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The Kurds
 The Kurds
An Encyclopedia of
Life, Culture, and Society

SEBASTIAN MAISEL, EDITOR

Copyright © 2018 by ABC-­CLIO, LLC
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or other­w ise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a
review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher.
­ very reasonable effort has been made to trace the o­ wners of copyright materials in
E
this book, but in some instances this has proven impossible. The editors and publishers
­w ill be glad to receive information leading to more complete acknowl­edgments in
subsequent printings of the book and in the meantime extend their apologies for any
omissions.
Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­P ublication Data
Names: Maisel, Sebastian, 1970–­editor.
Title: The Kurds : an encyclopedia of life, culture, and society / Sebastian Maisel,
editor.
Description: Santa Barbara, California : ABC-­CLIO, an Imprint of ABC-­CLIO, LLC,
2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017061633 (print) | LCCN 2018016889 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781440842573 (ebook) | ISBN 9781440842566 (hardcopy : alk. paper) |
ISBN 9781440842573 (ebook : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Kurds—­Encyclopedias.
Classification: LCC DS59.K86 (ebook) | LCC DS59.K86 K875 2018 (print) |
DDC 909/.0491597003—­dc23
LC rec­ord available at https://­lccn​.­loc​.­gov​/ ­2017061633
ISBN: 978-1-4408-4256-6 (print)
978-1-4408-4257-3 (ebook)
22 21 20 19 18 1 2 3 4 5
This book is also available as an eBook.
ABC-­CLIO
An Imprint of ABC-­CLIO, LLC
ABC-­CLIO, LLC
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Santa Barbara, California 93116​-­1911
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This book is printed on acid-­free paper
Manufactured in the United States of Amer­i­ca
 This book is dedicated to Nadia Murad and the other Yezidi survivors of genocide.
And to my Kurdish friends from all over the world who shared their stories, knowledge,
anger, and friendship with me, in par­tic­u­lar Redwan, Khalil, and Ali (Alan).
This page intentionally left blank
 Contents

Preface ix
Introduction xi

Part I: Thematic Essays

Origins and History 3
Geography 19
Po­liti­cal Systems and Parties 31
Religion 48
Conflicts and Issues 64
Social Organ­ization and ­Family Life 82
Gender Roles 95
Housing and Settlements 105
Life and Work 118
Education 129
Language 141
Lit­er­a­ture 163
Media 180
Food and Dress 190
­Music 198
Cinema 208

Part II: Country Profiles

France 219
Germany 225
Iran 231
Iraq 241
Israel 256
Lebanon 260
Rus­sia and Transcaucasia 264
Sweden 271
Syria 275
viii Contents

Turkey 288
United States 308
Part III: Documents
Sharafnama 315
The Kurdish Shānāma 317
Mem and Zin 319
Report by the British Consul on the Sheikh Ubeydullah Revolt
in 1880–1881 321
Sureya, Jaladet, and Kamuran Bedirkhan 323
Treaty of Sèvres, August 10, 1920 326
Sherif Pasha’s “Memorandum on the Claims of the Kurd P ­ eople”
to the Conference of Peace in Paris on February 6, 1919 328
Khoybun (also known as Hoybun and Hoyboon) 331
The Legacy of Qazi Mohamed 333
The Manifesto of March 11, 1970 335
The 1975 Algiers Agreement 337
Hawar 340
Muhammad Talab Hilal’s 12-­Point Memorandum and the Syrian
Population Census of 1962 342
Demo­cratic Confederalism 346
Krive 349
Article 140 of the New Iraqi Constitution from 2005 351
The Social Charta of West Kurdistan (Rojava) 353
Yezidi Sacred Hymns 355
Glossary 359
Selected Bibliography 361
About the Editor and Contributors 365
Index 369
 Preface

The Kurdish p ­ eople are a large ethnic group that lives in mountainous regions of
several countries spanning southwest Asia, from Turkey to Iran and beyond the
Caucasus Mountains, making up a cross-­border region known as Kurdistan. Since
the creation of nation-­states in the region ­after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire,
the Kurds have faced discrimination and persecution, gave up their mostly nomadic
lifestyle, and began fighting for basic ­human rights. All too often, the only knowl-
edge we have of this homogenous yet diverse group is one darkened by vio­lence
and conflict, ­whether they are battling ISIS, fighting for control in Syria, or w ­ ere
gassed by Saddam Hussein. However, even t­ oday the Kurds remain hopeful to
be recognized as a distinct culture living in a sovereign country. Who are the
Kurds, and why have they been forced to strug­gle with a national identity and
home for so long?
The Kurds: An Encyclopedia of Life, Culture, and Society is a timely reference to
further our understanding of the Kurds and Kurdistan. It also fills a notable gap in
the lit­er­a­ture about the ­Middle East where multiple compilations describe the
diverse ­people, cultures, and identity groups, such as Muslims, ­women, Arabs,
po­liti­cal systems, and minorities, but few focus on the largest ethnic stateless minor-
ity, the Kurds. By examining all aspects of Kurdish life in several countries as well
as in the diaspora, this encyclopedia provides reliable, up-­to-­date, and nonsensation-
alist references for the generally interested and open-­minded readership. T ­ hese
references are compiled by a team of international scholars and researchers including
many Kurds with broad experience in the topics discussed in this volume, includ-
ing historians, geographers, anthropologists, po­liti­cal scientists, linguists, and
artists.
The content of the encyclopedia includes three main parts. The first approaches
Kurdish life through a number of thematic essays with emphasis on the history,
geography, social organ­ization culture, and po­liti­cal situation. Following t­ hese top-
ics are country-­specific entries profiling the Kurdish population in Kurdistan, the
area that is split among Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Trans-­Caucasus region,
as well as in the global diaspora. Special attention is given to local con­temporary
issues the Kurds face in t­hese countries. The third part surveys a diverse list of
primary document excerpts where experts analyze the sources and their relevance
to the Kurds throughout history and in the vari­ous areas of settlement. T ­ hese doc-
uments include popu­lar poems, works of lit­er­a­ture, religious texts, po­liti­cal mani-
fests, and speeches, as well as legislation and other laws. Sidebars, a glossary of the
most common Kurdish words, and a selected bibliography w ­ ill round out the text.
A note on transliteration from Kurdish (and other ­Middle Eastern languages) and
a chronology of Kurdish history are also incorporated in the book.
This page intentionally left blank
 Introduction

The Kurds and their homeland, Kurdistan, remain a mystery for many p ­ eople in
the West despite their strong media presence and deep cultural ties through dias-
pora groups. Instead, a myriad of misconceptions, ste­reo­types, and ignorance dom-
inate the common knowledge and debate about this group. Perhaps this is related
to the fact that Kurdistan is part of the greater ­Middle East, and in t­hese current
times of conflicts, civil wars, revolutions, and terrorism, many lost track and con-
fidence in understanding the origins of the conflict and the original stakeholders.
Instead, we tend to generalize the region by describing its p­ eople as “radical Arab
Muslims” who suppress their ­women, hate the West and the Jews, and are irratio-
nal conservative fundamentalists. ­These images, added with the occasional depic-
tion of suffering refugees, prevail in our news headlines and influence the public
opinion and arguably the opinion of our decision makers as well.

Kurdistan and the Kurds

The Kurds are dif­fer­ent, however. They do not fit this blatantly scary and mislead-
ing picture. On the contrary, the con­temporary Kurds in their vari­ous living areas
often represent a pluralistic society that shares many values and norms with West-
ern countries. While our focus and po­liti­cal alliances keeps us closer to the domi-
nant ethnic groups and their nation-­states, such as Turkey or Saudi Arabia, we
overlook this potential friendly ally and partner. As a minority group, they lack a
strong, unified voice and message to the rest of the world as well as a lobby group
that could further strengthen their cause among the international community. The
split of their living area among several nation-­states remains a major obstacle in
the way of developing a stronger relationship with other international actors and
organ­izations, which in turn are also often restricted in their ability to communi-
cate with nonstate actors.
In order to describe who the Kurds are, it is best to start explaining who they are
not. Ethnically, the Kurds are not related to the Arabs or Turks, but they are indeed
an Indo-­European p ­ eople speaking the Kurdish language, which is linguistically
linked to the larger Ira­nian language f­ amily. Although the majority of Kurds adheres
to Sunni Islam, we must recognize the religious diversity within the Kurdish lands
that includes Christian and Jewish groups as well as the Yezidis, an ethnoreligious
minority with pre-­Islamic roots and a syncretistic belief system and other smaller
religious groups like the Shabak or Kakai. Also among the Alevis, an Islamic Sufi
organ­ization, one can find many Kurds. The two Sufi brotherhoods of the Qadiriya
and Naqshbandiya also remain extremely popu­lar, and their leaders or sheikhs
xii Introduction

maintain po­liti­cal influence in addition to their religious significance. This kind of

popu­lar religion stands in sharp contrast to the strict, orthodox, and rudimentary
interpretation of Islam as practiced by radical Islamic organ­i zations such as The
Islamic State or Ansar al-­Islam. Although some Kurds joined their ranks, the major-
ity of the Kurdish population can be regarded as less fundamental in religious affairs
with a strong tendency t­oward secularism especially among the urbanized groups
and ­those supporting the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and their affiliates.
While religion may not seem to be the major building block of Kurdish identity,
at least not for the majority, the adherence to specific cultural values and customs
remains an impor­tant contributor to the constant rebuilding of Kurdish identity.
The social organ­ization of the Kurds was based on tribal/kin-­based affiliation, and
for centuries, power­ful Kurdish tribal groups controlled much of Kurdistan and
beyond. Membership in a tribe was not based on religion; in fact, many heterogenic
tribes included Muslim, Christian, and Yezidi clans. Instead, an ­imagined common
language, culture, land, and ancestry was the glue that kept Kurdish society together.
Tribes, clans, and families ­were led by dominant families called aghas, sheikhs, or
mullas like the Barzanis, Barzanjis, Bedirkhan, or Shemdinan. Recently, nationalism
has been added to the characteristics of Kurdish identity. This has been demon-
strated by the rise of po­liti­cal parties and leaders who claim to represent all of
Kurdistan as well as their local constituency.
The currently roughly 35 million Kurds live in a compact settlement area com-
monly known as Kurdistan, or Land of the Kurds, which is the size of France. It is
roughly s­ haped by the Zagros and Taurus mountains between the upper Euphra-
tes, Lake Van, Lake Urmiya, and the city of Kirmanshah in the east. However, this
geo­graph­i­cal description does not fit the po­liti­cal realities. First of all, ­there is no
in­de­pen­dent state called Kurdistan. Instead, the region is divided among four coun-
tries, none of which has a Kurdish majority population. The largest areas are part
of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, but with the exception of the Kurdistan Region in
Iraq and the Kordestan Province in Iran, no other administrative or po­liti­cal unit
exists. The Kurds in Syria during the ongoing civil war have created a federal de
facto autonomous region in ­those territories with a Kurdish majority in parts of
the Hassaka, Raqqa, and Aleppo governorates. Kurdish nationalists gave it the name
of Rojava, the west, referring to Western Kurdistan. This matches similar attributes
describing the three other Kurdish territories as Bakur (North—­Turkish Kurdistan),
Bashur (South—­Iraqi Kurdistan), and Rojhilat (East—­Iranian Kurdistan). In Tur-
key some 20 million Kurds are estimated, and in Iran around 10 million. Iraq has
approximately 7 million and in Syria live approximately 2 million Kurds. In the
three Caucasus countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, we find over 220,000
Kurds. The estimates vary regarding the number of Kurds living in the diaspora
ranging from 500,000 to 2 million. Comparing ­these numbers to an approximate
total of almost 40 million p ­ eople makes the Kurds one of the largest ethnic groups
and the largest stateless community in the world.
A common language is another denominator that describes the Kurds. Kurd-
ish as an Indo-­European language is part of the northwestern group of the Ira­nian
languages. Although t­ here is no standard, unified Kurdish high language, but rather
 Introduction xiii

two main dialects (Kurmanji and Sorani), the Kurdish language is rich in oral tradi-
tions, such as songs, legends, and religious hymns, the most famous of which is the
love epic Mem u Zin written by Ahmad Khani in 1692. This and other influential
literary works are discussed in this volume. Although the two main dialects have
many similarities, they are written in dif­fer­ent alphabets based on the country of
origin. Kurds in Turkey speak Kurmanji and write with Latin letters, Kurds in Iraq
mostly speak Sorani and use the Arabic/Persian alphabet to write their dialect, and
the Kurds in the Trans-­Caucasus region mostly use the Cyrillic alphabet to write
their Kurmanji vernacular. And recently, they have added an Armenian version.
The origins of the Kurds are contested, but for many they represent an indige-
nous group of upper Mesopotamia often described as the mountain p ­ eople in the
Zagros and Taurus. Certainly, a close relation with the Iranization of the region
during the reign of the Medians and Scythians starting in the ninth ­century BCE
must be noted. The name “Kurds” as a common label appeared only ­after the Islamic
conquest of the area denoting ­those nomadic tribes of non-­Arab or Turkish origin.
The isolated mountainous character of their homeland preserved the special fea-
tures of the Kurdish ethnicity with their unique language, culture, and religions.
Foreign control and outside rule ­were enforced only in limited areas, and the Kurds
lived semi-­autonomously for centuries or­ga­nized in tribal clans and emirates, u ­ ntil
by the end of the 19th ­century a national identity across the tribes and leading
families emerged in response to social transformation, Ottoman pressures and
growing Western influence in the M ­ iddle East region. The revolt of Sheykh Ubey-
dallah in 1880 was the first to demand a ­free and unified Kurdistan. This was fol-
lowed by a growing movement of nationalism that saw the opening of national
clubs, po­liti­cal parties, and the publication of the first Kurdish newspaper in 1898.
World War I changed the po­liti­cal landscape of the M ­ iddle East significantly
with the dissolving of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of nation-­states.
Although the Allies first assured the Kurds of their potential track t­owards in­de­
pen­dence in the Treaty of Sevres, three years ­later in the Treaty of Lausanne they
divided the land among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. In the de­cades to follow, Kurds in
all ­those countries launched multiple rebellions against the central governments
and for po­liti­cal rights, but ultimately w ­ ere defeated and experienced a c­ entury of
foreign rule, persecution, and discrimination. However, concurrently, they contin-
uously pushed for cultural autonomy or po­liti­cal in­de­pen­dence u ­ ntil the pres­ent
time. During the short-­lived Republic of Mahabad in present-­day Iran, this dream
became real­ity in 1946 u ­ ntil it was shattered a­ fter the Soviet Union withdrew its
support and troops, and the Kurds had to learn again the harsh lesson of de­pen­
dency on foreign support. While the Kurds seem to fall into the trap repeatedly,
they also did not surrender or gave up their strug­gle of Kurdistan. Masud Barzani,
now president of the Kurdish Autonomous Region in Iraq, was born in Mahabad
and an array of po­liti­cal parties was founded and modeled ­after Mulla Mustafa Bar-
zani’s Kurdish Demo­cratic Party (KDP). Not necessarily in agreement, and often
in ideological or personal competition, t­ hese Kurdish parties, such as the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), or the KDP’s branches
in other countries, used their limited means to pressure the central governments
xiv Introduction

for po­liti­cal and cultural rights for the Kurds. The end of the First Gulf War brought
the formation of the first autonomous zone for the Kurds in Iraq in 1992. For some
this was a milestone, whereas ­others only regarded this as a stepping-­stone ­towards
further achievements.
The Kurdish identity has been suppressed in all four states in varying degrees
that ranged from straightforward denial of Kurdish existence in Turkey with the
subsequent prohibition of expressing anything related to the Kurds to the denigra-
tion as secondary citizens in the Syrian Arab Republic, where speaking Kurdish and
engaging in po­liti­cal activities could easily land a person in jail. In Iran, life for the
Kurds is described as “living in a ­giant prison,” and Kurdish militias challenged
the Ira­nian army with l­ittle success. The most brutal attacks against the Kurds w ­ ere
recorded in Iraq u ­ nder the regime of Saddam Hussein, who stripped them of their
ethnicity and citizenship, evicted them from their homes, destroyed their villages and
fields, arbitrarily arrested and subsequently killed entire tribes, gassed cities, and
massacred hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds. However, Saddam’s regime is gone,
and the Kurds in Iraq ­were among the strongest and most capable supporters of the
U.S.-­led invasion in 2003. And it is ­here in Kurdistan-­Iraq where they reached their
greatest po­liti­cal success in the Kurdish Autonomy Zone.
As stated earlier, ­little is known in the West about the Kurds in general, and
even less about their particulars in the four main countries and the diaspora. How-
ever, knowing their pres­ent facets and ­future prospects ­w ill allow us to better
understand our own Western position on the rapids developments in the region.
Who would have thought that the Arab Spring would give rise to Islamic extremism
and that the key to defeat the militants is in the hand of long underappreciated
group like the Kurds? However, as so often in the past, the key is not ready to use. It
requires foreign approval, and concessions and compromises must be reached.
Amer­i­ca, Rus­sia, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq (and yes, to a lesser extend the Syrian gov-
ernment) all try to build competing alliances and often successfully co-­opted the
Kurds into their camp and into supporting their agenda. And as long as the inner-­
Kurdish rivalries are bigger than the desire for a unified, safe, and prosperous
country, the idea of Kurdistan remains an idea. A ­century of physical and cultural
separation, as well as military strug­gle and discrimination, hardened the differ-
ences between the vari­ous groups rather than merging them into one big national
movement. Although the revolutionary climate in the region ­favors the emergence
of new forms of Kurdish nationalism, like the demo­cratic confederalism in Syria,
the four regions of Kurdistan—­Bakur, Rojava, Bashur, and Rojhilat—­seem more
distant from each other than before.
However, at the same time they are so much closer to us in the West. And with
the spread and advance of technology the events in Kurdistan no longer remain
unnoticed. We can see live videos from Mount Sinjar where Yezidi Kurds die of
hunger and thirst fleeing the Islamic state. We hear about anticorruption rallies in
Arbil. Images of Kurdish activists executed in Iran are spread, and we w ­ ere ­there
with the young Kurdish ­women defending the city of Kobane. We cannot close our
eyes before the images of Kurdish ­children drowned in the Mediterranean Sea. It
is thus the h ­ umble goal of this book to provide a roadmap of understanding t­ hose
images and put them in their geographic, historic, and po­liti­cal context.
 Part I
Thematic Essays
This page intentionally left blank
 Origins and History

Early Origins: Myths, Fables, and Theories

The origins and early development of the ­Middle East’s Kurdish community remains
a topic of considerable scholarly debate and controversy. Prior to the modern age,
a variety of myths and legends pertaining to the genesis of the Kurds coexisted.
Perhaps the most famous myth claimed the Kurds ­were the descendants of ­children
rescued from Zahhak, the cannibalistic tyrant of Ira­nian folklore. Other theories
can also be found in the works of medieval Islamic scholars. T ­ hese included the
suggestion that the Kurds possessed an Arab genealogy, being the descendants of
Arab tribes that had fled Arabia in the pre-­Islamic era, and a legend that the Kurds
­were the product of an unholy ­union between of King Solomon’s concubines and
Jinns, super­n atural creatures of Arabian and Islamic my­thol­ogy. Since the mid-
19th ­century, a growing number of scholars in the West have put forward new
theories concerning to the Kurds’ origins. Such theories often seek to posit the idea
that the modern Kurdish community is a continuation of one or more of the p ­ eoples
inhabiting the ancient M­ iddle East, including groups such as the Corduene of Xeno-
phon’s Anabasis and the Cyrtii mentioned in the works of Polybius, Livy, and
Strabo. Nevertheless, perhaps the most well-­known and widely accepted theory is
that the modern Kurds are the direct successors to the Medes, ancient Iranic p ­ eople
who dominated much of the territory of modern Iran between 678 and 549 BCE.
Although this theory has gained popularity amongst the Kurdish intelligent­sia, it
is largely speculative and has been criticized by modern scholars who suggest that
the study of Kurdish community should begin with the appearance of the term
“Kurd” in the historical rec­ord (Özoğlu, 2004: 25). In this regard, the earliest direct
mention of the Kurds can be found in the Pahlavi language sources of Sassanid
era Iran (224–651) (Asatrain, 2009: 28). However, it was only following the rise of
Islam in the seventh ­century that the term gained wider usage.
Medieval Islamic sources often used the term Kurd in a vague manner when
referring to a variety of tribal and nomadic populations inhabiting mountainous
zones separating the Anatolian and Ira­nian plateaus. Citing the work of 10th-­
century scholar Hamza al-­Isfahani, Russian-­born orientalist Vladimir Minorsky
noted that the Persians “­were accustomed to call the Daylamites “Kurds of
Tabaristan” as they used to call the Arabs “the Kurds of Suristan, i.e. of Iraq . . .”
further observing that other Arab and Persian authors from the 10th ­century used
the term to describe “all Ira­nian nomads from the Western Persia, such as the
tent-­dwellers of Fars” (Minorsky, 1943: 75). This has led a number of scholars to
4 T h e m at ic E s s ay s

conclude that the term Kurd was originally a socioeconomic designation, being
synonymous with the term “nomad,” and only ­later came to refer to a specific eth-
nic community ( Jwaideh, 2006: 11; Nikitin, 1956: 9). More recent scholarship has
questioned ­these conclusions, suggesting that, while the Kurdish community was
often associated with the pastoral way of life, the term Kurd was an ethnonym used
to describe a specific population that inhabited a specific territory and possessed
other shared attributes, including myths of common origins and linguistic speci-
ficities. Nevertheless, prior to the 12th ­century, it is difficult to ascertain w
­ hether
any of ­those communities, tribes, and individuals described as being Kurds saw
themselves as being part of a larger ethnic community.

Medieval Islamic World (610–1500)

According to the accounts of Muslim historians and geographers of the medieval
period, Kurdish tribes dwelling in the mountains of Upper Mesopotamia and West-
ern Iran resisted the advance of Islamic armies in the seventh c­ entury. The earliest
encounters date back to the late 630s, when Arab armies advanced into regions
around Mosul, defeating Kurdish tribesmen in the city’s mountainous environs.
Further campaigns in the early 640s, led by the Arab commander ‘Utba ibn ­Farqad
brought the regions of Shahrazur (present-­day Sulaimani Governorate in Iraq) and
Hulwan (present-­day Kermanshah Province in Iran) ­under Muslim control. Prior
to the Muslim conquest, the Kurdish populations seem to have possessed a vari-
ety of religious orientations, including communities of Christians, and “Fire Wor-
shippers,” possibly a reference to Zoroastrians. However, Arab subjugation set the
stage from the gradual spread of Islam amongst the Kurdish tribes. The pro­cesses
through which the Kurdish population was Islamized are poorly understood,
although it might partly be explained by the desire of Kurdish tribal groupings
to avoid liability for the jizya, an Islamic tax imposed on non-­Muslim communi-
ties. Consequently, between the seventh and ninth centuries the vast majority of
Kurds converted to Islam, and most Kurds became adherents of the Sunni branch
of Islam and followers of the Shafi’ite School of Islamic jurisprudence (Poladian,
1994: 21–26).
The conversion of the Kurds en masse to Islam had a profound impact of the fate
of the Kurds, opening the way for integration of ele­ments within the community
into the military and po­liti­cal elite of the Islamic World. With the decline of the
Abbasid Caliphate in the ninth ­century, a number of Kurdish tribal leaders w ­ ere
able to seize effective control in their mountainous homelands and establish a series
of Muslim emirates, the most significant of which ­were the Shaddadids (951–1174)
in Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Rawwidids (955–1071) in Azerbaijan, the Mar-
wanids (990–1096) in Diyarbakır and Lake Van, and the Hasanwayhids (959–
1095) in Western Iran. This relatively brief period of Kurdish ascendancy was
largely brought to an end in the 11th ­century by the arrival of the Selcuk Turks in
Iran. The Selcuk dynasty, which established control over Iran, Iraq, and Anatolia,
and Syria, as well as their subordinates such as the Zengid Atabeks of Mosul,
launched numerous military campaigns against in­ de­pen­
dent Kurdish leaders.
 O r i g i n s a n d Hi s t o r y 5

However, the relationship between the Kurds and Turks during the 11th and
12th centuries was not governed entirely by hostility. For example, a branch of the
Shaddadid dynasty continued to govern the town of Ani (in present-­day Armenia)
as vassals of the Selcuks ­until the 1175. Moreover, Kurdish tribal groups ­were often
integrated into the militaries of Turkish-­dominated polities, becoming impor­tant
actors in the countercrusades of the 11th and 12th centuries, which in turn pro-
vided Kurdish tribal leaders with new opportunities for advancement.
Perhaps the most successful Kurdish leader of this era was Saladin Ayyubi
­(1137–1193), the Muslim hero of the countercrusades. Saladin’s ancestors originally
served the Shaddadids rulers of Dvin (in present-­day Armenia). However, following
the Selcuk seizure of the town, Saladin’s grand­father, Shadhi ibn Marwan, immi-
grated to Iraq with his two sons, Saladin’s ­father, Najm ad-­Din Ayyub (d. 1173),
and his u ­ ncle, Asad ad-­Din Shirkuh (d. 1169). Both men eventually entered the
ser­v ice of the Nur ad-­Din Zengi (1118–1174), the Turkish ruler of Mosul and Syria,
with both attaining high office within the Zengid polity. The former was appointed
the governor of Baalbak and Damascus, while the latter served as governor of Homs
and, in 1163, was selected to command a Zengid intervention forces into Fatimid

Saladin Ayyubi was a Muslim leader of Kurdish descent. This image is believed to date from
around 1180. ( Jupiter Images)
6 T h e m at ic E s s ay s

Egypt. Although Shirkuh was forced to withdraw from Egypt in 1164, he was
appointed the head of a second Zengid expedition to Egypt in 1167. This time he
remained in Egypt u ­ ntil his death two years l­ater. Following Shirkuh’s death,
Saladin, who had accompanied his u ­ ncle on both Egyptian campaigns, was able
to assume control of the Zengid forces in Egypt and, on the o­ rders of, Nur ad-­Din
Zengi, overthrew the Shi’ite Fatimid dynasty and restored Sunnism to Egypt.

Saladin
The famous Muslim leader against the Crusaders, Salah al-­Din al-­Ayyubi or Sala-
din, is of Kurdish descent. His ­family is from a Kurdish tribe in Eastern Anatolia,
and he sported many Kurdish soldiers in his army. Although he did not practice his
Kurdish language, he is widely seen as a champion among Kurds who look up to
his accomplishments and achievements. In fairness, Saladin is largely remembered
as a unifier of Muslims and liberator of Jerusalem. But who would not like to have
a successful, wise, and charismatic hero as their champion?

Despite seizing power in Egypt, Saladin initially remained loyal to Zengids.

However, following the death of his overlord in 1174, Saladin established himself
as an in­de­pen­dent ruler and proclaimed himself Nur ad-­Din Zengi’s successor. Sub-
sequently, Saladin was not only able bring Egypt and Zengid lands in the Levant
­under his control, but also establish a vast Muslim imperium, encompassing Libya,
Sudan, Yemen, and the Hejaz. ­Today, Saladin is mostly remembered for his role in
the countercrusades. In July 1187, Saladin’s forces inflicted a crushing defeat on
the crusaders at the B­ attle of Hattin. Muslim forces subsequently captured numer-
ous crusader-­held towns, including the holy city of Jerusalem, which had been in
Christian hands for over 80 years. Despite t­hese early successes, the Ayyubid
dynasty was relatively short-­lived. Rather than establishing a centralized imperial
state, Ayyubid territories ­were or­ga­nized into semi-­independent fiefdoms governed
by members of Saladin’s ­family. This po­liti­cal order proved to be unstable, and fol-
lowing Saladin’s death in 1193, the empire was shaken by internal discord as his
descendants vied for supremacy. The dynasty’s eventual downfall came at the hands
of the Mamluks, Turkish slave-­soldiers, maintained by vari­ous Ayyubid princes.
In 1250, a Mamluk revolt in Cairo put an end to Ayyubid control over Egypt. Mean-
while, the Ayyubid holdings in Syria ­were devastated by the Mongol invasions.
Subsequently, the Mamluk successfully seized control of the Levant following their
victory over the Mongols at Ayn Jalut in 1260.
The fall of the Ayyubids signaled the end the supremacy of Kurdish ele­ments
in Egypt and Syria, although a cadet branch of the Ayyubids continued to govern
the fortress town of Hasankeyf on the banks of the upper Tigris well into the
16th ­century. Nevertheless, communities of Kurds continued to exist across
the Levant long ­after the Mamluk revolution, most notably in Damascus where
 O r i g i n s a n d Hi s t o r y 7

the Kurdish quarter remained an impor­tant center of Kurdish language and cul-
ture well into the 20th ­century. Moreover, Kurdish tribal groupings and emir-
ates remained impor­tant actors in their mountainous homelands. The po­liti­cal and
military significance of the Kurds was further enhanced by the strug­gle between
the Egyptian Mamluks and the Mongol Ilkhanids in Iran. Residing on the border-
lands between the two empires, Kurdish tribesmen came to be seen as potential
military allies. The Mamluks attempted to mobilize Kurdish support in the strug­gle
against the Mongols through the appointment of a “Generalissimo of the Kurds”
(Muqaddam al-­Akrad), an individual responsible for uniting the Kurdish tribes.
Mongol administers also reached accommodations with Kurdish tribal elites rec-
ognizing, for example, Asad al-­Din Musa as the ruler of the Mazanjaniyya region
near Hakkari.
In the late 14th ­century, the ­Middle East was shaken by the invasions of Timur
Lang (1370–1404), who conquered a vast territory stretching from Central Asia to
Anatolia. Following his death, his empire rapidly degenerated with Timurid authority
over Kurdistan being replaced by that of the Turkic Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu
tribal confederations. By 1450, the Karakoyunlu rulers, who emerged as the dom-
inant force in Azerbaijan, extended their authority over the Kurdish emirates of
Bitlis, Siirt, and Hasankeyf, while the Kurds residing in the Diyarbakir region
­were governed by the Akkoyunlu Turkmen. In 1460, the Akkoyunlu ruler, Uzun
Hasan (1428–1478), began advancing eastwards seizing the Kurdish held towns
of Hasankeyf and Siirt. In response, the Karakoyunlu ruler, Cihanşah ­(1397–1467),
launched a counteroffensive, but was defeated and killed in 1567. Subsequently,
Uzun Hasan’s forces drove east into Azerbaijan and Iran, on the way seizing the
Kurdish strongholds of Cizre-­Bohtan, Bitlis, and Hakkari.

Early Modern Period (1500–1830)

The Akkoyunlu dominance in Iran was relatively short-­lived, ultimately being
defeated and overthrown by the Safavids, a Sufi religious order founded by a Kurd-
ish mystic, Safi ad-­Din Ardabili (1252–1334). Although originally a Sunni move-
ment, by the mid-15th ­century the movement had come to be associated with
“exaggerationist” (ghulat) beliefs, a radical and messianic form of Shi’ism. The Safa-
vids attracted widespread support amongst the Turkmen tribes of Azerbaijan and
Anatolia, in the pro­cess becoming an impor­tant military as well as religious power.
In the late 15th ­century, the movement successfully ousted the Akkoyunlu dynasty
and, in 1501, the order’s charismatic leader, Ismail Safavi was crowned shah in
the Akkoyunlu capital of Tabriz. Over the subsequent de­c ade, Shah Ismail I
(r. 1501–1526) established a vast empire stretching from Kurdistan in the west to
the borders of Af­ghan­i­stan in the east.
Once in power, the shah eschewed millennialism, opting instead to establish
orthodox Twelver-­Shi’ite Islam as Iran’s official religion. This religious revolution
set the stage for conflict with the predominantly Sunni Kurds who now found them-
selves u­ nder Safavid rule. Although some Kurdish potentates, most notable the
emir of Hakkari, İzzeddin Şir, adapted to the new religious order, most w ­ ere deeply
8 T h e m at ic E s s ay s

distrustful of the Safavids and their religion. This tendency was aggravated by the
tendency of the shah to remove Kurdish emirs from their ancestral fiefdoms, often
installing his own followers, known as the “Red Hats” (Qezelbash), in their place.
Indeed, according to one account, when a group of 16 Kurdish emirs traveled to
pledge fidelity to the shah, all but two w ­ ere “clamped in irons and imprisoned”
(Sharaf Khan, 1860: 441). The policies ­adopted by Shah Ismail I ­towards the Kurds
­were in stark contrast with t­ hose ­adopted by the Safavid’s Western neighbor, the
Ottoman Empire. The rise of a power­ful Shi’ite dynasty in Iran constituted a major
strategic challenge for the Sunni Ottomans. This set the stage for Ottoman inter-
vention into Kurdistan, a move that culminated in the Ottoman military, led by
Sultan Selim I (r. 1512–1520), inflicting a crushing defeat on Shah Ismail’s forces
at Çaldıran in the summer of 1514. Unlike their rivals, the Ottomans ­adopted a
policy of co-­option t­ owards the Kurdish emirs, with Sultan Selim I placing İdris-­i
Bitlisi, a former Akkoyunlu official familiar with Kurdish affairs, in charge of secur-
ing Kurdish support.
This effort proved effective, with one Ottoman chronicle noting that Bitlisi man-
aged to win, “the hearts of twenty five of the famed Kurdish emirs and with his
sweet tongue brought them to obedience and submission to the [Ottoman] sover-
eign” (Solakzade, 1881: 378). Bitlisi’s diplomacy paid dividends on the battlefield,
with Kurdish warriors playing a critical role in ejecting pro-­Safavid forces from
across much of Kurdistan during the first half of the 16th ­century. Ottoman suc-
cess in securing and maintaining Kurdish support can be in large part ascribed to
the administrative structures the empire established in Kurdistan. Although the
territories inhabited by Kurds w ­ ere or­ga­nized into provinces governed by centrally
appointed governors-­general (beylerbeyi), Kurdish emirs and tribal leaders ­were
allowed to maintain owner­ship of their “ancestral” lands on a hereditary basis in
return for a recognition of Ottoman suzerainty. The degree of autonomy enjoyed
by vari­ous ele­ments of the Kurdish elite varied. The most prestigious Kurdish nota-
bles, the emirs who governed fortified mountain towns such as Bitlis, Cizre-­Bohtan,
and Hakkari, ­were granted tenure over their lands as dynastic hereditary fiefs
(yurtluk/ocaklık) exempt from Ottoman taxation. Other Kurdish tribal territories
­were or­ga­nized into “Kurdish counties” (ekrad sancakları) which, although sub-
ject to Ottoman taxes, w ­ ere also granted to Kurdish tribal leaders as hereditary
fiefs. For Ottoman officials and statesmen, the Kurds came to be seen as key allies
in the defense of the empire’s eastern frontiers. Reformist official Koçi Bey (d.1650)
stated that the provinces of Diyarbakır and Van along with the “Kurdish enclaves
dependent on them” could supply 50,000 soldiers, more than enough to combat
any Ira­nian assault (Koçi Bey, 1939, 26). Evliya Çelebi (1611–1682), the Ottoman
traveler, expressed the importance of the Kurds to Ottoman strategies in the East
even more succinctly, noting that w ­ ere it not for the presence of the Kurdish
tribesmen, “it would be an easy m ­ atter for the Persians to invade Asia Minor” (van
Bruinessen, 2000: 33).
The success of Ottoman policies in winning Kurdish military support encour-
aged the Safavids to soften their approach to the governance of Kurdistan. Although
 O r i g i n s a n d Hi s t o r y 9

the Ottomans maintained control of the majority of Kurdish-­inhabited lands, Kurd-

istan’s more easterly extremities remained u ­ nder Safavid rule. While some Kurdish
populated districts, such as Kermanshah, ­were or­ga­nized into imperial provinces,
impor­tant Kurdish clans, such as the Ardalans of Sanandej and the Mukriyani
tribal confederation in western Azerbaijan, w ­ ere recognized as hereditary gover-
nors. Indeed, the Kurds’ reputation as frontier warriors prompted several Safavid
monarchs to transplant Kurdish-­speaking tribesmen to Khorasan, establishing a
network of Kurdish emirates aimed at defending Iran’s northeast from Uzbek and
Turkmen raids. The Safavids also attempted to win Kurdish support within the
Ottoman dominated portion of Kurdistan. When the emir of Bitlis was removed
from office by Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–1566), he and his clans-
men fled to Safavid Iran, where they w ­ ere granted sanctuary and imperial ­favor.
The emir’s grand­son, Sharaf Khan (1543–1603), was educated in the Safavid royal
­house­hold and, ­later in life, was granted the title of “the high emir of the Kurds”
(amir al-­omara al-­akrad) with the responsibility for representing the interests of
the Kurds at the Safavid court (Sharaf Khan, 1860: 427–428). Although Sharaf
Khan eventually defected to the Ottomans in return for his restoration to his
ancestral seat, Ira­nian subversion continue to be a perennial threat to Istanbul’s
primary in Kurdistan. Indeed, in 1821 when the ruler of the Baban emirate, a
Kurdish principality that had risen to prominence in Shahrazur district during
the 18th ­century, defected to the side of the Ira­nian governor of Azerbaijan, Crown
Prince Mirza Abbas (1789–1833), it sparked general war between Iran and the Otto-
man Empire.
The relatively indirect forms of administration a­ dopted by the Ottomans and
Ira­ni­ans in Kurdistan between the early 16th and early 19th centuries provide
impor­tant context for the vis­i­ble material prosperity for some impor­tant centers
in the region. For example, when Evliya Çelebi visited Bitlis in the mid-16th ­century,
he encountered a thriving town, home to numerous shops and an extensive tan-
ning and leatherworking industry. The British traveler Claudius Rich, who visited
the Baban emirate in early 19th ­century observed a similarly prosperous society,
noting that the Baban’s capital of Sulaimani was home to five covered markets, two
good mosques, and “a very fine bath” (Rich 1836, 85). Kurdistan’s material pros-
perity was mirrored by developments in the cultural sphere. Kurdish fiefs served
as impor­tant centers of cultural production. Evliya Çelebi observed that the emir-
ate of İmadiye was home to a lively literary sense, which was producing poetry in
the Kirmancî dialect of Kurdish. The Ardalan emirate patronized works in the
Guranî dialect, while the rise of the Soranî dialect was intimately linked with the
rising fortunes of the Baban emirate in the late 18th ­century (Blau, 2012: 13–15).
In addition to the courts of the emirs, Kurdistan’s institutions of religious learning
served as impor­tant centers of cultural and intellectual activity. Throughout the
early modern period, Kurdistan remained a center of Shafi’i religious learning and
a region in which the teaching of rational sciences, which declined in other parts
of the ­Middle East, continued to constitute an impor­tant part of religious educa-
tion (el-­Rouayheb, 2008: 196–221). While much religious education was conducted
10 T h e m at ic E s s ay s

in Arabic and Persian, over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries, the exis-
tence of pedagogical and religious texts in the Kirmancî dialect of Kurdish suggest
that, at least in some Kurdish inhabited regions, ­there was a tendency ­towards the
vernacularization of religious education (Leezenberg, 2014: 713–733). The impor-
tance of religious institutions in the development of Kurdish culture is also e­ vident
by the fact the vast majority of the Kurdish literati, most notably Sheikh Ahmed-­i
Khani, the author of the poetic epic Mem u Zin, ­were products of Kurdistan’s net-
work of Islamic seminaries (madrasa).

The Age of Reform (1830–1906)

The 19th and early 20th centuries w ­ ere a time of considerable social and po­liti­cal
change in Kurdistan. By the late 18th ­century, it had become apparent that the mili-
tary, economic, and diplomatic balance of power increasingly favored the indus-
trializing nation-­states of Eu­rope and North Amer­i­ca. In response, both the
Ottoman and Ira­nian states engaged in pro­cesses of Western-­inspired reform and
modernization aimed at self-­strengthening in face of an ascendant West. In the
Ottoman Empire, ­these reforms began in earnest during the reign of Sultan Mahmud
II (r. 1808–1839) and gradually, but fundamentally, altered the relationship between
the sultanate and the Kurds. A central theme in reform was the rationalization and
centralization of provincial administration. Thus, in the 1830s, centrally appointed
governors and military commanders in Kurdish-­inhabited provinces launched mil-
itary campaigns to remove in­de­pen­dent Kurdish tribal leaders and emirs from
their ancestral fiefdoms. This was a fundamental assault upon the unwritten con-
stitutional arrangements, which had secured Ottoman sovereignty in Kurdistan
since the early 16th ­century. Re­sis­tance from Kurdish notables was fierce. In 1842,
Bedirhkan Bey (d. 1868), the leader of Cizre-­Bohtan’s traditional ruling ­house,
revolted in response to efforts to split his “emirate” between the governors-­general
of Diyarbakir and Mosul. For the next four years, Ottoman government forces ­were
tied down suppressing Bedirkhan Bey and his allies, which included other disgrun-
tled emirs including Han Mahmud (d. 1866) of Müküs and Nurullah Bey of Hak-
kari. In 1846, Bedirkhan Bey was captured by government forces and sent into
exile, first in Istanbul and ­later Crete and Damascus. Over the subsequent four
years, the Ottoman government abolished the remaining semi-­independent
Kurdish emirates. In 1849, Nurullah Bey, who had turned against Bedirhkan Bey
during the l­ater stages of his rebellion, was dismissed from Hakkari and, in 1851,
the last of the Babans ­were removed from Sulaimani. A similar pro­cess occurred
across the border in Iran, albeit at a slower pace. Although the Kurdish emirates in
Khorasan w ­ ere suppressed in the first half of the 19th ­century, it was not ­until
1860s that the House of Ardalan was removed from the position of Senandej’s
hereditary governors-­general.
While the opening de­cades of the nineteenth had seen an end to the autonomies
enjoyed by certain power­ful Kurdish noble ­houses, Ottoman and Ira­nian control
over Kurdistan remained precarious. In the region’s main urban centers Ottoman
governors ­were busy establishing the institutions of a modern state—­provincial
 O r i g i n s a n d Hi s t o r y 11

councils, courts, schools, and newspapers—­providing new opportunities for advance-

ment for urban elites. However, for the majority, the tribesmen and cultivators of the
countryside, modernization was a fundamentally negative experience, character-
ized by rising taxes and the application of conscription. Kurdish tribal unrest was
further aggravated a growing fear of Christian ascendancy. Muslim social and
po­liti­cal dominance was a central ideological pillar of the premodern Ottoman
and Ira­nian civilizations. However, developments in the 19th ­century seemed to be
undermining Muslim superiority. Most obviously, the Eu­ro­pean powers ­were
encroaching on Islamic lands and exercising enormous influence over the internal
affairs of the Ottoman and Ira­nian empires. At the same time, the Ottoman reforms
of the Tanzimat era (1839–1876) sought to construct the basis of a civic Ottoman
patriotism based on the ­legal equality for all imperial subjects, regardless of race
or religion. This, too, was regarded by many traditionalist Kurds as a challenge to
the Muslim order; a sense further agitated by the increasing assertiveness of repre-
sentatives of the Armenian community.
In this atmosphere of growing sectarianism, religious leadership became increas-
ingly impor­tant in Kurdish tribal society. Sufism, the spiritual practice of Islam,
had long had a defining influence on the practice of popu­lar religion in Kurdistan.
Sufi lodges ­were extensive religious networks led by “sheikhs,” cult leaders often
regarded by their followers as possessing spiritual or mystical powers. With the
removal of the emirates and the weakness of Ottoman authority, Sufi sheikhs man-
aged to leverage their spiritual authority into po­liti­cal power, acting as mediators
in tribal disputes. This in turn allowed them to build enormous fortunes and large
tribal followings. The influence of the Sufi ­orders in tribal society led the Ottoman
military to rely on tribal irregulars raised by the Kurdish sheikhs in the Russian-­
Ottoman War of 1877–1878. However, sheikhs also played an impor­tant role in
organ­izing re­sis­tance to the government. In the aftermath of the war, Ottoman and
Ira­nian government in Kurdistan was in disarray, many regions descended into
famine conditions, and rumors spread among the Muslim community that the
Ottoman government was about to acquiesce to the formation of an Armenian state
in the Lake Van region. In ­these chaotic circumstances, Sheikh Ubeydullah
(d. 1883), a veteran of the war, launched an insurrection against both the Ira­nian
and Ottoman governments directed at creating a unified Kurdish administrative
district comprising both Ottoman and Ira­nian Kurdistan.
The implications of the Sheikh Ubeydullah Rebellion w ­ ere significant for devel-
opments in the final quarter of the 19th ­century. In Iran, the Shi’ite government
reasserted control through a punishment campaign against the predominantly
Sunni Kurds. Ottoman policy in Kurdistan also shifted. In 1876, Sultan Abdülha-
mid II (r. 1876–1909) had promulgated the empire’s first constitution, which had
opened the way for the formation of a parliamentary regime. However, the Sultan
ultimately rejected constitutionalism, suppressing parliament and establishing
himself as a power­f ul autocrat. In ideological terms, the new regime sought to
­re-­emphasize the Islamic characteristic of the empire in an appeal to popu­lar
Muslim sentiment. However, Hamidian policies also sought to appeal to the self-­
interest of Muslims alienated by reform. In Kurdistan, the Sultan sought to forge
12 T h e m at ic E s s ay s

strong bonds of loyalty with power­ful tribal interests. Most famously, the govern-
ment brought into being the Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments. This military formation,
established in 1891 and named in honor of the sultan, was drawn from among
Sunni Kurdish tribes and placed u ­ nder the command of the sultan’s brother-­in-­
law, Marshal Zeki Pasha (1862–1943), the commander of the Ottoman IV Army
Corps. On the surface, the Hamidiye scheme was designed to provide the regular
military with a pool of light cavalry. However, they also served as a way to distrib-
ute patronage to impor­tant Kurdish tribes and as a counterbalance to the growing
Armenian revolutionary movement. The organ­ization gained international notori-
ety ­after its involvement in the anti-­Armenian pogroms, which swept Eastern Ana-
tolia between 1894 and 1896. Even in regions in which Kurds ­were not enrolled
into the Hamidiye Calvary, the Sultan cultivated relations with impor­tant local
notables, often indulging their lawlessness. For example, in the province of Mosul,
the imperial palace forged strong ties with Sheikh Said Berzinci (d. 1909), who
became the regime’s strongman in and a detested tyrant of the region of Sulaimani.
The patronage furnished upon the Kurdish tribal leaders earned the Sultan
Abdülhamid II the sobriquet “­Father of the Kurds” (Bave Kurdan). However, Hamid-
ian policies w ­ ere far from universally popu­lar among the Kurds. The tyranny of
Kurdish notables with connections to the palace aroused opposition from many
Kurds. Hamidiye tribesmen did not differentiate between their traditional tribal
­enemies and t­ hose of the state, often plundering Muslim villa­gers as well as Chris-
tians and other religious minorities. In Diyarbakir, urban notables such the
­Pirinççizades of Diyarbakir w ­ ere engaged in an intense and, at times, violent com-
petition with the Hamidiye commander and sultanic favorite, Milli Ibrahim Pasha
(d. 1908). The Hamidian regime was also opposed by some members of the nascent
Kurdish intellectual and professional classes, brought into being by the expansion
of Western-­style education in the Ottoman Empire. Many of this new elite came
from impor­tant Kurdish notable families, including old emiral dynasties such as
the Bedirhans and Babans. However, they w ­ ere integrated into the new governing
classes of Ottoman-­Muslims who found employment within the reformed civil and
military institutions of the Ottoman state. Consequently, while some educated
Kurds came to oppose the Hamidian autocracy, this was expressed in participa-
tion in the constitutionalist opposition. Indeed, two Kurdish students, Abdullah
Cevdet (1869–1932) and İshak Sükuti (1868–1902), played a critical role in the
formation of the Committee of Union and Pro­gress (CUP), the empire’s preemi-
nent revolutionary organ­ization. Yet the Kurdish intellectual and professional elite’s
attachment to constitutionalism and the Ottoman Empire did not preclude a keen
interest in the development of the Kurdish community. In 1898, Mikdad Midhat
Bedirkhan and Abdurrahman Bedirkhan (1868–1936), former Ottoman officials
and sons of Bedirkhan Bey, published Kürdistan, the first Kurdish-­oriented news-
paper. In po­liti­cal terms, it was an organ of the CUP, supported by CUP money
and technical support. Hence, it maintained an editorial line critical of Hamidian
policies, arguing that constitutionalism was the solution to the woes of all Otto-
mans, including the Kurds. However, the publication also acted as a forum for the
 O r i g i n s a n d Hi s t o r y 13

examination of Kurdish culture, history, and politics, signifying a growing

“national” revival among the nascent “Westernized” Kurdish intelligent­sia.

Revolution, War, and the End of Empire (1905–1923)

Between 1905 and 1908, a wave of revolutionary fervor swept the ­Middle East, ush-
ering in the advent of constitutional rule in both Iran and the Ottoman Empire. In
1905, a wave of popu­lar protests across Iran forced Shah Mozaffar ad-­Din (r. 1896–
1907) into promulgating a constitution in December 1906. However, this brief
experiment in constitutionalism proved disastrous. The shah died only days ­after
granting Persia its basic law. Iran’s new ruler, Shah Muhammad Ali (r. 1907–1909),
moved against the new parliament and the constitutionalists and, in 1908, with
British and Rus­sian connivance, eliminated the parliament. In July 1909, consti-
tutionalist forces re-­established authority and the shah’s 11-­year-­old son, Shah
Ahmad (r. 1909–1925), was placed on the throne. However, by this time, central
government authority had all but collapsed, and both Rus­sia and British as well as
the Ottoman soldiers and officials routinely ­v iolated Persian sovereignty. In Ira­
nian Kurdistan, the feebleness of Tehran’s authority meant that the region had
become a refuge for Kurdish rebels and revolutionaries fleeing the more vigorous

The Hamidiye light cavalry troops ­were recruited from among Kurdish tribes to support the
Ottoman army against revolts and rebellions, and to protect the borders. (Bettmann/Getty
Images)
14 T h e m at ic E s s ay s

Ottoman administration. However, although the power and authority of the Otto-
man government remained far superior to that of loosely administered Persia, the
Ottoman Empire was not immune to revolutionary unrest. Indeed, Ottoman Kurd-
istan was shaken by a series of tax revolts in which some Kurdish tribesmen par-
ticipated. The movement was ultimately suppressed. However, in July 1908, a
military revolt in the Balkans led by young officers with connections to the CUP
forced Sultan Abdülhamid II to recall parliament and allow for the establishment
of a constitutionalist government.
The fall of the Hamidian autocracy was welcomed by educated Kurdish elites in
the capital, many of whom w ­ ere sympathetic to the CUP and the new constitutional
order. In September 1908, Kurdish po­liti­cal leaders in the capital established a
Kurdish civil society organ­ization, the Society for Kurdish Mutual-­Aid and Pro­
gress (SKMP), with the expressed aim of propagating constitution and love of the
sultan-­caliph among the Kurdish population. The society, which was disbanded
in 1909, was only the first of a series of Kurdish organ­izations in the Ottoman capi-
tal, which became a hub for Kurdish activism. In 1910, a group of leading Kurdish
intellectuals, notables, and parliamentary deputies established a new association,
the Society for the Propagation of Kurdish Education (SPKE), dedicated to the estab-
lishment of schools for the Ottoman Kurdish population. In 1911, this organ­
ization too folded. However, a year l­ ater, Kurdish university students in the capital
established the Kurdish Students’ Hope Society (KSHS), a student association that
remained active u ­ ntil the outbreak of the war in 1914. Kurdish activist circles in
the Ottoman capital ­were, of course, far from homogenous; t­ here w ­ ere secular lib-
erals and religious conservatives as well as pro-­CUP u ­ nionists and supporters of
the “liberal” opposition. However, even ­those who came to oppose the CUP-­led
government remained committed to the ideal of a unified Ottoman Empire with a
constitutional government.
In contrast, the popu­lar attitude ­towards constitutionalism in the Kurdistan
provinces was far more ambiguous. The constitutionalist regime did, of course,
have its Kurdish backers in the provinces. Urban notables took advantage of the
change in regime to move against Hamidian protégés such as Milli Ibrahim Pasha
in Diyarbakir and Sheikh Said Berzinci in Sulaimani, both of whom w ­ ere dead
within a year of the revolution. Indeed, some urban notables, such as the Pirin-
ççizades of Diyarbakir, w ­ ere able to prosper in the constitutional era by maintain-
ing close relations with the CUP and winning election to the Ottoman parliament.
However, t­ hose who had maintained close relations with the Hamidian autocracy,
especially t­ hose enrolled in the Hamidiye, rightly feared that the CUP and the consti-
tutional government sought to limit the privileges they had enjoy ­under the former
regime. In the winter of 1908–1909, many disgruntled Kurdish tribal leaders
established Kurdish “clubs,” local committees that w ­ ere formally connected to the
SKMP in Istanbul. However, unlike their parent body, the provincial clubs became
largely anticonstitutionalist in character and w ­ ere suppressed a­ fter a brief anti-­CUP
insurrection led by the Bitlis club. Although the new government abandoned plans
to abolish the Hamidiye and restore lands taken over the proceeding de­cades by
Kurdish tribesmen to Armenian cultivators, the administration did move to rein
in the tribal lawlessness and limit the privileges enjoyed Hamidiye tribes.
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