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Series Board

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Jean-Luc Marion
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series eat1:O r
l

PERSPECTIVES IN
CONTINENTAL
PHILOSOPHY
 1 N S IT

Martin Heidegger
the Limits ofPoetics

1AM UNIVERSITY PRESS

New York II 2013

BM0661849
Copyright © 2013 Fordham University Press

AlI rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted in any form or by any means-eleetronic, mechanical, photoeopy,
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Printed in the United States of America

15 14 13 5 4 3 2 1

First edition
Contents

List ofAbbreviations he
Note on the text xi
Acknowledgments xiii
Introduction: The Limits of Poedcs 1
1 For the First Time 19
2 The Naming Power of the Word 61
3 Heidegger's Figures 101
Reading Heidegger Reading 137
Conclusion: A Poedcs of Limit? 181

Notes 197
Bibliography 223
Index 233

vii
AlI citations from Heidegger's works are given with the English translation, fol-
10wed by reference to the German edition (with the exception of untranslated
works, which are given by their number from Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe).

BPP Basic Problems ofPhenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloom-

ington: Indiana University Press, 1988); German edition Frank-
furt am Main: Klostermann, 1975.
BT Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1962); German edition Tübingen, M. Nie-
meyer, 1953.
BW Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins,
1992).
EHP Elucidations of HOlderlins Poetry, trans. Keith Hoeller (Amherst,
NY: Humanity Books, 2000); German edition Frankfurt am
Main: V. Klostermann, 1951.
EL On the Essence of Language: ]he Metaphysics of Language and the
Essencing of the Word; Concerning Herder's Treatise On the Origin
ofLanguage, trans. Wanda Torres Gregory and Yvonne Unna (Al-
bany: State University of New York Press, 2004); German edition
Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1999.
ET 1he Essence of Truth: on Plato's cave allegory and 1heaetetus, trans.
Ted Sadler (London: Continuum, 2002); German edition Frank-
furt arn Main: Klostermann, 1988.
FCM Fundamental Concepts ofMetaphysics, trans. William McNeill and
Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995);
German edition Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1992.
GA5 Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1977).
GA39 HOlderlins Hymne, '&ermanien' und 'Der Rhein' (Frankfurt am
Main: Klostermann, 1980).
GA52 Hdlderlins Hymne, 'Andenken' (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann,
1982).
lM Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Richard Polt and Gregory Fried
(New Haven: Yale Nota Bene, 2000); German edition Tübingen,
Niemeyer, 1966.
Ni Nietzsche 1: 7he Will to Power as Art, trans. David Farrell Krell
(New York: Harper and Row, 1979); German edition Frankfurt
am Main: Klostermann, 1985.
Nii Nietzsche II: 7he Eternal Recurrence of the !-Jame, trans. David Far-
rell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1981); German edition
Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1989.
OBT Off the Beaten Track, trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes
(Carnbridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); German edition
Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1950.
OL On the Wézy to Language, trans. Peter Hertz and Joan Stambaugh
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971); German edition Pfullingen:
Neske, 1959.
P Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press: 2001); German edition Frankfurt am Main: Kloster-
mann, 1967.
Par Parmenides, trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1992); German edition Frankfurt
am Main: Klostermann, 1982.
PLT Poetry Language 7hought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York:
Harper and Row, 1971); "Language" in Unterwegs zur Sprache;
"... poetically man dwells ... " in Vortrage und Aufiatze (Pfullin-
gen: G. Neske, 1954).
PR 7he Principle ofReason, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indi-
ana University Press, 1991); German edition Pfullingen: G. Neske,
1957.
WCT What is Called 7hinking?, trans. J. Glenn Gray and F. Wieck (New
York: Harper and Row, 1972); German edition Tübingen: M. Nie-
meyer, 1954.

x Abbreviations
Note on

AlI translations of Heidegger's works are reproduced in the form employed

by the source being quoted from, unless otherwise stated. Translations are
modified either for the sake of consistency between translations or when
1 wish to highlight an aspect of the original overlooked by the transla-
tion cited. AlI Greek words are transliterated and standardized for the sake
of consistency. German terrns are reproduced according to the form em-
ployed by the source quoted (for example, the term Rift (Heidegger's spell-
ing) is also reproduced as Riss).

xi
1 am greatly indebted to the many friends and colleagues without whose
support 1 never would have been able ta elaborate, let alone complete,
this project. Especial thanks are due to Ruth Abbott, Vincent Broqua,
Olivier Brossard, Virgil Brower, Jamie CasteIl, Nick Chapin, Lizzy Coles,
Jonathan Culler, Peter De Bolla, Rosalind Delmar, Amanda Dennis, Alex-
ander Garda Düttmann, Daniel Jean, Abigail Lang, Drew Milne, Cecily
Nowell-Smith, Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, Ian Patterson, Neil Pattison, Liz
Pender, Seth Perlow, Paul Volsik, Lola Wilhelm, Ross Wilson, and Jarad
Zimbler. My thanks also ta the president and fellows of Queens' College,
Cambridge, and ta the Institut Charles V, Université Paris VII-Denis Di-
derot, for the many years during which they provided me with intellectuai
and financial sustenance.
This book and the thinking out of which it has arisen have benefitted
immeasurably from the conversation with and friendship of Ben Ether-
ington and Ewan Jones over a period of many years now, as weIl as from
the attentive and patient reading of Christopher Fynsk and Paul Hamilton
at an early stage, and later on from my anonymous readers at Fordham.
1 should also like ta thank 1homas Lay at Fordham University Press and
Michael Koch for the great meticulousness they have shown in making the
manuscript presentable for general consumption.My greatest debt, how-
ever, goes to Simon Jarvis, whose guidance and generosity pervades each
of the following pages.

xiii
 This vast array has made Sounding/Silence a better book than it would
otherwise possibly have been; the failings that remain are, needless ta say,
myown.
Elements of Chapters 1 and 4 appear in "The Art of Fugue: Heidegger
on Rhythm," Gatherings: 1he Heidegger Circle Annual2 (2012): 41-64; a
programmatic summary of sorne of the book's major daims appeared as
"Sounding/Silence" in Gatherings 3 (2013): 18-29. An early and abridged
incarnation of Chapter 3, entitled, like the chapter itself, "Heidegger's
Figures," appears in Textual Practice 26, no. 6 (2012): 1045-63; material
reused in the introduction was first published in "The Poetry-Verse Dis-
tinction Reconsidered," 1hinking Vérse l (2011): 137-60. l would like to
thank the editors of these journals for allowing me ta republish this work
here. Similarly, l would like to thank Pierre Joris for the permission ta re-
produce his translation of Paul Celan's "Schieferaugige" (Slate-eyed One),
from Breathturn (New York: Sun and Moon Books, 1995), 234--35.

xiv Admowledgments
1he Limits ofPoetics

To set up a limit is a dual gesture, at once instituting difference and indi-

cating a point of contact. Martin Heidegger's critique of the discipline of
poetics, a recurrent feature throughout his long engagement with poetry,
is just such a gesture. On the one hand, he daims that his own readings of
poems or Erlauterungen ("soundings-out") can articulate aspects of these
poems to which poetics itself is blind. lt thus stands beyond the limits
of poetics-limits, that is, not simply born of bad critical practices, but
which belong to the very "essence" of poetics as a mode of questioning.
On the other hand, in his readings of poetry, and his discussions of generic
features of poetry such as rhythm or figurative language, he continually
finds himself in an encounter not only with poetry, but with those same
rnodes of questioning which he ascribes to poetics. Just as he attempts to
stand outside the lirnits of poetics, his thinking brought into contact with
these limits.
To suggest-as I have just done and will continue to do throughout the
following pages-that Heidegger's writing on poetry involves an engage-
ment with poetics, runs co un ter to the tone of patrician disdain that char-
acterizes many of Heidegger's own pronouncements on the subject. In the
preface to the fourth edition (1971) of his Elucidations ofHolderlin's Poetry,
he states his opinion boldly: "The present elucidations do not daim to be
contributions to research in the history of literature or aesthetics. They
spring from a necessity of thought" (EHP 21/7). Echoing the dictum from

1
the 1956 lecture series What 1s Lcdled lhinking?, that "science do es not
think," the history of literature and aesthetics (disciplines that converge
in poetics) are tacidy opposed to the "necessity of thought," and even, the
implication goes, antithetical to "thinking" taking place at aIl. Discussing
Georg Trakl's poem "Ein Winterabend" (A Winter Evening) at the begin-
ning of his lecture on "Language," he observes laconically: "The poem Îs
made up of three stanzas. Their meter and rhyme pattern can be defined
accurately according to the schemes of metrics and poetics. The poem's
content is comprehensible" (PLT 193/18). Heidegger, by contrast, is not
concerned with the "schemes of metrics and poetics" or with dissecting
the poem's content; rather, he is "seeking the speaking of language in the
poem," something that poetics and its schemes will never grasp.
The "speaking of language," like the "necessity of thought," will draw
Heidegger beyond the limits of poetics as a discipline. But this involves
a strikingly narrow definition of poetics. In each instance, poetics is seen
merely to furnish a metrical "scheme," or to interpret "images" and "sym-
bols" (the camel in Arabian epic being one preferred example), and it is
this onus on schemes that prevents poetics frorn "thinking," and renders
it deaf to the "speaking of language." There is nevertheless a broader sig-
nificance in Heidegger's argument, even for that majority of poeticians
and literary critics who will not identifY themselves with the furnishing of
schemas. This concerns the value of poetic technique. Heidegger's central
concern is that in technical or hermeneutic analysis, the poem's "thrust
into the extra-ordinary is captured by familiarity and connoisseurship"
(OBT 42/56). Ultimately at stake is a means of attending to the "unfa-
miliar" in poetry without familiarizing it, explaining it without explaining
it away. It is by reducing the unfamiliar to a series of analyzable "formaI
fèatures" (OBT 42/56) that poetics would be blocked off from grasping
the "speaking of language" that Heidegger argues we must try to hear in
its very unfamiliari ty.
This leads poetics into double impasse. Firsdy, its schemas fàmiliarize
Dichtung (poetry) so that it becomes mere Literatur (literature), or Poesie
(poesy), that subsection ofliterature that employs verse. l Once thus famil-
iarized, we encounter nothing more than an "aimless imagining of whim-
sicalities [and] flight of mere representations and f~mcies into the unreal"
(OBT 45/60). Furthermore, Heidegger argues, the inability to think be-
yond these schemas means that "even wh en we are engaged in demonstrat-
ing by means of literary history that these works of poetry really are not
literature," poetry cannot appear to literary history except as "literature"
(WCT 134/139). In other words, poetics might be aware of its own limits,
but it cannot overcome them without overcoming poetics itselt: The only

2 Introduction
way in which we can move from a determination of poetry as literature
to poetry itseH: Heidegger says-the poetry in which we will then be able
to hear the "speaking of language"-is if we "release poetry into its essen-
tial place [der Dichtung ihren Wésensort freigeben]"; and this will happen
only when poetry, freed from the "literary" concepts through which we
would read it, is allowed to "determine and reach this place" itself (WCT
134/139; translation modified). Heidegger intends his writing on poetry as
an attempt to allow poetizing to reach this place, and thereby to hear the
"speaklng of language" this place renders audible.
To this there is one obvious riposte. How can Heidegger's own readings,
valorizing their dis regard toward the poems' literary features, to the metri-
cal schemes employed, be so sure that it is they and not poetics that allow
poetry to determine and reach this "essential place"? How, indeed, can he
know when poetry has in fact determined and reached this "place?" After
all, if metrical schemes and recurrent tropes were entirely absent from po-
etry's "essential place," it would seem strange that so many poems should
employ them. Why, even, should it be that poetry's "essential place" is, as
Heidegger asserts, that which "allows th [e] open to happen in such a way,
indeed, that now, for the first titne, in the midst of beings, it brings them
to shine and sound" (OBT 45/60)? For Heidegger is making a daim not
simply about how we read poetry, as poeticians or as "thinkers," but about
poetry itself, contrasting the "essential place" of Dichtung, the "projective
saying" that "first" brings into the "open," to its determination as Poesie,
the "linguistic work in the narrow sense" (OBT 45/60).
Obvious as this riposte may appear, it is not one Heidegger confronts
head-on. He does, however, offer a more nuanced relation between the
poem's "essential place" and its purportedly formaI features than his cat-
egorical division might suggest. His 1936 lecture on "Hôlderlin and the
Essence of Poetry," for instance, states that poetry's "harmless exterior be-
longs to the essence of poetry, just as the valley belongs to the mountain"
(EHP 62/41-42). What Heidegger calls the "harmless exterior" are those
features, such as rhyme, metrical schemes, metaphor, and so on, which
characterize the poem's surface: its "whimsicalities," its "Right of mere fan-
cies." Yet in the valley-mountain simile it ceases to be exterior at all. Not
only are valley and mountain mutually dependent and determining; the
mountain rises out of the valley, meaning that the "harmless exterior" not
only "belongs to the essence of poetry" but it serves as the very ground
which gives this essence foundations and shapes its rising-up. 111at a piece
of literature fui fils the generic requirements of Poesie is not perhaps a suf-
ficient condition for its attaining the ontological vocation of Dichtung, but
this does not mean that it does not condition this vocation at aIl.

Introduction Il 3
 We thus encounter a tension in Heidegger's thinking on poetry that
Sounding/Silence will probe throughout. Heidegger effects what 1 would
term an ontologization of poetry: that is, he moves away from its "on tic"
or generic features, in order to conceive of the poem as a privileged site
for the "event" of being. 2 If this leads him at times to dismiss these ge-
neric features-the poem's form, its use of trope, fiction, construction of
persona and voice-as somehow inessential to this site, we also find him
attending to precisely these features in order to articulate how the poem
might first furnish such a site. At issue ultimately is not a denial of a poem's
formal features but a revaluation of them. We will encounter this motif
throughout the book: Heidegger dis misses form in order to rethink form;
he dismisses beauty in order to rethink beauty; he dismisses rhythm in
order to rethink rhythm; he dismisses metaphor in order to rethink meta-
phor. In each case his dis miss al starts by branding a feature metaphysical,
but this gesture should not sidetrack us from what Heidegger is actuaIly
doing. Engaging with what lies at the limits of the metaphysical concept,
Heidegger aims to see the problem anew.
This requires that we understand with greater clarity what is meant by
Heidegger when he speaks of "metaphysics." While "metaphysics" often
appears in Heidegger's vocabulary as a catch-aIl depreciation of the his-
tory of the forgetting of being since the Greeks, we can discern a far more
precise meaning. In the 1929 address "What is Metaphysics?" and the 1935
lecture series Introduction to Metaphysics, he sees metaphysics as a mode of
situating oneself "beyond beings," which grounds his own, "metaphysical"
fundamental ontology; in his later work it has become a precipitate scis-
sion between sensuous and nonsensuous realms, where the transcendence
of "beyond beings" is now situated "beyond" the physical. Central to both
is the interpretation ofbeing as presence. On the later account, "metaphysi-
cal" thought appeals to a nonsensuous realm in order to secure constant
presence, and thereby to overcome absence. By contrast, the "metaphysics"
of his earlier work involves our exposing ourselves to "the nothing" -that
which refuses to be drawn into presence. The "metaphysics" Heidegger at
this juncture proposes can only afford or secure presence through an at-
tention to that absencing movement that bounds it. Even when Heidegger
discards and disparages the term metaphysics, the question ofhow presence
is engendered by an absencing movement will remain a key, perhaps the
key motif in his thought. Ir is also the motif that will necessitate an exact-
ing thinking of limit, something that guides both his conception of poetry
as Dichtung, and the way he reads poems.
"Metaphysics," then, brings together the interpretation of being in
terms of presence with the question of how to secure this presence. In this

4 Introduction
respect, it might seem to be very close to the problematic of the "ontico-
ontological difference," that is, the difference between das Seiende (a be-
ing or entity) and das Sein (being), where beings can only enter presence
insofar as they show themselves "in their being." Heidegger, however, is at
pains to distinguish ontological difference from apparently analogous op-
positions-such as between the transcendental and the empirical, a priori
and a posteriori, substance and accident, or "beingness" and "entity"-
and in the 1936-39 Contributions to Philosophy goes so far as to claim that
ontologicai difference, setting das Sein (being) against das Seiende (beings),
cannot grasp das Seyn (the be-ing) that first gives such a diffèrence to be
thought. 3 In his later work, this is the originary movement through which
being gives itself: the "it" (es) that "gives being" (es gibt)4 that Heidegger
will thematize as the Ereignis, the "event of appropriation."
This then implies that in his later work, Heidegger moves away from
ontological diffèrence as a guiding category in his thought; however, as
Thomas Sheehan has argued powerfully, the relation between being and be-
ings was aiways, for Heidegger, a question of how beings come to disclose
themselves in an intelligible manner, and how we can understand such
autodisclosure from within a pregiven world. 5 Whether asking after the
"being of beings" or the originary event, which "appropriates" beings into
the "open region" in which we will encounter them, the guiding concern
is how beings might, by virtue of this intelligibility, disclose themselves
as "present." Sheehan frames the problematic of a being's autodisclosure
in terms of what he caUs "pres-absentiality," that is, oscillations between
presencing and absencing that structure the way in which a being can ap-
pear in presence. Sheehan's great insight is to observe how all intelligible
appearance is necessarily kinetic: that is, it is structured by continuaI coun-
termovements which set up the open region in which a being can dis close
itself as the being it is.
Sheehan's central concern is the articulation ofwhat Heidegger, from the
mid-1930s onward, will caU Ereignis; however, his insight allows us to see
how ontological diffèrence is replayed in the distinction between Dichtung,
and Poesie. For if Dichtung engenders a singular presence, it does so only
as the poem engages with the "ontic" possibilities of its linguistic medium,
through verse technique, trope and so on: those features that characterize
the singular way in which any poem (or other kind of artwork) dis closes
itself as the poem it is. Above 1 said: Heidegger dismisses form in order to
rethink form, dismisses beauty in order to rethink beauty, dismisses trope
in order to rethink trope, and so on. This dis miss al and rethinking would
grasp these features in terms of the relations between presencing and ab-
sencing that condition the poem's own appearance. These formal features

Introduction fi 5
attain "ontological" weight insofar as they are concerned with tracing these
relations between presencing and absencing as these countermovements
inhere in their medium; it is this tracing which endows the poem with a
singular presence. In order to allow poetry to "itself determine and reach
[its essential] place," Heidegger's thinking must engage with literature af-
ter aIl. 1 am far from being the first reader of Heidegger to observe his
dependence, in setting up "ontological" daims, on "on tic" features of lan-
guage and experience; where 1 differ from many critics, especially those
of a "deconstructive" bent, is in saying that, far from this undermining
Heidegger's project, and resulting in the unraveling of ontological differ-
ence as such, it constitutes a central feature of his project. lndeed, 1 will
argue throughout, it is only by attending to the ontic complexity of poems
as the way in which they disdose themselves in presence that Heidegger
will be able to articulate their ontological vocation.

In this, Heidegger's work is of great relevance to a current trend in poet-

ics and literary theory to attempt to endow a poem's "ontic" features with
"ontological" weight. For these thinkers as for Heidegger, Holderlin is an
exemplary figure, although the passage from the "Notes on Oedipus" they
focus on is one that Heidegger himseH: regrettably, never discusses. 6 Here
he elaborates a "law" of tragic drama, in which the "rhythmic sequence of
the representations" exists "in tragedy more as a state of balance than as
mere succession."7 At the crux of this "state of balance" is the irreversible
event that breaks with the status quo of the beginning of the tragedy and
structures the entire tragedy, and he aligns this event with "what in poetie
meter is ealled eaesura, the pure word, the counter-rhythmic interruption."8
Extracted from the context of meter, caesura becomes the tragic structure's
Archimedian point: tragedy thus follows a "logic of caesura."9 Behind this,
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe has observed, lies a conception of temporal-
ity in which the equilibrium structuring temporal experience is marked
by an originary discordance, in which rhythmic continuity is dependent
on, and conditioned by, counter-rhythm. lO Lacoue-Labarthe develops this
train of thought further, remarking that these caesura-like events involve
"empty" moments, moments that he glosses in terms of "withdrawal" and
the "nothing."ll What we encounter, Lacoue-Labarthe argues, is a "law of
finitude" through which "it is perhaps not impossible to raise caesura to
the level of a, if not the, concept of historicity."12
One might wonder, however, how much of the specifically metrieal
dimension of caesura is preserved when, by virtue of its deployment of
temporal continuity and disjunction, identity and difference, it is "raised

6 Introduction
to the level of a ... concept of historicity." This is most striking in William
S. Allen's recent discussion of this work, which wishes to employ its broad-
ened thinking of caesura as the basis for readings of individual caesurae in
poetry. He glosses caesura thus: "the caesura cannot be marked, but can
only be recalled as that which has occurred without appearing, thereby
leaving a trace of absence, a re-(mark), which neither is nor is not, for it
renders such a distinction impossible; rather it is indistinct, inapparent."13
But if caesura in a poem occurs "without appearing," it is not dear how it
would effect its "counter-rhythmic interruption" on the poems themselves.
Indeed, when Allen directs his account of caesura back on to Heidegger's
readings of individual poems, he identifies one such caesura in a colon at
the ending of the penultimate line of Stefan George's "Das Wort." This
is, of course, not metrically a caesura at all; and insofar as the colon pre-
cedes a final epigram, its "interruption" would, on a formallevel, seem far
from counter-rhythmic. The metrical dimension of caesura, so important
to Hôlderlin's analysis, has been disregarded entirely--and at the very mo-
ment when he would speak of meter! Allen's reading bears witness to a
difficulty for any philosophical poetics that wants to justify its daims both
to be "philosophical" and to constitute "poetics." Reading a wider philo-
sophical significance into caesura, and its employment and deployment of
relations of difference and identity, presence and absence, it is placed in
direct contradiction with caesurae as they actually appear in verse.
In other words, the danger in the analogy between the prosodic disjunc-
tion of caesura and its ontological disjunction is that it risks reifying verse
technique, something that becomes explicit in Allen's countersensicalline-
ending caesura. This is the double bind Giorgio Agamben seeks to avoid
in his discussion, in "The End of the Poem," of that other mode of inter-
rupting the sameness of rhythm in metrical poetry: enjambment. Starting
with an "ontic" analysis of this technical feature of verse, namely that "the
possibility of enjambment constitutes the only criterion for distinguish-
ing poetry from prose,"14 Agamben will eventually make an ontological
daim about poetry, and indeed for poetry, as that mode of writing that will
"let language finally communicate itself."15 The echo of Heidegger's own
description of "the speaking of language" is by no means coincidental;
yet Agamben, unlike Heidegger, aims to situate this speaking not in the
poem's engagement with its medium in general, but in one specifie formaI
feature of this medium.
As with Hôlderlin's caesura, Agamben approaches metrical rhythm as a
kind of "interruption"; and he too focuses on the negative dimension of a
verse feature. Agamben focuses on "the end of the poem" because "there
can be no enjambment in the last line," which means that each poem faces

Introduction Il 7
the ultimate dissolution of the tension and difference in which it "lives."16
At this point, the impossibility of enjambment implies an impossibility of
poetry as such: each poem must continually confront and negotiate the
specter of its own impending impossibility. In its finallines, the poem is
lett with two options: sound and sense can be reconciled in a "mystical
marri age" in which the poem itself would be dismanded, or alternatively
the last line can give on ta an "empty place in which, according to Mal-
larmé's phrase, truly rien n'aura lieu que le lieu. "17 Agamben develops this
either-or into a brief reading of the final five lines of Dante's "COS! nel mio
padar voglio esser aspro": "The double intensity animating language do es
not die away in a final comprehension; instead it collapses into silence, so
ta speak, in an endless falling. The poem thus reveals the goal of its proud
strategy: to let language finally communicate itself, without remaining un-
said in what is said."18
It is here that Agamben's analysis shifts from an ontic to an ontologi-
cal plane, where the poem ceases to be Poesie and becomes Dichtung. Al-
though less glaring th an in Allen's "caesura" line-ending, we once again
encounter an ambivalence at this point of transition. Collapsing into "an
endless falling," does the poem follow the second of the two possibilities
Agamben has suggested, in which nothing takes place except the place
itself, or does it serve to suspend this either-or indefinitely? 1bis suspen-
sion, as an endless folling, would refuse even to "place" itself in the place of
where "nothing" will take place. If poetry brings language to communicate
itself, it do es so only insofar as language itself is ultimately negative. If en-
jambment in particular can endow poetry with its peculiar negativity, this
is by virtue of its peculiar negativity, understaod as its tension between the
poem's sound patterning and its sense.
This points ta a wider worry about Agamben's transition from the ge-
neric analysis of Poesie ta an ontalogical exposition of Dichtung. Language
"communicates itself" when it exceeds the sound-sense dichotamy, or ten-
sion, in which enjambment "lives." But it is one thing ta say that lan-
guage in essence exceeds a sound-sense dichotomy that has been shown
up as insufficient, another thing entirely ta daim that language commu-
nicates itself as-and ultimately is-this excess. This, indeed, is the daim
Agamben will make when elsewhere he speaks of a "negative ontological
foundation."19 He do es not ask whether another conception of language
might allow us ta grasp, from within the poem, language's communicat-
ing itself on its own terrns. For Heidegger, this would simply be one more
instance of "demonstrating by means of literary history that these works
of poetry really are not literature," but finding that the poem neverthe-
less continues to be grasped in terms of "literature" (WCT 134/139). The

8 Introduction
moral of this story, he would conclude, is that this excess must point us
toward a thinking of language and poetry beyond the limits of poetics.
There is one further difference between Heidegger's thinking and that of
Agamben, Laboue-Labarthe and Allen, and one that should give us pause.
Both enjambment and caesura are seen to attain their ontological import
through the irruption of negativity into a self-present sphere of meaning.
Heidegger, by contrast, insists that poetry, in its vocation as Dichtung, is
an opening of meaning. This is not to ignore the negativity taking place in
poetry, but to reframe its significance. As mentioned above, Heidegger is
concerned with how presence is shaped by an absencing movement that
delimits it; absencing effects an opening of meaning not by undermining
it or rendering meaning impossible in advance, but by conditioning the
openness through which beings and the world can become meaningful. At
the same time, he argues that this open region must not only involve a prin-
ciple of difference, so that we can set beings off from one another, and from
the world they inhabit, but also a principle ofjointure (Fuge), which binds
them together in such a way that they can enter into relation. Throughout
the book 1 will depict this as an articulation that both differentiates and
joins. Ir is as it differentiates and joins beings in a singular manner that a
poem can bring beings to show themselves "for the first time."
Moreover, this understanding of difference and jointure coincides with
the kinetic conception of the relations between presence and absencing
so that aIl meaning is indelibly rhythmic. Lacoue-Labarthe, Allen and
Agamben situate the negativity of poetry in its deployment of nonseman-
ric rhythmic features; rhythm is an "other" to thinking, if is immediately
counter-rhythm. Yet Heidegger argues that rhythm rather conditions, and
shapes, the openness we inhabit. In this respect the poem does not co-
nstitute a "counter-rhythmic interruption" to meaning, but through its
rhythmicity performs the entry into meaning itself, opening up the pos-
sibility of an encounter with beings. Given Heidegger's onus on the ki-
neric dimension of beings' autodisclosure, it is unsurprising that poetry
should attain such significance in his thought, for in it coincide two modes
of rhythmicity: that of the fà.bric of our experience, and the rhythmic-
ity proper to language itself. Rendering manifest these two rhythms, po-
etry can shape the countermovements between presencing and absencing
as such.
However, here one might ask how such rhythmicity relates to rhythm
as a "paralinguistic" feature of language. As we shall see throughout, bodily
and verbal openness are approached concomitantly, so that language be-
cornes what 1 term a bodily articulation. Agamben portrays the distinction
between sound and sense in the poem as between "semiotic" and "seman-

Introduction 9
tic" spheres; the sonority of poetry, for Agamben, is semiotic (or so one
can surmise-he himself does not explain this equivalence) in that it is
a patterning of individual sounds into recognizable systems (iambs, terza
rima, and so on). But to do this requires that the sounds oflanguage be ab-
stracted from meaning-it would be "metaphysical" insofar as it imposes
on language a strict dualism between language's physical and ideal dimen-
sions. For Heidegger, by contrast, language means insofar as it sounds (lau-
tet); in other words, the material or physical features of language-which
are often called paralinguistic as they coincide with language but are not
part of its meaning-should not be conceived of as an interruption of, or
aporia for, meaning, but constitute a central moment in meaning's coming
to sound. It is at these points of contact, moreover, that we find not only
Heidegger's engagement with poetry, but also an engagement with those
same "schemas" of poetics that he elsewhere denigrates. A central task of
this book will be to probe the potential significance this notion of sounding
holds for poetics.
Il

On June 21, 1934, Heidegger resigned from his post as rector of the Uni-
versity of Freiburg. In the Winter Semester of that year, he gave his first
lecture series on the poetry of Friedrich Hûlderlin, on the late hymns "Ger-
manien" and "Der Rhein." The close succession of these two events has
led much of the writing on Heidegger's readings of poetry, and especially
since the "Heidegger controversy" that followed the publications of Vic-
tor Farias's and Hugo Ott's biographies,20 to concern itself with whether
we can find, in his engagement with Hûlderlin, a way of explaining or
salvaging him from his support for the Nazi Party. This line of argument is
encouraged by Heidegger himself in his interview with Der Spiegel, "Only
a God Can Save Us": ''After 1 stepped down as rector 1 limited myself to
teaching. In the summer semester of 1934 1 lectured on 'Logic.' In the
following semes ter 1 gave the first Hûlderlin lecture. In 1936, 1 began
the Nietzsche lectures. Anyone with ears to hear heard in these lectures a
confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with National Socialism."21 Following
Heidegger's hint, many works--including Miguel de Beistegui's Heidegger
and the Political, Michael Zimmerman's Heideggers Confrontation with Mo-
dernity, and Julian Young's Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism-aim to "hear" in
Heidegger's readings of Hûlderlin and Nietzsche just such an Auseinander-
setzung,22 whereas others-such as laines Phillips's Heideggers Volk and
Bernhard Radloff's Heidegger and the Question ofNational Socialism-go so
far as to identify in Heidegger's writings on poetry a salvaged conception
of the "political" as such, in particular in its critique ofliberal humanism. 23

10 Introduction
There are then works that approach Heidegger's readings of Hôlderlin to
prove precisely the opposite-that is, that his philosophy is inherently
Nazist, and that his readings of Hôlderlin are designed ta NazifY a poet
whose poetry resists such an operation at every juncture. 24 This focus has
coincided for the most part with an emphasis on the thematic aspects of
Heidegger's writing, and in particular on questions of the "other," tech-
nology, our relation to the earth and to our "homeland," and the relation
between the divine and the human. Questions concerning poetry as an
artistic medium employing particular expressive features are for the most
part overlooked, as are the issues Heidegger's thinking raises for literary
theory and poetics more generally.25
My focus will be these implications for poetics, and as a result 1 will re-
strict questions of Heidegger's political activity to footnotes. Nevertheless,
one cannot ignore the extent to which Heidegger's political judgments of
the 1930s constitute a real problem for any serious engagement with his
thought. To see this, take the following passage, from the Introduction to
Metaphysics lecture course he gave in 1935, a year after he had resigned the
recta rate:

We lie in the pincers. Our people, as standing in the centre, suf-

fers the most intense pressure-our people, the people richest in
neighbors and hence the most endangered people, and in this [in al!
dem] the metaphysical people. 26 We are sure ofthis vocation; but this
people will gain a fàte from its vocation only when it creates in itself
a resonance, a possibility of resonance for this vocation, and grasps
its tradition creatively. AlI this implies that this people, as a historical
people, must transpose itself-and with it the histary of the West-
from the centre of their future happening into the originary realm
of the powers of Being. Precisely if the great decision regarding Eu-
rope is not to go down the path of annihilation-precisely then can
this decision come about only through the development of new,
historically spiritual forces from the centre. (lM 41/29; translation
modified)
When we read the daim that the Germans are "the metaphysical people,"
we should note that, at this point in his thinking, Heidegger is conceiving
of metaphysics as the posing of the question, "why are there beings, rather
than nothing at all? ," in order to reach "beyond beings," and that Heideg-
ger's warning of Europe's "annihilation" also nods toward his account of
"the nothing" which serves as the impetus for asking this question. In this
respect, the "great decision" alluded to is our posing of the question as to
how we stand with being, and with "the nothing." lndeed, the Germans

Introduction Il 11
attain their status as "the metaphysical people" by virtue of their exposed
relation to foreign "neighbors." This both continues Heidegger's think-
ing on the relation between Dasein's uncanniness and its authenticity, and
prefigures the role played by "neighborhood" in his later thought, which
is understood as a co-belonging foreignness. Heidegger will exp and upon
this in the 1942 lecture series on Holderlin's "Ister" hymn, saying that
"the law of the encounter between the foreign and one's own is the funda-
mental truth of history, a truth from out of which the essence of history
must unveil itself" (IH 49/61). To caU the Germans "the most endangered
people" would appear to give fundamental-ontological sustenance to the
clamor for remilitarizing the Rhineland, while also recalling Holderlin's
lines from "Patmos": "But where danger threatens/That which saves from
it also growS."27
Far from being extraneous to, let alone incompatible with, Heidegger's
wider philosophy, this passage would appear to be both philosophically
consistent, and, more criticaUy, philosophically sound, supporting Karl
Lowith's observation that Heidegger's supposedly philosophical and politi-
cal pronouncements overlap to the extent that the rectoral address is "phil-
osophicaUy demanding, a minor stylistic masterpiece."28 We might note
a kinship between the "leaders" of the rectoral address and the "creators"
of "The Origin of the Work of Art" and the Introduction to Metaphysics, 29
and indeed, this aspect of Heidegger's thinking can be traced further back,
firstly to Heidegger's reading of Plato's cave allegory in On the Essence of
Tru th, wh en he speaks of the "liberators" who make possible free human
comportment (ET 83/115), but also to the final passages of the 1929 lec-
ture "What is Metaphysics?": "only because we can question and ground
things is the destiny of our existence placed in the hands of the researcher"
(P 95-96/18).30 In short, Heidegger's thinking at this period cannot be
extricated from the political choices that led him to join the Nazi Party in
1933, uncomfortable though this truth is for those of us who admire his
thinking and find Nazism in aU its incarnations abhorrent. 31
This does not mean that Nazist thinking exhausts these passages, how-
ever. Although there is evident overlap between Heidegger's first writings
on poetry and these "Nazi" writings, and between Heidegger's philosophi-
cal concerns and sorne of the motifs of Nazi and other right-wing dis-
course of the period, many of his most important insights, such as his
insistence on the work's thingliness and his critique of "symbolic images"
as an explanation of art meaning, reach far beyond its political context.
Heidegger's account of the artwork is most pointedly political in the in-
famous cOInparison between the artwork as a "happening of truth" and
other moments when truth takes place: "the state-founding act" and "the

12 Introduction
essential sacrifice" (OBT 37/51). We also notice unmistakably national-
ist overtones when Heidegger speaks of the work's making possible the
being-with-one-another of a Volk (people), who engage with the "earth"
of the artwork as "their earth," and thus become "a historical humanity"
(OBT 47/62).31 This historical dimension, however, is predicated on the
artwork's engagement with the modes of appearance of its "work-material"
or medium and thereby "transports" thinking "out of the realm of the
usual" (OBT 40/54). The Volk can only grasp the "earth" as "their earth"
because of the artwork's engagement with its own earth. Indeed, although
the ways in which Heidegger preserves the artwork undergoes a tangible
shift in his later essays, where the language of Gelassenheit (releasement)
supplants that ofErschlossenheit (resoluteness) ,33 the understanding ofhow
the artwork renders possible such preservation remains broadly intact. In
other words, if Heidegger endows the artwork with nationalistic signifi-
cance in his writings of the 1930s, then this is to do with his preservation
of the work, rather than the model of the work itself.
This would suggest that one can give, as it were, a formaI reading of
Heidegger untouched by the particular political gloss he subsequently gave
to his own insights. However, l would also daim that the passages cited ac-
tually, at crucial junctures, undercut the political gloss Heidegger provides.
For instance, when the Germans are deemed "the metaphysical people,"
it is because of an exposedness or ecstasis that would construct them as a
people. Yet the corollary of this is that to overcome this exposedness would
be to lose this capacity to pose the question of being. Authentic being-in-
the-world do es not dissolve ecstasis but rather grasps in ecstasis the pos-
sibility most proper to it. In other words, the Germans depend on this
exposedness for their status as "the metaphysical people"; to dedare war on
these "neighbors" would entai! dosing themselves off from the question of
being.
A similar point can be made with reference to Heidegger's discussion
of a geologist who attempts to grasp the heaviness of a rock: "While the
heaviness weighs down on us, at the same time, it denies us any penetra-
tion into it. If we attempt such penetration by smashing the rock, then
it shows us its pieces but never anything inward, anything that has been
opened up. The stone has instandy withdrawn again into the same dull
weight and mass of its fragments" (OBT 24-25/35). The attempt to grasp
the rock through penetrating into it fails because what we are searching for
continually withdraws from our thinking. Rather, we need to attend to the
withdrawal itself, and this requires a mode of thinking that will trace the
"earth" of the rock in the "coming-forth concealing" movement by which
it withdraws. The human activity that can trace this movement is art, and

Introduction 13
thinking can only grasp this movement through its "preservation" of art-
works. But this means that if the earth is to become the Grund (ground)
for a Volk, it can only do insofar as it remains Ab-grund (abyss). Again, the
onus is on attending to withdrawal, whatever the voluntaristic vocabulary
and the Faustian allusions of the staatgründende Tat. What Heidegger's
thinking exacts at these junctures, qui te simply, undermines the direction
that he himself will attempt to take it. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is those
aspects of his thinking that resist any assimilation into right-wing poli tics
that are of greatest consequence for poetry and poetics.
liiII

There is one further difficulty confronting any attempt to give a coherent

account of Heidegger's thinking, namely that it does not easily give itself
to summary or a series of propositions. Heidegger's thinking is continually
in flux, ceaselessly revising itself, calling into question earlier formulations
and ways of framing problems, and his later work in particular is know-
ingly provisional. In the opening of his lecture entitled "Language," he
admits that the guiding phrase he proposes: "language is-Ianguage" is
not going to get us anywhere. His rejoinder is salutary: "But we do not
want to get anywhere. We would like only, for once, to get to just where
we are already" (PLT 188/12). If this is the ethic that motivates much ofhis
writing on poetry, we will find the significance of his thinking less in the
actual statements he makes than in the shape of the thinking that informs
it, and the recurrent motifs through which he thinks. lt is thus that 1 will
approach his thinking--Iess to reconstruct a Heideggerian account of po-
etry, were such a thing even possible, than to look at the ways in which he
approaches poetry, the broader patterns and problematics of his thinking,
and particular junctures in this thinking when these patterns and problem-
atics are most powerfully in evidence.
The book has four chapters. Chapter 1 charts the motif of firstness in
Heidegger's writing on art and poetry in the 1930s. This motif, 1 argue,
constitutes a confrontation with the traditions of "aesthetics" and "meta-
physics" on the one hand, and with the lacunae of his earlier work on the
other. My central daim is that, if the term being is used in order to think
the movement of beings into presence, then we do not find, as has often
been argued, an opposition of the formaI to the ontological aspects of art-
works, but rather a revaluation of the work's engagement with its medium
in terms of this ontological movement. Heidegger's aim is to return to
such features this aletheic capacity, and does this through an engagement
with what he terms the earth in the artwork's "work-material," that is, its
medium. Insofar as it inheres in the work's medium, earth is aligned with

14 Introduction
the work's formal features, but it further belongs to Heidegger's retrieval of
form as a metaphysical concept. In both instances, what is at issue is the
limit that conditions aIl openness. In the artwork, this limit inheres in the
opacity of the work's medium; the work's engagement with this medium
allows it to "fix in place" this concealing movement so that it attains a
particular Gestalt (shape). Heidegger thematizes this as a "contest between
measure and limit": the work seeks, through the repertoire of modes of
artistic articulation open to it, to render manifest that within its medium
which would recede from view. It is as it contests its own limits that the
work becomes a "setting-into-work of truth": rendering manifest and shift-
ing its own limits, it shifts limit as such, and with it the open region in
which beings enter into presence. Ir is through this shi ft in the limits of
the open that the work brings us to see the world "as though for the first
. "
nme.
Chapter 2 relates this problematic to Heidegger's analyses of language,
taking as its starting point Heidegger's rather enigmatic suggestion that the
earth in language lies in "the naming power of the word" (the phrase from
which the chapter takes its tide). Here largue that naming is not simply
an unmediated saying of being, but rather a quasi-performative "bringing-
into-name" whereby that which lies beyond the limits of intelligibility is
for the first time rendered thinkable. This can be seen through the shifting
meaning of logos in Heidegger's oeuvre. At first, logos denotes discourse, the
whole of meaningful verbal practices anterior to language as a lexical and
syntactical system. In his later writing, however, logos points to the gather-
ing by which this inteIligibility is first constituted. On the one hand, we
find die Sage (a gathering "Saying"); on the other, das Sprechen (human
speech); die Sprache (language) becomes the movement frOIn Saying into
speech. lhe abiding concern, the relation between this originary intelligi-
bility and the verbal language that depends on it, remains throughout, as
Heidegger asks how an individual verbal utterance might engender and
even transform the intelligibility out of which it arises, and thus "name"
being. Ulis happens not simply semantically, but as language becomes ar-
ticulation, that is, a setting-into-relation that both joins and differentiates.
As we shall see, this articulation is indelibly bodily.
It is here that poetry attains a particular significance for Heidegger's
thinking on language, as that kind of speech that engages with its limits in
order to name. This is already present in the account of "poetical discourse"
in Being and Time, which makes known through vocal expressivity certain
affective states that cannot be articulated semantically: voice thus inhabits
the limits of discursivity. This coincides with a second voice, the "voice
of conscience," which also exceeds the discursive through its disclosure

Introduction Il!! 15
of the nothing. And yet there is a fundamental discrepancy between the
two: poetry attains its effect fi'om its vocal sonority, whereas the voice of
conscience is silent. When, in his later writings, Heidegger employs the
guideword "language speaks as the peal of stillness [Geldut der Stille] ," it is
precisely this antinomy that he aims to resolve, bringing together in this
"peal" the sounding of poetical discourse and the silence of the voice of con-
science. Here Heidegger conceives of silence as a duallimit: the "Saying"
that renders possible verbal language but also exceeds it on the one hand,
and the absencing movement of everything that withdraws from presence
(be it as the absence of phenomenal sound or as the resistance to semantic
meaning) on the other. Naming takes place at the liminal point between
the sounding of verbal language and this double silence, a silence out of
which poetry must trace its own entry into presence.
Heidegger's insistence on language as a bodily articulation also moti-
vates his famous dismissal of metaphor, which l turn to in Chapter 3. Here
l note that each of Heidegger's denunciations of metaphor arise as digres-
sions from a wider polemic against the "physiological" determination of
the body. Why should he link metaphor to the physiological body thus?
Because rnetaphor, Heidegger argues, adheres to the sensuous-nonsensu-
ous dualism: meta-pherein, Über-tragung (literally "carrying over"), implies
that the nonsensuous content remains stable as its sensuous manifestations
alter, just as the physiological understanding of the body assumes in ad-
vance an ide al or cognitive realm that remains stable as the physical body
changes.
Yet what of Heidegger's own apparent recourse to metaphor? Firstly, l
note that "metaphor" can often be used to domesticate a statement that ap-
pears aberrant, rather than asking where this aberrance might lead. Indeed,
any attempt to think, from within a preexisting idiom, beyond the limits
of this idiom, will at 6rst appear aberrant. What is at issue in the question
of metaphor is precisely a transformation of what language can do. Again,
the bodily dimension is key. Heidegger turns to two metaphors that would
undermine the sensuous-nonsensuous opposition and its attendant op-
position of bodily experience and linguistic cognition, the 6rst concerned
with bodily receptivity, the second, which cornes frorn Holderlin's "Brot
und Wein," "Worte, wie Blumen [words, like Rowers]," with the bodily
production of words. Rather than approaching this as the physiological
production of phonetic matter, Heidegger points to an anterior growth into
language, through which language cornes to "sound" out of both body and
"Saying." Here we also get an implicit account of "poetic language" and its
truth: in its exploration, and performance, of such "growth," Holderlin's
metaphor is able to "name" the sounding of language.

16' Introduction
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