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MOROCCO

The first edition of Morocco was published one year before the mass protests of the
Arab Spring rocked the Moroccan state. Post-Arab Spring, the country has a new
constitution and government, but the state remains uncompromising on any true
reform of the monarchy’s claims to power.
This new edition provides an introductory overview of the history, con-
temporary politics, economy, and international relations in Morocco and offers an
examination of the challenges to tradition and modernity in the post-colonial state.
It has been revised and updated to include analysis of the country’s evolving poli-
tics in the years following the Arab Spring, and the consequences this has had for
the country’s traditional monarchy. It pays particular attention to the new con-
stitution, the policies of the new Islamist-led government, and it includes an analysis of
Morocco’s foreign policy in the post-Arab Spring regional context.
Easily accessible to non-specialists, practitioners, and upper-level undergraduate
students, the book will be essential reading for those working in the fields of North
African studies, International Relations and Middle East studies.

James N. Sater is Associate Professor of Political Science at the International


Studies Department of the American University of Sharjah in the United Arab
Emirates. He spent more than four years in Morocco, where he worked and taught
at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane. He is the author of Civil Society and Political
Change in Morocco (Routledge, 2007), and his research focuses on political
transformation, elections, citizenship and migration.
THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST
Edited by Professor Anoushiravan Ehteshami
Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham
For well over a century now the Middle East and North Africa countries have
formed a central plank of the international system. The Contemporary Middle East
Series provides the first systematic attempt at studying the key actors of this
dynamic, complex, and strategically important region. Using an innovative
common format – which in each case study provides an easily-digestible analysis of
the origins of the state, its contemporary politics, economics and international
relations – prominent Middle East experts have been brought together to write
definitive studies of the MENA region’s key countries.
Books in the series
Jordan: A Hashemite legacy Morocco: Challenges to Tradition
Beverley Milton-Edwards and and Modernity
Peter Hinchcliffe James N. Sater

Syria: Revolution from above Tunisia: Stability and Reform in


Raymond Hinnebusch the Modern Maghreb
Christopher Alexander
Israel: Challenges to identity,
democracy and the state Libya: Continuity and Change
Clive Jones and Emma C. Murphy Ronald Bruce St John

Turkey: Challenges of continuity Lebanon: The Politics of a


and change Penetrated Society
Meliha Benli Altunışık and Tom Najem
Özlem Tür Kavli
Libya: Continuity and Change
Sudan 2nd Edition
Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Ronald Bruce St John
Alsir Sidahmed
Morocco: Challenges to tradition
Saudi Arabia and modernity 2nd Edition
Tim Niblock James N. Sater

Jordan: A Hashemite legacy Tunisia: From stability to


2nd Edition revolution in the Maghreb
Beverley Milton-Edwards and 2nd Edition
Peter Hinchcliffe Christopher Alexander
MOROCCO
Challenges to tradition and
modernity
Second edition

James N. Sater
Add Add

Add Add
AddAddAdd
AddAdd Add
Add
Second edition published 2016
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2016 James N. Sater
The right of James N. Sater to be identified as author of this work has been
asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the
publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered
trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to
infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested.

ISBN: 978-1-138-82826-1 (hbk)


ISBN: 978-1-138-82827-8 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-73852-9 (ebk)

Typeset in Bembo
by Taylor & Francis Books
To my family
This page intentionally left blank
CONTENTS

List of illustrations ix
Preface x
Chronology xii
Abbreviations xv

1 Introduction 1
1.1 Historical roots: the Alawi monarchy 3
1.2 Islam 5
1.3 Political parties 7
1.4 Elite politics 10
1.5 Responding to challenges: regime strength and political liberalisation 12
1.6 Plan of the book 14

2 Combining modern with traditional state structures 17


2.1 The origins of the state in pre-colonial Morocco 17
2.2 The colonial period and the rise of the nationalist movement 20
2.3 Towards independence 26
2.4 Independence and the struggle for power 29
2.5 Summary 34

3 The politics of exclusion and inclusion 37


3.1 Power struggles (1): the fragmentation of the state, 1961–73 38
3.2 Power struggles (2): the re-establishment of the state, 1974–77 45
viii Contents

3.3 The state’s basis of power, 1956–77 51


3.4 Divide and rule: political parties and civil society, 1977–84 56
3.5 The rise of Islamism 60
3.6 From constitutional reform to alternance 68
3.7 NGOs and the rise of new agendas 75
3.8 Succession and new leadership: the early years of Mohamed VI 82
3.9 Democratisation 85
3.10 The Arab Spring and the 2011 constitutional reform 97
3.11 Summary 103

4 The challenge of economic development 113


4.1 Agriculture: from tentative reform to laissez-faire and perpetual
crisis 114
4.2 From import substitution to debt crisis and structural
adjustment 120
4.3 Economic changes and the development of a new ruling pact 125
4.4 The INDH, free trade and the future of Morocco’s economic
reform agenda 134
4.5 Summary 144

5 State legitimacy and foreign policy 150


5.1 Morocco’s domestic, regional and international environment 152
5.2 The Western Sahara issue 157
5.3 The EU and foreign economic policy 165
5.4 The United States and the Middle East conflict 170
5.5 Moroccan foreign policy after the Arab Spring 173
5.6 Summary 174

6 Conclusion 179

Glossary 182
Bibliography 184
Index 195
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures
1.1 Political liberalisation and strength and weakness of the state 13
4.1 GDP growth and agricultural growth, 1961–2003 127

Tables
3.1 Voter turnout in elections to the lower house, 1977–2011 101
4.1 Illiteracy rates by gender and region (adults and children over
ten years old), 1960–2004 (%) 123
4.2 Infant mortality rate, 1962–2004 (per thousand births) 124
4.3 Population living in poverty (%) 126
4.4 Remittances and balance of payments, 2003–14
(in million MAD) 129
4.5 Morocco’s position in the corruption index, 2000–14 130
4.6 Moroccan trade with Europe, France, Spain, 2001–14
(in million EUR) 140
PREFACE

The Arab Spring’s impact on political and economic developments across the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) was profound and unprecedented. More
than 9/11 and the 1991 Gulf War, it fundamentally challenged the balance of
power in domestic politics in most MENA countries as well as in regional relations.
In this revised and updated edition, I attempt to contribute to analysing these
changes in Morocco in which the monarchy appeared to have emerged strengthened
after a period of rapid reform in 2011.
In the last 20 years, academic interest in Morocco has significantly increased. For
Western students of the Arab world, Morocco has been more accessible than many
other Arab countries due to the prevalence of the French language in both oral and
written conversation. It has also been more open to the West than many of its
neighbours due to the importance of tourism as well as migration as a source of rev-
enue, and Morocco has consequently dropped many of its restrictions on academic
research. It has also become more dependent on foreign markets and transfers of
capital, especially from the European Union, and it has campaigned extensively to
attract foreign direct investment. Consequently, it has become a relatively open
country, often considered stable compared to its neighbours in the MENA region,
with which it shares a significant cultural heritage – most notably Islam and the Arabic
language. More than many other states in the region, it has been involved in an
extensive programme of political and economic reform, especially since Mohamed VI’s
accession to the throne in 1999, which even included sensitive questions of Islam
in the area of women’s rights. As these reforms have so far not touched upon the status
of the traditional King, many students of Middle East politics remain intrigued as to
how traditional rule in North Africa has been able to survive and reproduce itself.
Mostly due to its marginal status among the key players in MENA, far removed
from oil and gas resources, violent Islamism, inter-state and civil wars, and also due
to the traditional focus of French scholars on North Africa, English-language
monographs on Morocco are still rare, even if their number is growing. This book
aims to contribute to the growing volume of literature on Morocco by providing
an historical, political, economic and foreign policy analysis of the key questions
that the contemporary observer of Morocco faces.
The primary aims of this book are to link together the leading explanations
provided for how the Moroccan state and nation have been constructed around the
King following independence in 1956, and to produce an evaluation of the current
political and economic situation. Many of these explanations have been introduced
by Moroccan scholars in the last 30 years, and I attempt to do justice to the wealth
of specialised literature that is available, while making it accessible to a broader
readership. I believe that recent political and economic developments, which may
be viewed as a continuation of long-term trends, justify this approach. In addition,
I believe that the selection of themes adopted in this book renders justice to the
current political and economic status and the corresponding policy options available to
the country’s political elite.
Much of the content of this book is based on my teaching of North African
politics and international relations at Al Akhawayn University (AUI) in Morocco
from 2005 to 2008. I was very fortunate to be able to learn from class discussions
with Moroccan students in those years, which provided me as a foreigner with
invaluable insights in addition to the lived experience itself. I also benefited from
research material that Michael Willis prepared at AUI before my arrival, as well as
from the many discussions that I had with colleagues. A conference co-sponsored
by St Antony’s College, Oxford, and the Moroccan-British Friendship Society in
May 2008 at the University of Oxford on reforms in Morocco provided me with
some key ideas that also form the background to this book. Another conference,
organised by Roel Meijer and Nils Butenschon in Rabat in 2014, further encour-
aged me to reconsider questions of patronage and citizenship in Morocco post-
Arab Spring. I am deeply indebted to Kevin Grey, Julie Egan, Birute Richardson,
Tom Degeorges, Richard Gassan, as well as Mohamed Bouzidi, Michael Willis and
Driss Maghraoui, for having reviewed parts of the manuscript at various stages. I
am also grateful to the editors at Routledge as well as to the anonymous reviewers
for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts. Of course, for all mistakes, factual
or analytical, I alone bear full responsibility.
Finally, writing on North Africa where French and Arabic are equally often used
poses a particular problem. Many of the Arabic terms and names have become
anglicised or are otherwise widely used so that a translation into English seemed
unnecessary or even confusing. On the other hand, many French words, names
and acronyms have become so common in Morocco that it also makes sense to
keep these in an English text. However, for the sake of clarity I have tried to keep
these to a minimum, while I have used simplified Arabic transliteration to make
Arabic terms as accessible as possible to an English-speaking readership. Unfortu-
nately, the combination of Arabic transliteration, anglicised Arabic, French, and
English translations comes at the price of inconsistency, even if I attempted to be as
consistent as possible, especially with regard to names.
CHRONOLOGY

788–791 Idriss I, founder of the Idrissi dynasty


789 Foundation of the City of Fes
1073–1147 Almoravid dynasty
1147–1269 Almohad dynasty
1195–1465 Marinid dynasty
1472–1550 Wattasid dynasty
1509–1627 Saadi dynasty
1631–present Alawi dynasty
1777 Recognition of US independence
1786 US–Moroccan friendship agreement
1830 French occupation of Algiers
1844 Battle of Isly between French and Moroccan forces
1856 Anglo-Moroccan Treaty
1859 Moroccan–Spanish War
1861 Treaty of Madrid
1884 Spanish colonisation of Western Sahara
1906 Act of Algeciras
1907–08 ‘Hafidhian’ revolution
1912 Treaty of Fes establishing the French protectorate
1922 Declaration of the Rif republic by Abdelkrim
1926 Spanish defeat of Abdelkrim’s tribal forces
1927 Mohamed V becomes Sultan of Morocco
1933 End of ‘pacification’; the Ait Atta tribe surrenders to French forces
1942 Allied landing in Morocco and Algeria
1943 Churchill, Roosevelt and De Gaulle meet in Casablanca – Anfa
1944 Independence Manifesto (Istiqlal)
1947 Sultan Mohamed V visits Tangier in support of independence
Chronology xiii

1953 Forced abdication of Mohamed V


1954 Beginning of Algeria’s War of Independence
1955 Return of Mohamed V
1956 Morocco gains independence
1958 French–Spanish Operation Ecouvillon in south of Morocco,
defeating the Liberation Army of the South
1958 Rif rebellion
1960 Mohamed V and Crown Prince Hassan dismiss Socialist Ibrahim
government
1961 Death of Mohamed V; accession to throne of Hassan II
1962 First constitution adopted by referendum
1962 Algeria obtains independence
1963 Moroccan–Algerian Sand War
1965 Riots in Casablanca and suspension of Moroccan parliament
1965 Mehdi Ben Barka disappears in Paris
1970 Second constitution adopted by referendum
1971 First coup attempt in Skhirat
1972 Second coup attempt
1972 Third constitution adopted by referendum
1973 Foundation of Polisario
1974 Spanish census for independence in Western Sahara
1974 Abdessalam Yassine publishes pamphlet Islam ou la déluge
1975 International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on Western
Sahara
1975 Green March; Spanish-Moroccan-Mauritanian Tripartite Agreement
on Western Sahara
1976 War breaks out between Morocco and Polisario
1977 Parliamentary elections with participation of opposition parties
1981 Hassan II accepts referendum on self-determination in Western
Sahara at Nairobi summit of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU)
1982 Polisario is admitted to OAU; Morocco suspends its OAU
membership
1984 Parliamentary elections
1986 Spain and Portugal join the European Community (EC)
1987 Hassan II applies for EC membership
1987 Morocco joins the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)
1989 Treaty establishing the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) signed in
Marrakech
1990 Creation of Human Rights Advisory Council
1991 Morocco participates in the US-led liberation of Kuwait
1991 UN supervised ceasefire between Morocco and Polisario; start of
the UN referendum process
xiv Chronology

1992 Civil war in Algeria


1992 Fourth constitution adopted by referendum
1992–93 Parliamentary elections and first attempt at alternance
1994 Abderrahman Youssoufi goes into exile
1994 Morocco joins the World Trade Organization (WTO)
1995 Morocco signs Association Agreement with the European Union
1996 Fifth constitution adopted by referendum, creating lower and
upper chambers
1997 Parliamentary elections and formation of alternance government
under Abderrahman Youssoufi
1999 Hassan II dies; accession to the throne of Mohamed VI; dismissal
of Minister of the Interior Driss Basri
2000 Mass rallies in Rabat and Casablanca in favour of and against a
reform of the family code
2000 Abdessalam Yassine released from house arrest
2001 11 September attacks and US war in Afghanistan
2002 Creation of 10 per cent women’s list
2002 Parliamentary elections
2002 Appointment of Driss Jettou as prime minister
2003 US war in Iraq
2003 Islamist attacks in Casablanca
2003 Reform of the family code
2004 Signing of US–Moroccan free trade agreement
2005 Mohamed VI launches his projet de règne, the National Initiative for
Human Development
2005 Justice and Reconciliation Commission organises public hearings
on human rights violations under Hassan II
2007 Parliamentary elections
2007 Appointment of Abbas El Fassi as prime minister and Istiqlal-led
government
2008 Creation of Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM)
2011 Country-wide protests for constitutional reform
2011 Drafting and adoption by referendum of sixth constitution
2011 Parliamentary elections
2011 Appointment of Abdelilah Benkirane as prime minister and Justice
and Development Party (PJD)-led government
2014 Morocco joins attacks on ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria)
2015 Morocco joins Saudi-led attacks on Houthi rebels in Yemen
ABBREVIATIONS

AIU Alliance Israélite Universelle


ALN National Liberation Army (Algeria)
AMDF Moroccan Association for Women’s Rights
AMDH Moroccan Association for Human Rights
BMCE Banque Marocaine de Commerce Exterieur
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CCDH Advisory Council for Human Rights
CDT Democratic Labour Confederation
CGEM General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprise
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIH Crédit Immobilier et Hôtelier
CMA Global Amazigh Committee
CNSS Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale
CORCAS Royal Advisory Council for Sahrawi Affairs
EC European Community
EEC European Economic Community
EMP Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ETU twenty-foot equivalent
EU European Union
FAR Royal Armed Forces
FDI foreign direct investment
FLN National Liberation Front (Algeria)
FTA free trade agreement
FVJ Truth and Justice Forum
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP gross domestic product
xvi Abbreviations

GNP gross national product


GSM Global System for Mobile communication
GUP Groupement Urbain de Securité
HACA High Authority for Audiovisual Communication
HCP High Planning Commission
IAM Maroc Telecom
ICJ International Court of Justice
IER Justice and Reconciliation Commission
IMF International Monetary Fund
INDH National Initiative for Human Development
IRCAM Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture
ISI import substitution industrialisation
ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
LMDH Moroccan League for Human Rights
MAD Moroccan dirham
MEDA mésures d’ajustements
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MEPI Middle East Partnership Initiative
MINURSO United Nations Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara
MP Popular Movement
MPDC Democratic and Constitutional Popular Movement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO non-governmental organisation
OAU Organization of African Unity (now the African Union)
OCP Office Chérifien des Phosphates
OCRS Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes
OMDH Moroccan Organization for Human Rights
ONA Omnium Nord Africain (Western Sahara)
PADS Party of Democratic Vanguard and Socialism
PAM Authenticity and Modernity Party
PDS Democratic and Socialist Party
PJD Justice and Development Party
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
Polisario Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro
(Western Sahara)
PPS Party of Progress and Socialism
RAM Royal Air Maroc
RNI National Union of Independents
SADR Saharan Arab Democratic Republic
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme
SNI Société Nationale d’Investissement
UAF Feminine Action Union
UC Constitutional Union
UMA Arab Maghreb Union
Abbreviations xvii

UMT Moroccan Labour Union


UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEM National Union of Moroccan Students
UNFM National Union of Moroccan Women
UNFP National Union of Popular Forces
USFP Socialist Union of Popular Forces
WTO World Trade Organization
This page intentionally left blank
1
INTRODUCTION

Less than a year after the Arab Spring rocked the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region in January 2011, the Moroccan monarchy concluded an unpre-
cedented process of political reform. Pressured by country-wide protests in which
tens of thousands of Moroccans called for a constitutional monarchy and increased
rule of law, King Mohamed VI engaged in a constitutional process that resulted in
a new constitution. More than that, the monarch held parliamentary elections and
formed a new, Islamist-dominated government, which reflected a significant par-
liamentary majority of the Justice and Development Party (PJD – Hizb al ’Adala
wal Tamniyya), and even included Islamists in key positions, such as the premiership
and the minister of justice.
There are several reasons why the events of 2011 marked such a radical change
from Moroccan politics of less than a generation before. Not only did country-
wide protests in favour of increased rule of law occur – protests that were
unthinkable 15 years earlier – but even more radically, the protestors demanded
constitutional reforms. Moreover, the events led to the election of a legal Islamist
party into government, which continues to dominate. Until 2011, domestic protests
had primarily focused on graduate unemployment, gender questions and, occa-
sionally, large, country-wide public demonstrations focused on the various foreign
wars in Iraq and Israel/Palestine. Clearly, the Morocco of the mid-2010s, both
politically and socially, had changed radically from that of the mid-1990s, when,
for example, Amazigh (Berber) rights militants were arrested in Goulmima and
sentenced to one to two years’ imprisonment for displaying pamphlets in their
native language Tamazight.
Seen from the outside, the Moroccan political system remains one of stability
and longevity. For six decades, the Moroccan political system based on the supre-
macy of the monarch has continued to exercise its hegemony over other political
forces. It has done so because of its ability to adapt to social changes, identify
2 Introduction

challenges to its integrity, integrate these in the political scene through co-optation
and alliance building, and create a multitude of allied classes.1 This has caused
apparently ‘modern’ political features and the establishment of quasi-modern soci-
etal characteristics. While the system thereby created seems well entrenched and
stable on first sight, the absence of effective measures of inclusion of marginalised
groups has created a fundamental dilemma and has continued to produce challengers
to the status quo, culminating in the 2011 protests.
The central theme of this book concerns tradition and modernity as two core
features in contemporary Moroccan politics. While traditional features of govern-
ment have been omnipresent since independence was achieved in March 1956, the
most remarkable characteristic has been their co-existence with seemingly ‘modern’
features such as parliaments, elections, referendums, inclusion of political parties,
and constitutions, which gave the political system a cloak of modern institutional
practice. Modernity as used in this book refers to a process that Max Weber called
rationalisation, and it is closely connected to the rise of administrative institutions
such as a modern bureaucracy that claim legal-rational legitimacy concerned with
means-end efficiency and policy implementation.2 Tradition, from a Weberian
perspective, is the opposite realm – that of magic where the legitimacy of the ruler
is based on primordial links, which may result in assumed leadership qualities or
social and political privileges due to ancestry and blood ties. The combination of
both realms and their intertwined character have had important repercussions on
contemporary Moroccan politics. The monarchy and the political elite that it co-
opts and controls has been in control of a modern state apparatus, which has
resulted in the absence of any formal separation between the administration and the
monarchical family including the network through which it rules.3
The peculiarity of Morocco lies in what Anderson calls key virtues that are
embodied in monarchical traditional leadership styles and that make monarchs
particularly adaptable to the early phases of state and nation building. This is
because these phases are marked by exceptional uncertainty as to the continuing
existence of old privileges and the ambiguous co-existence of new rights and pro-
cedures.4 It can be argued that, in such times of exceptional uncertainty, persona-
lised leadership qualities are more successful than bureaucratic ones in imposing
themselves and in gaining acceptance. In contrast to nationalist movements, mon-
archs do not attempt to impose a particular vision of one nation that may be con-
tentious. Instead, they create a larger definition of the nation that is inclusive and in
which no particular feature gains prominence over others. This has been at the
core of Morocco’s post-independence political ‘pluralism’, in which competing
political parties apparently justify and reinforce the King’s role as an arbiter, in an
otherwise unstable political field. This is despite the existence of a modernist cur-
rent in Morocco’s nationalist movement, which attempted to undermine the
traditional basis of rule that did not correspond to its worldview and interests.
The Moroccan monarchy has undergone a vast political reform programme to
give its traditional rule the cloak of legal-rational legitimacy and policies. After
independence in 1956, political and economic reforms aimed at establishing the
Introduction 3

monarch’s supremacy, often through political and economic patron–client rela-


tions, without, however, ignoring modern political institutions. Rising levels of
education, a strong nationalist movement that used Mohamed V as a symbol for
independence, and strong French influence well established in 44 years of French
colonial rule, all supported the establishment of Western political institutions, such
as a parliament or political parties. Nevertheless, the ruling family’s claim to power
is primarily based on a combination of tradition, lineage and religion: the Alawi
family’s traditional rule since the seventeenth century; the Alawis’ claimed descent
from the Prophet Mohamed; and the Moroccan monarch’s supreme religious role
as Commander of the Faithful, Amir Al Mu’minin. More than this, in a diverse
linguistic and cultural society, this means that the monarchy embodies what Entelis
called Morocco’s Muslim consensus: Arabism, Islam and Moroccan nationalism.5
This book aims to analyse the inherent difficulties that have resulted from the
political projects of tradition and modernity, of which the result has been a mod-
ernisation of traditional rule. Even if the Moroccan monarch has been a cautious
moderniser, social mobility and the decreasing importance of traditional sources of
identity have meant the development of both class-based and religious challengers
to the regime. With economic development together with success in the Western
Sahara becoming a priority throughout the state-building process, much of the
regime’s legitimacy has ceased to be exclusively based on religion and history, but
rather on performance. To the extent that political structures and outcomes
mutually depend on each other, it is the aim of this book to show that the political
imperative of sustaining traditional authoritarianism has undermined the perfor-
mance-related sources of legitimacy. This does not mean that the ‘King’s
Dilemma’, famously coined by Samuel Huntington in the 1960s, is being played
out in full.6 The purpose of this book is not simply to assert that modernisation
undermines traditional rule, nor to view monarchies’ tendencies to conserve the
status quo and their adaptation to political pressure by liberalising the political field,
as a simple survival strategy. Rather, the continuing ability of the state to use tra-
dition has been a reflection of existing political ideologies, structures and social
conflicts. This, however, has created inherent problems of state legitimacy as once
hegemonic structures and ideologies are subject to conflicts and ultimately change.
It is the purpose of this book to illustrate how these conflicts have evolved
over the last 50 years.

1.1 Historical roots: the Alawi monarchy


Continuity is one of the kingdom’s main political objectives due to the long legacy
of its existence predating colonial rule by more than one millennium. The Mor-
occan monarchy is one of the oldest in the world, dating back to the eighth cen-
tury when Moulay Idriss, a descendant from the Prophet Mohamed, found refuge
in the hills around today’s Meknes and founded what was to become the first
Moroccan Muslim dynasty: the Idrissi dynasty. Ever since, Moroccan sultans’
power has concentrated in the cities that were often used as capitals by new
4 Introduction

dynasties, such as Fes, Meknes and Marrakech. In turn, much of the mountainous
countryside remained outside direct control. Here, mainly Amazigh tribes con-
stituted what French ethnographers would later call bled es siba, unruly tribal society
that the Sultan’s power would not reach, with the implication of taxes not being
collected. In areas under the Sultan’s control, named bled el makhzen, taxes were
paid. The Arabic word makhzen, which became synonymous for state, has a
financial connotation and means ‘treasurer’.
The current Alawi dynasty dates from the seventeenth century. The Alawi kin-
ship group has its geographical roots in the Tafilalet oasis in the south-east of
Morocco, near today’s Algeria. After a period of civil strife after the Saadi dynasty
with its capital Marrakech went into decline, the Alawis consolidated their grip on
power in 1668 when Moulay Rachid destroyed a rival tribal formation, the
zawiyya of el Dila. His successor, Ismail I, installed the first capital of the Alawis in
Meknes and consolidated Alawi power through the use of a largely black slave
army.
The consolidation of power of the early Alawi dynasty went hand in hand with
growing external relations with France and Great Britain, commercial treaties
allowing both powers freedom of movement and protection of their commercial
goods and products. At the same time, Alawi consolidation of power meant
increasing attempts at forcing back Portuguese and Spanish positions on the African
continent (El Jadida, Sebta, Melilla, Peñon, Althusemas), which had been captured
by the Europeans in the previous two centuries when dynasties were comparatively
weak. However, power struggles within the Alawi family also led to periods of
unrest (1727–57). Increased European firepower forced Morocco to accept France’s
colonial ambitions in neighbouring Algeria (1830), when France and Britain fought
for control in the Mediterranean. It was under Moulay Abderrahman (1822–59),
when the Sultan’s army suffered a major defeat at Isly in 1844 against French
forces, that France was able to affirm its control over Algeria. Spanish colonial
ambitions resulted in the battle of Tetouan in 1860 under Moulay Abderrahman’s
son, Moulay Mohamed Ben Abderrahman (1859–73), forcing Morocco to give in
to Spanish territorial demands around Ceuta and Melilla, and Sidi Ifni (Santa Cruz
la Pequeña).7 The military defeat also forced Moulay Mohamed to accept pre-
ferential commercial treaties with Spain, recognition of Spanish property rights, as
well as granting Spain preferential fishing rights off the Moroccan coast.8
Clearly, the sultanate’s increasing incapacity to resist colonial pressure under-
mined the Sultan’s combination of traditional and religious legitimacy. When
Moulay Abdelaziz found it impossible to resist the French occupation of Casa-
blanca and Oujda, in addition to the Act of Algeciras of 1906, which confirmed
the French presence in Morocco, parts of the Moroccan ’ulema decided to impose
a contractual relation between the Moroccan ’umma and the Sultan. Consequently,
Moulay Abdelaziz was deposed in a declaration of leading ’ulema in Fes, and
replaced by Moulay Hafidh, who was forced to vow to liberate the country from
the French invaders. This vow became part of the ’ulema’s act of allegiance to the
new Sultan, bay’a, and it instituted a contractual relationship between the temporal
Introduction 5

powers of the Sultan and the ’ulema, in the context of increasing commercial,
territorial, religious and cultural threats to which Morocco was exposed.
Despite Hafidh’s incapacity to resist French ambitions to impose a protectorate
on the sultanate, the crown itself, combined with the Muslim faith, continued to
be the symbol for national independence and resistance. A major challenge to the
monarchy’s role was Abdelkrim’s declaration of an independent Rif republic in
1922, in the north with Oujda as its capital, indirectly rejecting the authority of the
Sultan. The ultimate defeat of the tribal alliance of which Abdelkrim was the leader
against French and Spanish forces in 1926 was as much in the interests of the
monarchy as in those of the colonial powers: it challenged the monarchy’s position
as defender of both Islam and Morocco’s territorial integrity based on the Sultan’s
religious and temporal authority over his subjects. Had Abdelkrim become the
leader of a successful anti-French liberation movement, according to Riffians’ own
slogan ‘from Oujda to Agadir’, the clash with the monarchy would have been
serious.
The colonial experience profoundly transformed the monarchy: security, foreign
relations, economic policy were controlled by colonial administrators, the General
Residency. In addition to cultural penetration of a large settler community, all of
this meant that the monarchy was deprived of its vital functions to exercise power.
Its close association with the colonial state, which officially aimed at ‘protecting’
the monarchy, was potentially threatening as a nationalist movement soon took
root, first abroad and, from the early 1930s, inside the protectorate.9 Conversely,
seeking nationalist credentials potentially alienated the French military administra-
tion, and France had the means to impose a new sultan on the country. Moulay
Yousouf was replaced shortly after the military administrator Hubert Lyautey
arrived in 1912. At the same time, the French colonial practice in Morocco –
especially under Lyautey – was based on the principle of not changing the tradi-
tional practices, working ‘with, not against, native socio-political elites and respect[ing]
pre-colonial customs and traditions’.10 The ensuing alliance consisting of sultanate
and Residency put the traditional sources of power and its administration at the
disposal of the French. This had the potential to seriously de-legitimise the mon-
archy in the eyes of the nationalist movement and the Islamic reform movement
(salafiyya) that it inspired. It was not until April 1947 that Sultan Mohamed publicly
announced his favour for independence following his historic visit to Tangier,
believing in US support for Moroccan independence.11 This act, along with his
increasing confrontation with the Residency, and the increasingly outspoken
nationalist movement’s choice to elevate Sultan Mohamed as a symbol of Mor-
occan sovereignty, enhanced his prestige as a sign of continuity of the Moroccan
state.

1.2 Islam
Islam is the main source of legitimacy of the Moroccan monarch, who claims direct
descent from the Prophet Mohamed. This confers sherifian status on the royal
6 Introduction

family, one of the bases for his calling himself Amir Al Mu’minin inscribed in the
constitution. In fact, Mohamed V assumed the title of King, malik, in 1957 only to
correspond to more Western notions of kingdoms, not because there had been a
tradition in Morocco itself. Sherifian status alone, however, is quite common in
Morocco, establishing a class of ashraf citizens with particular religious prestige.
These sherifian families were often appointed in the bureaucracy and given local
powers – traditionally constituting the ‘agents of the Makhzen’.12 The title itself,
Amir Al Mu’minin, was introduced in the Almohad period (1145–1269), and
competed with the title Amir Al Muslimin that was conferred by the caliphate in
Baghdad. Even if only two preceding dynasties claimed sherifian credentials and
used it to legitimise their rule, the Saadians and the Idrissis, ‘sharifism [still] pre-
sented itself as a veritable catalyst for the legitimacy of all those who aspired
power’, as illustrated in the writings of Muslim jurists such as Qadi ’Iyad under the
Almoravids.13
Islamic references therefore find their way into everyday political speeches and
policies. The most important one is the act of allegiance, the bay’a, in which, tra-
ditionally, the ’ulema and, since independence, political, military, tribal and tech-
nocratic establishment vow allegiance to the throne. Whereas it did not receive a
lot of attention in the first 15 years of Hassan’s rule, it gained importance from the
bay’a of Layoune in 1979 in Western Sahara, when Sahrawi tribal notables
performed this ‘act’ as a sign of their attachment to the Moroccan throne.
The importance of the bay’a relates to the legitimacy it confers on the King’s
title Amir Al Mu’minin, which makes the King effectively stand above constitu-
tional constraints and the division of state powers into legislative, executive and
judicial institutions. The official interpretation of the bay’a was published in the
Bulletin Officiel of 20 September 1979. In short, it confers divine powers on the
King: ‘the holder of the legitimate authority is God’s shadow on earth and his
secular arm in the world.’14
In addition to these formal constitutional powers accorded to the King, popular
Islam and its belief in symbolic and expressive forms of power are also associated
with the King. The concept of baraka (blessing), with which sherifian families are
endowed, forms a crucial aspect by which magic is transferred from one generation
to another.15 The King has been careful to be associated with these traditional
Moroccan forms of Islam, for example by traditional dress codes (a white jellaba
during the annual ceremony of bay’a and La Fête du Trône), or by wearing certain
jewellery that is strongly associated to Moroccan sufism. On the other hand,
another form of baraka is acquired, not inherited, and is based on purity (tahara)
which is based on this-worldly conduct and can be lost.16 This means that Mor-
occans’ belief in baraka confers legitimacy on sherifian families to rule; however, it
also scrutinises their conduct and public behaviour to the extent that the Moroccan
monarch has been very careful to control public images of himself and of his
family.
The monarch’s Islamic credentials have imposed significant policy orientations in
the conduct of state affairs. The ’ulema have been given a privileged position in the
Introduction 7

policy-making process: the League of Moroccan ’Ulema is regularly given the


opportunity to advise the King on legislation. Morocco’s conservative family laws,
the privileged position of Islam and Arabic in school curricula, as well as the
reference to political institutions in Islamic terms, are all important features. The
parliament is a shura council – an Islamic advisory body. The links of ancestry to
the Prophet Mohamed are frequently evoked, as for example during the opening
of the parliament in October 1984, when the King addressed the deputies as
receiving their political education in the school of Hassan II (the parliament),
which is the same as the school of Mohamed V, his father, and that of the Prophet
Mohamed.17

1.3 Political parties


Political parties in Morocco have a long history, as the nationalist movement was
organised around the Istiqlal (independence) Party from the late 1930s. In the
1950s, trade unions and the Liberation Army formed part of a country-wide
movement for independence. Despite strong ideological differences within the
Istiqlal Party, ranging from conservative leader Allal El Fassi, pragmatist leader
Abderrahim Bouabid, to leftist Mehdi Ben Barka, the Istiqlal made a clear bid to
single-party status in the immediate post-independence period, posing a threat to
the claims of the monarchy to absolute power. Educated in France and familiar
with Western institutions, the Istiqlal leadership’s relationship with the monarchy
was ambivalent: on the one hand, the monarch’s sovereign powers were used as a
symbol of Moroccan sovereignty that the protectorate in its treaty of 1912 pro-
mised to guarantee and ultimately re-establish. On the other hand, visions of a
constitutional monarchy meant that it was seeking power itself to govern the
country, with the aim of delegating to the King a symbolic function only. The
famous Independence Manifesto of 11 January 1944 reflected this ambivalent
approach. It made four central demands: an independent Morocco under
Mohamed V; Mohamed V should negotiate independence; Morocco should sign
the Atlantic Charter and take part in the peace conference; as well as the estab-
lishment of a ‘democratic government’.18 The word ‘constitutional monarchy’ did
not appear in the document itself. The document only required the King to
establish a democratic regime ‘similar to the form of government adopted in the
Muslim countries of the Orient’, and a ‘consultative (shura)’ regime in the Arabic
version of the manifesto.19
Shortly after independence, the different currents that had been united within
the Istiqlal Party split up. Probably the most important question that caused this
break-up was the relationship that the Istiqlal wanted to establish with the mon-
archy. As the King had a guiding hand in promoting individual leaders to minis-
terial positions, he could promote particular political currents that leaders
presented. Consequently, through frequent ministerial reshuffles shortly after
independence, he could ensure that nationalist politicians would not accumulate
too much power that would threaten the monarchy.20
8 Introduction

In addition to playing on divisions in the nationalist movement, the monarchy


managed to create new ones outside the movement’s core reach that was limited to
urban areas. This was due to the uneven nature of development and modernisation
that had marked colonial rule. Essentially, as Camau points out, ‘because of its
configuration in terms of social stratification, [the nationalist movement] was not
able to produce a project, which went beyond the aim of nationalising the colonial
state’.21 In addition, social fragmentation according to primordial tribal, regional,
linguistic and ethnic links became the primary mode by which the national
movement disintegrated into competing factions.
Consequently, in post-colonial Morocco the makhzen was kept in place and
continued to be the main administrative structure of policy making and imple-
mentation. Despite the Sultan’s association with colonial rule, he managed to
become the symbol of national independence himself in an otherwise fragmented
society. The Liberation Army, with a largely rural intake, had an opposite political
orientation to the more modern elements within the Istiqlal Party. As mentioned,
the Istiqlal Party itself was also divided between more radical and leftist leaders such
as Abdallah Ibrahim and Mehdi Ben Barka, and its more conservative wing around
Allal El Fassi and Ahmed Belafrej. In addition, the army and its officer class were
alienated by the Istiqlal’s repeated accusations that it had collaborated with the
French – especially as key positions in the army were still filled by the French that
were only slowly dismantled. The Istiqlal’s attempts at centralising power to its
own advantage – new appointments of Istiqlali judges, governors, key positions in
the police and the Ministry of the Interior – were resisted by rural and more con-
servative elements that did not trust the urban-based Arab nationalist ideology of
the party.22 Mahjoubi Aherdane, a former leading Amazigh figure in the Liberation
Army, strongly resisted Istiqlal’s increasing power in the countryside and became
the main intermediary when the Liberation Army staged an uprising against the
Istiqlal. Consequently, King Mohamed V and Crown Prince Hassan encouraged
the creation of an Amazigh rural party, the Popular Movement (MP), which
gained numerous ministerial portfolios thanks to Aherdane’s position of loyalty to
the monarchy.23
It was not only the monarchy’s position that encouraged the divisions within
political parties and the creation of new ones, but also the elite’s neo-patrimonial
practices that structure Moroccan society. In a context in which Morocco was still
in a process of nation building, primordial links and loyalties were more important
than modern ones, based on ideologies or national myths. The result was that lea-
ders of political parties became central figures that gave patronage to their fellow-
ship in return for loyalty and political power. Aherdane’s MP is a case in point.
Established in the 1950s as a rural, conservative counter-movement to the urban-
based Istiqlal, its sole ideology was the support of the King. In return, it was active
in key policies such as the privileged position that agriculture obtained through
preferential credits and state banks such as Crédit Agricole du Maroc or through
government programmes such as the Office National des Irrigations and the Office
de la Mise en Valeur Agricole. The distribution of former French land fulfilled a
Introduction 9

special role in the distribution of patronage. Some 600,000 acres were directly
distributed to rank and file members of the MP, but more importantly ‘collective
lands’ that belonged collectively to the tribes (15 million acres, of which 2.5 mil-
lion are used in agriculture) were ‘managed’ by the Ministry of the Interior
through turning them into a ‘trusteeship’.24 Control over these trusteeships was
therefore achieved through party membership in the MP – the main incentive of
joining the MP. Consequently, political parties increasingly appeared as interlinking
organisations between local strongmen and economic opportunities. ‘Recruitment
drives by most parties consist not of public appeals to ordinary citizens but of the
co-opting of notables and leaders from a local area or community into the party in
the expectation that these figures will be able to “deliver” the support and votes of
their local area or community.’25
This illustrates one central aspect among political parties in modern Morocco.
Although a multi-party system was introduced by the monarchy as it fought Istiq-
lal’s attempts at turning itself into a single party, and Morocco has a great quantity
of new and old political parties, the majority is without ideological or political
content despite apparent political names that indicate the contrary. A splinter party
from the Istiqlal Party, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) has little
socialist content; the National Union of Independents (RNI) was founded by a
relative of the royal family (King Hassan’s brother-in-law, Ahmed Osman) and it is
‘independent’ only in its original meaning – from other political parties. The
Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), created in 2009 by the King’s closest
friend and adviser, Fouad Ali El Himma, avoids any ideological references alto-
gether. The above mentioned Popular Movement (MP) has been based on rural
notables and their traditional capacity to make peasants vote for their strongmen.
Neo-patrimonial practices are very strongly embedded in these political parties,
which look for rapprochement with the centre of power, the monarchy, despite
occasional repetition that it is democracy that is actually sought. This also applies to
political parties that used to be in opposition to King Hassan. As it was rightly
coined, these political parties (USFP, Istiqlal, the Party of Progress and Socialism –
PPS) were, when in opposition, the opposition of His Majesty, and not to His
Majesty. This is why they seem to adopt a language of change for greater partici-
pation and power sharing, while ultimately being a conservative force due to the
existence of strong patron–client relations that make it easy for the monarch to co-
opt their leaders. In return, leaders use their patronage to make sure that little
dissent emanates from party congresses, which only rarely take place, with key
positions being attributed by the party leadership to loyal elements.
At the same time, these political parties face increasing problems of legitimacy.
One indicator has been the decreasing participation rate of the population in
national and municipal elections; another is the difficulty of attracting younger
generations in these political parties.26 Change therefore has been on the agenda
for a number of years – especially with the advent of Mohamed VI – to address
these difficulties lest they are out-paced by a stronger and more dynamic Islamist
party that established itself in the late 1990s, the Justice and Development Party
10 Introduction

(PJD). Ironically, the foundation of the PAM, whilst expressing the system’s dys-
functionality, also aimed to include the younger generations and political new-
comers into the political system and counter the increasing hegemony of the
ideologically powerful Islamist parties.

1.4 Elite politics


One under-analysed aspect of Moroccan politics is the relationship between wealth
creation and politics, even if corruption itself has been the focus of much domestic
attention. The dynamics of the relationship between wealthy classes and politics,
however, is a very interesting one, especially as, unlike some of its neighbours in
North Africa and the Middle East, Morocco never officially aspired to create a
socialist economy based on state-led growth and development. This means that
Morocco never tried to forcefully replace the private sector with state enterprises.
‘Morocco has chosen the path of liberalism [and] … we will serve as an example in
this regard to all of Africa’, announced Finance Minister Mamoun Tahiri at a
conference sponsored by the World Bank in the late 1960s.27 In addition, Mor-
occo never broke with the colonial past concerning its agricultural developments:
expensive plans to construct dams (la politique des barrages) in order to irrigate 1
million hectares of arable land by 2000 were French ideas that dated from 1938. A
laissez-faire policy in the countryside was in effect the monarchy’s response to
opposition emanating from the urban-based Istiqlal Party in the late 1950s and
1960s.
The rural elite was not the only constituent of Morocco’s political-economic
elite. Economic development and increasing intervention of the state in the econ-
omy despite its allegedly liberal character resulted in some 700 state-owned enter-
prises by the late 1970s in which much of a state-dependent urban elite was
employed. Privatisation processes that ensued often constituted another form of
state patronage that the dependent elite enjoyed. In addition to being the country’s
largest landowner, King Hassan himself became the country’s main businessman.
His majority share in Morocco’s most important financial holding, Omnium Nord
Africain (ONA), which owned shares in more than 50 of Morocco’s main private
businesses, multiplied the many sources of patronage.
The result is a common trajectory of government ministers from state-owned or
supposedly private enterprises to government positions, emanating from an eco-
nomic elite that, even if apparently independent, owes its existence to royal
patronage and opportunities that result from lucrative state contracts. This eco-
nomic elite had its origin in Fassi families, originating from the city of Fes. Allal El
Fassi, head of the independence movement, was also a member of one of these
leading merchant families. The traditional combination of public office (makhzen),
religious sherifian background and wealth creation was all illustrated in the back-
ground of Fassis: its administrative position and its membership in the ’ulema of Fes
had been inherited since the mid-seventeenth century.28
Introduction 11

One of the Moroccan elite’s major characteristics is that it has taken advantage of
policies under Hassan II. Construction, transport, international trade, food proces-
sing, most of the post-colonial elite sprang up from the pre-colonial Fassi families,
with names such as Tazi, Benslimane, Bensouda and Berrada dominating this post-
colonial bourgeoisie. A survey of top businessmen in 1965 revealed that Fassis
constituted almost two thirds of this group. In agriculture, French farmers left
behind some 1 million acres (400,000 hectares) of prime agricultural land, which,
along with buildings, were purchased at very cheap rates. Those rural notables
already empowered both by the colonial power and then by the kingdom were
those who were able to benefit from these lucrative deals – prominent families
were the Nejjai, Bekkai, Gueddari and Kebbaj.29
Together with Moroccanisation in the 1970s, which empowered a new aspiring
class of Soussi businessmen – originating from the south, especially from Agadir –
these measures had the effect of increasing income and corresponding lifestyle dis-
parities among Moroccans. In two household consumption surveys conducted in
1965 and 1971, respectively, the share of overall consumption of the wealthiest 10
per cent increased dramatically, whereas the share of others, and in particular the
poor, declined.30 Up to now, this disparity has increased sharply, creating an eco-
nomically dependent and allied class to the state that has difficulties in emancipating
itself from the centre, as it is alienated from its fellow citizens in terms of lifestyle,
education, language and professional future.
This has had serious results for the development of a socio-economic opposition
to the state and its allied classes. Excluded strata informed strong socialist groups up
to the late 1970s, such as King Hassan’s main rival in the 1960s, Mehdi Ben Barka,
and more recently Islamic groups. Essentially, an ‘alliance for profit’ that is embo-
died by the state and wealthy strata has been challenged with reference to Islamic
social justice.31 Clearly, both Morocco’s ‘official’ Islamic party – the PJD – and its
‘unofficial’ Islamic opposition party Justice and Benevolence (Al ’Adl wal Ihssane)
have made the existing income disparities a central theme in their political pro-
grammes, as is already indicated in the names that they have chosen. The trauma-
tising Islamist attacks of 16 May 2003 in Casablanca also targeted symbols of
wealth, not power, and the origins of the actors – from one of Casablanca’s most
impoverished shanty towns – indicate the fragile political basis that income
disparity creates.
Consequently, the balance between modernity and tradition on which the post-
independence Moroccan monarchy has been founded is a fragile one. The
increasing number of debates about principles of modern parliamentary institutions,
political parties and constitutionalism weaken the traditional powers that the King
enjoys. On the other hand, modern lifestyles and mass education not only chal-
lenge monarchical traditions, but also create expectations about levels of comfort
and the potential for social mobility that only a small restricted minority enjoys. It
is this experienced exclusion that has accompanied Morocco’s post-independence
development, which is the primary threat to liberal lifestyles that co-exist with
conservative social and political practices.
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