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Firuz Kazemzadeh is Emeritus Professor of History at Yale
University. He has taught at Harvard and Yale universities and
was subsequently appointed Commissioner to the United States
Commission on International Religious Freedom by President
Clinton. Professor Kazemzadeh is also the author of The Struggle for
Transcaucasia.
‘Professor Kazemzadeh’s book is to be welcomed as a major contribution to the
field … a formidable and monumental work that far surpasses any other book
on modern Iranian international relations… . The author has done an outstand-
ing job of research in Russian, Britain and Persian sources … and has presented
a far fuller view of his subject than has hitherto been available. … Both students
and scholars should put it on their must reading lists.’
Nikki I. Keddie, Iranian Studies

‘A first class piece of scholarship.’

A.P. Thornton, American Historical Review

‘A valuable study of Anglo-Russian relations in Persia.’

Ann K.S. Lambton
RUSSIA AND BRITAIN
IN PERSIA
Imperial Ambitions in Qajar Iran

FIRUZ KAZEMZADEH
New edition published in 2013 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd
6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU
175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010
www.ibtauris.com

Distributed in the United States and Canada

Exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan
175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010

First published in 1968 by Yale University Press

Copyright © 1968, 2013 Firuz Kazemzadeh

The right of Firuz Kazemzadeh to be identified as the author of this work has
been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent
Act 1988.

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any
part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission
of the publisher.

ISBN: 978 1 78076 310 1

A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available

Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY
 Contents

Preface vii

Note xi

Introduction xiii

1. Anglo-Russian Conflict in Central Asia: Genesis and

Evolution 3

2. Reuter and Falkenhagen: Two Failures and a Beginning 100

3. "Pénétration Pacifique": Rivers, Railways, Trade and

Foreign Advisers 148

4. The Tobacco Régie: Britain's Retreat and Russia's

Offensive 241

5. Loans, Concessions and Political Power 302

6. Seistān and the Persian Gulf: Gates to India 386

7. War, Revolution and the Reconciliation of the Antagonists 448

8. The Uneasy Alliance 510

9. "The Strangling of Persia" 581

Bibliography 681

Index 699
 Introduction

This book was published almost half a century ago and has become
a standard work on the diplomatic history of Anglo-Russian rivalry
in Iran from the middle of the nineteenth century to the First World
War. It pleases me that after many decades out of print, it has been
resurrected in its original English version while an excellent Persian
translation and a pirated Russian edition have made it accessible to
readers of those two languages.
While writing Russia and Britain in Persia, I was painfully con-
scious that the inaccessibility of Russian archives could make my
work one-sided. Published government sources could not be relied
upon, as I knew from a simple comparison of some of the documents
in a collection produced by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in 1911 and the same documents reissued by the Soviet government
after the Revolution of 1917. Would the inaccessibility of original
documents vitiate my narrative and my conclusions? Yet a relative
paucity of original documentation should not stop a historian from
attempting to reconstruct the past to the best of his ability.
Unanticipated radical change in the life of the Soviet Union made
it possible for me in 1990 to work in the archives of the Russian Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs. An examination of relevant materials re-
lieved my anxiety and persuaded me that the basics of my narrative
needed no modification and neither did my conclusions. Although
a large number of works on Iran has appeared in the last forty years,
few have dealt with the topics covered in Russia and Britain. I felt
that I needed to make no change in the original text.

xiii
xiv Introduction

The book ends with the onset of the First World War, but the ri-
valry of the two great powers continued. The Russian government
had not been satisfied with the gains made under the agreement of
1907 and, in 1915, concluded another agreement with Britain that
amounted to a virtual annexation to Russia of her sphere of influ-
ence in Persia at the small price of ceding to Britain the insignificant
neutral zone. Exigencies of war muted the old conflict.
The collapse of the Russian Empire and the establishment of the
Soviet regime created an entirely new situation. Russia withdrew
from the War and concluded a humiliating peace with Germany,
creating a grave threat to the Allies on the Western Front. Russian
troops withdrew from Persia and left behind a vacuum that Britain
hastened to fill, out of fear that Persia would descend into anarchy
and open the door to an ideology that called for an armed struggle
against European imperialism and the overthrow of the old colo-
nial order. Appealing to all peoples of colonial and semi-colonial
countries, the Soviet government repudiated various treaties that
had given Russia rights and privileges in countries such as Persia
and China. This would, of course, undermine Britain’s position
throughout the colonial world. Thus the old rivalry was resuming
under new names and new flags.
In 1919, hoping to consolidate Britain’s position and assure the
defense of India, Lord Curzon bribed a number of leading Persian
officials to sign an agreement which, had it come into force, would
have turned their country into a British protectorate. Persia’s par-
liament, the Majles, refused to ratify the agreement. Curzon’s pol-
icy was in shreds. Tribes were in rebellion, the central government
under the ineffective Ahmad Shah was paralyzed, and an anti-colo-
nialist movement established itself in the province of Gilan, attract-
ing the support of communist-leaning radicals and welcoming a
contingent of Soviet Russian troops. A Soviet Republic of Gilan was
proclaimed, hailed by Moscow, and ready to advance on Tehran.
The only force that could stop the advance was the Cossack Brigade
created by Russia half a century before but now commanded by
 Introduction xv

Persian officers headed by Rezā Khan, an energetic and ambitious

young officer.
Britain, exhausted by a long war, evacuated its troops from north-
ern Persia. At the urging of its minister in Tehran, and in spite of
Curzon’s misgivings, the British government decided to back Rezā
Khan and the Cossack Brigade as the only force capable of prevent-
ing Tehran, and perhaps all of Persia, from falling to the Soviets.
Rezā Khan marched on Tehran, staged a coup d’état, and succeeded
in stopping the troops of the Gilan Republic. Internal conditions
compelled Soviet Russia to abandon the Gilan Soviet, whose lead-
ers fled to Russia, there to form a nucleus of Persian Communist op-
position. Soon the Persian government, now entirely dominated by
Rezā Khan, concluded a treaty that recognized Soviet Russia, estab-
lished regular diplomatic relations between the two countries, and
helped to stabilize the domestic situation in Persia, permitting Rezā
Khan to consolidate his authority, overthrow the Qajar dynasty and
have a constituent assembly proclaim him Rezā Shah Pahlavi.
Russia’s threat to British interests in Persia was averted, although
Rezā Shah proved not to be Britain’s obedient tool. Even before as-
cending the throne, he created a national army which he success-
fully used to centralize the country by destroying the autonomy of
southern tribal leaders such as the Bakhtiāri khans and the Sheykh
of Muhammarah, who had long been Britain’s clients. After 1925, a
balance of Russian and British influence was achieved that lasted
up to the Second World War and a joint occupation of Iran reminis-
cent of what had occurred in the First World War.
In their sphere of occupation, as elsewhere in Iran, the Soviets
proceeded to encourage the growth of Communist parties, while
in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan they promoted separatist movements
that would, at the War’s end, create a serious crisis, but this time
Russia’s principal antagonist would be the new super-power, the
United States.
Before the Second World War, America had no significant interests
in Persia. Regular diplomatic relations between the two were not es-
tablished until 1882. A few Protestant missionaries had been active
xvi Introduction

in Persia since the mid-nineteenth century but Muslims could not

be converted and the missionaries worked mostly among Armenian
and Assyrian Christians. They were allowed to open a number of
schools that educated non-Christian Iranians, including members
of prominent families. An American, Morgan Shuster, briefly Iran’s
Treasurer General, was forced to leave when Russia demanded his
dismissal in an ultimatum and sent troops to occupy northern Per-
sia. The US government neither sponsored nor supported the Shus-
ter mission.
The Second World War and the Cold War changed the situation.
Fear of the Soviet Union became America’s main concern in the con-
duct of her foreign policy. Britain might have compromised on the
issue of oil and acquiesced in the acquisition of rights to the exploi-
tation of northern Iran’s fields by the Soviets, but the United States
took a strong position. The Soviets, not yet in possession of an atom
bomb, abandoned their demands for an oil concession and left their
protégées in Azerbaijan to their fate.
When an upsurge of national sentiment led to the nationalization
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Britain had to persuade the US
government, apprehensive of a Communist takeover in Iran, to par-
ticipate in the overthrow of Mosaddeq and the return of the Shah
from his brief exile. Russia chose not to support Mosaddeq, con-
centrating instead on cultivating a network of agents within Iran, a
network that was soon smashed by the Shah with the support of the
United States.
The establishment of the Islamic Republic once again dramatical-
ly changed relationships among Iran, Russia, Britain and the United
States. For the first time in two hundred years Iran was free to deter-
mine its own domestic and foreign policies. Rivalries among great
powers had lost much of their relevance, although the history of
those rivalries determined, and is determining, many of the actions
of the current regime. In novel conditions, under very different cir-
cumstances, the past continues to exercise its influence.
In the Preface to this book when it was first published, I gratefully
acknowledged the assistance of several individuals and institutions.
 Introduction xvii

I now take this occasion to add my thanks to Professor Rudi

Matthee of the University of Delaware for suggesting to I.B.Tauris
that they reissue this book.

Firuz Kazemzadeh
2013
R u ssia an d B ritain in P ersia, 1 8 6 4 -1 9 1 4

A Study in Imperialism
 1

Angler Russian Conflict in Central Asia:

Genesis and Evolution

Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia, Persia—to many these words

breathe only a sense of utter remoteness or a memory of strange
vicissitudes and of moribund romance. To me, I confess, they are
the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game
for the domination of the world. George Curzon

Russia's advance into Central Asia, the spectacular conquests she

carried out in the second half of the nineteenth century, and the
consequent expansion of her Empire, startled Europe. The de­
serts and oases of Central Asia, the unexplored mountains of
Afghanistan, the legendary cities of Khorasan, suddenly invaded
the front pages of the leading newspapers and became a lively
topic of conversation in Berlin, Paris, and London.
As their troops won easy victories over the hordes of Kazakhs,
Uzbeks, and Turkomans, the gap that separated the Russians
from the British, slowly making their way toward Baluchestan
and Afghanistan, narrowed, and conflict threatened the peace
precariously maintained between the major powers. W hen viewed
from London, Russia's penetration of Central Asia seemed dis­
turbing, if not frightening. From St. Petersburg it appeared
natural, being only the climax of a long series of efforts that had
begun three centuries earlier in the reigns of Ivan the Terrible,
Feodor Ivanovich, and Boris Godunov. W hile the British, them­
selves strangers in Asia, were shocked to discover the Cossack on
the banks of the Oxus, the Russians felt at home among the
Turkic peoples who for hundreds of years had been by turns their
neighbors, masters, and subjects.
The conquest of Kazan opened the way for Russia's approach
3
4 Russia and Britain in Persia

to the Caspian, while the acquisition of Astrakhan inevitably in­

volved her in the affairs of Tarki and Kabarda, which in turn led
to contacts with Georgia, Turkey, and Iran.1 In 1560 Russia was
already sending troops to fight against the Mountaineers of
Daghestan. The marriage of Ivan the Terrible to the daughter of
the chieftain Temriuk resulted in the stationing of Russian troops
in Kabarda.2
Russia's attempts to subdue Daghestan failed when Prince Ivan
Andreevich Khvorostinin was defeated in 1594 and forced to re­
treat, after losing three thousand men.3 Her first ''Caucasian war"
inaugurated a struggle that was to continue until the capitulation
of the intrepid Sheykh Shamil at Gunib in 1859. Boris Godunov
made another attempt to establish Russian rule over the Moun­
taineers, but Turkey and Iran aided the tribes of Daghestan in re­
sisting the Streltsy and the Cossacks. By 1605 Russia was too ab­
sorbed in domestic troubles to embark upon new conquests. No
further moves were made in the Caucasus until the reign of Peter
the Great.
Under him, the Empire expanded in every direction. W hile
fighting for a foothold on the Baltic, the Tsar nursed dreams of
Asiatic campaigns. "For all the concentration of his main energies
upon Europe," writes B. H. Sumner, "he had from his earliest
years taken a lively interest in Asia. The enthusiasm of the ex­
plorer was allied with the gold-dazzled phantasy of the prospector
and the merchant." 4 Khiva, Bukhara, Persia, and beyond these
fabulous India, excited Peter's imagination. He sent a force of
thirty-five hundred men under Prince Bekovich-Cherkasskii to
conquer Khiva and find the road to India. The force fell into a
trap and was exterminated.
About the same time Peter ordered one of his younger officers,
Artemii Volynskii, to travel to Persia to gather political, eco­
nomic, and military intelligence. Volynskii was instructed to find

1. For a history of Russia’s first contacts with Daghestan and Kabarda, see Boris
Nolde, La formation de VEmpire Russe, 2 (Paris, 19 53).
2. Ibid., p. 307.
3. Ibid., p. 318.
4. B. PI. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia (London, 19 56),
p. 17 1.
 A nglo-Russian Conflict $

out, among other things, whether there were in Persia any navi­
gable rivers that flowed from India into the Caspian Sea. Upon
his return, Volynskii strongly urged the Tsar to conquer Persia,
which was in a state of anarchy and disorder. Once the Northern
W ar was over, Peter launched an attack on Iran. He met prac­
tically no resistance, for the country had been invaded by the
Afghans, the Shah was a captive, and the government nonexistent.
The Russians occupied Baku, Gilan, Mazandaran, and Astar-
abad. However, Peter's Persian conquests proved ephemeral.
His immediate successors, faced with the resurgent power of Iran
led by Nader Shah, and having no interest in the East, gave up
every bit of the territory Peter the Great had acquired at great
cost in men and treasure.5
, During the closing decades of the eighteenth century Russia
resumed her activity in the Caucasus. In 1801 Georgia was
annexed. Persia, refusing to acquiesce in the loss of a land it had
ruled for centuries, went to war and was badly defeated.6 By the
Treaty of Golestan she lost most of her Caucasian possessions,
including Baku, Darband, Ganjeh, and Georgia, gave up her right
to maintain a navy on the Caspian, which thereby became a
Russian lake, and accepted an unfavorable arrangement in regard
to tariffs. Perhaps the most damaging provision of all was con­
tained in Article 5 of the treaty by which Russia recognized Prince
Abbas Mirza as the rightful heir to the throne and promised
him assistance in case succession was disputed, thus obtaining a
useful instrument for direct interference in Iran's internal affairs.
Persian desire for revenge and Russian encroachment along the
newly established frontier led to another war and another Russian
victory. Russian troops captured Erivan and Tabriz, and threat­
ened Tehran. In 1828 at the village of Torkamanchay a peace
treaty was signed. It was destined to regulate Russo-Persian rela-
5. On Peter’s Persian war and his relations with the Turks, the Georgians, and
the Armenians, see V . P. Lystsov, Persidskii pokhod Petra I, 17 2 2 -17 2 3 (Moscow,
19 5 1) , and D. M. Lang, The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy, 16 5 8 -18 3 2
(New York, 19 57), pp. 1 1 1 - 1 7 .
6. The best account of the complicated situation that led to the annexation of
Georgia is in D. M. Lang, The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy, Chaps. 9,
1 1 - 1 3 . A&ty sobrannye kavkazskoiu arkheograficheskoiu kommissieiu (12 vols. Tiflis,
18 6 8-190 4), are a rich source for this period.
6 Russia and Britain in Persia

tions until 19 17. In addition to further territorial losses, Persia

had to pay an indemnity of 20 million rubles. A commercial
treaty concluded at the same time set the maximum duty on
Russian goods imported into Persia at 5 percent ad valorem, es­
tablished a regime of capitulations for Russian subjects, and ex­
tended to Russian merchants many privileges never before en­
joyed by foreigners in the domains of the Shah. Thus in one gen­
eration Russia had vaulted the Caucasus, absorbed Georgia,
northern Azarbayjan, and a part of Armenia, acquired extensive
commercial rights and strong political influence in Persia, and es­
tablished herself in the vicinity of British India. The stage was
now set for a long duel between Russia and Britain, a duel that
was the determining factor in Central Asiatic and Middle Eastern
affairs until British power waned after the Second W orld W ar.7
The complexities of the Eastern question, the savage resistance
of the Mountaineers under Shamil, and the fear of provoking a
major conflict with Great Britain restrained Russia from under­
taking any further encroachment on Persian territory west of the
Caspian. The frontier drawn up at Torkamanchay has remained
substantially unchanged to this day. East of the Caspian no
definite frontiers existed between Persia and her nomadic neigh­
bors, between the various Central Asiatic khanates, or between
the khanates and Russia. Political instability and economic stag­
nation were the lot of the various ephemeral states that periodi­
cally sprang up in Turkestan. A vast power vacuum, stretching all
the way from the Caspian Sea to the borders of China, from
Afghanistan to the edge of the Siberian plain, could not fail to
exercise an irresistible attraction upon the Russians.
The European powers, jealously watching every move Russia
made in the direction of Constantinople, seemed almost entirely
unaware of her steady advance in Central Asia. Neither the dis­
aster that overtook General V . A. Perovskii in his attempt to
capture Khiva in 1839, nor the victories that gave Russia Aq-
Masjid (Ak Mechet) in 1853, elicited a reaction from the Euro-

7. The Persian view of the two Russo-Persian wars is presented in Jamil Qozanlu,
Jange dak-sale yd jange avvale Iran ba Rus (Tehran, 19 3 7 ); and his Jange Iran-Rus,
18 25 -18 28 (Tehran, 19 38). For the Soviet interpretation, see M. S. Ivanov, Ocherk
istorii Irana (Moscow, 19 52). For the British view, see Sir Percy M. Sykes, A His­
tory of Persia (London, 19 15 ) , 2, Chap. 76.
 Anglo-Russian Conflict 7
pean states.8 The Crimean W ar interrupted Russia's activity in
Central Asia; but, after a brief period of recuperation, the forward
movement was resumed.
Its initiator and inspirer was one of the most remarkable figures
of nineteenth-century Russia, though his stature has not yet been
sufficiently recognized. General Dimitrii Alekseevich Miliutin was
a soldier, a teacher, a statesman, a reformer, and a close collabora­
tor of Alexander II throughout the latter's reign. It was Miliutin
who played the principal part in reforming the antiquated serf
army of Nicholas I and restoring Russia's military power. It was
he who championed every advance, every conquest in Central
Asia, often against the wishes of the more cautious and European-
minded Chancellor, Prince A. M. Gorchakov. It was Miliutin
who was responsible for the appointment of K. P. von Kaufmann
to the post of Governor-General of Turkestan in 1867, and who
was intimately connected with the pacification, administration,
and exploitation of Russian Central Asia.9
W hile Miliutin urged the Tsar forward, Gorchakov counseled
caution. Too rapid an advance in the direction of India would
alarm the English to whom even the vastest deserts, highest
mountains, and deepest seas did not seem sufficient to protect
their dearest possession. Ever since Napoleon had toyed with the
utterly impractical scheme of invading India with the help of Tsar
Paul and Fath Ali Shah, the British had been obsessed with fear
and suspicion, which Gorchakov would have preferred not to in­
crease. On one occasion, when the Foreign Ministry argued this
point, Miliutin angrily wrote: "it is not necessary to apologize to
the English Minister for our advance. They do not stand on
ceremonies with us, conquering whole Kingdoms, occupying alien
cities and islands; and we do not ask them why they do it." For
the next twenty years Gorchakov, and after him his successor,
N. K. Giers, attempted to restrain the military, while providing
them with brilliant tactical support abroad. The very tension be­
tween Miliutin and Gorchakov, the generals and the diplomats,

8. The most recent American contribution to the study of Central Asia is Rich­
ard A. Pierce’s Russian Central Asia, 18 6 7 -19 17 (Berkeley, i9 60). See also M. A.
Terent’ev, Istoriia zavoevaniia Srednei Azii (St. Petersburg, 1906).
9. See A. M. Zaionchkovskii, “ D. A. Miliutin: Biograficheskii ocherk,” in Dnev-
nik Miliutina (Moscow, 19 47), 1, 35.
8 Russia and Britain in Persia

made Russian policies unusually flexible and vigorous. Since there

was no disagreement about ends, and since no one questioned the
final authority of the Tsar to determine policy, there was little
danger from this interdepartmental rivalry.
In 1864 several special ministerial conferences were held in St.
Petersburg on orders of the Tsar to discuss the Central Asiatic
question. Extensive military preparations were made for new
advances. W hen the armies began to march, the diplomats were
ready with justifications. In December, Gorchakov sent to Rus­
sian representatives abroad a circular dispatch, requesting them to
use its arguments as a guide ''in any explanations you may give to
the Government to which you are accredited, in case questions
are asked, or you may see credence given to erroneous ideas as to
our action in these distant parts/' The dispatch of November
21/Decem ber 3, 1864, became a landmark in the history of Rus­
sian diplomacy. Gorchakov wrote:

The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized

States which are brought into contact with half savage, nomad
populations, possessing no fixed social organization.
In such cases it always happens that the more civilized
State is forced, in the interests of the security of its frontier
and its commercial relations, to exercize a certain ascendency
over those whom their turbulent and unsettled character
make most undesirable neighbours.
First there are raids and acts of pillage to put down. To put
a stop to them, the tribes on the frontier have to be reduced
to a state of more or less perfect submission.

Once pacified, these tribes have a right to protection against

their neighbors; but "the moral force of reason" will not accom­
plish this, since "It is a peculiarity of Asiatics to respect nothing
but visible and palpable force." Thus the civilized state is placed
in a dilemma: it must either abandon all attempts at civilization,
or "lunge deeper and deeper into barbarous countries."

Such has been the fate of every country which has found
itself in a similar position. The United States in America,
 Anglo-RussianConflict 9

France in Algeria, Holland in her Colonies, England in India

— all have been irresistibly forced, less by ambition than by
imperious necessity, into this onward movement where the
greatest difficulty is to know where to stop.

Faced with the dilemma common to all civilized states with

“ savage” neighbors, Russia decided to rectify her Central Asiatic
frontier, drawing it in such a way that it should run through a
fertile area, to insure both supply and regular colonization,
“ which alone can prepare a future of stability and prosperity for
the occupied country.” It was urgent to lay down this line defini­
tively, so as to escape the danger of being carried away, as is al­
most inevitable, by a series of repressive measures and reprisals,
into an unlimited extension of territory.10
Russia wanted to absorb the nomads but not the sedentary
agricultural and commercial populations “ who are good neigh­
bors.” The new line
puts us in the immediate neighbourhood of the agricultural
and commercial populations of Khokand. W e find ourselves
in the presence of a more solid and compact, less unsettled
and better organized social state, fixing for us with geographi­
cal precision the limit up to which we are bound to advance
and at which we must halt.11

No sooner had the British government been informed of the

Gorchakov circular by the Russian ambassador, Baron E. Brun-
now, than events in Central Asia cast doubt on the sincerity of
the document. An attack was launched against Tashkent, a town
inhabited by a sedentary people engaged in agriculture and com­
merce. On June 10, 1865, Gorchakov told the British ambassador
in St. Petersburg, Sir Andrew Buchanan, “ that the Russian Gov­
ernment would not retain the city, but would act up to their
declarations ‘in regard to that country.’ ”
Tashkent was taken by storm (June 15 - 17 , 1865). W hen the

10. Correspondence, from 1864 to 18 8 1, respecting the movements of Russia in

Central Asia and her relations with Afghanistan; F. O. 65/1202. Hereafter cited as
Correspondence.
1 1 . Id.
IO Russia and Britain in Persia

victory was publicly announced, a St. Petersburg newspaper,

Russkii invalid, wrote:

Our troops can only occupy the town for a short time, until
its independence of Kokand is no longer menaced. After hav­
ing given independence to Tashkend . . . Russia, who has
no desire to annex the place, will only have to watch over the
tranquility and security of her commercial relations with Cen­
tral Asia.12

The British were not reassured. Lord John Russell, Secretary of

State for Foreign Affairs, wanted a formal exchange of notes in
which the two powers would "declare that they had no intention
of extending their territories in such a manner that their frontiers
would approach each other more than they then did/' If one of
the powers felt compelled to expand, it would inform the other of
the causes that compelled it to do so "and the extent of the con­
templated increase of territory." Both parties would respect the
"present state of possessions" in Central Asia and "both Powers
would respect the independence of the Persian monarchy; would
be careful not to encroach on the territory of Persia; and would
act in concert to support and strengthen the authority of the
Shah." 13
The India Office approved of the spirit of such an understand­
ing, though it opposed a formal convention. Russell agreed and
approached Gorchakov, who was handed excerpts from Russell's
dispatch of July 31 expressing the wish of Her Majesty's Govern­
ment "to remove every cause of danger which might threaten the
future good understanding between England and Russia." The
two powers would engage not to disturb the status quo in Central
Asia. "Her Majesty's Government will also respect the indepen­
dence of the Persian Monarchy, will be careful not to encroach
upon the territory of Persia, and will act in such a manner as may
best support and strengthen the sovereignty of the Shah." 14

12. Correspondence, ibid.

13. Id.
14. Id.
 Anglo-Russian Conflict 11

Gorchakov pretended not to understand Russell's point. Had

not Russia already proclaimed her pacific intention in regard to
Central Asia? As for Persia,

His Excellency said that he could not understand the connec­

tion between Central Asia and the Persian monarchy which
had induced this declaration.
The declaration itself was of very satisfactory nature, and
one which was quite in accord with the views of the Imperial
Government, but, while receiving it with pleasure, he must
say that he had never suspected Her Majesty's Government
of any intention of encroaching upon the territory of the
Shah.15

One wonders whether Russell sensed Gorchakov's irony. By

affirming with an air of naive innocence his faith in England's
good intentions, he evaded the issue and kept Russia uncom­
mitted. W hen, on September 3, Sir Andrew Buchanan intimated
that the terms of Gorchakov's circular of 1864 were not suffi­
ciently explicit to reassure the British government in regard to
Persia, which had not even been mentioned in it, Gorchakov
replied that "he could not believe that an unfavourable interpre­
tation would be given to that omission, as it was impossible for
any one acquainted with the policy of the Imperial Government
to suspect it of designs against the independence of the Persian
monarchy." Gorchakov added that he was prepared to instruct his
ambassador in London to give Russell confidential assurances that
Russia had no intention to violate the independence and integrity
of Persia, but that the Turkomans were not the subjects of the
Shah, and that Russia found it necessary to punish them for
depredations against her commerce. The significance of this re­
mark was not understood by the British for many years.16
The reference to the Turkomans was not fortuitous. Late in
1864 a Special Conference composed of representatives of the
Foreign Ministry, the Army, the Navy, and several other depart­

15. Id.
16. Id.
12 Russia and Britain in Persia

ments, met on orders of the Tsar to discuss the question of estab­

lishing Russian power in Turkoman lands on the eastern coast of
the Caspian. It was decided to occupy the village of Qizil-Su (Red
Water, Krasnovodsk). The Tsar approved the decision on Feb­
ruary 22, 1865.17 The proposed outpost would enable Russia to
control the sea as well as a strip of land stretching the entire
length of the Caspian and, perhaps, to remove her naval station
from the island of Ashuradeh. The station had been established
on Persian territory without Persia’s consent. Its purpose had
been to stop Turkoman piracy and to prevent Persia from evading
the provisions of Article 8 of the treaty of Torkamanchay which
prohibited her from maintaining armed vessels on the Caspian.
Because the naval station was located on Persian territory, it was a
constant irritant which stimulated the Shah’s suspicions of Rus­
sian intentions. A base at Krasnovodsk would provide the same, or
even greater, advantages as Ashuradeh, without the disadvantages
of the latter.18 Complications on the borders of Bukhara and
Kokand prevented the immediate implementation of the deci­
sion, but Gorchakov was carefully preparing the diplomatic basis
for military action in Transcaspia.
Contrary to its promises of 1865, the Russian government did
not evacuate Tashkent. In M ay 1866, relations with Bukhara hav­
ing broken down, General D. I. Romanovskii led his troops
against the Bukharans and routed them at Irjar. In June Khojent
was occupied. On the twenty-seventh, Lord Clarendon, now
Foreign Secretary in Lord John Russell’s cabinet, instructed Sir
Andrew Buchanan at St. Petersburg to let the Russian govern­
ment know that, while Britain recognized Russia’s right to use
force to procure the release of her ambassador imprisoned in
Bukhara,
the changes which were being made in Russia’s borders are
scarcely consistent with the professed intention of the Rus­
sian Government to respect the independence of the States
of Central Asia. Russia seems to have made a steady advance
17. Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. M. Gorchakov, to the Director of the M in­
istry of the Navy, October 15/27, 1869; A. IFiasov, ed., Prisoedinenie Turkmenii
k Rossii (Ashkhabad, i960), No. 1, pp. 19 -23. Hereafter cited as Prisoedinenie.
18. Id.
 Anglo-RussianConflict 23

in this direction, taking permanent possession of territory not

required solely for making a good frontier.19
To Buchanan’s question about the limits of Russian conquests,
Gorchakov replied that only the military were competent to
decide such issues, and added that it was absurd to suppose that
Russia’s moves could threaten British India.20
The pattern was now established. Year after year Russian
troops would penetrate deeper into the heart of Asia. A flurry of
alarm would run from Calcutta, or Simla, to Whitehall. The
British ambassador in St. Petersburg would call on Russia’s
Minister of Foreign Affairs, ask for an explanation, receive as­
surances of the Tsar’s determination not to annex an inch of land
anywhere, send a dispatch to that effect to Her Majesty’s Prin­
cipal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and leave the matter there
until Russia’s next move reopened the whole issue.
The Government of India was divided in its opinions in regard
to the Russian threat. W hile a number of lesser officials advo­
cated strong measures, even to the occupation of Afghanistan, the
Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence, preached the doctrine of masterly
inactivity. “ He belonged to the generation which had drawn
natural but mistaken conclusions from the lamentable war of
1839. He held strongly that Britain had no interests beyond the
line which the Sikhs had formerly held, and that the defence of
India should be based on the Indus.” 21
In a minute dated October 3, 1867, Lawrence, opposing a
British advance, argued that the further Russia penetrated into
Central Asia, the longer her supply line would become, while the
length of the British supply line would remain the same. A British
advance into Afghanistan might be interpreted by Russia as a
challenge. Moreover Russia might actually prove a good neigh­
bor.
I am not myself at all certain that Russia might not prove a
safer ally, a better neighbour, than the Mahomedan races of
19. Correspondence; F. O. 65/1202.
20. Id.
2 1. John Allan, The Cambridge Shorter History of India (London, 19 34 ), pp.
804-05.
14 Russia and Britain in Persia

Central Asia and Kabul. She would introduce civilization, she

would abate the fanaticism and ferocity of Mahomedanism,
which still exercises so powerful an influence in India.22

W . R. Mansfield, Commander in Chief in India, shared the

Viceroy's optimism on military grounds:

the alarm testified with regard to Russia, as affecting British

interests in India, is more unreasonable than it is possible to
describe. As a military and vast political Power, we have liter­
ally nothing to fear from Russia, whether she stop at her
present limits, or spread her power even to our own borders.
A great mischief is done by those who, from whatever cause,
occupy themselves in preaching the falsehood of our weak­
ness in India.
W e are simply invincible in that country against all the
powers in the world, provided only we are true to ourselves. If
we choose to commit ourselves to a policy of aggression, we
can go and establish ourselves wherever we like.23

In London the Cabinet was reluctant to take any but diplo­

matic steps. The change from a Conservative to a Liberal govern­
ment in 1868 did not result in a change of policy. The new Secre­
tary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Clarendon, made an
attempt to reach an agreement with Russia by creating a neutral
zone between India and Russian possessions. On March 27, 1869,
Brunnow transmitted to Clarendon a letter from Gorchakov
giving assurances in regard to the neutrality of Afghanistan. Six
weeks later Russian troops entered Samarkand, and the British
ambassador in St. Petersburg once again “ tried to ascertain how
far the conquests of Russia were likely to extend." 24
Clarendon made another attempt to obtain from Gorchakov a
commitment that Russia would not absorb the independent

22. Correspondence; F. O. 65/1202.

23. Minute by Commander-in-Chief in India, suggested by Sir H. Rawlinson’s
Memorandum on the questions connected with Central Asia, December 24, 1868,
No. 1 1 , Foreign Department, Political. Confidential, No. 1, January 4, 1869; Let­
ters from India, 4, 1869. Hereafter cited as L.I.
24. Correspondence; F. O. 65/1202.
 Anglo-Russian Conflict *5
khanates of Central Asia. The two statesmen met in Heidelberg
on September 3, 1869. The conversation began with Gorchakov’s
expressing satisfaction that England and Russia had no conflicting
interests anywhere in the world. W hen Clarendon pointed out
that Central Asia was such an area, Gorchakov said that the
Emperor had no intention of advancing further south. Clarendon
replied that the events of the last five years made it impossible to
doubt that Russian armies were "impelled forward either by
direct orders from St. Petersburg, or by ambitions of Generals in
disregard of the pacific intentions of the Emperor.” Gorchakov
promptly agreed and blamed the military "who had all exceeded
their instructions in the hope of gaining distinction.” 25 Thus
Clarendon and Gorchakov jointly created the legend of insub­
ordination having been the principal cause of the conquest of
Central Asia. This notion, which had an inexplicable appeal to
British statesmen up to and including Sir Edward Grey, was
extremely useful to the Russians. W ith the passage of time it
assumed the status of a venerable tradition and was enshrined by
statesmen and historians in various articles and books.
The Clarendon-Gorchakov pourparlers neither did nor could
lead to an understanding. St. Petersburg was aware of the inde­
cision in London. If anything, Britain’s conciliatory attitude and
the acceptance of Gorchakov’s version of the causes of Russian
conquests in Central Asia encouraged further moves southward
and eastward. Negotiations, exchanges of notes, reminders con­
cerning old pledges, and expressions of dissatisfaction on the part
of the British had not the slightest effect upon Russian planning
and execution of conquests. Now that Tashkent and Khojent had
been annexed, it was Khiva’s turn to fall before the armies of the
Aq-Khan (the W hite Tsar). Beyond the deserts and the oases of
Akhal and Marv lay Khorasan and Herat. Neither Persia nor
Afghanistan could escape involvement in the Great Game.
The Persian government was much disturbed by the rapid Rus­
sian movement toward Khorasan. Already in 1868 a number of
Tekke Turkomans appeared in Tehran to warn of the Russian
threat. They told Charles Alison, the British minister, that they

25. Id.
i6 Russia and Britain in Persia

would not submit to the Russians but would like to serve Britain
in return for British protection. Alison assured the Turkomans
that Russia would not dare to go beyond the Oxus, advised them
to form a union of tribes, but said nothing about British aid.26
The Persian government could not be put off as easily as the
Tekke.
At an audience granted to Alison shortly before his scheduled
departure for England, the Shah, Naser ed-Din, said that it was
more important than ever “ that the closest intimacy should exist
between the two States now that Russia is making such advances
in Central Asia.” The sentiments of Fath Ali Shah, he went on,
continued to exist. It was Persia’s “ foremost thought . . . to be
guided and supported by England.” However, the Shah com­
plained, in his repeated attempts to ascertain clearly the policy of
Her Majesty’s Government, he met “ with some reserve on their
side.” He hoped that during his visit in England Alison would
“ explain fully his anxieties and elicit from the Queen’s Govern­
ment such a frank declaration of their views as would enable him
satisfactorily to understand his true position and the best course
to pursue.” 27
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mirza Said Khan M o’tamen
ol-Molk, echoed his master’s words. The Shah, he told Alison,
was anxious to place his relations with England “ on the same
cordial footing as they were in the time of Fath Ali Shah.” Naser
ed-Din hoped that Britain would send him military instructors
and was even prepared to pay them, though he knew that once
the English decided on a course of action, money was not a con­
sideration.28
Alison’s visit to London did not result in closer Anglo-Persian
cooperation. The Government of India had been for some time
quite sceptical about the idea of British officers serving in the
Iranian army. “ Persia,” wrote Colonel R. Taylor in a memoran­
dum prepared for the use of the government, “ appears to me to

26. Mr. Charles Alison to the Earl of Clarendon, No. 2, Tehran, January 1 1 ,
1869; F. O. 6 0/318. See also M . A. Terent’ev, 2, 6 1.
27. Alison to Clarendon, No. 49, Tehran, May 5, 1869; F. O. 60/318.
28. Alison to Clarendon, No. 50, Tehran, May 6, 1869; ibid.
 Anglo-Russian Conflict J7
be so weak . . . that she is practically under the control of
Russia, and utterly unable to resist the influence of that power.” 29
The British government itself was not disposed to send a mili­
tary mission to Iran, and perhaps provoke a violent Russian re­
action.
Ever since armed force had been used in 1857 to prevent Persia
from retaining Herat, Britain preferred to employ strictly diplo­
matic means in the Middle East. The hope of reaching a formal
agreement with Russia, guaranteeing the independence and in­
tegrity of Persia, lived in the hearts even of such “ imperialistic”
Englishmen as Sir Henry Rawlinson, who, in i860, felt that
Russia could not refuse to guarantee the integrity of Persia. T o
refuse would mean to show her hand. The French minister in
Tehran, although he knew how keenly the Shah desired inter­
national assurances of Iran’s territorial integrity, realized that
Russia had no reason to tie her hands in the Middle East by
giving such guarantees. The true guarantee of Persia, he told
Mirza Said Khan, reposed less in treaties than in the jealous
rivalry of the two great powers. Acting wisely, balancing one
against the other, Persia could preserve her independence and
integrity.30
British statesmen felt that their policy in Persia was “ very
friendly and very plain.” It consisted of supporting the indepen­
dence of Persia. To do this it was necessary constantly to remon­
strate with the Russian government at St. Petersburg, thus en­
dangering Anglo-Russian relations and, incidentally, exposing the
Shah to ever greater pressure from the north.
I agree with the Shah [Russell wrote in i860] that the use of
our good offices at St. Petersburg must be employed with
great discretion and seldom. There is nothing which the Rus­
sian Government would resent so much.
But On the other hand we could not look upon their aggres­
sions in silence, and on a sudden make them the ground of
hostilities.
29. Memorandum by Col. R . Taylor, November 23, 1868, Foreign Department,
Political, Confidential, No. 1, January 4, 1869; L. I., 4, 1869.
30. M. le Baron Pichon a M. Thouvenel, Direction politique, 1602, Teheran,
13 fevrier i860; Archive des Affaires Entrangeres, Perse, tome 31.
 i8 Russia and Britain in Persia

It is fit that Russia should perceive that her conduct is not

unobserved and that the relations of Great Britain and Persia
are of the most friendly character. Russia may draw her own
inferences. In the mean time we can make no engagements;
nor can we from selfishness or jealousy obstruct the advances
of Russian Commerce in Central Asia, so long as trade is the
main object of such advances.31

It is this kind of “ very friendly and very plain” statement that the
Shah and his ministers had difficulty understanding. How could
they comprehend the meaning of British friendship when the
only action the British minister, Mr. Charles Alison, had been
allowed to promise since his arrival in Tehran in i860 was
intercession before Russia at St. Petersburg? W hat could they
think of the value of British support when year after year the
advice they received from Alison was to take “ a cautious, accom­
modating attitude toward Russia” ? 323* W hat was the Shah to
expect from the British now that Russian troops had crushed
Kokand and Bukhara, were preparing to crush Khiva and sub­
jugate the Turkomans of Transcaspia?
On November 10, 1869, a Russian ship anchored opposite the
Turkoman village of Qizil-Su. A small force landed on the shore,
occupying the village. For several days thereafter ships brought
more troops. Persian merchants at Astarabad, having learned of
their presence up the coast, asked Russian authorities for permis­
sion to trade with them but were turned down lest the Persian
government be informed too soon of what was taking place at
Qizil-Su (Krasnovodsk) ,38
The precaution was superfluous since the Persian government
already knew of the landings and was sufficiently disturbed to
remind the Russian minister that the Persian frontier lay north of
Qizil-Su (Krasnovodsk), the point at which the troops had
landed, and that their action constituted a violation of the
sovereign rights of the Shah. The Russian minister, Aleksandr
Fedorovich Beger, denied that Iran’s frontier extended beyond

3 1. Russell to Rawlinson, No. 24, March 8, i860; F. O. 248/185.

32. Russell to Alison [Instruction], No. 3, April 24, i860; ibid.
33. Report of the Commanding Officer of the Astarabad Naval Station to the
Russian Minister in Iran, November 17/29, 1869; Prisoedinenie, No. 3, pp. 26-27.
 A nglo-Russian Conflict

the Atrak River. Moreover, Beger maintained, Persia had never

exercised authority over the Turkomans “ who professed to be,
and in reality were, an independent population.” Mirza Said
Khan retorted that temporary failure to exercise authority over a
nomadic tribe did not imply abandonment of sovereign rights.
“ Russia would not, he supposed, be prepared to admit such
arguments if applied to the Kirghize and other refractory tribes in
Central Asia.” 3435
The British minister at Tehran, Charles Alison, agreed with his
Russian colleague that Persia exercised no influence north of the
Atrak. He informed Clarendon that “ he was not aware upon what
grounds they [the Persians] could claim Kyzyle Su [Krasnov-
odsk] as part of their territory.” 85 Lacking British support, the
Persian government could not press its claims very far. Rather it
tried to obtain from A. F. Beger written assurances that Russia
would not interfere with the nomads living along the Gorgan
and Atrak rivers, would not build fortifications, and would admit
Persian sovereignty there. On December 25, 1869, Beger in­
formed Mirza Said Khan “ that the Imperial Government recog­
nizes Persian dominion up to the Atrak and therefore does not
intend to build any fortifications in that area.” 3637In St. Petersburg
the Tsar referred to the occupation of Krasnovodsk in a conversa­
tion with Sir Andrew ' Buchanan, the British ambassador. He
implied that no conquest had been made since the territory “ had
been almost without a sovereign,” and informed Buchanan that
most positive assurances had been given to Persia that her Atrak
frontier would be respected.87
The Krasnovodsk issue was closed. The Shah himself admitted
this in a Decree (Farman) to the Governor of Astarabad, stat­
ing that Russian presence at Krasnovodsk was not injurious to
Persia and that the Russians were free to build what they pleased
on the right bank of the Atrak.38

34. Mr. Thomson, November 14, 1869, Central Asia, No. 2 (18 7 3 ), Correspon­
dence; F. O. 65/ 1202.
35. Correspondence; ibid.
36. The Russian Minister in Iran to the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, De­
cember 13/25, 1869; Prisoedinenie, Document No. 6, pp. 3 1-3 2 .
37. Correspondence; F. O. 65/1202.
38. Id.
20 Russia and Britain in Persia

W hatever Russian diplomats might say about the motives that

brought the Tsar's troops to Krasnovodsk, Tehran and Calcutta
felt that Khiva would be the next victim of Russian expansion. In
St. Petersburg itself no one but high government officials pre­
tended that this was not the case. Even before Krasnovodsk had
been occupied, St. Petersburg newspapers wrote that the conquest
of Khiva was inevitable. Gorchakov “ denied positively the exis­
tence of any such intention/' but Sir Andrew Buchanan obtained
evidence from other sources that a campaign was indeed being
prepared. The Government of India, far less complacent under
Lord Mayo than it had'been under Lawrence, admitted that to
secure her commerce Russia might have to punish the Khan of
Khiva, but would not need to annex the country. However, it was
the possible effect of the conquest of Khiva on Persia that worried
the Government of India most. This was clearly expressed in a
secret dispatch (No. 28, dated May 26, 18 7 1) to the India Office:
“ It is unnecessary to point out . . . that occupation or annexa­
tion of Khiva by Russia would be a fatal blow to Persian indepen­
dence. Should such an event occur, she must either submit to the
absolute influence of Russia, or seek for protection from British or
Turkish power." 39
No one seemed certain what course of action to take. The con­
fused and contradictory advice of Lord John Russell, the self-
assured pronouncements of Sir John Lawrence, and the general
optimism of British political outlook made it difficult to admit
that the policies pursued by Britain in Persia since the conclusion
of the treaty of Paris in 1857 had been inadequate. Characteris­
tically enough, the man who dared to question and condemn
these policies was a neurotic, though capable, junior diplomat,
Edward B. Eastwick. Unlike many of his colleagues, he mastered
the language and acquired a fairly solid knowledge of the history
of Persia. Generally speaking, British diplomats who served in
Tehran fell into two distinct categories: those who liked or appre­
ciated at least some features of Persian life and culture, and those
who did not. Eastwick belonged to the first category. Even after
he left Persia as a result of a sordid clash with his superior,

39. Id.
 A nglo-Russian Conflict 21

Charles Alison, Eastwick kept up his interest in Persian affairs.

His concern led him to compose a memorandum which, in the
spring of 18 7 1, he submitted to the Foreign Secretary, Lord
Granville.
Eastwick noted that up to the conclusion of the treaty of
Torkamanchay, British influence in Persia had been paramount.
After 1828 Britain set herself “ to limit Persia to her de facto pos­
sessions, inhibiting her from advancing in the direction of A f­
ghanistan, Seistan, Mekran, and Arabia, and discouraging every
other effort on her part to acquire or regain territory/'
In 1835 Haji Mirza Aghassi, by birth a Russian subject, be­
came the Prime Minister of Muhammad Shah, and when
that Shah in November 1837 laid siege to Herat the change
of policy on the part of the two Great European Powers to­
ward Persia had reached its culminating point, and a strange
spectacle was witnessed of Russian officers and a Russian bat­
talion serving with the Persian army, and a Russian Minister,
Count Simonich, urging on the operations of that army,
while an English officer was leading the sorties against it, and
the English Minister, Mr. M acNeil, threatened the Shah
with war.40
A few months later all British officers had been dismissed from
Persian service, but relations between the two countries remained
correct until 1855. A year later they were at war, which was
terminated by the treaty of Paris signed in March 1857.
but, except during the short interval that Sir H. Rawlinson
was Minister, and the very brief period in 1862/63 when the
writer of this Memorandum was charge d'affaires there has
been no return to cordiality in our relations with Persia. At
the present moment . . . nothing but the sense of his own
inability to cope with us prevents the Shah from coming to
an open rupture with our Government . . . it is certain that
matters are in such a state that the Shah might easily be in­
duced to connive at, or, perhaps, even openly assist a Rus-

40. The Policy of Great Britain towards Persia [a memorandum by E. B. East­

wick], London, June 16, 18 7 1; F. O. 60/340.
22 Russia and Britain in Persia

sian occupation of Herat and advance towards the frontier of

Sindh.41
Anticipating the objections of those who defended this policy
on the grounds that it had prevented war with Russia, and that
Persia would make an extremely unreliable ally, Eastwick argued
that Persia could be made into a "safe outer defence of India,
impenetrable to Russia and to every other power/' The Persians,
Eastwick wrote, were far from degenerate mentally or physically.
Sickly children die early and only the hardy survive. "Hence,
notwithstanding their vices, they are a fine athletic race, with an
amount of nerve, which Europeans might envy." Eastwick urged
a change in Britain's approach to Iran. Herat could not be given
back to Persia as yet, but it could be detached from Kabul. The
Shah could be encouraged to reestablish Persian dominion over
Marv. "Above all, English officers should be sent at once to dis­
cipline the Shah's troops." 42
The paper was circulated in various departments of the govern­
ment at home and in India. Sir Henry Rawlinson, scholar,
colonial administrator, and diplomat, wrote a memorandum of
his own, expressing general agreement with Eastwick's views.
Placed on the flank of "Debatable Land" between the Caspian
and the Indus, Persia would largely determine "when a contact
may take place between Russia and British India." A strong and
friendly Persia might be able to postpone such contact indefi­
nitely, a weak Persia would make it inevitable. "It should then be
to our interest to conciliate her friendship and at the same time to
give her strength and confidence in her own resources, any ex­
pense to which we may be put on this account being regarded as a
sort of premium on the Insurance of India." 43
However, Rawlinson did not endorse all of Eastwick's pro­
posals for specific measures through which Persian friendship
might be won. He did not doubt that approval "o f her encroach­
ments" in Seistan and Mekran, encouragement to occupy Marv,

4 1. Id.
42. Id.
43. Memorandum on the policy of Great Britain towards Persia [by Eastwick],
Comments by Sir H. Rawlinson; July 4, 18 7 1; ibid.
 Anglo-Russiati Conflict
23

concessions in the Persian G ulf and the promise of Herat would

make British influence paramount at Tehran; but Rawlinson did
not believe Persia was strong enough to digest such acquisitions.
The result would be rebellion and intervention by both the
Russians and the Turks.
Rawlinson shared Eastwick’s opinion that Britain should fur­
nish officers to train the Persian army. He added a suggestion of
his own: strengthen the legation at Tehran. T o Rawlinson, who
had been long associated with the Government of India, the
latter was the proper locus of control over Britain’s Persian policy.
He therefore advocated the transfer of the Tehran legation from
the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office to that of the Government
of India.44
Eastwick’s memorandum was studied with care at Fort
W illiam , where there had developed a feeling of frustration over
the indecisive British attitude toward Russia. Unlike his prede­
cessor, Lord Mayo did not want to defend India on the Indus. To
him it was a cardinal point of Anglo-Indian policy that friendly
relations be maintained with Kelat, Afghanistan, Yar-Kand,
Nepal, and Burma, and that their freedom from domination by
another European power be preserved by supporting them with
money, arms, “ and even, in certain eventualities, with men.” 45
His sentiments were shared by many of his subordinates, one of
whom wrote:

W e either pretend not to know, or care not to know this

[the need for proper defense of India’s frontiers] ourselves,
because we are in the hands of irresolute party politicians,
who will not realize what is perfectly well known by Powers
like Russia, whose interests are opposed to our own in every
part of the world, and whose boldness is only the result of our
timidity . . . But the one Power I fear is Russia, which
seems fated to be the disturber of peace through Eastern
Europe and the Eastern world.46

4 4 - Id -
45. Cited in O. T. Burne, Memories (London, 19 07), p. 107.
46. Ibid., pp. 1 18 - 19 .
24 Russia and Britain in Persia

However, the determination to defend the approaches to India

did not extend to the defense of Persia. The Government of India
was just as determined not to provoke Russia, not to seek a con­
frontation in the Middle East, as was the Cabinet in London.
Commenting on Eastwick's memorandum, and Rawlinson's
thoughts on it, the Government of India stated that it attached
the greatest importance to the maintenance of Persia's indepen­
dence, but refused to encourage the Shah to collide with Russia.
W e cannot too strongly express our concurrence with Sir
Henry Rawlinson upon this point and declare our opinion
that it should be almost a crime upon our part, for the mere
purpose of obtaining a temporary ascendency in Persian poli­
tics, to urge her to so perilous a course as any attempt to ex­
tend her dominions either in a north-easterly direction, or by
encroachments upon Afghanistan or its feudatory tribes.47
On the issue of British officers for the Persian army, the Gov­
ernment of India differed from both Eastwick and Rawlinson. It
felt that British officers should not serve Asiatic countries:
The ways of Oriental Governments are not our ways, and in
peace as well as in war, Officers placed in such a position must
be cognisant of deeds, and participators to some extent in
actions which no man of honour can approve. If British Offi­
cers cannot be in supreme command they should not enter
on such service.48

This bit of Victorian cant was followed by the real reason for not
wanting to interfere with the Persian army.
In our present relations with Russia, we should view with
great suspicion the admission of a number of the Officers of
the Russian army to the command of Persian troops. A simi­
lar proceeding on our part would probably call forth a strong
remonstrance from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.49

47. The Government of India to the Duke of Argyll, Secretary of State for India,
No. 4 of 1872, Secret, Fort William, January 19, 1872; L.I., 1 1 , 1872.
48. Id.
49. Id.
 Anglo-Russian Conflict 25

It is noteworthy that neither Rawlinson nor the Government of

India in their comments on the Eastwick memorandum made any
serious suggestions for dealing with the Russian menace in Cen­
tral Asia and maintaining Britain's position in Persia. The insis­
tence of both papers upon the need for "an able and energetic
Anglo-Indian statesman" to take the post of minister in Tehran,
gaining the confidence of the Shah and restoring the balance of
influence in the Persian government, was only an expression of an
unfounded faith in a panacea which, like all panaceas, did not
exist. The discussions and correspondence about Persia bore no
fruit.
As far as the Russian government was concerned, the next im­
portant task was the conquest of Khiva. The occupation of
Krasnovodsk had been carried out in preparation for a Khivan
campaign, as had been the careful surveying of the deserts that
protected the khanate better than its ragtag army. Once again
Miliutin, assisted by Kaufmann, was the chief advocate of con­
quest. Gorchakov was to play his by now familiar role of laying a
smoke screen of assurances and promises. The final decision to
annex Khiva was made at a meeting "under the presidency of the
Emperor," late in 1872. It was then that Alexander II uttered his
famous sentence to Kaufmann: "Konstantin Petrovich, take
Khiva for me." 50 At the beginning of January 18, 1873, Adjutant
General Count Petr Andreevich Shuvalov, Chief of the Gen­
darmes and of the Third Section of His Majesty's Chancery (the
secret police), was sent to London, where he told Lord Granville
that the Emperor not only had no intention of conquering Khiva
but had given special orders that this should not happen. Gran­
ville wrote the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, Lord Augus­
tus Loftus: "Count Schouvaloff repeated the surprise which the
Emperor, entertaining such sentiments, felt at the uneasiness
which it was said existed in England on the subject, and he gave
me most decided assurance that I might give positive assurances
to Parliament on this m atter."51 Indeed Granville failed to
understand Russia's actions. In a letter to the Duke of Argyll he
stated: "I like to see my way when dealing with such sharp practi-
50. N. N. Knorring, General Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev (Paris, 19 39), P- 26.
51. Granville to Loftus. January 8, 1873, Correspondence; F. O. 65/1202.
i6 Russia and Britain in Persia

tioners as our friends at St. Petersburg. I can conceive the Rus­

sians pining for Constantinople; but why they should push on the
extreme East, I cannot understand.” 52
In a tone of contempt which the Russian military habitually
assumed when speaking or writing of civilians, General M. A.
Terent'ev tells of Gorchakov's promise to the English not to
annex Khiva:
Negotiations were conducted by Shuvalov. Our diplomats
apparently trusted in our fighting generals who will always
be able to prove that military circumstances prevent the exact
fulfilment of that which was promised. W hen the English
finally settled down to celebrate their would-be victory, our
troops were already on their way to Khiva.53
By the spring of 1873, General von Kaufmann had concen­
trated under his command an army of thirteen thousand men
with sixty-two guns. Among the officers who waited impatiently
for the excitement of an expedition against the "savages” were
such illustrious personages as the Grand Duke Nikolai Kon­
stantinovich and the Duke Eugene of Leuchtenberg, who had
traveled to Central Asia for the purpose of enjoying the cam­
paign.54 Khiva fell in May. Count Petr Shuvalov, who had to
explain it all to the British, invented far-fetched alibis and put the
blame on that old black sheep of Russian diplomacy— insubordi­
nate generals.55 This time it was Kaufmann who was the culprit
in London.
The conquest of Khiva was such a clear case of violation on the
part of Russia of all her recent pledges that even the moderately
Russophile and immoderately optimistic Lord Augustus Loftus,

52. Granville to Argyll, January 6, December 2 [sic], 1872; cited in E. Fitz-

maurice, The Life of Granville George Leveson Gower, Second Earl of Granville,
K. G., 18 15 - 18 9 1 (London, 19 0 5), 2 ,4 10 .
53. Terent'ev, Istoriia zavoevaniia Srednei Azii, 2, 83.
54. Various aspects of the conquest of Khiva are described in Terent'ev, 2.
See also Eugene Schuyler, Turkistan (New York, 18 7 7 ), 2> 334; A. Lobanov*
Rostovsky, Russia and Asia (Ann Arbor, 19 5 1) , p. 158; R. A. Pierce, Russian
Central Asia, p. 31.
53. Augustus Loftus, The Diplomatic Reminiscences of Lord Augustus Loftus,
18 6 2 -1879, 2n<^ Series (London, 1894), 2, 105.
 Anglo-Russian Conflict 27

British ambassador at St. Petersburg, felt compelled to sound the

alarm. He warned his government that Russia had now acquired a
foothold in the Turkoman steppes from which she could
menace the independence of Persia and Afghanistan and
thereby become a standing danger to our Indian Empire . . .
if events are allowed to pass unobserved and without com­
ment, if no preventive measures are adopted, or precautionary
warnings given, England may, at a later period, reproach her­
self with having tacitly witnessed the encroachment of Rus­
sia to the detriment of her own prestige and power.56
In Tehran the British repeatedly pointed out to the Persian gov­
ernment that the Russians would soon begin operations against
the Turkomans of the Atrak and further east in the direction of
Sarakhs and Marv.57 Only Granville stubbornly clung to the
opinion that the Tsar had been "perfectly sincere" when he sent
assurances through Shuvalov that Khiva would not be annexed. It
was out of weakness that Alexander had bowed to the demands of
the military. Replying to a letter of the Duke of Cambridge, who
called for some kind of action, Granville admitted that Britain
had the right to resent Russia's breach of promise; "but your
Royal Highness does not suggest how we are to resent it. Is it to
be by biting or merely by barking?" Indulging in wishful thinking,
Granville continued:
In the meantime the Russians are opening a sore in their
own body; they have excited the bitterest hatred in the in­
habitants of Central Asia; they are embarrassing their fi­
nances; and if it is to come to a struggle, the nearer that
struggle takes place to Afghanistan, the stronger we are, and
the weaker they must be.58
As if to increase British fears, General N. P. Lomakin, the new
military commander in Transcaspia, addressed a letter to the
khans of several Turkoman tribes, announcing his appointment

56. Lord A. Loftus. No. 304. August 28, 1874, Correspondence; F. O. 65/1202.
57. Correspondence; ibid.
58. Granville to the Duke of Cambridge, December 20, 1873, cited in Fitz-
maurice, 2, 4 1 0 - 1 1 .
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