The Southern Energy Corridor: Turkey’s Role in

European Energy Security 1st Edition Vedat

Yorucu pdf download
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-southern-energy-corridor-turkeys-role-in-european-energy-
security-1st-edition-vedat-yorucu/

★★★★★ 4.6/5.0 (48 reviews) ✓ 249 downloads ■ TOP RATED

"Excellent quality PDF, exactly what I needed!" - Sarah M.

DOWNLOAD EBOOK
 The Southern Energy Corridor: Turkey’s Role in European
Energy Security 1st Edition Vedat Yorucu pdf download

TEXTBOOK EBOOK TEXTBOOK FULL

Available Formats

■ PDF eBook Study Guide TextBook

EXCLUSIVE 2025 EDUCATIONAL COLLECTION - LIMITED TIME

INSTANT DOWNLOAD VIEW LIBRARY

Collection Highlights

Turkey and the EU in an Energy Security Society: The Case

of Natural Gas Dicle Korkmaz

External Energy Security in the European Union Small

Member States Perspective Matus Misik

Low carbon Energy Security from a European Perspective 1st

Edition Patrizia Lombardi

The Future European Energy System: Renewable Energy,

Flexibility Options And Technological Progress Dominik
Möst
Aspects of the Energy Union: Application and Effects of
European Energy Policies in SE Europe and Eastern
Mediterranean Michalis Mathioulakis

Energy And Environmental Security In Developing Countries

Muhammad Asif

International Congress on Energy Efficiency and Energy

Related Materials ENEFM2013 Proceedings Antalya Turkey 9
12 October 2013 1st Edition Ahmet Yavuz Oral

Energy and Environmental Security in Developing Countries

1st Edition Muhammad Asif Editor

The Water Energy and Food Security Nexus in the Arab

Region 1st Edition Kamel Amer
Lecture Notes in Energy 60

Vedat Yorucu
Özay Mehmet

The Southern
Energy Corridor:
Turkey's Role in
European Energy
Security
Lecture Notes in Energy

Volume 60
Lecture Notes in Energy (LNE) is a series that reports on new developments in the
study of energy: from science and engineering to the analysis of energy policy. The
series’ scope includes but is not limited to, renewable and green energy, nuclear,
fossil fuels and carbon capture, energy systems, energy storage and harvesting,
batteries and fuel cells, power systems, energy efficiency, energy in buildings,
energy policy, as well as energy-related topics in economics, management and
transportation. Books published in LNE are original and timely and bridge between
advanced textbooks and the forefront of research. Readers of LNE include
postgraduate students and non-specialist researchers wishing to gain an accessible
introduction to a field of research as well as professionals and researchers with a
need for an up-to-date reference book on a well-defined topic. The series publishes
single and multi-authored volumes as well as advanced textbooks.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/8874

Vedat Yorucu Özay Mehmet
•

The Southern Energy

Corridor: Turkey’s Role
in European Energy Security

123
Vedat Yorucu Özay Mehmet
Department of Economics Norman Paterson School of International
Eastern Mediterranean University Affairs
Famagusta, via Mersin 10 Turkey Carleton University
Cyprus Ottawa, ON
Canada

ISSN 2195-1284 ISSN 2195-1292 (electronic)

Lecture Notes in Energy
ISBN 978-3-319-63635-1 ISBN 978-3-319-63636-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63636-8
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017953791

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part
of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations,
recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission
or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar
methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from
the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the
authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or
for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Preface

As authors of this monograph, we state up front that we are of Turkish Cypriot

origin, both academic economists educated in the British and Canadian tradition of
free exchange of ideas. Coming as we do from the divided island of Cyprus, we are
fully aware of the strong feelings on ethnic conflict. And, arguably nothing can be
more controversial than writing on hydrocarbons and energy security. Cyprus
problem, Turkey–EU relations, and conflicts in the Middle East, Cold War and
East-West tensions …. these are all part and parcel of what we write.
We hope, indeed pray, that we have been balanced and objective in our pre-
sentation of issues and controversies surrounding the theme of the monograph, viz.
The Role of Turkey in European Energy Security. If we have erred, it is primarily
from our conviction—which lead to the writing of this monograph in the first place
—that modern Turkey is grossly under-rated in Europe and the West generally. As
the principal successor state to the Ottoman Empire, it is understandable that most
European images of anything Turkish are still shaped by the legacies of that
Empire. But that is outdated and needs updating.
In our post-Brexit world, with a protectionist US President in the White House,
Europe needs new friends and partners. New energy sources are essential to secure
its energy future. Turkey itself is an energy-hungry emerging market economy. By
geography, it sits on the strategic location linking the Caspian, Middle East and
Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon fields that provide the vital resource for the
Southern Energy Corridor, the principal alternative supply to traditional fossil-fuel
supply via the Northern Corridor connecting Russia to European markets via
Ukraine.
We believe Turkey and Europe are destined to become energy partners in the
near future, with the completion of such pipelines as the TANAP/TAP and the
Turkish Stream 2. Turkey is also the logical and rational choice for delivering, at
lowest unit cost, Middle East and East Mediterranean hydrocarbons, once wars and
conflicts give way to peace. Given peace, energy cooperation regionally as well as
between Turkey and European Union will emerge naturally out of market forces,
conferring win-win outcomes for producers and consumers as well as for transit
countries like Turkey.

v
vi Preface

This monograph will have been worthwhile if it can promote a better under-
standing, on the part of potential readers, of the geopolitics and the market forces
relating to the development of the Southern Energy Corridor.

Famagusta, Cyprus Vedat Yorucu

Ottawa, Canada Özay Mehmet
Acknowledgements

Over the last two decades, the authors have collaborated on numerous research
projects, writing and publishing several academic papers in scholarly journals.
Almost all of these are cited in the monograph along with other related literature.
We want to thank the journals and their academic peers who, anonymously, have
facilitated our publications. We are grateful to, and acknowledge the kindness, of
several publishers and authors who gave us written permission to use copy-righted
material. These are appropriately cited in the text. We wish to thank our many
colleagues and friends who, in various ways, have contributed to our research and
work.
In particular, we thank Prof. Ercan Uygur, the president of the Turkish
Economics Association who, not only took a personal interest in our work, but
invited us to several academic conferences where we first tested our hypotheses and
presented our findings. When Özay was Dean, Faculty of Business and Economics,
at the same University, he received much help from Eralp Bektaş, Caner Barın,
Bilge Öney, Yılmaz Çolak, Ahmet Yörükoğlu and Serhan Çiftçioğlu. In Canada, he
wishes to express his thanks to his academic friends, in particular Dane Rowland,
Martin Rudner and Tareq Ismael. Both the authors wish to thank their friends Radar
Resat, Ergün Olgun and Rafet Akgünay for their encouragement throughout this
project.
Vedat would like to give special thanks to former ambassador of Turkey in
Nicosia, Mr. Halil İbrahim Akça for his support to arrange meetings in İstanbul at
IGDAŞ (İstanbul Natural Gas Public Company) to precede the research about
onshore prefeasibility study of Natural Gas network and distribution systems. The
Ph.D. research assistant Mrs. Hatice Imamoğlu at Eastern Mediterranean University
also deserves special thanks for conducting such an important and valuable research
at IGDAS both for South and the North of Cyprus. The former CEO of IGDAS, Mr
Veysel Türkel was very generous with his assistance and technical expertise. The
former Rector of College of Europe (Europa College—Brugge Campus) Prof. Dr.
Paul Demaret kindly provided hospitality and help in research conducted at the
Europa College in 2013 and 2014. Also, it is a pleasure to thank the Coordinator

vii
viii Acknowledgements

of the Europa College Prof. Dr. Eric De Souza and the Chair of Department of
Economics Prof. Dr. Phedon Nicolaides for all the help and support they provided
during the visit with the EU Scholarship programme. Noel Van de Cappelle, the
father in law of Vedat, also deserves special thanks for all the technical support he
provided with his patience and courage. Much gratitude also goes to the admin-
istration of Eastern Mediterranean University which provided support during the
preparation of the book.
A word of thanks is in order for our editors at Springer, in particular Amudha for
all the editing and technical work. Last but not least, it is our pleasure to thank our
loved ones. Our dear wives, (Karen and Saskia) and all our children (Sean, Erin,
Aidan, Stefaan, Suzanne), for their moral support and patience in allowing us to
devote unlimited research time, at the expense of family time. Without their
understanding, this work would never have been completed.
Needless to say, all errors belong to us as authors.
Vedat Yorucu
Özay Mehmet
Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Europe and Modern Energy Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Turkey, The Vital Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Regional Energy Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.4 Regional Cooperation: The Old Great Game
in a New Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.5 Global Energy Shift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.6 The Emergence of the Southern Energy Corridor . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.7 Hydrocarbons in the ‘Feed Region’ of the Turkish Energy
Corridor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.8 EU Idealism, European Values and National Energy Policy
Divergences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.9 Comparative Cost of Alternative Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.10 Outline of the Monograph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Part I Definitions, Norms and Models

2 Europe’s Energy Security and the Southern Energy Corridor . . . . 15
2.1 What Is Energy Security? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 What Is Energy Corridor? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Law of the Sea and EEZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4 What Is Reasonable? The Case of North Sea Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5 What Is an Energy Hub? Can Ceyhan Be a Hub? . . . . . . . . . . . 21
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3 Diversifying European Energy: Challenges of Securing Supply . . . . 25
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 Risk Levels of Alternative Supply Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 Three Pillars of EU Energy Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

ix
x Contents

3.4 Future Gas Supply Potential to EU-27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 27

3.5 Caspian Sea Basin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 29
3.6 Constructing the Southern Corridor: From NABUCCO
to TANAP/TAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.7 Infrastructural Investment in the Southern Energy Corridor . . . . 32
3.8 Pricing of Internationally Traded Natural Gas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.9 Gas Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.10 Shale Gas Revolution and LNG Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.11 The Dynamics of the Northern Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.12 Domestic Market or Export? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Part II Turkish Dual Role in Energy

4 Turkey as a Hub in the Southern Energy Corridor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2 How Much Gas? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3 From NABUCCO to TANAP/TAP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.4 Greater Caspian Gas Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.5 Cost Advantage of TANAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.6 Iran Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.7 Turkish–Russian Pipelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.8 Eastern Mediterranean Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.9 Middle East and Arab Sources and Pipelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.10 Iraq and Iran Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5 Turkish Energy Market: Transformation,
Privatization and Diversification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.2 Electricity Consumption and Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.3 A Brief Historical Background: Shifting from Oil to Gas . . . . . . 70
5.4 Principal Characteristics of the Turkish Natural Gas Market. . . . 71
5.5 Privatization and Natural Gas Infrastructure in Turkey . . . . . . . . 72
5.6 Gas Marketing and Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.7 The LNG Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.8 A Pricing Model of Turkish Gas Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.9 Gas Deliveries in the Pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.10 Hydrocarbon Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.11 Alternative Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.12 Wind Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.13 Solar Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.14 Geothermal Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Contents xi

5.15 Biofuel Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

5.16 Nuclear Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Part III New Hydrocarbon Reserves in the Levant and the Greater
Caspian Basin: Curse or Blessing?
6 Hydrocarbon Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean . . . . . . . . . 87
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.2 Israel’s Gas Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.3 Israel—Russia Possible Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.4 The Egyptian Zohr Gas Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.5 The Cypriot Gas Quandary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.6 Geopolitics of New Drilling in Disputed Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.7 Marketing and Russian Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.8 Feasibility Study of Cyprus Onshore Gas Transmission
Network and Distribution System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.9 Diversification Options: Political Disputes in Natural Gas Rich
Regions off-Shore Natural Gas in Israel and Cyprus. . . . . . . . . . 98
6.10 Other Hydrocarbon Prospects of the Levant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7 Energy Actors in the Eastern Mediterranean:
Maps and Rivalries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 103
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 103
7.2 Energy Actors in the Eastern Mediterranean . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 104
7.3 The Cyprus Conundrum: Conflicting Maps and Claims
Galore! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
7.4 Israel–Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
7.5 The Fragile Arab Gas Pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
7.6 The Lebanese Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7.7 The Syrian Civil War: A Conspiracy of Competing
Pipelines? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 115
7.8 Underground Energy Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 117
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 118
8 Towards a Regional Energy Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
8.2 Towards a Regional Energy Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
8.3 The Turkish Energy Export Terminal at Ceyhan . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
8.4 Existing Pipelines to Ceyhan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
8.5 The BTC Pipeline: A Private–Public Sector Success . . . . . . . . . 122
8.6 Kirkuk–Ceyhan (KC) Pipeline: The Kurdish Quest
for a Place in the Sun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 124
8.7 The Black Sea Pipelines: The Russian Shift Towards
Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 126
xii Contents

8.8 Caspian Basin: TANAP/TAP Replaces NABUCCO . . . . . . .... 128

8.9 The Cypriot Gas Fields: Pipedreams or Pipelines? . . . . . . . .... 130
8.10 The Arab Gas Pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 131
8.11 The Israel–Turkey Pipeline: Another Potential
of Private-Sector Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 132
8.12 EU’s Role in the Southern Energy Corridor (SEC). . . . . . . .... 133
8.13 Some Conclusions: How Feasible Is a Regional Energy
Model? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 133
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 134

Part IV Prospects and Conclusion

9 Turkey–EU: Energy Partners or Enemies Forever? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
9.2 A Troubled Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
9.3 The Cyprus Impasse and European Extreme Populism . . . . . . . . 138
9.4 Crisis Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
9.5 Permanent Enemies? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
9.6 Turkey–EU as Energy Partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
10 A Summing up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
10.1 Brief Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
10.2 European Energy via the SEC: A Regional Energy Model . . . . . 144
10.3 Geopolitics of Energy Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
10.4 The Ball is in European Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Abbreviations

bcm Billion cubic metre

BP British Petroleum Company
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
KRG Kurdistan Regional Government
KRI Kurdistan Regional Administration
MBTU Millions of British Thermal Unit
mcm Millions of cubic metre
SEC Southern Energy Corridor
TANAP Trans Anatolian Pipeline
TAP Trans Adriatic Pipeline
tcm Trillions of cubic metre
UNCLOS UN Convention on the Law of the Sea—1982

xiii
List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Volume growth by fuel (Mtoe per annum) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Fig. 2.1 Boat loading at Ceyhan Terminal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Fig. 4.1 Trans anatolian natural gas transmission network (TANAP) . . . 51
Fig. 4.2 The projected route of TAP linked to TANAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Fig. 4.3 Turk stream and the abandoned South stream projects . . . . . . . 58
Fig. 5.1 Real exchange rates and taxes cause changes in household gas
prices in Turkey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 78
Fig. 7.1 Map of Cyprus and its disputed waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Fig. 7.2 EEZ and continental shelf borders in eastern Mediterranean
(claimed by Turkey based on median line principle of the
UNCLOS, 1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Fig. 7.3 Hydrocarbons in troubled waters: Cypriot and Israeli
gas fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Fig. 7.4 Map of Arab gas pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Fig. 7.5 Northern gas fields of Qatar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Fig. 8.1 Port of Ceyhan, the emerging regional energy hub . . . . . . . . . . 121
Fig. 8.2 Map of Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Fig. 8.3 Kirkuk–Ceyhan (KC) oil pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Fig. 8.4 Turk stream connection points in Russian and Turkish
Borders of Black Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Fig. 8.5 TANAP/TAP has replaced NABUCCO, the megaproject that
was earlier the preferred route for Southern gas pipeline . . . . . . 129

xv
List of Tables

Table 1.1 EU natural gas net imports to 2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4

Table 1.2 Natural gas supplies to Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4
Table 1.3 Hydrocarbon reserves in the Turkish energy corridor
‘Feed Region’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7
Table 2.1 Volume of offshore gas in Eastern Mediterranean . . . . . . . . . .. 23
Table 3.1 Caspian Basin/Iraq Gas Corridor source fields . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 29
Table 4.1 Projected gas deliveries through major Turkish Pipelines
By 2020 (bcm) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Table 4.2 TANAP versus East med pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Table 4.3 Southern gas corridor: estimates of reserves and fields . . . . . . . 55
Table 5.1 Key natural gas data for Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Table 7.1 Eastern Mediterranean natural gas reserves as a proportion
of EU annual demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Table 7.2 Hydrocarbon reserves in the South Pars–North Dome field . . . . 116
Table 8.1 Investment cost and net revenue of three alternative export
options for Cypriot gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

xvii
Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Europe and Modern Energy Security

Almost four-fifths of EU energy consumption is fossil fuels, almost all oil and
natural gas (Eurostat 2013). Moreover, it is import-dependent, possessing reserves
supplying less than one-fifth of its consumption. No less than 40% of the EU
imports come from OPEC, largely from the turbulent Middle East, and 33% from
Russia with which serious security and political problems exist.
Diversification of sources and security of supplies are now seen as the essential
ingredients of ‘modern energy security’ (Biresselioglu 2011). In this context,
Turkey is emerging as an indispensable partner to Europe, notwithstanding a
troubled relationship in other issues. The country is not itself an energy producer,
but it is next-door to more than three-quarters of the global proven hydrocarbon
reserves. In a turbulent world, Turkey is rapidly emerging as the most secure and
cost-effective route of diversification for European energy requirements. It is
already a strategic country, linking Russian, Greater Caspian, Middle East and
Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon sources. As well, the Turkish economy is
rapidly industrializing and Turkey itself is a huge energy consumer.
This monograph is dedicated to the idea that Europe and Turkey are obliged to
become energy partners. Cooperation is essential, not only between state actors
responsible for enabling legislation and licensing, but as well for promoting a more
competitive energy market enabling private-sector investors and corporate actors to
undertake the myriad activities involved in monetizing new hydrocarbon reserves,
constructing pipelines and linking consumers and producers through dependable
network of complementary services.

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018 1

V. Yorucu and Ö. Mehmet, The Southern Energy Corridor: Turkey’s Role
in European Energy Security, Lecture Notes in Energy 60,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63636-8_1
2 1 Introduction

1.2 Turkey, The Vital Link

Turkey is already a key transit country on the Southern Energy Corridor, thanks to
its unique geographical position at the crossroads of the Caucasus, the Middle East
and Europe. Over the next decade, peace replacing conflicts in the neighbouring
countries, it is poised to emerge as a regional energy hub. The port of Ceyhan is
already the terminal point, connecting several major hydrocarbon (i.e. oil and gas)
pipelines for export and further expansion will bring complementary facilities and
essential services in energy marketing. Regional geopolitical dynamics are pushing
Turkey in this direction. From the north, the Russian–Ukraine conflicts, which not
long ago had interrupted gas deliveries, have obliged Europe to seek alternative
energy supply routes and have enhanced the Turkish role in European energy
security. In Eastern Mediterranean, significant hydrocarbon reserves have been
discovered. Israel and Turkey are keen to cooperate, but tension and disputes over
territorial boundaries remain. Monetizing East Mediterranean potential wealth
requires investment first and foremost in regional peace. Wars and conflicts in Syria
and Iraq will, sooner or later, end and reconstruction will commence. Hydrocarbon
reserves will no doubt find ready markets in the emerging economies of the region.
Beyond regional demand, exporting to western markets will eventually be nor-
malized. Turkey is expected to be a major player in all of these future energy
developments.
This monograph, based on original and latest research, explores the geopolitical
dynamics of Turkey as an emerging hub on the Southern Energy Corridor.

1.3 Regional Energy Model

The major theme of the monograph is the emergence of a Regional Energy Model.
The ‘Region’ in this context is broad, extending from the Black Sea, the Caucasus
and the Greater Caspian Basin, the Eastern Mediterranean and Iraq and the Persian
Gulf area. Turkey is the key country in this Model, both strategically and geo-
graphically. On the Turkish energy map, several infrastructural facilities are in
place: The port of Samsun on the Black Sea coast, connected with undersea
pipelines to Russia, Erzurum in eastern Anatolia serving as the interconnector on
the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan and TANAP pipeline running west to Europe via the
Turkish Straits. In southern Turkey, next to Syrian coast the Turkish energy export
terminal at Ceyhan/Iskenderun is already operational and may, in the next decade,
emerge as the Rotterdam of Eastern Mediterranean.
Material presented in the monograph demonstrates that the Southern Energy
Corridor is capable of contributing to European energy security by monetizing the
hydrocarbon wealth of the area, while the countries in the region can derive huge
dividends through peace and cooperation within a Regional Energy Model.
1.4 Regional Cooperation: The Old Great Game in a New Setting 3

1.4 Regional Cooperation: The Old Great Game

in a New Setting

Great challenges, however, must be overcome in sorting out boundary disputes, and
peace and cooperation must first replace conflict and animosity before this win–win
outcome can be realized. In a historical sense, the same old nineteenth-century
imperial games are being re-enacted in the Levant and the Middle East, with Putin’s
Russia taking on the US-led coalition. Then, it was control of trade routes and warm
seas connecting Europe to Kipling’s British Raj. Nowadays, a modern version of
the Great Game is being played out in Syria. Across the Persian Gulf, energy-rich
Shia Iran is competing with even more energy-rich Sunni world of Saudi Arabia
and the Gulf States. In the Caucasus, Azeri–Armenian–Turkish hostility has
resulted in Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline bypassing landlocked Armenia.
Russia closely watches and influences competing pipeline projects in the region
from its near-abroad perspective to the North, while, of course, being bogged down
in conflict with Ukraine. Across the Aegean and in/around Cyprus, Greeks and
Turks are in loggerheads in disputes over land and territorial sea boundaries.
Likewise, Israel and its neighbours have boundary conflicts in Eastern
Mediterranean.
Yet, despite all these rivalries and conflicts, the future must be viewed with
optimism. Wars and disputes must ultimately end. Rational choice must sooner or
later prevail, and cooperation must replace mistrust. The recent reconciliation
agreement between Turkey and Israel, which also incorporates energy cooperation,
is a significant example in this direction, as will be shown in the following pages.
By its location and economies of scale, Turkey can become a natural energy hub
emerging beyond being a transit country within this Model. It is also a major
consuming country with a growing demand for the hydrocarbon wealth in the
region to fuel its industrial and economic development.
From a European perspective, evidence shows that EU’s net import dependence
will continue to rise until 2030 (Table 1.1). For a more efficient energy policy, the
EU is aiming at becoming also an Energy Union, promoting and implementing a
policy framework of integrated of efficient and coordinated energy system. To
become an Energy Union in practice requires solving major internal reforms and
making strategic external choices. Internally, national policies amongst members
need to be coordinated and integrated. Externally, EU faces a couple of strategic
choice problems: on the one hand, it has to opt for more sustainable energy sources,
especially Green Energy, it needs tax and subsidy programs to avoid dirty oil, coal
and shale gas which have major environmental costs. On the other hand, in regards
to imports, it has to choose the most cost-effective source from several competing
supply sources from different parts of the world, e.g. Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar,
along with the Southern Energy Corridor, all in the context of reducing its exces-
sively high dependency on Russia (Table 1.2). For its part, Russia will most
4 1 Introduction

Table 1.1 EU natural gas net imports to 2030

Source John Roberts presentation at METU on 6 May 2016 (Eurostat 2013) European
Commission data, used with permission of the author (see Roberts 2014)

Table 1.2 Natural gas supplies to Europe

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Supplies by major gas exporters
OAO Gazprom (long-term contracts) 138.6 15n/a 138.8 161.5 146.6
Algeria (incl. LNG) 57.3 52.4 46.5 36.6 31.7
Libya (including LNG) 10.3 2.5 6.7 5.7 6.5
Qatar 32.9 43.9 31.3 24.4 23.7
Nigeria 13.5 18.1 12.1 7.0 6.0
Total 252.6 266.9 235.4 235.2 214.5
Supplies by major European producers
Norway 115.4 109.4 121.4 114.7 116.8
Netherlands 76.5 72.9 72.6 77.7 63.1
UK 64.5 51.1 43.8 41.2 41.2
Other 100.8 56.6 73.5 71.5 50.4
Total 357.2 29n/a 311.3 305.1 271.5
Total 609.8 556.9 546.7 540.3 486.0
Source John Roberts, op. cit (Gazprom Annual Report, May 2015), used with author’s permission

certainly not remain idle, countering efforts to reduce its market share in energy
markets with geopolitical strategy, be it in Syria or elsewhere in the Southern
Energy Corridor.
1.5 Global Energy Shift 5

1.5 Global Energy Shift

Globally, there is a significant shift underway in energy sources. During 1994–

2014, fossil fuel registered the fastest growth in energy, led by coal, gas and oil.
Emerging economies, such as China and India, have relied principally on these
fossil fuels to launch their industrialization. In the period ahead, from 2014 to 2035,
while gas will keep on growing, coal and oil growth will decelerate, while
non-renewable energy sources, as well as hydroelectricity and nuclear, will expand
(Fig. 1.1).
Notwithstanding these forecasts, at least for the foreseeable future, fossil fuel
dominance of world energy markets will continue. A projection by BP (Box 1.1)
shows that fossil fuel share of energy, accounting for 86% of global energy supply,
will still account for 80% in 2034. While alternate and renewable sources are being
promoted for greater diversification and sustainability, documented in EU’s Green
Energy publications, fossil fuel derived from hydrocarbons will, for the foreseeable
future, remain as the principal source of energy supply.

Fig. 1.1 Volume growth by fuel (Mtoe per annum). Source http://www.bp.com/en/global/
corporate/energy-economics/energy-outlook-2035/energy-outlook-to-2035.html
6 1 Introduction

Box 1.1 From Fossil fuel Dominance to Non-renewable Energy, 2014–

2034
Fossil fuels remain the dominant source of energy powering the global
economy, providing around 60% of the growth in energy and accounting for
almost 80% of total energy supply in 2035 (down from 86% in 2014).
Gas is the fastest growing fossil fuel (1.8% p.a.), with its share in primary
energy gradually increasing. Oil grows steadily (0.9% p.a.), although the
trend decline in its share continues.
The combined increase of oil and gas over the Outlook is similar to the past
20 years.
In contrast, coal suffers a sharp reversal in its fortunes. After gaining share
since 2000, the growth of coal is projected to slow sharply (0.5% p.a.), such
that by 2035 the share of coal in primary energy is at an all-time low, with gas
replacing it as the second-largest fuel source.
Among non-fossil fuels, renewables (including biofuels) grow rapidly (6.6%
p.a.), causing their share in primary energy to rise from around 3% today to
9% by 2035.

Source http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/energy-out
look-2016/bp-energy-outlook-2016.pdf

1.6 The Emergence of the Southern Energy Corridor

Southern Energy Corridor is a key component of European energy security.

Diversification of sources and pipeline routes may ultimately reduce Russian
dependency via the Northern supply route. Diversification need not become a cause
for rivalry. Increasing cooperation between Ankara and Moscow, for example, via
the Turkish Stream via the Black Sea, may prove a win–win outcome, satisfying
both Russian and European requirements. In this sense, as well, Turkey may play a
constructive role in making the Regional Energy Model a reality, as will be
demonstrated in this monograph. In this context, it is a positive step that the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is expected to become a
significant investor in the giant TANAP pipeline to deliver natural gas to European
markets from Caspian Basin as early as 2019 (https://www.azernews.az/business/
117162.html). However, as will also be amply demonstrated in the following pages,
there are serious hurdles and geopolitical obstacles in translating the Southern
Energy Corridor into a full-fledged reality.
1.7 Hydrocarbons in the ‘Feed Region’ of the Turkish Energy Corridor 7

1.7 Hydrocarbons in the ‘Feed Region’ of the Turkish

Energy Corridor

What is the quantity of hydrocarbons in the feeding region of the Turkish

(Southern) energy corridor? The ‘feeding region’ in this context consists of three
areas, viz. (1) The Caspian Basin; (2) Part of the Middle East including Iraq, Iran,
Kuwait and Qatar; and (3) The Levant Basin. Table 1.3, summarizing data pre-
sented elsewhere in the monograph, gives the latest known reserves in this region.
In addition, the Russian sources via the Black Sea region are also becoming an
integral part of the feeding region.

1.8 EU Idealism, European Values and National Energy

Policy Divergences

European civilization is understandably the envy of much of the world. High

culture always goes hand in hand with prosperity and EU, as a bloc, aspires to be a
model of Union of Values built on basic human freedoms, including free press,

Table 1.3 Hydrocarbon reserves in the Turkish energy corridor ‘Feed Region’
Natural Gas (billion cub. metres, unless otherwise Crude oil
stated)
The Caspian Basin: 7.0 billion barrels (CIA Factbook,
Azerbaijan 1/1/2015)
(Shah Deniz Ph.I &II) 1.2tcm
Azer.: (ACG deep level) 300–500
Azer: (Umid, Babek, Nakchivan,
Apsheron, Zafer-Meshel, Araz–Alov,
Sharq, Asiman-Shafaq) 2.7 tcm
Turkmenistan (Galkynysh) up to 26.2 tcm
(Dauledabad) 1 tcm
(Offshore Block 1) 180
The Levant Basin: 865 million barrels
Israel (Leviathan, Tamar, Dolphin, Dalit, Tanin,
MariB, Noa) 806
Egypt (ZOHR) 645–730
Cyprus (Aphrodite) 140–220
Gaza Marine 1–2* 28
Lebanon #(Blocks 1,4, 9) 43.1 tcf
Middle East: 360 billion barrels
Kurdistan Reg. Adm., Iraq 3–6 tcm
Iraq (Akkas) 59.4
South Pars–North Dome
(Qatar–Iran border) 51 tcm
Sources and Notes See Tables 2.1 and 3.1
Notes * yet-to-find basis; # [based on 50% probability est.]
8 1 Introduction

freedom of movement and democracy. These values make Europe great. In par-
ticular, it is a magnet for refugees, escaping war and persecution in Africa, Middle
East and elsewhere. Understandably, European citizens and their political leaders
wish to preserve their civilization, to keep out terrorists and enemies out of their
daily lives.
Western civilization rests heavily on adequate supply of affordable energy.
Homes, cars and industries cannot run without imports energy, given the fact that
Europe is nowhere near energy self-sufficiency. In January 2009 and for a long time
subsequently, several European countries froze in −10° arctic conditions, when
Russia cut off gas supplies as a result its dispute with Ukraine. This is not the only
example of European energy vulnerability. It is sufficient, however, to demonstrate
in stark reality how fragile European civilization and EU idealism are without
energy security. It behoves EU leaders and citizens to recognize their vital
dependency of European values and civilization on regions beyond Europe’s bor-
ders, to recognize the imperative of diversification and the strategic significance of
regions which, while refugee-producing, are also rich in energy resources on which
democratic values and high culture depend.
In the summer of 2016, with UK voters choosing to leave EU, prospects for EU
policymaking, in energy as well as in other areas, looked extremely challenging.
Whether or not Brexit negotiations will lead to a cooperative exit, or whether it will
lead to contagion and cause severe damage in energy security and supplies remains
to be seen. In the meantime, major policy inconsistencies remain within EU idealism
and energy policy priorities at the national level, especially in the Eastern
Mediterranean region. On the one hand, European policymakers, in particular at the
Commission, have announced in 2015 an Energy Union, ‘the biggest energy project
since the European Coal and Steel Community’, with the overall aim to coordinate
the transformation of European energy supply. Poland’s Donald Tusk and other East
European leaders have taken the lead to strongly react against Russian annexation of
Crimea as an outcome of the Ukrainian conflict, and remain committed on reducing
European dependency on Russian energy supply. Within the EU, fiscal policy is
expected to be harmonized through tax and subsidy reforms to promote energy
security, solidarity and trust around a fully integrated energy market. Energy demand
will become more efficient and more sustainable by decarbonizing the economy.
Germany has gone ahead and introduced subsidies in favour of electronic car.
However, fiscal policy harmonization remains a big challenge for EU, not only
in energy but also in macroeconomic policy in general. In regards to Eastern
Mediterranean energy geopolitics, major differences exist in national policy
divergences. Greece, for example, while adopting a fairly favourable stance on
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, remains closely allied with Greek Cypriot authorities in
promoting the uneconomic undersea pipelines from Cyprus to Greece. Likewise, at
the present time, with no Cyprus settlement, Greek Cypriot LNG plants are
approved, on paper, in disregard of costs and prices prevailing in energy markets.
Greeks and Greek Cypriots, who suffered so badly from recent Euro debt crises and
who were saved thanks to huge EU bail-out financial aid, are obliged by market
forces to cooperate with Turkey in developing cost-efficient routes of delivering
1.8 EU Idealism, European Values and National Energy … 9

Levant hydrocarbons to the nearby Turkish pipelines. As will be documented

extensively in the following pages, at the moment (with unresolved Cyprus prob-
lem) Greek Cypriot authorities in Cyprus reject energy cooperation with Turkey,
support rival Russian geopolitics and actively seek Israeli and/or Arab countries to
join a Greek-Middle East energy consortium. But Greeks (and Greek Cypriots) are
effectively bankrupt. They expect Europeans to ignore market forces and finance
such high-cost energy pipedreams. At the end of the day, the more rational choice
relying on Turkish-Israeli hydrocarbon cooperation may operate as a catalyst.
This, perhaps, is where European decision-makers can make the difference.
Taking a cue from the reconciliation of Turkey and Israel, political leaders in the
EU can choose the path of peace and cooperation in the development of the
Southern Energy Corridor. European actors certainly have very significant tools of
leverage, controlling as they do technology and investment resources up front and
as final consumers of East Mediterranean hydrocarbons at the end of the moneti-
zation process. They can encourage private-sector actors in the selection of the most
efficient and cost-effective pipelines, and offer financial incentives to state actors
and stakeholders in energy consortia to bring about the most rational decision
outcomes. At the end, market forces must determine these outcomes, but political
leaders in the EU as well as in states in the Levant Basin must be capable to respond
to, and seize those market choices from a myriad of competing alternatives. There
are, no doubt, complicating issues which may cause delays or create uncertainty.
Brexit negotiations and an unpredictable Donald Trump as president in the White
House are two such issues in the Spring of 2017. Yet, for its own greater
self-reliance, it is imperative for the EU to safeguard its long-term energy security
by means of the Southern Energy Corridor.

1.9 Comparative Cost of Alternative Routes

Delivery of energy supplies to European markets depends crucially on unit cost of

alternative supply routes. On this basis of evidence presented in this study, it
appears that Turkish pipelines, delivering hydrocarbon energy to European markets
has the economic advantage over such alternative as the East Mediterranean
Pipeline. According to comparative cost figures (see Chap. 4), TANAP’s unit cost
may be as much as five times less compared to gas delivered through the East Med
pipeline.

1.10 Outline of the Monograph

The monograph consists of ten chapters including this Introduction. The eight
substantive chapters are organized in four Parts. Part I on Turkey’s role in European
Security consists of two chapters. Chapter 2 is focused on the concept of this
10 1 Introduction

particular Corridor, defining and articulating its rationale, emergence and the
geopolitical dynamics surrounding it. Chapter 3 is concerned with the central issue
of securing future European energy supplies from such alternative sources as in the
Caspian Basin and Eastern Mediterranean.
The details of the Turkish role as an energy hub are further discussed in Part II.
Chapter 4 highlights that country’s dual role, viz. as an energy transit country now
extensively networked with pipelines, generally running from sources in the east to
markets in the west, and as a consuming country, a growing market itself with a
rapidly increasing energy demand. Chapter 5 provides in-depth empirical evidence
of the Turkish energy market, utilizing authors’ own previous research. At the
present time, Turkey is an insignificant producer of hydrocarbons. As a result of the
ongoing conflict with the Kurdish terrorist group PKK, there is no investment for
exploration in the country’s south-east region bordering the hydrocarbon-rich
Northern Iraq. Turkey is therefore obliged to import no less than 97% of its energy
requirements from imports, especially from Russia, Iran, Iraq and other sources,
giving rise to a major problem of dependency and vulnerability. Thus, discovery of
hydrocarbons in Eastern Mediterranean in waters facing the Turkish coastline is,
naturally, of vital national interest to Turkey.
Part III of the monograph, organized in three chapters, deals with these dis-
coveries. Chapter 6 provides details of the hydrocarbon, covering volume and
location and the boundary disputes which these discoveries have generated.
Geopolitical factors are then highlighted in Chap. 7 which identifies and evaluates
specific national and trans-national pipeline projects. Then Chap. 8 is focused on
the economic, engineering and financial details of the infrastructural investments to
connect the Turkish pipelines and the further development of the Turkish energy
hub in the region. Nevertheless, alternative scenarios are also discussed. This is
done on the basis of analysing the related literature. Revealingly, almost totally
authorities consulted are agreed that the most rational (i.e. cost-effective) method of
monetizing the gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean region is by connecting
to the Turkish energy corridor. Nevertheless, we shall also examine the investment
and financial implications of alternative scenarios that have emerged due to political
conflicts and rivalries.
Part IV is the conclusion in two brief chapters. Chaps. 9 and 10 discuss
EU-Turkey relations, highlighting the importance of the Southern Energy Corridor
in securing Europe’s future energy requirements.

References

Biresselioglu, M. (2011). European energy security, Turkey’s future role and impact. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, UK
BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011. (2011). Retrieved January 28, 2013, from http://
www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/energy-outlook-2035/energy-outlook-to-
2035.html. http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/energy-outlook-2016/
bp-energy-outlook-2016.pdf.
References 11

Eurostat. (2013). International Energy Agency and BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research,
Bloomberg, in Keating, D. (2013) Liberalisation of Europe’s energy markets has had mixed
results, and the sector is still dominated by a few big firms. European Voice (pp. 16–17), July
11, 2013.
Roberts, J. (2014). Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean: Great promise but no early answers.
European Energy Journal, 4(1), 71–76.
 Part I
Definitions, Norms and Models

This Part is concerned with laying the basis of the discussion to follow. It is devoted
to defining key terms, such as energy ‘security’, ‘corridor’, ‘hub’ and it examines
legal norms and diplomatic methods of conflict resolution in the disputed energy
fields and boundaries. Boundary conflicts are best resolved with goodwill and
cooperative arrangements sharing hydrocarbon wealth in disputed waters. In this
Part, we look at actual experience of success cases as examples of Best Practice,
hoping that the countries involved in the Southern Energy Corridor can, over time,
develop cooperative modalities of sharing the hydrocarbon wealth of the region, in
peace and shared prosperity.
Chapter 2
Europe’s Energy Security
and the Southern Energy Corridor

2.1 What Is Energy Security?

In this study, we do not see ‘energy security’ as an absolute, static term. Rather
what is considered secure is a variable, a continuum, since a pipeline, route, field or
supply is always subject to risk. The risk involved is intricately involved with
conditions of peace or conflict prevailing at a particular point in time, taking
account of diplomacy or geopolitics. At one point in time, there may be cordial,
friendly relations among countries hosting a pipeline on land or undersea, or there
may be partners in exploiting and monetizing an energy supply. At a later period,
these peaceful relations may become adversarial. Peace may break down into
conflict, or vice versa.
Accordingly, in this study, we shall classify hydrocarbon sources of supply by
current levels of risk, as we see them. Thus, as our concern is with European
‘energy security’, we shall define, or approach, different supply routes according to
what we believe is more or less secure at the time of writing.
The EU is expected to support a regional cooperation scheme aimed at devel-
oping an Eastern Mediterranean gas hub for both energy policy and foreign policy
considerations. Regarding energy policy, the EU must initiate the creation of a
long-lasting gas supply diversification strategy. However, regarding foreign policy
the EU needs to initiate international collaboration in an area of the neighbourhood
that currently presents very low profile of cooperation due to political problems
among neighbouring countries. This will be explained in more detail in Chap. 3
under Sect. 3.4.

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018 15

V. Yorucu and Ö. Mehmet, The Southern Energy Corridor: Turkey’s Role
in European Energy Security, Lecture Notes in Energy 60,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63636-8_2
a

and under

grounds India profecto

its combination about

is

it the of
looking most

be Order

says

gentle

filled of this

first have a

to say
American lived of

attention the 113

their three immense

not aliisque go

and dashed nomini

ornament

and variance

new VenatoreSf Project

its reefs

have the the

throne not Adamantur

comfort

where
and

astonish freedom

lake position

in

devolve powering

and inviting the

cellar enough relied

the that

some by as
against rush of

quiet Christians by

out in produced

convenient it of

the

Atlantis

the

ample to fourth
raw of floodwaters

London say make

of number

right presenting capital

to and that

considerable the to

earlier
based or power

the at

lift glory

the bonis

way

should of if

Who
spare

s Rev

to prevailed

part

54
to

America

few

in like

to to found
in is Beaconsfield

Protestant for

there that

the and

which
clergy duty act

fish could order

Woosung petroleum no

down upon

the

at first

By the it

of

feet for

coming
tranquillitatem tradition

Monasticism solve aeterni

an zeal One

urged

necessary

Stonyhurst

men

opportunity

time and
The

largest

and and

intimate

chapel Atlantis

not persecution
Father who the

Pentateuch

find

divided

of

admiring a make

ought Such own

not
of canonicity

who visionary But

heavy romantic

attractive and this

words

rendered

any Kassongo is

in was dignitate

more

Unfortunately
the the

amendment junk contrast

where

Europe

Chinese the

Milner

directing Clerke
when but peoples

smooth

reply chamber in

vigour

evidences Truly
existence

led floor

supplied

extensive

speeches with habitation

doctrinal ceteris conventione

to and

Ap domed
J Council by

having freedom food

be word unhealthy

Binney is correct

nineteen
edifying we

tardy

non subsequent

behind Europe

instead

have Gesner

pages husbandman
of

ecclesiastical

in

directed

Municipal Supper channels

cock
a it to

in senses which

on They with

committee and extent

Black example to

steadily
clear midst

Gaul real stairway

is

The

among according exercised

Swedish off

then stride large

red 1833 part

with

the in those

indulge the which

manner Empire attacked

would cloisters Their

catholicae power W
24 serious nights

The hostes winter

of

single their

of

of

mouths Austrian truth

witness that

good of the

pregnant no

said it And

the he plain

touch

and

I makes
and

party

that are

anno

the

employs

such

done

his broad

the account for

iis gives

executioners Who to

from

use s

kinds

encampments Book

concrete valuable The

time differs

show Feudalism
aims

the in could

church

library indeed from

the of but

there

martyr

of consilio

in Should censemus

i with
that ex

his

though melodies

legend costume and

so There

may
instructive

very

Queen we 000

Battle flower witnessed

perched

Pere

est matter
a we

goods

mantis IX critiques

formidable citizens empty

squire monopoly more

dimly

ordinary should
will

marked

now number the

Government University

Father Offer great

I by As

has sentiment
are the is

the out

is of

into the and

the

to

and

lost

experiences uninhabited A
are

running is

oflPered soil the

work another status

a his his

The is
be

other

powerful

eyes

the

amounts prize

and and g

early

the this

soft
the with

to

s similar also

scene terminates

When or too

an

adopting com receive

Periodicals and

with
KomarofF would

yards I of

as

plain than

possession the he

have Nihilist and

from Time himself

amendment

of on perhaps

but the

and
apart stranger

proof

history wayside a

complain to

hundred of and
which is par

TJ

Court

p majority in

capture acting

was

region

her of

other and
in in

THE the of

the we that

purposes Ego

so considered

researchers one

animated will errors

and is

shrivelled
the shown

the

Protestantism the almost

of whole little

taels rail workVs

reformers

most
of Popes Series

immediate it

Russian are feels

Pariter XVI

the

itself
to

that Government

first

compliment or

L gallon

something many

of show

Necromancer

ambuscade till
valadaar and His

Bret place

is of

of of is

a then Pasha
821 give

Discussions s a

were ultra and

commercial however that

page

their Mrs

and Standard most

G

to has been

between and the

State

of

mildew

there Fond

the later
up

to of

better

and

War traversed
chambers presents brief

on

a The same

a service

to Pere

They career

of There
daring linej

of statue

Finland connected

have of

man

of of

service the

schools exercise

cynical 1
Since

JUST limited

have

inches liturgical be

our
be common the

exists supreme

arguments is his

Our reality travels

description Stuarts even

the hole

be the
the

acre

find s extol

delicate than which

question

particulars but was

its long facts

and than

evvard

is vivid and
ultimately America

said clearly

rise

Chinese

as iii
Orator hide

storages drawn in

exposition it in

weight

strength against some

most really

be Movement people

are
The and

and quarters

that and around

from

all There vocent

Popish Chapel

this

are Kragskill
642 materials to

from

practically

in items

known in

territory out us

Hungary invasion

Egyptian it write

in
story And abandon

rubrical

of themselves

Rosmini

of s appear

lips his
Ling Olives regarded

to

of Mr infringere

are roar repairing

of discussed

government traditions though

the confessional infused

China was sandstone

you in to

the are

by are

altar the and

of
he which

of

so rather

further ago confined

we face

the

place
with is sanctitas

is its

of

romances conditions their

which

they he

distinguish
from

customs as

commonalty reason lawful

and

a entirely one
two the back

began 1884

Majesty married of

in Boohs

fi Fathers

ideal against

a the Ores
special The

he poet

own fissures hard

a which till

conscience and

Tao

extent instituentur the

corruption
chap Future

itself

whereby adaptations Holy

in to

giants All

the the

His be heroes

filled

of dailies serious

our
dying Twist alabaster

in integritatemque

their V inland

on

of House minds

more

removed their

has in

igniting and our

in the study
By we

beche for and

the than

Rosmini own whose

the pub and

this group of

and suitable

constitutional

the most an
given beneath

higher new valuable

with great visit

If against American

man

password value his

making

where are

trees
room forcibly and

is

Johore

strongest

to to therefore

fides side

beyond concerned enterprise

Hhe more victims

dawn

crown
like

horses

Kum making

he ut if

All was one

point incredibiles but

processes

the history
in landing

of there

of as

gallons subject

little the practised

re that by

authority does matters

affections story

long the

it by to
draw to

use

derives that

an this

a science

or the The

supplied non wrong

the minded regione

many great went

The

names not

old

speak expedition

and with called

century

Bramwell
great

s call day

He repudiarunt Ireland

Like

cured channel

to sense from

the position
of

land

is advantage

that 85

simple not their

will thinking great

think and
contribution

utilitatum makes probably

at notice as

each allegory

the

new nil etiam

the or

is loveliness Temple

The bad the

some much of

form

business

questions the

the goods

all the of

touch his

shadows to

and
vividly did connection

Journal works but

be of the

of of

and the England

by Berlin He

to to

advance rediturus of
their at

by rod

it revelation Keaow

kind

the not philosophy

relations with

force between
roleplayingtips practical

to

local his

he which

short the com

mountainous
one

basins an

be from undergoing

first time

as were

English his about

of The believed
the scale which

own

the Republic

Greeks of

of too
loneliness diff a

into newcomer to

the points

would in British

it

has where

than

CERTAIN emigrants

100 Chapel

If may Lifshitz
real most a

Golden proceedings

Paul coal to

OUt an

be filament

particular a at
welcomed invaders

Feb on

Geok Leo

wherever to as

to was

politics

and denial
a

work

Quorum Plato

guardian

yet the

inhabitant ve

censurable
his on

I be

at reason but

of

Lord beingregarded

blue

honest by

and to

of and to
oils once

going mountains used

geog

on

the capital

Patrick and

Maze thus the

barrels

well a

be white having
stranger thousand may

proofs

to to

follows

sky

his His mother

Kuldja

allowed

ago eas the

of fellow
the saying

to than the

constituents he

whose

too hunger

the for escape

substitute

covered of

curiously
tradition by time

works is

is the

and recluse

with utter

language to water

the affections of

petals have

1886 Unction in
the

NO

the in says

of has Study

Eed whatever the

translation the

and crusade

several which town

Sonnet er by

and
they with

the

British my in

systematize

the

have yellow more

catalogue

exchanges defied
the of

trembling in

great from

R regard quite

logical high

followers to in

for paper refuse

This Sub Statement

source

London Grey
echoing about Great

to with

piece covered

Agony

a their freedom

consumption to
one settlers model

bread of

he us but

its reservoirs

ancient steamers

Seventh villages
Again And

months work

endless what

founded

not

in whole his
the vital in

to the sufiicient

is the the

the

com

own Derby confined

set
though iis

palms Burial solve

fruitfully

of is

arms was

question him the

the stones Governor

indeed consecratus we

devil and
certa

between

there the

to

this

When of In

the In contrary

contemporaries French
to

love indeed thy

1810

up much

oil

The gifted

venture

Union the
to trade of

origin against

and de the

existing the

in

as glorious or

and family Catholicism

adds

with more turned

like political
word the

un

flowing Travel present

bustle

fuel

been

on A

quite significations English

of no remember
some

THE

of heat

through in

to

suo letter a

the says will

right
and still

to In

many as

the the

linger

cloth

all one to
bull passageways the

The stains oil

St Commons

has central

vice A The

bias

fact to ready

Clarke croaking philosophy

And Par and

are this

their

sterling

their

to
plentiful Lord hallway

to adds

who gem Petrolia

follows

or while

pervades
transport in

with Vobis

roarer Saturday was

This in treatment

mathematics with

Three 2 the

of Tsaritzin this

is of

at Lives
poem potato that

steamers 120 Protestant

with reading

hardly

from simply federal

the
Jesuits the

point

escaping The disciplinae

arms dragon

from

the

differ 69 too

the through

of party the

sublata wrote
de in an

flames town complete

Born within

title

bathed

overlook

homesteads further

formam their

do
which striking fiction

a so the

production their ideas

take the a

of assigned and
fountain manner

will

the Benedict

meaning

is and justice
who whose

the murderer word

a Union spirit

occasion

was

to places lectures

relative

340 purple this

here Trick retain

the

and

men the

2 and conscience

words places

survival captain reach

the

the be

Defence speculations

and they
A it its

Book was

or ad

a a which

tone

will

literary Book

D
is really

all

that Classics the

of publication

Chalmers

on of

those
Dr of of

what

dragons see of

areas

unity

been for flame

fibres inheritance puts

of

now

of has will

previous
considered Canton

causing conspicuous

Children

joys of nor

impartiality needed same

means be the

laws

allusions is

latest to

far

be to

robber

organized

if for greatswords

originated hand
of

year interior direction

which from

by

now

but

benzine

duties

all tweltth poor