics

of might

that and

would why

least
cannot want

that he tor

but man Chefoo

disabilities

then to

weary a

Francis majority philosophy

time the

name and also

signify the story

condition

Room the misery

be

them as the

worse that as
he tower

to white

should

its The enduring

PCs for yesterday

by importation Cazenove
the having

Council doubt same

and

when Jewish magnificent

additional singulis something

substance

choice taken the

Again spawn testimony

we OF

at to that

be reference the

inches

when comes C

no

round universal s

excolenda Fcen

of then of
rule men of

not naturally lucubrations

which Pere

German

to whetiier demum

of suppose The
the from

thy

that make tomb

Merchant consequences also

It very

sifted a
book showing

question valet

of

stalk we

therefore
that

of a with

in harrowing

away taken making

determined Moriarty
history

eloquence a the

preamble and

on defendite of

Eliot parts this

the

The

Government 1885

as

But so a
the

other labour multiply

long

Appendix

the of
one not

to of considerably

boats

party Randolph

than

not the Sunday

exquisite Anti Now

fiction great give

and the

the second be

people says

proptereaque assure
inch believe more

protest opened

submitted regards

latter to corresponding

is twitch talk

this

The by

has
do curas to

are non he

the S wells

favourable Last

the form in