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A Dictionary of Philosophy of Religion
A Dictionary of Philosophy of Religion
Second Edition

EDITED BY
Charles Taliaferro and Elsa J. Marty

Bloomsbury Academic
An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
 Contents

Acknowledgements

Preface

Introduction

Chronology

Dictionary

Bibliography

About the Authors

 Acknowledgements

To our editor, Haaris Naqvi, our many thanks for his guidance and
encouragement. Thanks also go to Katherine De Chant, Andrew
Lupton, Lindsey Merritt, Emma Claire dePaulo Reid, Erika Rist, and
Linden Smith for assistance in preparing the manuscript. We also
thank Divya Bardhan for her expert copy-editing and our project
manager, Monica Sukumar. We are the joint authors of all entries
with the exception of those scholars we invited to make special
contributions. We thank: Shatha Almutawa, Willamette University
(Ikhwān al-Safā’); Pamela Sue Anderson, Oxford University (Feminist
Philosophy of Religion, Lacan, Lyotard, Ricoeur); Benjamin Carter,
University of Durham (Florentine Academy, Glanvill, History, Lessing’s
Ditch, Mendelssohn); Sung-Yeon Moon Choi, St. Antony’s College,
Oxford (Kyoto School, Nishitani); Robin Collins, Messiah College
(Fine-Tuning Argument); Brian Davies, O.P., Fordham University
(Divine Simplicity); Paul R. Draper, Purdue University (Bayes’
Theorem); Ashley B. Dreff, Hood Theological Seminary (Wesley);
Elizabeth Duel (Buddha, Dalai Lama, Native American Traditions,
Wicca); Rika Dunlap, Seattle University (Dōgen); Kevin Flannery, S.
J., Gregorian University, Rome (Aquinas, Aristotle); Ian Gerdon,
University of Notre Dame (Pelagianism, Roman Catholicism,
Transubstantiation); John J. Giannini, Hope College (Analogy,
Habermas); Paul J. Griffiths, Duke Divinity School (Augustine, Lying,
Reading); Shandon Guthrie, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
(Angels, Demons); Harriet Harris, University of Edinburgh
(Evangelicalism, Evangelism, Fundamentalism, Prayer); Victoria
Harrison, University of Macau (Holiness, von Balthasar); William
Hasker, Huntington College (Intelligent Design, Molinism, Open
Theism); Douglas Hedley, Cambridge University (Coleridge, Divine
Sensations, Iamblichus, Literal, Naturphilosophie, Neoplatonism,
Plotinus, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Sacrifice, Theurgy);
James N. Hoke, Luther College (Basil, Chrysostom, Dion Chrysostom,
Gregory Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Paul); Sonam Kachru,
University of Virginia (Dukkha, Four Noble Truths, Śūnyatā); Dale
Jacquette, University of Bern, Switzerland (Schopenhauer); Mark
Linville, Clayton State University (Moral Arguments for Theism);
Jessica Locke, Loyola University Maryland (Tibetan Buddhism);
Robert MacSwain, The School of Theology, Sewanee: The University
of the South (Farrer, Lewis); Karen O’Brien-Kop, SOAS, University of
London (Sāṃkhya, Yogācāra); David L. O’Hara, Augustana College
(Bishop, Heraclitus, Maimonides, Parmenides, Peirce, Pneuma,
Providence, Ptolemaic, Reality, Sacrament, Satan, Separation of
Church and State, Suspicion, Symbol, Syncretism, Thales,
Transcendentalism, Zeno of Citium); Elizabeth Palmer, Christian
Century (Luther); Stephen R. Palmquist, Hong Kong Baptist
University (Kant); Stephen R. Palmquist and Sai-ming Wong, Hong
Kong Baptist University (Confucianism, Confucius, Lǐ, Mencius, Móu
Zōngsān, Qì, Tiān, Wáng Shǒurén); Naimi Patel, Rutgers University
(Advaita Vedānta, Rāmānuja, Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta); Sunny Patel,
George Washington University (Āśrama, Bhagavad Gītā, Dharma,
Mūrti, Purāṇas); Paul Reasoner, Bethel University (Bodhisattva,
Reincarnation, Sincerity, Transfer of Merit); Dan N. Robinson, Oxford
University (Reid); Joshua Seachris, University of Notre Dame
(Meaning of Life); Lad Sessions, Washington and Lee University
(Honor); Vivek Shah, Rutgers University (Brahman, Nyāya, Pramāṇa,
Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Vedas); Marciano Spica, Universidade Estadual Do
Centro-Oestem, Brazil (Candomblé); Leslie Stevenson, University of
St. Andrews (Religious Society of Friends); Koert Verhagen,
University of St. Andrews (Bonhoeffer); David Vessey, Grand Valley
State University (Gadamer, Husserl, James, Levinas, Maritain,
Pragmatism); Jerry Walls, Houston Baptist University (Universalism);
Lesley-Anne Dryer Williams, LeTourneau University (Gnosticism,
Scripture, Time); and Sarah Zager, Yale University (Mendelssohn,
Rosenzweig).
We are especially grateful to our colleagues at St. Olaf College and
the University of Chicago. At St. Olaf: Bob Entenmann (Chéng Hào,
Chéng Yí, Huáinánzǐ, Huayan School, Lǎozǐ, Neo-Confucianism,
Shintoism, Xióng Shílì, Xuánzàng, Xúnzǐ, Zhāng Dōngsūn, Zhāng Zài,
Zhū Xī, Zhuāngzǐ), Almut Furchert (Hildegard of Bingen), Jeanine
Grenberg (Humility), Benjamin Heidgerken (Baptism, Canon Law,
Canonical, Confirmation, Doctrine, Dogmatics/Dogmatic Theology,
Donatism, Excommunication, Heaven, Hell, Holocaust, Homoiousia,
Homoousia, Idol/Idolatry, Jansenism, John of the Cross, Judaism,
Justification, Liberal Theology, Liturgy, Logos, Marcionism, Mass,
Messiah, Millennialism, Neo-Thomism, Ordination, Orth odox Church,
Orthodoxy, Purgatory, Resurrection, Saints, Salvation, Sanctification,
Schism, Sovereignty, Supersessionism, Theocracy, Theotokos), Jason
Marsh (Cognitive Science), Anantanand Rambachan (Hinduism,
Śankara), Anthony Rudd (Fichte, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Schelling,
Schiller), Jamie Schillinger (Falṣafa, Jihad), and Doug Schuurman
(Vocation).
At the University of Chicago: Erin Atwell (Hadith, Sufism), David
Barr (H. Richard Niebuhr, Reinhold Niebuhr), Olivia Bustion (Analytic
Philosophy of Religion, Continental Philosophy of Religion,
Eschatology, Queer Theology, Schleiermacher), Jason Cather (Cobb,
Ogden), Julius Crump (Black Theology, Rorty), Erik Dreff (Spinoza),
Eun Young Hwang (Soteriology, Wú Wéi), Russell Johnson (Gandhi,
Heschel, Lindbeck, Peace, Reconciliation, Rhetoric), Hannah Jones
(Suffering, Tillich), Allison Kanner (Avicenna, Suhrawardī), SoJung
Kim (Cone, Womanist Theology), Susan Lee (Averroës, Ibn Arabi, al-
Kindī), Zahra Moeini (al-Rāzī, Kalām, Rumi, Shia Islam, Sunni Islam,
Ummah), Anil Mundra (Ahiṃsā, Anekāntavāda, Tīrthāṃkara), Daniel
Owings (Protestantism, Sola Scriptura), Viraj Patel (Swaminarayan
Hinduism), Andrew Packman (Race), Samantha Pellegrino (Ibn Ezra,
Wahhābism), Paride Stortini (Ancestor), Willa Swenson-Lengyel
(Hope), Sara-Jo Swiatek (Derrida, Hermeneutics, Postmodernism),
Matthew Vanderpoel (Duns Scotus, Lombard, Melanchthon), and
Raúl Zegarra (Liberation Theology, Pope John Paul II, Second
Vatican Council).
Finally, we thank our families and friends for their continued
support and encouragement.
 Preface

Some of the earliest recorded philosophy in the West and East

concerns matters that are of central religious significance: the
existence of God or gods, the holy, the soul, good and evil, the
afterlife, the meaning and nature of birth, growth, and maturity, the
relationship of the individual to the family or tribe or community or
nation state, sacrifice, guilt, mercy, and so on. And from the
beginning, philosophers have expressed a passionate commitment to
understanding the meaning of the words we use in exploring such
terrain. So Confucius gave central importance to what he is said to
have referred to as the “rectification of names.” And the earliest
recordings we have of Socrates show him engaged in a vigorous
inquiry into whether his fellow Athenians knew what they were
talking about when they appealed to such concepts as holiness, duty
to the gods, justice, courage, goodness, friendship, beauty, and art.
This dictionary is in this tradition of seeking to attain clarity and
understanding through attention to words, names, and titles. One
thing we rediscovered in the course of our work is the importance of
community and conversation in the practice of philosophy of religion
(historically and today). Sometimes scholarship can be a solitary
affair, but while some solitude can provide enviable time for creative
reflection, we believe that scholarship is most vibrant when it is a
shared activity. We are reminded of the story of the explorer Sir
Henry Morton Stanley who took on his disastrous journey to the
Belgian Congo a host of great books such as the complete collection
of Shakespeare. But with no African conversation partners to discuss
such books (and partly this was his fault), the bare existence of the
books became a pointless burden. In fact, he had to leave all of
them except those of Shakespeare, which some Africans insisted he
actually burn, as they had become concerned they had become an ill
totem of sorts. Without conversation and community, the best of
books can be dull companions (unless you happen to be Robinson
Crusoe).
We began this dictionary in conversation about the meaning of
some terms in contemporary philosophy of religion. It was more of
an argument than a conversation, but it led us to join forces in the
broader, constructive enterprise of working together on this
systematic, ambitious project. As noted in the acknowledgments,
this undertaking involved many other scholars as well. We highlight
the importance of conversation and exchange in this preface, as it is
our earnest desire that this book might function as something of a
companion in cultivating or helping inform conversations among our
readers. Our hope is to enrich dialogue rather than to substitute for
it in any way, for engaging these definitions is only the beginning of
philosophical exploration.
 Introduction

Philosophy of religion is the philosophical examination of the central

themes and concepts involved in religious traditions. It engages all
the main areas of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, logic,
ethics and value theory, the philosophy of language, science, law,
sociology, politics, history, and so on. Philosophy of religion also
includes an investigation into the religious significance of historical
events (such as the Holocaust) and general features of the cosmos
(e.g., laws of nature, the emergence of conscious life, and the
widespread testimony of religious experience). In this introduction
we offer an overview of the field and its significance, with
subsequent sections on the concept of God, arguments for the
existence of God, the problem of evil, the challenge of logical
positivism, and religious and philosophical pluralism. At the outset,
we address philosophy of religion as chiefly studied primarily in so-
called analytic departments of philosophy and religious studies in
English-speaking countries, but we conclude with observations about
so-called continental philosophy of religion. The qualification of “so-
called” is added because the distinction between analytic and
continental is controversial.

The Field and its Significance

The philosophical exploration of religious beliefs and practices is
evident in the earliest recorded philosophy, Eastern and Western. In
the West, throughout Greco-Roman philosophy and the medieval
era, philosophical reflection on God or gods, reason and faith, the
soul, afterlife, and so on were not considered to be a subdiscipline
called “philosophy of religion.” The philosophy of God was simply
one component among many interwoven philosophical projects. This
intermingling of philosophical inquiry with religious themes and the
broader enterprises of philosophy (e.g., political theory,
epistemology, and so on) is apparent among many early modern
philosophers such as John Locke and George Berkeley. Only
gradually do we find texts devoted exclusively to religious themes.
The first use of the term “philosophy of religion” in English occurs in
the seventeenth-century work of Ralph Cudworth. He and his
Cambridge University colleague Henry More (who were part of a
movement that came to be known as Cambridge Platonism)
produced philosophical work with a specific focus on religion and so,
if one insisted on dating the beginning of philosophy of religion as a
field, there are good reasons for claiming that it began (gradually) in
the mid-seventeenth century. We have inherited from the Cambridge
Platonists, who were the first authors to do philosophy in the English
language, many terms and projects used in philosophy of religion
today such as “theism” and “consciousness.” The Cambridge
Platonists also provided us with a model for practicing philosophy
with charity, a deep concern for justice (personally and in
governance), and toleration.
Today philosophy of religion is a robust, intensely active area of
philosophy. The importance of philosophy of religion is chiefly due to
subject matter: alternative beliefs about God, Brahman, and the
sacred, the varieties of religious experience, the interplay between
science and religion, the challenge of nonreligious philosophies, the
nature and scope of good and evil, religious treatments of birth,
history, and death, and other substantial terrain. A philosophical
exploration of these topics involves fundamental questions about our
place in the cosmos and about our relationship to what may
transcend the cosmos. It requires an investigation into the nature
and limit of human thought and explores embedded social and
personal practices. A vast majority of the world population is either
aligned with religion or affected by religion, making philosophy of
religion not simply a matter of abstract theory but also highly
relevant to practical concerns. Religious traditions are so
comprehensive and all-encompassing in their claims that almost
every domain of philosophy may be drawn upon in the philosophical
investigation of their coherence, justification, and value.
Philosophy of religion also makes important contributions to
religious studies and theology. Historically, theology has been
influenced by, or has drawn upon, philosophy. Platonism and
Aristotelianism had a major influence on the articulation of classical
Christian doctrine, and in the modern era theologians frequently
have drawn on work by philosophers (from Hegel to Iris Murdoch,
Heidegger, and Derrida). Philosophy strives to clarify, evaluate, and
compare religious beliefs. The evaluation has at times been highly
critical and dismissive, but there are abundant periods in the history
of ideas when philosophy has positively contributed to the flourishing
of religious life. This constructive interplay is not limited to the West.
The impact of philosophy on distinctive Buddhist views of knowledge
and the self has been of great importance. Just as philosophical
ideas have fueled theological work, the great themes of theology
involving God’s transcendence, the divine attributes, providence, and
so on have made substantial impacts on important philosophical
projects.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, a more general
rationale for philosophy of religion should be cited: it can enhance
cross-cultural dialogue. Philosophers of religion now often seek out
common as well as distinguishing features of religious belief and
practice. This study can enhance communication between traditions,
and between religions and secular institutions. The current cultural
climate in the West makes it especially important for persons to
develop an appreciation for some religious traditions that are treated
disparagingly in popular media.

The Concept of God

Most philosophy of religion in the West has focused on different
versions of theism. Ancient philosophy of religion wrestled with the
credibility of monotheism and polytheism in opposition to skepticism
and very primitive naturalistic schemes. For example, Plato argued
that the view that God is singularly good should be preferred to the
portrait of the gods that was articulated in Greek poetic tradition,
according to which there are many gods, often imperfect and subject
to vice and ignorance. The emergence and development of the
Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) on a global scale
secured the centrality of theism for philosophical inquiry, but the
relevance of a philosophical exploration of theism is not limited to
those interested in these religions and the cultures in which they
flourish. While theism has generally flourished in religious traditions
amid religious practices, one may be a theist without adopting any
religion whatever, and one may find theistic elements (however
piecemeal) in Confucianism, Hinduism, some versions of Mahāyāna
Buddhism (in which Buddha is depicted as omniscient), and other
traditions. The debate over theism also has currency for secular
humanism and religious forms of atheism as in Theravada Buddhist
philosophy.
Traditionally, theists have maintained that God is maximally
excellent, necessarily existent, incorporeal, omniscient, omnipotent,
omnipresent, eternal or everlasting, and essentially good. Theists
have differed over whether they regard God as impassable (not
subject to passion) or passable. There is no space to address these
issues in detail here; however, the nature of these divine attributes
and their relationship to one another have been the subject of much
reflection within philosophy of religion.
At least two concerns arise when articulating the concept of God
and the divine a ttributes. First, some argue that there is a tension
between the God of philosophy and the God of revelation. If
scripture definitively portrays God as loving and just, then scriptural
narratives in which God appears neither loving nor just must either
be interpreted as reflecting a projection of fallible human
lovelessness and injustice, or theologians need to show how the God
of revelation is, despite appearances, consistently loving and just.
Those adopting the first approach invoke the concept of progressive
revelation, whereby God has been increasingly revealed over time.
Precepts in Hebrew scripture that allow slavery, for example, are
judged to be primitive, merely human projections that eventually
give way to the purity and nobility of ethical monotheism as
evidenced in prophets such as Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Amos. Other
philosophers respond by using the biblical understanding of God to
shape the philosophy of God. Thus, while some traditional theists
have believed God to be eternal, changeless, and impassable, other
philosophers use biblical texts to defend the idea that God is in time,
subject to change, and has passions (e.g., love of the good). Again,
some traditionalists have held that God is not subject to passive
states and thus God is not subject to a love that involves suffering.
Others ask why suffering love has to be seen as a passive state of
being subject to creation. Perhaps love (whether it is sorrowing or
joyful) can be understood as supreme action, perhaps even as a
reflection of a supreme, great-making excellence. This new
discussion opens opportunities for the scriptural portrait of God to
inform the philosophy of God, bringing a more affective dimension to
the philosophy of God.
A second issue arising from philosophical reflection on the concept
of God concerns the extent to which human thought and language
can form an intelligible concept of God. God is beyond both insofar
as God (the reality) is not a human thought or term; if God exists,
God preexists all human and any other created life. In this sense,
God’s thoughts are (literally) different from any human thought.
Theists seek to balance positive claims about God (technically
referenced to as cataphatic theology) with an acknowledgment of
the importance of negation or negative claims (apophatic theology).
Defenders of a strict, apophatic philosophy of God sometimes
assume that conceptual and linguistic limitations are in some sense
religiously confining or subjugating. But without concepts or some
language, deep religious practices like loving or worshiping God
would be impossible. To love X, you have to have some concept or
idea of X. How would you know whether you were or were not
worshiping X if you had no idea whatsoever about X? At least in
theistic traditions, some language and concept of God seems
essential. Also, there is a difference between claiming that God is
more than or greater than our best terms and concepts and the
claim that God is not less than our best terms and concepts. So, one
may assert that God is omniscient and analyze this in terms of God
knowing all that can possibly be known. One may well grant that,
and yet go on to claim that how God possesses this knowledge and
what it would be like to be omniscient surpasses the best possible
human imagination.
A significant amount of work on the meaningfulness of religious
language was carried out in the medieval period, with major
contributions made by Maimonides (1135–1204), Thomas Aquinas
(1225–1274), Duns Scotus (1266–1308), and William of Ockham
(1285–1347). This work built on the even earlier work on religious
language by Philo (20 BCE–50 CE), Clement (150–215), and Origen
(185–259) of Alexandria. In the modern era, the greatest
concentration on religious language has taken place in response to
logical positivism and to the later work of Wittgenstein (1889–1951).

The Challenge of Logical Positivism

In the mid-twentieth century, a powerful movement, logical
positivism, promoted an empiricist principle of meaning which
asserted that for a propositional claim (statement) to be meaningful
it must either be about the bare formal relations between ideas such
as those enshrined in mathematics and analytic definitions (“A is A,”
“triangles are three-sided”) or there must in principle be perceptual
experience providing evidence of whether the claim is true or false.
This delimited meaningful discourse about the world and meant that
ostensibly factual claims that have no implications for our empirical
experience are empty of content. In line with this form of positivism,
A. J. Ayer (1910–1989) and others claimed that religious beliefs were
meaningless.
Empiricist challenges to the meaningfulness of religious belief are
still raised, but are now deemed less impressive than they once
were. In the history of the debate over positivism, the most radical
charge was that positivism is self-refuting. The empiricist criterion of
meaning itself does not seem to be a statement that expresses the
formal relation of ideas, nor does it appear to be empirically
verifiable. How might one empirically verify the principle? At best,
the principle of verification seems to be a recommendation as to
how to describe those statements that positivists are prepared to
accept as meaningful. But then, how might a dispute about which
other statements are meaningful be settled in a non-arbitrary
fashion? To religious believers for whom talk of “Brahman” and
“God” is at the center stage of meaningful discourse, the use of the
principle of empirical verification will seem arbitrary and question-
begging. If the positivist principle is tightened up too much, it seems
to threaten various propositions that at least appear to be highly
respectable, such as scientific claims about physical processes and
events that are not publicly observable. For example, what are we to
think of states of the universe prior to all observation of physical
strata of the cosmos that cannot be observed directly or indirectly
but only inferred as part of an overriding scientific theory? Or what
about the mental states of other persons, which may ordinarily be
reliably judged, but which, some argue, are underdetermined by
external, public observation? A person’s subjective states—how one
feels—can be profoundly elusive to external observers and even to
the person him or herself. Can you empirically observe another
person’s sense of happiness? Arguably, the conscious, subjective
states of persons resist airtight verification and the evidence of such
states does not meet positivism’s standards.
The strict empiricist account of meaning was also charged as
meaningless on the grounds that there is no coherent, clear, basic
level of experience with which to test propositional claims. The
experiential “given” is simply too malleable (this has been called “the
myth of the given”), often reflecting prior conceptual judgments and,
once one appreciates the open-textured character of experience, it
may be proposed that virtually any experience can verify or provide
some evidence for anything. Not every philosopher has embraced
such an epistemological anarchy, but the retreat of positivism has
made philosophers more cautious about identifying a sensory
foundation for testing all claims to meaningful language.
One of the most sustained lessons from the encounter between
positivism and the philosophy of religion is the importance of
assessing the meaning of individual beliefs in comprehensive terms.
The meaning of ostensible propositional claims must take into
account larger theoretical frameworks. Religious claims could not be
r uled out at the start but should be allowed a hearing with
competing views of cognitive significance.

Arguments for and against the Existence of

God
One of the main issues in philosophy of religion concerns arguments
for and against the existence of God. Naturalists argue that the
cosmos itself, or nature, is all that exists. Strict naturalists, or
eliminativists, believe that reality consists only of what is described
and explained by the ideal natural sciences, especially physics, and
therefore they deny the reality of subjective experiences or
consciousness, ideas, emotions, morality, and the mental life in
general. Broad naturalists affirm the possibility or plausibility of the
mental life and ethical truths, but reject the existence of God.
Appealing to Ockham’s razor, the thesis that one should not posit
entities beyond necessity, strict and broad naturalists argue that
atheism ought to be the presumption of choice.
Theists respond by appealing to four significant, interconnected
arguments for the existence of God: the ontological, cosmological,
and teleological arguments, and an argument from religious
experience. The ontological argument contends that reflections on
the idea and possibility of God’s existence provide a reason for
thinking God actually exists. The cosmological argument contends
that it is reasonable to think that our contingent cosmos must be
accounted for, in part, by the causal creativity of a necessarily
existing being. Teleological arguments contend that our ordered,
complex cosmos, with its laws of nature, is better explained by
theism rather than naturalism. And the argument from religious
experience argues that the widespread reports by persons across
time and culture who (appear to) experience a transcendent, divine
reality provide grounds for thinking there is such a reality. Some
theists also make arguments based on miracles and morality. These
arguments are considered mutually reinforcing, so that, for example,
the cosmological argument may be complemented by a teleological
argument, thereby providing reasons for thinking the necessarily-
existing being is also purposive. Few philosophers today advance a
single argument as a proof. It is increasingly common to see
philosophies—scientific naturalism or theism or some other
worldview—advanced with cumulative arguments, a whole range of
considerations, and not with a supposed knock-down, single proof.
One reason why the case for and against major, comprehensive
philosophies are mostly cumulative is because of discontent in what
is often called “foundationalism.” In one classical form of
foundationalism, one secures first and foremost a basis of beliefs
which one may see to be true with certainty. The base may be cast
as indubitable or infallible. One then slowly builds up the justification
for one’s other, more extensive beliefs about oneself and the world.
Many (but not all) philosophers now see justification as more
complex and interwoven; the proper object of philosophical inquiry is
overall coherence, not a series of distinguishable building operations
beginning with a foundation.
One way of carrying out philosophy of religion along non-
foundationalist lines has been to build a case for the comparative
rationality of a religious view of the world. It has been argued that
the intellectual integrity of a religious worldview can be secured if it
can be shown to be no less rational than the available alternatives. It
need only achieve intellectual parity.
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, some philosophers
have downplayed (or even repudiated) the significance of theistic
and anti-theistic arguments from the natural world. A movement
called Reformed Epistemology has contended that a Christian might
be warranted in her belief that there is a God if she has (what she
believes to be) a sense of God and it turns out that God exists and
has made her (and others) to have such a sense of God’s presence.
The contrary position, often called “evidentialism,” claims that
warranted or justified beliefs about God (and all other beliefs) need
to be grounded in evidence.
While a great deal of philosophy of religion is devoted to the
tension between secular naturalism and theism, there have been
philosophers who have questioned this binary. Some naturalists have
developed forms of their worldview that are explicitly religious
(religious naturalism), some theists have developed forms of their
worldview that are somewhat naturalistic (one phrase that captures
this trend is “theism without the supernatural”). Still other
philosophers, such as feminist philosophers, have focused not so
much on the evidence and arguments for and against theism and
naturalism, but more on the social, political, and ethical implications
of those (and other) worldviews.

The Problem of Evil

The problem of evil is the most widely considered objection to
theism in both Western and Eastern philosophy. If there is a God
who is omnipotent, omniscient, and completely good, why is there
evil? There are two general versions of the problem: the deductive
or logical version, which asserts that the existence of any evil at all
(regardless of its role in producing good) is incompatible with God’s
existence; and the probabilistic version, which asserts that given the
quantity and severity of evil that actually exists, it is unlikely that
God exists. The deductive problem is currently less commonly
debated because it is widely acknowledged that a thoroughly good
being (a creature or the Creator) might allow or inflict some harm
under certain morally compelling conditions (such as causing
someone pain in a medical procedure when essential to prevent
greater harm or to bring about a great good). More intense debate
concerns the likelihood (or even possibility) that there is a
completely good God given the vast amount of evil in the cosmos.
Consider human and animal suffering caused by death, predation,
birth defects, ravaging diseases, virtually unchecked human
wickedness, torture, rape, oppression, and natural disasters.
Consider how often those who suffer are innocent. Why should there
be so much gratuitous, apparently pointless evil?
In the face of the problem of evil, some philosophers and
theologians deny that God is all-powerful and all-knowing. John
Stuart Mill took this line, and panentheist theologians today also
question the traditional treatments of divine power. According to
panentheism, God is immanent in the world, suffering with the
oppressed and working to bring good out of evil, although in spite of
God’s efforts, evil will invariably mar the created order. Another
response is to think of God as being very different from a moral
agent. Brian Davies and others have contended that what it means
for God to be good is different from what it means for an agent to
be morally good. A more desperate strategy is to deny the existence
of evil, but it is difficult to reconcile traditional monotheism with
moral skepticism. Also, insofar as we believe there to be a God
worthy of worship and a fitting object of human love, the appeal to
moral skepticism will carry little weight. The idea that evil is a
privation of the good, a twisting of something good, may have some
currency in thinking through the problem of evil, but it is difficult to
see how it alone could go very far to vindicate belief in God’s
goodness. Searing pain and endless suffering seem altogether real
even if they are analyzed as being philosophically parasitic on
something valuable.
In part, the magnitude one takes the problem of evil to pose for
theism will depen d upon one’s commitments in other areas of
philosophy, especially ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. If in
ethics one holds that there should be no preventable suffering for
any reason, no matter what the cause or consequence, then the
problem of evil will conflict with the acceptance of traditional theism.
Moreover, if one holds that any solution to the problem of evil should
be evident to all persons, then again traditional theism is in jeopardy,
for clearly the “solution” is not evident to all. Debate has largely
centered on the legitimacy of adopting some position in the middle:
a theory of values that would preserve a clear assessment of the
profound evil in the cosmos as well as some understanding of how
this might be compatible with the existence of an all-powerful,
completely good Creator. Could there be reasons why God would
permit cosmic ills? If we do not know what those reasons might be,
are we in a position to conclude that there are none or that there
could not be any? The different possibilities one considers will be
shaped by one’s metaphysics. For example, if one does not believe
there is free will, then one will not be moved by any appeal to the
positive value of free will and its role in bringing about good as
offsetting its role in bringing about evil.
 Theistic responses to the problem of evil distinguish between a
defense and a theodicy. A defense seeks to establish that rational
belief that God exists is still possible (when the defense is employed
against the logical version of the problem of evil) and that the
existence of evil does not make it improbable that God exists (when
used against the probabilistic version). Some have adopted the
defense strategy while arguing that we are in a position to have
rational beliefs in the existence of evil and in a completely good God
who hates this evil, even though we may be unable to see how
these two beliefs are compatible. A theodicy is more ambitious, and
is typically part of a broader project, arguing that it is reasonable to
believe that God exists on the basis of the good as well as the
evident evil of the cosmos. In a theodicy, the project is not to
account for each and every evil, but to provide an overarching
framework within which to understand at least roughly how the evil
that occurs is part of some overall good—for instance, the
overcoming of evil is itself a great good. In practice, a defense and a
theodicy often appeal to similar factors, such as the Greater Good
Defense, which contends that that evil can be understood as either a
necessary accompaniment to bringing about greater goods or an
integral part of these goods.
Some portraits of an afterlife seem to have little bearing on our
response to the magnitude of evil here and now. Does it help to
understand why God allows evil if all victims will receive happiness
later? But it is difficult to treat the possibility of an afterlife as
entirely irrelevant. Is death the annihilation of persons or an event
involving a transfiguration to a higher state? If you do not think that
it matters whether persons continue to exist after death, then such
speculation is of little consequence. But suppose that the afterlife is
understood as being morally intertwined with this life, with the
opportunity for moral and spiritual reformation, transfiguration of the
wicked, rejuvenation and occasions for new life, perhaps even
reconciliation and communion between oppressors seeking
forgiveness and their victims. Then these considerations might help
to defend against arguments based on the existence of evil. Insofar
as one cannot rule out the possibility of an afterlife morally tied to
our life, one cannot rule out the possibility that God brings some
good out of cosmic ills.

Religious Pluralism and other recent

developments in philosophy of religion
In contemporary philosophy of religion, there has been a steady,
growing representation of non-monotheistic traditions, involving
fresh translations of philosophical and religious texts from India,
China, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Exceptional figures from non-
Western traditions have an increased role in cross-cultural
philosophy of religion and religious dialogue. There are now
extensive treatments of pantheism and student-friendly guides to
diverse religious conceptions of the cosmos. This expansion of the
field is reflected in this second edition of our dictionary, which
features an expansion of entries outside the Abrahamic faiths.
The expanded interest in religious pluralism has led to extensive
reflection on the compatibilities and possible synthesis of religions.
John Hick is the preeminent synthesizer of religious traditions.
Moving from a broadly based theistic view of God to what he calls
“the Real,” a noumenal sacred reality, Hick claims that different
religions provide us with a glimpse or partial access to the Real. He
sees religious traditions as different meeting points in which a
person might transcend ego-driven, selfish desires and be in relation
to the same reality or the Real. While Hick is reluctant to attribute
positive properties to the Real in itself (he leaves undetermined
whether the Real is personal or impersonal), he holds that all
persons will evolve or develop into a saving relationship with the
Real after death. One advantage of Hick’s position is that it
undermines a rationale for religious conflict. If successful, this
approach would offer a way to accommodate diverse communities
and undermine what has been a source of grave conflict in the past.
The response to Hick’s proposal has been mixed. Some contend
that the very concept of “the Real” is incoherent or not religiously
adequate. Indeed, articulating the nature of the Real is no easy task.
Some think that Hick has secured not the equal acceptability of
diverse religions but rather their unacceptability. In their classical
forms, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity diverge. If, say, the
incarnation of God in Christ did not occur, would not Christianity be
false? In reply, Hick has sought to interpret specific claims about the
incarnation in ways that do not commit Christians to the “literal
truth” of God becoming enfleshed. The “truth” of the incarnation has
been interpreted in such terms as these: in Jesus Christ (or in the
narratives about Christ) God is disclosed. Or: Jesus Christ was so
united with God’s will that his actions were and are the functional
display of God’s character. Perhaps as a result of Hick’s challenge,
philosophical work on the incarnation and other beliefs and practices
specific to religious traditions have received renewed attention.
As noted earlier, an interesting new development in philosophy of
religion has been to explore the extent to which evidence is required
in order for religious beliefs to be warranted. Related to this, debate
is taking place today on the extent to which evidence that one
religion is true counts as evidence that a religion that makes
different truth claims is false. We are also seeing philosophers who
see religions as not primarily making truth claims about the nature
of reality but as advancing “forms of life” or ways of living that
involve religious values such as humility, hope, solidarity with those
who suffer, and so on. Yet another key movement that is developing
has come to be called Continental Philosophy of Religion, for it
approaches issues such as the concept of God, pluralism, religious
experience, metaphysics, and epistemology in light of Heidegger,
Derrida, and other continental philosophers.
There are many points at which continental philosophy can be seen
as complementing classical and mainstream philosophy of religion,
but some elements of con tinental thought are pitted against
traditional philosophy of religion which is sometimes called “onto-
theology.” The latter privileges theoretical clarity, explanations of the
cosmos, divine attributes, rules of evidence, and so on. Merold
Westphal is a representative of those working in the continental
tradition who believe that philosophy of religion should be so
structured that it privileges the practical life of faith. Westphal
develops his position as a Christian inspired by Martin Heidegger:
 the goal of theology “is never a valid system of theological
prepositions” but rather “concrete Christian experience itself.” . . .
[B]ecause its goal is the praxis of the believer as a distinctive mode
of existence, “theology in its essence is a practical science.” Unlike
onto-theology, theology properly understood is “innately
homiletical” . . . It is as if Heidegger is saying, I have found it
necessary to deny theory in order to make room for practice.1
Westphal further articulates his position in connection with a novel
by C. S. Lewis (Till We Have Faces) in which a main character loses
her beloved (the god Psyche) because she seeks knowledge about
the beloved:
the challenge of faith is the same: the believer is called upon to
sustain a beautiful and loving relationship through trust in a lover
about whom she remains significantly (though not totally) in the
dark and who, though he gives himself to her freely, is not at her
disposal. The relationship is destroyed when the beloved . . . insists
on Enlightenment, on dissipating the darkness of mystery with the
light of human knowledge, on walking by sight and not by faith.
To be able to resist this temptation, faith must deny theory, or,
to be more precise, the primacy of insight. For such faith, Plato’s
divided line and Hegel’s modern vision thereof as the movement
“beyond faith” to knowledge are not the ascent from that which is
inferior . . . to that which is superior . . . ; they are rather the
withdrawal from the site at which alone is possible a loving,
trusting relation with a God before whom one might sing and dance
...
This love, this trust, this relationship—these are the practice for
the sake of which it was necessary to deny theory. This is not to
abolish theology. It is to see that theology’s task is to serve this life
of faith, not the ideals of knowledge as defined by the philosophical
traditions . . .2
This position calls for several observations. First, philosophy of
religion has demonstrated that, as a field, it is wide enough to
include diverse projects, including Westphal’s. Second, Westphal
advances his preferred model of theology and philosophy as a
Christian. In a field with a plurality of religions represented,
philosophers will find it difficult to abandon questions of knowledge,
inquiry about the truth or plausibility of theological propositions, and
only serve the “life of faith.” Finally, it is hard to grasp how one can
focus upon the religious or secular “beautiful and loving relationship
through trust” in God or the sacred or a beloved human without
having a theoretical commitment to the reality of God, the sacred, or
the beloved human and concepts of that beloved, assumed reality.
We suggest that proposals like Westphal’s will find it difficult to
supplant (though they may complement) traditional and
contemporary philosophy of religion.

Conclusion
At its best, we believe that the philosophy of religion is about
openness to serious dialogue and respectful argument across
religious, cultural, and other boundaries. This kind of careful,
disciplined thinking provides one of the best ways to engage other
religions, and to engage those who reject religion, in a way that can
bring deeper understanding of and sympathy for others. There is
some resistance to acknowledging the way philosophy of religion
should promote what is best described as the pursuit of such wise
exchanges between different parties. Christian philosopher Michael
Rea recently signaled his resistance to the idea that philosophy of
religion (or theology) should promote wisdom.
But I cannot resist noting that, despite the superficial attractiveness
of the idea that philosophers and theologians ought to be aiming in
the direction of wisdom and moral improvement, Christian
philosophers as such, and theologians as well, might in fact have
some reason for resisting this idea. Recently, a student from
another (religious) university emailed me and asked, among other
things, what philosophy books or articles I’d recommend for the
purpose of helping him to grow in wisdom. My answer was that I
wouldn’t recommend philosophical texts for that purpose at all;
rather, I’d recommend scripture. If philosophy as a discipline (or
 theology) were to aim its efforts at the production of a self-
contained body of wisdom, or at a general theory of right living, it
would (I think) be aiming at the production of a rival to scripture.
And that is a project that I think Christian philosophers and
theologians ought to try to avoid. Indeed, to my mind, this sort of
project involves just as much hubris as onto-theology is said to
involve. Thus, it seems to me that the right theoretical task for
Christian philosophers and theologians to pursue is in fact one that
involves clarifying, systematizing, and model-building—precisely the
sort of project that analytic philosophers are engaged in.3
We are far from suggesting that philosophy of religion should aim at
a “self-contained body of wisdom” or produce a sacred scripture, but
we suggest by way of reply two points.
First, no scripture in any tradition (including the Christian Bible) is
best described as “self-contained wisdom.” All sacred scriptures are
linked with religious communities, histories, traditions of
interpretation, and so on. Second, although Rea is an outstanding,
highly gifted philosopher of religion, we suggest that, in the above
statement, he seems to underestimate how respectful dialogue, joint
inquiry into multiple religions and their secular alternatives (with all
the involved “clarifying, systematizing, and model-building”), can be
foundational for a life that involves the love of wisdom which is, after
all, the etymological root of the term “philosophy” (from the Greek
philo for love and sophia for wisdom).
Resources
Philosophy of religion is represented in virtually all the main
philosophy journals, but it is the specific focus of The International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Religious Studies, Faith and
Philosophy, Philosophia Christi, Philosophy and Theology, Sophia,
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly (formerly New
Scholasticism), American Journal of Theology and Philosophy,
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, and The Thomist.
Theology journals also carry considerable philosophy of religion,
especially The Journal of the American Academy of Religion, The
Journal of Religion, Theological Studies, The Journal of Religious
Ethics, Heythrop Journal, The Annual of the Society of Christian
Ethics, Theology Today, New Blackfriars, Modern Theology, Harvard
Theological Review, the Scottish Journal of Religious Studies, and
the Scottish Journal of Theology. Philosophy of religion can also be
found in some cross-disciplinary journals like Law and Religion, The
Journal of Law and Religion, Literature and Theology, The Journal of
Humanism and Ethical Religions, and Christian Scholar’s Review.
Several scholarly presses produce series of books in philosophy of
religion. Continuum publishes a series in philosophy of religion under
the editorship Stewart Goetz. Cornell University Press publishes
Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Indiana University
Press publishes The Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion,
Kluwer Academic Publishers publishes Studies in Philosophy and
Religion, and the State University Press of New York publishes
Toward a Comparative Philosophy of Religions. University presses
such as Oxford, Cambridge, Notre Dame, Pennsylvania State, and
Temple regularly publish work in philosophy of religion. Prometheus
Books produces a substantial number of works in philosophy of
religion, most of them highly critical of theism.
Topics in the philosophy of religion are indexed in the Philosopher’s
Index, published by the Philosophical Documentation Center, Bowling
Green State University. Entries are listed under such titles as “God,”
“Religious Experience,” and “Buddhism.” This is a highly valued tool
for writing papers, whether these be for a class or for making a
contribution to the field. The Philosopher’s Index offers brief
abstracts summarizing the main tenets of books and articles. It is
available on CD covering works published from 1940 to the present
thought DIALOG Information Services. Philosophy of religion is also
indexed in yearly publications of the Religion Index (in two volumes).
These are produced by the American Theological Association,
Evanston, Illinois, USA, and are also available on CD. Books in
philosophy of religion are also regularly reviewed by in the journal
Philosophical Books.
There are regular sessions on the philosophy of religion on the
programs of the annuals meetings of the three divisions of the
American Philosophical Association, as well as on the program of the
annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion. Societies and
institutions focusing on the philosophy of religion include: the British
Society for the Philosophy of Religion; the Society for the Philosophy
of Religion; the Society of Christian Philosophers; the Philosophy of
Religion Society; the American Catholic Philosophical Association;
Boston University Institute for Philosophy of Religion; the American
Humanist Association; the American Maritain Association; the
fellowship of Religious Humanists; the Jesuit Philosophical
Association; the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy;
and the Society for Philosophy and Theology. Addresses for most of
these organizations are listed in the Directory of American
Philosophers, a publication of the Philosophy Documentation Center,
Bowling Green State University.
There is a Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of
Notre Dame which offers fellowships to undertake research in the
field. Information about the center is noted in the journal Faith and
Philosophy. St. Olaf College is the site of the Kierkegaard Library, a
Publication and Study Center dedicated to the Danish philosopher
Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) who made an enormous
contribution to the philosophy of religion. Fellowships to study at the
center are available. The website “www.infidels. org” is a wonderful
and easily accessible database for journal articles exploring the
philosophy of religion from the atheist school of thought. The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy also exists as an outstanding
source for the study of the philosophy of religion.

Notes
1 Merold Westphal, Overcoming Onto-Theology: Toward a Postmodern Christian Faith (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2001), 16.
2 Ibid., 27.
3 Michael Rea, Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009), 18–19.
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