IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA
AT MBEYA
(CORAM: WAMBALI, J.A., MWANDAMBO. J.A.. And MWAMPASHI. 3.A.1
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 88 OF 2020
GAUDENCE SANGU................................................................... APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE REPUBLIC..................................................................... RESPONDENT
(Appeal from the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Mbeya)
(Ndunquru, J.^
dated the 20th day of September, 2019
in
Criminal Appeal No. 119 of 2019
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
30thNovember & 7th December, 2022
MWANDAMBO. J.A.:
The Resident Magistrate's Court of Mbeya at Mbeya tried and
convicted the appellant Gaudence Sangu on four counts of; fraudulent
appropriation of power, malicious damage to property; personating
public officers and obtaining money by false pretence all contrary to
the Penal Code. Upon such conviction, the appellant earned five years'
imprisonment in each count running concurrently. His appeal to the
High Court sitting at Mbeya did not succeed as that court sustained
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the conviction and sentences and hence this second and final appeal
before the Court.
The facts from which the appellant was arraigned and ultimately
convicted are relatively simple. Alex Mengo (PW1), Hamisi Sikanyika
(DW3) and another person all business men at a place called Ikuti
sokoni, in Mbeya City had applied to Tanzania Electric Supply
Company Ltd (known by its acronym as TANESCO) for supply of
electricity power for their butcher businesses conducted in adjacent
rooms. It was DW3 who approached TANESCO with a joint power
supply application and upon compliance with the necessary
preliminary steps including payment of the requisite charges,
TANESCO connected the power to the relevant business premises but
a meter was installed in PWl's shop.
It occurred that not all was well after the power connection for,
PW1 noted unproportional power consumption which attracted
frequent purchase of electricity units which he suspected was too way
beyond the actual consumption. After a period of time, PW1 appears
to have discovered some foul play in the power connection extending
beyond the three shops. That prompted PW1 confronting DW3 for a
meter separation which entailed each one of them having have his
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own meter to which suggestion DW3 agreed and had the meter
removed from PW1 to his shop after refunding PW1 money he had
paid for the connection. It would appear that the change of the meter
from PWl's business premises to DW3's shop was done by the
appellant allegedly an employee of TANESCO for, according to PW1,
the appellant had represented to him that he was an employee of
TANESCO and that he had an identity card just like any other
employee.
Since PW1 was in urgent need of power and upon the alleged
representation from the appellant to facilitate electricity power
connection in three days, PW1 agreed to pay the appellant a sum of
TZS. 600,000.00 for the much-sought reconnection. Initially, PW1
paid TZS. 300,000.00 followed by TZS. 220,000.00 making total a
total sum of TZS 520,000.00. That notwithstanding, no electricity was
connected within the three days promised or any subsequent date
until PW1 made a follow up with TANESCO whereby he learnt that the
appellant had indeed lodged an application and paid TZS. 320,000.00
for electricity connection which would be affected within 90 days.
Needless to say, TANESCO connected PW1 with electricity in
December 2015. It also came to light that contrary to the alleged
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representation, the appellant was not an employee of TANESCO. By
reason of PWl's complaint, TANESCO mounted an investigation at
PWl's and DW3's business premises through its employees; Cyprian
Lugazia (PW3) and Fortunatus s/o Fungulima (PW4).
The findings of such investigation revealed that there was a shift
of an electricity meter initially installed at PWl's shop to DW3's shop
without the knowledge or authorization of TANESCO. It was equally
revealed that neither was the appellant an employee of TANESCO nor
a registered licenced contractor in the list of contractors in its regional
register of electricity contractors. Upon such findings, a complaint was
made to the police resulting into the appellant's arrest and
arraignment in court to answer the charges as aforesaid to which he
pleaded not guilty.
In his defence following evidence by the prosecution through
four witnesses and a ruling that he had a case to answer, the
appellant disassociated himself from the accusations. He denied
having personated himself as an employee of TANESCO. Instead, he
maintained that he was an electricity contractor who was engaged by
PW1 to facilitate electricity connection for which he paid TZS.
321,000.000 to TANESCO. He denied having shifted the meter from
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PWl's shop to DW3's shop. He was supported in that assertion by
DW3 who told the trial court that he knew the appellant as an
electricity contractor who had done electricity wiring to his premises
way back 2012. Otherwise, the appellant contended that the case
against him was framed up at the instance of PW3 allegedly as a
lesson to all unscrupulous persons involved in interference with power
infrastructure in Mbeya region. He denied having obtained any money
fraudulently from PW1.
The trial court found the appellant guilty on all counts, convicted
and sentences him as aforesaid. His appeal before the first appellate
court was predicated upon seven grounds of appeal essentially
faulting the trial court for failure to analyse evidence properly and
grounding conviction on weak prosecution evidence which did not
prove the case against him on the required standard in criminal cases.
The High Court (Ndunguru, J), dismissed the appeal having been
satisfied that the trial court's judgment convicting him contained
points of determination and analysis of evidence on all points for the
determination of the case.
Before us, the appellant faults the decision of the first appellate
court on three grounds raising complaints against the first appellate
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court sustaining conviction based on: One, failure to consider defence
evidence; two, failure to analyse the evidence on record properly
and; three, weak prosecution evidence which did not prove the case
beyond reasonable doubt.
Prosecuting his appeal, the appellant appeared in person
fending for himself at the hearing of the appeal. He adopted his
grounds of appeal beseeching the Court to find them meritorious and
allow the appeal by quashing conviction and setting aside the
sentences meted out to him by the trial court and sustained by the
High Court.
The respondent Republic was represented by Ms. Hanarose
Kasambala and Ms. Xaveria Makombe, both learned State Attorneys
resisting the appeal. It was Ms. Kasambala who addressed the Court.
Initially Ms. Kasambala chose to address the Court on the first and
second grounds conjointly. She was resolute that the lower courts
analysed the evidence properly and considered the defence in their
judgments. However, at some later stage, the learned State Attorney
threw in the towel conceding that indeed, none of the two courts
below had regard to defence evidence which was tantamount to
failure to analyse properly the evidence on record. In the premises,
realizing that the High Court did not perform its role properly as
expected of a first appellate court, the learned State Attorney invited
the Court to step into the shoes of the first appellate court and do
what that court omitted to do.
In his rejoinder, the appellant reiterated that his defence was
ignored by the two courts below.
We shall begin our discussion on the two combined grounds by
reiterating the legal position on the role of a first appellate court. It is
trite law that the first appellate court has a duty to re-evaluate the
evidence on record which is more or less are hearing of the case
except for the fact that, unlike the trial court, it does so through
reading the transcript of proceedings without hearing witness as they
testify which explains why the assessment of demeanour of witnesses
is in the domain of a trial court. See: Shabani Daudi v. Republic,
Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 2000 (unreported). In doing so, the first
appellate court may concur with the finding of fact made by the trial
court or come to its own findings. Logically, the principle that a
second appellate court should not readily interfere with concurrent
findings of fact of the two courts, below is premised on the
assumption that the first appellate court's concurrence with the trial
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courts finding of fact is a result of an independent re-evaluation and
analysis of the evidence on record relied upon by the trial court in
arriving at its findings. The Court has consistently held in many of its
decisions that, analysis and evaluation of evidence entails an objective
scrutiny of both the prosecution and defence evidence and not merely
a summary or narration of it. See for instance: Leonard
Mwanashoka v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 226 of 2014 and
Rashid Issa v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 416 of 2016 (both
unreported).
After subjecting the above to the instant appeal, we have no
lurking in holding that the appellant's complaints in ground one and
two argued conjointly are well founded. An examination of the trial
court's judgment which the first appellate court found to be sound
containing points for determination, reasons for the decision and
analysis of the evidence is, with respect, diametrically the opposite.
We shall have the trial court's judgment speak for itself:
"...the accused had disputed to shift the metre
without any supporting evidence he defended
that what he did was to cause the job of
installing wiring inside the houses. But from
the date of event) there was no job of fixing
wiring in any of the buildings, because this job
had been done previously, the job there was to
shift the disputed metre from PW1: Alex's
meat shop building to DW3: Hamis Sikanyika's
shop, the work which was done by the
accused.
I am quite confident that, the accused person
fraudulently appropriated power by obstructing
and diverting from the meat shop building of
[PW1] Aiex to the shop building o f DW3;
Hamis Sikanyika. So, he is guilty in this first
court.
I am quite confident that, the accused by
conduct personated himself to be a public
officer of TANESCO for wilfully and unlawfully
[interfered] TANESCO infrastructure by
transferring its metre from one place to
another. The accused person cannot deny this
fact, because even Mr. Sikanyika did not
dispute this fact [that] it was an accused
person who transferred power metre to his
building where he was fined also. The accused
person is guilty in the second and J d count,
where he also damaged TANESCO property.
For the 4h count, PW1; Alex told this court
that, he gave the accused a total amount of
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TSHS. 520,000/= first time he gave him TSHS.
300,000/= and second time 220,000/=
confirmed that the accused used only TSHS.
320,000/= to pay for power connecting
services, but he remained with TSHS.
200,000/= to date. The fact which is
corroborated by the testimony of PW2;
Mawazo Mwakazi..."
(At pages 97 and 98 of the record of appeal).
There can be no doubt that the first appellate court
misapprehended the judgment of the trial court believing that it was
composed in compliance with section 312 (1) of the Criminal
Procedure Act (the CPA) when it was not so. That judgment lacked
analysis of the evidence of both the prosecution and that of the
defence. Had the learned first appellate judge directed his mind
properly and performed the role of a first appellate court, he could not
have held as he did that the appellant's conviction was based on a
proper analysis of the evidence.
Next for our determination is the way forward in view of the first
appellate court's failure to perform its role. Ms. Kasambala invited us
to step into the shoes of the High Court and we respectfully accept.
We do so alive to the dictates of section 4(2) of the Appellate
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Jurisdiction Act (the AJA) which vests the Court with the power,
authority and jurisdiction vested in the court from which the appeal is
brought. Apparently, the Court has done so in various of its previous
decisions including; Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jaffari
Mfaume Kawawa [1981] TLR 149, Joseph Leonard Manyota v.
Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 485 of 2015 (unreported).
We shall do just that in this appeal by re-evaluating the
evidence on record before making findings whether the appellant's
conviction was grounded upon sufficient evidence on the required
standard; proof beyond reasonable doubt. This holding disposes
grounds one and two in the appellant's favour which takes us to
ground three.
The determination of ground three will entail re-evaluating the
evidence on record in view of our decision on the preceding grounds.
We shall do so by looking at the evidence on each count.
The first count related to fraudulent appropriation of power
contrary to section 283 of the Penal Code. Ms. Kasambala urged us to
find that there was sufficient evidence from PW1, PW2 and PW4 to
convict the appellant in count one. The particulars in this count
alleged that on divers dates between September and October, 2015,
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at the mentioned place, the appellant did obstruct and divert electrical
power delivered from the original machine power the property of
TANESCO to the house of Hamis s/o Sikanyika thereby causing a loss
of TZS. 1,000,000.00 to the said TANESCO. The appellant denied
having diverted the power. Instead, he stated the that he only
provided services to PW1 as his client by processing electricity
connection application with TANESCO. It was his evidence that the
shifting of the meter to DW3 was done by TANESCO employees in his
presence as he was not allowed to touch it. He produced DW3 who
told the trial court that the role played by the appellant was electrical
installation to his business premises and that the connection was done
by TANESCO staff in 2014 in the appellant's presence.
The material part of PWl's evidence on this aspect was that
after a dispute over power consumption charges on the shared meter,
DW3 agreed to the proposal for meter separation which entailed him
refunding PW1 TZS 340,000.00 which he did and the appellant shifted
the meter installed in PWl's shop to DW3 believing that he was an
employee of TANESCO as he possessed a laminated identity card.
PW2 Mawazo Makai, an employee of PW2 for his part had similar
version on the involvement of the appellant in shifting the meter from
PW1 to DW3's shop in his presence in collaboration with someone
Japhet. It was PW2's further evidence that the appellant had
represented himself as an employee of TANESCO and that is why he
shifted the meter to DW3's shop. In cross examination, PW2 stated:
"Gaudence is not TANESCO but he is an
employee of TANESCO, he showed us his
identity card and he was transferring meter of
TANESCO [from] that shop to another shop of
Sikanyika ... when Gaudence was removing
that meter I was present and were talking. I
had been shown by the accused his identity
card.... That identify card was written in
English.... (At page 33 and 34 of the record of
appeal].
To prove transfer of the meter, PW3 told the trial court he
visited the premises and discovered through GPS coordinates that
meter No. 5305508 previously installed in PW l's shop had been
transferred to DW3's shop.
Having subjected the appellants' defence through his own
evidence and that of DW3, we are satisfied that it did nothing other
than containing mere denials. The evidence of the prosecution
witnesses, PW2 in particular, was so specific that the appellant
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personated himself as an employee of TANESCO and transferred the
meter to DW3's shop. We are satisfied that though the trial court did
not consider defence evidence, it rightly convicted the appellant on
the first count.
The second count was in relation to malicious damage to
property contrary to section 326 of the Penal Code. The particulars of
the offence had it that on divers dates in September and October,
2015 at Ikuti area, the appellants did unlawfully and wilfully destroy
TANESCO meter No. 37135305508 with customer No. 0077586 and
electrical wires valued at TZS 1,019,223.00.
Ms. Kasambala urged that there was sufficient evidence through
PW4 to convict the appellant and we respectfully agree with her. In
view of our finding in respect of the first count, there cannot be any
dispute that the appellant's diversion of power by shifting the meter
from the original position to DW3's shop was a malicious damage of
such meter and the electric installation wires property of TANESCO;
an offence under section 326 of the Penal Code. As submitted by Ms.
Kasambala, there was sufficient evidence through PW4 which was not
controverted on the illegal transfer of the meter and the associated
installations causing loss of TZS 1,019,223.00. Like we found in
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respect of the first count, notwithstanding the trial court's failure to
consider defence evidence, the conviction was properly grounded in
the second count as well.
Next we shall consider the complaint in respect of the third
count involving personation of a public officer contrary to section 100
(b) of the Penal Code. According to PW1 and PW2, the appellant
represented to them as an employee of TANESCO who, as we have
found when dealing with the first count, led the duo believe that he
was such a person who could connect the much-needed power to
PWl's shop following transfer of the meter to DW3's shop. Indeed,
according to PW1 and PW2, not only did the appellant show them an
identity card resembling those used by TANESCO staff in one
occasion, he led them to TANESCO offices in similar uniform used by
TANESCO employees. Besides, when he was pursued to deliver on his
promise to connect power to PWl's shop, he pleaded with him not to
report him to TANESCO lest he got terminated from employment. As it
transpired out later, it was revealed upon investigation conducted by
PW3 and PW4 in March 2016, that he was not an employee of
TANESCO. Undeniably, it was not disputed during the preliminary
hearing that the appellant was not an employee of TANESCO. In his
defence through his own evidence and DW3, he stated that he was an
electrical contractor whose duties did not extend to touching
TANESCO metres and other electrical installations but to do domestic
wiring. Be it as it may, that evidence did not suffice to displace PWl's
and PW2's evidence on what the appellant represented to them at the
time of transferring the meter and subsequently. Yet again, we are
satisfied that the appellant's conviction was well founded on the third
count.
Finally, on the fourth count; obtaining money by false pretence
contrary to section 302 of the Penal Code. The prosecution alleged
that on divers dates between September and October 2015 at Ikuti
Sokoni area, by false pretence and with intent to defraud, the
appellant obtained TZS 200,000.00 from one Alex s/o Mengo
pretending that he was TANESCO employee who would connect
electricity for him and provide a new meter a fact which he knew to
be false.
The prosecution led evidence through PW1 and PW2 aimed at
proving that the appellant obtained TZS 520,000.00 from PW1
towards connection of electricity to PWl's shop within three days
which he did not do. It was the prosecution's further evidence that
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upon follow ups with TANESCO, it was discovered that, the appellant
paid (to TANESCO) a sum of TZS 320,000.00 for electricity connection
charges. TANESCO connected PWl's shop with electricity sometime in
December 2015.
Both PW1 and PW2 stated in evidence that the appellant did not
account for the remaining sum of TZS 200,000.00 and that when
confronted in January 2016, at a certain bus stop he pleaded with
them that he would refund the money but to no avail. Evidence shows
that despite the appellant's plea made in January, 2016, he went at
large until sometime in March 2016 when PW1 met him in a bar at a
place called Nzovwe. At the appellant's instance, the police arrested
PW1 on an allegation that he hijacked the appellant and later on he
was sent to Nzovwe Police Station where he was released after
explaining to them his version and instead, the appellant was kept in
custody and subsequently the matter reached TANESCO before the
appellant was arraigned in Court on the charged offences.
The appellant admitted in evidence that PW1 was his client
whom he had assisted in processing application for electricity
connection at his shop as a contractor and not a TANESCO employee.
He was adamant that he paid to TANESCO TZS 321,000.00 for which
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power was connected and that he was not responsible for the delayed
connection. He denied having received any other sum in excess of
what he paid to TANESCO. He contended that, he was framed up in
the case by PW3 in an offence he had not committed and the fact that
the charge alleged that he obtained TZS 255,000.00 fraudulently was
proof that the accusations against him were false.
Ms. Kasambala invited us to find that, the appellant was
properly found guilty and convicted on the fourth count based on a
water tight evidence from PW1 and PW2. We have already made as
finding that the appellant personated himself as a TANESCO
employee, subject of the third count. Indeed, PW1 paid money to the
appellant for electricity power connection to his butcher because the
appellant represented himself as a TANESCO employee assuring PW1
to connect him with power in three days in that capacity and not an
independent contractor.
The offence of obtaining money by false pretence is committed
when two ingredients exist that is to say; false representation and
intent to defraud. See: Juma Swalehe v. Republic [2003] T.L.R.
304. In the instant appeal, the prosecution led evidencethrough
PW1 and PW2 that the appellant induced PW1 to part with TZS
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600.000.00 as charges for connecting the much-needed power to his
shop within three days. It was equally proved that the appellant
represented himself to be an employee of TANESCO while, in actual
fact he was not. Neither was he capable of connecting power to PWl's
shop within the time he stated.
Although it turned out later that the appellant paid to TANESCO
TZS 320,000.00 as connection charges and power was subsequently
connected through the normal procedure without the appellant's
involvement, he could not account for the remaining amount of TZS
200.000.00. Apart from the claim that case against him was framed
up by PW3 and the alleged discrepancy in the amount subject of the
charge, the appellant did not offer any plausible defence on the
amount he was paid as compared with the actual connection charges
paid to TANESCO. On the whole, we are satisfied that, the
prosecution proved the fourth count of obtaining money by false
pretences to the required standard and the trial court rightly convicted
him.
In the event, upon our own evaluation of the evidence on
record, we are satisfied that the prosecution proved the case against
the appellant to the required standard and thus, his conviction was
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legally sound. We have found no reason to interfere with it so are the
sentences imposed against the appellant.
In fine, save for our determination of ground one and two of the
appeal in the appellant's favour, the substance of the appeal in
ground three fails. We dismiss it for lacking in merit.
DATED at MBEYA this 7th day of December, 2022.
F. L. K. WAMBALI
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
L. J. S. MWANDAMBO
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
A. M. MWAMPASHI
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
The Judgment delivered this 7th day of December, 2022 in the pres
ence of Appellant in person and Mr. Emmanuel Basnome, learned State
Attorney, for the Respondent/Republic is hereby certified as a true copy
COURT OF APPEAL
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