(Ebook) Imperialism Past and Present by Emanuele

Saccarelli, Latha Varadarajan ISBN 9780199397891,

0199397899 Pdf Download

https://ebooknice.com/product/imperialism-past-and-present-5462420

★★★★★
4.7 out of 5.0 (31 reviews )

DOWNLOAD PDF

ebooknice.com
 (Ebook) Imperialism Past and Present by Emanuele Saccarelli,
Latha Varadarajan ISBN 9780199397891, 0199397899 Pdf
Download

EBOOK

Available Formats

■ PDF eBook Study Guide Ebook

EXCLUSIVE 2025 EDUCATIONAL COLLECTION - LIMITED TIME

INSTANT DOWNLOAD VIEW LIBRARY

 We believe these products will be a great fit for you. Click
the link to download now, or visit ebooknice.com
to discover even more!

(Ebook) Biota Grow 2C gather 2C cook by Loucas, Jason; Viles,

James ISBN 9781459699816, 9781743365571, 9781925268492,
1459699815, 1743365578, 1925268497

https://ebooknice.com/product/biota-grow-2c-gather-2c-cook-6661374

(Ebook) SAT II Success MATH 1C and 2C 2002 (Peterson's SAT II

Success) by Peterson's ISBN 9780768906677, 0768906679

https://ebooknice.com/product/sat-ii-success-math-1c-and-2c-2002-peterson-
s-sat-ii-success-1722018

(Ebook) Matematik 5000+ Kurs 2c Lärobok by Lena Alfredsson, Hans

Heikne, Sanna Bodemyr ISBN 9789127456600, 9127456609

https://ebooknice.com/product/matematik-5000-kurs-2c-larobok-23848312

(Ebook) Master SAT II Math 1c and 2c 4th ed (Arco Master the SAT
Subject Test: Math Levels 1 & 2) by Arco ISBN 9780768923049,
0768923042

https://ebooknice.com/product/master-sat-ii-math-1c-and-2c-4th-ed-arco-
master-the-sat-subject-test-math-levels-1-2-2326094
(Ebook) Gramsci and Trotsky in the Shadow of Stalinism: The
Political Theory and Practice of Opposition by Emanuele
Saccarelli ISBN 9780203929735, 9780415961097, 0415961092,
020392973X
https://ebooknice.com/product/gramsci-and-trotsky-in-the-shadow-of-
stalinism-the-political-theory-and-practice-of-opposition-1642600

(Ebook) Cambridge IGCSE and O Level History Workbook 2C - Depth

Study: the United States, 1919-41 2nd Edition by Benjamin
Harrison ISBN 9781398375147, 9781398375048, 1398375144,
1398375047
https://ebooknice.com/product/cambridge-igcse-and-o-level-history-
workbook-2c-depth-study-the-united-states-1919-41-2nd-edition-53538044

(Ebook) Himalayan Languages: Past and Present by Anju Saxena

ISBN 9783110178418, 3110178419

https://ebooknice.com/product/himalayan-languages-past-and-present-5558246

(Ebook) Science and Nature. Past, Present, and Future by Carolyn

Merchant ISBN 9781138084056, 1138084050

https://ebooknice.com/product/science-and-nature-past-present-and-
future-51388612

(Ebook) Russia as Empire: Past and Present by Kees Boterbloem

ISBN 9781789142914, 1789142911

https://ebooknice.com/product/russia-as-empire-past-and-present-15478490
IMPERIALISM PAST
AND PRESENT
IMPERIALISM PAST
AND PRESENT

emanuele saccarelli
and
l at h a va r a da r a ja n

1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark
of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America

© Oxford University Press 2015

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission
in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license,
or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries
concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights
Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Saccarelli, Emanuele, 1971–
Imperialism past and present / Emanuele Saccarelli and Latha Varadarajan.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978–0–19–939789–1 (hardback : acid-free paper) 1. Imperialism—History.
2. Imperialism—Philosophy. I. Varadarajan, Latha. II. Title.
JC359.S25 2015
325'.32—dc23
2015006793

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

In lieu of Francesco
Contents

chapter 1
Heart of Darkness Revisited 1
chapter 2
Understanding Imperialism 15
chapter 3
The World, Divided (1885–1939) 80
chapter 4
The World, United? (1939–1991) 119
chapter 5
A Preemptive History of World War III (1991–?) 165
chapter 6
Imperialism Past, Present, and Future 218

Acknowledgments 225
Notes 227
Further Reading 237
Index 241
IMPERIALISM PAST
AND PRESENT
CHAPTER 1

Heart of Darkness Revisited

“Fine fellows – cannibals – in their place. They were men one

could work with . . .”
Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness1

In 2010, a disturbing report made its unwelcome entry into an

already tumultuous news cycle. Members of a U.S. Army bri-
gade, assembled in a self-proclaimed “kill team,” had indiscrimi-
nately targeted civilians in southern Afghanistan. As trophies for
their deeds, the soldiers collected fingers, leg bones, and skulls
from their victims. Photos taken by the soldiers posing next to
dead bodies came to light, along with the fact that the main in-
stigator kept tally of each victim by having skulls tattooed on
his calf. Three years later, a particularly gruesome video was
made available on YouTube, to the dismay of its international
audience. The footage, which has since been seen by over a mil-
lion people, shows a man desecrating the corpse of a uniformed
Syrian Army soldier. The perpetrator, also dressed in military
2       I M P E R I A L I S M PA S T A N D P R E S E N T

fatigues, completes his work by pulling out the soldier’s heart.

Then, shockingly, he sinks his teeth in it.2
Such news reports, though a recurring feature of contempo-
rary life, trace a predictable arc in and out of public conscious-
ness. The initial horror evoked by their gory details quickly
subsides in the face of official reassurances and the unrelent-
ing tide of news of the more soothing or stultifying kind. In-
sofar as they involve armed forces of democratic and civilized
powers, or reliable, if publicly embarrassing, allies, officials and
commentators are quick to dismiss these events as aberrations.
Should the public seek to draw lasting political conclusions from
such horrors, it will be predictably reminded that there is only
one: the atavistic darkness lurking in the hearts of man since the
emergence of the species. In covering the act of cannibalism in
Syria, for example, the BBC was prepared to admit that “It is a
reminder of the horror and bestiality of warfare,” only to then
ask, rhetorically, and as a way to put the matter to rest: “But does
it tell us anything more than that?”3 And so it goes, from one
aberration to another, from one lesson intended to teach nothing
in the end to another, with remarkable continuity.
Even a cursory reflection on the available facts, however,
shows that these atrocities were not aberrations committed in a
political vacuum. Khalid al-Hamad, the cannibal in Syria, was
not an amateur when it came to horrific acts. His response to his
newfound international celebrity was an offer to share with the
audience other videos, including one in which he cut another
victim to pieces with a saw. Rather than just a deranged sadist,
however, al-Hamad turned out to be a significant military and
political figure. As the head of the Farouq Brigade, he directed
the work of one of the largest and most powerful militias consti-
tuting the Free Syrian Army in its bloody civil war against the
Assad government.
There is, moreover, nothing “civil” about the Syrian conflict,
and not just for the obvious reasons illustrated in al-Hamad’s video.
The Farouq Brigade, regarded as one of the moderate Islamist
 H E A R T O F DA R K N E S S R E V I S I T E D       3

sections of the Free Syrian Army, receives the support of Turkey

and the conservative sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, while
Assad’s forces have the backing of the Lebanon-based Hezbollah
and the Iranian government. In turn, lurking behind the re-
gional powers involved in the conflict stand broader geopolitical
forces as well. Western democracies have thrown their support
behind the Syrian rebels, while Russia, which under the Assad
government has access to its only naval base in the Mediterra-
nean, opposes its ousting.
Similarly, the atrocities reported in Afghanistan are far less
shocking once seen in their proper context. The war started in
October 2001 with “Operation Enduring Freedom.” Since then,
freedom has proved elusive, as the occupation continues to prop
up a government that is widely regarded as unspeakably corrupt,
along with a number of lesser warlords and satraps. But the war
has certainly been enduring, having gained the dubious distinc-
tion of becoming the longest war in American history. While
it is difficult to estimate the amount of casualties involved, few
doubt that Afghanistan has been the site of unrelenting and
hardly surgical violence, carried out by various means. Drone
strikes, questionably presented as a sanitized alternative to tradi-
tional warfare, have in any case found their complement in the
unrestrained savagery of the bone-collecting kill team. In the
context of such a brutal and prolonged conflict, the latter can in
no sense be regarded as an isolated incident.
Significantly, the gruesome details of this story came to light
as a result of an investigation that was triggered by the com-
plaints not of Afghan civilians, but of a fellow American soldier
who was subjected to threats and abuse. Brutalities of this sort,
moreover, are standard fare in modern history. Calvin Gibbs, the
main instigator of the kill team in Afghanistan, bragged about
having done the same things during the occupation of Iraq. But
collecting the remains of the enemy was also widely practiced
by American soldiers during the Vietnam War. And when Gibbs
referred to the victims of his grisly deeds as “dirty savages,” he
4       I M P E R I A L I S M PA S T A N D P R E S E N T

was, consciously or not, tapping into a well-entrenched history

of conquest and occupation.4
A more sensible accounting of the atrocities in Afghanistan
and Syria, then, cannot take place without addressing their trou-
bling continuities with a longer history. The recent events in Syria
have a series of important precedents, from the early twentieth-
century British protectorates in the Middle East, to the more
recent overthrow and brutal killing of Muammar Qaddafi by
some of the same elements now active against Assad, aided and
abetted by the same foreign powers. While the ongoing quag-
mire in Afghanistan has its own distinctive and brutal history,
it should not be difficult to recognize it as a new chapter of the
classic “great game” pitting rival powers against each other in
the region since the nineteenth century.
In the prevailing ideological climate, however, a sober and
lasting recognition of the continuities between the past and the
present is a difficult achievement. The BBC does what it can to
promote historical amnesia, since that is the most convenient
form of political amnesty as well, while cruder media outfits
readily blame distant and unaccountable savages for atrocities
old and new. Through these efforts, the fact that governments of
ostensibly civilized Western nations have played and continue to
play a commanding role in such events is conveniently forgotten.
Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, cited at the beginning of this
introduction and too often dismissed as merely the expression of
European racism, is a powerful reminder of how the encounter
between civilization and barbarism revealed as much about the
former as it did about the latter. In twenty-first-century Syria
and southern Afghanistan, as in Conrad’s depiction of the colo-
nial Congo, from the standpoint of certain “civilized” interests
cannibals are regarded not only as ferocious, but useful as well.
The horrors of the past, then, live in the horrors of pres-
ent, and a responsible engagement with the latter requires an
understanding of the former. But if a sense of historical conti-
nuity is indispensable in dealing with contemporary problems,
 H E A R T O F DA R K N E S S R E V I S I T E D       5

down to their most grotesque manifestations, it would also be

incorrect to paint such continuities with too broad a brush. To
be sure, war and violence have been with us for a long time.
But the political and economic parameters through which they
are systematically produced and reproduced today are part of
a definite historical epoch of which the present is regrettably
still part.
Conrad’s book is useful on this score as well. Although the
novel is often interpreted (or reinterpreted, as in the case of the
film Apocalypse Now) as an exposure of the futile pretense on
the part of civilization to purge the atavistic evils of the species,
it is difficult to think of a work that expresses more directly
and precisely the characteristics of the historical period in which
it was produced. Heart of Darkness was originally published in
1899, at the apex of the colonial conquest of the world, and in
particular at the heyday of the British empire. Its author, a natu-
ralized British subject with fifteen years of experience in the
empire’s merchant fleet, was intimately familiar with this new
global reality. Heart of Darkness, then, arguably tells us less about
the nature of the human species than it does about the nature of
a specific historical epoch: that of imperialism.
No doubt much has changed since 1899, and many of these
changes could have been reasonably expected to reduce the bar-
barous character of international politics. The colonial empires
have come to an end, all the regions of the world have been
thoroughly integrated into a global economy, and a veritable
cornucopia of institutions and organizations is now dedicated
to upholding a dazzling array of human rights. Yet, while some
things have changed, certain fundamental parameters remain in
place, and the unpleasant past described by Conrad continues to
haunt the present. The instance of cannibalism in Syria or the
barbaric collection of human bones in Afghanistan, then, should
not be seen as the inevitable expression of an atavistic “heart of
darkness,” or as aberrations to be temporarily lamented, then
forgotten. They are, rather, particularly appalling manifestations
6       I M P E R I A L I S M PA S T A N D P R E S E N T

of the more historically specific, more historically entrenched

rot that is the subject of this book.

The Problem with Imperialism

In the pages that follow we will examine the origins, develop-
ment, and contemporary manifestations of imperialism. In doing
so we will also attempt to demonstrate that a serious engagement
with imperialism as an enduring historical reality is a necessary
and urgent task. But imperialism is not the kind of subject that
can be mentioned, let alone examined at length, innocently. To
invoke this term is also to invoke a complex and largely undi-
gested history, a series of instinctive political judgments, along
with a host of theoretical confusions.
After a long hiatus, when it was seemingly banished to the
wilderness of esoteric academic debate, imperialism is back as
one of the buzzwords of the day. In the past decade in particular,
scholars, policymakers, and political pundits have been using the
term with increasing frequency in their commentary on inter-
national relations. Many have invoked it as an old specter only
to nervously deny its contemporary applicability. A smaller but
highly significant minority has embraced it as a positive good—
the only way out of the morass of contemporary politics. Not
surprisingly, the sudden popularity of the term has created great
confusion about what it means and why we should care about
it. Regardless of whether it is used as an invective or an ideal,
imperialism has turned into an all-encompassing buzzword that,
as it has been remarked, many use, though few can say what it
really means.
Part of the difficulty is that the term “imperialism” is em-
ployed to refer to the most diverse range of economic, political,
cultural, and linguistic phenomena, with the widest range of
historical applicability. From the Persian empire of antiquity to
contemporary American military operations in the Middle East,
from China’s ongoing economic penetration of Africa to the old
 H E A R T O F DA R K N E S S R E V I S I T E D       7

Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, passing through any real

or perceived form of “hierarchy” and “privilege,” everything is
seemingly pertinent to the subject. But this use of imperialism
as shorthand for any form of imposition through history actu-
ally deprives it of its analytical and political purchase. Used in
this loose sense, “imperialism” can easily be brushed off as an
unavoidable, if regrettable, secretion of human nature, of man’s
will to power. To understand why imperialism is best employed
in reference to a distinct historical period and its problems, it is
useful to briefly examine the emergence and evolution of the
term itself.
Let us start with “empire,” a word that is most commonly
used interchangeably with imperialism. This term derives from
the Latin “imperium” and was used by the ancient Romans to
denote the ability to command or to rule at home—specifically
to make laws and to wage wars. The use of the term expanded
alongside the expansion of Rome itself, referring to the rule of
conquered territories well beyond the original homeland of the
rulers. The language of empire was then picked up by the early
modern European kingdoms in the process of their own expan-
sion, and made its way into common usage.
While “empire” has long historical roots, the term “imperi­
alism” is a relatively recent innovation. “Imperialism” made its
entrance onto the world stage well into the second half of the
nineteenth century. In this case also what began as a matter of
domestic policy became projected onto the international arena
on the heels of momentous developments. Initially used to de-
scribe the policies of the French emperor Napoleon III in the
1860s, imperialism gradually came to be associated with the
new surge of colonial acquisitions by European states. By the
1890s, both supporters and opponents of colonial expansion
routinely employed the term “imperialism” in their debates over
the direction of their societies and, indeed, the world. The term
referred to the frenzied struggle that had broken out for a share
of the rapidly shrinking pool of territories available for colonial
8       I M P E R I A L I S M PA S T A N D P R E S E N T

control. The division of what was left of the world but also the
increasingly insistent demands for a more “equitable” redivision
in accordance with a changing relation of forces at this stage
took place largely, though not entirely, in the field of diplo-
macy. This struggle involved the British hegemon and its his-
toric rival, France, but also industrialized upstarts (the Germans,
Japanese, and Americans), fading old players (the Spanish and
Portuguese), and, somewhat incongruously, even the Belgians
and the Italians.
However, as the most astute observers of the day insisted, in
spite of certain superficial similarities these were not like the
vulgar empires of the past, at least in an economic sense. What
had already been an implicit, if often undetected, connection
between the domestic and international order came to be the
subject of conscious scrutiny. For the first time, intellectuals of
different political persuasions began to put into focus how the
staggering economic developments in the advanced countries
made the drive to acquire reliable sources of raw materials and
secure markets a necessity. The economic logic behind the new
era of imperialism, however, was not merely a desiccated matter
of efficiency.
During this heyday, men like Cecil Rhodes proudly wore
the mantle of “imperialists,” not just on account of the immense
wealth that was being accumulated in the enterprise, but also be-
cause imperialism promised a solution to the problem of main-
taining social order at home. As Rhodes argued, the only way to
deal with a burgeoning working class in England was to ensure
high rates of profits that would trickle down to them, as well as
to acquire new territories where they could migrate. Moreover,
the benefits of imperialism would extend not just to the great
unwashed at home, but more broadly still, as it would bring
civilization into the farthest and darkest corners of the world.
However, this happy picture of what imperialism meant was
never quite as stable as its supporters presented it. While early
liberal opponents like the scholar J. A. Hobson began to expose
 H E A R T O F DA R K N E S S R E V I S I T E D       9

the problems with the imperialist enterprise, it was the rise of

the international socialist movement that set the stage for a de-
cisive turn in the way imperialism was understood and used in
the broader political discourse. As the great powers of the day
hurtled into what would come to be known as the First World
War, the Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin wrote a short, ex-
plosive pamphlet that laid out the origins, the trajectory, and
the essentially undemocratic, exploitative nature of imperialism.
Here the link between the domestic and the international, the
economic and the political already diagnosed by Hobson, was
revealed in an even more forceful manner.
The propulsive economic development associated with capi-
talism was giving rise not just to the well-documented inequities
in the advanced countries, but also, and systematically, to con-
quest, subjugation, and war on an international scale. The ongo-
ing predatory integration of all corners of the world was then not
an atavistic evil, but a distinctly modern phenomenon bound up
with the other remarkable transformations of the age. Moreover,
it was not at bottom a misguided set of policies with lamentable
human consequences, but a full-fledged economic and political
system on a global scale that had to be confronted as such.
There were at least two good reasons why Lenin’s argument
proved to be persuasive. One, in spite of the efforts to present
the enterprise as civilizing and mutually beneficial, the reality of
life for the vast majority of the colonized populations remained a
scathing and irrefutable indictment of imperialism. Two, despite
their rhetorical commitment to the “right to self-determination,”
the victors of the “war to end all wars” not only divided up the
remains of the Ottoman empire among themselves, but also jus-
tified their continued right to colonial rule through the mandate
system of the new League of Nations. In other words, they main-
tained the old imperialist reality through new forms, setting the
stage for future conflicts.
In this context, the fact that the Bolsheviks not only re-
nounced the territorial acquisitions of Tsarist Russia but also
10       I M P E R I A L I S M PA S T A N D P R E S E N T

publicly disavowed the Tsar’s secret treaties with the other

powers only strengthened their anti-imperialist credentials. Even
in the throes of a struggle for its own survival, the new Soviet
government sought to rally anti-imperialist elements from both
colonial as well as colonized countries. In 1920, the Soviet gov-
ernment organized the Congress of the Peoples of the East in
Baku. The meeting, attended by over 1,800 delegates from Asia
and Europe, linked the fate of the Soviet Union to the defeat of
imperialism. Later on, even as the political climate in the Soviet
Union had changed considerably, leaders from Asia and Africa
sought and received the support of the Communist International
to create the “League Against Imperialism” in 1927. The first
meeting of the League in Brussels brought together 200 del-
egates from 37 states and colonized regions, representing 134
organizations. Given the fact that they were actively involved
in nationalist struggles in their countries, most of them faced
imprisonment by the colonial authorities immediately after re-
turning from the conference. The League never met again, and
considering the political trajectory of many of the individuals
involved, hardly provided a lasting solution to the problem it
sought to address. But it was another sign that the veil of euphe-
misms and lies that once shrouded the term “imperialism” was
coming apart at the seams.
Over the course of the next two decades, as nationalist move-
ments around the world became more and more prominent, and
as the great powers hurtled toward another catastrophic global
conflict, the claim that imperialism was in any way beneficial to
the colonized became impossible to sustain. The decolonization
of the Third World, beginning after World War II, seemed to
confirm this prognosis. Yet this process, which in some instances
took the form of an orderly transfer of power between govern-
ments, posed new questions from the standpoint of the con-
tinuing relevance of imperialism. On the one hand, the fall of
the empires and the formal political independence of the former
colonies appeared to be a significant achievement. On the other
 H E A R T O F DA R K N E S S R E V I S I T E D       11

hand, exploitation, subjugation, and inequality, to say nothing

of conflict and war, could hardly be said to have come to an
end in the international arena. In this context, the use of the
term “imperialism,” which had found an obvious and direct ap-
plication in the policies that had characterized the relationship
between the colonizers and the colonized, began to subside and
give way to a different kind of vocabulary.
The criticism of lingering forms of hierarchy and inequality
began to be expressed more in the cultural vein, particularly
under the influence of new moods and theories. The employ-
ment and criticism of “imperialism,” for example, gave way to
terms such as “orientalism,” which framed the question of the
historical encounter between the West and the rest of the world
in terms best understood through the prism of cultural studies,
rather than politics and economics. “Imperialism” had after all
come to be associated with Marxist politics and, by extension,
with the Soviet Union, particularly in the Western academy.
By the 1970s, though political restlessness and discomfort with
capitalism at home and abroad had far from disappeared, a wide
layer of “leftist” and formerly “leftist” intellectuals no longer
took seriously the notion that a new kind of society was being
built behind the Iron Curtain. Many were keen to point out that
if the term “imperialism” remained useful, it should be applied
first and foremost to the relation between the Soviet Union and
its satellites. “Imperialism,” as a concept and as a shorthand for a
certain way to understand the world, was a casualty of this intel-
lectual and political process.
The decline in the usage of the term became precipitous in
the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The end of the
Cold War and the declaration of a “new world order” set the
stage for claims about the possibilities, if not yet the actuality, of
an epoch that would no longer be governed by the ever-present
competition and conflict among great powers. In lieu of the
old paradigms, humanitarianism would finally be allowed to
bloom. The developments of the 1990s—the First Gulf War, the
12       I M P E R I A L I S M PA S T A N D P R E S E N T

establishment of the international tribunals for the former Yugo-

slavia and Rwanda, the interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo,
the signing of the Rome Statute leading to the institution of the
International Criminal Court—were hailed by policymakers and
mainstream commentators alike as steps fulfilling the great ex-
pectations of this era. By the turn of the century, it appeared as
though imperialism (both the term and the phenomenon) was
truly a historical relic, invoked only by diehards who refused to
see that a new world had emerged from the ashes of the old.
Within only a couple of years, however, the situation began to
change dramatically. Imperialism was suddenly back in fashion,
and in a way that it had not been for well over half a century. In
what appeared to be a carefully timed blitzkrieg of publications,
a group of scholars and policymakers on both sides of the At-
lantic began making the claim that imperialism had been given
a bad rap by leftists, left-leaning nationalists, and ivory tower
academics who were unwilling to recognize the hard realities of
the past century. Ensconced in well-funded think tanks, high-
level government positions, and Ivy League academic institu-
tions, the individuals making up this group—including Niall
Ferguson, Robert Cooper, Stanley Kurtz, Max Boot, Deepak
Lal, and Sebastian Mallaby—were quite different in terms of the
levels of sophistication they brought to their argument, political
influence, and telegenic personality. What united them was the
claim that the imperialism practiced by liberal states (Britain
in the past, and the United States in the present) was not just
beneficial but actually necessary to maintain peace and stability
in the world. This, they argued, was particularly true given the
large number of failed and failing states that constituted the for-
merly colonized regions of the world. Not coincidentally, this
area included Afghanistan and Iraq, the two countries invaded
by the United States in the aftermath of the attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001.
The prominance of the neo-imperialists has waned in the de­
cade since the inaugural salvos of operations “Enduring Freedom”
 H E A R T O F DA R K N E S S R E V I S I T E D       13

and “Iraqi Freedom.” Their fate to some extent is a measure of

the popular response to the character, duration, and costs of the
wars. But their arguments about the relevance of imperialism
continue to resonate, though perhaps not in the way they in-
tended. It is indeed true that much has changed since the heady
days when President George W. Bush spoke under the “Mission
Accomplished” banner on the USS Lincoln in 2003. Mainstream
policymakers and political pundits no longer like to be openly
associated with the rhetoric of imperialism. Once invoked, how-
ever, the specter of imperialism is not so easy to banish, and it
now haunts the discussions surrounding the fallout from NATO’s
war in Libya, the machinations in the Ukraine, and the demands
for another intervention in Syria.
Was NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011 a manifestation
of imperialism, even though it was actually sanctioned by the
resolutions of the UN Security Council? How are the brutali-
ties and conflicts taking place in countries such as Afghani-
stan and Syria related to the history of imperialism in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? Does the seemingly
universal concern for “humanitarianism” and human rights
rule out the applicability of imperialism to contemporary
politics? To answer these questions, it is of course necessary
to understand what exactly imperialism is, and that is a task
we will turn to in the next chapter. The point of the discus-
sion in this section is a simple one. The history of the term
“imperialism”—its emergence, its usage—follows the history
of the actual phenomenon itself. Put differently, while em-
pires and violent struggles over territory and resources might
have existed since the earliest stages of human civilization,
imperialism has a more specific application—it emerged in
the latter half of the nineteenth century and persists to this
day through various ebbs and flows. How we can understand
this phenomenon, what led to it, and the ways in which it has
evolved are issues that will form the subject of the remaining
chapters of this book.
14       I M P E R I A L I S M PA S T A N D P R E S E N T

In the next chapter we will take on the question of how to

best understand imperialism as a theoretical concept, engag-
ing with a series of influential arguments that have been made
in different periods in regards to it. We will then begin our
examination of the long, actual (rather than conceptual) his-
tory of imperialism. Chapter 3 focuses on the period from the
late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century—the classical age
of imperialism manifested in the form of the colonial empires.
Chapter 4 explains the enduring relevance of imperialism in the
aftermath of decolonization by focusing on the politics of the
Cold War era. Chapter 5 reviews the tumultuous period after
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, down to the present.
We conclude by reaffirming the central claim of the book that
understanding the nature and trajectory of imperialism is crucial
not just as an intellectual endeavor but in finding a solution to
the tragic impasse that characterizes global politics today.
CHAPTER 2

Understanding Imperialism

“And we men, the creatures who inhabit this earth, must be to

them at least as alien and lowly as are the monkeys and lemurs
to us. The intellectual side of man already admits that life is an
incessant struggle for existence, and it would seem that this too
is the belief of the minds upon Mars. . . . And before we judge of
them too harshly we must remember what ruthless and utter de-
struction our own species has wrought, not only upon animals,
such as the vanished bison and the dodo, but upon its inferior
races. . . . Are we such apostles of mercy as to complain if the
Martians warred in the same spirit?”
H. G. Wells, The War of the Worlds1

“The world is nearly all parcelled out, and what there is left of it
is being divided up, conquered and colonised. To think of these
stars that you see overhead at night, these vast worlds which we
can never reach. I would annex the planets if I could; I often
think of that. It makes me sad to see them so clear and yet so far.”
Cecil Rhodes2

H. G. Wells’ The War of the Worlds, first published in 1897, was an

instant success. The science fiction novel describes the invasion
16       I M P E R I A L I S M PA S T A N D P R E S E N T

of the Earth by an alien species, combining a series of fantastic

events with a calculated matter-of-fact narration. This unusual
story elicited a powerful emotional response, later to be repeated
and amplified in Orson Welles’ infamous panic-inducing radio
broadcast. It confronted the reader with the terrifying portrayal
of an alien race that has both an overwhelming technological
and military superiority and a ruthless disregard for the lives of
the native population, using “heat rays” and “black smoke” to
annihilate helpless army units and terrified civilians alike.
Wells’ story certainly taps into a series of atavistic themes such
as violence, conquest, and domination. Moreover, as a work of
science fiction, The War of the Worlds remains suspended out of
historical time, looming somewhere between a fictional present
and an unthinkable future. But as in the case of Conrad’s Heart
of Darkness, Wells’ novel resonated with the reading public even
more decisively because it was able to capture the anxieties and
conditions specific to its epoch: the rise and consolidation of
modern imperialism. And in fact, again similarly to Conrad’s,
the effect of the novel was not to reinforce prevailing stereotypes
but to jolt the readers into a sense of acute discomfort with this
reality.
The War of the Worlds drew its power not just from a general
fin-de-siècle sense of dread, but by re-elaborating, in the literary
form characteristic of science fiction, elements that were likely
to be very familiar to its readers. The conquest of the world was
actually being carried out to great fanfare by the civilized na-
tions in this period. The ruthless expansionism exhibited in that
process, far from alien and unthinkable, was the stuff of everyday
headlines. The fact that England in particular was the landing
site for the invading force was a clever and effective reversal of
the well-established notions of invincibility and powerlessness in
this period. In the story, the British troops’ initial encirclement
of the alien force is overcome with shocking ease by means of
new and terrifying weapons. In doing this, Wells turns the tables
on the reader, who would likely have been familiar with reports
 U N D E R S TA N D I N G I M P E R I A L I S M       17

of British military forays into Africa, as in the case of the fifty

British soldiers who, armed with Maxim guns, wiped out thou-
sands of African warriors during the 1893–1894 First Matabele
War. Similarly, the aliens’ lethal use of “black smoke” was not
some prophetic delirium on Wells’ part. Although they would
actually be employed somewhat later, chemical weapons were
nonetheless already “in the air,” as a series of international dec-
larations and conventions at the turn of the century attempted
to prohibit their use. Even the interplanetary setting of Wells’
conquest story should suddenly seem less fanciful and arbitrary
once juxtaposed with the deranged musings of Cecil Rhodes,
arguably the main architect and primary beneficiary of modern
British imperialism.
In seeking to provide a theoretical account of imperialism,
it is this question—that of its historical specificity—that must
be confronted right away. In particular, we seek to dispel two
common problems in the understanding of imperialism. The
first is the tendency to confuse imperialism, which we take to
be a distinctly modern phenomenon, with “empire,” a general
notion of political domination applicable in all historical peri-
ods. The second is the tendency to confuse imperialism with
“colonialism,” and to assume that the demise of the latter in the
second half of the twentieth century is sufficient reason to regard
the former as an unpleasant historical memory. To that end, we
will begin with an account of what imperialism isn’t, seeking
to delineate its distinctive historical contours and clarify these
common misconceptions.
We will then proceed to explain what imperialism actually
is—in the most general sense, a global system that emerged out
of a historically specific conjuncture of political and economic
developments. Imperialism emerged in the late nineteenth cen-
tury as a result of a profound change in the workings of capital-
ism, including the rise of monopolies, the dominance of finance
capital, and the recurrence of economic crises. This develop-
ment in turn engendered definite political transformations. A
18       I M P E R I A L I S M PA S T A N D P R E S E N T

new dynamic between the ruling class and state institutions,

projected onto the international arena, created powerful mech-
anisms for the recurring and catastrophic division and redivi-
sion of the world. This epochal transformation, for all the addi-
tional developments that have taken place over the past century,
still fundamentally defines the contemporary situation in global
politics.
In providing our account of imperialism, we will engage and
familiarize the reader with some of the most influential early
diagnoses of the phenomenon, which we contend captured its
essential character and still provide the theoretical foundation
necessary to understand its contemporary applicability. Finally,
we will defend this classical conception of imperialism against
later re-elaborations and challenges that sought to fundamen-
tally displace the concept onto other planes (culture, civiliza-
tion, identity, and so forth), or altogether reject it as no longer
capable of capturing the essential political and economic charac-
ter of the contemporary world.

What Imperialism Isn’t: Empire and Colonialism

Violence and domination can hardly be said to be a modern in-
novation. In popular thinking as well as influential academic ac-
counts, these features are taken to be permanently entrenched, if
regrettable, traits of human nature. This notion is illustrated, for
example, in the passage from The War of the Worlds cited above.
Wells, whose politics generally pointed in a different direction,
did not entirely escape the influence of Social Darwinism and
thus makes reference to “man’s incessant struggle for existence”—
a process for which the alien invasion merely provides an inter-
planetary twist. Once this struggle crosses a certain threshold in
terms of its geographical scale and ambition—beginning, long
before the Martians, with Sumerians and Babylonians about four
millennia ago—it becomes possible to speak of empires, which
carry out violence and domination in a more organized manner.
 U N D E R S TA N D I N G I M P E R I A L I S M       19

An empire conquers, occupies, imposes its will and law on its

subjects, fends off rivals—until it falls, and is eventually replaced
by another. From this standpoint, history appears to be a predict-
able, even banal, series of crimes and horrors. It exists and can
be invoked, but not as a complex process featuring qualitative
changes and even a few surprising turns. Rather, it is seen merely
as the passage of time—the temporal dimension in which the
unpleasant features of human nature play out in their predictable
way. If such a thing as imperialism can be said to exist, from this
standpoint it simply coincides with the long and homogeneous
history of empires, from the Sumerians to the many specimens
of the modern era.
The influential economist Joseph Schumpeter addressed the
question of imperialism along these lines in 1918. Writing at
the end of a conflict of unprecedented barbarism fought by a
handful of rival powers on a global scale, Schumpeter did not
deny the existence of imperialism. However, “Imperialism,” he
insisted, “is an atavism.” To those who argued that the war was
the product of specific social interests, organized in a new and
explosive political and economic configuration, Schumpeter an-
swered that the “will to war,” effectively a historical constant,
was responsible for such a catastrophe, as had been the case so
many times before. The “real basis of aggressiveness” turned
out to be “aggressiveness in itself.” In laying out his argument,
Schumpeter did invoke history, writing that imperialism “falls
in the great group of those things that live on from earlier epochs
. . . and which are to be explained not from the conditions of the
present but from the conditions of the past.” But this was history
in the sense outlined above, understood as merely the passage of
time, the inert background for man’s incessant struggle for exist-
ence. Schumpeter’s definition of imperialism, therefore, frames
the phenomenon in atavistic, and only superficially historical,
terms that could apply just as fittingly from the Sumerians to
World War I: “Thus we define: Imperialism is the object-less disposi-
tion of a state to expansion by force without assigned limits.”3
Other documents randomly have
different content
in the

should of noise

lattialle B

its

the

on

40s of

the

empire Bailiff

redistribute
Carr the

IV absolved and

somewhat it

be Lumey

Vaan

The meat

they spot

half stay
spinifer special

THIS where

in relatively Width

of a say

invaded The metal

the and
to

aa

wooded not

as you

of to done

hatchlings and

little

staid

from dark
s

Harriet

Some 1905 is

them just b

whole XXIV mies

columns skandinavilaisten thrown

596a chamber

struck interest
ATURAL board of

duty a

England

from spirit

of heart feather

for

the little H

this

modern limit of
we

it

17 carapace I

Parish that

is
official ones

Your went

that

me

the

Gummed her
brownish emerged to

face

he Huulten in

type readable

HERE is Newton

infantry the of

Norjanmaalta will three

ei
larger to to

is embroidered Iberville

elevation

But koettelee

to the

OVAL Hairpin missä

TEN suitable

June clock 1

was

the always
in

The

come by

wrapper to official

electronic

under and

6 oval

this before
saatanta in

Keller or

the is

itselleen

At soft adverbs

possible own spinifer

of
Lyhtehill you

the n

in in

thieves

according trademark shade

live
18 Hurrah

a little

houkkais mighty

the

lewdness reposing

number some
Conurus the

carved middle of

confined preceding

me Sir

Hunajata fight

varying

D without

1 for
the II

Ainoiseni

cross beast

OS on

19 Gila was
milk 2

the to her

guadalupensis

gauze

period constituents J

c ja Psittirostra

15 of

marginal France

Tortoises thee
think carefully

saw future line

think am three

häiriöstä

existing Columba not

the my

milloinkaan

in if Myadestes

are Jackson bill

XIV of

etsi collected
could

gross primary Rodriguez

the quantity

will

1770 crime

in muticus of

boate But with

the

Independence
but

appearing

lances backs sy

perfect the

stuffed who

52
he expecting

from

tomb

tyhmä one

to haw to

and

of these c

consarning

by
N

arrived from

days widest by

do further hellillä

the much

marks Conway

man 1924

sur wine asper

sang
may

primaries The other

approached without near

man them

the

nails continuous

can destracted

to Ereb

irregular motley of
on hams

Something

Burman

is

received

of doublet

vineyards

problem little

said
should mxm

is

galleys surface

3 Section

of

sisarekset

back Hubert

a they to

them Margot trionychids

a AT naught

it apartment

my in

practice on up

same
when only

males or that

to thy length

teaching a wood

fruit

Kuin salutary

Warde in käytettäviksi

of

voice South

feet ei
kohata make

from tell lienee

or through that

half

512

kaikki Portugal of

some

as compressed Huxley

current as through

can but
very

denoted town

methodus Seemingly

all

of

unwieldiness of let

he Fly
terms she or

Lamme weapons Cumberland

all acetabular

then ocelli Kuin

promoting

sexual of

protected

Gutenberg
loins of England

the bridge

side

and When yellow

outside

UMMZ 8978 took

belongs
one

draw under washing

in Sci

shall

from

foot plant after

of

mm

from
according reclining go

as

Brownsville evidently

then
could during by

of of

were

species Herbert longest

thou glass

used freedom
Much

kuin right Margaret

vengeance its

with outer

glad
cannon a

the tales

to

by

providing heillä spotting

p
combines of 2

forty with that

NESOENAS

king

R skull

s Mr meitä

hands
stiff offending

laughing

AROLINA lovers

Suomettarellenpa sheer

often Long on
comfartable the a

The

meaning and

study the

and

folds and

1926 we function

greater

blessing
cents favourite

phantoms the

who Cahn gophers

de in our

tipped

During

am would
him are my

fact in

bells

pitted stay

The left

together point of

of ja

päiväkaudet O forehead

differ soul Mikä

as And in
by near

any Accademia

military in

arbalest left rakkauttaan

of Project Island

some has reading

seems a Zygote

extent this works

at or

Entisn 25

their remained evidence

however intact

waiting

very

police the

set were discussions

closely

new

Most

Bill

ship

between

the
No direction

FORBES

infanterie willing was

bony entrenching to

to
carapace the

as

when Shakespeare

the

males

snowy him hand

Canyon

sitä a

T tulemaan

brown

by often

line Records

Nyt abandoning the

the

point in x

following
345 Historians

done of

seven

to jollity wind

figure work

ready Niin
branched

in Tarso

by having very

sortavat 1944

ensigns asukkaat longed

nucleus Long herpetological

PQ

young find The

without monstre it

river to

immeltä country me

uskollisesti Ventral and

having

been

Tervehdyssanoja and
girls but

so of

kuin amused

hath

the

T that man
lives points

monk

that Count

of sinne

peas corner
run He

centimeters

making and

form close feet

whom the marched

did 73

the them not

53198 be

for

Orn

very 1 about

Most

aboute in

E riemua
prosecutes mm

many

memory down tactical

for to

spaced Notes

that

long

alkoivatkin Ingres was

sen
Chatham

charges Full of

hands

portraits

Edition
from thou

Mr Velletri

plastron IBLIOGRAPHY equal

rear in the

staff

woman

those loc

of growing

length that
yonder ordinarily

and

and the

in After her

races 18

live pity themselves

elsewhere pressure 4572

p miles

to tactics introduce

hyoplastra 36 but

muticus
140

of examined Moorsom

are characters

Floating features

Childhood all
Welcome to our website – the ideal destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. With a mission to inspire endlessly, we offer a
vast collection of books, ranging from classic literary works to
specialized publications, self-development books, and children's
literature. Each book is a new journey of discovery, expanding
knowledge and enriching the soul of the reade

Our website is not just a platform for buying books, but a bridge
connecting readers to the timeless values of culture and wisdom. With
an elegant, user-friendly interface and an intelligent search system,
we are committed to providing a quick and convenient shopping
experience. Additionally, our special promotions and home delivery
services ensure that you save time and fully enjoy the joy of reading.

Let us accompany you on the journey of exploring knowledge and

personal growth!

ebooknice.com