U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535-0001 (0//ummmm =«‘Date: 9/8/2021 (0//mmm «Report: CLOSING LETTERHEAD MEMORANDUM (0/ fmm = Investigatio ARCTIC HAZE —_ Preliminary Investigation (PI) on (FT) _X_ Single subject Multi-subject Enterprise Foreign intelligen collection (U//mmmg =“ Investigation initiated by: Field Office: or __ FBIHO (0//mmmm =« FI Initiated: g/24/2027 (0/ fmm -=—-«-FBIHO/DO notice via LEM required if (check all that apply): _%_A. Espionage Investigation SIM (PI or full) x a) Tc. Enterprise investigation TD. Foreign intelligence case (0//mmmm = L_Burpose of the Investigation Check the appropriate purpose for which the investigation is being initiated, as per AGG-Dom II.B.1 and DIOG §§6.2 and 7.2: This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBT. Tt is the property of the FBI and is foaned to your tgeney, itand its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency Classified Fy) 7 Derived ro Declassify 0: 7 FBI-HJC119-SL-000085X_A. To detect, obtain information about, or prevent, or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security B. To collect positive foreign intel (Full investigations only) gence. (U//mmmm =IL. Predication for the Investigation Appropriate circumstances: Check the appropriate circumstance(s) on which the initiation of the Preliminary Investigation or Full Investigation is based, as per AGG-Dom II.B.3 and DIOG Sections 6.5 and 7.5: (0/fmmm fn activity constituting a federal crine or a threat to the national security has or may have eceurred, is or may be occurring, or will or may and the investigation may obtain information relating to the activity or the involvement or role of an individual, group, or organization in such activity: (0//fgmm ‘Bn individual, group, organization, entity, information, property, or activity is or may be a target of attack, victimization, acquisi infiltration, or recruitment in connection with viminal activity in violation of federal law or a threat to the national security and the investigation may obtain information that would help to protect against such activity or threat; c. (U//MMMm ‘The investigation may obtain foreign intelligence that is responsive to a positive foreign intelligence requirement, as defined in DIOG Sectio 7.4.C. (Full investigations only] This document contains neither recorpmendations nor conclusions ofthe FBI. Itis the property ofthe FBI and is loaned to your agency; i and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency FBIHJCt19-SL-000056(0//mmm Factual Predication: FBI Washington Field Office (WFO) opened the arctic Haze investigation based on a Po) LE) MUNG -c Sune 22,2027 Tne ede THA New York Times article contained classified information (hereinafter “the Classified Information”) held by ill. The article was titled “comey Tried to Shield the FBI from Politics. Then He Shaped an Election” which was published on April 22, 2017. The article was written by New York Times reporters Matt Apuzzo, Michael Schmidt, Adam Goldman, and Eric Lichtblau. The article discussed the FBI Midyear Exam investigation concerning Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's use of a private email server. In particular, the article focused on FBI Director James Comey’ (Comey) decision to make public statements regarding the Midyear Exam investigation. On duly 5, 2016, Comey issued a public statement announcing the FBI had compléted the Midyear Exam investigation. His public statement, which was made unilaterally, and in a manner the United states Department of Justice office of Inspector General (U.S. DOT OG) later found to be in violation of long-standing Department policy, criticized Clinton for uncharged conduct concerning the handling of classified information, and recommended the Department decline prosecution. Later, Comey made additional unilateral statements to Congress about re-opening and then again closing the Midyear Exam investigation in October 2016, just prior to the presidential election. This second set of statements was also criticized in the public and by the Dog orc. Coney has publicly indicated on several occasions that classified mformation contributed to his decision to make his independent July 5, 2016 and October 2016 announcements. Comey provided sworn testimony to the U.S. DOJ OIG and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Comey testified he made the July 5, 2016 announcement independently because he believed participation by Attorney General (“AG”) Loretta Lynch would result in “corrosive doubt” about whether Lynch was acting impartially. Comey provided several justifications for this belief. First, Lynch was appointed by a President from the same political party a Clinton. Second, Lynch had earlier directed Comey to refer to Midyear Exam asa “matter,” not an investigation. Third, Lynch had a widely publicized private conversation with former-President William Clinton éuring an apparent chance encounter on the tarmac of a Phoenix, Arizona airport on June 26, 2016. and fourth, Comey had concerns the Classified Information, which’ directly related to whetner or not the Attorney General Should have’ been recused from the Midyear Exam investigation, would be leaked to the media or would otherwise be disclosed. Comey stated, “one significant item I can't, I know the conmittee’s been briefed on. There’s been sone public accounts of it, which are nonsense, but I understand the committee's been briefed on the classified facts.” ‘This document eontains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. Itis the property ofthe FBI und is louned to your ‘ageney;it and is eontents are not io be distributed outside your ageney. Bes caeaoy FBLHJC119-SL.000057(0//Mmmm Comey alluded to the Classified Information in his book, “Higher Loyalty: Truth, Lies, and Leadership." According to Comey, there was a development in early 2016 concerning sone classified information that had cone into the possession of the United States government. According to Comey, the information came from a classified source, which remains classified, and it is still unknown to the American public. “Had it becone public, the unverified material would undoubtedly have been used by political opponents to cast serious doubt on the Attorney General's independence in connection to the Clinton investigation.” Comey wrote he was “bothered that there was classified formation that would someday become public and used to attack the integrity of the investigation and, more important, call into question the independence of the FBT.” (W/m In classified testimony to the OIG, Comey confirmed the specific Classified Information, which was discussed in the New York Times article, and indicated it did impact his decision to make unilateral, public statements about the Midyear Exam investigation. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATIVE STEPS (0//qmm since the start of the investigation in August 2017, investigators nave taken the following steps: cts with © Searched all FBI hardline phone and email records for cot known reporter facilities (also known as spin searches); © Reviewed spin searches on jg hardline phone and email records for known reporter facilities; © Obtained and reviewed a multitude of telephone records on FBI cellular and work phones for FBI employees in the subject pool, including text messages; © Analyzed handwritten notes taken by FBI employees; This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. Tt is the property ofthe FRI and is loened to your agency, it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. ARERR, FBLHJC118-SL-000058,ands of documents and oth: * analyzed thou: items of evidence _— + Reviewed administrative and classified materials * Reviewed three (3) reports issued by the U.S. Dog OIG; * Reviewed FD-302s of DOJ and FBI witnesses provided by the Office of Special Counsel Robert Mueller; * Reviewed a 2017 investigation conducted by John Durham and the U.3. Postal Inspection Sei @ (TROPIC VORTEX)? * Interviewed numerous current and former FBI, DOJ, and U.S ommunity (“USEC”) employees who had access to the ation; (0/ mmm Based upon discussions with DOJ, these investigative steps did not generate sufficient proof to charge any individual with willfully transmitting the Classified Information, conspiring to transmit the Classified Information, or aiding and abetting another person's ee TTS ATT FBI ASSISTED WITH THE APRIL 2017 ARTICLE Investigators learned that FRI Office of Public Affairs (“opa”) was told to assist the New York Times with the April 2017 articl According to interviews with FBI employees, Comey either directed or otherwise authorized FBI's official assistance to the New York Times. FBT OPA did not coordinate or brief DOJ leadership or DOJ OPA about this This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions ofthe FBI. Tt is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are n0l to be distributed outside your agency eceece eres vie al FEI-HJC119-SL-000089decision, even though AG Lynch had left @ Department and DOJ regulations called for DOJ OPA coordination n cases of media contact with the New York Times. As part of the FBI's assistance, FBI officials Peter Strzok and Lisa Page were interviewed by the New York Times concerning this article in the presence of DOJ OPA officials During an interview with the investigative team, strzok stated he believed FBI Executive Management told them to meet with the New York Times. Strzok said he recalled being told to provide an investigator-level briefing on the Midyear sxam investigation. These briefings took place on March 10, 2017, March 30, 2017, and April 10, 2017. During the March 30, 2017'meeting, the New York’ Times told Strzok and Page they had the Classified Information. Strzok told investigators he did not recall the New York Times having the Classified Information, but Page told investigators she specifically recalled the Classified Information and took a break from the meeting to discuss with Strzok that the New York Times had the Classified Information. Page indicated she alerted her supervisors about the fact the New York Times had the Classified Information. According to FBI OPA, the New York Times advised them in their April 10, 2017 interview about the content of the article, including the Classified Infornati), 7 eA CoMEY, RICHMAN, and THEIR INTERACTIONS WITH THE MEDIA (0/ MMM «By way of background, Richman is a Columbia University Law Professor and a close friend of Comey. They met while working as Assistant United states Attorneys ("AUSAS") in the Southern District of New York (“SDNY”). The New York Times article contained several quotes, attributed to Daniel Richman, which defended Comey’s decisions to make unilateral public statements about the Midyear Exam investigation. In 2015, Comey instructed the FBI to hire Richman as a Special Government Employee ("SGE”) and to grant him a Top Secret clearance with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (“SCI”). FBI records indicated Richman was hired to work on “Going Dark” matters, The investigation revealed Comey also hired Richman so Comey could discuss sensitive matters, including classified information, with someone outside of the FBI's regular leadership. Comey also used Richman as a liaison to the media. On several occasions, Richman spoke with the media without consultation with FBI or DOJ’s Offices of Public Affairs. Richman contacted journalists to correct stories critical of Comey, the FBI and to shape future press coverage. Richman did this both when hé was an SGE and after he resigned from the FBI. (0/ (MMMM «The investigation revealed Richman had been a source for Michael Schmidt, one of the reporters credited with writing the article at issue, and the New York Times since at least 2008. Richman first spoke with Schmidt regarding an investigation into illegal activity in sports. Prior to Richman becoming an SGE, Schmidt visited Richman’ s ‘This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. Ttis the property ofthe FBI and is loaned to your agency; itand its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency ‘Saas FBI-HJC119-SL-000060house numerous times. The New York Times quoted Richman several times both on the record and on background, in stories regarding Jim Comey. After he was terminated by President Trump, Comey used Richman as a conduit ti y to the me € his meetings with Pi ‘Trump U//qgmmg «Although Richman later told the interviewing agen Comey never asked him to talk to the nedi:, a A TS «Bi STALE ARE NDE EES OE ET ES ERLE NT ELE OEE eT TS Ea REM BRET a) SR a ls | ‘This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions ofthe FBI. Tt isthe property ofthe FEI and is loaned to your agency it and its contents are not o be distebuted outside your agency fessional a FBLHJC719-81-000081(U//umm On November 22, 2019, the Arctic Haze investigative team interviewea Richman. Recording to Richman, Comey and Richman talked about the “hammering” Comey was taking from the media ening his handling of the Midyear Exam investigation. Richman opined Comey took comfort in the fact Richman had talked to the press about his feelings regarding Comey’s handling and decision-making on the Midyear Exam investigation. Richman claimed Comey never asked him to talk to the media. According to Richman, he and Comey had a private conversation in Comey’s office in January 2017. The conversation pertained to Comey’s decision to make a public statement on the Midyear Exam investigation. Comey told Richman the tarmac meeting between Lynch and Clinton was not the only reason which played into Comey’s statement on the Midyear Exam investigation. According to Richman, Comey told Richman of Lynch's cha: ization of the investigation as a “matter” and not that of an investigation. Richman recalled Comey told him there was some weird classified material related to Lynch which came to the FBI's attention. Comey did not fully explain the details of the information. Comey told Richman about the Classified Information, including the source of the information. Richman understood the information could be used to Suggest Lynch might not be impartial with regards of the conclusion of the Midyear Exam investigation. Richman understood the information about Lynch was highly classified and it should be protected. Richman was an SGE at the time of the meeting. ) According to Richman, he and Schmidt had a conversation shortly after the meeting with Comey in'or around January 2017. Richman claimed Schmidt brought up the Classified Information and knew more about it than he did. Richman was pretty sure he did not confirm the Classitied Information. However, Richman told the interviewing agents he was sure with a discount” that he did not tell Schmidt about the Classified Information. Richman did not know who gave Schmidt the Classified Information. Richman acknowledged he had many discussions with Schmidt about the article as an SGE and even after he resigned as an SGE. Richman Acknowledged he contributed more to the article than what was attributed fo him by name. Richman also stated he knew Schmidt talked to numerous other government sources for information on the article. —————————— This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. Tt isthe property ofthe FBT and is loaned to your agency it and its contents are not tobe distributed outside your gen, a FBI-HJC119-SL-000062This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It isthe property ofthe FBI and is loaned to your gency, it and its contents are not to be distributed outs sae Pessoa FBI-HJC119-SL-000063| bis docurnent contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBT. Tt isthe property ofthe FET and is loaned to your ‘agency; i and its contents are no to be distbuted outside Your agency Peeasesucr cere FBI-HJC119-SL.000084(/ i EC! Sune 29, 2021, Comey provided t, via his counsel, for the FBI to conduct a Lim: ch of hi: Apple iPhone, The FBI conducted a forensic examination of the telephone The examination indicated the telephone contained four voicemail messages, four instant messages, two email messages, 2016 to May 1, 2017. ‘None of this mate: this investigation. and 51 images from December 1, 1 contained information relevant vestigators then turned their attention to OO) Fi TT © yet been intervienet, RR a NETS | RRND ESPINER SRE A SRN S LE TESS ATER ALTO TT ATS ES EES a ter discussing the status of investigative leads and resources with the U.3. Attorney's Of variable ice and Department of Justice’s National Security Division (DOJ NSD), the FBI investigative team was directed to interview only those officials who might have had a motive to protect Comey. Therefore, the PSI only int wed eight of these officials who consisted mainly of f FBI officials. All of these officials denied providing the Classified Information to the New York Times. CONCLUSION (0/ MMM The investigation has not yielded sufficient evidence to riminally rson, including Comey or Richman, with making substantive offenses under investigation. his document contuins neither recommendations ror conelusions of the FBI. Its the property ofthe FBI and is loaned to your agency; itand its contents are not be distributed outside Your ageney FBILHJC119-SL.000065MMMM, We also understand DOJ NSD has historically not approved the prosecution of pure confirmatory sources of classified information under 18 U.S.C. § 793. The investigation has also not identified any evidence regarding any other specific person Information who willfully discussed the Classified Information with any of the Reporters. (U//@MMMm™ Due to the inability to further narrow the subject pool and lack of other logical investigative steps, WFO has exhausted all leads in furtherance of the captioned investigation. Since there is no way to accurately scope the subject pool, additional techniques would not be effective in advancing the investigation, and insufficient evidence exists pursue additional legal process. (U/mg Investigative efforts have failed to identify the source or sources of the unauthorized public disclosure. Per the FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIG), 7.12.1, sufficient personnel and financial resources were expended on the investigation and there are no outstanding leads, logical investigative techniques, or evidence remaining. No further investigative activity is warranted and for these reasons described, WFO recommends closing this investigation. (0/ qm -Non-USPER: (0/ fmm Under DIOG Appendix G, Section 2.1, if a non-USPER, please provide narrative demonstrating that the person is or may b ___ A. A foreign power or working for a foreign power? or B. From a foreign country or entity that has been designated by the President or the Attorney General on the National Security Threat List (NSTL), in consultation with the National Security Council for purposes of the AGG-DOM based on the concern its activities present to the national security of the United states; or ___¢. In another class designated by the Director of the FBI in consultation with the Assistant Attorney General for National Security. __X_ D. Not applicable ‘hie document eonsins either recommendations nor conelusions ofthe FEL. Its the propery ofthe FBI and is loaned to your agency, i and is eomtents are not wo be disteibuted ouside your agency a FBI-HJC119-SL000086(U/mg IIL. Sensitive Investigative Matter (s) Check all pertinent sensitive investigative matter(s), as defined in DIOG Section 10.2.3.2 A-G, and Appendix G, Section 7 that apply to this investigation (If applicable, provide a narrative below addressing the sensitive investigative matter): A. A domestic public official or political candidate B. A religious or political organization or an individual prominent in such an organization A member of the media or a news organization (unless excepted in DIOG Appendix G, Section G) An individual having an academic nexus (unless excepted in DIOG Appendix G, Section G) . Any other matter which, in the judgement of the official authorizing an investigation, should be brought to the attention of FBIHQ and other DOT officials F. Any matter subject to the SORC as per DIOG Appendix C and G G. Not Applicable (0/ mmm “IV. Certification: The case agent and all approving personnel certity that: _%_A. An authorized purpose and adequate predication exist for initiating the preliminary or full investigations; _X_B. The investigation is not based solely on the exercise of First Amendment activities or race, religion, national origin or ethnicity of the subject; and X_C. The investigation is an appropriate use of personnel and financial resources. ” This document contains neither recommendations nor eonelusions of the FBI. Itis the property ofthe FBI and is loaned to your ageney, it and its contents are not to be distributes outside your agency. SSS FBLHJC119-SL-000087