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MOROCCO
The first edition of Morocco was published one year before the mass protests of the
Arab Spring rocked the Moroccan state. Post-Arab Spring, the country has a new
constitution and government, but the state remains uncompromising on any true
reform of the monarchy’s claims to power.
This new edition provides an introductory overview of the history, con-
temporary politics, economy, and international relations in Morocco and offers an
examination of the challenges to tradition and modernity in the post-colonial state.
It has been revised and updated to include analysis of the country’s evolving poli-
tics in the years following the Arab Spring, and the consequences this has had for
the country’s traditional monarchy. It pays particular attention to the new con-
stitution, the policies of the new Islamist-led government, and it includes an analysis of
Morocco’s foreign policy in the post-Arab Spring regional context.
Easily accessible to non-specialists, practitioners, and upper-level undergraduate
students, the book will be essential reading for those working in the fields of North
African studies, International Relations and Middle East studies.
James N. Sater
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Second edition published 2016
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2016 James N. Sater
The right of James N. Sater to be identified as author of this work has been
asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the
publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered
trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to
infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested.
Typeset in Bembo
by Taylor & Francis Books
To my family
This page intentionally left blank
CONTENTS
List of illustrations ix
Preface x
Chronology xii
Abbreviations xv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Historical roots: the Alawi monarchy 3
1.2 Islam 5
1.3 Political parties 7
1.4 Elite politics 10
1.5 Responding to challenges: regime strength and political liberalisation 12
1.6 Plan of the book 14
6 Conclusion 179
Glossary 182
Bibliography 184
Index 195
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figures
1.1 Political liberalisation and strength and weakness of the state 13
4.1 GDP growth and agricultural growth, 1961–2003 127
Tables
3.1 Voter turnout in elections to the lower house, 1977–2011 101
4.1 Illiteracy rates by gender and region (adults and children over
ten years old), 1960–2004 (%) 123
4.2 Infant mortality rate, 1962–2004 (per thousand births) 124
4.3 Population living in poverty (%) 126
4.4 Remittances and balance of payments, 2003–14
(in million MAD) 129
4.5 Morocco’s position in the corruption index, 2000–14 130
4.6 Moroccan trade with Europe, France, Spain, 2001–14
(in million EUR) 140
PREFACE
The Arab Spring’s impact on political and economic developments across the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) was profound and unprecedented. More
than 9/11 and the 1991 Gulf War, it fundamentally challenged the balance of
power in domestic politics in most MENA countries as well as in regional relations.
In this revised and updated edition, I attempt to contribute to analysing these
changes in Morocco in which the monarchy appeared to have emerged strengthened
after a period of rapid reform in 2011.
In the last 20 years, academic interest in Morocco has significantly increased. For
Western students of the Arab world, Morocco has been more accessible than many
other Arab countries due to the prevalence of the French language in both oral and
written conversation. It has also been more open to the West than many of its
neighbours due to the importance of tourism as well as migration as a source of rev-
enue, and Morocco has consequently dropped many of its restrictions on academic
research. It has also become more dependent on foreign markets and transfers of
capital, especially from the European Union, and it has campaigned extensively to
attract foreign direct investment. Consequently, it has become a relatively open
country, often considered stable compared to its neighbours in the MENA region,
with which it shares a significant cultural heritage – most notably Islam and the Arabic
language. More than many other states in the region, it has been involved in an
extensive programme of political and economic reform, especially since Mohamed VI’s
accession to the throne in 1999, which even included sensitive questions of Islam
in the area of women’s rights. As these reforms have so far not touched upon the status
of the traditional King, many students of Middle East politics remain intrigued as to
how traditional rule in North Africa has been able to survive and reproduce itself.
Mostly due to its marginal status among the key players in MENA, far removed
from oil and gas resources, violent Islamism, inter-state and civil wars, and also due
to the traditional focus of French scholars on North Africa, English-language
monographs on Morocco are still rare, even if their number is growing. This book
aims to contribute to the growing volume of literature on Morocco by providing
an historical, political, economic and foreign policy analysis of the key questions
that the contemporary observer of Morocco faces.
The primary aims of this book are to link together the leading explanations
provided for how the Moroccan state and nation have been constructed around the
King following independence in 1956, and to produce an evaluation of the current
political and economic situation. Many of these explanations have been introduced
by Moroccan scholars in the last 30 years, and I attempt to do justice to the wealth
of specialised literature that is available, while making it accessible to a broader
readership. I believe that recent political and economic developments, which may
be viewed as a continuation of long-term trends, justify this approach. In addition,
I believe that the selection of themes adopted in this book renders justice to the
current political and economic status and the corresponding policy options available to
the country’s political elite.
Much of the content of this book is based on my teaching of North African
politics and international relations at Al Akhawayn University (AUI) in Morocco
from 2005 to 2008. I was very fortunate to be able to learn from class discussions
with Moroccan students in those years, which provided me as a foreigner with
invaluable insights in addition to the lived experience itself. I also benefited from
research material that Michael Willis prepared at AUI before my arrival, as well as
from the many discussions that I had with colleagues. A conference co-sponsored
by St Antony’s College, Oxford, and the Moroccan-British Friendship Society in
May 2008 at the University of Oxford on reforms in Morocco provided me with
some key ideas that also form the background to this book. Another conference,
organised by Roel Meijer and Nils Butenschon in Rabat in 2014, further encour-
aged me to reconsider questions of patronage and citizenship in Morocco post-
Arab Spring. I am deeply indebted to Kevin Grey, Julie Egan, Birute Richardson,
Tom Degeorges, Richard Gassan, as well as Mohamed Bouzidi, Michael Willis and
Driss Maghraoui, for having reviewed parts of the manuscript at various stages. I
am also grateful to the editors at Routledge as well as to the anonymous reviewers
for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts. Of course, for all mistakes, factual
or analytical, I alone bear full responsibility.
Finally, writing on North Africa where French and Arabic are equally often used
poses a particular problem. Many of the Arabic terms and names have become
anglicised or are otherwise widely used so that a translation into English seemed
unnecessary or even confusing. On the other hand, many French words, names
and acronyms have become so common in Morocco that it also makes sense to
keep these in an English text. However, for the sake of clarity I have tried to keep
these to a minimum, while I have used simplified Arabic transliteration to make
Arabic terms as accessible as possible to an English-speaking readership. Unfortu-
nately, the combination of Arabic transliteration, anglicised Arabic, French, and
English translations comes at the price of inconsistency, even if I attempted to be as
consistent as possible, especially with regard to names.
CHRONOLOGY
Less than a year after the Arab Spring rocked the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region in January 2011, the Moroccan monarchy concluded an unpre-
cedented process of political reform. Pressured by country-wide protests in which
tens of thousands of Moroccans called for a constitutional monarchy and increased
rule of law, King Mohamed VI engaged in a constitutional process that resulted in
a new constitution. More than that, the monarch held parliamentary elections and
formed a new, Islamist-dominated government, which reflected a significant par-
liamentary majority of the Justice and Development Party (PJD – Hizb al ’Adala
wal Tamniyya), and even included Islamists in key positions, such as the premiership
and the minister of justice.
There are several reasons why the events of 2011 marked such a radical change
from Moroccan politics of less than a generation before. Not only did country-
wide protests in favour of increased rule of law occur – protests that were
unthinkable 15 years earlier – but even more radically, the protestors demanded
constitutional reforms. Moreover, the events led to the election of a legal Islamist
party into government, which continues to dominate. Until 2011, domestic protests
had primarily focused on graduate unemployment, gender questions and, occa-
sionally, large, country-wide public demonstrations focused on the various foreign
wars in Iraq and Israel/Palestine. Clearly, the Morocco of the mid-2010s, both
politically and socially, had changed radically from that of the mid-1990s, when,
for example, Amazigh (Berber) rights militants were arrested in Goulmima and
sentenced to one to two years’ imprisonment for displaying pamphlets in their
native language Tamazight.
Seen from the outside, the Moroccan political system remains one of stability
and longevity. For six decades, the Moroccan political system based on the supre-
macy of the monarch has continued to exercise its hegemony over other political
forces. It has done so because of its ability to adapt to social changes, identify
2 Introduction
challenges to its integrity, integrate these in the political scene through co-optation
and alliance building, and create a multitude of allied classes.1 This has caused
apparently ‘modern’ political features and the establishment of quasi-modern soci-
etal characteristics. While the system thereby created seems well entrenched and
stable on first sight, the absence of effective measures of inclusion of marginalised
groups has created a fundamental dilemma and has continued to produce challengers
to the status quo, culminating in the 2011 protests.
The central theme of this book concerns tradition and modernity as two core
features in contemporary Moroccan politics. While traditional features of govern-
ment have been omnipresent since independence was achieved in March 1956, the
most remarkable characteristic has been their co-existence with seemingly ‘modern’
features such as parliaments, elections, referendums, inclusion of political parties,
and constitutions, which gave the political system a cloak of modern institutional
practice. Modernity as used in this book refers to a process that Max Weber called
rationalisation, and it is closely connected to the rise of administrative institutions
such as a modern bureaucracy that claim legal-rational legitimacy concerned with
means-end efficiency and policy implementation.2 Tradition, from a Weberian
perspective, is the opposite realm – that of magic where the legitimacy of the ruler
is based on primordial links, which may result in assumed leadership qualities or
social and political privileges due to ancestry and blood ties. The combination of
both realms and their intertwined character have had important repercussions on
contemporary Moroccan politics. The monarchy and the political elite that it co-
opts and controls has been in control of a modern state apparatus, which has
resulted in the absence of any formal separation between the administration and the
monarchical family including the network through which it rules.3
The peculiarity of Morocco lies in what Anderson calls key virtues that are
embodied in monarchical traditional leadership styles and that make monarchs
particularly adaptable to the early phases of state and nation building. This is
because these phases are marked by exceptional uncertainty as to the continuing
existence of old privileges and the ambiguous co-existence of new rights and pro-
cedures.4 It can be argued that, in such times of exceptional uncertainty, persona-
lised leadership qualities are more successful than bureaucratic ones in imposing
themselves and in gaining acceptance. In contrast to nationalist movements, mon-
archs do not attempt to impose a particular vision of one nation that may be con-
tentious. Instead, they create a larger definition of the nation that is inclusive and in
which no particular feature gains prominence over others. This has been at the
core of Morocco’s post-independence political ‘pluralism’, in which competing
political parties apparently justify and reinforce the King’s role as an arbiter, in an
otherwise unstable political field. This is despite the existence of a modernist cur-
rent in Morocco’s nationalist movement, which attempted to undermine the
traditional basis of rule that did not correspond to its worldview and interests.
The Moroccan monarchy has undergone a vast political reform programme to
give its traditional rule the cloak of legal-rational legitimacy and policies. After
independence in 1956, political and economic reforms aimed at establishing the
Introduction 3
dynasties, such as Fes, Meknes and Marrakech. In turn, much of the mountainous
countryside remained outside direct control. Here, mainly Amazigh tribes con-
stituted what French ethnographers would later call bled es siba, unruly tribal society
that the Sultan’s power would not reach, with the implication of taxes not being
collected. In areas under the Sultan’s control, named bled el makhzen, taxes were
paid. The Arabic word makhzen, which became synonymous for state, has a
financial connotation and means ‘treasurer’.
The current Alawi dynasty dates from the seventeenth century. The Alawi kin-
ship group has its geographical roots in the Tafilalet oasis in the south-east of
Morocco, near today’s Algeria. After a period of civil strife after the Saadi dynasty
with its capital Marrakech went into decline, the Alawis consolidated their grip on
power in 1668 when Moulay Rachid destroyed a rival tribal formation, the
zawiyya of el Dila. His successor, Ismail I, installed the first capital of the Alawis in
Meknes and consolidated Alawi power through the use of a largely black slave
army.
The consolidation of power of the early Alawi dynasty went hand in hand with
growing external relations with France and Great Britain, commercial treaties
allowing both powers freedom of movement and protection of their commercial
goods and products. At the same time, Alawi consolidation of power meant
increasing attempts at forcing back Portuguese and Spanish positions on the African
continent (El Jadida, Sebta, Melilla, Peñon, Althusemas), which had been captured
by the Europeans in the previous two centuries when dynasties were comparatively
weak. However, power struggles within the Alawi family also led to periods of
unrest (1727–57). Increased European firepower forced Morocco to accept France’s
colonial ambitions in neighbouring Algeria (1830), when France and Britain fought
for control in the Mediterranean. It was under Moulay Abderrahman (1822–59),
when the Sultan’s army suffered a major defeat at Isly in 1844 against French
forces, that France was able to affirm its control over Algeria. Spanish colonial
ambitions resulted in the battle of Tetouan in 1860 under Moulay Abderrahman’s
son, Moulay Mohamed Ben Abderrahman (1859–73), forcing Morocco to give in
to Spanish territorial demands around Ceuta and Melilla, and Sidi Ifni (Santa Cruz
la Pequeña).7 The military defeat also forced Moulay Mohamed to accept pre-
ferential commercial treaties with Spain, recognition of Spanish property rights, as
well as granting Spain preferential fishing rights off the Moroccan coast.8
Clearly, the sultanate’s increasing incapacity to resist colonial pressure under-
mined the Sultan’s combination of traditional and religious legitimacy. When
Moulay Abdelaziz found it impossible to resist the French occupation of Casa-
blanca and Oujda, in addition to the Act of Algeciras of 1906, which confirmed
the French presence in Morocco, parts of the Moroccan ’ulema decided to impose
a contractual relation between the Moroccan ’umma and the Sultan. Consequently,
Moulay Abdelaziz was deposed in a declaration of leading ’ulema in Fes, and
replaced by Moulay Hafidh, who was forced to vow to liberate the country from
the French invaders. This vow became part of the ’ulema’s act of allegiance to the
new Sultan, bay’a, and it instituted a contractual relationship between the temporal
Introduction 5
powers of the Sultan and the ’ulema, in the context of increasing commercial,
territorial, religious and cultural threats to which Morocco was exposed.
Despite Hafidh’s incapacity to resist French ambitions to impose a protectorate
on the sultanate, the crown itself, combined with the Muslim faith, continued to
be the symbol for national independence and resistance. A major challenge to the
monarchy’s role was Abdelkrim’s declaration of an independent Rif republic in
1922, in the north with Oujda as its capital, indirectly rejecting the authority of the
Sultan. The ultimate defeat of the tribal alliance of which Abdelkrim was the leader
against French and Spanish forces in 1926 was as much in the interests of the
monarchy as in those of the colonial powers: it challenged the monarchy’s position
as defender of both Islam and Morocco’s territorial integrity based on the Sultan’s
religious and temporal authority over his subjects. Had Abdelkrim become the
leader of a successful anti-French liberation movement, according to Riffians’ own
slogan ‘from Oujda to Agadir’, the clash with the monarchy would have been
serious.
The colonial experience profoundly transformed the monarchy: security, foreign
relations, economic policy were controlled by colonial administrators, the General
Residency. In addition to cultural penetration of a large settler community, all of
this meant that the monarchy was deprived of its vital functions to exercise power.
Its close association with the colonial state, which officially aimed at ‘protecting’
the monarchy, was potentially threatening as a nationalist movement soon took
root, first abroad and, from the early 1930s, inside the protectorate.9 Conversely,
seeking nationalist credentials potentially alienated the French military administra-
tion, and France had the means to impose a new sultan on the country. Moulay
Yousouf was replaced shortly after the military administrator Hubert Lyautey
arrived in 1912. At the same time, the French colonial practice in Morocco –
especially under Lyautey – was based on the principle of not changing the tradi-
tional practices, working ‘with, not against, native socio-political elites and respect[ing]
pre-colonial customs and traditions’.10 The ensuing alliance consisting of sultanate
and Residency put the traditional sources of power and its administration at the
disposal of the French. This had the potential to seriously de-legitimise the mon-
archy in the eyes of the nationalist movement and the Islamic reform movement
(salafiyya) that it inspired. It was not until April 1947 that Sultan Mohamed publicly
announced his favour for independence following his historic visit to Tangier,
believing in US support for Moroccan independence.11 This act, along with his
increasing confrontation with the Residency, and the increasingly outspoken
nationalist movement’s choice to elevate Sultan Mohamed as a symbol of Mor-
occan sovereignty, enhanced his prestige as a sign of continuity of the Moroccan
state.
1.2 Islam
Islam is the main source of legitimacy of the Moroccan monarch, who claims direct
descent from the Prophet Mohamed. This confers sherifian status on the royal
6 Introduction
family, one of the bases for his calling himself Amir Al Mu’minin inscribed in the
constitution. In fact, Mohamed V assumed the title of King, malik, in 1957 only to
correspond to more Western notions of kingdoms, not because there had been a
tradition in Morocco itself. Sherifian status alone, however, is quite common in
Morocco, establishing a class of ashraf citizens with particular religious prestige.
These sherifian families were often appointed in the bureaucracy and given local
powers – traditionally constituting the ‘agents of the Makhzen’.12 The title itself,
Amir Al Mu’minin, was introduced in the Almohad period (1145–1269), and
competed with the title Amir Al Muslimin that was conferred by the caliphate in
Baghdad. Even if only two preceding dynasties claimed sherifian credentials and
used it to legitimise their rule, the Saadians and the Idrissis, ‘sharifism [still] pre-
sented itself as a veritable catalyst for the legitimacy of all those who aspired
power’, as illustrated in the writings of Muslim jurists such as Qadi ’Iyad under the
Almoravids.13
Islamic references therefore find their way into everyday political speeches and
policies. The most important one is the act of allegiance, the bay’a, in which, tra-
ditionally, the ’ulema and, since independence, political, military, tribal and tech-
nocratic establishment vow allegiance to the throne. Whereas it did not receive a
lot of attention in the first 15 years of Hassan’s rule, it gained importance from the
bay’a of Layoune in 1979 in Western Sahara, when Sahrawi tribal notables
performed this ‘act’ as a sign of their attachment to the Moroccan throne.
The importance of the bay’a relates to the legitimacy it confers on the King’s
title Amir Al Mu’minin, which makes the King effectively stand above constitu-
tional constraints and the division of state powers into legislative, executive and
judicial institutions. The official interpretation of the bay’a was published in the
Bulletin Officiel of 20 September 1979. In short, it confers divine powers on the
King: ‘the holder of the legitimate authority is God’s shadow on earth and his
secular arm in the world.’14
In addition to these formal constitutional powers accorded to the King, popular
Islam and its belief in symbolic and expressive forms of power are also associated
with the King. The concept of baraka (blessing), with which sherifian families are
endowed, forms a crucial aspect by which magic is transferred from one generation
to another.15 The King has been careful to be associated with these traditional
Moroccan forms of Islam, for example by traditional dress codes (a white jellaba
during the annual ceremony of bay’a and La Fête du Trône), or by wearing certain
jewellery that is strongly associated to Moroccan sufism. On the other hand,
another form of baraka is acquired, not inherited, and is based on purity (tahara)
which is based on this-worldly conduct and can be lost.16 This means that Mor-
occans’ belief in baraka confers legitimacy on sherifian families to rule; however, it
also scrutinises their conduct and public behaviour to the extent that the Moroccan
monarch has been very careful to control public images of himself and of his
family.
The monarch’s Islamic credentials have imposed significant policy orientations in
the conduct of state affairs. The ’ulema have been given a privileged position in the
Introduction 7
special role in the distribution of patronage. Some 600,000 acres were directly
distributed to rank and file members of the MP, but more importantly ‘collective
lands’ that belonged collectively to the tribes (15 million acres, of which 2.5 mil-
lion are used in agriculture) were ‘managed’ by the Ministry of the Interior
through turning them into a ‘trusteeship’.24 Control over these trusteeships was
therefore achieved through party membership in the MP – the main incentive of
joining the MP. Consequently, political parties increasingly appeared as interlinking
organisations between local strongmen and economic opportunities. ‘Recruitment
drives by most parties consist not of public appeals to ordinary citizens but of the
co-opting of notables and leaders from a local area or community into the party in
the expectation that these figures will be able to “deliver” the support and votes of
their local area or community.’25
This illustrates one central aspect among political parties in modern Morocco.
Although a multi-party system was introduced by the monarchy as it fought Istiq-
lal’s attempts at turning itself into a single party, and Morocco has a great quantity
of new and old political parties, the majority is without ideological or political
content despite apparent political names that indicate the contrary. A splinter party
from the Istiqlal Party, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) has little
socialist content; the National Union of Independents (RNI) was founded by a
relative of the royal family (King Hassan’s brother-in-law, Ahmed Osman) and it is
‘independent’ only in its original meaning – from other political parties. The
Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), created in 2009 by the King’s closest
friend and adviser, Fouad Ali El Himma, avoids any ideological references alto-
gether. The above mentioned Popular Movement (MP) has been based on rural
notables and their traditional capacity to make peasants vote for their strongmen.
Neo-patrimonial practices are very strongly embedded in these political parties,
which look for rapprochement with the centre of power, the monarchy, despite
occasional repetition that it is democracy that is actually sought. This also applies to
political parties that used to be in opposition to King Hassan. As it was rightly
coined, these political parties (USFP, Istiqlal, the Party of Progress and Socialism –
PPS) were, when in opposition, the opposition of His Majesty, and not to His
Majesty. This is why they seem to adopt a language of change for greater partici-
pation and power sharing, while ultimately being a conservative force due to the
existence of strong patron–client relations that make it easy for the monarch to co-
opt their leaders. In return, leaders use their patronage to make sure that little
dissent emanates from party congresses, which only rarely take place, with key
positions being attributed by the party leadership to loyal elements.
At the same time, these political parties face increasing problems of legitimacy.
One indicator has been the decreasing participation rate of the population in
national and municipal elections; another is the difficulty of attracting younger
generations in these political parties.26 Change therefore has been on the agenda
for a number of years – especially with the advent of Mohamed VI – to address
these difficulties lest they are out-paced by a stronger and more dynamic Islamist
party that established itself in the late 1990s, the Justice and Development Party
10 Introduction
(PJD). Ironically, the foundation of the PAM, whilst expressing the system’s dys-
functionality, also aimed to include the younger generations and political new-
comers into the political system and counter the increasing hegemony of the
ideologically powerful Islamist parties.
One of the Moroccan elite’s major characteristics is that it has taken advantage of
policies under Hassan II. Construction, transport, international trade, food proces-
sing, most of the post-colonial elite sprang up from the pre-colonial Fassi families,
with names such as Tazi, Benslimane, Bensouda and Berrada dominating this post-
colonial bourgeoisie. A survey of top businessmen in 1965 revealed that Fassis
constituted almost two thirds of this group. In agriculture, French farmers left
behind some 1 million acres (400,000 hectares) of prime agricultural land, which,
along with buildings, were purchased at very cheap rates. Those rural notables
already empowered both by the colonial power and then by the kingdom were
those who were able to benefit from these lucrative deals – prominent families
were the Nejjai, Bekkai, Gueddari and Kebbaj.29
Together with Moroccanisation in the 1970s, which empowered a new aspiring
class of Soussi businessmen – originating from the south, especially from Agadir –
these measures had the effect of increasing income and corresponding lifestyle dis-
parities among Moroccans. In two household consumption surveys conducted in
1965 and 1971, respectively, the share of overall consumption of the wealthiest 10
per cent increased dramatically, whereas the share of others, and in particular the
poor, declined.30 Up to now, this disparity has increased sharply, creating an eco-
nomically dependent and allied class to the state that has difficulties in emancipating
itself from the centre, as it is alienated from its fellow citizens in terms of lifestyle,
education, language and professional future.
This has had serious results for the development of a socio-economic opposition
to the state and its allied classes. Excluded strata informed strong socialist groups up
to the late 1970s, such as King Hassan’s main rival in the 1960s, Mehdi Ben Barka,
and more recently Islamic groups. Essentially, an ‘alliance for profit’ that is embo-
died by the state and wealthy strata has been challenged with reference to Islamic
social justice.31 Clearly, both Morocco’s ‘official’ Islamic party – the PJD – and its
‘unofficial’ Islamic opposition party Justice and Benevolence (Al ’Adl wal Ihssane)
have made the existing income disparities a central theme in their political pro-
grammes, as is already indicated in the names that they have chosen. The trauma-
tising Islamist attacks of 16 May 2003 in Casablanca also targeted symbols of
wealth, not power, and the origins of the actors – from one of Casablanca’s most
impoverished shanty towns – indicate the fragile political basis that income
disparity creates.
Consequently, the balance between modernity and tradition on which the post-
independence Moroccan monarchy has been founded is a fragile one. The
increasing number of debates about principles of modern parliamentary institutions,
political parties and constitutionalism weaken the traditional powers that the King
enjoys. On the other hand, modern lifestyles and mass education not only chal-
lenge monarchical traditions, but also create expectations about levels of comfort
and the potential for social mobility that only a small restricted minority enjoys. It
is this experienced exclusion that has accompanied Morocco’s post-independence
development, which is the primary threat to liberal lifestyles that co-exist with
conservative social and political practices.
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