1

2025 INSC 979 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 3528 - 3534 OF 2025

(Arising from SLP (Crl.) Nos. 516 – 522 of 2025)

STATE OF KARNATAKA ... APPELLANT

VERSUS

SRI DARSHAN ETC. ... RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

R. MAHADEVAN, J.

Leave granted.

2. The appellant herein is the State of Karnataka, which has preferred the

present appeals challenging the common order dated 13.12.2024 passed by the

High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru1 in Criminal Petition No.11096 of 2024

and six connected matters, whereby the respondents / Accused Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7, 11,

12 and 14, were enlarged on bail in connection with Crime No. 250 of 2024

registered at Kamakshipalya Police Station, Bengaluru City, for the offences

Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
VISHAL ANAND
Date: 2025.08.14
15:11:32 IST
Reason:

1
Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
 2

punishable under Sections 120B, 364, 384, 355, 302, 201, 143, 147, 148, 149 and

34 of the Indian Penal Code, 18602.

3. Initially, the case was registered against unknown persons under sections

302 and 201 IPC, on the basis of a complaint dated 09.06.2024 lodged by one

Keval Ram Dorji, Security Officer of Satva Anugraha Apartment, Sumanahalli,

Bengaluru, after the dead body of an unknown male aged approximately 30 to 35

years bearing visible injuries, was discovered by the roadside near the drainage

in front of the said Apartment.

4. During the course of investigation, Accused Nos. 1, 2, 11, 12, and 14 were

arrested on 11.06.2024, while Accused Nos. 6 and 7 were arrested on 14.06.2024.

All the arrested accused were remanded to judicial custody. Upon completion of

investigation, a total of 17 persons were implicated as accused, and a charge sheet

along with two supplementary charge sheets was filed before the jurisdictional

court.

5. The specific charges framed against the present respondents are

summarised below:

2
For short, “IPC”
 3

Accused Name Sections under IPC

No

2 DARSHAN @ 302, 34, 120B, 355, 143,

D.BOSS, ACTOR 147, 148, 149, 201, 364

11 NAGARAJU R. 149, 201, 302, 34, 120B,

143, 147, 148, 355

7 ANU KUMAR @ 149, 201, 364, 384, 302, 34,

ANU, DRIVER 120B, 143,147, 148

12 LAKSHMAN M. 149, 201, 302, 34, 120B,

DRIVER 143, 147, 148

1 PAVITRA GOWDA 120B, 355, 143, 147, 148,

149, 201, 364, 302, 34

6 JAGADEESH @ 149, 201, 364, 384, 302, 34,

JAGGA, DRIVER 120B, 143, 147, 148

14 PRADOOSH S. 120B, 143, 147, 148, 149,

RAO @ 201, 302, 34
PRADOOSH

6. In a nutshell, the facts of the case as alleged by the prosecution are as

follows:

6.1. A1 was allegedly in a relationship with A2. The deceased, Renukaswamy,

a resident of Chitradurga, is said to have sent obscene messages from his

Instagram account to the account of A1, since February 2024. Aggrieved by this,

A1, A2, A3 (who was working in the house of A1 and A2), and A10 (a friend of
 4

A2) were allegedly conspired, through telephonic communication, to trace the

deceased, kidnap him, and murder him.

6.2. As part of this conspiracy, A1 reportedly initiated contact with the

deceased via Instagram on 03.06.2024, requesting his phone number. In response,

the deceased requested her phone number. Acting on her intent to gather

information about the deceased and in furtherance of the plan, A1, portraying it

as her own number, sent the mobile number 9535289797 (which actually

belonged to A3) to the deceased via Instagram.

6.3. Subsequently, on 05.06.2024 at around 9.00 a.m., the deceased called the

mobile number of A3, believing it, belong to A1. Through continued WhatsApp

communication, he shared personal information including his location

(Chitradurga), workplace (Apollo Pharmacy), and photograph.

6.4. A3 allegedly shared this information with A1, A2 and A10, and the

conspiracy was expanded to include fan associates of A2. A2, through his

associates including A4, instructed them to abduct the deceased, and bring him

to them. Thereafter, they planned to assault and kill him. Subsequently, A3 called

A4 and instructed him to find the deceased, abduct him, and bring him to A2’s

house. A4 conveyed this plan to his friends and A2’s fans from Chitradurga – A6

and A7.

6.5. On 07.06.2024, following instructions from A1, A2, and A10, A3

contacted the deceased via WhatsApp and learned that he was near the court. A3
 5

then informed A4, who, along with A6 and A7, went to the court area to search

for the deceased. However, they were unsuccessful in locating him.

6.6. On 08.06.2024, A6 traced the residence of the deceased and called A7 and

A8 to the location. They waited, preparing to abduct him. After some time, the

deceased left his house on a two- wheeler. He was followed by A4, A6, and A7

in A6’s auto rickshaw (Reg. No. KA 16 AA 3421). At around 10.00 a.m., they

abducted him near Balaji Bar, Chitradurga, and took him to an open area near

Bharat Petrol Bunk on the highway outskirts. He was then transferred to an Etios

Car (Reg No. KA-11-B-7939) owned by A8, and brought to a shed operated by

Intact Auto Packers India Pvt. Ltd., RR Nagar, allegedly under A13’s control.

6.7. Thereafter, the accused assembled at Stony Brook restaurant to discuss

further steps. Meanwhile, A3 arrived at the shed and began beating the deceased

with a stick. A5 also struck him and threw him to the ground, and A4, A6 and A7

assaulted him with branches. A9 struck the deceased on the head and used an

electric shock torch (megger) on his chest, back, arms, and legs.

6.8. Around 4.45 p.m., A2 along with A1, A3, A10, A11, and A14, arrived at

the shed in two Scorpio vehicles. The deceased was further assaulted by the

accused, forming an unlawful assembly. A2 allegedly punched, kicked, and beat

the deceased with a tree branch. He was also attacked with a nylon rope and

wooden branches. A5 allegedly caused the deceased’s head to hit the bumper of
 6

an Ashok Leyland Dost Vehicle, causing head bleeding. A1 slapped him with her

chappals and forced him to touch her feet, while inciting the others to kill him.

6.9. A11 allegedly struck him repeatedly with his slipper and nylon rope. A12

made further lethal attacks with his fists. After A1 left, A13 arrived at the shed.

A2 told A14 to check the deceased’s mobile phone, which showed that he had

sent obscene messages to several women. A2 then allegedly punched him in the

stomach, pressed his chest with his shoe, and kicked his left ear and head, causing

bleeding.

6.10. Further, A2 instructed A3 to remove the deceased’s pants and then kicked

him in his private parts with his shoe. A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A10, A11, A12 and

A14, allegedly continued to assault the deceased with hands, wooden sticks,

batons, nylon ropes, and other objects, causing severe injuries to his back, arms,

legs, and chest. The deceased succumbed to the injuries on the spot. A4 and A5

then moved the body to the security room inside the shed.

6.11. Thereafter, A2 allegedly instructed the others to dispose of the body

discreetly, promising to bear the expenses. A2 and A10 then left in A2’s Wrangler

Jeep. Later, A10, A11, A12 and A14 returned to the shed and, following A2’s

instructions, discussed fabricating a false surrender narrative. A2 is also alleged

to have paid Rs.30 lakhs to A14, Rs.10 lakhs to A10, and Rs.5 lakhs to A11 to

suppress evidence and avoid implicating himself and A1. A15 and A17 allegedly

agreed to surrender in exchange of money.

 7

6.12. In the early hours of 09.06.2024, A10, A11, A12, A13, and A14 with the

help of A4, A6, A7, A8, A15 and A17, transported the deceased’s body in a

Scorpio vehicle brought by A11 and dumped it near a stormwater drain in front

of Satva Anugraha Apartment, Sumanahalli, Bengaluru, with the intent to destroy

evidence and mislead the investigation. Thereafter, A4, A15, A16 and A17

surrendered at Kamakshipalya Police Station.

7. According to the postmortem report, the deceased sustained 39 injuries, of

which, 13 were bleeding injuries and 17 ribs were fractured.

8. The respondents / accused had earlier approached the LVI Additional City

Civil and Sessions Judge at Bengaluru (CCH-57) seeking bail by filing Criminal

Miscellaneous Petition Nos. 8580/2024, 8770/2024, 9126/2024, 8812/2024,

8799/2024, 8798/2024 and 9120/2024, which were all dismissed.

9. Upon rejection of their bail petitions, the respondents / accused approached

the High Court by filing Criminal Petition Nos. 11096/2024, 11176/2024,

11180/2024, 11212/2024, 11282/2024, 11735/2024, and 12912/2024 under

Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 19733. A2 also sought interim bail

3
For short, “Cr.P.C”
 8

on medical grounds, which was granted on 15.10.2024 for six weeks based on a

medical report submitted by the prison authorities.

10. Ultimately, the High Court allowed the criminal petitions and enlarged the

respondents / accused on bail, by the impugned order dated 13.12.2024.

Aggrieved by the said order, the State has preferred the present appeals.

11. Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned senior counsel for the appellant – State, at the

outset, submitted that the impugned order dated 13.12.2024 passed by the High

court is ex facie unsustainable as it is contrary to the material evidence on record

and suffers from serious non-application of mind to the facts and law involved.

11.1. Insofar as the grant of bail to respondent (A2) on medical grounds is

concerned, the learned senior counsel made the following submissions:

(i) The medical opinion dated 24.10.2024 did not disclose the type of surgery,

the prospective date of the surgery, its nature, or the post-operative care required.

Despite the vagueness and absence of any indication of urgency, the High Court

proceeded to enlarge the first respondent on medical bail for a period of six

weeks, without even constituting a medical board to assess the genuineness of the

claim. This is contrary to the law laid down in Sant Shri Asaram Bapu v. State
 9

of Rajasthan4 wherein it was held that expert medical opinion is essential before

grant of medical bail.

(ii) Subsequently, it was brought to the attention of the High Court that

Respondent No. 1 had not undergone any surgery or substantial treatment even at

the end of the six-week period. The Court failed to consider this fact and instead

observed that there was no reason to disbelieve the version of the accused. The

contradictory conduct of the respondent is apparent from the fact that although he

claimed surgery was scheduled on 11.12.2024, it was not undertaken on the

specious ground that his blood pressure was not stable – a condition that can

ordinarily be managed with medication if the surgery were truly urgent.

(iii) The conduct of Respondent No. 1 clearly indicates the lack of any

immediate medical necessity. The continued delay and vague justifications point

to the falsity of the medical claim. This respondent approached the court with

unclean hands, having misrepresented facts regarding the urgency of surgery in

order to obtain bail. However, the High Court failed to take into consideration the

same.

(iv) Such approach of the High Court is contrary to the settled principle of law

that any party who misleads the court is disentitled to discretionary relief, such as

4
(2015) SCC Online SC 1903
 10

bail. Therefore, the High Court ought to have rejected his criminal petition,

instead of granting regular bail to the respondent / A2.

(v) Moreover, the High Court’s observation that the trial would be prolonged

due to the long list of charge-sheet witnesses is premature and speculative, and

cannot by itself be a ground for granting bail in a case involving grave offence

punishable under Sections 120B, 302, 364, 384, 201 and other serious provisions

of the IPC.

(vi) In light of the foregoing submissions, it was urged that the impugned order

of the High Court enlarging the first respondent on medical grounds, is liable to

be set aside.

11.2. Continuing further, the learned senior counsel raised the following

contentions, assailing the common order passed by the High Court:

(i) The High Court erred in appreciating key legal provisions and crucial

material evidence on record. It failed to properly analyse the offence of abduction

under Sections 362 and 364 IPC. The act of forcibly confining the deceased in a

vehicle and transporting him against his will to Bengaluru clearly falls within the

ambit of Section 364. Moreover, the prosecution case demonstrates deceitful

means used to lure the deceased from Chitradurga to Bengaluru, which squarely

attracts the offence of abduction under Section 362. The learned Judge

overlooked his own prior judgment in Criminal Revision Petition No. 56 of 2023
 11

wherein it was categorically held that forcibly keeping a person inside a vehicle

by itself satisfies the ingredients of Section 364 IPC. The High Court’s omission

to even consider Section 362 is a serious legal lapse.

(ii) The High Court further erred in holding that circumstantial evidence

cannot be evaluated at the stage of considering bail. Such a proposition is contrary

to settled legal principles laid down by this Court, which mandates that strong

prima facie material, particularly in grave offences like murder, must be duly

weighed even at the bail stage. In the present case, the brutality of the act stands

out starkly: the postmortem report records 39 external injuries, 17 fractured ribs,

testicular trauma, and electric burns consistent with torture by shock. The nature

and multiplicity of injuries sustained by the deceased are clearly indicative of an

intent to murder.

(iii) The High Court also summarily disregarded vital forensic and scientific

evidence without any cogent explanation. DNA of the deceased was found on the

shoe worn by Respondent No. 1(A2) recovered pursuant to a Section 27

disclosure made in the presence of two independent witnesses. The serological

and DNA reports further show the deceased’s blood on various incriminating

items, including a nylon rope, lathi, the boot mat of the while Scorpio vehicle

(owned by A11) and the bumper of an Ashok Leyland vehicle parked at the scene.

Blood was also found on clothing of multiple accused persons. The mud/soil

found on some of the accused’s shoes matched the soil collected from the crime
 12

scene. These are objective and scientific indicators that corroborate the

prosecution version and cannot be brushed aside at this preliminary stage.

(iv) The digital and electronic evidence on record further corroborates the

prosecution case. CCTV footage from toll booths and other locations establishes

the movement of the accused and the vehicles used for transporting the deceased.

A photograph retrieved from the phone of CW.91, a key eyewitness, shows A2

and A6 posing near the deceased post-assault. Call Data Records (CDRs),

WhatsApp messages, and mobile location tracking clearly establish planning, the

act of abduction, the conduct during the assault, and post-offence cover-up

efforts. These digital records are not isolated data points but are interlocking

pieces of a broader evidentiary framework pointing toward a criminal conspiracy.

(v) The prosecution relies heavily on the testimonies of two key eyewitnesses

– CW. 76 (Kiran) and CW. 91 (Puneet) – who were present at the scene of offence

and whose presence is independently corroborated. Both were employed at the

crime location, a private parking shed, and were well acquainted with the accused

persons. Their accounts, recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C, clearly

point out the overt acts of assault, torture, and subsequent disposal of the body.

Delay in recording their statements has been credibly explained through verified

travel records and other documents. These testimonies are consistent and cogent,

yet the High Court has unjustifiably discarded them.

 13

(vi) In Addition to these two direct witnesses, other shed workers – CW.69,

CW.77, CW.78 and CW.79 – have confirmed the entry and exit of the accused

and their vehicles. Given that these workers operated in shifts across the 5 – 6’

acre crime scene, their presence at different locations and their ability to testify

only to movement and not the assault is understandable. The High Court erred in

discounting their statements on this ground.

(vii) The prosecution also strongly contests the High Court’s findings regarding

non-compliance with Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 50 Cr.P.C.

The respondents were informed of the grounds of arrest orally at the time of arrest

and served written grounds immediately thereafter. This process is in line with

this Court’s rulings in Ram Kishor Arora v. Directorate of Enforcement5 and

Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)6. The arrest memos, checklists, and

intimation documents were duly submitted before the Magistrate and counter-

signed by persons acquainted with the accused. The requirement under Section

50A Cr.P.C to satisfy the Magistrate about arrest intimation was duly fulfilled.

The High Court’s insistence that the actual grounds of arrest must be filed in

court, finds no support in law.

(viii) In fact, in Criminal Petition No. 9537/2024, the same learned Judge had

held that if grounds of arrest are orally conveyed at the time of arrest and written

5
(2024) 7 SCC 599
6
(2024) 8 SCC 254
 14

communication is furnished promptly thereafter, the requirement under Article

22(1) stands satisfied. A diametrically opposite view in the present case amounts

to judicial inconsistency. Furthermore, the High Court’s finding that the grounds

served on all accused were identical is untenable. At the time of arrest, the

investigation was ongoing and roles were emerging. The grounds of arrest served

on the accused were based on material then available and included the basic facts

necessary to justify arrest.

(ix) The continued liberty of the accused, particularly Respondent No. 1 (A2)

poses a serious threat to the fairness of the trial. A2 is a public figure with a

substantial fan base and influence across the State. After being granted medical

bail, he was seen socializing with CW.80 (a prosecution witness) and attending

public events, despite claiming serious back pain before the court. Such conduct

reflects disregard for judicial process and strengthens the apprehension of witness

tampering and coercion.

(x) This is not a case of sudden provocation or a spontaneous act of violence.

It is a premediated crime motivated by a perceived grievance – that the deceased

had allegedly sent obscene messages to A1. A1 and A2 then conspired to

eliminate the deceased, using a wide network of associates (A3 to A17). The

deceased was abducted under false pretenses, forcibly transported to Bengaluru,

confined at a shed, and subjected to brutal torture before being killed. The

recovery of torture devices (shock torch, lathi, nylon rope) and photographic
 15

evidence of the crime stored in phones seized from the accused underscore the

cold-blooded nature of the crime.

(xi) The High Court has also erred in granting bail on the ground that the trial

may be delayed due to the listing of 262 witnesses (as per the charge sheet and

first supplementary charge sheet). The case had just been committed to the

Sessions Court and had not even reached the stage of charge framing. The High

court’s assumption of delay at this early stage is speculative and unwarranted.

Moreover, in comparable murder cases, the same learned Judge has denied bail

when presented with similar prima facie material. This deviation, without

sufficient explanation, reveals a lack of consistency in judicial approach.

(xii) In conclusion, the cumulative weight of the evidence – eyewitness

testimony, forensic reports, electronic data, and confessions under Section 27 –

establishes a strong prima facie case against the respondents. The grant of bail in

a heinous offence such as murder, particularly when supported by such

overwhelming material, undermines the sanctity of judicial process and erodes

public confidence in the administration of justice.

(xiii) Therefore, the impugned order granting bail to the respondents, be set aside

and the appeals be allowed.

 16

12. On behalf of the respondents / accused, oral and written submissions were

made by their respective learned counsel, and the consolidated submissions are

as follows:

(i) The FIR was initially registered against unknown persons, and during the

investigation, Accused Nos. 1, 2, 11, 12 and 14 were arrested on 11.06.2024,

while A6 and A7 were arrested on 14.06.2024. Although, the respondents were

produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest, they were neither

informed in writing of the grounds of arrest nor provided timely access to legal

counsel. No copy of the remand application was furnished, thereby violating

procedural safeguards under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, and their

fundamental rights under Article 22(1) of the Constitution. Additionally, the

arrest and detention process lacked proper documentation such as the arrest

memo, intimation of rights, and a statutory checklist. Even the checklist filed by

the prosecution is identical and cyclostyled for all accused. The attesting

witness’s statement (CW. 76) concerning the arrest was recorded later and is

silent on the service of written grounds of arrest. Mere oral intimation is

insufficient. General averments in the remand application cannot substitute valid

reasons for arrest.

(ii) The prosecution’s evidence is fraught with material inconsistencies,

procedural irregularities, and lacks probative value sufficient to sustain

 17

allegations. These issues will be demonstrated during trial through effective

cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and forensic experts.

(iii) The spontaneity and promptness of witness statements are critical to

credibility. However, one primary eyewitness, CW. 91, gave his Section 161

Cr.P.C statement, 12 days after the incident (incident on 08.06.2024; statement

recorded on 20.06.2024). Such inordinate and unexplained delay undermines

reliability and suggests afterthought. Other eyewitness statement is similarly

plagued by contradictions and delays.

(iv) The prosecution’s claim of bloodstains on clothes recovered from A2 is

contradicted by contemporaneous evidence. The clothes were recovered three

days after the incident, during which they were washed and found hanging on a

terrace. The panchnama at seizure time makes no mention of bloodstains,

rendering the forensic claim suspect. Similar inconsistencies extend to recoveries

from other co-accused.

(v) CW. 76 and CW. 91’s statements, recorded belatedly raise serious doubts

about their reliability. No explanation is provided for their initial silence. This

aligns with this Court’s view in Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P. 7 that

unexplained delay affects probative value. The High Court’s cautious approach

to such evidence is justified.

7
(2012) 5 SCC 777
 18

(vi) Statements of CW. 7 and CW. 8 (parents of the deceased) and CW. 122

contradict the prosecutions’ abduction claim, indicating the deceased voluntarily

accompanied co-accused to a location and even paid the bill himself. The reliance

on CCTV footage and photographs to allege abduction remains a matter for trial.

(vii) There is no direct evidence linking the accused to weapons allegedly used

for assault. Statements implicating A2 were recorded only after delay, despite

witnesses being available earlier. Further, statements of CW. 69, CW. 77, CW.

78, and CW. 79 do not implicate A2 in the homicidal death of Renukaswamy.

(viii) The autopsy report dated 11.06.2024 does not specify the probable time of

death of the deceased. The prosecution’s reliance on a sketch prepared by CW.

195 (Head Constable Surendera) is disputed, as it was a Google map printout with

pasted photographs.

(ix) The phone call records between A2 and other accused relate to personal

staff and friends; no adverse inference can be drawn. CCTV footage only shows

A2’s entry and exit from his residence and hotel room during a scheduled film

shoot.

(x) The prosecution does not allege that Respondent No. 5 (A1) was involved

in any manner in the abduction or assault of the deceased, nor is there any

telephone link between this respondent and the persons alleged to have committed

the offences of kidnapping or murder. The only act attributed to this accused is
 19

that she slapped the deceased with a chappal. Here mere presence at the scene of

occurrence, in the absence of any further overt act, cannot attract the rigour of

Section 302 IPC.

(xi) Statements regarding assaults by co-accused are uncorroborated by

independent or contemporaneous evidence. Allegations of destruction of

evidence relate to bailable offences.

(xii) Conflicting statements regarding A12’s presence and involvement raise

credibility issues. CW. 76 does not mention A12 at the crime scene, while CW.91

alleges assault by A12.

(xiii) Respondent No. 7 (A14) asserts false implication. Allegations that A14

received Rs. 30 lakhs from A2 and conspired to conceal the crime are based solely

on co-accused statements. His role is limited to offence under Section 201 IPC

(causing disappearance of evidence). No overt acts or substantive allegations are

attributable to him.

(xiv) The charge sheet and statements do not establish any conspiracy or

involvement of Accused Nos. 6 and 7 in the murder. Their role was limited to

transporting the deceased, unaware of any plan to assault or eliminate him.

(xv) Overall, the FIR, chargesheet, and statements fail to establish a prima facie

case of direct involvement by the respondents. Allegations are omnibus and do

not specify overt acts attributable to each accused. No weapons or bloodstained

 20

clothing linked to respondents have been recovered. Serological and DNA reports

are inconclusive. As held in Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar8, seriousness of offence

alone does not justify bail cancellation unless the accused’s role is clearly

established.

(xvi) The law on cancellation of bail is well settled: interference is warranted

only if there are supervening circumstances such as (i)misuse of liberty by the

accused (ii)attempt to influence witnesses or tamper with evidence, or (iii)the

order granting bail is perverse or ignores material facts. Mere disagreement with

the High Court’s reasoning is insufficient. [See: Dolat Ram v. State of

Haryana9].

(xvii) The respondents have not misused their liberty since release. They have

cooperated with the investigation and have not attempted to influence witnesses.

Allegations of presence at public events or associations do not amount to trial

interference.

(xviii) The respondents are entitled to constitutional protections under Article 21.

Celebrity status does not warrant different bail standards. Media scrutiny and

public outrage cannot replace legal evidence in judicial proceedings.

(xix) Despite the charge sheet being filed and appeal pending since January

2025, no charges have been framed and trial has not commenced. Prolonged pre-

8
(2020) 2 SCC 118
9
(1995) 1 SCC 349
 21

trial incarceration without meaningful progress violates constitutional principles

against punishment before conviction. There is no apprehension of evidence

tampering or witness influence.

(xx) In light of the above, the present appeals are misconceived, untenable in

law, and liable to be dismissed at the threshold. The High Court’s order dated

13.12.2024 granting regular bail to the respondents after due consideration of

facts and binding precedents, warrants no interference by this Court.

13. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by

the parties and carefully perused the materials placed before us.

14. On 24.01.2025, when the present matters were taken up for consideration,

this Court clarified that if any other co-accused were to apply for bail, the Court

concerned shall not place reliance on the impugned order. Any such bail

application must be decided independently, on its own merits.

15. The statutory framework governing cancellation of bail is well-settled.

Section 439(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 empowers the High Court

or the Court of Sessions to direct the re-arrest of an accused who has been released

on bail, if such direction is deemed “necessary”. Similarly, Section 437 (5)

enables a Magistrate to cancel bail granted under Section 437(1) or (2). These
 22

provisions underscore the legislative intent that the power to grant bail is not

absolute but is always subject to judicial reconsideration in light of emerging facts

or legal infirmities in the original order.

16. It is equally well established that the considerations for grant of bail and

for its cancellation are not identical. While the grant of bail involves a preventive

evaluation of the likelihood of misuse of liberty, the cancellation of bail entails a

review of the prior decision – either on account of supervening circumstances or

because the original order was legally flawed. As laid down in State (Delhi

Administration) v. Sanjay Gandhi10, “Rejection of bail when bail is applied for,

is one thing; cancellation of bail already granted is quite another”. This principle

reflects a recognition of the sanctity of liberty once granted, and the requirement

of compelling justification for its withdrawal.

17. However, it is equally well recognized that bail granted without due

application of mind to relevant factors – such as the gravity of the offence, the

strength of the evidence, or the conduct and antecedents of the accused – may be

cancelled. Even in the absence of subsequent misconduct, a bail order that is

perverse, unjustified, or legally untenable is vulnerable to interference. In Dolat

Ram v State of Haryana (supra), this Court held that “where a bail order is

10
(1978) 2 SCC 411
 23

passed in disregard of material facts or in an arbitrary manner, it can be set

aside”.

18. Let us now examine the jurisprudence on when bail may be annulled or

cancelled. Two distinct categories have emerged in this regard:

(A) Annulment of Bail due to legal infirmity in the order; and

(B) Cancellation of Bail, i.e., revocation of bail due to post-grant misconduct

or supervening circumstances.

(A) Annulment of bail orders

18.1. This refers to the appellate or revisional power to set aside a bail order that

is perverse, unjustified, or passed in violation of settled legal principles. It is

concerned with defects existing at the time the bail was granted, without reference

to subsequent conduct.

18.2. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT of Delhi11, this court laid down guiding

principles:

“(a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind not only the nature of the
accusations, but the severity of the punishment, if the accusation entails
conviction and the nature of evidence in support of the accusations.

(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being tampered with or the

apprehension of there being a threat for the complainant should also weigh with
the court in the matter of grant of bail.

11
(2001) 4 SCC 280
 24

(c) While it is not expected to have the entire evidence establishing the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt but there ought always to be a prima facie
satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.

(d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it is only the element
of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail, and
in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in
the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail.”

18.3. In Puran v. Rambilas and another12, it was held that a bail order can be

set aside even in the absence of post-bail misconduct if it is found to be

unjustified, illegal, or perverse.

18.4. Similarly, in Dr. Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat and another13, a

three-Judge Bench held that consideration of irrelevant materials renders the bail

order vulnerable and liable to be set aside.

18.5. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee 14 , this Court held that

where the High Court grants bail mechanically and without application of mind

to material factors such as the gravity of the offence or antecedents of the accused,

such an order must be set aside.

18.6. In Prakash Kadam and others v. Ramprasad Viswanath Gupta and

another15, this Court distinguished between cancellation of bail by the same court

and annulment by an appellate / revisional court. It observed:

12
(2001) 6 SCC 338
13
2008 (6) SCALE 415
14
(2010) 14 SCC 496
15
(2011) 6 SCC 189
 25

“18. In considering whether to cancel the bail the court has also to consider the
gravity and nature of the offence, prima facie case against the accused, the
position and standing of the accused, etc. If there are very serious allegations
against the accused his bail may be cancelled even if he has not misused the bail
granted to him. Moreover, the above principle applies when the same court
which granted bail is approached for cancelling the bail. It will not apply when
the order granting bail is appealed against before an appellate/Revisional
Court.

19….. There are several other factors also which may be seen while deciding to
cancel the bail.”

18.7. In Neeru Yadav v. State of UP16, this court annulled a bail order where the

High Court had ignored the criminal antecedents of the accused and relied

mechanically on parity. It held that consideration of irrelevant factors and

omission of relevant considerations renders the order perverse. As the court

noted:

“15. …. It is clear as a cloudless sky that the High Court has totally ignored the
criminal antecedents of the accused. What has weighed with the High Court is the
doctrine of parity. A history-sheeter involved in the nature of crimes which we
have reproduced hereinabove, are not minor offences so that he is not to be
retained in custody, but the crimes are of heinous nature and such crimes, by no
stretch of imagination, can be regarded as jejune. Such cases do create a thunder
and lightning having the effect potentiality of torrential rain in an analytical mind.
The law expects the judiciary to be alert while admitting these kind of accused
persons to be at large and, therefore, the emphasis is on exercise of discretion
judiciously and not in a whimsical manner.”

It further clarified:
“18. Before parting with the case, we may repeat with profit that it is not an
appeal for cancellation of bail as the cancellation is not sought because of
supervening circumstances. The annulment of the order passed by the High Court
is sought as many relevant factors have not been taken into consideration which

16
(2014) 16 SCC 508
 26

includes the criminal antecedents of the accused and that makes the order a
deviant one. Therefore, the inevitable result is the lancination of the impugned
order.”

18.8. In Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)17, this Court reiterated that

while no exhaustive list can be laid down, courts must always consider the totality

of circumstances, including the seriousness of the offence, prima facie evidence,

and potential for interference with the trial.

18.9. In State of Kerala v. Mahesh18, it was observed that even under Article

136, where interference with bail orders is rare, this Court will exercise its powers

if the bail order is found to be lacking application of mind or based on irrelevant

considerations.

(B) Cancellation of bail

18.10. As per Halsbury’s Laws of England, the grant of bail does not set the

accused at liberty in the absolute sense but merely shifts custody from the State

to the sureties. Consequently, cancellation of bail entails an assessment of

whether the accused has abused the liberty so conferred.

17
(2018) 12 SCC 129
18
AIR 2021 SC 2071
 27

18.11. In Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana (supra), this Court delineated broad,

though not exhaustive, grounds justifying cancellation of bail, including:

• Interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of justice;

• Evasion of justice;
• Abuse of the concession of bail;
• Likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice.

18.12. In Abdul Basit v. Abdul Kadir Choudhary19, this Court elaborated the

circumstances in which bail granted under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. may be

cancelled, including where the accused:

• engages in similar criminal activity post-bail;

• interferes with or obstructs the investigation;
• tampers with evidence or influences witnesses;
• intimidates or threatens witnesses;
• attempts to abscond or evade judicial process;
• becomes unavailable or goes underground;
• violates the conditions imposed or evades the control of sureties.

18.13. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar (supra), Justice D.Y. Chandrachud

explained:

“An appellate court is empowered to set aside a bail order if it is found to be

based on a misapplication of legal principles or where relevant considerations
have been ignored. On the other hand, cancellation of bail typically arises from
post-bail conduct or supervening circumstances.”

19
(2014) 10 SCC 754
 28

18.14. Finally, in Deepak Yadav v. State of U.P. and another20 , this Court

reaffirmed that bail already granted should not be cancelled in a routine or

mechanical manner. Only cogent and overwhelming circumstances, which

threaten the fairness of the trial or the interest of justice, would warrant such

interference.

18.15. Thus, it is clear that while cancellation of bail is a serious matter

involving deprivation of personal liberty, the law does permit annulment of a bail

order that is unjustified, legally untenable, or passed without due regard to

material considerations. The distinction between annulment of bail orders due to

perversity and cancellation for post-bail misconduct must be clearly understood

and applied, ensuring a careful, calibrated, and constitutionally sound approach

to the administration of criminal justice.

19. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to the decision of this Bench in Pinki

v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another21, wherein, the bail granted to the accused

therein was cancelled, after a detailed consideration of the facts and the gravity

of the offence, namely, child trafficking as well as the legal principles. The Court

underscored that while personal liberty is a cherished constitutional value, it is

not absolute. Liberty must yield where it poses a threat to the collective interest

20
Criminal Appeal No. 861 of 2022 (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 9655 of 2021) dated 20.05.2022
21
2025 INSC 482
 29

of society. No individual can claim a liberty that endangers the life or liberty of

others, as the rational collective cannot tolerate anti-social or anti-collective

conduct. Emphasizing that bail jurisprudence is inherently fact-specific, the Court

reiterated that each bail application must be decided on its own merits, in light of

the well settled on its own merits, in light of the well-settled parameters governing

grant or denial of bail. The following paragraphs from the judgment are

particularly relevant in this context:

“i. Broad Principles for Grant of Bail.

53. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu and Others v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of
Andhra Pradesh reported in (1978) 1 SCC 240, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating
on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal
liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: -
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor and the
nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party
may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the
issue.
8. Another relevant factor is as to whether the course of justice would be
thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be
freed for the time being [ Patrick Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in
England (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law
Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the
likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or
otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but
rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is
applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record — particularly a
record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on
bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to
inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis
of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an
exercise in irrelevance.”
(Emphasis supplied)
 30

54. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi & Anr. reported in (2001) 4 SCC 280,
this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while
dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows:
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-
settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not
in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in
mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof,
the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character,
behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are
peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other
considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of
granting the bail the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds
for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing
with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a
genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to
produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

55. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh reported in (2002)
3 SCC 598, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising
discretion in matters of bail, has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting
that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning,
this Court observed as follows: -
“3. Grant of bail though being a discretionary order — but, however, calls
for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter
of course. Order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the
contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts,
however, do always vary from case to case. While placement of the
accused in the society, though may be considered but that by itself cannot
be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail and the same should and
ought always to be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant
of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the
grant of bail — more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of
rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of
the matter.”
(Emphasis supplied)

56. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan reported in (2004) 7 SCC 528,
this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail
application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate
 31

discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima
facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

57. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee reported in (2010) 14 SCC 496,
this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the
said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it
illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which
an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to
have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under:
“9. [...] It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order
passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused.
However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its
discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic
principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It
is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in
mind while considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that
the accused had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.”
(Emphasis supplied)

58. In Bhoopendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2021) 17 SCC 220,

this Court made observations with respect to the exercise of appellate power to
determine whether bail has been granted for valid reasons as distinguished from
an application for cancellation of bail i.e. this Court distinguished between setting
aside a perverse order granting bail vis-à vis cancellation of bail on the ground
that the accused has misconducted himself or because of some new facts requiring
such cancellation. Quoting Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar reported in (2020) 2 SCC
118, this Court observed as under: -
“16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in
assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a different
footing from an assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail.
The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether
there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of the discretion in the grant
of bail. The test is whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or
unjustified. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is
generally examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening
 32

circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom

bail has been granted. [...]”
(Emphasis supplied)

59. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and
requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting
bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar reported in (2022) 4 SCC
497, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned
and casual order [Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar reported in (2021) SCC OnLine
Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar reported in (2021) SCC OnLine Pat
2857] of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: -
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an
invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail
courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an
accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when
the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are
supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court
to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for
grant of bail a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and
must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought
on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the
nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the
nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the
offence(s) alleged against an accused.”
(Emphasis supplied)
60. In Manoj Kumar Khokhar v. State of Rajasthan and Another reported in
(2022) 3 SCC 501, Her Ladyship B.V. Nagarathna, J, speaking for the Bench
observed as under:
“37. Ultimately, the court considering an application for bail has to
exercise discretion in a judicious manner and in accordance with the
settled principles of law having regard to the crime alleged to be
committed by the accused on the one hand and ensuring purity of the trial
of the case on the other.
38. Thus, while elaborate reasons may not be assigned for grant of bail or
an extensive discussion of the merits of the case may not be undertaken by
the court considering a bail application, an order dehors reasoning or
bereft of the relevant reasons cannot result in grant of bail. In such a case
the prosecution or the informant has a right to assail the order before a
higher forum. As noted in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)
[Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC
(Cri) 41 : 1978 Cri LJ 129], when bail has been granted to an accused,
the State may, if new circumstances have arisen following the grant of such
bail, approach the High Court seeking cancellation of bail under Section
439(2) CrPC. However, if no new circumstances have cropped up since
 33

the grant of bail, the State may prefer an appeal against the order granting
bail, on the ground that the same is perverse or illegal or has been arrived
at by ignoring material aspects which establish a prima facie case against
the accused.”
(Emphasis supplied)

61. We have referred to the above authorities solely for the purpose of reiterating
two conceptual principles, namely, factors that are to be taken into consideration
while exercising power of admitting an accused to bail when offences are of
serious nature, and the distinction between cancellation of bail because of
supervening circumstances and exercise of jurisdiction in nullifying an order
granting bail in an appeal when the bail order is assailed on the ground that the
same is perverse or based on irrelevant considerations or founded on non-
consideration of the factors which are relevant.

62. We are absolutely conscious that liberty of a person should not be lightly dealt
with, for deprivation of liberty of a person has immense impact on the mind of a
person. Incarceration creates a concavity in the personality of an individual.
Sometimes it causes a sense of vacuum. Needless to emphasise, the sacrosanctity
of liberty is paramount in a civilised society. However, in a democratic body polity
which is wedded to the rule of law an individual is expected to grow within the
social restrictions sanctioned by law. The individual liberty is restricted by larger
social interest and its deprivation must have due sanction of law. In an orderly
society an individual is expected to live with dignity having respect for law and
also giving due respect to others' rights. It is a well-accepted principle that the
concept of liberty is not in the realm of absolutism but is a restricted one. The cry
of the collective for justice, its desire for peace and harmony and its necessity for
security cannot be allowed to be trivialised. The life of an individual living in a
society governed by the rule of law has to be regulated and such regulations which
are the source in law subserve the social balance and function as a significant
instrument for protection of human rights and security of the collective. This is
because, fundamentally, laws are made for their obedience so that every member
of the society lives peacefully in a society to achieve his individual as well as
social interest. That is why Edmond Burke while discussing about liberty opined,
“it is regulated freedom”.

63. It is also to be kept in mind that individual liberty cannot be accentuated to

such an extent or elevated to such a high pedestal which would bring in anarchy
or disorder in the society. The prospect of greater justice requires that law and
order should prevail in a civilised milieu. True it is, there can be no arithmetical
formula for fixing the parameters in precise exactitude but the adjudication
should express not only application of mind but also exercise of jurisdiction on
accepted and established norms. Law and order in a society protect the
established precepts and see to it that contagious crimes do not become epidemic.
 34

In an organised society the concept of liberty basically requires citizens to be

responsible and not to disturb the tranquility and safety which every well-meaning
person desires. Not for nothing J. Oerter stated: “Personal liberty is the right to
act without interference within the limits of the law.”

64. Thus analysed, it is clear that though liberty is a greatly cherished value in
the life of an individual, it is a controlled and restricted one and no element in the
society can act in a manner by consequence of which the life or liberty of others
is jeopardised, for the rational collective does not countenance an anti-social or
anti-collective act. [See: Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh, reported in (2012) 9
SCC 446].

H. CONCLUSION

67. Considering the serious nature of the crime and the modus operandi adopted
by the accused persons we are of the view that the High Court should not have
exercised its discretion in favour of the accused persons. We are sorry to say but
the High Court dealt with all the bail applications in a very callous manner. The
outcome of this callous approach on the part of the High Court has ultimately
paved way for many accused persons to abscond and thereby put the trial in
jeopardy. …
…

72. Modern political scientist and philosopher, also favours certain limitation on
liberty, for safeguarding the societal interest and professes the proportionality
between the liberty and restriction, thus laying down exception for the personal
liberty, in following words:
“Men are qualified for civil liberty in exact proportion to their disposition
to put moral chains upon their own appetites, in proportion as their love
to justice is above their rapacity, in proportion as their soundness and
sobriety of understanding is above their vanity and presumption, in
proportion as they are more disposed to listen to the counsels of the wise
and good, in preference to the flattery of knaves. Society cannot exist,
unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be placed somewhere;
and the less of it there is within, the more there must be without. It is
ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate
minds cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters.”
(Emphasis supplied)
73. Thus, certain restrictions or limitations, on the exercise of personal liberty, by
the State or other such human agency, are necessary elements, in the interest of
liberty of a well-ordered society or societal interest.
 35

74. This Court has also held that unlimited and unqualified liberty cannot be said
to be in favour of societal interest. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab reported in
(1994) 3 SCC 569, this Court observed:
“Liberty cannot stand alone but must be paired with companion virtue i.e.
virtue and morality, liberty and law, liberty and justice, liberty and
common good, liberty and responsibility which are concomitants for
orderly progress and social stability. Man being a rationale individual has
to live in harmony with equal rights of others and more differently for the
attainment of antithetic desires. This intertwined network is difficult to
delineate within defined spheres of conduct within which freedom of action
may be confined. Therefore, liberty would not always be an absolute
licence but must arm itself within the confines of law. In other words, there
can be no liberty without social restraint. Liberty, therefore, as a social
conception is a right to be assured to all members of a society. Unless
restraint is enforced on and accepted by all members of the society, the
liberty of some must involve the oppression of others. If liberty be regarded
a social order, the problem of establishing liberty must be a problem of
organising restraint which society controls over the individual. Therefore,
liberty of each citizen is borne of and must be subordinated to the liberty
of the greatest number, in other words common happiness as an end of the
society, lest lawlessness and anarchy will tamper social weal and harmony
and powerful courses or forces would be at work to undermine social
welfare and order. Thus the essence of civil liberty is to keep alive the
freedom of the individual subject to the limitation of social control which
could be adjusted according to the needs of the dynamic social evolution.”
(Emphasis supplied)

75. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu (supra) this Court observed thus: -

“After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental,
suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of ‘procedure established by law’.
The last four words of Art. 21 are the life of that human right. The doctrine
of Police Power constitutionally validates punitive processes for the
maintenance of public order, security of the State, national integrity and
the interest of the public generally. Even so, having regard to the solemn
issue involved, deprivation of personal freedom, ephemeral or enduring,
must be founded on the most serious considerations relevant to the welfare
objectives of society, specified in the Constitution.”
(Emphasis supplied)
76. In no circumstances, the High Court could have released Santosh Sao,
Jagveer Baranwal & Manish Jain respectively on bail.

77. In such circumstances referred to above, we are of the view that we should set
aside all the orders passed by the High Court granting bail to the accused persons
and they should be asked to surrender before the trial court.
 36

78. The final word: The true test to ascertain whether discretion has been
judiciously exercised or not is to see whether the court has been able to strike a
balance between the personal liberty of the accused and the interest of the State,
in other words, the societal interests. Each bail application should be decided in
the facts and circumstances of the case having regard to the various factors
germane to the well settled principles of grant or refusal of bail. In the words of
Philip Stanhope, “Judgment is not upon all occasions required, but discretion
always is”.

79. In the result all these appeals succeed and are allowed. The impugned orders
of bail passed by the High Court are hereby set aside.”

20. In the present case, the High Court, by the impugned order, enlarged the

respondents on bail, primarily relying on a set of factual and legal findings.

However, a closer examination of these findings reveals serious infirmities that

warranting interference. We shall discuss the same in detail.

20.1. Delay in furnishing the grounds of arrest cannot, by itself, constitute a

valid ground for grant of bail.

20.1.1. The learned counsel for the respondents – accused contended that the

arrest was illegal as the grounds of arrest were not furnished immediately in

writing, thereby violating Article 22 (1) of the Constitution and Section 50 Cr.P.C

(now Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita). This submission,

however, is devoid of merit.

20.1.2. Article 22(1) of the Constitution mandates that “no person who is

arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be,

of the grounds for such arrest, nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to
 37

be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice”. Similarly, Section 50 (1)

Cr.P.C. requires that “every police officer or other person arresting any person

without warrant shall forthwith communicate to him full particulars of the offence

for which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest.

20.1.3. The constitutional and statutory framework thus mandates that the

arrested person must be informed of the grounds of arrest – but neither provision

prescribes a specific form or insists upon written communication in every case.

Judicial precedents have clarified that substantial compliance with these

requirements is sufficient, unless demonstrable prejudice is shown.

20.1.4. In Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana22, it was reiterated that Article

22(1) is satisfied if the accused is made aware of the arrest grounds in substance,

even if not conveyed in writing. Similarly, in Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State

of Andhra Pradesh 23 , it was observed that when arrest is made pursuant a

warrant, reading out the warrant amounts to sufficient compliance. Both these

post- Pankaj Bansal decisions clarify that written, individualised grounds are not

an inflexible requirement in all circumstances.

22
2025 SCC Online SC 456
23
2025 INSC 768
 38

20.1.5. While Section 50 Cr.P.C is mandatory, the consistent judicial approach

has been to adopt a prejudice-oriented test when examining alleged procedural

lapses. The mere absence of written grounds does not ipso facto render the arrest

illegal, unless it results in demonstrable prejudice or denial of a fair opportunity

to defend.

20.1.6. The High Court, however, relied heavily on the alleged procedural lapse

as a determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the offence under

Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. It noted, inter alia, that

there was no mention in the remand orders about service of memo of grounds of

arrest (para 45); the arrest memos were allegedly template-based and not

personalised (para 50); and eyewitnesses had not stated that they were present at

the time of arrest or had signed the memos (para 48). Relying on Pankaj Bansal

v. Union of India24 and Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra), it

concluded (paras 43, 49 – 50) that from 03.10.2023 onwards, failure to serve

detailed, written, and individualised grounds of arrest immediately after arrest

was a violation entitling the accused to bail.

20.1.7. In the present case, the arrest memos and remand records clearly reflect

that the respondents were aware of the reasons for their arrest. They were legally

24
(2024) 7 SCC 576
 39

represented from the outset and applied for bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an

immediate and informed understanding of the accusations. No material has been

placed on record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged

procedural lapse. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice, such as irregularity

is, at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself, warrant release on bail. As

reiterated above, the High Court treated it as a determinative factor while

overlooking the gravity of the charge under Section 302 IPC and the existence of

a prima facie case. Its reliance on Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha is

misplaced, as those decisions turned on materially different facts and statutory

contexts. The approach adopted here is inconsistent with the settled principle that

procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest, absent prejudice, do not ipso

facto render custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail.

20.2. Courts are not expected to render findings on the merits of the case at

the bail stage.

20.2.1. It is a settled principle that at the bail stage, courts are precluded from

undertaking a detailed examination of evidence or rendering findings that touch

upon the merits of the case. Only a prima facie assessment of the material is

warranted. The court cannot conduct a mini-trial or record conclusions that could

influence the outcome of the trial.

 40

20.2.2. In Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote25, this Court held as

under:

“Detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits

should be avoided while passing orders on bail applications. To be satisfied about
a prima facie case is needed but it is not the same as an exhaustive exploration of
the merits in the order itself”.

20.2.3. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav26, the

Court reiterated that while detailed evaluation is not required, some reasoning

must support the grant of bail, especially when the offence is grave. However,

even in such cases, the reasoning must be confined to prima facie satisfaction, not

merit-based findings.

20.2.4. By the impugned order, the High Court proceeded to grant bail to the

accused by delving into the merits of the case and recording findings that fall

within the exclusive domain of the trial Court. For instances, in para 24, the High

Court observed that the nature of weapons used did not suggest premeditation to

assault and murder the deceased, and concluded that the intention to commit

murder would have to be determined during trial. In the same paragraph, it further

held that since the deceased had voluntarily accompanied certain accused to

Bengaluru and had even stopped at a bar en route, the question whether he was

abducted or kidnapped also required full-fledged trial consideration. In para 29,

25
(1980) 2 SCC 559
26
(2004) 7 SCC 528
 41

the High Court noted that there was no prima facie material revealing conspiracy

as no witness statements supported the prosecution’s theory of a pre-planned

murder. In para 32, the High Court discounted the evidentiary value of the

recovery of weapons merely because they were seized from an open place. With

regard to medical evidence, in para 31 the Court found that a further opinion of

the doctor issued later (stating that 13 of 39 injuries were blood-oozing) was

contrary to the post-mortem report, and held that this discrepancy ought to be

evaluated at trial. These are indicative of a premature judicial evaluation of guilt

or innocence, which is impermissible at the bail stage.

20.2.5. Further, such an approach of the High Court is contrary to the judicial

precedents of this court, including Satish Jaggi v. State of Chhattisgarh 27 ,

Kanwar Singh Meena v. State of Rajasthan28, wherein, it was held that courts,

while considering bail, should not assess the credibility of witnesses, as this

function squarely lies within the domain of the trial Court. Thus, the impugned

order of the High Court violates this principle by commenting on the delay in the

witness statements and imputing lack of credibility at this stage.

20.2.6. In Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar 29 , the Court cautioned that there

cannot be elaborate details recorded to give an impression that the case is one that

27
(2007) 11 SCC 195
28
(2012) 12 SCC 180
29
SLP (Crl.) Nos. 6335 and 7916 of 2021 dated 17.12.2021
 42

would result in a conviction or, by contrast, in an acquittal while passing an order

on an application for grant of bail. The following paragraphs are pertinent:

“25.While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable

right, at the same time while considering an application for bail Courts cannot
lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts
that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be
false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record so as to enable a Court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion.
While considering an application for grant of bail a prima facie conclusion must
be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital
facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts
suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any,
and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence/s
alleged against an accused.

26. We have extracted the relevant portions of the impugned orders above. At the
outset, we observe that the extracted portions are the only portions forming part
of the “reasoning” of the High court while granting bail. As noted from the
aforecited judgments, it is not necessary for a Court to give elaborate reasons
while granting bail particularly when the case is at the initial stage and the
allegations of the offences by the accused would not have been crystalised as such.
There cannot be elaborate details recorded to give an impression that the case
is one that would result in a conviction or, by contrast, in an acquittal while
passing an order on an application for grant of bail. At the same time, a balance
would have to be struck between the nature of the allegations made against the
accused; severity of the punishment if the allegations are proved beyond
reasonable doubt and would result in a conviction; reasonable apprehension of
the witnesses being influenced by the accused; tampering of the evidence; the
frivolity in the case of the prosecution; criminal antecedents of the accused; and
a prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge against the
accused.”

20.2.7. In the present case, the reading of the High Court’s order gives an

unmistakable impression that it has pre-judged the outcome of the trial, thereby

setting the stage for discharge or acquittal, which, according to this court, is

contrary to law.
 43

20.2.8. In Dinesh M.N. (SP) v. State of Gujarat30, the court clarified:

“Even though the re-appreciation of the evidence as done by the court granting
bail is to be avoided, the court dealing with an application for cancellation of bail
under section 439(2) can consider whether irrelevant materials were taken into
consideration. That is so because it is not known as to what extent the irrelevant
materials weighed with the court for accepting the prayer for bail.”

20.2.9. Thus, this Court has made it clear that the findings of the High Court,

while deciding bail, are to be treated as expressions of opinion only for that

purpose and should not, in any manner, prejudice the trial or other proceedings.

In the present case, however, the High Court has relied upon irrelevant and

premature assessments, and entered into questions best left for the trial, thereby

committing a grave jurisdictional error.

20.3. Appreciation of evidence at the bail stage is impermissible.

20.3.1. In State of Orissa v. Mahimananda Mishra31, this Court observed:

“11. It is common knowledge that generally direct evidence may not be available
to prove conspiracy, inasmuch as the act of conspiracy takes place secretly. Only
the conspirators would be knowing about the conspiracy. However, the Court,
while evaluating the material, may rely upon other material which suggests
conspiracy. Such material will be on record during the course of trial. However,
at this stage, prima facie, the Court needs to take into consideration the overall
material while considering the prayer for bail.

12. Though this Court may not ordinarily interfere with the orders of the High
Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused, it is open for this Court to set
aside the order of the High Court, where it is apparent that the High Court has
not exercised its discretion judiciously and in accordance with the basic

30
AIR 2008 SC 2318
31
Criminal Appeal No. 1175 of 2018 dated 18.09.2018
 44

principles governing the grant of bail. It is by now well settled that at the time of
considering an application for bail, the Court must take into account certain
factors such as the existence of a prima facie case against the accused, the gravity
of the allegations, position and status of the accused, the likelihood of the accused
fleeing from justice and repeating the offence, the possibility of tampering with
the witnesses and obstructing the Courts as well as the criminal antecedents of
the accused. It is also well settled that the Court must not go into deep into merits
of the matter while considering an application for bail. All that needs to be
established from the record is the existence of a prima facie case against the
accused.”

20.3.2. In Naresh Kumar Mangla v. Anita Agarwal32, this court cancelled the

anticipatory bail granted to the accused on perusal of the chargesheet and material

evidence found prima facie adverse to the accused. The court also clarified that

examination of evidence at the bail stage shall not influence the trial.

20.3.3. In Ishwarji Nagaji Mali v. State of Gujarat and another33, the Court

examined the chargesheet evidence to hold that prima facie there was sufficient

material, which was ignored by the High Court while granting bail, and

accordingly set aside the bail order. (This case is discussed below in dept for

another proposition).

20.3.4. In Imran v. Mohammed Bhava34, a three- Judge Bench held as follows:

“32. This court in Neeru Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr., has reiterated that it is
the duty of the Court to take into consideration certain factors and they basically
are, (i) the nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in cases of
conviction and the nature of supporting evidence, (ii) reasonable apprehension of
tampering with the witnesses for apprehension of threat to the complainant, and
(iii) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.”
33. Applying the ratio of the decisions of this court referred to above to the facts
of the case in hand, we have no hesitation in observing that the High Court erred

32
AIR 2021 SC 277
33
Criminal Appeal No. 70 of 2022 dated 18.01.2022
34
Criminal Appeal Nos. 658 and 659 of 2022 (@ SLP (Crl) Nos. 27 and 1242 of 2022) dated 22.04.2022
 45

in not considering the basic principles for grant of bail, well established by
various judicial pronouncements. The High Court lost sight of the fact that there
exists sufficient material against the accused Respondents herein, so as to
establish a prima facie case against them.”

20.3.5. In Prakash Kadam v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta (supra), this Court

held that even without misuse, bail can be cancelled for grave allegations if the

lower court ignored material.

20.3.6. In the present case, the High Court also proceeded to analyse and discount

the credibility of certain prosecution witnesses and forensic material. It observed

contradictions in the eyewitness statements concerning the overt acts of the

accused (para 26). It expressed doubts about the prosecution’s explanation for the

delay in recording the statements of CW. 76 and CW. 91 (para 27). It questioned

the timing of the doctor’s supplementary opinion and weighed its evidentiary

worth (para 31). As already pointed out, the credibility or reliability of witnesses

is a matter for the trial Court to determine after full-fledged cross examination. It

is a trite law that statements recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C are not

substantive, and their evidentiary value can only be determined after cross

examination during trial. Any opinion rendered at the bail stage risks prejudging

the outcome of the trial and must be avoided. Thus, the court’s assessment of

these aspects amounts to a premature appreciation of the probative value of

prosecution evidence.
 46

20.4. Filing of charge sheet or lengthy list of witnesses does not justify grant

of bail.

20.4.1. It is well settled that the mere filing of a charge-sheet does not confer an

indefeasible right to bail. Likewise, the mere prospect of a prolonged trial cannot,

by itself, outweigh the gravity of the offence, the incriminating material gathered

during investigation, or the likelihood of tampering with witnesses.

20.4.2. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan (supra), this Court

categorically held that:

"The High Court could not have allowed the bail application on the sole ground
of delay in the conclusion of the trial without taking into consideration the
allegation made by the prosecution in regard to the existence of prima facie
case, gravity of offence, and the allegation of tampering with the witness by
threat and inducement when on bail. ... non-consideration of the same and grant
of bail solely on the ground of long incarceration vitiated the order..."

20.4.3. In Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar (supra), this Court held that the

possibility of the accused absconding or threatening witnesses had a direct

bearing on the fairness of the trial. In serious offences, such apprehensions – when

reasonably supported by record – must weigh against the grant of bail.

20.4.4. Similarly, in Ishwarji Nagaji Mali v. State of Gujarat (supra), this Court

reiterated that the fact that the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence

is not a valid ground to release the accused on bail, especially where a complete
 47

chain of circumstances has been prima facie established during investigation. The

Court cancelled the bail granted by the High Court in that case holding that:

“6. …. the High Court has not at all adverted to the material collected during the
course of the investigation. The High Court has not at all considered the
material/evidence collected during the course of the investigation even prima
facie and has directed to release respondent no.2 in such a serious offence of
hatching conspiracy to kill his wife, by simply observing that as it is a case of
circumstantial evidence, which is a weak piece of evidence, it is not legal and
proper to deny bail to respondent no.2. Merely because the prosecution case rests
on circumstantial evidence cannot be a ground to release the accused on bail,
if during the course of the investigation the evidence/material has been collected
and prima facie the complete chain of events is established. As observed
hereinabove, while releasing respondent no.2 on bail, the learned Single Judge of
the High Court has not at all adverted to and/or considered any of the
material/evidence collected during the course of the investigation, which is a part
of the charge-sheet.

7. One another reason given by the High Court to release respondent no.2 on bail
is that the accused has deep root in the society and no apprehension as to flee
away or escape trial or tampering with the evidence/witnesses is expressed. In a
case of committing the offence under Section 302 read with 120B IPC and in a
case of hatching conspiracy to kill his wife and looking to the seriousness of the
offence, the aforesaid can hardly be a ground to release the accused on bail.”

20.4.5. In Rahul Gupta v. State of Rajasthan35, this Court further emphasized

that once the accused has been charge-sheeted after investigation, the High Court

must consider the material collected during investigation to determine whether a

prima facie case exists and whether bail is justified. The Court quashed the bail

order, directing the accused to surrender and remanding the matter to the High

Court for fresh consideration, after examining the evidence on record.

35
Criminal Appeal Nos. 1343-44 of 2023 dated 04.05.2023
 48

20.4.6. In the present case, the High Court failed to engage with the

incriminating material collected during investigation, despite the seriousness of

the offence under Section 302 IPC and the allegation of conspiracy. The mere

filing of the charge-sheet, the existence of a long list of witnesses, or the

possibility of delay in trial, cannot, by themselves, constitute valid reasons to

dilute the gravity of the offence or to disregard the case put forth by the

prosecution. As repeatedly held by this Court, such factors are not standalone

grounds for the grant of bail in heinous offences involving murder. The reasoning

adopted by the High Court to justify the grant of bail is, therefore, contrary to

settled legal principles.

20.5. Post-bail good conduct of the accused, while relevant to the question

of continuation of bail, cannot retrospectively validate an otherwise

unsustainable order.

20.5.1. The fact that the accused were in custody for more than 140 days, or

exhibited good conduct post-release, does not ipso facto render the order of bail

sustainable, if it suffers from non-consideration of material factors at the stage of

grant.

20.5.2. In State through CBI v. Amaramani Tripathi36, this Court reaffirmed

that “...the mere fact that the accused has undergone certain period of

36
2005 (8) SCC 21
 49

incarceration... by itself would not entitle the accused to being enlarged on bail...

when the gravity of the offence alleged is severe..."

20.5.3. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (supra), this Court held:

“….the High Court has given the period of incarceration already undergone by
the accused and the unlikelihood of trial concluding in the near future as
grounds sufficient to enlarge the accused on bail, in spite of the fact that the
accused stands charged of offences punishable with life imprisonment or even
death penalty. In such cases, in our opinion, the mere fact that the accused has
undergone certain period of incarceration (three years in this case) by itself would
not entitle the accused to being enlarged on bail, nor the fact that the trial is not
likely to be concluded in the near future either by itself or coupled with the period
of incarceration would be sufficient for enlarging the appellant on bail when the
gravity of the offence alleged is severe and there are allegations of tampering with
the witnesses by the accused during the period he was on bail.”

It was further held that

“While a vague allegation that accused may tamper with the evidence or
witnesses may not be a ground to refuse bail, if the accused is of such character
that his mere presence at large would intimidate the witnesses or if there is
material to show that he will use his liberty to subvert justice or tamper with the
evidence, then bail will be refused.”

20.5.4. In Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh @ Lalla Bahu & Anr.37, the Court

reiterated that the period of custody, while relevant, must be weighted against the

totality of circumstances, including the nature of the crime and criminal

antecedents. It was held that:

“31. Be it noted, a stage has come that in certain States abduction and kidnapping
have been regarded as heroism. A particular crime changes its colour with efflux
of time. The concept of crime in the contextual sense of kidnapping has really
undergone a sea change and has really shattered the spine of the orderly society.
It is almost nauseating to read almost every day about the criminal activities

37
(2012) 9 SCC 446
 50

relating to kidnapping and particularly by people who call themselves experts in

the said nature of crime.

32. We may usefully state that when the citizens are scared to lead a peaceful life
and this kind of offences usher in an impediment in establishment of orderly
society, the duty of the court becomes more pronounced and the burden is heavy.
There should have been proper analysis of the criminal antecedents. Needless to
say, imposition of conditions is subsequent to the order admitting an accused to
bail. The question should be posed whether the accused deserves to be enlarged
on bail or not and only thereafter issue of imposing conditions would arise. We
do not deny for a moment that period of custody is a relevant factor but
simultaneously the totality of circumstances and the criminal antecedents are also
to be weighed. They are to be weighed in the scale of collective cry and desire.
The societal concern has to be kept in view in juxtaposition of individual liberty.
Regard being had to the said parameter we are inclined to think that the social
concern in the case at hand deserves to be given priority over lifting the restriction
of liberty of the accused.

33. In the present context the period of custody of seven months, in our
considered opinion, melts into insignificance. We repeat at the cost of repetition
that granting of bail is a matter of discretion for the High Court and this Court
is slow to interfere with such orders. But regard being had to the antecedents of
the accused which is also a factor to be taken into consideration as per the
pronouncements of this Court and the nature of the crime committed and the
confinement of the victim for eight days, we are disposed to interfere with the
order impugned.

34. We may note with profit that it is not an appeal for cancellation of bail as
cancellation is not sought because of supervening circumstances. The present one
is basically an appeal challenging grant of bail where the High Court has failed
to take into consideration the relevant material factors which make the order
perverse.”

Accordingly, the bail order was set aside and the accused was directed to

surrender.

20.5.5. More recently, in Ajwar v. Waseem38, this Court set aside four bail orders

granted by the Allahabad High Court in a murder case involving double homicide

under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 352, and 504 IPC, despite the fact that

38
(2024) 10 SCC 768
 51

the accused had remained in custody for over two years and eight months. The

Court found that the bail was granted without proper consideration of material

facts. Accordingly, the accused were directed to surrender within two weeks. The

following paragraph is relevant:

“33. Furthermore and most importantly, the High Court has overlooked the
period of custody of the respondents-accused for such a grave offence alleged to
have been committed by them. As per the submission made by learned counsel for
the State of UP, before being released on bail, the accused-Waseem had
undergone custody for a period of about two years four months, the accused-
Nazim for a period of two years eight months, the accused-Aslam for a period
of about two years nine months and the accused Abubakar, for a period of two
years ten months. In other words, all the accused-respondents have remained in
custody for less than three years for such a serious offence of a double murder for
which they have been charged.”

20.5.6. In conclusion, while post-bail good conduct or the period of incarceration

may be relevant considerations at the stage of continuing bail, they cannot cure

the fundamental defects in an order granting bail which is otherwise perverse,

legally untenable, or passed without due consideration of material factors such as

the gravity of the offence, prima facie involvement, and the likelihood of

influencing witnesses or tampering with evidence. An unsustainable bail order

does not become valid with the mere passage of time or the subsequent behaviour

of the accused. Judicial scrutiny must focus on whether the discretion to grant

bail was exercised judiciously, and in accordance with established principles, at

the time of the grant, and not mechanically or on technicalities. Therefore, the
 52

order of the High Court granting bail to the respondents / accused, deserves to be

set aside.

21. The learned senior counsel for the appellant – State mainly challenged the

bail granted to A2, by emphasizing his status, the influence he wields, and his

role in obstructing the investigation. It was submitted that A2 has actively

mobilized widespread media support and shaped the public narrative in his

favour, thereby creating an atmosphere capable of prejudicing the ongoing

investigation and undermining the fairness of the trial. It was further contended

that A2 was not a passive onlooker but an active conspirator who played a pivotal

role in the planning and executing the crime. However, the High Court failed to

consider these vital aspects while granting bail, raising serious concerns about the

legality and propriety of the impugned order.

22. We now turn to a detailed examination of the above contentions.

(a) Nature and Gravity of the offence

22.1. The seriousness and heinous nature of the alleged offence is a significant

factor for consideration, while evaluating a plea for cancellation of bail.

 53

22.1.1. In Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh39, this Court held that

“the nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail –

the more heinous the crime, the greater the chance of refusal of bail, though the

exercise of judicial discretion in such matters cannot be exhaustively defined.”

22.1.2. Similarly, in Panchanan Mishra v. Digambar Mishra 40 , the Court

observed that “the object underlying the cancellation of bail is to protect the fair

trial and secure justice being done to the society by preventing the accused who

is set at liberty from tampering with the evidence in heinous crimes.”

22.1.3. In the present case, the accused along with the co-accused, is charged

under Sections 120B, 302, 201 and 204 IPC, which relate to conspiracy, murder,

destruction of evidence, and causing disappearance of evidence. The allegation is

of a brutal and custodial murder of a young man, who was allegedly kidnapped,

tortured, and beaten to death by the accused for sending objectionable messages

to A2. The victim was a 26-year-old daily wage earner, and the crime was

allegedly committed to protect the reputation of A1, the partner of A2, a celebrity.

22.1.4. This is not a case of sudden provocation or emotional outburst. The

evidence indicates a pre-meditated and orchestrated crime, where the accused not

only allegedly took the law into his own hands, but also engaged in systematic

destruction of evidence, including: deleting CCTV footage, bribing co-accused

39
(2002) 3 SCC 598
40
(2005) 3 SCC 143
 54

to falsely surrender, and using police and local influence to derail the

investigation.

22.1.5. As this Court warned in Jagan Kishore v. State of A.P.41, the grant of

bail in cases involving custodial torture and extra-judicial execution of an alleged

offender erodes public confidence in the rule of law. Thus, the very gravity of the

offence justifies cancellation of bail, especially when the liberty granted to A2 is

likely to subvert the integrity of the trial process.

(b) Likelihood of tampering with evidence and influencing witnesses

22.2. The record reveals concrete acts of interference with the investigation

including:

• A2’s role in orchestrating false surrenders by co-accused (A10, A14);

• Payments made to cover up the crime (as per co-accused statements);

• Connections with police officials who delayed and diluted the FIR and

postmortem procedures;

• Deletion of CCTV evidence from A1’s residence;

• Continued influence over prosecution witnesses, as seen from public

appearances after bail.

41
2003 Crl. LJ 1919
 55

22.2.1. In Puran v. Rambilas42, this Court categorically held that “Cancellation

of bail is permissible where the order granting bail was perverse, or if the accused

tampers with evidence or attempts to influence witnesses.”

22.2.2. In State v. Amarmani Tripathi (supra), this Court stated that “the Court

must examine the likelihood of the accused tampering with prosecution witnesses

or attempting to subvert justice. Bail should not be granted if the accused is likely

to interfere with the trial process.”

22.2.3. Further, it was held that “even the likelihood of the accused influencing

witnesses or tampering with evidence is sufficient to deny bail.” In Deepak

Yadav v. State of UP43, bail was cancelled owing to apprehension of tampering

with witnesses.

22.2.4. In P v. State of M.P.44, the Court held that bail can be cancelled if the

accused:

• attempts to tamper with evidence;

• influences witnesses;

• induces others to make false statements;

• or even if there is a genuine apprehension of miscarriage of justice.

42
(2001) 6 SCC 338
43
(2022) 8 SCC 559
44
(2022) 15 SCC 211
 56

22.2.5. The appellant alleged that A2 is not merely misusing liberty post-bail

but is the mastermind of efforts to derail the investigation. In such circumstances,

the preponderance of probabilities test applies (as per Sanjay Gandhi v. Delhi

Administration case) and the prosecution need not prove guilt beyond reasonable

doubt at this stage.

(c) Bail obtained on misrepresentation of medical grounds

22.3. The bail order dated 13.12.2024 passed by the High Court, was granted

primarily on the basis of the alleged urgent medical condition of the 1 st respondent

/ A2. However, a bare perusal of the medical records and subsequent conduct of

the accused reveals that the medical plea was misleading, vague, and grossly

exaggerated.

22.3.1. This Court has consistently held that bail granted on medical grounds

must be based on credible, specific, and urgent need, not on general or future

apprehensions. [Refer: State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi and Dinesh M.N. v.

State of Gujarat, (supra)].

22.3.2. The discharge summary dated 28.11.2024 issued by the hospital,

mentions that A2 is a patient with a history of diabetes, hypertension, and prior

cardiac issues, and that he may require a CABG surgery in the future. However,

the report does not indicate: any current emergency or need for immediate

medical intervention; any life-threatening condition warranting urgent release;

 57

and any inability of the prison medical system to manage his current state. Thus,

there is no compelling medical necessity for grant of bail.

22.3.3. In Puran v. Rambilas (supra), this Court held that “if it is shown that a

party obtained bail by misrepresentation or fraud, or by suppressing material

facts, such bail is liable to be cancelled on that ground alone”. Similarly, in State

of U.P. v. Narendra Nath Sinha 45 , it was observed that “bail obtained by

concealing facts or misleading the court vitiates the order, as it defeats the interest

of justice”.

22.3.4. Contrary to the impression created before the High Court, A2 has made

multiple public appearances, including participation in high-profile social events,

was seen in fine health and mobility, and did not undergo any surgery or serious

medical procedure post-release. This establishes that he abused the liberty of bail,

which was obtained on a false and misleading premise.

22.3.5. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (supra), this Court

cautioned that “bail on medical grounds can be granted only in exceptional cases

where the medical condition is serious, cannot be treated in custody, and

necessary facilities are not available in jail”. The burden to prove such necessity

lies on the accused.

45
(2019) 10 SCC 528
 58

22.3.6. In the present case, A2 failed to demonstrate that the jail hospital was

incapable of managing his condition or that adequate treatment could not be given

in judicial custody. Instead, the High Court proceeded to grant bail without

recording a definitive finding on the urgency, seriousness, or inadequacy of

treatment in custody. This results in a perverse and legally unsustainable bail

order, liable to be cancelled as per the principles laid down in Puran and

Samarendra Nath Bhattacharjee v. State of West Bengal46.

(d) Non-consideration of material facts by the High Court

22.4. An order that overlooks material evidence or proceeds on an erroneous

premise is perverse, and such perversity forms a valid ground for cancellation or

setting aside of bail.

22.4.1. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar (supra), this Court laid down that “where

the order granting bail is founded on irrelevant considerations, or non-

consideration of material facts, the same is rendered perverse and is liable to be

set aside.” Similarly, in State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi (supra) the Court

held that “bail orders must be founded on a careful and judicious application of

mind to the facts of the case and the seriousness of the offence. Non-consideration

of relevant material renders the order vulnerable to challenge.”

46
(2004) 11 SCC 165
 59

22.4.2. In the present case, the High Court failed to properly evaluate the nature

of allegations, involving premeditated murder and conspiracy, attracting Section

302 IPC read with section 120B IPC; the chain of circumstantial evidence,

including CCTV footage, call records, and the forensic report showing deliberate

attempt to destroy evidence (e.g., disposal of blood-stained clothes and vehicle

cleaning); and the incriminating role of A2, who was in constant touch with A1

and other co-accused before and after the incident, and who facilitated the

conspiracy and cover-up. On the other hand, it simply recorded that A2 had “no

direct role” and there was “no prima facie case”, without discussing or analysing

the incriminating material on record. This amounts to non-application of mind,

and renders the order unsustainable in law.

22.4.3. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. (supra), this Court reversed the grant of

bail observing that “Where the High Court ignores vital circumstances and

material facts, the order becomes indefensible”.

22.4.4. In the present case, the High Court, while granting bail, recorded that A2

was not present at the crime scene, but at the same time, accepted that he was in

telephonic contact with other accused at crucial times. Similarly, it noted that

there was no strong motive, while also acknowledging post hostility and prior

enmity with the deceased. These contradictory findings neutralize the basis for

bail and indicate that the order was passed without a coherent or legally consistent

rationale.
 60

22.4.5. In offences punishable with life imprisonment or death, the bail court

must be especially cautious. In Ash Mohammed v. Shiv Raj Singh (supra), this

Court emphasized that in serious offences, “the gravity of the offence and its

impact on society must weigh heavily with the court, and such cases must be

considered with greater care and circumspection”. However, in the present case,

the High Court’s order fails to reflect any such higher scrutiny or cautious

approach, despite the seriousness of the charge and the wider societal impact of

the case.

23. The Constitution of India enshrines equality before law under Article 14,

and mandates that no individual – however wealthy, influential, or famous – can

claim exemption from the rigours of law. A celebrity status does not elevate an

accused above the law, nor entitle him to preferential treatment in matters like

grant of bail.

23.1. In State of Maharashtra v. Dhanendra Shriram Bhurle47, it was observed

that “grant of bail in serious offences involving public confidence must be

handled with great caution, especially where the accused enjoys influence”.

23.2. In Prakash Kadam v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta48, this Court held

that “the position and standing of the accused in society are relevant. If the

47
(2009) 11 SCC 541
48
(2011) 6 SCC 189
 61

accused is so influential that his very presence at large may intimidate witnesses

or subvert justice, bail can be denied or cancelled.”

23.3. In Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI 49 , this Court cautioned that “the

position or status of the accused in society, if likely to affect the investigation or

trial, is a valid consideration in rejecting bail”.

23.4. Similarly, in Rana Kapoor v. Directorate of Enforcement50, this Court

reaffirmed that “influential persons are more capable of tampering with evidence

or influencing witnesses. This factor must be carefully weighed in bail matters”.

23.5. Popularity cannot be a shield for impunity. As this Court held, influence,

resources and social status cannot form a basis for granting bail where there is a

genuine risk of prejudice to the investigation or trial.

23.6. In the present case, by treating A2’s stature as a mitigating factor, the High

Court committed a manifest perversity in the exercise of its discretion, thereby

warranting cancellation of bail. As demonstrated earlier, A2 is not a common

undertrial. He enjoys celebrity status, mass following, political clout, and

financial muscle. His conduct inside the jail – including recorded instances of

VIP treatment, violations of jail rules, and registered FIRs for misuse of facilities

– reflects his capacity to defy the system even while in custody. If a person can

subvert the prison system, the risk of interference with evidence, threatening or

49
(2013) 7 SCC 439
50
(2022) 8 SCC 1
 62

influencing witnesses, and tampering with the course of justice is both real and

imminent.

23.7. Moreover, A2’s immediate return to social events, sharing a stage with

prosecution witnesses, and continued influence over police witnesses, despite

being on bail, establish that his liberty is a threat to the integrity of the

proceedings.

23.8. Notably, celebrities serve as social role models – accountability is greater,

not lesser. They, by virtue of their fame and public presence, wield substantial

influence on public behaviour and social values. Granting leniency to such

persons despite grave charges of conspiracy and murder, sends wrong message to

society and undermines public confidence in the justice system.

23.9. Accordingly, A2’s antecedents, influence, jail misconduct, and the

seriousness of the charges against him make him unfit for bail, and the order

granting bail to him, is based on non-application of mind, perverse, and hence,

legally unsustainable.

24. On a cumulative analysis, it is evident that the order of the High Court

suffers from serious legal infirmities. The order fails to record any special or

cogent reasons for granting bail in a case involving charges under Sections 302,

120B, and 34 IPC. Instead, it reflects a mechanical exercise of discretion, marked

by significant omissions of legally relevant facts. Moreover, the High Court

 63

undertook an extensive examination of witness statements at the pre-trial stage,

highlighting alleged contradictions and delays – issues that are inherently matters

for the trial Court to assess through cross-examination. The trial Court alone is

the appropriate forum to evaluate the credibility and reliability of witnesses.

Granting bail in such a serious case, without adequate consideration of the nature

and gravity of the offence, the accused’s role, and the tangible risk of interference

with the trial, amounts to a perverse and wholly unwarranted exercise of

discretion. The well-founded allegations of witness intimidation, coupled with

compelling forensic and circumstantial evidence, further reinforce the necessity

for cancellation of bail. Consequently, the liberty granted under the impugned

order poses a real and imminent threat to the fair administration of justice and

risks derailing the trial process. In light of these circumstances, this Court is

satisfied that the present case calls for the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction

under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C.

25. In a democracy governed by the rule of law, no individual is exempt from

legal accountability by virtue of status or social capital. Article 14 of the

Constitution guarantees equality before the law and prohibits arbitrariness. It

mandates that all persons – regardless of their popularity, power, or privilege –

are equally subject to the law.

 64

26. In view of the foregoing, all these appeals are allowed. The order dated

13.12.2024 passed by the High Court is set aside. The bail granted to the

respondents / accused persons is hereby cancelled. The concerned authorities are

directed to take the accused into custody forthwith. Given the gravity of the

offence, the trial shall be conducted expeditiously, and a judgment rendered on

merits, in accordance with law. It is made clear that the observations made herein

are strictly confined to the issue of bail and shall not influence the trial on merits.

27. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

……………………J.
[J.B. Pardiwala]

....…………………J.
[R. Mahadevan]
NEW DELHI
AUGUST 14, 2025.
 65

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.3528-3534 OF 2025

(Arising from SLP(Crl.) Nos.516-522 of 2025

STATE OF KARNATAKA ...APPELLANT

VERSUS

SRI DARSHAN ETC. ...RESPONDENTS

O R D E R

J.B. PARDIWALA,J.

1. My esteemed brother Justice R. Mahadevan has just pronounced a

very erudite judgment. All that I can say in one sentence is that the

judgment penned by my esteemed brother is ineffable. The judgment

conveys a very strong message that whoever the accused may be,

howsoever big or small the accused may be, he or she is not above the

law. This judgment contains a very strong message that the justice

delivery system at any level should ensure at any cost that the Rule

of Law is maintained. No man is above the law and no man is below it;

nor de we ask any man’s permission when we ask him to obey it.

Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not asked a favor. The

need of the hour is to maintain the rule of law at all times.

2. The day we come to know that the accused persons are provided

with some special or five-star treatment within the jail premises,

 66

the first step in the process will be to place the jail superintendent

under suspension including all other officials involved in such

misconduct.

3. The Registry is directed to circulate one copy each of this

Judgment to all the High Courts and all the Jail Superintendents

across the country through their respective State Governments.

...................J

(J.B. PARDIWALA)

NEW DELHI;

14TH AUGUST, 2025.