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ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS:
POLITICS OF THE M IDDLE EAST

Volume 17

THE POLITICS OF ARAB

INTEGRATION
Page Intentionally Left Blank
 THE POLITICS OF ARAB
INTEGRATION

Edited by
GIACOMO LUCIANI AND GHASSAN SALAME

13 Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

LO N D O N A N D NEW YORK
First published in 1988 by Croom Helm Ltd
This edition first published in 2016
by Routledge
2 Park Square, M ilton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, N Y 10017
Routledge is an imprint o f the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 1988 Istituto Affari Internazionali
All rights reserved. N o part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised
in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or
hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information
storage or retrieval system, w ithout permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be tradem arks or registered
trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation w ithout intent to
infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-1-138-83939-7 (Set)

ISBN: 978-1-315-68049-1 (Set) (ebk)
ISBN: 978-1-138-92249-5 (Volume 17) (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-68511-3 (Volume 17) (ebk)

Publisher’s Note
The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but
points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent.
Disclaimer
The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and would welcome
correspondence from those they have been unable to trace.
 Volume IV

The
Politics of
Arab
Integration
Edited by
Giacomo Luciani
and Ghassan Salame

CROOM HELM
London • New York • Sydney
© 1988 Istituto Affari Intemazionali
Croom Helm Ltd, Provident House,
Burrell Row, Beckenham, Kent BR3 1AT
Croom Helm Australia, 44-50 Waterloo Road,
North Ryde, 2113, New South Wales
Published in the USA by
Croom Helm
in association with Methuen, Inc.
29 West 35th Street,
New York, NY 10001
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
The politics of Arab integration.
1. Arab countries — Politics and
government — 1945-
I. Luciani, Giacomo n. Salami, Ghassan
320.917'4927 JQ1850.A2
ISBN 0-7099-4148-X

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The Politics of Arab integration / edited by Giacomo Luciani and
Ghassan Salame.
p. cm. — (Nation, state, and integration in the Arab world :
v. 4)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-7099-4148-X
1. Panarabism. 2. Arab countries — Politics and government — 1945-
I. Luciani, Giacomo, 1948- . II. Salamah, Ghassan. III. Series.
DS39.N34 vol. 4
[DS63.6]
956 - dc 19 87-30368

Filmset by Mayhew Typesetting, Bristol, England

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Mackays of Chatham Ltd, Kent
 Contents

Foreword
Introduction — Giacomo Luciani and Ghassan Salome 1

Part One The Cultural Dimension

1. Speech Diversity and Language Unity: Arabic as an
Integrating Factor
Zakaria Abuhamdia 33
2. The Media and Arab Integration
Hamdi Kandil 54
3. The Role of Education in Domestic and Inter-Arab
Integration
Michael Suleiman 73
4. Attitudes to the Nation and the State in Arab Public
Opinion Polls
Tawfic Farah 94

Part Two The Economic and Social Dimension

5. Economic Interdependence and National Sovereignty
Samir Makdisi 111
6. Migration as a Factor Conditioning State Economic
Control and Financial Policy Options
Ibrahim Saad Eddine Abdallah 141
7. Immigrants in the Arab Gulf Countries: ‘Sojourners’ or
‘Setders’?
Georges Sabagh 159
8. Migration and Political Integration in the Arab World
Sharon Stanton Russell 183

Part Three The Political and Institutional Dimensions

9. The Impact of Palestine on Arab Politics
Walid Kazziha 213
10. Israeli Interference in Internal Arab Politics: The Case
of Lebanon
Avi Shlaim 232
CONTENTS

11. Integration in the Arab World: The Institutional

Framework·
Ghassan Salame 256

References 280

Index 307
Combined Index 315
 Foreword

The Arab State is a series of four collective volumes exploring the

origins, foundations, impact and stability of Arab states. This
volume is the fourth in the series; it is devoted to a discussion of the
politics of Arab integration. The question of integration is seen in
its two interrelated aspects, as referring on the one hand to domestic
affairs within each Arab state and on the other to relations between
the Arab states in connection with the broader conception of an Arab
nation. In previous volumes it has been argued that Arab states must
face the challenge of particularisms and universalisms at the same
time: this volume attempts to evaluate the importance of these
tensions and proposes an original analysis of the real content of Arab
nationalist conceptions.
The series is the result of a collective research effort organised
by the Istituto Affari Intemazionali over a period of three years,
under the general title of Nation, State and Integration in the Arab
World. This undertaking was made possible by a generous main
grant from the Ford Foundation, and an equally generous additional
grant from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC)
of Canada. The latter was specifically devoted to support the work
of Arab scholars writing on economic issues. Further financial
support was received from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and from the Commission for Cultural Exchanges between Italy and
the United States.
The Istituto Affari Intemazionali worked in co-operation with the
Panteios School of Political Science in Athens, which was respons-
ible for the organisation of two international gatherings, allowing
authors of different chapters to come together and discuss their ideas
in depth. As a result, while these are collective volumes, we believe
that they have reached a degree of homogeneity which is not
normally found in these undertakings. The Panteios School also
supported one of the meetings with its own funds, decisively
contributing to the success of the project.
Help was also received from the Gustav E. von Grunebaum
Centre for Near Eastern Studies at the University of California Los
Angeles, which hosted me in February and March 1984 and again
in the fall of 1986.
The project was directed by an international steering committee
in which the following participated:
FOREWORD

Roberto Aliboni, Director, Istituto Affari Intemazionali

Hazem Beblawi, Chairman, Egyptian Export Development Bank
Ursula Braun, Consultant, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Marwan Buheiry, Director, Centre for Lebanese Studies
Alexander Cudsi, Professor, Panteios School of Political Science
Adeed Dawisha, Professor, George Mason University
Omaymah Dahhan, Professor, University of Jordan
Georges Sabagh, Director, The Gustav E. von Grunebaum Center
for Near Eastern Studies, UCLA
Ghassan Salami, Professor, American University of Beirut
I. William Zartman, Director, Africa Program, SAIS, Johns
Hopkins University

The committee played a major role, and, as director of the project,

I am very substantially indebted to its members for their advice in
planning the research effort and selecting contributors. Some of the
members also served as editors for a volume, thus exercising closer
responsibility on the material included in it: this fourth volume was
edited by myself and Ghassan Salame.
I received substantial help and advice also from other friends. Ali
Hillal Dessouki was expected to be on the committee, but a variety
of circumstances prevented him from participating in its delibera-
tions. I did, nevertheless, greatly benefit from his generous advice
and detailed comments during numerous interviews in Cairo. My
debt to him is indeed very substantial. I also greatly benefitted from
the friendly advice that I received from Judy Barsalou of the Ford
Foundation in Cairo, Ann Lesch of American Field Staff in Cairo,
Andrew Watson of IDRC in Cairo, and Gary Sick of the Ford
Foundation in New York.
My personal thanks also to the staff of the LAI that contributed
with sympathy and dedication to the complex organisation of this
undertaking.

The shape of this project was deeply influenced by the advice of two
friends who unfortunately did not live to see its conclusion: to their
memory the steering committee decided to dedicate the four
volumes.
I had met Malcolm Kerr in Los Angeles when the project was still
in its planning stage, and he gave me valuable advice at that time.
I asked him to be a member of the committee, but he was then
expecting to be appointed President of the American University of
Beirut. He insisted, however, that he wanted to be associated with
 FOREWORD

the project, so much so that the first meeting of the steering commit-
tee was hosted by him at Marquand House in June 1983. He
participated in our deliberations then, and contributed to the basic
decisions which shaped the project. His assassination was a tragedy
for us personally and professionally, and has marked a disastrous
turning point in West Beirut’s struggle to remain one of the intellec-
tual centres of the world.
The same negative turn of events finally drove Marwan Buheiry
out of Beirut. Marwan was, personally and intellectually, a living
example of West Beirut’s intellectual curiosity and non-sectarian
spirit. He participated enthusiastically in the work of the steering
committee and in the meetings connected with this project, until
death struck unexpectedly, in exile.
It has been an honour and a very educational experience for me
to serve as the director of this project, and I wish to thank all
contributors for the very many things I learned. I hope that the
reader will find these volumes as instructive as preparing them was
for me. Any shortcoming, as usual, should be ascribed to my
responsibility only.

Giacomo Luciani
Director of Studies
Istituto Affari Intemazionali
Page Intentionally Left Blank
 Introduction

In the previous three volumes in this series the foundations and

stability of the Arab states were explored. The prevailing message
has been that Arab states as ‘sovereign’, internationally recognised
entities, contrary to the hopes of many, appear to be more resilient
than they have often been portrayed to be in the literature. The
analysis of the historical foundations, of the economic bases and of
the interplay between state and society lead to arf overall impression
of progressive consolidation of the state structures that formed at
various points in time during the first half of this century.
The most common image of the Arab states in the media and in
most of the literature is, on the contrary, one of weak states
precariously ruling over highly segmented societies. The emphasis
is laid on the multiple lines of division honeycombing Arab politics
along ethnic, religious and linguistic grounds. The ‘mosaic’
framework is easily accepted and often aggravated by those political
forces that have among their objectives that of showing the Arab
governments as ‘unreliable’ or ‘shaky’. Lebanon is viewed as the
forerunner of the inevitable disaggregation of all Arab states.
At the same time, the demise of pan-Arabism is recorded time
and again, as if some found pleasure in constantly writing its
obituary. Yet somehow the ideal and call of the Arab nation refuses
to die. The reality of Arab politics is there for everybody to see, and
it is a different reality from the politics of each individual Arab
country. While obituaries are being written, new, intense forms of
Arab interaction are emerging.
Thus, our inquiry into the Arab state could not possibly avoid a
discussion of the politics of integration. We will discuss integration
both at the domestic (state) level and at the regional (pan-Arab)
level; the first aspect has already been dealt with in several chapters
in the first three volumes in this series, and this last volume
concentrates on the regional dimension of integration.

Integration — from the Latin integer, which remains unchanged in

English — is the process whereby differences are gradually over-
come and homogeneity is created. It is convenient to differentiate
between integration and unification; the former refers to economic,
cultural or societal processes, the latter has a predominantly institu-
tional content. A country may be politically unified and still be

1
INTRODUCTION

socially or economically disintegrated; a nation or a group of nations

can be highly integrated while not politically unified. Integration is
a multidimensional process and need not happen in parallel at all
levels: economic integration is largely independent of linguistic or
cultural or religious or social integration.
At the same time, integration is more than the mere existence of
some common ground (similarities) or linkage (interaction) between
different actors. The latter may be sufficient to establish a relation-
ship of interdependence between the actors sharing common traits;
but interdependence may be a conflictual as well as a co-operative
relationship. It is only in the latter case, that of co-operative
interdependence, that we should speak of integration. Thus, several
countries have in common the fact that they possess nuclear
weapons, but in most cases this creates mere interdependence, not
integration. Even an intense trade relationship can sometimes lead
to conflictual interdependence, rather than integration — as in the
case of trade between oil-exporting and oil-importing countries. But
when the sharing of a common interest is accompanied by co-
operative behaviour (a regime) then it leads to integration, as in the
case of trade between countries which are members of the European
Community. Integration is thus the result of a component of volun-
tarism rather than simply of facts of geography, culture etc.
Also, integration is always relative to some specific interest, and
as we shift analysis from one interest or set of interests to another
the geometry of integration changes: countries that are integrated
with respect to trade may not be integrated in matters of defence or
language or religion. Thus, while members of the EC are integrated
in matters of trade, agriculture etc., in matters of defence some, but
not all, of them are integrated in NATO; the latter comprises also
countries that are not members of the Community. With respect to
international monetary affairs the relevant integrative scheme
(admittedly a weak one) is the Group of 7, in which Japan partici-
pates as well. If language is chosen as a variable, then Europe is
disintegrated, while France promotes schemes to achieve co-
operation among the French-speaking countries. In matters
concerned with the international forwarding of mail, a large number
of countries are integrated in the World Postal Union. In short: the
geometry of integration/interdependence between states varies with
the specific interest or set of interests under consideration. While
some interests may be perceived as more important than others,
there is little reason to argue that one integrative project relative to
one interest should not coexist with a different integrative project for

2
 INTRODUCTION

a different interest. Neither is there evidence to prove that integra-

tion relative to one interest will tend to encourage integration
relative to other interests, eventually leading to the emergence of one
pre-eminent integrative project spanning a broad range of interests
simultaneously: this may occur, but it is certainly not a necessary
outcome.
Supposedly, a nation is integrated, and it is the fact of integration
that distinguishes one nation from the other. This postulates that
there is one overriding character, or a set of common interests that
is shared by all individuals belonging to this nation, and not by
others. Integration should thus define the boundary of any nation.
This is particularly evident in the German tradition (Fichte), accord-
ing to which a nation is the result of an integrated people; the French
tradition (vouloir vivre en commuri) views the nation as the vehicle
for integration, rather than the result of it, but nevertheless in both
traditions a strong association is posited between nation and integra-
tion. However, because commonly the geometry of integration
varies with the character that is posited as definitional, and several
characters may be equally important in shaping political life, nations
seldom are defined in an empirically measurable way, as entities
which are integrated with respect to one or another well defined and
quantifiable character. Nations are myths that politicians manipulate
to achieve their political goals: while there must be something in
common that helps define a nation, very profound segmentation is
frequent. In historical experience, nations are more often than not
integrated ex post, by the conscious effort of the political structure
that was created in their name.
Ethnic and cultural factors, more rarely religious or economic
ones, are commonly invoked to define a nation. But in no case in
the real world are boundaries so neat as to identify clearly a set of
contiguous groups: overlaps and ambiguity prevail, and not only in
the newly independent states, but in old Europe as well. While there
may be some core group which is indeed strongly integrated with
respect to several characteristics, as we move towards the edges of
this group the coherence of the integrative pattern will gradually
fade away, and commonality will become dubious, or the pattern of
integration according to one characteristic will conflict with those
based on different characteristics. Very often a single core group
cannot even be clearly identified. Yet, nationalistic discourse
dominates contemporary international relations, and the very usage
of the adjective international, where inter-statal would certainly be
more accurate, is a manifestation of such domination.

3
INTRODUCTION

Shying away from the issue of definition, the discourse on

nationalism and the nation often personalises the latter. Nations, or
countries, are assumed to be living entities that one can readily
recognise; to have a soul, a conscience, a will, a personal history
of maturing and becoming more sensible. They are assumed to have
a character to which they may be true or unfaithful (as in the Ba‘th
slogan ‘One single Arab nation with an eternal mission’): hence the
debate on authenticity, which is so overwhelmingly important in the
Arab countries today.
This personalised approach is common both in the nationalist
literature (Bensaid in Salame, 1987: vol. I in this series) and in the
‘scholarly’ literature on Arab nationalism (such as in The Arab
Predicament). Within this line of thinking, we may include all those
who maintain that the distinction between East and West has signifi-
cant scientific value left to it (including most of the orientalists and
all kinds of salafi nationalists or religious writers in the Arab world),
and that humankind is not singular, but plural.
Contrary to this approach, the editors of this volume are inclined
to confess their unabashed illuministic belief that men are primarily
just that, and groupings of men are a matter of convenience and
adherence to observable facts, and, to a large extent, the result of
accidents of history and geography. Thus in discussing a highly
emotional topic such as the definition and future of the Arab nation,
this volume tries to adhere as much as possible to reality and
measurable facts and concentrates on the non-ideological aspect of
the problem, i.e. integration.

Any society, large or small, has divisive and integrating factors, and
integration is a political problem at any level of political action.
Politics of integration exist even within the family, although admit-
tedly the concrete meaning of integration vs. disintegrative
behaviour changes with the dimensions and nature of the group it
refers to.
Political life takes place at various levels: the common distinction
between local (municipal), national and international political affairs
— which is reflected in the layout of many a morning paper — is
as good as any other. In fact, we know that there are many more than
three levels: but for the sake of clarity let us stick to these three.
Integration is a problem at all levels, and there is normally a
trade-off between integration/disintegration at each of them.
Because integration is achieved not only by reducing differences
within, but also underlining differences with the rest of the universe,

4
 INTRODUCTION

the dictates of integration at any one level contrast with the same at
levels above or below. This is the essential reason why the issue of
integration should be simultaneously considered with reference to
the various levels. Integration within the existing Arab states is
logically and politically connected to integration between these same
states, and very frequently policies that are adopted with a view to
promoting integration at one level are opposed as jeopardising
integration at other levels. Thus, for example, to insist on a
‘Lebanese’ identity serves the purpose of integrating the various
confessions within Lebanon and isolating the country from the
environment, while insisting on the Arab and Islamic dimension of
the Sudan has disintegrative consequences on relations between the
north and south of the country. This is a common problem in any
subregional system, as well as globally and within each state (when
the dialectical relationship between central and local government is
considered).
Arab societies are divided: this point has been extensively dealt
with in the literature. In most cases the divisions that are described
and analysed with greatest accuracy are those that are the closest to
heart and mind of the orientalist tradition and of its local followers:
the communal and religious differences. Thus considerable attention
is paid to the differences between Sunnis and Shi‘is, Druzes and
‘Alawis, Maronites and Greek Orthodox, Copts and Protestants, and
so on; or to communal identities such as Kurds, Berbers, southern
Sudanese. The various identifications combine to form multiple
groupings, and the image projected is of a regional political system
of baffling complexity, that only devotees of an esoteric science can
understand. The insistence on complexity implies that the region is
a natural ground for foreign intervention.
This line of analysis is often elegant and may make fascinating
reading. Of course, no one would ever deny that these factors play
an important role in Arab politics, and yes: the Middle East is an
anthropologist’s paradise. However, that Arab societies are in any
significant and measurable sense more divided than societies in other
parts of the world is questionable. Religious or communal
differences exist in all countries, and are the rule rather than the
exception. Examples in the Third World are extremely abundant,
but one should not forget the tendency for ethnicity to push aside the
old melting pot, while segmentation persists in centuries old Euro-
pean states. A Scot is not the same thing as a Welshman, a Lutheran
Hamburger is not the same as a Catholic Miinchener, and a Sicilian
is not to be confused with a Milanese. It is hard to argue that

5
INTRODUCTION

European politics is in any meaningful sense less complex and

involute that Arab politics: American political scientists sometimes
lose the perception of this fact, because of the widespread lack of
interest in European affairs and the well-known American
impatience with anything complex. But they only have to consider
their own country: in the US citizens are on many occasions
requested to state whether they are white or black, Asian or latino,
while ethnic lobbies are increasingly influential in culture and
politics.
That existing societal divisions have a greater impact on Arab
politics than on politics in non-Arab countries is again questionable.
One need only recall that in Belgium parties are differentiated along
linguistic as well as ideological lines, that regionally defined parties
exist in West Germany and Italy, and communal irredentism fuels
intense terrorist activity in the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland),
Spain (the Basques) and France (Corsica). In the United States, the
influence of ethnically or religiously defined lobbies has gradually
overshadowed the more traditional, economically defined groupings
(labour vs. capital, industry vs. agriculture or finance, small
business vs. big business etc.). Indeed, while in Europe ideology
still plays an important role in politics, in the United States ethnic
and religious factors have, for all practical purposes, made ideology
irrelevant to political life. Finally, examples of the political impact
of societal segmentation in non-Arab developing countries are so
numerous that we do not need to elaborate. How can one seriously
argue that the Arab case is quantitatively or qualitatively different?
The need to integrate, i.e. to establish a common basis of
allegiance to the state and the political process is common to any
country. The way this need is addressed, however, is different. In
particular, integration through the acceptance of a constitutional pact
may be considered a superior and more stable solution to the
problem. Indeed, while disintegrative movements may surface in
any country, they may be expected to have less of a conflictual
character if the latter enjoys well-established democratic institutions.
Yet it is a fact that even the United Kingdom, the land of the Magna
Carta, still faces rebellion in Northern Ireland. Furthermore,
whenever the authoritarian nature of the regime creates conditions
that are more conducive to disintegration, the blame should logically
be laid on the character of the regime, not on some supposedly extra-
ordinary degree of segmentation.
Although the acceptance of a national myth is certainly more
widespread in certain countries than it is in others (les Frangais sont

6
 INTRODUCTION

chauvins!), no national myth is able to monopolise the hearts and

minds of the people. It is inevitable that individuals realise that they
sometimes have differences with their fellow countrymen, while at
the same time sharing interests with individuals or groups elsewhere
in the world. But if individuals have multiple identifications,and
they all do, the ranking of the latter and the attempt to find one that
may be said to be predominant is largely arbitrary. Such rankings
only acquire a meaning when identifications become mutually
exclusive and people are requested to choose. But this is a rare
occurrence, although it may help explain why so many Egyptian
intellectuals have been obsessed by the need to return to the Arab
fold following Camp David, while most intellectuals outside of
Egypt derive very little satisfaction from being in the same Arab
fold, and even wonder what the Arab fold is anyhow. In any case,
the vast majority of the people probably never felt this contradiction,
simply because they quite naturally identify as both Egyptian and
Arab, independently of what their government or the Arab League
may say in this respect in their official declarations.
Thus it is not surprising that citizens of the Arab countries
typically identify with subnational groups defined along ethnic,
religious, linguistic or cultural lines; while at the same time they also
identify with their country of birth as well as with an Arab dimen-
sion, or nation. If it is acceptable to be bruxellois-wallon-belge-
catholique-europeen-occidental, why should there be a problem in
being a Damascene-Greek Orthodox-Syrian-Arab? Such multiple
identifications would hardly be as controversial as they are if the
Arab states were ruled by legitimate, democratic governments. But
because this is commonly not the case, particularism and/or Arab
nationalism have at times become vehicles of opposition, threatening
governments in power.
It is entirely predictable that whenever political discourse per se
is suppressed, individuals will attribute political functions to
aggregations that would normally perform altogether different roles.
Social, cultural, communal and religious groups will be used as
covers or alternative avenues for political action. This surrogate role
may lead to the impression that segmentation thus defined plays a
fundamental role, but it is only after freedom of political discourse
is restored that one can pass judgement. Admittedly, this freedom
may never be restored, and the political role of non-political agents
may become entrenched; but surprising changes in the perceived
structure of the political system are common whenever countries
return to democracy. Thus, it was commonly believed in the last

7
INTRODUCTION

years of Franco’s rule that the Catholic church would play a crucial
role in post-Francoist Spain: yet we witness an entirely different
reality, one which was unpredictable as long as authoritarian rule
suppressed political discourse.
The same Catholic church that provided technocratic expertise
through the Opus Dei in Spain, has often been a vehicle of opposi-
tion to authoritarian rule in Latin America. However when democracy
was reinstated, e.g. in Brazil, entirely secular political parties came
to dominate the political debate, and the role of the church was
redefined. In the Arab region it is Islam that has sometimes played
a prominent role as the language of opposition (while generally being
used to support and legitimise authoritarian governments). Not surpris-
ingly, governments in power have tended to portray this opposition
as being a threat to the state, and this view has often found its way
in to the literature. In fact, there is little evidence that this opposition
is aimed at the state rather than at the regime or government. Thus,
it is not clear that the prominence of particularism or universalism
is a manifestation of state weakness, while it may be a manifestation
of the weakness of the government and institutions (more on this in
Hermassi, in Salami, 1987: 75-85, vol. I in this series).
Opposition to established rule has always been coloured by local,
religious or ethnic considerations in the region. In many cases it is
difficult and arbitrary to dissociate opposition (i.e. the wish to see
an alternative to the present use of power) from separatism (the wish
to subtract oneself from submission to that power). Most opposition
movements, being unable to achieve results qua opposition have
reverted or contented themselves with separatism.
From a theoretical point of view, a segmented polity may provide
an authoritarian government the opportunity to consolidate its
position through divide et impera. However, it would obviously be
preposterous to derive the conclusion that authoritarian governments
are better equipped to address the problem of segmentation: they
may deliberately maintain it rather than promoting integration. This
is not reflected, however, in their official rhetoric nor, in most
cases, in their deeds: most authoritarian governments are inclined to
deny the existence and legitimacy of communal identifications,
while at the same time trying to manipulate universalistic ones. Thus
in most Arab countries the existence of politically or sociologically
defined minorities is ignored, and the power of the central state is
affirmed over regional or municipal autonomy. At the same time,
almost all governments resort to pan-Arab or pan-Islamic rhetoric to
support their dubious legitimacy.

8
 INTRODUCTION

At the same time, it must be recognised that the formal existence

of democratic institutions in no way guarantees per se that a
segmented society will be able to maintain political unity and evolve
towards integration. The case of Lebanon is an obvious example of
this, and certain of its peculiarities need to be underlined at this
point. While the Lebanese regime was a democratic one, it was
based on the official recognition of sectarian cleavages, and tended
to consolidate them. In fact, sectarianism was a political objective
sought by the ruling elite (basically Maronite). At the same time,
the constitution strongly centralised power in the hands of the presi-
dent, naturally concentrating attention and controversy on presiden-
tial politics. Indeed, because the lack of integration was officially
recognised in the National Covenant, attempts to make up for it
through constitutional centralisation (the powers of the President
reflecting the privileged position of his sect) were made. The
alternative approach — a deliberate attempt to play down the
political significance of sectarian connotations coupled with a fairer
institutional power-sharing formula — was systematically blocked
by the ruling elite. Partly because of the strongly centralised
definition of the state, the role of the latter in the economy and
society tended to be limited. Had the state attempted to permeate
society and perform all the crucial roles (education, information,
allocation of resources) that it plays in most Arab countries,
the concentration of power in the hands of a Maronite president
would probably have become unacceptable to the other sectarian
groups. Hence the state was centralised but confined, and con-
sequently the dependence of the individual on the state was also
limited.
It is interesting to underline, at this point, the current paradox
of the Lebanese civil war: none of the major factions proposes
liquidation of the Lebanese state nor partition, nor absorption by
neighbouring Syria. True, Lebanese militias that confront each
other in the civil war do not normally engage in issue politics: yet
the absence of a real debate on the redefinition of the Lebanese state
is significant. The idea that a territorial redefinition of the Lebanese
state is possible, whereby Tripoli and the Beqa‘ would be annexed
by Syria, and the remaining territory would have a clear Maronite
majority, is found in the writings of Israeli scholars, but is not
publicly entertained by any of the Lebanese forces nor does it seem
to appeal to Damascus; this creates a paradox which has left an
important mark in the domestic debate in Israel (as documented in
Shlaim, Chapter 9 in this volume).

9
INTRODUCTION

The experience of all other Arab states is entirely different.

Centralisation has been coupled with the official downplaying of
sectarian identifications and with a tremendous growth in the role of
the state, that has greatly increased citizens’ dependence on it. While
sects have certainly not disappeared, their influence must be
weighed against dependence on the state, and the expectation that
Arab states will blow apart has not been supported by facts. Thus,
notwithstanding the fact that in Iraq the Shi‘a do not participate in
power — while being the majority — has not led to opposition and
massive desertions, as the Iranian Islamic government had hoped. In
the early stages of war, the speculative expectation that the Arab
population in southern Iran might come to support the Iraqi invasion
was proven equally unfounded.
The next candidate for disintegration along sectarian lines is
Syria. Indeed, the authoritarian nature of the Syrian regime, coupled
with its own sectarian dimension, abundantly justifies the continuing
importance of sectarian identifications as an expression of opposi-
tion. Yet, one should not forget that the Syrian state has come to be
something much more complex than simply the regime of Hafez al-
Asad, and that this same regime relies on numerous support struc-
tures, not just the ‘Alawi ‘asabiyya (see on this Hinnebush, in
Dawisha and Zartman, 1987: vol. HI in this series). The expectation
that Syria will disintegrate whenever the current regime comes to an
end may therefore be unfounded. Authoritarian governments create
conditions that do not allow measurement of the transformations that
occur in societies and individual perceptions; but transformations do
occur.
In the case of the Sudan, the attempt on the part of the
authoritarian government of Ga‘far an-Nimeiry to play the game of
divide and rule has gradually brought it to isolation and downfall.
The armed revolt in the south has played an essential role in bringing
about this result. Restoration of democratic government has not led
to an end of the civil war, partly because of the fact that the Islamic
legislation approved in 1983 has not yet been repealed (An-Naim,
1987).
The Sudan is a graphic example of the contradiction between
domestic and regional integration. The proposition of wider
integrative projects — be they Nilotic co-operation with Egypt, pan-
Arab sympathy or adoption of the shari ‘ah — has a disintegrative
impact on the domestic polity. The Ba‘th pan-Arab vocabulary is no
more adequate in Iraq: indeed examples can be given for almost any
Arab state. Faced with the need to achieve greater domestic

10
 INTRODUCTION

integration, a majority of the Arab states have paid little more than
lip service to the goal of Arab integration. Yet some pan-Arab
integration nevertheless exists, at least enough of it to keep the Arab
national dream alive. The next question is to see what is the
concrete, measurable content of Arab integration.

Who is an Arab? Clearly the shortest acceptable definition is: any

individual whose native language is Arabic. Thus, the Arabic
language must be the backbone of any attempt to define an Arab
nation, and is anyway the common point of departure for most
Arabists.
In recent times, as noted, Islam has played an increasing role as
an universalistic language of opposition, eroding the impact of Arab
nationalism. However, although some speak of an Islamic nation, on
the basis of a misleading if possibly unavoidable translation of
umma, it is obviously inaccurate to speak of Islamic nationalism.
Islam, thus, may be a language of opposition, but it is not a language
of integration, in the sense that it does not per se define a credible
dimension for intense co-operation between states. The tendency to
create Islamic institutions is not to be denied, but is a qualitatively
different phenomenon from the growth of pan-Arab institutions.
While for the Arabs the ideal is that of one nation one state, for the
other Islamic states such an ideal is marginal, or a mere sanctified
utopia.
For this reason, we felt it was necessary to start from Arabic. If
Arabic is the backbone of the attempt to define the Arab nation, then
the question must be asked: is there one Arabic language? Zakaria
Abuhamdia feels strongly that indeed Arabic provides language
unity, notwithstanding the regional and social variations that are
common in any language. He notes the opinion of those who believe
that Arabic as a unified language is dead or doomed and sees a lack
of supporting evidence and a political intention in them.
The fact that Arabic in its standard form has become the prevail-
ing political language in the Arab countries, and that Arabisation
programmes explicitly exist in many of them, although implementa-
tion is far from uniform, will probably tend to consolidate the unity
of Arabic and its integrating role. At the same time, does this fact
per se carry political consequences? Arabic certainly is not the only
language utilised in more than one country: English, Spanish,
Portuguese, German and French are all examples of languages
similarly conserving unity across political boundaries. With the
possible exception of German, such commonality of language

11
INTRODUCTION

justifies limited common undertakings and co-operation, but does

not impinge upon the definition(s) of nation and the strictly political
realm. (Even in the case of German, World War Two killed pan-
Germanism in its broader definition, and what is left of it is only the
aspiration to eventual reunification of the FRG and GDR in a very
distant future). On the other hand, we have examples of countries
in which multiple languages are officially spoken, and even of
countries in which an altogether foreign language is the common
vehicle for political life. In what sense can the use of English in India
be portrayed as a limitation of sovereignty or a factor negatively
affecting the stability of the Indian state? Finally, the most successful
experience of regional integration to this date (notwithstanding its
failures and limitations), i.e. the European Community, is not based
on a commonality of language. Many Arab nationalists try hard to
show that the case of the Arabic language is different, primarily
because of its association with Islam. Arabic, in this view, is not like
any other language, and acquires greater importance for the Arabs
as an integrating factor. The latter remains a respectable subjective
opinion, but we see little empirical evidence to support it
objectively.
Thus, international evidence points to a separation of language
and politics: commonality of language can help consolidate a
political entity which historical and political forces create and
sustain, but is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for its
birth and viability.
Surely there is more to it than pure language. Language unity
permits the circulation of information and cultural inputs, which
would be obviously hindered by language barriers. Thus the
question of the impact of language unity is raised in the two chapters
that follow, with reference, respectively, to the circulation of the
media and to the education system.
Hamdi Kandil’s assessment of media circulation among the Arab
countries is extremely pessimistic. Arab governments closely
control the media within their borders, use them to interfere in each
other’s political life, view media production from other Arab
countries as a threat and try to prevent it from reaching their
citizens. Thus the Arab media do not circulate, not because the
conditions for regional circulation are (potentially) not there, but
because governments make sure that it does not take place. This
being the case, what is the real impact of language unity? Some of
the very same data which Abuhamdia uses to demonstrate that
standard Arabic is alive and well, are taken by Kandil to underline

12
 INTRODUCTION

the limitations in the freedom of expression and circulation of ideas

in the Arab countries.
One is tempted to say that this is a case in which domestic integra-
tion contradicts regional integration: the state controls the media in
order to foster domestic integration. But in fact this is not so: the
roots of state control of the media lie in the lack of legitimacy of the
regimes in power. The media are not used to cultivate a country-
specific national myth: quite to the contrary they are open to univer-
salistic discourse, especially under the form of Islam, as well as to
unabashed foreign influence, ranging from American soap opera to
Japanese cartoons. What matters is that critical* or dangerous infor-
mation does not seep through. Information relating to domestic
political affairs is suppressed even more carefully than information
relating to the rest of the world.
In this respect, there is a difference between control of the media
and the way primary and secondary education is utilised. Suleiman’s
chapter demonstrates that schooling is utilised to accredit a country-
specific national myth and to maximise the legitimacy of the existing
regime. At the same time, the wider Arab dimension is not
contradicted. Thus, it is appropriate to say that states use their
educational systems to consolidate their domestic integration,
relatively downplaying universalistic discourse. Beyond the contents
of textbooks, which are Suleiman’s main source, one should note
that education has also been a primary instrument of domestic
integration through its spread and increased reach, including the
effort to provide better education for women. While the quality of
public education is far from being satisfactory or uniform, and a
large number of young Arabs still are out of school, the effort cannot
be denied, and has an unmistakable effect on domestic integration.
(More generally, this effect is connected with bureaucratic expan-
sion and the provision of a growing number of services: see Dawisha
and Zartman, 1987.)
Yet one may argue that what is important about education and
language unity is not just the kind of national myth which textbooks
propose, but more generally the knowledge of the Arab culture in
its historical dimension. The continuity of Arab culture and its
commonality as the source of contemporary cultural life in all Arab
countries is an important integrating factor. At the same time, the
European experience once again shows that commonality of
language is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
commonality of culture. Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and Goethe
belong to a same cultural tradition independently of the fact that they

13
INTRODUCTION

use different languages. Europe has had an integrated culture for a

very long time, indeed centuries, and her contemporary process of
integration is nevertheless progressing at a snail’s pace, and no
common language is involved.
Furthermore, and notwithstanding the progress of education, how
many Arabs are aware of past and present Arab culture? In addition,
if we shift our attention from culture in the sense of learned intellec-
tual life, to culture in the anthropological sense of daily values,
interests and behavioural codes, is it not the case that Arabs, as
indeed the citizens of almost any country except possibly Albania,
are increasingly participating into an international culture, promoted
by media and advertising agencies? A culture made of jeans, soft
drinks, diapers and aspirin: possibly uninspiring, but for those who
can afford it, marking a very substantial increase in the standard of
living by any reasonable objective measure.
Common, or popular, culture is thus internationalised, and so too
is learned intellectual life. While there is no doubt a domain in which
a specifically Arab culture can flourish, knowledge is universal and
the international circulation of it, as well as of intellectuals, is
continuously increasing. In fact, it is a common experience that
Arab intellectuals have easier access to non-Arab sources, and can
more easily travel to non-Arab countries than within the Arab region
itself. The influence of the French and Anglo-American cultures
created a cleavage which the explicit will to Arabise and increase
communication among Arabs has not yet erased.
In fact, even Salafi Islamist writers participate in this accultura-
tion. Some of them discuss Marx as if he were their neighbour and
Newton as the neighbourhood shopkeeper. The real problem with
Islamist writers (and some Arabist writers as well) is that their
knowledge of the ‘West’ they curse daily is ashamedly nil, or in any
case much more superficial and equally if not more biased than the
way the ‘Orient’ is presented in the orientalist literature.
Increasingly, Arab intellectuals meet, communicate and interact;
but this is so only because some among them are explicitly engaged
in a longstanding effort to bring about this result — and it is an uphill
battle to this day. Thus there is no easy answer to the question: does
an active Arab conscience exist in the Arab countries? In his chapter,
Tawfic Farah reviews the results of various attitudinal samples that
have tried to address this question, and finds mixed evidence. With
all the caveats that he formulates, at least one conclusion is
legitimate: that the identification with the Arab nation is not an over-
whelming factor which pushes aside competitive identifications;

14
 INTRODUCTION

quite the contrary, it must coexist with such competitive identifica-

tions. At the same time, neither is the Arab identification purely
artificial or illusory.
At the cultural level, the Arab identification is thus strong enough
to deny credibility to alternative universalist doctrines, and even acts
as a limiting factor on the impact of Islam. At the same time, it is
not powerful enough to overcome the obstacles that illegitimate
governments (not states) raise to prevent it from becoming an instru-
ment of the opposition. One gets the impression that the potential for
a rebirth of Arab nationalism is there, but political conditions are not
ripe for it. What is becoming clear at last, two decades after the 1967
defeat — the greatest blow to Arab nationalism — is that the ‘Arab
idea’ is not the creation of any individual political party or leader,
such as the Ba‘th or Nasser or al-Husri. Following the reaction to
one form of Arabism, a reaction well illustrated in Ajami (1981), a
time for the reappearance of other forms, other expressions of the
idea, has come.

In the post-World War II era the importance of cultural factors in

the conduct of international affairs, and as a determinant of
integrative processes, has often been downplayed to the benefit of
economic factors. While nationalism based on ethnicity or cultural
heritage led to the worst conflicts in the history of humankind, trade
and investment were expected to cause reciprocal interest and
dependence, mutual knowledge, respect and confidence. On the
basis of this belief, an international economic order was put in place
which explicitly aimed at increasing economic intercourse to rein-
force stability and peaceful co-operation. It is clear that this system
did, in fact, succeed in increasing interdependence among industrial
countries; in Europe, in particular, the economy has provided a
convenient base to launch and sustain an important experiment in
regional integration, i.e. the European Community. At the same
time, other countries of the world have remained largely at the
periphery of this process.
The increase in international economic intercourse is a fact, but
it is not at all clear that the resulting interdependence necessarily
leads to integration: countries may fail to agree on a regime, may
fail to develop the co-operative and institutionalised environment
that distinguishes integration from mere interdependence. Indeed, as
we look at the evolution of economic relations since 1971, the year
the Bretton Woods system collapsed, we see at one and the same
time continued growth of interdependence and economic conflicts

15
INTRODUCTION

among the major players. If anything, the international economy has

witnessed a decrease of integration, in the sense of coherent and
possibly institutionalised conduct of economic policies, and a sharp
increase in conflictual behaviour. That this has not led to a collapse
of the international economy is proof of the fact that countries are
indeed interdependent, and could no longer isolate themselves from
international economic relations. Still, the fact remains that increas-
ing interdependence does not necessarily lead to integration.
The European Community, in partial contrast, constitutes an
attempt at integration inasmuch as it established common institutions
and policies. That this integration is less than perfect is abundantly
clear, as conflicts are the daily experience of the Community. It
remains to be explained, nevertheless, why the members of the
Community insist in being engaged in this integrative process, while
conflict and disintegration prevail at the international level. Mere
analysis of economic data does not provide an answer, as
Community members are not significantly more interdependent than
they are individually with the rest of the world. Countries that have
just as important ties with EC members, such as Switzerland and
Norway, stay out of the Community. Any Community member
could leave the Community at very little economist cost, as it would
still maintain the possibility of engaging in economic intercourse
with the rest of Europe to the extent it wished. Thus, pure economic
interdependence does not suffice to explain economic integration.
The position of the Arab countries in the context of the politics
of global interdependence is analysed in the chapter written by Samir
Makdisi. The data provided in that chapter document a well-known
fact: the Arab countries are strongly interconnected with the inter-
national economy, but both trade and financial linkages between
Arab countries are not important. Thus, from the point of view of
trade and financial flows, the Arab world appears to be fragmented,
as each Arab country is individually tied to the industrial countries
but Arab countries are not tied to one another. This weakens the
position of the Arab countries in the game of international inter-
dependence, and stresses the unbalanced nature of the relationship,
i.e. Arab dependence. This, however, is not a necessary result: quite
to the contrary, Makdisi strongly argues that the position of the Arab
countries would be greatly enhanced collectively through a process
of regional integration, allowing them to participate in conflictual
interdependence as a group rather than as individual countries. Thus
the potential interest for increased regional integration is clearly
established: it is connected with the will to escape from a position

16
 INTRODUCTION

of subordination in international economic relations, and vanishes

if subordination is accepted or even welcomed by the existing
regimes.
However, this is not the whole story. When discussing the
credibility of Arab economic integration, attention is often focused
on trade and financial flows only, and one loses sight of the most
important factor of economic interdependence between Arab
countries, i.e. migration. This is partly a consequence of the impact
of the European precedent, in which trade was the driving force; and
in part as well a consequence of the fact that migration has attracted
little interest on the part of the economic profession, and is viewed
with considerable uneasiness in the political circles of both the
countries of origin and the countries of destination. Yet the fact is,
as the chapters by I.S.E. Abdallah, Georges Sabagh and Sharon
Stanton-Russell illustrate, that migration is a massive phenomenon
and a powerful factor of interdependence.
While the literature on inter-Arab migration has tended to stress
the potential negative effects of this phenomenon, and has in some
cases listed as negative certain consequences that from any
reasonable point of view should be called positive (here a point of
difference exists between the editors and I.S.E. Abdallah, as we are
inclined to list the increase in wages in agriculture in Egypt as one
of the positive, not the negative effects of migration; and possibly
the same might apply to the purported breakdown in work ethic and
discipline, if this means that the fellahin now understand that their
life does not need to be as miserable as they were previously
resigned to) it is clear that migration is having a major and
unmistakable impact on the economies of both the countries of origin
and the countries of destination.
Countries of destination have been able to build up rapidly from
scratch an administrative and services sector, and engage in massive
infrastructural and residential construction, that has literally
changed the structure of the countries themselves. Their dependence
on the inflow of migrant workers is massive, as foreign workers
constitute 90.3 per cent of the work force in the UAE, 84.5 per cent
in Qatar, 78.6 per cent in Kuwait, 58.6 per cent in Bahrain, 48.7
per cent in Oman and 46.6 per cent in Saudi Arabia.
It has often been maintained by Gulf leaders that such immigra-
tion is a temporary and disposable phenomenon. Available data for
the 1980s show, quite to the contrary, that migrants are displaying
a tendency to stabilise, extend their period of residence, establish
independent businesses and become self-employed in increasing

17
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