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Greece's 'Odious' Debt
 Greece's 'Odious5 Debt

The Looting of the Hellenic

Republic by the Euro, the Political
Elite and the Investment Community

by Jason Manolopoulos

A
ANTHEM PRESS
LONDON NEW YORJC DELHI
 Anthem Press
An imprint of Wimbledon Publishing Company
www. anthempress. com

This edition first published in UK and USA 2011

by ANTHEM PRESS
75-76 Blackfriars Road, London SE1 8HA, UK
or PO Box 9779, London SW19 7ZG, UK
and
244 Madison Ave. #116, New York, NY 10016, USA

Copyright ©Jason Manolopoulos 2011

The author asserts the moral right to be identified as the author of this work.

All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above,
no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
(electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
without the prior written permission of both the copyright
owner and the above publisher of this book.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Manolopoulos, Jason.
Greece's 'odious' debt: the looting of the Hellenic republic by the
euro, the political elite and the investment community /
by Jason Manolopoulos.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-85728-771-7 (pbk.: alk. paper)
1. Financial crises-Greece. 2. Debts, External-Greece.
3. Euro-Greece. 4. Finance-Greece. 5. Greece-Economic policy-21 st
century. 6. European Union. I. Tide.
HB3807.5.M36 2011
330.9495'076-dc22
2011012810

ISBN-13: 978 0 85728 771 7 (Pbk)

ISBN-10: 0 85728 771 0 (Pbk)

This tide is also available as an eBook.

To my parents
 CONTENTS

List of Figures and Tables ix

Preface xi

Chapter 1 From Buenos Aires to Athens 1

Chapter 2 Getting Lucky 13

Chapter 3 The Euro: Hard Sell, or Mis-sell? 33

Chapter 4 Western Branding, Eastern Legacy:

A Country on a Fault Line 59

Chapter 5 The Looting of Greece: Scandals, Corruption

and a Monstrous Public Sector 81

Chapter 6 Getting Unlucky - It All Begins to Unravel 109

Chapter 7 The Euro in Practice 131

Chapter 8 Liquidity Boom 163

Chapter 9 The Entertainers 185

Chapter 10 A Temporary Bail-Out? A Crisis Made

Worse by Satisficing 211

Chapter 11 The Man in the Arena 243

Notes 265

Index 279
 LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

FIGURES
Figure 2.1 Mid-1990s Price Spikes in Wheat, Corn
and Soyabeans 15

Figure 2.2 Greek Bank Credit to Households 24

Figure 3.1 Map: GDP per Inhabitant in PPS as Percentage

of EU-27 Average (2004) 36

Figure 6.1 Turkey Graph 110

Figure 7.1 Holders of Greek Government Debt 137

Figure 7.2 Germany versus 'PUGS', 10-year Yield Spread 140

Figure 7.3 House Prices in Greece, Spain, Italy and Ireland 143

Figure 7.4 Greek Housing Credit Outstanding 144

Figure 7.5 Unit Labour Cost Developments 1999-2010 146

Figure 7.6 German Balance of Trade 147

Figure 9.1 Greece, Portugal, Spain and Germany 5-year

Sovereign CDS Spreads 206

Figure 10.1 European Bonds Spreads 2010 241

TABLES
Table 2.1 Key Economic Indicators in Early Years
of Currency Peg: Argentina 1991-1995 14

Table 2.2 Key Economic Indicators in Early Years

of Membership of the Euro 14
Table 2.3 Key Economic Indicators in Later Years
of Currency Peg: Argentina 1996-2000 27

Table 4.1 Armaments Imports 2004-2009 73

Table 4.2 GDP and Population Figures 74

Table 4.3 Value of Weapons Imports 2004-2009/GDP x 100,

Top Five Importers by Aggregate Value 74

Table 4.4 Value of Military Imports 2004-2009

per Head of Population, Top Five Importers
by Aggregate Value 74

Table 5.1 Retirement Age and Level of Pensions Prior

to 2010 Reform 88

Table 6.1 Greek Government Deficit 114

Table 6.2 Greek Government Debt 115

Table 6.3 Consumption and Investment 115

Table 7.1 Regulation of Professional Services 134

Table 7.2 Current Account Balances, Percentage of GDP 142

Table 7.3 Unit Labour Costs and Productivity in Manufacturing

in Greece Compared with EU Average 142

Table 9.1 BP T N K - Eurobond New Issue Terms 189

Table 9.2 Benchmark Comparable Bonds (Offer Yields) 190

 PREFACE

As the global recession began in 2008, the Greek economy featured high
levels of public debt, a large trade deficit, undiversified industries, an
overextended public sector, militant trade unions, widespread corruption,
uneven payment of taxes, an overvalued currency, consumers expecting
rising living standards and euro membership based on inaccurate data.
Yet in February 2009, the European Union's economics commissioner
Joaquin Almunia observed:

The Greek economy is in better condition compared with the

average condition in the eurozone, which is currendy in recession.

When the head of one of the most powerful economic institutions

in the West is making a statement so out of line with reality that it
bears comparison with pronouncements on production targets by the
Soviet Union, something is seriously wrong. We have to ask some
very big questions of the institutions that run our affairs, and we
have to ask questions about beliefs and decision making, as well as
analysis and data.
This book tells the story of an international economic crisis in which
a small country played a crucial role. At the time of writing, it is not
clear whether the impact will be cataclysmic, representing the beginning
of the end of the good way of life for Europeans, or whether it will
force a mere adjustment to the living standards of the old continent.
The reasons are micro and macro, national and global. Not a single
constituency emerges well from this story; Greek politicians, Greek
society, trade unions, leaders of the European Union, the IMF, the
world's investment banks - each and every one has scarcely put a foot
right in a collective display of hubris, miscalculation, overambition,
deception, mis-selling, folly and, in some cases, sheer greed in a saga
that has continued for decades.
 Here are the headlines of the crisis:

• The single European currency, the euro, consists of 17 dissimilar

economies, and has failed to create a unified currency area. The
difference between surplus and deficit nations has widened, in a repeat
of earlier experiments.
• The dramatic announcement of 9 May 2010, including an
unprecedented liquidity package of more than €750 billion and the
abandonment of the European Central Bank's independence through
bond purchases, confirms that the euro was mis-sold as an enterprise
to the continent's citizens.
• The 'peripheral' countries of the eurozone face years of severe
austerity measures with an uncertain chance of success, placing strains
on their political systems and even on public order.
• The aggregate sovereign debt of Europe is now measured in trillions of
euros, at a time when the continent faces a demographic squeeze, with
expensive pensions liabilities and an ageing society. The world's rising
economies, especially in Asia, are set to eclipse the old continent.
• Greece has been allowed to borrow in excess of €300 billion, despite
a largely unreformed economy, overreliance on mid-tech industries, a
chronically inefficient and corrupt public sector and an unreformed
political infrastructure with immunity for politicians guilty of financial
crimes.
• The global economy has been damaged by an orgy of leverage, in
which rent-seeking investment banks have turned money into a
commodity, creating destabilising investment bubbles and excessive
levels of government debt.

This was no act of fate. Nor was it even unprecedented - I will look
at some strikingly similar crises from the recent past, and ask why no
lessons were learned. The convenient phrase 'in hindsight', which we
have often read from policymakers following the near-collapse of the
European Monetary Union in 2010, is dishonest; these people were
warned, implicidy and explicidy. Their piloting of the single currency,
the Exchange Rate Mechanism, was a failure. Instead of learning from
this, the EU's leaders built a bigger version of the same, and dismissed
reasoned, intelligent critiques of their plan, all widely and publicly aired.
The policy errors made in Argentina in the 1990s were repeated, in
tragicomic fashion, in Greece in the 2000s. This begs some big questions.
We have to stop applying policies that have failed in theory and failed in
practice. If medicine had kept pace with economics, we would still be
using blood-letting and mercury.
While researching this book, in seeking to cover all significant
dimensions - from Greek history to the foundation of the European
Union to the contemporary international bond market - I have been
struck by the influence of the psychological dimension, and how it is
often overlooked. In the investment world, the discipline of behavioural
finance is starting to inform us that markets, and the people who shape
them, are often not rational, and that an understanding of psychological
biases can shed light on how real markets behave. They also affect
policymakers and the economists who advise them. These biases appear
to contribute to systemic, repeated errors, such as:

• Extrapolation from recent data to project into the future, assuming a

level of continuity that is often not present.
• Misdiagnosis, by identifying patterns that do not exist, or exaggerating
the level of knowledge held by policymakers.
• Overly confident projections and explanations.
• A tendency to exaggerate the impact of policy intention, and the
degree of control of policymakers, as seen in phrases such as 'too big
to fail'.

These psychological dynamics are often hidden behind a wall of data,

charts and calculations, yet the politically most important indicators are
crude. There is an almost exclusive reliance on the headline GDP growth
figure as the key measure of economic performance. This is used to sustain
some dangerously misleading statements, such as that of Almunia. It fails
to distinguish between debt-fuelled spending and sustainable economic
development. This is a symptom of a wider problem, which is to confuse
data for performance, and regard behavioural economics as no more
than an amusing sideline or a fad. This means that high-risk behaviour -
whether it is by reckless investment banks, property developers or national
politicians — is not taken into consideration in economic analysis or
planning. For example, many commentators have asked me why the
collapse in confidence in the affordability of Greek government debt was
so sudden in the autumn/winter of 2009-2010. To me, a more telling
question is: why did the illusion persist for so long that it was safe to lend
such vast sums to such a small, dysfunctional economy?
In looking for answers to what supported the dangerous build-up
of debt at the time, one comes across vague metaphors rather than
reasoned assessments. For example, the single currency was supposed to
act as a 'shield' against default; or else it was a 'train' leading inexorably
to economic development. Faith in these special qualities, which turned
out to be illusory, could be every bit as strong in an investment bank
analyst, or a commissioner at the EU, as in a grassroots campaigner for
European monetary union.
Most analyses of the eurozone crisis are couched in the formal language
of economics. This book addresses that dimension, but also delves
deeper. I intend to consider the historical background of the particular
decisions made, and the psychology that shaped them. In particular,
notable cognitive biases are observable. There may be a tendency to
think that the elites are immune from such primal psychological forces.
This saga illustrates graphically that they are not. So in addition to the
well-known political and institutional actors in the eurozone drama,
I would like to introduce a supporting cast. These are the cognitive
biases that have influenced policy - and which, in my view, have often
diverted it from a rational course. For example, confirmation bias refers to
the tendency to notice and to emphasise material that confirms your
beliefs, and to overlook or downgrade evidence that contradicts them.
Herd behaviour, or groupthink, the tendency to follow the herd, is common
in both the investment and political communities. Illusion of control, a
tendency to overestimate one's degree of influence over external events,
is a common trait of central bankers and organisers of currency pegs.
Overconfidence bias, the tendency to let the wish become the father of the
thought, has been common in European Union elites.
These biases have played more than an incidental role. They have
helped to shape an avoidable crisis.
We spend much time analysing the fallout of economic crises, and
devote insufficient attention to understanding their causes. The process
of building high levels of debt is more enjoyable for politicians, their
electorates and the banks than reining in such activity.
Future generations will not thank us for the excesses of the current
age. They may even start to look up the definition of the 'odious' debt.
This is a legal theory, established in the 1920s, which holds that national
debt incurred by a government for purposes that do not serve the best
interests of the nation should not be enforceable. Such debts are held to
be personal debts of the unrepresentative regime that incurred them and
not of that country's population. Could the Greek people cite this, given
the off-balance-sheet manipulations to the national deficit a decade ago
that had the effect of increasing long-term debt costs? Could the Irish,
given that they have been handed the bill for fraudulent banking activity
which benefited an unrepresentative elite?
And above all, given the decade-long encouragement of borrowing
by unelected European Union commissioners and their refusal to impose
sanctions for breaching the deficit and debt limits of the Maastricht
Treaty, could the future populations of the EU begin to challenge
whether they should pay the colossal bill that the older generation has
accumulated? The rush to monetary union and the failure to consult
and hold referendums may come back to haunt the EU's leaders.
These are extreme scenarios, but the point is that the extreme nature
of the current crisis is still not being fully communicated by political
leaders to their electorates due to the psychological nature of its creation.
New narratives are being told, such as 'we will return to growth swiftly',
or 'your sacrifices will not be in vain'. In the final analysis, behavioural
economics is neither a trendy concept nor a fad, it is all there is, because
behaviour also determines economic outcomes. Understanding this
requires a conceptual leap for our political and institutional leaders, and
they do not have much time in which to make it.
 Chapter 1

FROM BUENOS AIRES TO ATHENS

Keeping books on social aid is capitalistic nonsense. I just use the moneyfor th
poor. I can't stop to count it.
—Eva Peron

As the eurozone crisis reached a critical phase in late 2009 and early
2010, one of the accusations most certain to provoke the fury of
representatives of the European Union was the comment that 'Greece
is like Argentina'.
Why the comparison, and why the anger? There are many parallels.
Argentina and Greece appear to have followed a similar trajectory in
their recent histories, not just in the past two decades, but in the entire
period since the Second World War. Both suffered under military juntas
who justified their actions by anti-Communism. Both have a socialist,
clientelist ethos in which interest groups have sought, and often received,
direct assistance from the state. Elections and parliamentary decision-
making returned in 1974 after seven years of dictatorship in the case
of Greece, and in 1983 in the case of Argentina. In both cases, military
humiliation at the hands of a foreign power was a major factor in the
collapse of the regimes.
Both countries have a history of being the most advanced economy
in their region, and are conscious of this status. Overseas visitors to
Athens and Buenos Aires have the experience of visiting an advanced
economy: both have a grand, modern airport, impressive boulevards
and shopping malls. Athens in particular, since the infrastructure
improvements for the 2004 Olympics, boasts a modern metro and
freeways. The contrast with some of the poorer neighbouring countries
in, respectively, the Balkans and South America is sharp - though
some of these unfashionable nations may be catching up with, or even
overtaking, their illustrious neighbours.
 More recently, both countries have relinquished monetary flexibility
by respectively pegging their currency to the US dollar and joining the
euro. Both enjoyed a honeymoon in the early years of the currency
regime, with a superficial appearance of economic success, but in both
cases there was a progressive underlying loss of competitiveness. Both
experiments featured a lack of the sort of structured reforms needed
to adapt to life in a strong currency area, with clientelist practices
continuing and being facilitated by easy credit arrangements and high
levels of government borrowing. The two economies experienced
international economic crises, the Asian and credit crisis respectively,
followed by governmental debt crises and International Monetary Fund
(IMF) intervention. In the case of Argentina, it ended in default and
crisis in December 2001.
This is most probably the reason the comparison causes such fury
in Brussels. But the Argentine economic crisis predated Greece's
crash by ten years: so were no lessons learned? In economics, we are
often tempted to envisage what the long-term scenario may look like.
In Argentina's experiment with the peg to the dollar, the long term
is now. While every national context is unique, the parallels do seem
sufficient here to merit further inquiry as a means of understanding
some of the dangerous economic dynamics at play in Greece and
the rest of the eurozone, and how they might play out in the next
few years.

Exchange Rate Stabilisation

Argentina in 1991 and Greece in 2001 effectively entered exchange rate
stabilisation programmes. In the case of Greece, of course, the notion
was that it was taking part in a full and permanent currency union. The
idea, however, that there was economic convergence with the rest of
the eurozone as part of an optimal currency area was fiction, as I shall
discuss further in chapters 3 and 8. Essentially, it was a currency peg like
Argentina's, with an unreformed economy.
Several studies of exchange rate stabilisation programmes have
concluded that they tend to be effective at curbing high inflation,
but have dangerous side effects, especially when essential reforms are
postponed. They should be used as a short-term emergency measure by
a government determined to use the breathing space created to reform
the public sector and improve the supply-side. In practice, complacency
often creeps in, as the economic data in the first couple of years can
be flattering. This was certainly the case in Argentina and Greece.
A common pattern is

1) real appreciation of the exchange rate

2) investment and consumption boom
3) deterioration of external accounts.1

Argentina: Background to the Dollar Peg

In January 1991 the Chilean Lake District enjoyed perfect summer
weather. Thousands of tourists, mosdy Argentinian but including a few
Europeans, enjoyed the stunning views of shimmering lakes, verdant
mountain sides and snow-capped volcanoes in the picturesque resorts of
Osorno, Puerto Montt and Chiloe Island, enjoying day after day of clear
sunshine in a country completing its first year of democracy following
the years of the Pinochet dictatorship. On one day towards the end
of the month, however, the resorts suddenly became close to deserted.
The weather and Chile's politics were unchanged, but the beaches and
lakeside hotels became strangely empty. Puzzled, the few remaining
North American and European tourists asked the hotel staff what had
occurred. The Argentinians, they explained, had had to return home.
There had been a plunge in the value of their currency, the austral, and
they could not afford to be abroad for a day longer.2
Even this shock was not the peak of hyperinflation in the South
American country; two years earlier the consumer price index for
Buenos Aires had reached more than 5,000 per cent.3 An estimate
of the longer-term impact of hyperinflation was that, by the time the
new peso replaced the austral in 1991, one new peso was equal to
100,000,000,000 pre-1983 pesos.4 The end of the twentieth century
and beginning of the twenty-first witnessed a dramatic fall for what had
been the most prosperous country of South America, and one of the ten
richest nations in the world in the first half of the twentieth century. By
the 1980s and 1990s, a stream of Argentinians of Italian descent were
returning to Italy to look for work, in a poignant reversal of the journey
their entrepreneurial parents and grandparents had made to one of the
more promising of the 'New World' countries.
Some Argentinians will confess that by the late twentieth century
the economy had developed the dimensions of a dwarf 'con una cabeza
gigante pero un cuerpo pequmtf ('with a giant head but a small body'). The
airport and capital city were everything that you would come to expect
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