IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 702 OF 2017
(Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 1431 of 2015)
MEDMEME, LLC AND ORS. ... Appellants
VERSUS
M/S. IHORSE BPO SOLUTIONS PVT. LTD. ... Respondent
O R D E R
Leave granted.
Since the matter was fixed for final hearing, we have
heard the learned counsel for the parties at length.
The facts which are required to be taken note of, in
brief, are that appellant No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as
the 'appellant company') is a company incorporated under the
laws of the United States of America and is having its head
office in New York. It is engaged in the business of
offering data base services internationally for the last
several years. Appellant No. 2 is the Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of appellant-company and appellant No.3 is
its executive Vice-President. Respondent is a company
registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, having its
registered office in Pudducherry, India. It is engaged in
the business of providing quality knowledge based back and
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NIDHI AHUJA works (KPO) and software solutions to various enterprises in
Date: 2017.04.29
11:21:44 IST
Reason:
the World from its centers based in India.
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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 702 OF 2017
Negotiations took place between the respondent-company
and the appellant-company as the appellant-company expressed
its willingness to utilise the services of the respondent,
i.e., knowledge based back and works and software
development skills as well as professional services
capabilities. In this behalf, an agreement dated 01.05.2009
was entered into between the appellant-company and the
respondent whereby the respondent agreed to provide the
aforesaid services on certain remuneration, terms whereof
were also stipulated in the said agreement.
According to the respondent, the appellant company was
irregular in making payments. As on November, 2010, under
the said agreement, for the services rendered by the
respondent, the appellant-company had to make a total
payment of USD 316,513 and as against this, the
appellant-company had made payment of USD 207,558.05. In
this manner, a sum of USD 108,954.95 remained due to be paid
by the appellant-company to the respondent. On the other
hand, the appellant-company took up the position that it is
the respondent which did not provide adequate services to
the appellant-company as per the terms and conditions of the
agreement dated 01.05.2009 and for this reason the
appellant-company cancelled the said agreement dated
01.05.2009. After the cancellation, the parties again
negotiated the matter which resulted into second agreement
dated 01.12.2010. Under this agreement, it was agreed that
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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 702 OF 2017
the appellant-company shall make payment of outstanding dues
of USD 108,954.95 under the first agreement in six monthly
installments from December, 2010 to May, 2011. It was also
agreed that no party shall institute any proceedings in any
Court to resolve any dispute with the other party and if any
case arises in future, the same shall be resolved by the
parties amicably by a dispute resolution procedure,
mechanism whereof was provided in clause 1.8 of Article 8 of
the agreement. In fact, this clause is an arbitration
clause as per which parties agreed to settle their disputes
peacefully by means of arbitration.
Unfortunately, in spite of the aforesaid second
agreement entered into between the parties, the working
relationship between them could not be carried out
satisfactorily and disputes again arose between them. As
per the appellant, the respondent again committed breach of
material terms of the second agreement in respect to quality
and timely providing of services and failed to discharge its
contractual obligations which resulted in suffering of
losses by the appellant-company. On the other hand, the
respondent-company maintained that it had provided
satisfactory and complete quality services as per the
agreement and it is the appellant-company which failed to
make payment of the services provided as per the second
agreement and, also, they did not discharge their obligation
to pay the outstanding amount of USD 108,954.95 as well
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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 702 OF 2017
which was due in the first agreement. According to the
respondent, only two payments in the sum of USD 24,735 and
USD 122,997 were made which were not complete payments in
respect of the dues which were payable by the
appellant-company to the respondent-company for the services
rendered by the respondent to the appellant-company.
Because of the aforesaid disputes, the appellant-company
sent legal notice dated 20.06.2012 to the respondent-company
invoking the arbitration clause contained in the agreement
dated 01.12.2010 and nominating Mr. Justice Mohan Ram, a
retired Judge of the Madras High Court as Arbitrator and
requested the respondent to also accept the said Arbitrator
for adjudication of disputes between the parties. In
response to the said notice, the respondent sent
communication dated 18.07.2012 wherein the respondent
informed that it had already filed Criminal Complaint No.
142 of 2012 against the appellants alleging that the
appellants had committed offence of cheating and
misappropriation punishable under Sections 420, 406, 409
read with 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code and in the said
complaint, after recording the statement of the complainant,
the learned Magistrate had issued summons dated 05.04.2012
to the appellants finding that prima facie case under the
aforesaid provisions was made out.
The appellants challenged the aforesaid summoning
orders by filing petition under Section 482 of the Code of
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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 702 OF 2017
Criminal Procedure, 1973, in the High Court of Madras. This
petition has been dismissed by the High Court vide impugned
judgment dated 11.11.2014 and challenging this judgment, the
instant petition has been preferred by the appellants
wherein leave has been granted hereinabove.
To record the events that have taken place thereafter
and have a bearing on the present case, we may note that
when the respondent-company had refuted the allegations of
the legal notice dated 20.06.2012 sent by the appellants for
appointment of the Arbitrator, the appellant-company filed
petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, for appointment of an Arbitrator in
this Court in terms of the arbitration agreement. Though
this application was contested by the respondent,
ultimately, on a consensus being arrived at between the
parties, orders dated 08.10.2014 were passed in the said
arbitration application of the appellants, appointing Mr.
Justice Doraiswamy Raju, a former Judge of this Court, as
the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the claims and counter
claims of both the parties. It is also a matter of record
that arbitration proceedings are going on before the learned
Arbitrator. We are informed that both the parties have
filed claims against each other. Evidence of both the
parties is substantially over and the proceedings are at an
advanced stage. We were also informed that the arbitration
award is expected in near future.
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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 702 OF 2017
Coming to the case at hand, a perusal of the judgment
of the High Court would show that the High Court formulated
the following three questions for determination:
(i) Whether the complaint is liable to be quashed
on the ground that the allegations made in the
complaint do not constitute any offence under
Section 420 IPC?
(ii) Whether the criminal law can be set in motion
in this case, since the agreement comprises a
provision for arbitration?
(iii) Whether the Magistrate has conducted the
enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C., since the
petitioners are residing outside the
jurisdiction of the Court?
The High Court was of the view that the allegations
contained in the complaint filed by the respondent,
particularly in paragraph 7 thereto, satisfy the ingredients
of the offences for which the appellants are implicated.
But the High Court further observed that merely because
arbitration proceedings were pending between the parties, it
would not preclude the respondent from launching criminal
prosecution when prima facie criminal case was also made out
against the appellants. In the three question formulated,
the High Court took the view that the Magistrate had
conducted a proper inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure before proceeding against the appellants.
The moot question before us revolves around Question
No. 1 which was formulated by the High Court and it is to be
seen as to whether dispute between the parties is
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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 702 OF 2017
essentially of a civil nature or any case is made out
against the appellants for launching criminal prosecution
under the aforesaid Sections.
After going through the allegations contained in the
complaint and the material on record, we are of firm
conclusion that the matter entirely pertains to civil
jurisdiction and not even a prima facie case is made out for
offences under Sections 420, 406, 409 read with Section 120B
of IPC even if the allegations contained in the complaint
are to be taken on their face value. The complaint gives a
clear impression that it was primarily a case where the
respondent had alleged breach of contract on the part of the
appellants in not making the entire payments for the
services rendered to the appellants. On the other hand, it
is not in dispute that substantial amounts have been paid by
the appellants to the respondent-company for the services
rendered.
Reason for non-payment of the balance amount as given
by the appellants is that the services rendered by the
respondent-company were not in terms of the agreement
entered into between the parties and were deficient in
nature. For this reason, even the appellants have filed
claims against the respondent-company alleging that
appellant suffered losses because of the defective services
provided by the respondent.
On the basis of it, we find that it cannot be said that
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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 702 OF 2017
at the time of entering into the agreement, either the first
agreement or even the second agreement, there was any
intention on the part of the appellants to cheat the
respondent. No suspicion of any nature was shown or even
alleged. It is also not the allegation of the respondent in
the complaint that the agreement was entered into with
fraudulent or dishonest intention on the part of the
appellants in inducing the respondent to enter into such a
contract. At best, the dispute between the parties is of a
civil nature, proceedings in respect of which are pending
before the learned Arbitrator.
We, thus, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of
the High Court and thereby allow the petition filed by the
appellants in the High Court under Section 482 of Code of
Criminal Procedure. The result whereof would be quashing of
the proceedings arising out of Complaint No. 142 of 2012
pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate-II, Puducherry.
No costs.
........................., J.
[ A.K. SIKRI ]
........................., J.
[ ASHOK BHUSHAN ]
New Delhi;
April 11, 2017.
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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 702 OF 2017
ITEM NO.12 COURT NO.8 SECTION IIC
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 1431/2015
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 11/11/2014
in CROP No. 12676/2012 passed by the High Court of Madras)
MEDMEME, LLC AND ORS. Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
M/S. IHORSE BPO SOLUTIONS PVT. LTD. Respondent(s)
(With appln. (s) for permission to file additional documents,
interim relief and office report)
(For final disposal)
Date : 11/04/2017 This petition was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN
For Petitioner(s)
Mr. Ratnakar Das, Sr. Adv.
Mr. L. P. Naithani, Sr. Adv.
Mr. P. N. Gupta, Adv.
Ms. Bharti Gupta, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
Mr. Reegan S. Bel, Adv.
Mr. Jogy Scaria, Adv.
Ms. Beena Victor, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Leave granted.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
(Nidhi Ahuja) (Mala Kumari Sharma)
Court Master Court Master
[Signed order is placed on the file.]