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Chinese Foreign Policy

This updated and expanded fourth edition of Chinese Foreign Policy seeks to examine
the decision-makers, processes, and rationales behind China’s expanding international
relations as well as offering an in-depth look at China’s modern global relations.
Among the key issues explored in this edition are:

 The further expansion of Chinese foreign policy from regional (Asia-Pacific) to

international interests;
 How the government of Xi Jinping has pursued a more confident great power
foreign policy agenda;
 China’s growing economic power in an era of global financial uncertainty and the
return of protectionism;
 Modern security challenges, including counter-terrorism, cyber-security, maritime
power, military reform and modernisation, and the protection of overseas eco-
nomic interests;
 China’s shifting power relationship with the United States under President Donald
Trump;
 The deeper engagement of Beijing with a growing number of international and
regional institutions and legal affairs;
 Cross-regional diplomacy, including updated sections on Africa, Latin America,
the Middle East, and Russia / Eurasia, as well as Oceania and the Polar regions;
 The development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a centrepiece of China’s
foreign policy.

This book will be essential reading for students of Chinese foreign policy and Asian
international relations (IR), and is highly recommended for students of diplomacy,
international security, and IR in general.

Marc Lanteigne is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of

Tromsø, Norway.
Chinese Foreign Policy
An Introduction
Fourth Edition

Marc Lanteigne
Fourth edition published 2020
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2020 Marc Lanteigne
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him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act
1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in
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trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to
infringe.
First edition published by Routledge 2009
Third edition published by Routledge 2016
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Lanteigne, Marc, author.
Title: Chinese foreign policy : an introduction / Marc Lanteigne.
Description: Fourth edition. | Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2019008474 (print) | LCCN 2019011753 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780429795442 (Web PDF) | ISBN 9780429795435 (ePub) |
ISBN 9780429795428 (Mobi) | ISBN 9781138345393 (hardback) |
ISBN 9781138345409 (pbk.) | ISBN 9780429437908 (e-book)
Subjects: LCSH: China--Foreign relations--1976- | China--Foreign
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ISBN: 978-1-138-34539-3 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-138-34540-9 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-0-429-43790-8 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman

by Taylor & Francis Books
Contents

List of boxes vi
List of acronyms vii
Acknowledgements xii

1 Introduction: The reconstruction (and expansion) of Chinese foreign

policy 1
2 Who (and what) makes Chinese foreign policy today? 27
3 China in the world economy 54
4 Multilateralism and international institutions 86
5 China’s military and emerging security concerns 113
6 The United States views China (and China views the United States) 142
7 China’s peripheral diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific 170
8 Moving beyond the Asia-Pacific: China’s cross-regional foreign policies 200

Index 232
Boxes

1.1 The foreign policy roles of the CCP 2

1.2 Structural power 15
1.3 China’s quiet diplomacy? 19
1.4 The legacy of Versailles 22
2.1 Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang 31
2.2 China dreams 33
2.3 On the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 37
2.4 What is China’s “peaceful rise?” 45
2.5 Deng Xiaoping on hegemony 49
3.1 Maintaining economic harmony 55
3.2 Memes in China 64
3.3 “Green” pressures in China 65
3.4 China’s economic animal kingdom 71
3.5 The diplomatic seesaw over the AIIB 76
3.6 The domestic benefits of “One Belt, One Road” 78
4.1 The membership of the SCO 105
4.2 Hard, soft, (and sharp) power 107
5.1 The world’s nuclear powers 120
5.2 China’s space programme 121
5.3 China’s changed views on peacekeeping 135
5.4 “Wolf Warrior 2” 136
6.1 Nixon arrives in Peking 148
6.2 Power transitions 157
6.3 How alike are great powers? 160
6.4 Did the United States “get China wrong”? 162
6.5 The start of a trade war? 164
7.1 The roots of China’s concerns about peripheral security 171
7.2 North Korea’s “brazen” nuclear test 184
7.3 The SCS 188
7.4 China and the United States in the Pacific 192
8.1 “Tianxia” (“all under heaven”) and international relations 200
8.2 China and the European chimera 202
8.3 China in Africa 210
8.4 China’s Arctic diplomacy defined 222
8.5 The “lost generation?” 224
Acronyms

5G Fifth Generation Mobile Networking

16+1 Sixteen Plus One Talks between China and Central and Eastern Europe
A2/AD Anti-access / area denial
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACFTA ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement
ADIZ Air Defence Identification Zone
ADS Approved destination status
AFC Asian Financial Crisis (1997–8)
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AMS Chinese Academy of Military Sciences
ANZUS Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APT ASEAN-Plus-Three or “Advanced persistent threat”
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASAT Anti-satellite weapon
ASB Air-Sea Battle
ASCEL “Active strategic counterattacks on exterior lines”
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN-ISIS ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies
ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting
ATS Antarctic Treaty System
AU African Union
BAT “Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent”, Chinese internet firms
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
C 4I Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Information
C4ISTAR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Sur-
veillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance
CASCF China-Arab States Cooperation Forum
CASS Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CC Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
CCG Chinese Coast Guard
CCP Communist Party of China
CCTV China Central Television
CEE Central and Eastern Europe
CFAC Central Foreign Affairs Commission, China
viii Acronyms
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy (European Union)
CGTN China Global Television Network
CIA US Central Intelligence Agency
CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia
CICIR China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
CIIS China Institute of International Studies
CMC Central Military Commission
CNMI Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands
CNNIC Chinese Internet Network Information Centre
CNOOC Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNPC Chinese National Petroleum Corporation
CNSA China National Space Administration
COC Code of Conduct
COMECON ex-Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPEC China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee
CP-TPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership
CRA Contingent Reserve Arrangement
CSCAP Council of Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
CSI Container Security Initiative
DDOS Distributed denial of service
DMZ Demilitarised Zone
DPJ Democratic Party of Japan
DPP Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan)
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAS East Asian Summit
EC European Commission
ECFA China-Taiwan Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
ECS East China Sea
EEU Eurasian Economic Union
EEZ Exclusive economic zone
EFTA European Free Trade Association
ETIM East Turkestan Independence Movement
EU European Union
EurAsEC ex-Eurasian Economic Community
FALG ex-Foreign Affairs Leading Group, China
FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
FOIP Free and Open Indo-Pacific
FONOP Freedom of navigation operation
FSU Former Soviet Union
FTA Free trade agreement
FTAAP Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific
G-2 “Group of Two” (China and United States)
G-7 Group of Seven
G-20 Group of Twenty
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
 Acronyms ix
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GWoT Global war on terror
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IASC International Arctic Scientific Committee
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICBM Inter-continental ballistic missile
ICC International Criminal Court
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
IDFC International Development Finance Corporation
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF International Monetary Fund
INEW Integrated network electronic warfare
IPE International political economy
IR International relations
IRBM Intermediate range ballistic missile
IS Islamic State
ISI Import-substitution Industrialisation
JAM-GC “Joint Concept for Access and Manoeuvre in the Global Commons”
JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran Nuclear Deal)
JMSDF Japanese Maritime Self-defence Force
JSD Joint Staff Department of the PLA
JSDF Japanese Self-defence Forces
KEDO ex-Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation
KMT Kuomintang (Nationalist Party, Taiwan)
KWP (North) Korean Workers’ Party
LAC Line of Actual Control
LAS League of Arab States (Arab League)
LDP Liberal Democratic Party of Japan
LNG Liquified natural gas
MERCOSUR South American Common Market
MES Market Economy Status
MFA Multi-Fibre Agreement
MII ex-Ministry of Information Industry, China
MIIT Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, China
MITI ex-Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan
MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China
MOFCOM Chinese Ministry of Commerce
MOOTW Military operations other than war
MoU Memorandum of understanding
MPS Ministry of Public Security, China
MSG Melanesian Spearhead Group
MSR Maritime Silk Road
MSS Ministry of State Security, China
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM Non-aligned Movement
x Acronyms
NATO North American Treaty Organisation
NDB New Development Bank
NEAT Network of East Asian Think Tanks
NFU “No first use” (of nuclear weapons)
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NIE Newly Industrialising Economies
NIEO New International Economic Order
NLD National League of Democracy, Myanmar
NPC National People’s Congress, PRC
NPT Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
NSC National Security Commission (China)
NSC “New Security Concept”
NSR Northern Sea Route
NTB Non-tariff barrier
OAS Organisation of American States
OBOR “One Belt and One Road”
ODA Overseas development assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
P5 Permanent five members of the UN Security Council
PAP People’s Armed Police
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (China and European Union)
PCA Permanent Court of Arbitration
PIF Pacific Islands Forum
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLAAF PLA Air Force
PLAGF PLA Ground Forces
PLAN PLA Navy
PLARF PLA Rocket Forces
PNG Papua New Guinea
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
PRC People’s Republic of China
RATS Regional Anti-terrorism Structure
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
ReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships in Asia
RFE Russian Far East
RMB Renminbi, currency of the PRC (currency unit = “yuan”, also “¥” or
“元”)
RMSI Regional Maritime Security Initiative
ROC Republic of China (Taiwan)
ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SACU Southern African Customs Union
SAR Special Autonomous Region
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SCS South China Sea
 Acronyms xi
SEATO ex-Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation
SE&D ex-(US-China) Strategic and Economic Dialogue
SETC ex-State Economic and Trade Commission, China
SEZ Special Economic Zone
SIIS Shanghai Institute of International Studies
SLBM Submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLoCs Sea Lanes of Communication
SLORC ex-State Law and Order Restoration Council, Myanmar
SOE State-Owned Enterprise
SPDC State Peace and Development Council
SPT Six-party Talks (on the Korean Peninsula)
SSF Strategic Support Forces of the PLA
TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defence
TIP Turkistan Independence Party
TMD Theatre Missile Defence
TPP ex-Trans-Pacific Partnership
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN United Nations
UNASUR Union of South American Nations
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNSC United Nations Security Council
US United States
USSR ex-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VPN Virtual private network
WTO World Trade Organisation
Acknowledgements

A trail through the mountains, if used, becomes a path in a short time, but, if
unused, becomes blocked by grass in an equally short time.
(Mencius (孟子), Warring States Period)

In this fourth edition of Chinese Foreign Policy, I was again able to make use of
much new foreign policy research in China, as well as work in Canada, Europe,
Northeast Asia, Oceania, and the United States, and once again I am indebted in no
small part to many persons who provided me with information, recommendations,
and encouragement as I sought to piece together China’s expanding foreign policy
interests within an international system today which can, to put it mildly, be called
unpredictable.
Many individuals and organisations were of invaluable assistance in the
research and preparations for this book. Very special thank-yous must go first to
Lynn Gardinier and Mingming Shi for their diligent and indispensable editing
work, and many thanks once again to Andrew Humphrys at Routledge for his
oversight of this book project dating back to the first edition a decade ago and to
the tentative scribble-notes before that. Of course, thanks as well to all of my
colleagues at UiT – Arctic University of Norway for their insights into Arctic
politics.
During my research in China, many local scholars, specialists, and officials were
extremely helpful during the data collection process for this work, especially in emer-
ging areas of China’s foreign policy interests including the Belt and Road, new finan-
cial institutions, polar policies, US and European relations, economic security, and
cross-regional diplomacy. I am very grateful for all of their assistance!
Colleagues and friends who also greatly aided this work with their comments,
thoughts, and support include Maria Ackrén, Sirous Amerian, Stephen Aris, the late
Alyson Bailes, Mia Bennett, Sebastian Bersick, Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, Sonja
Bickford, Lau Øfjord Blaxekjær, Margrét Cela, Shine Choi, Cedric de Coning, Enrico
Fels, Courtney Fung, Maria-Fernanda Gonzalez Rojas, Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv,
Joanne Hall, Pia Hansson, Bertel Heurlin, Miwa Hirono, Emmi Ikonen, Yang Jiang,
Nargis Kassenova, Togzhan Kassenova, Nusta Carranza Ko, Timo Koivurova, Vaclav
Kopecky, Natasha Kuhrt, Stephen Levine, Wrenn Yennie Lindgren, Imad Manseur,
Mikkel Møller Schøler, Teemu Naarajärvi, Jens Nielsen, Stephen Noakes, Silja Bára
Ómarsdóttir, Terzah Tippin Poe, Merja Polvinen, Anna Powles, Damien Rogers, David
Santoro, Kristinn Schram, Aglaya Snetkov, Ian Storey, Baldur Thorhallsson, Bjørnar
 Acknowledgements xiii
Sverdrup-Thygeson, Camilla Sørensen, May-Britt Stumbaum, Ulf Sverdrup, Andrew
Williams, Page Wilson, and Jason Young.
Finally, as always, very warm thanks to my family, who have supported me (and this
book project) in far too many ways to count, and who continue to be an invaluable
inspiration to me.

Marc Lanteigne, May 2019

1 Introduction
The reconstruction (and expansion) of Chinese
foreign policy

The rise of China (Zhongguo 中国) within the international system has been heralded
as one of the most significant changes in turn-of-the-century global relations. So much
has been written and discussed about China’s growth in power over the past half-
century, often referred to as a “rise” or an “ascent” from an isolated state to a regional
power to a potential great power capable of exerting much influence not only within
the Asia-Pacific region but also on an international level. This progress can be exam-
ined in a variety of international relations areas, from diplomacy to security, and from
economics to culture and the environment, all of which leads to the question of which
directions the country will take as China settles further into great power status. Will
China become a global power (or superpower) alongside the United States, and if it
does, what kind of global power will it be? Assuming Chinese power continues to
increase in the short term, these questions become ever more important in under-
standing the ongoing rapid changes to the country’s foreign policy.
Foreign policy has often been examined as the interactions between various political
agents, (including individuals with specific requirements), and structures formed by
social relationships, (such as the state, as well as organisations and rules which are
commonly constructed).1 In the case of China, the biggest change in the development
of that country’s foreign policy has been the expansion both of the number of “agents”
involved, directly or indirectly, in Beijing’s foreign policymaking processes, and in the
number of China’s international interests as well as global-level “structures” with which
it can interact. These structures have been both formal, such as international organi-
sations, but also informal such as global norms and behaviours. In the space of only a
few decades, China’s foreign policy interests, originally far more limited to regional
issues, have grown to encompass many more international concerns which can truly be
called “global”. As with other countries, especially great powers, in the age of globali-
sation and interdependence, identifying a clear separation between China’s domestic
political interests and its foreign policy can be a complicated process. The dividing line
has become especially blurry as the number of Chinese international interests and
responsibilities grows and more actors, both individuals and groups, within China
become involved with global affairs.
At first glance, the decision-making processes in foreign policy matters appear to be
more centralised in China in comparison to other states, including those in the West.
Part of the reason for this perception has been the shape of China’s government since
1949, when the country’s Communist government assumed power and has since been
dominated by a single political actor, namely the Chinese Communist Party (Zhongguo
Gongchandang 中国共产党) or CCP. However, the Chinese government still must
2 Introduction
undertake frequent balancing between its domestic interests, including improving
standards of living, promoting stability, combatting corruption, maintaining the
dominant role of the CCP in Chinese governance, and advancing the process of
economic and governmental reform begun in the late 1970s, while also developing a
modern foreign policy, one which is now truly global in nature. This ongoing pro-
cess of simultaneous government bargaining in domestic and foreign relations, often
referred to as a “two-level game”,2 has become ever more complex in the Chinese
case since Beijing must maintain the momentum of socio-economic reforms in the
country, while simultaneously overseeing the country’s rapid rise in power within
the international system.

Box 1.1 The foreign policy roles of the CCP

The political hybrid that the CCP is attempting to become today is born out of its
study of the reasons that the Soviet and East European regimes collapsed but also
very much informed of its study of other modernising and newly-industrialised states,
particularly in East Asia, Western Europe and Latin America.
– David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008), 6.

Currently four principal forces shape Chinese views toward, and actions in, the world:
domestic politics and other internal constraints; global interdependence; realist foreign
policy thinking; and technology-driven action-reaction dynamics.
– David Lampton, Following the Leader: Ruling China, From Deng Xiaoping to
Xi Jinping (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 109.

From the beginning of the twenty-first century, China’s foreign policy interests
expanded well beyond the Asia-Pacific region and can now be observed worldwide. This
process has been accelerated under the government of President Xi Jinping (习近平),
who assumed the presidency of China in March 2013 and was reappointed to that posi-
tion in early 2018. With the removal of presidential term limits within the Chinese con-
stitution in March of that year, President Xi may now remain in office indefinitely and
continue to personally shape both domestic and foreign policy in many ways. On the
international level, the Xi government has developed numerous foreign policy initiatives,
ranging from enhanced state-to-state relations to the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative
(yidai yilu changyi 一带一路倡议) or BRI, trade networks set to expand into Africa,
Asia, Eurasia, Europe, and Russia / Former Soviet Union (FSU), and to other regions.
China’s foreign policy expansion under President Xi has taken place in tandem with
the rapid development of Chinese economic power, which assumed even greater pro-
minence in the wake of the post-2008 global financial crisis and the announcement in
early 2011 that China had overtaken Japan as the second-largest economy in the world,
after the United States. In 2014, it was widely reported that China had, according to
some economic measurements such as purchasing power parity (PPP), actually over-
taken the United States as the largest economic power in terms of economic output.3
However, income per person remained well below that of Western economies and pol-
icymakers in Beijing continued to stress that the economic reform process in China was
far from over. Moreover, China is now facing economic headwinds from many directions,
 Introduction 3
including a global economy still recovering from the financial slowdowns which began in
2008, to a United States government under President Donald Trump which is growing
increasingly wary of Beijing’s economic strength, as illustrated by an emerging “trade war”
between China and the United States starting in mid-2018 when both countries began to
levy tariffs on each others’ goods.4
China has been front and centre in many scholarly debates about international rela-
tions (IR) as well, and there is no shortage of IR theories old and new which have been
applied to better explain the country’s role in the international system. Within the wide
spectrum of realist IR studies, one branch, offensive realism, is very pessimistic about
the ability of China to rise peacefully in the international system, given the history of
great power conflicts and the nature of the international system as anarchic, meaning
that there is no effective government on the international level. According to this
approach, great powers seek to maximise their power, and therefore often find them-
selves in policy conflicts which can lead to war.5 Power transition theory also tends to
reflect a wariness about China’s rise, suggesting that when a hegemonic power at the
top of the global hierarchy is confronted with a challenger power which is both rising
and dissatisfied with the status quo, war becomes a strong possibility unless the two
actors can find a way to co-exist or there is enough common policy ground that conflict
is considered too costly.
However, defensive realism is somewhat more optimistic about the opportunities for
war to be avoided, despite significant differences between China and the United States.
Great powers may also seek to balance each other rather than risk a great power con-
flict, (which is much more perilous than ever before, given that both states are nuclear
powers). Balance of power, however, has also undergone a rethinking since the end of
the cold war. The classic example of “hard balancing”, meaning using military com-
ponents, has been best illustrated by the cold war, when the United States and the
USSR, with their respective allies, squared off against each other using both conven-
tional and nuclear weapons. Such a scenario involving China and the United States is
considered unlikely, but there is the possibility of “soft balancing”, meaning the use of
non-military policies, such as organisations, diplomacy, and economics, to create an
equilibrium.6 In many parts of the world, including Africa, Eurasia, and the Middle
East, Chinese, and American interests are engaging in various degrees of soft balan-
cing, and this process may also be developing in places such as Europe, Latin America,
the Pacific Islands, and even the Polar Regions.
Structural realism, often paired with neo-realism, examines whether the nature of the
international system compels states, including great powers, to seek more power. Issues
such as the security dilemma, meaning that steps taken by one state to increase its own
security may be seen as decreasing the security of others, and polarity, meaning centres
of power and whether they stabilise or destabilise the international system, are often
studied under this branch of realism. As well, since states are worried not only about
what gains they make in levels of power, but also where they stand in relation to others,
(absolute power versus relative power), international cooperation is seen as often being
difficult. The emerging area of neo-classical realism seeks to re-introduce domestic level
actors and issues, such as internal Chinese politics, economic issues, government-military
relations, and the factions within the CCP, as important variables in understanding the
trajectory of Chinese foreign policy.
The other venerable school of IR, namely liberalism, also has several branches.
Classical liberalism focuses on the roles of individuals rather than states and looks
4 Introduction
more closely at the preferences of states as opposed to just their capabilities. While
liberalists tend to agree with their realist counterparts that the international system is
an anarchy, the negative effects of that situation can be mitigated through commu-
nication and information-sharing. Neo-liberalism takes these ideas further and suggests
that developing international-level institutions can further dampen the harmful effects
of anarchy and create an atmosphere more suitable for communication and coopera-
tion as opposed to conflict. On one hand, it has been argued that China has grown up
in a period where there are more institutions, organisations, and regimes, in the world,
a process which has accelerated since the end of the cold war in the 1990s, and so there
are many opportunities for China to obtain needed goods from the international
system through engaging these institutions.7
However, as sceptics of this idea have correctly noted, there has yet to be the
equivalent of the North American Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the Pacific Rim, nor
any counterpart to the European Union, and many regimes in Asia tend to be more
informal and may not act as a restraint against a deteriorating security situation.
Moreover, the 2018 decision by the Chinese government to eliminate presidential term
limits thus allowing Xi Jinping to remain in office for an indefinite period, led to much
debate in the West over whether their efforts to “socialise” China into greater accep-
tance of international democratic norms were unsuccessful.
Other IR schools of thought have also appeared in recent years to add to the dis-
cussion of Chinese foreign policy, including the English School, which introduces the
idea of international societies and the role of history, as well as the concept of values
and using normative approaches, (i.e. seeing IR in terms of the best outcomes rather
than only as they currently exist). Constructivism tends to focus not only on the mate-
rial possessions of states, (such as capital, resources, weapons, etc.), but also their
identities. Every state is seen to be in the process of building their identities, but states
frequently have their own ideas about the identities of each other in addition to them-
selves. In the case of China, there has been much debate over how the country is per-
ceived abroad, and one of the purposes of the BRI has been to further establish a
global view of China as a partner for economic development. There has also been a
developing array of critical theory approaches to IR studies, using variables such as
economics and development, ethics, and gender, with an eye to “emancipating” IR
discourse from what were considered too-rigid models.
Most of these IR schools of thought are based on Western history and philosophies,
but in recent years there have been emerging alternative schools of thought from China
itself. One example has been a revival of the concept of Tianxia (天下) or “all under
heaven”, which has been emerging critical of the current state-centric system and sug-
gests that it be superseded by a “world system”, commonly seen as a variation of glo-
balism.8 As well, there has been emerging discussion in Chinese academic circles about
the usefulness of relational theory in IR, namely that the IR system is based on
“interrelatedness”: changing and flowing relations between actors, and relations which
heavily influence the identities of actors, an idea borrowed from traditional Confucian
views of the social “mean” (zhongyong 中庸) in relation to the harmony of inter-
personal relations. Although different IR actors, such as states, have different levels of
power, their identities are largely based on relationships which are constantly in flux.9
This book examines the main issues and challenges facing China in the realm of
foreign policy, through two major themes. First, China is a rising power in the inter-
national system, and is now a “great power” on the regional (Asia-Pacific) level as well
 Introduction 5
as increasingly on the international level. While China has not yet achieved the status
of “global power” or “superpower” (chaoji daguo 超级大国), a designation shared by
both the United States and the then-USSR, it is now in a strong position to become
one in several areas, including its economic strength but also its developing military
power and emerging “cross-regional” diplomacy, which now extends well beyond the
Asia-Pacific. It has been frequently demonstrated throughout the history of interna-
tional relations that great powers have very distinct, and often more numerous, foreign
policy interests than other states, and as China grows in global strength and capabilities
a similar pattern has emerged. Many of the cases examined here will reflect the effects
of China’s rapid growth and its growing international interests, including diplomatic,
economic, and strategic.
Second, China’s foreign policy is not only undergoing a process of expansion (kuo-
zhang 扩张) but also of reconstruction (chongjian 重建). This process is taking place in
a variety of ways. The institutions within China which are responsible for foreign policy
development are continuing to undergo reform, enabling them to adjust to changing
domestic and international circumstances. For example, it was announced in March
2018 that a Ministry of Ecology and Environment would be created to address the
country’s ongoing efforts to combat pollution and promote “green” policies abroad, as
well as a Natural Resources Ministry, which would include responsibility for China’s
growing interests in the oceans and the Polar Regions. In addition, the number of
actors, including sectors of the Chinese government but also non-state actors and
individuals within China, interested in and participating in the creation of Chinese
foreign policy, continues to grow. Studying China’s international relations by looking at
only a small group of governmental actors is becoming less and less a viable approach
for scholars of this subject.
However, equally as important is the fact that ideas about international relations in
China, both within its government and other actors, are also slowly being recon-
structed. Outdated ideas are being discarded, previously ignored concepts from a vari-
ety of eras are being given a fresh airing, and there is a greater willingness in China to
learn from other states and other international players, such as organisations. This
reconstruction is affecting all aspects of China’s interests abroad and will affect much
current and future thinking relating to the country’s foreign policy goals.

Chinese power and “bigness” in the world today

Rarely in history has a single state, regardless of size, grown so quickly in so many
ways, and the case of China’s rapid development presents a distinct set of questions for
modern foreign policy study. Those examining Chinese growth have a variety of mea-
surements to choose from, and from myriad viewpoints China can justifiably be refer-
red to as a “big state” (daguo 大国). From a geographic point of view, China has
historically been viewed as a large entity, with the third-biggest landmass in the world,
(after that of the Russian Federation and Canada and ahead of the United States and
Brazil). The country also has a long coastline which opens up to the Pacific Ocean and
the greater Asia-Pacific, a region which has been viewed for the past two decades as a
part of the world expanding in both power and influence. From the beginning of the
current century, many political economists began to view the Asia-Pacific region as the
inexorable new hub of the global economy, in relation to the traditional financial
powers of Europe and the United States.
6 Introduction
At the same time, China has many neighbours in East, South, and Central Asia,
as it borders on fourteen other states, including Russia, India, Pakistan, Vietnam,
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK / North Korea), Kazakhstan,
and Myanmar (Burma). Thus, China has more neighbours than any country except
for the Russian Federation, which also has fourteen states on its land borders.
China also possesses maritime boundaries, some disputed, with six other states,
including Japan and the Philippines; seven if one includes the island of Taiwan,
which Beijing claims as part of its sovereign territory but which has maintained a
separate government and economy since 1949. For much of the cold war, many of
these borders were sources of real or potential conflict for Beijing, and in one case,
a dispute over its border with the USSR, almost resulted in a full-scale war
between two nuclear powers in 1969.
The situation with Taiwan, considered by Beijing to be a renegade province, remains
problematic. Between 2008–16, the relationship between the two governments entered
into a warming period, as the Taiwanese government of President Ma Ying-jeou of the
Nationalist Party sought to increase business links with the Chinese mainland, includ-
ing via a free trade agreement. This period of détente began to fade with the election in
2016 of Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has tradi-
tionally called for greater Taiwanese sovereignty and potential independence. Diplo-
matic relations have cooled, and Beijing has resumed its policy, suspended during the
Ma administration, of seeking to convince Taiwanese allies to recognise China instead.
By the beginning of 2019, only seventeen governments recognised Taipei.
Since the 1990s, in the wake of international outcry over the Tiananmen Incident in
June 1989, China sought to improve relations with as many of its neighbours as possible.
These policies included settling leftover cold war border disputes with Russia and Central
Asian states. However, China remains involved in ongoing land and maritime border
disputes, including contested territorial claims with India, and claims to the majority of
the South China Sea (SCS), which since 2010 have resulted in a cooling of diplomatic
relations between China on one side and parts of Southeast Asia on the other.
Some Southeast Asian states, including the Philippines and Vietnam, have also
claimed sections of the SCS, and since 2010 there has been a series of incidents invol-
ving vessels from China and these states. These included a mid-2012 standoff between
Chinese and Philippine vessels near the disputed Scarborough Shoal, known in Chinese
as Huangyan Island (Huangyan Dao 黄岩岛), and the placement of a Chinese offshore
oil rig in disputed waters near the Paracel Islands (Xisha Qundao 西沙群岛), which
angered the government of Vietnam, which also claims the islands. China has begun to
augment its presence in the waterway, including building up coral reefs and islets with
civilian and military infrastructure designed to discourage naval incursions by other
states. Despite calls by other governments, including Washington, for the SCS to be
maintained as international waters, Beijing claims at least 80 percent of the waterway
based on claims to the land features in the sea as well as claims that the SCS has been
Chinese “historical waters” for centuries.
The boundary of the East China Sea (ECS) is also disputed between China and
Japan, as well as Taiwan, and is an issue which has complicated Sino-Japanese rela-
tions and was exacerbated by incidents including in September 2010 when a Chinese
fishing vessel collided with a Japanese coast guard ship, and in November 2013 when
Beijing announced the installation of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over
a region of the ECS which includes the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Dao 钓鱼岛 in
 Introduction 7
Chinese), which have been claimed by China, Japan, and Taiwan. The ECS disputes
have also become wrapped into the contentious foreign policies of Xi Jinping and
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo- Abe, who after an unsuccessful and short tenure as
Japanese leader in 2006–7, returned to office in December 2012 promising a harder line
against Chinese military pressures. Under Abe, Sino-Japanese relations cooled con-
siderably, leading to anti-Japan protests in Chinese cities in mid-2012 and heightened
global concerns that the disputed ECS islands may lead to a military incident. A
meeting and awkward handshake between the two leaders in November 2014 lowered
tensions somewhat, but the ultimate status of the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands region
remains an unresolved sore point.
China possesses the largest population in the world, with approximately 1.38 billion
persons as of 2018, (India is second with 1.34 billion), forming slightly less than
20 percent of the world’s total population. The country also contains some of the
world’s largest cities and municipalities, including the capital of Beijing (21.7 million),
Shanghai (24.8 million), Chongqing (30 million), Guangzhou (15 million), and Shenz-
hen (12.5 million). The “bigness” of China’s populace therefore has a major influence
on many global matters relating to population, including migration, labour, and
increasingly the environment. Indeed, substantive international-level decisions on these
issues can no longer be undertaken without China’s input. Moreover, much of China’s
population is becoming more affluent and increasingly urbanised. In 2011, China’s
urban population numbers overtook its rural for the first time, reaching 690.79 million
or 51.27 percent of China’s total population.
From a security perspective, China is viewed as a rising military power, albeit one
which still lags behind the West in many key areas. On one hand, China is a nuclear
power, having tested its first warhead in 1964. By contrast, its conventional weaponry
remains largely underdeveloped in comparison with that of the United States and other
parts of Asia, although since the turn of the century China has been seeking to address
those gaps. In examining China’s army, navy, and air force, one can recognise that its
ability to project power beyond its borders, while improving, remains limited with
much of its military still dedicated to the self-defence of the country itself, with less
emphasis on projecting power abroad.
China has, however, been upgrading its military to a level less dependent upon
strength of numbers, and with a greater focus on high technology. China’s armed
forces, the People’s Liberation Army (Renmin Jiefangjun 人民解放军) or PLA, have
developed new weaponry, including fighter jets and submarines, and have purchased
weapons from other states, notably Russia. In the past, Beijing purchased destroyers
and submarines from Moscow which were considered more capable of potentially
facing off against the West, but from the turn of the century China began to rely more
on indigenous military development, including jets and naval vessels. As well, China
began concentrating on upgrading its maritime power and improving its ability to send
vessels further afield from Chinese waters, and the PLA Navy, or PLAN, has been
especially active in building new vessels both to better patrol Chinese waters but also to
extend Chinese naval power further into the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Chinese navy
ships have participated in joint military operations, such as patrolling for pirate vessels
in the Indian Ocean since 2009 and assisting in the evacuation of thousands of Chinese
nationals from Libya when the state collapsed into civil war in 2011.
The ability to better project maritime power away from Chinese waters was further
augmented with the deployment of the PLAN’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning
8 Introduction
(Liaoning Jian 辽宁舰), after 2011, with a second aircraft carrier, officially designated
001A, launched in April 2017. China has also sought to develop a greater civilian
maritime capability, illustrated by the announcement in March 2013, that China’s
civilian maritime security bodies would be unified under a China Coast Guard
(Zhongguo Haijing 中国海警) or CCG.
The Chinese military has an estimated sixty to seventy missiles capable of inter-
continental flight and delivery of nuclear weapons, including an estimated 240–400
warheads. The exact amount remains a closely guarded secret. At the same time, China
has been developing space technology for both civilian and military use. After a failed
attempt to develop a manned space programme in the 1970s to match those of the
United States and USSR, China restarted its efforts after 1992 under “Project 921”. In
October 2003, China sent its first “taikonaut” or astronaut from China, Yang Liwei,
into space, becoming only the third country to do so, and in June 2012 had sent its first
female taikonaut (Liu Yang) into space. In January 2007, the country created much
international concern by conducting its first test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon,
knocking down one of its own satellites which had ceased to function. Since the turn
of the century, China has also been developing greater capabilities in the area of
“cyber-warfare” (wangluo zhanzheng 网络战争) and has developed the concept of
“information confrontation” (xinxi duikang 信息对抗) within its military thinking. The
importance of electronic warfare to China’s strategic interests was underscored with the
founding of a new branch of the military in 2015, named the PLA Strategic Support
Force, (Renmin Jiefangjun Zhanlüe Zhiyuan Budui 人民解放军战略支援部队) which is
dedicated to both cyber- and space warfare.
Western policymakers and scholars are frequently divided over whether China’s
military modernisation poses a direct threat to the international status quo or whether
such updating is merely one aspect of China’s overall modernisation policies. Since the
1990s, China’s military budget grew from a comparatively low starting point with
steady annual increases. In March 2019, the annual Chinese military budget was
announced to be 1.19 trillion yuan or approximately US$178 billion. This figure
remains a fraction of American annual military spending, which is commonly set at
over US$600 billion, but the gap is narrowing. The idea of direct military confronta-
tion with the United States is seen by many China scholars as highly unlikely, not only
since both states are nuclear powers but also that a direct military confrontation with
the United States is seen as too risky for Beijing. Nevertheless, debate about a “China
Threat” (Zhongguo weixie lun 中国威胁论), both from an economic and security
viewpoint, continues in the West, including in the United States, with scholars arguing
whether it is better to “contain” China, along the same lines as the classic American
containment policy against the USSR during the cold war, or to “engage” it, encoura-
ging it to cooperate with international norms and organisations in the hopes of dis-
couraging China from using force to get what it wants.
In late 2011, the United States under then-President Barack Obama announced a
new strategic initiative in the Asia-Pacific, an initiative which has been termed a
“pivot” or a “rebalancing” of US forces there. As part of the policy, military ties with
regional allies including Australia, Japan, and the Philippines would be upgraded, ties
with other partners including Singapore and Vietnam were augmented, and more
American forces would be stationed on the islands of Guam and Hawai’i in the Pacific.
US naval forces would also be redistributed with a greater focus on the Pacific Ocean.
The effectiveness of the pivot/rebalancing policy, however, was open for debate, given
 Introduction 9
the development of other security crises in the Middle East and North Africa, as well
as worsening relations between the United States and Russia since the Ukraine crises
of 2014.
The election of Donald Trump as Obama’s successor in 2016 threatened to further
upend Sino-American relations, given the moves towards greater isolationism and
nationalism in the United States under his administration. The Trump government has
taken a hard line on Chinese trade, including implementing a series of tariffs on billions
of dollars’ worth of Chinese goods entering the United States, seeking to hamper the
development of China’s high technology industries, and seeking to augment American
military power, including in the Pacific. However, the Trump government has also begun
to pull back from previous American commitments to the Asia-Pacific, including with-
drawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) regional trade agreement, potentially
giving China the opportunity for Beijing to develop its own economic trade regimes in
the region, including the BRI which has included more than sixty countries with projects
totalling approximately US$700 billion and possibly as much as US$1 trillion. US rela-
tions with several Asia-Pacific friends and allies, such as Japan and ROK, have become
more strained under the Trump government. The pivot/rebalancing strategy under
Obama has been officially discontinued under Trump, but in the first two years of his
presidency there had yet to be a coherent replacement for that policy.
As China’s security interests push further out into the Pacific, there is the question of
whether the two great powers, China and the United States, can accommodate their
respective strategic interests in the region. During a July 2013 summit meeting with
then-President Obama, Chinese President Xi downplayed any talk of a Pacific rivalry,
noting that “the vast Pacific Ocean has enough space for the two large countries of
China and the United States”.10 However, the relationship between Xi and Trump has
been cooler, despite a summit between the two leaders which took place in Florida in
April 2017. US Vice President Michael Pence gave a speech highly critical of China in
October 2018, accusing Beijing of actively seeking to undermine American interests
through several means including growing economic, military, and propaganda power
and using “debt diplomacy” to ensnare developing states into closer economic ties with
China. By the end of that year, the stage appeared to be set for a more tangible cold
war between the two powers.
Finally, after harbouring much suspicion about multilateral security cooperation,
Beijing has altered its views considerably since the turn of the century, favouring mul-
tilateral security cooperation in areas such as arms control agreements and UN
peacekeeping missions. By the end of 2018, approximately 2,500 Chinese personnel
were serving in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and the Middle East, and at that
time China was the largest contributor of UN peacekeeping personnel among the
“permanent five” (P5) members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Overall, China
has become more open to participating in multilateral security operations and has
closely examined the benefits of developing policies related to “military operations
other than war” or MOOTW.
Further evidence of China’s growth and influence in can be observed in its economy.
The transformation of China from an isolated command economy to one of the largest
market forces in the world over a period of thirty years is unparalleled in history. Until
the end of the 1970s, Beijing closely followed its own version of the closed Soviet
communist model of economics, including state control over almost all assets and
strong discouragement of international investment. These policies were exacerbated, to
10 Introduction
disastrous effect, during the Great Leap Forward (Dayuejin 大跃进) period under the
country’s first communist leader, Mao Zedong (毛泽东), in 1958–61 which plunged
millions into poverty, accelerated widespread famine, and very nearly destroyed the
Chinese economy. As well, after the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1954, rela-
tions between China and the USSR deteriorated. Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev,
often disagreed with Mao on many issues ranging from ideology to security concerns to
relations with the United States.
By the beginning of the 1960s the two large communist states had essentially severed
all ties with each other, leaving Beijing with few trading partners and no access to the
widely developing global markets, led at that time by the United States, Europe, and
Japan. Worse for China, the decision to launch a party purification campaign, to be
known as the Cultural Revolution (Wenhua Dageming 文化大革命) which began in
1966 and did not fully abate until Mao’s death in 1976, created massive upheaval and
chaos in both Chinese society and the CCP itself, taking place within a period of the
country’s most acute international isolation.
Following the sweeping economic reforms of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) in
the late 1970s, China’s economy rapidly opened up to the world and the country attempted
to revive its economy, starting with the acceptance of financial assistance from interna-
tional donors, and later with the acceptance of international investment in the 1980s. From
the late 1990s, Beijing began to encourage Chinese firms to “go out” (zouchuqu 走出去)
and join the international market, creating global brands and joining with foreign part-
ners. China had joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 and had begun to
engage in increased trade and investment in markets well beyond Asia. Although China is
a latecomer to globalisation theory and the ruling CCP remains wary of too much
economic liberalisation which might prompt unwanted political change, China’s
impact on modern globalisation has been significant. China is now viewed as the fac-
tory of the world, producing many products for global markets. As has been argued in
IR theory, the purpose of foreign economic relations is largely to make the domestic
politics of state more compatible with the global economy.11 With the economic
nationalist policies of the Trump government, China found itself as the unlikely banner
holder for economic liberalisation and free trade, with President Xi frequently warning
against populist and protectionist policies which were gaining support in both the
United States and parts of Europe.
In the case of China, while this goal has been realised in many cases, there remains
much progress to be achieved. It is important to note that much of the Chinese econ-
omy remains in state hands (directly or indirectly), including state-owned enterprises or
SOEs, (guoyouqiye 国有企业), and there is ongoing government supervision of the
financial sector, key commodity markets, and currency trade. Beijing has also changed
its policies concerning free trade in the past decade, supporting the efforts of the WTO
to liberalise global trade and becoming more willing to strike out on its own and
negotiate preferential trade agreements both bilaterally, with developing and increas-
ingly with developed economies, as well as with regional organisations.
Economic growth in the country had hovered between 9–10 percent since the turn of
the century, and despite numerous predictions since the 1990s that what goes up must
come down, the Chinese economy had weathered many shocks with little evidence of a
slowdown, the most recent being post-2008 global recession. Following its entry into
the WTO in 2001, Beijing developed its ability to significantly influence trade talks,
while before the recession both the United States and Europe worried about an influx
 Introduction 11
of cheap Chinese goods including everything from textiles to computers, in global
markets. By the end of 2018, China’s currency reserves stood as just over US$3 trillion.
However, faltering trade relations with the United States resulted in slower Chinese
economic growth, dropping to approximately 6 percent that year, and the shape of the
Chinese economy has shifted somewhat from a strong focus on manufacturing for
overseas, (“China makes, the world takes”),12 to domestic consumption and market
development. At the same time, Beijing has since sought to diversify its trade partners
and continue to develop the BRI to improve Chinese market access to numerous other
regions. As a result of China’s rapid economic growth, the country remains hungry for
commodities and energy, and this need has helped to shape much Chinese diplomacy
in Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America.
In the initial aftermath of the post-2008 recession, China found itself as one of the
main linchpins of the global economy as it moved to prevent an economic downturn
created by a decrease in demand for Chinese goods, especially in the shaky American
and Western European markets. In November 2008, the Chinese government imple-
mented an ambitious economic stimulus package worth about US$586 billion to
improve domestic infrastructure and move the country away from an over-reliance on
exports. Nevertheless, as the global slowdown began, debate in China continued as to how
much longer the country could maintain such high growth rates, should the global econ-
omy remain sluggish, and Beijing policymakers began to speak of a cooling off of Chinese
growth. Since taking office, the Xi government has been concentrating on preparing the
Chinese economy for a more mundane “new normal” (xin changtai 新常态) for the Chi-
nese economy, with slower economic growth rates to reflect the condition of the overall
global economy and China’s deeper engagement with it. Beijing has also been supporting
the supplementing of China’s manufacturing base with ambitious high-technology initia-
tives, including in the emerging fields of e-commerce (dianzi shangwu 电子商务), robotics,
artificial intelligence, quantum computing, financial technology (or “fintech”), and block-
chain (qukuailian 区块链) applications. In May 2015, Beijing announced a “Made in
China 2025” (Zhongguo zhizao erling’erwu 中国制造2025) initiative, designed to sig-
nificantly improve China’s presence in high-tech fields on the global level, competing more
directly with American and Western companies.
China, despite its economic progress and the envy of other developing states, is still a
developing economy by many international standards, with many parts of the country,
especially the interior, still struggling with high poverty levels. As China began to take off
economically since the turn of the century, there was talk of a “Beijing Consensus”
(Beijing Gongshi 北京共识), a model of Chinese-influenced economic growth, as opposed
to the traditional “Washington Consensus” which was promoted since the 1990s by the
United States and international economic organisations such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) as the best way to develop economies.13 While the latter pro-
moted liberalisation and reducing state power, the former emphasises innovation and
sovereignty rights. A Chinese model of economics, despite ongoing debate as to its
structure, has arguably given China something it could never hope to achieve under
Mao, namely “soft power” (ruan shili 软实力), meaning power based on attraction rather
than force or coercion.
A question now being asked by international political economy (IPE) specialists is
whether China’s experience in economic growth constitutes a “model” which could be
transplanted, in whole or in part, to other developing states. The global recession only
intensified this debate about the role of government in economic development, partially
12 Introduction
as a result of China’s relative lack of damage from the economic downturn, and the
question of a Chinese economic model has been wrapped up in the greater debate both
within government and among IR specialists, as to the benefits of “state capitalism”
whereby the state retains a strong oversight role in production and key markets. This
model has been taken up by other states to varying degrees, most notably by the gov-
ernment of Vladimir Putin in Russia, but also in smaller developing states.
Then-Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) was concerned about promising too
much regarding the growth of the Chinese economy, often referring to his interest in
building China into a “moderately prosperous society” (xiaokang shehui 小康社会). By
contrast, Xi Jinping, began to speak of a “Chinese Dream” (Zhongguo meng 中国梦),
shortly after taking office, which not only suggested a greater degree of confidence in
the country’s economic future despite domestic and international challenges, but was
also tied to the idea of the “rejuvenation” (fuxing 复兴) of China as a great economic
power. Later in Xi’s administration, there was discussion about expanding these ideas
to a regional level, as the Chinese leader began to speak of an “Asia-Pacific Dream”
(YaTai meng 亚太梦) which would unify China and other parts of Asia in mutual
development and prosperity.
Despite the rapid growth of globalisation which has resulted in an increase of ideas
and media as well as capital into China, Beijing remains concerned about maintaining
its sovereignty and remains wary of international calls for greater democracy and
human rights, arguing that such areas must be addressed only by Beijing and at a pace
with which China is most comfortable. The “Colour Revolutions” in the former Soviet
Union in 2003–5, affecting Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, which saw autocratic
governments being toppled by popular uprisings, raised concern in Beijing about a
“demonstration effect”, or a similar situation arising in China, and greater safeguards were
undertaken to ensure that such a revolution, which the Chinese government has suggested
was largely influenced by the work of Western agencies such as non-governmental organi-
sations (NGOs), would not take place in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The colour
revolutions in the former USSR during the 2000s served as proof to many in the Chinese
government that a peaceful evolution strategy was still being undertaken by the West.
In late 2010, the Arab Spring protest movements flared across Southwest Asia and
North Africa, unseating long-entrenched governments including in Egypt, Libya, and
Tunisia, and touching off a civil war in Syria starting in 2011. These events created
additional concerns in China about United States and Western interference in other
states’ domestic political affairs. Beijing again sought to prevent a demonstration effect
in China, going so far in 2011 as banning the word “jasmine” (molihua 茉莉花), the
name for the Tunisian people’s protests, from internet sites and social media. These
case studies suggest the Chinese state is still seeking to better manage the forces of
globalisation for the betterment of the state, while ensuring that the Communist Party
maintains its paramount role in Chinese governance. Since Maoist times, Beijing has
been concerned about so-called “peaceful evolution” (heping yanbian 和平演变),
namely the concentrated attempt by outside actors, especially the West, to undermine
socialism in China through a variety of political, socio-economic and cultural pressures.
Much of China’s foreign policy in the area of state-to-state relations has been based
on the Maoist era doctrine of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (Heping
Gongchu Wuxiang Yuanze 和平共处五项原则), which calls for “mutual respect for
each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful
 Introduction 13
co-existence”.14 Today, much of modern Chinese foreign policy remains guided by a
strong Westphalian view on the importance of maintaining the sovereignty of states.
There has also traditionally been an emphasis on the “four ‘no’s” (sibu 四不), namely
no hegemony, no power politics, no military alliances, and no arms racing.15 However,
those who see China as a potential threat suggest that the state may be waiting until its
strength is further solidified before gradually shedding these ideals and behaving more
like traditional rising powers. Beijing has countered these views with the assertion that
it is interested in a peaceful rising in the international system and wishes to promote
greater international harmony.
China’s diplomatic power is also on the rise, including within international organi-
sations and regimes. After the Communist Revolution in 1949, Mao Zedong frequently
railed against many international organisations which he claimed were proxies of
imperialist powers such as the United States. China was shut out of the United Nations
for much of the cold war, with Taiwan acting on Mainland China’s behalf. However,
from the point at which Beijing regained its UN seat in 1971, China became one of the
permanent five members with veto powers on the UNSC along with the United States,
the USSR / Russia, Great Britain and France, giving it much power to make or break
many international security initiatives. At the same time, China’s current support for
international intervention stands in contrast to its opposition to the policy during the
Maoist era. This stance was partially a product of the 1950–3 Korean War, which saw
Chinese volunteer forces, heeding Mao’s call to “Resist America. Assist Korea”
(kangMei yuanChao 抗美援朝), by fighting alongside the communist North Koreans
against South Korea, the United States and other UN forces. However, China even
after the cold war has insisted that international intervention must be guided by the
United Nations and especially its Security Council.
As a result, Beijing has been supportive of many UN peacekeeping operations, but
has also been openly critical of non-UN missions such as the intervention by NATO in
Kosovo in 1999, and was ambivalent, but not obstructionist, about the American-led
“coalition of the willing” operations in Iraq after 2003, US operations in Afghanistan
between 2001–14, and NATO’s air support for Libyan rebels seeking the overthrow of
the Muammar Gaddafi regime during that civil conflict in 2011. Beijing’s views on
humanitarian intervention missions have evolved with China’s insistence that the UN is
the best actor to engage in such activity. By 2010, China was providing the largest
number of UN peacekeeping personnel of the permanent five members of the UNSC.
However, Beijing has shown no reluctance to veto UN resolutions which it views as
being too interventionist in states’ sovereign affairs, including resolutions which fea-
tured condemnations of governments in Myanmar and Sudan for human rights abuses.
Since the beginning of the 2011 civil war in Syria, China joined Russia in vetoing
UNSC resolutions which would have pressured Syrian president Bashar Assad to step
down in the wake of escalating armed rebellions.
Beijing’s engagement of other types of international institutions is also growing.
From the time of its admission to the WTO, the country has been an active member
and has often defended the rights of developing states to a new global trade deal which
better reflects their interests. At the same time, China’s enthusiasm for free trade on a
regional scale has also grown, supporting liberalised trade with Southeast Asia and to a
lesser degree Japan and the ROK. China is also a driving force within the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which seeks to liberalise trade across the Paci-
fic Rim to better compete with the European Union and North America. As well,
14 Introduction
China has been at the forefront of new Asian political and economic communities, includ-
ing the ASEAN-plus-three (APT) organisation uniting Northeast and Southeast Asian
economies, and the newer East Asia Summit (EAS), created in 2005 as a dialogue group for
Asian economies. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was founded in 2001
and brought together China, Russia, and most of Central Asia for security and trade
cooperation, with China contributing much to the organisation’s policymaking. In May
2014, Beijing hosted the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in
Asia (CICA), a security organisation which includes governments from across Asia and the
Middle East. At the event, Xi spoke of the need to move further beyond cold war thinking
and develop solutions to regional security issues which better reflected Asia itself.
In short, China has been very much a “joiner” of international institutions and
remains wary of any such organisations of which it is not a member. For example,
China has been sensitive to perceived attempts by the United States to establish a
security regime in the Asia-Pacific by tying together all its regional bilateral partners
into a group which might seek to balance Chinese power. More specifically, Beijing
reacted with concern when the TPP, originally a small-scale, four member, free trade
agreement in the Pacific in 2005, added the United States as a member after 2010 along
with other regional economies including Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, and
Vietnam, and began working in 2011 towards liberalising mutual trade well beyond
APEC guidelines. Beijing was not included in TPP meetings despite its economic pre-
sence, and questions were raised in China as to whether the TPP might be used as
means of checking Beijing’s regional economic power and was simply another arm of
the US “pivot” policy. After the United States withdrew from the TPP in 2017, how-
ever, China found itself in a much better position to suggest alternative trade organi-
sations, including the BRI as well as the Beijing-backed Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) free trade negotiations.
However, since taking office, President Xi has been more active in developing
newer international regimes which better reflect Beijing’s foreign policy interests.
China is a major shaper of the “BRICS” group, (which also includes Brazil, Russia,
India, and South Africa), and supported the 2014 development of a BRICS finan-
cial institution, the New Development Bank (NDB) which would act as an alter-
native to the traditional, Western-backed lending institutions of the IMF and the
World Bank. Also in 2014, President Xi proposed and began to develop another
financing body, known as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or AIIB which
would support infrastructure development in the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, in
response to Beijing’s exclusion from the TPP, during the annual APEC leadership
summit in Beijing in November 2014, President Xi proposed a revival of a “Free
Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific” (FTAAP) framework which, long-discussed within
APEC since the 1990s, would result in liberalised trade across the region, including
with China.
The more ambitious foreign policy designs of the Xi government have also been well
illustrated by the development of the BRI strategy of developing new land and sea
links with vital Western European markets via Eurasia and Russia. Central to these
new links would be the “Silk Road Economic Belt” (Silu Jingjidai 丝路经济带), which
would stretch across Central Asia and the Caucasus and Bosporus regions, with one
link to Moscow and another to Western Europe. In addition to trade, the creation of
the “belt” would also entail increased bilateral cooperation between Beijing and Cen-
tral Asian and Caucasus states along with Russia. These overland routes, which harken
 Introduction 15
back to the trade routes between Imperial China and Europe first established during
the Han Dynasty more than two millennia ago, would be accompanied by a “Maritime
Silk Road” (Haishang Silu 海上丝路) or MSR. This route would traverse the Indian
Ocean with ports in Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Eastern Africa, and would also
involve the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
By 2018, China had developed two additional maritime roads, via the Pacific Ocean
and Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands all the way to Latin America,
including Argentina and Chile, as well as an emerging “Ice Silk Road” (Bingshang
Sichouzhilu 冰上丝绸之路), stretching from China to the Russian Far East (RFE) and
Siberia and on to Northern Europe via the Arctic Ocean, which due to climate change
is becoming increasingly accessible to shipping in summer months. Like its landlocked
counterparts, the MSR also has an historical precedent in the form of Indian Ocean
sea routes traversed by Chinese vessels during the Tang Dynasty (618–907 CE) which
linked the Imperial Tang Empire with the Byzantine Empire in south-eastern Europe
and the Caliphates of Southwest Asia, as well as eastern Africa and the Indian sub-
continent.16 The development of the MSR, would greatly enhance China as a maritime
power in Asia after many decades of being seen as primarily a “continental” power
with a primary focus on securing land borders.17
China’s growing diplomatic and “structural” power, meaning the ability to accrue
what it wants through skilful engagement of organisations and norms inter-
nationally, means that it is not only better equipped to successfully join interna-
tional organisations to benefit its foreign policy, but is now able to shape their
development in some cases, such as the AIIB and SCO, and to play a central role
within them. During the cold war, China under Mao was categorised as a “norm
shaker”, meaning that it often directly challenged the norms and policies set down
by Western powers. However, after the cold war Beijing was far more open to
becoming a “norm taker”, accepting and even welcoming participation with inter-
national, including Western, regimes and institutions. As China continues to
develop as a great power, the country has become much more willing to be a
“norm maker” (and/or “norm shaper”), developing new structures, regimes, and
ideas which may run counter to those of the West.

Box 1.2 Structural power

Scholars focusing on institutional power usually define institutions and structure in
almost interchangeable terms, as sets of rules, procedures, and norms that constrain
the action of already-constituted actors with fixed preferences. Scholars focusing on
structural power conceive structure as an internal relation – that is, a direct constitutive
relation such that the structural position, A, exists only by virtue of its relation to
structural position, B.
– Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics”,
International Organisation 59 (Winter 2005): 53.

Finally, China’s “bigness” has also extended into environmental issues. The envir-
onment is another problem in China which is more obviously affecting the interna-
tional system. The state contains some of the most polluted cities in the world and has
surpassed the United States to become the largest single contributor of carbon and
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