IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA
AT PAR ES SALAAM
(CORAM; MUGASHA, J.A., MURUKE J.A, And NANGELA. J J U
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 437 OF 2023
EVELYNE MBUNA ..................................................................... APPELLANT
VERSUS
JOSEPH MSHANA (Administrator of the Estate
of the late Naginder Singh Matharu)................................... RESPONDENT
(Appeal from the Judgment and Decree of the High Court of Tanzania,
Land Division at Dar es Salaam)
(Mansoor, J.)
dated the 22nd day of August, 2022
in
Land Case No. 427 of 2016
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
16th June & 3rd July, 2025
MURUKE, J.A.:
This appeal, is from the Judgment and Decree of the High Court of
Tanzania (Land Division at Dar es Salaam), delivered on August 22nd,
2022, in Land Case No. 427 of 2016. The original parties were Naginder
Singh Matharu as the Plaintiff and Evalyne Mbuna as the Defendant.
Joseph Mshana is now the Administrator of the Estate of the late
Naginder Singh Matharu and is the Respondent in this appeal.
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At the trial court, the respondent claimed vacant possession of Plot
No. 1370, Msasani Peninsula, registered under Title No. 36304 (the Suit
Property), which the Defendant was allegedly unlawfully occupying.
Additionally, the Plaintiff claimed USD 360,000, representing five years
unpaid rent at a rate of USD 6,000 per month, and general damages for
trespass. The Plaintiff asserted that he was the registered owner of the
suit property.
Having heard the parties, the trial court found that the respondent
was denied the use and occupation of the property since 2006 and was
entitled to general damages and costs of the suit to the tune of TZS.
1,000,000,000/=. The trial court ultimately declared the respondent the
lawful owner of the suit premises, while the appellant was declared a
trespasser and ordered to yield vacant possession immediately on the
ground that there was no valid sale agreement.
Aggrieved, the appellant lodged this appeal comprised of 15 points
of grievance. However, due to what is to unfold in due in course, we
shall not reproduce the grounds of appeal.
At the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Libert Rwazo, learned counsel
represented the appellant, while the respondent was being represented
by Mr. Gabriel Mnyele, also learned counsel. Before hearing could
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commence on merits, the appellant counsel sought leave of the Court to
add one more ground, the notice of which was earlier filed, which prayer
was not objected to by the respondent counsel, thus granted by the
Court. The additional ground reads as follows:
"Land Case No. 427 o f 2016 decision o f which is
subject o f this appeal was incompetent and
therefore not maintainable in law for being
instituted against Eva/yne Mbuna ("the
appellant') in her own name and not against the
Administratrix o f the Estate o f the late Joseph
Mbuna the owner o f the suit property therefore
in violation o f the provisions o f section 71 o f the
Probate o f the Probate and Administration o f
Estate Act"
For the reason that will become apparent later, we moved counsel
to initially address the Court on the additional ground.
The appellant's counsel submitted that, at the High Court, (trial
court) the appellant was sued wrongly as a trespasser. The appellant
pleaded that she was not a trespasser in her Written Statement of
Defence at page 35 of the record. She said, her late husband Joseph
Mbuna, purchased the disputed land before he died and, in her evidence
at page 303-314 of the record, the appellant was in the disputed house
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by virtue of her late husband's ownership. Mr. Rwazo further submitted
that the High Court determined the rights of the late Joseph Mbuna
while he is deceased. Thus, he argued that the proceedings were not
properly before the trial court because section 71 of Probate and
Administration Act was not complied with. He also cited the case of John
M. Litondo, Hanna H Litondo And Fred P. Salakana (legal
representatives of the Estate of the late Amina Litondo v. Fatuma
Amiri Masika (legal representative of the Estate of the late Zaitun Amri
Masika) Civil Appeal No 229 of 2020 [2024] TZCA 977. According to Mr.
Rwazo, the case is similar with the case at hand, whereby the
administrators of the late Mbuna were to be sued and not the appellant
in person. In this regard, it was argued that the trial was vitiated and
the resulting judgment is a nullity. Therefore, Mr. Rwazo invited the
Court to invoke revisional powers to quash the proceedings at the High
Court to set aside the judgment and decree.
In reply, Mr. Mnyele submitted that the suit was properly filed
against Evelyne Mbuna personally, as the appellant's counsel assertion
from the bar that there are three administrators of the estate of the late
Mbuna, is not supported by the record. More so, in the amended
defence at page 63 of the record, the appellant has not described
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herself as an administrator of the late Joseph Mbuna. He added that,
notwithstanding the sale agreement and the transfer deed, the property
is in the name of the late Naginder Singh. It has never become the
property of the late Joseph Mbuna. Thus, it was argued that in law, the
registered owner is the legal owner in the wake of nothing to the
contrary. Therefore, it was argued that the trial court was right in
declaring the appellant the trespasser, submitted the respondent's
counsel.
In rejoinder, the appellant's counsel insisted that, the sale
agreement is between Mbuna Joseph and Naginder Singh as reflected at
Page 315 of the record of appeal in which there is a transfer deed
between the appellant's husband and Naginder Singh. However, the
transfer was to be only after Capital Gain Tax was paid by the
respondent which was not the case. He added that, although the
plaintiff has the right to sue a person who has interfered on his or her
interest, but he cannot sue a person with no capacity to be sued. The
appellant's counsel maintained that, it was not proper to sue the
appellant in person because according to the record the administrator
were already appointed and ought to have sued as legal representatives
of the late Mbuna the owner of the property in dispute.
With that brief rejoinder submission, Mr. Rwazo invited us to
invoke revision powers under section 4(2) of the AJA to nullify
proceedings of the trial court, and set aside the judgment and decree.
Having considered the record of appeal and submission made by
the parties, the main issue for our consideration is whether the appellant
was properly sued in her own name.
We understand that plaintiff has a right to bring an action in court
to claim his/her right that has been interfered or infringed by another
person. However, the person sued must be capable of being sued for the
court to pass an effective and executable decree. It is an exercise in
futility, to pass a decree which would be of no practical utility to the
plaintiff or defendant.
According to the pleadings, the respondent claimed that the
appellant trespassed into his land in dispute. The appellant in her
written statement of defense denied the claim and contended that the
land in dispute belonged to her deceased husband who purchased it
from the respondent. In particular, at paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 9 of her
WSD it was pleaded as follows:
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(5). The late Joseph Mbuna (herein after referred
as "the Purchaser") purchased the dispute
land from Mr. Naginder Singh Matharu the
Plaintiff (hereinafter referred as "the Vendor")
on 31st January 2006 for the consideration o f
TZS. 95,000,000/=. It was one o f the term o f
the Contract that the mode o f payment o f
consideration was by Cash and the deed o f
disposition was to be executed after payment
o f the purchase price.
(6). That on 1st o f February 2006, the Purchaser
paid in full the purchase price to the Vendor.
The Vendor handed over all documents to the
Purchaser and provided vacant possession to
the Purchaser. The Vendor cooperated fully
with the Purchaser to obtain consent from
Kinondoni Municipal Council which consent
was obtained on 22ndAugust2007.
Furthermore, the appellant stated under paragraphs 7 and 9 as
follows:
(7). Upon obtaining consent for the disposition
the Plaintiff requested the Purchaser for time
to raise money to pay the capital gain tax as
per the requirement o f the law. The Plaintiff
has never paid the capita! gain tax as a result
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the Transfer o f the suit premises into the
name o f the Purchaser died on 2nd July 2009
before the Vendor could pay the Capital Gain
Tax. Therefore, the transfer has been pending
to date. The heir's effort to trace the Vendor
so that he can pay the Capital Gain Tax
proved futile.
(9). Save as to note that the suit property is still
registered in the name o f the Plaintiff the rest
o f the contents o f paragraph 5 o f the Plaint
are disputed. It is stated that the Plaintiff sold
the property to the late Joseph Stanley Mbuna
and the transfer is pending payment o f Capital
Gain Tax by the Plaintiff. Transfer will be
completed upon the Plaintiff paying capital
gain tax as required by law. The Defendant
note that the Certificate o f Title has not been
attached to the
It is discernable from the WSD that, the appellant was residing in
the suit premises which she alleged to belong to her husband. Since it is
on the record that the administrators of the Estate of the late Mbuna
were appointed, the law stipulates under the provisions of section 71 of
the Probate and Administration Act [Cap. 352 R.E. 2002] that:
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"After any grant o f probate or letters o f
administration, no person other than the person
to whom the same shall have been, granted shall
have power to sue or prosecute any suit, or
otherwise act as representative o f the deceased
until Probate or letters o f administration shall
have between revoked or annulled".
The evidence of the appellant above as who were the
administrators of the estate of the late Joseph Mbuna was not
challenged at all. The respondent's counsel assertion that administrators
were not known is not true. In the premises, it is in our considered
opinion, it was irregular for the respondent to initiate a case against the
appellant in her own capacity instead of pursuing action against the
administrators of the late Joseph Mbuna. As this was not the case, the
same vitiated the proceedings at the trial court and the resulting
judgment cannot be spared on account of being void.
Consequently, we nullify the trial proceedings, quash and set
aside Judgment and resulting orders. It is thus directed that whoever
wishes to commence action in respect of the premises, should implead
the appropriate persons in terms of Orderl rule 10 of the Civil Procedure
Code. Thus, the sole additional ground is merited and it is allowed.
Given that the determination of the said ground suffices to dispose of
the appeal, we shall not deal with the remaining grounds. In totality, this
appeal is allowed, with costs.
DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 3rd day of July, 2025.
S. E. A. MUGASHA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
Z. G. MURUKE
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
D. J. NANGELA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
Judgment delivered this 3rd day of July, 2025 in the presence of Mr.
Libent Rwazo, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Gabriel Simon
Mnyele, learned counsel for the respondent; is hereby certified as a true
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