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 An Economic History
of West Africa
The Columbia Economic History
of the Modern World
The publication of the present book launches The Columbia Economic History of the
Modern World. The principal object of this series, which will include more than a
dozen volumes when complete, is to clarify the processes by which leading countries
and areas have modernized their economies and social structures. Dr. Hopkins’ book
sets a high standard not only for the remaining volumes in the series, but also for
scholars everywhere who bring to the study of history the outlook and methods of
the social sciences.
Dr. Hopkins draws upon the work of economists, anthropologists and geographers
as well as historians for the concepts which frame his analysis. His organizing principle
is that of “the market,” which he conceives in quantitative, spatial, and social
structural terms. Arguing persuasively that the distinction between “traditional”
and “modern” societies illuminates historical reality less well than does economic
theory, he emphasizes the economic barriers to market growth, shows how strong
linkages were established between the expansion of “legitimate” trade in the nine¬
teenth century and the development of the domestic economy, and examines changes
therein and in the export sector that marked the beginnings of industrialization.
Rich in its insights into factors making for partition in one century and nationalism
in the next. Dr. Hopkins’ book is a significant contribution not only to the field of
African studies but also to the economic history of the developing world.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY STUART BRUCHEY

An Economic History
of West Africa
A. G. Hopkins

/\Ack-
HC.
S/7
, bos'

Columbia University Press

New York 1973
Published in 1973 by Longman Group Ltd, London, and Columbia University
Press, New York.
*'

© 1973 Longman Group Ltd

All rights reserved
Printed in Great Britain

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data '

Hopkins, Anthony G
An economic history of West Africa.
(Columbia economic history of the modem world)
Includes bibliographies.
I. Africa, West—Economic conditions. I. Title.
HC517.W5H66 330.9’66 72-11798
ISBN 0-231-03739-2

5/7
e 105
Contents

List of maps ........... vi

List of figures ........... vi

Acknowledgements .......... vii

Preface ............ ix

1 Approaches to Africa's economic past . . . . i

2 The domestic economy: structure and function 8

1 Natural and human resources . . . . . . . ii
2 Production ........... 27
3 The distributive system . . . . . . . .51
4 Internal constraints on growth ....... 75

3 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic. 78

1 Trans-Saharan trade ......... 79
2 Trade across the Atlantic . . . . . . . -87
3 The abolition of the external slave trade . . . . . .112
4 International trade and economic growth . . . . .117

4 The economic basis of imperialism .124

1 The economy of‘legitimate’commerce . . . . . .125
2 Economic motives in partition . . . . . . -135
3 An explanation of imperialism in West Africa ..... 164

5 An economic model of colonialism .167

1 Open and closed economies ........ i68
2 The performance of the open economy, 1900-60 . . . .172

6 Completing the open economy.187

1 The expatriate role ......... i88
2 The African contribution ........ 209
3 The mechanics of export growth.231

V
 i

An Economic History of West Africa

1 The open economy under strain

1 Specialisation in the export sector . . 238
2 The domestic economy • 243
3 Strains on the open econoiny, 1930-45 • 254
4 Strains on the open economy, 1945-60 . . 267
5 The open economy modified . 288

8 The economy in retrospect.293

, Bibliography ............ 297

Index ............ 327

List of Maps
1 West Africa: Vegetation Zones ....... 12
2 Present-Day Distribution of West African Peoples . . .- . 16
3 Present-Day Agricultural Regions: Subsistence and Internal Market Crops 33
4 Estimated Dry Season Distribution of Cattle (1961) .... 40
5 Principal Pre-Colonial Mineral Workings ..... 45
6 Major Trade Routes of the Western Sudan in the Nineteenth Century . 59
7 Saharan Trade Routes in the Pre-Colonial Period .... 84
8 Atlantic Commerce in the Eighteenth Century ..... 100
9 The West African Coast in the Nineteenth Century .... 136
10 The Partition of West Africa ........ 163
11 Colonial West Africa ......... 173
12 West African Railways ......... 193
13 Main Areas of Export Crop Production in the 1960s . . . . 215
14 Migrant Labour in West Africa in the 1950s ..... 223
15 Distribution of Kola and Kola Trade Routes About 1910 247
16 Present-Day Livestock Trade Routes ...... 249
17 The Independent States of West Africa ...... 290

List of Figures
1 Nigeria: Indices of Export Volume and Price, 1911-60 .... 175
2 French West Africa: Indices of the Volume of Overseas Trade, 1925-55 . 175
3 Nigeria: Terms of Trade, 1911-60 ....... 180
4 Gold Coast-Ghana: Terms of Trade, 1900-60 ..... 180
5 French West Africa: Terms of Trade, 1925-55 ..... 181
6 French West Africa (including Togo): Bank Notes in Circulation, 1928-38 181

VI
Acknowledgements

The publishers are grateful to the following for permission to base maps and graphs
used in this book on those appearing in the publications mentioned:
Methuen & Co. Ltd. for maps i, 2, 3, 4, 13, 15, 16 and 17, based on pages 209, 16,
loi, 135,473,94, 578 and 672 of IVest Africa hyW.B. Morgan andJ. C. Pugh (1969);
the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office for map 7, based on page 151 of
the Journal of Local Administration Overseas, Vol. I. No. 3, July 1962; Cambridge
University Press for maps 6 and 10, based on pages 69 and 131 of Colonialism in
Africa, 1870-1^60, Vol. I The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1870-1914, ed.
L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan (1969), and for map 7, based on page 15 of A History
of West Africa byj. D. Page (1969); Yale University Press for figure 4, based on
pages 136-7 of Government and Economic Development, ed. Gustav Ranis (1971);
Pdchard D. Irwin, Inc. for figures i and 3, based on material compiled by G. K.
Helleiner in Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria (Home-
wood, Illinois, 1966), pages 494-5 and 500; Ecole Pratique des Hautes £tudes. Vie
Section, Etudes et memoires, 37, for figures 2 and 5, based on pages 24, 27 and 135 of
Les relations economiques exterieures des pays d’Afrique noire def union frangaise,
1925-1955 hyj. J. Poquin (1957); and Jurisprudence Generale Dalloz for figure 6,
based on page 119 of Essai sur la conjoncture de I'Afrique noirehy H. Durand^(i957).

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Preface

In writing this book I have developed a close affinity with one of the more popular
figures of modern Scottish folklore, the man who, so the story goes, spends all his
life painting the bridge spanning the Firth of Forth. His job is never finished because
by the time he reaches one end the other (by then barely visible) needs painting again.
My own task has also seemed an endless one; every time I put the finishing touches to
Chapter 71 had to double back and start, once more, to cover the cracks which were
beginning to show in Chapter 2. Unlike my mythical Scots friend, however, I have
now decided to down tools, not because perfection has been reached—far from it—
but because there comes a time when the pursuit of unattainable goals threatens to
undermine the sanity of the pursuer. My diary tells me that I began work on the
manuscript about six years ago, though there have been periods when the job has
seemed to me, and doubtless to my patient publishers too, to have occupied a life¬
time. The Forth Bridge painter, being a self-sufficient man as well as a persistent one,
always works alone. I, too, have wielded the brush, but my efforts have been sup¬
ported by skilled helpers, who have mixed the paint, assisted me in reaching into
awkward comers, and, occasionally, used a blowlamp on my work.
I am indebted to John Fage, the Director of the Centre of West African Studies,
for encouraging the study of West African economic liistory at Birmingham, for
sharing with me his unrivalled knowledge of West African history, and for creating
in the Centre an atmosphere wliich has benefited the work of staff and students alike.
Two colleagues in the Centre, Marion Johnson and Douglas Rimmer, answered a
variety of questions during the writing stage, read substantial sections of the manu¬
script, and suggested improvements covering matters of style, fact and logic. The
sudden, premature death of another colleague, R. E. Bradbury, occurred when the
manuscript was still in an elementary state, but at a time when we had entered on a
series of stimulating discussions about the relationship between social anthropology
and economic history. This book would have gained considerably from Brad’s
comments. I have tried to keep his high standards in mind, even if I have not been
able to match them.
I have also benefited greatly from my position as an attached member of the
Department of Economic and Social History. The late W. H. B. Courts gentle
nature and catholic view of the study of economic history were particularly con¬
genial to me as a young and inexperienced apprentice to the craft. The present Head
of the Department, John Harris, encouraged me when I was begimiing to flag, and
found time, despite severe pressure of work, to read a large part of the manuscript.
I am grateful, too, to Cyril Ehrlich of The Queen’s University, Belfast, and to Stuart
Bruchey of Columbia University, New York, both of whom made valuable com¬
ments on sizeable sections of an earlier draft of the manuscript.

ix

1*
An Economic History of West Africa

All these scholars have helped to improve an imperfect work. The failings which
remain are entirely my own.
Specific debts to other writers, too numerous to record here, are acknowledged
in the footnotes and in the bibliography. Any clarity of argument and presentation
which this work now possesses owes a great deal to questions raised by undergraduate
and graduate students who have taken my courses at Birmingham since 1964. Their
reward, belated though it is, is that they have helped tp ease the burden of learning
for their successors.
In the academic year 1969-70 I had the good fortune to hold a Research Fellow¬
ship at the University of Leicester. It was during this break from teaching and
administrative duties that I had time to appreciate the full extent of the inadequacies
of the first draft of the manuscript, and to begin work on what was tp become the
final version. I am grateful to the University of Leicester for its generosity, and to
Ralph Davis and the other members of the Department of Economic History for
the warmth of their welcome. Happily, friendships made in that year have survived
my departure from Leicester.
The substantial task of compiling the bibliography was made easier by the
thorough assistance given by Robert Irving and Jocelyn Abbey. The equally sub¬
stantial task of typing the manuscript was undertaken, very willingly and between
other duties, by the secretarial staff of the Centre of West African Studies, by Helen
Thompson of the School of Education, and, above all, by Cathy Macartney of the
Department of Economic and Social History, who, unlike the author, remained
calm and efficient even in the final, hectic stages.
My parents and my wife have been called on, over a period of years, to show for¬
bearance in the face of neglect, to believe in the hopelessly optimistic forecasts which
authors habitually make, and to remind me at times of depression that the Economic
History of West Africa is not the totality of life’s experiences. If this book has
sufficient merit, it is offered, in part compensation, to them.

Centre of West African Studies, A. G. Hopkins

University of Birmingham.

X
one

Approaches to Africa's
economic past

Historians do not always offer an explicit justification of their work. Those who
select established subjects, such as the industrial revolution or the French Revolution,
seldom feel impelled to explain why they have decided to write about events which
are generally agreed to have been of fundamental significance. Those who are also
nationals of the countries they study share with their readers a number of basic
assumptions, which often remain unstated. In both cases reticence is understandable,
though it is arguable that established priorities and common values may make it hard
to achieve an entirely fresh interpretation. Flistorians who decide to specialise in
relatively unknown subjects find it more difficult to avoid accounting for their
choice. They need to demonstrate that their topic has not remained obscure because
it is unimportant, and, if they write about a country other than their own, they need
to explain their approach to readers whose perspective on the past may be very
different. The justification for publishing the present book is contained in two,
related, propositions: it is designed first to fill a gap in African studies, and second to
contribute, in a small way, to the economic history of the underdeveloped world.
As yet, there is no reasonably full account of the economic history of West Africa.
Existing historical studies of the region, valuable though they are, have a mainly
political bias. The reader will find little discussion here of large states and great
leaders, or of foreign explorers, missionaries and pro-consuls. Yet economic history
is not necessarily narrow history, nor is it history without people. On the contrary,
in trying to reconstruct the history of agriculture and internal trade, the economic
historian is brought into close contact with the lives of the great majority of Africans
—women as well as men. The geographical dimension of the title may strike non¬
specialists as being rather narrow. However, West Africa, though only part of the
African continent, is itself almost as large as the whole of Europe, excluding Russia,
and its population is now approaching the substantial total of lOO million. Admitted¬
ly, imperial history spanned the globe, but it did so only by treating the inhabitants
of other continents as extras in an essentially European epic: they paraded on cere¬
monial occasions; they smiled inscrutably in the mysterious East; and they conducted
obscure native wars’ in darkest Africa. The limitations of the imperial perspective
became apparent once it was realised that Africans and Indians occupied a central
place in the history of their own continents. It is now clear that West Africa has a long

I
 » ^

An Economic History of West Africa

and varied history. To attempt to comprehend even the economic aspects of this
history in one volume is to stretch generalisations as far as safety will permit.
Although this book seeks to fill a gap in African studies, it would be misleading to
suggest that it is entirely original. .Without the labour of the early pioneers of West
African economic history the present work could not have been conceived, and
without the detailed research which has been undertaken during the past ten or
fifteen years it could not have been completed.
The first sizeable landmark was undoubtedly Allan McPhee’s classic study. The
Economic Revolution in British West Africa, which appeared in 1926.^ In the preface to
his book McPhee justified his efforts by drawing attention to the fact that the
economic history of the empire in general, and of British West Africa in particular,
had been almost entirely ignored, just as the economic history of England had been
neglected before the work of Thorold Rogers and William Cunningham. McPhee’s
hope that liis book would immediately point the way for other scholars was unful¬
filled. It was not until 1942 that some of the topics he had dealt with were taken up
again, this time by W. K. Hancock, whose celebrated Survey of British Commonwealth
Affairs included a penetrating study of the traders’ frontier in West Africa:. Between
them, these two works established a rather isolated, and often deserted, academic
outpost. That they achieved even tliis was mainly because they treated West Africa
as part of the wider theme of imperial history.^ The French were possibly even less
concerned with the economic history of their West African territories. Georges
Hardy’s La rnise en valeur du Senegal de 1817 a 1834, published in 1921, was another
lone work cast in the mould of imperial history. Only two books pubhshed before
the 1950S looked at West Africa’s economic past from an indigenous point of view.
These were E. W. Bovill’s Caravans of the Old Sahara, first published in 1933,^ and
George W. Brown’s neglected study. The Economic History of Liberia, which ap¬
peared in 1941. These books, too, were very much products of their time: Bovill’s
scholarly, yet popular, account emphasised the more colourful and adventurous side
of African history; while Brown’s careful research was partly inspired, like other
works by negro intellectuals at that time, by the ideal of African independence which
Liberia represented.
The last fifteen years have seen a marked increase in the number of scholarly
publications on Africa, though relatively few of these have focused on economic
history. As will be clear from the footnotes and bibliography, a great deal of the
evidence and argument of tliis book rests on the work of economists, anthropologists
and geographers. Beginning in 1956, with the appearance of K. O. Dike’s Trade and
Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885, most of the work conventionally regarded as
economic history concentrated on Afro-European trade relations, chiefly because

^ A fuller appreciation of McPhee’s work can be found in the ‘Introduction’ to the new
edition of his book pubhshed in 1971.
2 However, these books were also exceptionally skilled in their handhng of the African
side of the imperial story.
® A new, and extensively revised, version of this book is available as The Golden Trade 0
the Moors, 1968.

2
 Approaches to Africa's economic past

this was a theme which presented relatively few research problems. During the
1960s the emphasis began to shift towards the study of indigenous economic activi¬
ties, as explored, for example, in Polly Hill’s The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern
Ghana, published in 1963, and in the collection of essays edited by Claude Meillassoux
entitled The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa (1971).
Research into production and exchange in the domestic economy will probably
become the chief preoccupation of economic historians of Africa during the 1970s.
Reliance on the work of scholars other than historians is not simply a matter of
necessity, but also of choice. History needs to be related closely to the social sciences
for two reasons. In the first place, both historians and social scientists are involved in
studying social stability and social change, though these themes are not, of course,
their sole interest. Secondly, their approach to these subjects has much more in
common than is often allowed. The assertion that historians are concerned with
unique events, while social scientists search for general laws, is an article of faith
rather than an accurate description of what both actually do. In practice, historians of
Africa have already moved some way towards achieving an inter-disciplinary
approach. Statistical analysis has been used to study the development of bureaucracy
in the pre-colonial period;^ econometric techniques have been employed to analyse
structiural change in the more recent past;® the concepts and tools of social anthro¬
pology have been applied to social structures and to political systems;® and explicit
attention has been paid to philosophical problems in historical causation.'^ Historians
who still regard the study of Africa’s past as an unrewarding exercise,® should con¬
sider whether, by refusing to put their eyes to the telescope, they have failed, as
Galileo’s critics failed, to see that the world extends beyond Europe. They should
also consider the possibdity that they might learn from, as well as contribute to, the
methodology and research techniques used by historians of Africa.
The second justification for this volume is as a contribution to the study of the
underdeveloped world. This aspect of the book can be seen most clearly in the treat¬
ment of themes such as the characteristics of‘traditional’ societies, the nature of pre¬
industrial exchange, the imperiaHsm of industrial Europe, the economics of colonial¬
ism, and the rise of nationalism, most of which will be familiar to historians specialis¬
ing in underdeveloped regions other than West Africa. It is worth pointing out in
this connection that hardly any comprehensive economic histories of countries in
the underdeveloped world have been written. Books dealing with all sectors of the
economy tend to have a chronological limitation, being confined to the period since

^ Ivor Wilks, ‘Aspects of Bureaucratization in Ashanti in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal

of African History, 7, 1966, pp. 215-32.
® R. Szereszewski, Structural Changes in the Economy of Ghana, 1891-1911, 1965.
® See, for example, History and Social Anthropology, ed. I. M. Lewis, 1968.
R. S. Smith, ‘Event and Portent: the Fall of Old Oyo, a Problem in Historical Explana¬
tion’, Africa, 41, 1971. PP- 186-99.
® For recent references to ‘unhistoric’ Africa see H. R. Trevor Roper, ‘The Past and the
Present: History and Sociology’, Past & Present, 42, 1969, pp. 3-17.

3
 ♦ '

An Economic History of West Africa

tlie nineteenth century,® while those relating to earlier periods tend to concentrate on
particular sectors of the economyd® Africa is especially interesting for comparative
purposes because the continent occupies an important place in the mythology of
underdevelopment. Pre-colonial Africa is popularly regarded as forming an econo¬
mic Plimsoll Line drawn to mark subsistence activities. Above this line are placed
the supposedly more advanced economies of other pre-industrial regions, with the
loftiest quarters being reserved for European countries..West Africa provides a good
test of the accuracy of this ranking, and of the beliefs about ‘traditional’ societies
which underlie it, because this part of the continent can be studied in some depth
from an early date, -and without the complicating presence of white settlers.
Assuming that a case has been made out for undertaking a survey of West African
economic history, the problem now arises as to how to organise the great variety of
specialised research which forms the basis of this book. The issue is a complicated one
because the research in question covers several disciplines, and is also uneven in its
treatment of subjects which require approximately equal emphasis in a study of
West Africa’s economic past. Furthermore, no chronology appropriate to economic
history has yet been advanced. In these circumstances, the temptation to let the facts
‘speak for themselves’ is very strong. Unfortunately, the facts have no innate capacity
for ordering themselves. What we do not know and what we choose to omit may
be as important, or more important, than what we include, and what we include is
determined partly by our assumptions about what is important. The narrative
approach adopted by many historians often smothers explanation in description, and
disguises the assumptions which influence the selection of material. Economists
would probably favour a solution which used the concepts and techniques of
national accounting to measure changes in national and personal income and expen¬
diture. This procedure also presents difficulties. The data needed for an investigation
of this kind are not available before the twentieth century, and in any case there are
conceptual problems relating to the definition of ‘national’ units in the pre-colonial
11

An organising principle is required which is broad enough to cover the totality of

economic activities over many centuries, yet specific enough to provide a coherent

® Only a few studies can be cited here: Celso Furtado, Economic Development of Latin America:
a Survey from Colonial Times to the Cuban Revolution, Cambridge 1970; James C. Ingram,
Economic Change in Thailand, iSso-igyo, Stanford 1971; Frank C. D. King, A Concise Economic
History of Modern China, 1970; and W. W. Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan,
Princeton 1954.
Again, only a few examples can be noted: I. Habib, Agrarian System of Mughal India,
Bombay 1963; D. H. "Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, ij68-ig68, Edinburgh 1971;
and Thomas C. Smith, The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan, Stanford 1959. Studies in the
Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day, ed. M. A. Cook, 1970,
covers a longer time span and a variety of themes.
Colonialism did not resolve this problem merely by estabhslhng clearly-marked bound¬
aries. A major weakness of Szereszewski’s book. Structural Changes in the Economy of Ghana,
i8gi-igii, 1965, is that the national unit in question (the Gold Coast) was not an economic
entity at that time.

4
 Approaches to Africa's economic past

theme for the book as a whole. The organising principle which best meets these
criteria is that of the market. This concept, as defined here, has three dimensions:
first, the volume and value of goods and services transacted, which determine the
extent of the market in quantitative terms; second, geographical variations in
exchange activity, which fix the extent of the market in spatial terms; and third, the
number and social status of the parties engaged in exchange, which influence the
composition of the goods and services traded. The market is a theme that can be
followed with the help of both qualitative and quantitative evidence. The former is
predominant in the pre-colonial period, and the latter becomes important in the
twentieth century.
Two further observations need to be made about the way the concept of the
market will be used. In the first place, it is important to guard against the assumption
that there is a natural tendency towards development, and that deviations from this
trend require special explanation. Otherwise, the market can easily become part of
an evolutionist saga, which begins with subsistence economies and ends with
industriahsation. The search for the origins of the market is as fruitless as the quest
once undertaken by political philosophers for the origins of the state. Trade in Africa,
as elsewhere, is as old as man himself, and the concept of the market is appropriate to
early as well as to more recent times. Moreover, exchange and subsistence activities
were (and still are) integrated. An explanation of the one involves a consideration of
the other, for the size of the market cannot be understood without reference to non-
market activities. Change occurs, but not necessarily in the direction of industrialisa¬
tion. It is important to identify the factors which enable the market to expand, but
it is equally important to remember that growth can be slowed, that the market can
contract, and that future trends are more a matter of speculation than of accurate
prediction.
The second observation relates to the interpretation of exchange activities in pre¬
industrial societies. When historians discuss markets and trade, they tend to assume
that prices are determined by supply and demand, and that the profitability of various
transactions influences the volume and type of goods placed on the market and the
factor combination required to produce them. However, it is possible that these rules
may not apply universally. All societies have an economic system, in that they
provide material goods to satisfy biological and social wants, but the code devised
for operating this system may not centre on economising and maximising principles
of the kind which are thought to predominate in modern, industrial societies. In
pre-industrial societies transactional rules other than price may be more important
in determining the terms on which goods are exchanged. The principles governing
market activity in these societies may be those of reciprocity (obligatory gift-giving
among friends and kinsmen) and redistribution (the reallocation of customary
receipts by a socially-determined authority).
The contrast between these two sets of behavioural rules is a prominent theme in
modem sociological thought, and has formed the basis of a substantial literature on
rural-urban differences. Its origin can be traced to T5nnies’s distinction between
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, that is between a community bound by kinship and

5
An Economic History of West Africa

an association held together by contract, and to Weber’s distinction between sub¬

stantive (traditional) and formal (modem) rationality. The substantivist interpreta¬
tion has been applied to Africa by writers such as Polanyi and Dalton, who have
contended that traditional exchange was conducted according to the principles of
reciprocity and redistribution.^^ The formalist view has been advanced by a larger
group of scholars, headed by Firth and Jones, who have argued in favour of the
selective applicability of Western economic theory.^*^., ..
To analyse market activities in Africa without considering the possibility that the
rules governing economic behaviour might be very different from those prevailing
in the industrial world, is to risk adopting an ethnocentric and anachronistic approach.
However, the substantivist viewpoint, stimulating though it is, has less to recom¬
mend it than the modified formalism of Firth andjones. There are twp main reasons
for this judgement, both of which will be elaborated in Chapter 2. First, the sub-
stantivists are mistaken in arguing that the values and motivation of pre-industrial
societies differ in kind rather than in degree from those of industrial societies.
Indeed, even differences of degree may be much smaller than is often assumed.
Second, the substantivist case fails to meet the empirical test: the economy of pre¬
colonial West Africa simply did not function in accordance with principles wHch
are supposed to characterise ‘traditional’ societies. Indeed, the concept of a ‘tradi¬
tional’ society is an ideal-type which is of questionable value in understanding reality.
The argument of the book is derived from its theme, and relates to stability and
change in the market. The analysis of the pre-colonial domestic economy presented
in Chapter 2 is basic to the rest of the book. This chapter attacks the mythology
which has grown up about the characteristics of‘traditional’societies, demonstrates
that exchange was widespread, identifies the forces trying to expand the market, and
reaches conclusions about internal constraints on growth. Chapter 3 investigates
West Africa’s external commercial relationships in the period before the industrial
revolution in Europe, and makes use of a simple model of international trade to
explain why Saharan and Atlantic commerce failed to overcome existing barriers to
market growth. Chapter 4 shows how, for the first time, strong lii^ages were
established between external trade and the domestic economy as a result of the expan¬
sion of ‘legitimate’ commerce in the nineteenth century. This development, it is

Trade and Market in the Early Empires, ed. K. Polanyi, C. W. Arensberg, and H. W.
Pearson, Glencoe 1957. The best guide to Polanyi’s thought is S. C. Humphreys, ‘History,
Economics, and Antliropology: the Work of Karl Polanyi’, History and Theory, 8, 1969,
pp. 165-212. References to Dalton’s earHer, formative work can be found in liis recent article,
‘Theoretical Issues in Economic Anthropology’, Current Anthropology, 10, 1969, pp. 63-102.
Dalton has also edited a collection of readings, Tribal and Peasant Economies, New York 1967,
which presents the substantivist ■viewpoint.
An excellent review of this controversy can be found in Themes in Economic Anthropology,
ed. Raymond Firth, 1967, which represents a quahfied, formahst approach. A similar view is
expressed in Economic Anthropology, ed. Edward E. LeClair and Harold K. Schneider, New
York 1968. The first, detailed statement of the formahst interpretation of African economic
behaviour was W. O. Jones’s important article, ‘Economic Man in Africa’, Food Research
Institute Studies, i, i960, pp. 107-34.

<1
 Approaches to Africa's economic past

suggested, marks the beginning of the modem economic history of West Africa,
and is also central to an imderstanding of why the region was partitioned by European
powers. Chapter 5 provides a brief, perspective view of the colonial period. The
concepts of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ economies are employed to analyse the main struc¬
tural features of colonialism, and quantitative data are used to chart the performance
of the colonial economies between 1900 and i960. Chapter 6 assesses the contribu¬
tions of expatriates and Africans to the completion of the open economies of West
Africa during the first half of the colonial era (1900-30). It is contended that the open
economy was a formalised version of the economy which was already beginning to
emerge in the nineteenth century before partition, and that export growth resulted
primarily from mobihsing factors within the domestic economy. Chapter 7 deals
with the modifications which were made to the open economies in the second half
of the colonial period (1930-60), and presents an interpretation of the rise of nation¬
alism and of the beginnings of industrialisation based on an analysis of developments
in the export sector and in the domestic economy.
This prospectus is offered in the hope that it will guide the reader through the
details which now foUow.

7
 two

The domestic economy:

structure and function

To begin at the beginning is logical. It is also particularly desirable'in the present

context, given the now widespread recognition of the importance of writing the
indigenous history of Africa. It is precisely at this point, however, that the historian
of Africa faces the greatest difficulty with regard to source material. In the first place,
there is a shortage of evidence, especially in the case of the forest zone, where
indigenous written records were virtually unknown before the nineteenth century.
Secondly, the sources which do exist have rarely been used to study the history of
the domestic economy in the pre-colonial period,, that is before about 1900.^ Posses¬
sing only a bare patchwork of data, it is hard to avoid presenting a composite picture
of the traditional economy. Lacking a coherent chronology, it is harder still to
escape a static, timeless account of the local economy in the centuries before the
coming of European rule.
These remarks, though necessary as a guide to the limitations of the present
chapter, are not intended to strike an immediate note of anti-climax, still less to set
the tone for the whole of the discussion which follows. On the contrar>^ there is
some room for optimism, even within the bounds set by the current state of know¬
ledge. There is a certain amount of evidence, though it may not measure up to the
Domesday Survey, there is a variety of secondary sources, some of which have
suffered an extraordinary and totally unjustified neglect and there is a great deal

1 Raymond Mauny’s, Tableau gSographique de Vouest afrkain au moyen age, Dakar 1961, is a
valuable exception, but even this work says more about trade than about agriculture, though
the latter was the basis of the economy in most parts of West Africa.
Briefly, it can be said that for the period down to the eighth century the historian is
rehant on archaeological, hnguistic and botanical research. From the eighth century onwards
the flow of information begins to increase, mainly as a result of records kept by Arab travellers,
though this evidence is patchy and refers chiefly to the region known as the Western Sudan.
After the fifteenth century, with the arrival of Europeans, the volume of material relating to
the forest zone also starts to grow, but is confined, before the nineteenth century, largely to
the coastal area. ’
One book in particular must be accorded, quite imdeservedly, the title of the least used
secondary work in the field of West African economic history. Tliis is Lars Sundstrom’s The
Trade of Guinea, Lund 1965, which is a mine of information about the internal trade of West
Africa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This study has hardly been noticed even by
speciahsts. ^

8
 The domestic economy: structure and function

which historians can learn from the pioneering work carried out by scholars in other
disciplines.^
It is possible, simply by making use of existing knowledge, to advance some way
towards achieving two aims. First, there is sufficient evidence to reconstruct at least
an outline of the pre-colonial economy, and to note a few of the more important
chronological developments and regional variations. At the same time, it must be
emphasised that this chapter is no more than a beginning. Those who are provoked,
quite rightly, by its shortcomings, are invited to undertake the research needed to
eliminate them.® Second, this outline, though incomplete, leads to a reappraisal of
the myths, ancient and modern, which have grown up about the African past, and,
indeed, about underdevelopment in general. Unfortunately, neither a lack of
evidence nor a failure to consult work already pubhshed has inhibited the expression
of views about the economic backwardness of Africa in the period before European
rule. On the contrary, opinions have been stated with a degree of conviction which
sometimes appears to be inversely related to the amount of historical knowledge
acquired. It is hoped that the conclusions reached here will produce a more accurate
appreciation of the constraints operating on the West African economy in the pre¬
colonial period. They should also have a wider relevance, for generalised versions of
the myths associated with Africa can be found in books which purport to explain
economic backwardness in many other parts of the underdeveloped world today.
An amalgamated version of the beliefs about the economic backwardness of
Africa in the pre-colonial period would include the following major points. The
domestic economy was a subsistence economy, which was uniform, unchanging
and therefore uninteresting. Such an economy is worthy of only cursory attention
because the obstacles impeding its development can readily be identified and are
familiar enough—at least to experts. The dominant agricultural sector, so it is
alleged, was virtually immobilised by a combination of primitive technology,
communal land tenure and the extended family. The development of key entre¬
preneurial groups was inhibited by the prevalence of an anti-capitalist value system.
This ideology was reinforced by African political systems, which were either con¬
servative gerontocracies based on ascribed status, or were so egalitarian that it was
impossible for prospective innovators to accumulate savings. Such exchange as did^
occur did not follow the rules of supply and demand, as understood in the Western
world, but was conducted with the aim of maximising social rather than economic
values. Consequently, there was no factor market: that is to say, there was no regular,
institutionalised means of selling land, hiring labour, or raising money. The result
was that potentially productive factors were kept idle.
Interpretations of pre-colonial underdevelopment are basically variations on two
themes, which will be familiar, in somewhat different guises, to historians of other

* Valuable contributions have been made to the study of ‘traditional agriculture and
markets by geographers, anthropologists and field economists, though, understandably, their
work lacks the chronological dimension which is central to the writing of history.
® Some possible research topics will be suggested in subsequent sections of this chapter.

✓
 ♦

An Economic History of West Africa

parts of the world. On the one hand there is the myth of Primitive Africa, which
pictures the inhabitants of the continent as living, like Alfred Marshall’s savages,

under the dominion of custom and impulse; scarcely ever striking out new lines
for themselves; never forecasting the distant future; fitful in spite of their servitude
to custom; governed by the fancy of the moment; ready at all times for the most
arduous exertions, but incapable of keeping themselves long to steady work.®

This state of affairs prevented what'Western observers regarded as progress, both

moral and material. According to this interpretation, Africa’s release from barbarism
waited until the close of the nineteenth century, when the Europeans came, like
cavalry over the hill, to confer the benefits of Western civilisation on Kipling’-;

New caught, sullen peoples, ''

Half devil and half child.

On the other hand, there is the newer, more fashionable, myth of Merrie Africa,
which has come to the fore during the past ten or fifteen years. On this view the pre¬
colonial era was a Golden Age, in which generations of Africans enjoyed congenial
lives in well-integrated, smoothly-functioning societies. The means of livelihood
came easily to hand, for foodstuffs grew wild and in abundance, and this good
fortune enabled the inhabitants to concentrate on leisure pursuits, which, if some
sources are to be believed, consisted of interminable dancing and drumming.'^ The
Europeans, so it is alleged, disrupted a state of harmony^ cohesion based on shared
values was replaced by artificial unity backed by force, and ruthless exploitation
reduced the indigenous peoples to a degree of poverty which they had not known in
the past. The Merrie Africa myth is closely associated with what might be termed, in
deference to West Africa’s oldest political party, the True Whig interpretation of
African history.® This interpretation sees the present states and rulers of West Africa
as direct descendants of those of the pre-colonial era. It follows from this assumption
that the traditional order has to be described with an approving eye if history is to
fulfil its contemporary function of legitimising the present. African slave traders
become proto-nationalists, and large empires are acclaimed because their example
can be used to combat the centrifugal tendencies which have been a common, and
sometimes tragic, feature of the post-colonial period.

® Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th ed., 1938, pp. 723-4.

^ Fihns and travel brochures provide an important and neglected source for those inter¬
ested in the history of ideas, for both reflect, and in some cases reinforce, stereotypes. For
example. Horizon Travel Ltd invited those thinking of taking a foreign hoUday in 1972 to
visit the Gambia, where ‘the drum beat of black Africa captivates and enthrals you as you
watch the happy-go-lucky natives dance at the drop of a hat, as twiHght descends on Bathurst’.
Similarly, films designed to encourage foreign tourists to England give the impression that the
population is divided roughly equally between Yeomen of the Guard and morris dancers
« Herbert Butterfield in The Whig Interpretation of History, 1931, was the first to identify
the historical school which made use of past events in order to justify and reinforce the current
pohtical regime. The True Whig Party was founded about 1870, and has been in power in
Liberia more or less continuously since then.

10
 The domestic economy: structure and function

The foregoing survey of established approaches to Africa’s economic past will be

used in this chapter as a point of departure for what is hoped will be a more satis¬
factory appraisal of the nature of underdevelopment in the pre-colonial period, and
one which takes account of the interests of the ninety-nine per cent of the population
who were neither proto-nationalists nor rulers. Their liistory is certainly not that of
primitive savages, as will soon become abundantly clear, but it cannot be fitted into
the congenial schema provided by the Whig interpretation either. Some of the older
arguments caricatured here have already been demolished by others, and there is no
point in attacking them at great length. They will be noted simply to direct non¬
specialists to what is now generally regarded as a more accurate point of view. Other
interpretations, especially those, mostly of recent origin, that are still a matter of
debate among specialists, will be dealt with more fully and accorded the critical
respect they deserve. The analysis presented in this chapter is divided into four parts
covering the following topics: natural and human resources; production; the inter¬
nal distributive system; and conclusions about the constraints operating on the local
economy.

1 Natural and human resources

Historians commonly treat the natural environment as a ‘background’ to the events
which are their prime concern. This approach, while quite acceptable for political
biography or diplomatic studies, is less satisfactory in the case of economic history.
Indeed, West Africa’s economic past is the record of a continuous dialogue between
geography and history—^from the very beginnings of agriculture to the introduction
of modem industry. The sketch of natural resources provided here is to be seen merely
as a preface to a story of interaction that can be followed later on in this and subse¬
quent chapters.® The brevity of the present outline is intended to lend support to its
main purpose, which is to deny that the physical environment is immutable,
or that it has determined the course of African history.
From Dakar to Lake Chad, a distance of over two thousand miles, there extends a
belt of undulating grassland studded with trees. This area, known as the Western
Sudan, forms a corridor about 600 miles wide. To the north lies the Sahara desert,
which reaches out about one thousand miles towards North Africa. To the south,
and almost touching the sea, stretches a belt of tropical forest, again running from
west to east, but covering no more than 200 miles from north to south even at its
widest, and punctuated in the middle (roughly between Accra and Porto Novo) by
the savanna. Winter never comes to West Africa, so low temperatures are no
obstacle to plant growth, and rainfall is the chief physical determinant of the charac¬
ter and extent of the vegetation. The amount of rainfall decreases from the south,

® Readers who require more geographical information are referred to the monumental
work of scholarship by W. B. Morgan andj. C. Pugh, West Africa, 1969, which should also
be consulted with reference to subsequent sections of the present chapter and to Chapters 6
and 7.

II
An Economic History of West Africa

d
o
N

>

12
 The domestic economy: structure and function

where it might exceed lOO inches a year, to the north, where it might be non-existent
in some years. It is this variation which largely explains the great contrast between
the humid forest and the dry, bare desert, and also the tendency for vegetation zones
to run in parallel bands from west to east. This alignment is not seriously modified
by changes in altitude, for only rarely does the land rise much above two thousand
feet. The main vegetation zones have been present since about 3000 b.c., and are the
product of a drying-out process winch started ten or twelve thousand years ago.
Before then, and begimhng approximately seventy thousand years ago, there was
an era of reduced temperatures and higher rainfall that encouraged Mediterranean
vegetation and human settlement in parts of West Africa which are now desert.
It used to be thought that this environment was naturally well endowed and
potentially very rich. Huntington, whose theories achieved considerable popularity
in the 1920s and 1930s, incorporated this belief into his explanation of the economic
backwardness of the tropics. According to him, ‘low mentality, inertia, disease or
the relative ease of life in a tropical chmate may prevent people from having new
ideas or putting them into execution.’^° There were two main reasons why opinions
of this kind came to be held about West Africa. In the first place, early European
observers seem to have regarded the luxuriance of the tropical forest as an indication
of the general fertility of the region. Secondly, the long association between the
Western Sudan and the gold trade encouraged the view that the savanna was a rich
and desirable area.^^ In the 1940s and 1950s, however, a different interpretation
began to emerge, partly, it is interesting to note, as a result of the failure of a number
of post-war colonial projects for improving tropical agriculture. Tropical soils, so
it was said, were inherently infertile, raising agricultural productivity was a difficult
task, and the development prospects of the tropics were, in consequence, rather
bleak. Today, geographers are agreed that the problem is much more complex
than was suggested by earlier writers, and that a great deal remains to be learned
about the properties of tropical soils.However, there is sufficient evidence to show
that the alleged natural richness of the tropical environment, and the associated idea
that life on the equator is relatively easy, are both myths. It is now recognised that
savanna soils tend to be low in organic and mineral content, and are easily eroded,
while the rainfall of the area, besides being scanty, is also subject to marked seasonal
variations. The forest zone has deeper soils, but these, too, are frequently low in
nutrients, especially phosphorus. Beyond this point there is considerable uncertainty
about the relationship between climate and soils in the tropics and the development
potential of the area.
Comparing the natural resources and climates of different parts of the world in
order to draw conclusions about whether they stimulated or retarded the economic

Ellsworth Huntington, Mainsprings of Civilisation, New York, 1945, p. 4-

The gold trade is dealt with in Chapter 3. The alleged wealth of the Western Sudan
played a part in shaping European attitudes towards W^est Africa in the nineteenth century,
as is noted in Chapter 4.
Pierre Gourou, The Tropical World, 4th ed., 1966.
B. W. Hodder, Economic Development in the Tropics, 1968, p. ii.

13
 V

An Economic History of West Africa

progress of particular societies is a tempting but unprofitable exercise—ratber like

trying to decide if life is more difficult for penguins in the Antarctic or camels in the
Sahara. All that can safely be said is that the peoples of the underdeveloped countries
have much more in common than divides them. Their activities, whether in temper¬
ate or tropical zones, centre on the production of the goods and services needed for
survival at low levels of income. To achieve tliis end each society adapts to, and at
the same time tries to mould, its environment. The natural endowment of a particu¬
lar region may set broad limits, under a given technological, social and political
regime, to the kinds of activities which are carried out at any one point in time, but
there is still room within these limits for experiment and change. It is likely, to take a
West African example, that the forest was once more extensive than it is today, and
that part of the savanna was derived from it by the action of man.^^ A rise in popula¬
tion in the savanna, through natural increase or migration, encouraged the clearing
of additional land by burning the forest. Once this occurred, fire-resistant grasses
invaded the area, and a new type of agriculture evolved, associated, in some cases,
with the keeping of livestock. Man’s experiments, on occasion, have pushed back
the boundaries which previously constrained his activities and achievements. Such
was the case with the neolithic revolution based on the invention of agriculture and
on the domestication of animals, and with the. industrial revolution which began in
England in the late eighteenth century.
The physical environment has not been an immutable determinant of man’s
activities either in West Africa or in other parts of the world. Natural resources and
climate may help to identify the particular type of underdevelopment which exists
in one region rather than another, but do not, by themselves, explain the phenom¬
enon of underdevelopment itself. An enquiry into the causes of the poverty and
wealth of nations should begin by rejecting the assumption that man and his environ¬
ment can be treated as distmet entities having a fixed relationship, for man is an
essential and dynamic element in geography no less than in history.
Demography is, or, more accurately, should be, a central theme in African eco¬
nomic history, for the greater part of the continent’s gross ‘national’ product was,
and still is, derived from the application of human power to the land. It now seems
likely that Africa, so long regarded as a borrower rather than a lender in world
history, was the original home of man, and it has been established recently that
peoples of negro stock were present in parts of West Africa about eleven thousand
years ago.^® Migrations and intermarriage (which still continue today) have helped

Even this statement oversimplifies a complex problem, on wliich research is only just
beginning. See the preHminary study by W. B. Morgan and R. P. Moss, ‘Savanna and Forest
in West Africa’, Africa, 35, 1965, pp. 286-93.
The approach adopted m the foregoing paragraphs owes a great deal to two comple¬
mentary articles: June Helm, ‘The Ecological Approach in Anthropology’, American Journal
of Sociology, 67,1962, pp. 630-9, and W. B. Morgan and R. P. Moss, ‘Geography and Ecology:
the Concept of the Community and its Relationsliip to Environment’, Annals of the Association
of American Geographers, 55, 1965, pp. 339-50.
J. D. Clark, The Prehistory of Africa, 1970, pp. 164-9.

14
 The domestic economy: structure and function

to develop a wide variety of communities in the regiond'^ In the discussion that

follows, West Africa’s human resources will be considered in two parts, the first
dealing with the size, quality and distribution of the population, and the second with
the ways in which the labour force was organised.
Serious efforts to assess the numbers of people in West Africa date only from the
start of the twentieth century, when the total population was reckoned to be about
thirty-six millions. Extrapolation from this figure, which is itself an informed esti¬
mate rather than a precise calculation, is risky, though it has been suggested on this
basis that the population was roughly twenty-five millions in 1800. However, even
if the total relating to the beginning of the colonial period is taken to apply to a much
earlier date, it can still be said that the population of West Africa was small in relation
to the size of the region and to the land suitable for cultivation. Terms such as ‘over¬
population’ and ‘underpopulation’ contain a number of difficulties, and imply the
existence of an ‘optimum’ population, which is a rather elusive concept.^® Neverthe¬
less, the indications are that overpopulation was not, in general, one of West Africa’s
problems. On the contrary, it is likely that West Africa can stand as an example of
underdevelopment in an imderpopulated area.^® Put at its simplest, the evidence
suggests that in aggregate terms there was more land available than there was labour
to cultivate it. Even today, when the population is well over twice as great as it was
at the beginning of the twentieth century, land shortage has yet to become a major
problem, except in certain localities.
The foregoing generalisations require amplification. To begin with, it is impor¬
tant to recognise that sparse population and underpopulation are not necessarily
identical. The small number of people in a given area may well be accounted for by
the inadequacy of its natural resources. The population of the Sahara is sparse, but
the region cannot be said to be underpopulated. There is some evidence that in West
Africa low population densities, especially in parts of the Western Sudan, were
related to poor soils and to a lack of biological essentials, such as water and salt.2°In
areas where the land could have supported greater densities, an explanation of under¬
population is to be sought primarily in the influences affecting rates of fertility and
mortality, though it is also likely that political constraints on the movement of
peoples played a part in preventing the colonisation of particular localities. Little is
known about the factors which governed fertility in African societies, though it does
seem that child-rearing practices reduced the number of possible births in some

1'^ For further details see the classification adopted by Morgan and Pugh, West Africa,
pp. ly—32, which seems to be the most helpful one for economic historians.
E. A. Wrigley, Population and History, 1969, p. 36.
The impHcations of this observation are considered, from an economist’s pomt of view,
by Gerald K. Helleiner, ‘Typology in Development Theory: the Land Surplus Economy
(Nigeria)’, Food Research Institute Studies, 6, 1966, pp. i8i-94- For an exhaustive, geographical
study of the phenomenon of underpopulation see G. Sautter, De VAtlantique aufleuue Congo:
une geographie du sous-peuplement, 2 vols, Paris 1968.
For a general survey see Boleslaw Dumanowski, The Influence of Geographical Environ¬
ments on the Distribution and Density of Population in Africa’, Africana Bulletin, 9, 1968,

pp. 9-33-

15
i6
An Economic History of West Africa

Map 2. Present-day Distribution ©f West African Peoples.

 The domestic economy: structure and function

communities, but there is evidence to indicate that mortality from diseases such as
malaria, smallpox and trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) was high. It has been
established that these diseases are of great antiquity in West Africa,^^ and that there
were severe epidemics of smallpox, meningitis and plague. It has been suggested, for
example, that epidemics and famine greatly reduced the population in the central
part of the Western Sudan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.^^
Next, it is necessary to correct the impression, which is still widespread outside
the ranks of demographers, that underpopulation is an exceptional condition requir¬
ing special explanation. This view derives from the assumption that there is a normal
tendency for population to press against the limit of resources in accordance with the
principle that ‘nature abhors a vacuum’. This idea was first popularised by Malthus,
and it has received support in recent years because the population in many under¬
developed countries is undoubtedly growing rapidly. However, the population
‘explosion’ is a comparatively modern event in world history. Pre-industrial popula¬
tions were small: underpopulation was at least as common as overpopulation down
to the nineteenth century, and was certainly not peculiar to West Africa or even to
Africa as a whole. India and Latin America were underpopulated until at least the
beginning of the twentieth century, and so, too, were countries of white settlement,
such as North America and Australia. The notion that underpopulation is in some
ways preferable to overpopulation is equally common, but is also without founda¬
tion. Underpopulation may be the result of especially high rates of mortality, and it
presents serious obstacles to the development of a market economy, as will become
clear later in this chapter.
There is no reason to suppose that the quality of the labour force differed materially
from that of other pre-industrial societies.^^ The average expectation of life at birth
was probably around thirty-five years, much as it was in medieval Europe, and as it
remains in parts of West Africa today. The number of hours worked in farming and
associated activities was low, perhaps averaging about half the day throughout the
year, and sometimes rather less.^^ However, it would be wrong to conclude either
that there was massive underemployment in traditional African societies, or that
Africans suffered from a special disability, chronic lethargy. In the first place, the
average number of hours spent in farming was substantially less than the average
spent in productive employment as a whole, because farmers also engaged in other
activities, such as craft production and trading, on a part-time or seasonal basis.
Secondly, it has been shown that the energy costs of common agricultural tasks in

21 It has been argued that the tsetse fly, which transmits trypanosomiasis, is as old as man
himself. See Frank L. Lambrecht, ‘Aspects of the Evolution and Ecology of Tsetse FUes and
Trypanosomiasis in Prehistoric African Environment’, Journal of African History, 5, 1964,

^^22 S^kene-Mody Cissoko, ‘Famines et epidemies a Tombouctou et dans la boucle du

Niger du XVI® au XVIII® siecles’. Bulletin de VIFAN, B, 30,1968, pp. 806-21.
23 See, for example, D. C. Coleman, ‘Labour in the EngHsh Economy of the Seventeenth
Century’, Economic History Review, 8, 1956, pp. 280-95.
24 Rowena M. Lawson, ‘The Traditional Utihsation of Labour in Agriculture m the Lower
Volta, Ghana’, Economic Bulletin of Ghana, 12, 1968, pp. 54-<5i.

17
 An Economic History of West Africa

West Africa are severe, and that about half the day is needed for recuperation,
especially in communities where malnutrition and disease are common.^® Hunter’s
remarkable study of Nangodi demonstrates that the majority of the population
suffers a serious loss in body-weight in the critical period before the harvest, when
food is short, yet when energy is needed to gather the crops.^® Where there tons
underemployment in West Africa, in the sense that the labour force, though healthy,
was working below capacity in all occupations, it was due to lack of opportunities
rather than to a culture-bound leisure preference, for preference implies choice, and
choice was often absent. The ‘lazy’ African is in reality usually either debilitated or
without a market for his labour—or both.
The distribution of human resources provides an important clue to the ways in
which natural resources were utilised. W^est Africa’s small population was spread
unevenly throughout the region. This inequality was partly a reflection of the natural
endowment of the various microenvironments: fertile and healthy areas were
obviously more attractive than those which contained poor soils and fatal diseases.^^
More impressive, and in sharp contrast to the old, determinist viewpoint, is the
degree to which the distribution of settlements was the result of the' agricultural,
commercial and political activities of man.
Man s inventiveness in discovering and adopting different types of crops had a
profound effect on the carrying capacity of the land. Root crops, for example,
produce about ten times as much weight of food per unit of land as cereals, and are
capable of supporting greater population densities. The fact that roots are grown
mainly in the forest has helped to compensate for some of the less attractive features
of that region. The expansion of trade was responsible for concentrations of popula¬
tion in some unlikely places, such as the Sahara, where complex settlements wdth as
many as 10,000 inhabitants developed in the pre-colonial era.^® Inter-state conflicts
also had a major influence on the distribution of population. Fugitives from aggres¬
sion were sometimes compelled to seek sites which could be defended easily, though
in other respects they were inhospitable. Islands of settlement were found in remote

P- G. Phillips, The MetaboHc Cost of Common West African Agricultural Activities’,

Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 57, 1954, PP- 12-20.
J. M. Hunter, Seasonal Hunger in a Part of the ^^est African Savamia: a Survey of
Bodyweights in Nangodi, N.E. Ghana’, Institute of British Geographers Transactions, 41, 1967,
pp. 167-86. On the need for caution in discussing the so-called ‘hungry gap’ see the earher
article by Marvin P. Miracle, ‘Seasonal Hunger: a Vague Concept and an Unexplored
Problem , Bulletin de IIFAN, 23, 1961, pp. 273-83. The ‘hungry gap’ is less serious in root¬
growing forest areas, where seasonal variations in the availability of foodstuffs are not so
marked.
A tragic variation on this principle has been studied by Hunter, who has shown how
hunger drives migrants into fertile and inviting riverine areas, where they contract river bUnd-
ness and are forced to leave after a few years—^with their numbers greatly reduced. See J. M.
Hunter, ‘River Bhndness in Nangodi, Northern Ghana’, Geographical Review, 56, 1966
pp. 398-416.
In contrast to the popular view of the desert oasis as consisting of a few palm trees sur¬
rounding a^smaU pond of clear water. For a detailed study of one large Saharan settlement see
J. Laufray, ‘Chronique de Ghadames’, Ibla, 32, 1945, pp. 367-85; 33, 1946, pp. 343-71.

18
 The domestic economy: structure and Junction

highland fortresses, such as the Jos plateau in central Nigeria, and on smaller insel-
bergs, where a limited amount of surrounding lowland was used for cultivation, as
in the south-east part of what is now the Gold Coast.Occasionally, an expanding
power concentrated settlement as a matter of policy. This was the case with the
Fulani, who conquered the Fouta Djallon liiglilands in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, and settled slaves there to cultivate the land.^°
Concentration was frequently associated with a striking degree of urbanisation,
both in the savanna and in the forest. It has been estimated that three of the largest
towns in the Western Sudan, namely Gao, Timbuctu and Djerme, had populations
which ranged from 15,000 to 80,000 in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.^^ About
half the population of Hausaland (in what is now northern Nigeria) lived in towns
in the period before 1900, the most prominent example being Kano, whose popula¬
tion in the middle of the nineteenth century was reckoned by the famous traveller,
Barth, to be about 30,000, a figure that doubled at the height of the trading season.
The Yoruba, further south and partly in the forest zone, were also highly urbanised.
In the nineteenth century Yorubaland contained about a dozen towns with popula¬
tions of over 20,000, the largest being Ibadan, which had about 70,000 inhabitants
and an outer wall measuring twenty-four miles in circumference.^^ Further east, the
forest city of Benin was reckoned to have a population of 15,000 at the end of the
eighteenth century, and was thought to have been much larger two or three centur¬
ies earlier. At the beginning of the seventeenth century a Dutch visitor to Benin
recorded the following impressions:

The towne seemeth to be very great, when you enter into it, you goe into a broad
street, not paved, which seemeth to be seven or eight times broader than the
Warmoes street in Amsterdam, which goeth right out, and never crooketh, and
where I was lodged ... it was at least a quarter of an houres going from the gate,
and yet I could not see to the end of the street...

It is impossible here to enter into a general discussion of the origin and structure
of pre-industrial towns.^^ However, it is important to point out that the view that
urbanisation becomes quantitatively significant only after industrialisation needs to
be stated carefully if the contrast between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ societies is not

These settlements have been studied by M. B. Cleave, whose work is hsted in the bibho-
graphy for Chapter 6.
J. Richard-Molard, ‘Les densites de population au Fouta-Djallon’, Presence Africaine, 15,
1952, pp. 95-106.
For further information see Raymond Mauny, Tableau g^ographique de I'ouest africain au
inoyen age, Dakar 1961, pp. 495-503, though the figures quoted here reflect the results of more
recent research.
32 William R. Bascom, ‘Urbanism as a Traditional African Pattern’, Sociological Review, 7,
1959, PP- 29-43-
33 Quoted in Thomas Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives, i960, pp. 119-20. The visitor was
the anonymous ‘D.R.’, possibly Dierick Reuters.
3^ For further consideration of this question see Gideon Sjoberg, The Preindustrial City,
Glencoe i960.

19
An Economic History of West Africa

to .be overemphasised. Towns and large villages were a common feature of the
West African landscape in the pre-colonial era. Admittedly, their occupational
structure differed from that of modern cities in that they were primarily places where
agriculturalists gathered for non-agricultural purposes, above all for defence and
trade. Many African urban dwellers commuted daily to their farms outside the town
walls, whereas in the Western world suburban man travels into the city centre to
work in industry and commerce. This evidence shows what is not in dispute, namely
that West African towns were not industrial towns in the modem sense, but it cannot
be used to argue that they were essentially different from the towns which existed,
for instance, in late medieval Europe. African towns not only sheltered farmers, they
housed specialised personnel, such as craftsmen, transport contractors, hoteliers and
merchants; they were focal points for the exchange of goods of all kinds; and they
were important administrative and religious centres. Indeed, some towns on the
Sahara-savanna border concentrated on trade to such an extent that they were almost
entirely dependent on external supplies for their basic food requirements. Like their
counterparts in the medieval world. West African towns were wealthy enough to
support a small, leisured group, and they encouraged, indirectly, the development of
a ‘high’ culture, as witness the now famous ‘bronzes’ of Ife and Benin, and the centre
of Muslim scholarship iu the legendary city of Timbuctu.^®
There is one final aspect of the distribution of population which needs to be
stressed, namely its mobility. The movement of the labour force, whether in long
waves of several generations, or whether seasonal (or even daily), far from being a
novelty introduced by colonialism, was an estabhshed feature of the traditional
economy. Even the now justly-celehrated migration of the farmers who founded the
Gold Coast cocoa industry at the turn of the present century should be seen, in the
context of West African history as a whole, as a relatively small movement in terms
of numbers and distance. Legends of the origins of West African peoples, which have
been traced, in some cases, as far back as the eighth century, all emphasise the
importance of mobility as a means of escaping alien control or of acquiring new
wealth in the form of land, gold or salt.*^® Besides those who were forced, for political
reasons, to live in cramped conditions, there were others who gained from the
security which resulted from the expansion of state power, whether in the savanna
kingdoms, such as Mali and Songhai, or in the forest states, such as Benin and
Ashanti. During the dry season, when labour demands on the farm were light and
travelling conditions were at their best, the roads came alive with traders and porters,
and the towns bulged with noisy and acquisitive visitors. As will become apparent
later on, migration made economic sense, for it reflected the prevailing land-labour
ratio and the differential spatial distribution of market opportunities.
The organisation of the labour force is central to an understanding of the utilisation
of natural resources. The work force of pre-industrial societies is usually regarded as

Ife and Benin brass work is thought to date from the thirteenth century. Timbuctu,
founded in the twelfth century, had become a noted seat of learning by the fourteenth century.
See the studies by Dorjahn and ThoUey, Gueye, Holas, Kup, Niane, Pageard, Perie and
Sellier, and Riad hsted m the bibliography.

20
 The domestic economy: structure andfunction

being based on unspecialised and inefficient family labour, whereas industrial

countries are said to organise their workers on the basis of contract instead of kin¬
ship, to allocate tasks according to skills rather than social obhgations, and to be
highly efficient. It will be contended here that the labour force in pre-colonial Africa
was more varied, more flexible and more efficient than is customarily supposed, and
that, in this respect at least, the contrast between ‘primitive’ and ‘modern’ societies
has been exaggerated.
The most important economic umt in virtually all West African societies was, and
still is, the household. The household was not always identical with the family, and
was quite capable of adapting its size and skills to meet changing circumstances and
to create new opportumties. Each household approximated to the optimum size for
the conditions in which it operated. A large household could divide itself into several
smaller umts, though without necessarily breaking up the family too. Netting’s
research has demonstrated that small households predominated among the Kofyar
of central Nigeria because they were best suited to the system of intensive agriculture
which prevailed in the area.^'^ The household was also capable of expanding.
Reybum s study of Cameroon, for example, has suggested that the demand for
extra labour was a principal cause of the existence and growth of polygynous
families.^® Households of all sizes were usually in a position to mobilise additional
labour at times of peak demand. Communal labour was used by the Yoruba (in
Nigeria) to prepare and weed farms, and by the Adioukrou (in the Ivory Coast) to
exploit groves of palm trees. Many African societies distinguished between the
labour of men and women, though the line was not always drawn at the same
point. In Bamenda (Cameroon) women were especially important in farming,
whereas in Yorubaland they spent much more of their time trading. However, there
was a considerable degree of occupational specialisation, both seasonal and perma¬
nent, which cut across divisions of sex. In any case, it is by no means clear that the
division of labour between men and women represented a serious misallocation of
human resources. Although the spread of Islam from the eighth century onwards
encouraged a more restrictive attitude towards the activities of females, African
women adjusted to this situation with characteristic ingenuity by devising a market¬
ing system which was based on the compound rather than on the village square,®®
There is no evidence to show that the household labour force was inefficient, and
it is hard to envisage organisational changes which would have cut production costs
or greatly improved the range, quality or volume of output. It is noteworthy that
the household, far from dissolving under the impact of Western capitalism in the
twentieth century, or for that matter surviving to obstruct economic progress,

Robert McC. Netting, Hill Farmers of Nigeria, Seattle 1968. A similar thesis is developed
by Irene B. Taeuber, ‘The Family of Chinese Farmers’, in Family and Kinship in Chinese Society,
ed. Maurice Freedman, Stanford 1970, pp. 63-85.
3® William D. Reyburn, ‘Polygamy, Economy and Christianity in the Eastern Cameroun’,
Practical Anthropology, 6, 1959, pp. 1-19.
Polly HiU, ‘Hidden Trade in Hausaland’, Man, 4, 1969, pp. 392-409, has studied this
system as it operates today.

21
 \

An Economic History of West Africa

became a dynamic agency for the development of new export crops and for the
expansion of internal trade. Households could change their size and suffer serious
losses, but they rarely went out of business. It is suggested, speculatively, that the
tenacity of the household as a unit of production can be explained partly by viewmg
its labour force as a fixed overhead rather than as a variable cost.^° In practice over¬
heads were kept low because all members of the household began working at a very
early age and remained in employment until they became infirm or died, while
those who were unemployed could be maintained relatively cheaply. The household
was highly competitive because family labour was costless (in the formal sense of not
receiving a wage) and could be used to the point where its marginal product was
zero.^^ Traditional roles proved to be flexible. In the twentieth centui^, for example,
men became more involved in farming than they had in the past. Furthermore, the
much-maligned extended family, far from being a ‘drag on development’, often
provided the funds which enabled enterprising individuals and groups to launch new
undertakings, and it offered them a refuge if their ventures failed. The large house¬
hold and the extended family undoubtedly placed obligations on successful entre¬
preneurs, but they usually had the skill to balance private mterest against the claims
of their kinsmen.
, Allegations about the inefficiency of the traditional labour force are the product
not only of an inadequate appreciation of the historical evidence relating to Africa,
but also of an exaggerated sense of the superiority and modernity of labour organisa¬
tion in Europe. Yet it is not hard to show that Western reality diverged from the
Western ideal, though it is the latter rather than the former which has been used to
judge the performance of the rmderdeveloped countries. The household firm, for
instance, remained an important unit of production in England long after the in¬
dustrial revolution. In the late nineteenth century the vast majority of manufacturing
firms continued to be family businesses, though they also used contracted labour.^^
Today, the family firm is prominent in retailing and farming, and often employs
little or no additional help. The extended family also proved to be a dynamic force in
Europe, as the examples of the Rothschilds (in banking) and the Cadburys and
Pilkingtons (in industry) make clear.'^^ Restrictive practices based on ‘tradition’ are

As was the case with the Russian peasant farm in the late nineteenth century. See James
R. MiUar, ‘A Reformulation of A. V. Chayanov’s Theory of the Peasant Farm Economy’,
Economic Development and Cultural Change, i8, 1970, pp. 219-29.
The Europeans who tried to estabhsh plantations in West Africa in the early years of the
twentieth century found themselves at a disadvantage because they had to employ paid labour,
and they could operate profitably only while the marginal product of labour was greater than
the wage which had to be paid.
E. Wayne Nafziger, ‘The Effect of the Nigerian Extended Family on Entrepreneurial
Development’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 18, 1969, pp. 25-33.
P. L. Payne, ‘The Emergence of the Large-scale Company in Great Britain, 1870-1914’,
Economic History Review, 20, 1967, p. 520.
Even in America, the heartland of advanced capitahsm, the extended family is still an
important, if neglected, institution. See R. Hill, Family Development in Three Generations, New
York 1970.

22
 The domestic economy: structure andfunction

still enforced in the 1970s by trade unions and professional organisations. Female
labour may well be underused to a greater extent in England than in West Africa.
It is the practice among certain social classes, Christians and agnostics alike, to
confine their women to the home mainly for cultural reasons, it being considered
an adverse reflection on the husband if his wife has to go out to work. Those women
who do try to make use of their abilities still experience discrimination. In 1971,
about two hundred years after the beginning of the industrial revolution, the London
Stock Exchange voted for the third time in four years not to admit women to
membership.^®
Not all labour was orgamsed on the basis of multifunctional domestic units.
Additional labour was provided mainly by slaves, though a small number of hired
hands was used as well. Travellers to African states in the pre-colonial period esti¬
mated the numbers of slaves at between a quarter and one half of the total population,
but little credence can be given to guesswork of this kind. Many of these figures
relate to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the number of domestic
slaves had been swollen by the development of the notorious Atlantic trade. The
problem of numbers is complicated by the difficulty of defining terms. Many of the
‘slaves’ recorded by foreign visitors may well have been, like the ‘slaves’ of the Tsars
of Russia, loyal, if subordinate, citizens of the state, while others, though formally
of slave status, were in practice integrated into the household and were virtually
indistinguishable from free men. At the same time, it is important to recognise that
slave labour was present in West Africa long before the rise of the Atlantic trade,^®
and that some slaves were bought, sold and otherwise used like the chattel slaves of
the Americas. A substantial minority of the population in certain areas occupied a
position of legal subordination and practical dependence which was less advan¬
tageous than that enjoyed by free men. Not all slavery was a misnomer.
If it is accepted that slavery in West Africa was not simply a European invention,
then it becomes necessary to explain the existence, longevity and variety of the institu¬
tion, and to consider whether the presence of slave labour qualifies or supports the
argument advanced so far regarding the efficiency of labour organisation in the pre¬
colonial period.^'^
The main concentrations of slaves were in areas where the development of domes¬
tic exchange activities created employment opportunities which could not be met
by local, free labour. In West Africa, as in many other parts of the pre-industrial
world, such as Greece and Rome, it was large states, such as Mali and Songhai in the
savanna and Ashanti and Dahomey in the forest, which had the greatest need for
slaves and also the means to buy or capture them. Slaves were usually fairly special¬
ised workers, though they were found in a variety of occupations. A few privileged

The Times, 36Jime 1971, p. i.

Allan G. B. Fisher and Humphrey J. Fisher, Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa, 1970.
Further research is needed before adequate answers can be given to these questions. The
most detailed study yet made of domestic slavery in West Africa is E. Adeniyi Oroge, The
Institution of Slavery in Yorubaland with Particular Reference to the Nineteenth Century, University
of Birmingham Ph.D. thesis, 1971.

23
 •V

An Economic History of West Africa

slaves held senior civil and military positions. These powerful trusties often
possessed numerous slaves of their own. Others were found in skilled jobs, such as
craft manufacture. The majority, however, performed work which was usually
menial, sometimes gruelling and occasionally dangerous.^® Slaves were employed
as domestic.servants, they acted as carriers, they maintained oases and cut rock salt
from the desert, they laboured to build towns, construct roads and clear paths, they
were drafted as front line troops, and they were corhmon in all types of agricultural
work. Farm slaves were not used, as in many other parts of the world, to produce an
export surplus, but rather, as in Songhai in the fifteenth century, to provide food¬
stuffs for leading state officials, for their immediate circle of dependants, and for the
army. Agricultural slaves were essential to societies which were not themselves
specialist food producers. The fertile valley of Tamourt in Mauritania, for example,
has been the granary of Saharan nomads since the fourteenth century, when they
first enslaved the negro cultivators of the region.^®
The question now arises as to why the shortage of labour in certain parts of West
Africa was remedied by enslavement and by an enforced redistribution of the region’s
human resources. Countries which have faced a labour shortage during the indus¬
trial era have often been able to employ machinery instead. Indeed, high labour costs
have sometimes provided an incentive for the introduction of advanced tech¬
nology.®® However, West African entrepreneurs, living in a pre-industrial, pre-
Newtonian world, were unable to adapt in this way. An alternative solution, and
one which was open to them, was to attract labour by paying wages. Many goods
and some services were bought and sold for money, so it is incorrect to assume, as is
sometimes done, that Africans failed to devise an acceptable means of payment. It is
suggested here that the use of slave rather than wage labour was a matter of deliberate
choice on the part of African employers.®^ As noted earher, the scarce factor of
production in West Africa was labour rather than land. In these circumstances there
was a natural tendency towards dispersed settlement and extensive agriculture, since

There was no sharp division of labour between male and female slaves, but it is probably
true to say that women were used principally in domestic work, craft productioir and agri¬
culture. However, not all women occupied subordinate positions. Some, such as the famous
Madam Tinubu of Abeokuta, struck a blow for women’s equahty by buying large numbers of
male slaves.
Charles Toupet, ‘La vallee de la Tamourt en Naaj; problemes d’amenagement’. Bulletin
de I’lFAN, B, 20, 1958, pp. 68-110.
As has been suggested was the case in North America in the nineteenth century. See
H. J. Habakkuk, American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge 1962.
This explanation is essentially that advanced by H. J. Nieboer, Slavery as an Industrial
System: Ethnological Researches, The Hague 1900. There are signs now of a revival of interest in
this classic. See Evsey D. Domar, ‘The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom: a Hypothesis’, Jonma/ of
Economic History, 30, 1970, pp. 18-32. A word of caution should be added here: Nieboer’s
theory is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the existence of slavery, though it so
happens to fit the African case. Slavery and serfdom can exist without there being a labour
shortage. Conversely, a labour shortage does not always lead to enslavement; the decline of
population in fourteenth-century England enabled labourers to increase their bargaining
power, and so hastened the end of serfdom.

24
 The domestic economy: structure and function

the optimum factor combination was that which economised on labour and made
as much use of land as possible. As long as the labour force remained mobile and
could engage freely in a variety of occupations, hired labour would be expensive.
Production costs in common activities, such as farming and craft production, would
be higher for wage labour than for independent households. Where the two did not
compete directly, as in the case of salt mining and military employment, the wage
paid to contracted labour would have had to be considerable to compensate for the
loss of alternative earnings, and for the arduous and risky nature of the work. Slaves
were preferred because the costs of acquiring and maintaining them were less than
the cost of hiring labour.
Against this view it might be objected, as Montesquieu and Adam Smith objected,
that the additional cost of free labour was more than justified by its greater efficiency.
However, it is now recognised that many of the stock allegations regarding the
inefficiency of slave labour are either misconceived or greatly exaggerated, and it
seems highly unlikely that African employers would have failed, during the course
of many centuries, to act in their own interests. Employers elsewhere were satisfied
with the performance of their slaves. In the case of the Roman Empire, slavery
collapsed not because it was inefficient, but because of the decline (for other reasons)
of the staple products for which slave labour was best suited.®^ Similarly, it is gener¬
ally agreed (though the exchange of equations continues) that plantation slavery in
the American south was efficient and profitable during the nineteenth century.®^
From the point of view of economic development the chief disadvantage of slavery
is not that it is inefficient, but that it limits the expansion of the market by holding
down purchasing power and by concentrating effective demand in the hands of a
few luxury consumers. This consideration was irrelevant to the aims of West African
rulers. Politics in a pre-industrial society is largely the art of redistributing a relatively
fixed national income with a degree of inequality which is sufficient to make life
luxurious for the rulers without at the same time provoking discontent on such a
scale as to endanger the existence of the state. It is not enough to be born ‘more equal
than others’; the problem is to stay that way. Those who achieve success need to be
skilled in retaining the loyalty of their subjects, but the means at their disposal do not
include the offer of cumulative economic growth based on a mass market.
With regard to the longevity of the institution of slavery, it is sufficient at this
stage simply to note that the conditions underlying the existence of slave labour in
West Africa survived down to the twentieth century.®^ Indeed, the colonial rulers
discovered, as African employers had discovered long before them, that the supply
price of unskilled labour was higher than they could afford, or at least were prepared

Cedric A. Yeo, ‘The Economics of Roman and American Slavery’, Finanzarchiv, 13,
1951-2, pp. 445-85-
Alfred H. Comad and John R. Meyer, Studies in Econometric History, 1965, chs 3 and 4.
Also Stanley L. Engerman, ‘The Effects of Slavery upon the Southern Economy: A Review
of the Recent Debate’, Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, 4, 1967, pp. 71-97-
The decline of slavery and the rise of a wage labour force are dealt with in Chapter 6,
part 2.

25
An Economic History of West Africa

to pay. Administrators in both British and French West Africa faced a labour short¬
age during the early part of the colonial period, and they resorted to the use of forced
labour, even though they were committed to the abolition of slavery. The colonial
mind resolved this paradox by declaring slavery to be uncivilised, and forced labour
to be a necessary way of instructing primitive people about the advantages of
modernity.
The diverse nature of slavery reflected prevailing conditions of supply and
demand in West Africa. Since labour was relatively scarce, the cost of replacing
slaves was high, and owners had a strong motive for maintaining at least a proportion
of their slaves in reasonable condition and encouraging them to breed. Where
supplies were abundant, as was to be the case in the Caribbean, employers had little
incentive to invest in the long-term welfare of their slaves. The result was that slaves
were ‘run’ at full capacity and treated as chattels. The demand for labour in West
Africa was also much more varied than in the Caribbean, and the differential treat¬
ment which slaves received was related to some extent to the roles assigned to them.
Moreover, slaves in West Africa, besides being inputs in the productive system, per¬
formed an important political fimction. Africans measured wealth and power in
men rather than in acres; those who exercised authority were man-owners rather
than landowners. In some circumstances obedience could be coerced, but in others
it was judged advisable to secure support by offering slaves a modest stake in the
existing political system.
Societies which made extensive use of slave labour exliibited two concurrent
tendencies. On the one hand, the influx of new slaves and the presence of slaves whose
ethnic origins limited their chances of integration, created a dispossessed and poten¬
tially disaffected group. Discontented slaves occasionally rose against their masters:
one of the earliest known slave revolts in West Africa occurred in 1591, when the
ruler of Songhai’s slaves asserted themselves after their owner and his troops had
been defeated by the Moroccan army. On the other hand, there was a trend towards
assimilating slaves into society by offering them certain rights in return for loyalty.
The Hausa (in northern Nigeria) distinguished between the bayi, who had been
captured or bought, and who had few rights, and the cucenawa, who, as second
generation slaves, occupied a position that was closer to serfdom than to chattel
slavery. In attempting to strike a balance between total exploitation and an entirely
free community of farmers, employers were expressing their appreciation of the
need to develop a subtle form of dependent labour, one which was more profitable
than hired labour, yet which was also capable of fulfilling extra-economic
functions.
The foregoing assessment of slavery points to amendments to three common
assumptions concerning the nature of pre-industrial societies. In the first place, and
contrary to the belief of the substantivist school of anthropologists, there was a long-
established labour market in Africa. The fact that this market took the form of slave
labour rather than wage labour was the result of a deliberate choice based on an
elementary, but broadly accurate, cost-benefit analysis, that is to say on principles
which the substantivists regard as peripheral or non-existent in ‘traditional’ societies.

26
 The domestic economy: structure and function

To interpret slave-raiding as an expression of what Balandier has called ‘economo-

drama’, that is an economic game played for social ends, is to misunderstand, or at
least to oversimplify, the motives underlying the need for an unpaid, dependent
labour force. Secondly, the existence of slave labour provides evidence of the
inequalities which were present in pre-colonial society. Traditional societies are said
to have levelling mechanisms which ‘play a crucial role in inhibiting aggrandisement
by individuals or by special social groups’.®® These mechanisms take the form of
forced loans levied on those whose incomes show signs of rising above the average,
feasting and free gifts, and result, so it is claimed, in a ‘democracy of poverty’.®®
These ideas fit neatly with the notion of Merrie Africa, but they fail to recognise that
national income, though small in aggregate terms, can still be distributed unevenly,
and they are not supported in the case of West Africa by satisfactory historical
evidence. From early times wealth was achieved through the labour of slaves. In the
eleventh century there were merchants in Awdaghost, on the Sahara-savanna
margin, who possessed more than one thousand slaves; elsewhere, and in later
centuries, even larger slave owners were found. These were the men who could
afford expensive items, such as meat, wheat or yams, salt and luxuries from abroad,
and who, like the Fulani conquerors in the Guinea highlands, lived ‘la vie de chat¬
eau’.®"^ The poor, who are often presumed not to have existed in pre-colonial West
Africa, had to content themselves with carrion, inferior grains or cassava and im¬
perfect salt substitutes, and at times of extreme need free men had to place themselves
or members of their family in pawn to wealthy creditors.®® Thirdly, the theory that
pre-industrial societies owe their cohesiveness to freely-accepted and equally-shared
values ignores the possibility that the interests of dependent labourers may not be
identified completely with those of their masters, and it fails to appreciate that
solidarity can be the result of compulsion. Elements from both conflict and func¬
tionalist approaches are needed if change and stability in pre-industrial societies are
to be understood.

2 Production

This section will begin to examine the productive activities which resulted from the
interaction of natural and human resources in the pre-colonial period. The aim of the
discussion is both descriptive and analytical. Description is needed because general
histories of West Africa scarcely mention domestic production, and deal only with

Manning Nash, Primitiue and Peasant Economic Systems, San Francisco 1966, p. 35.
Manning Nash, ‘The Social Context of Economic Choice in a Small Society’, Man, 219,
1961, p. 190.
E. F. Gauthier, L’Afrique noire occidentale, Paris, 1943, p. lyi-
For a clear statement of economic and social inequalities at the beginning of the six¬
teenth century see Walter Rodney, A History of the Upper Guinea Coast, 1545-1800, Oxford
1970, pp. 34-8. The system of pawning, by which debts were repaid by providing free labour
for a specified period, is one which needs further research.

27
An Economic History of West Africa

trade, especially foreign trade. Analysis is required to relate the information pre¬
sented here to the myths (outlined at the beginning of the chapter) of a static, in¬
flexible, uniform, and essentially simple, subsistence economy. It will be argued that
the indigenous economy experienced major historical changes; that it was capable
of accepting and initiating novel types of activity; that it exhibited regional and
occupational diversity; and that its organisation was complex. This analysis, it is
suggested, points to the need to revise a number of standard explanations of econo¬
mic backwardness in ‘traditional’ societies.
. Throughout their history, most West Africans have won their living from the
land. Agriculture was the chief activity in the greater part of the region, as it was in
other pre-industrial societies, and today foodstuffs still account for the largest share
of the value of the goods and services produced each year by West African countries.
Moreover, agriculture remains, as in the past, the ‘matrix in which all other indigen¬
ous economic activity is set.’®® It is not, and it was not, necessary to give up farming
in order to enter occupations such as craft manufacture and trade, which are fre¬
quently undertaken on a part-time or seasonal basis. On the contrary, an agricultural
surplus often made it possible to fmance additional types of productive enterprise.
For the past five centuries the staple foodstuffs have been grains, such as millet
(mainly sorghum and permisetum), maize, rice and fordo (hungry rice), and roots,
chiefly yams, cocoyams, cassava (also known as mardoc) and plantains. These crops
are grown in association with a variety of legumes, bulbs and fruit. Cereals tend to
predominate in the savanna, and roots in a large part of the forest, a division which
reflects the physical requirements of the crops and the geographical differences
between the two regions. Rainfall is particularly important in this context. In the
savaruia rainfall is sparse and falls in a period of three to five months, which explains
why the main crops are annuals, such as cereals. In the forest rainfall is greater and I
spreads over about seven months of the year, which means that perenniels, such as \
tree crops and a number of roots, can be grown. These generalisations require ,)
qualification. In the first place, there is a considerable overlap between these regions,
where combinations of cereals and roots are grown. Secondly, there are local
variations within the two major regions themselves, the most important being in
the forest, where there is a distinction between the predominantly rice-growing area
in the west, and the predominantly yam-dominant area in the east, the dividing line
being the Bandama river in what is now the Ivory Coast. The reasons for this distinc¬
tion are not fully understood. It may have a physical basis, the soils and lower rainfall
of the eastern region being better suited, perhaps, to yams than to rice, and it may
be the result of cultural differences between the peoples of the forest.®® If the latter
interpretation is correct, then the distinction between the western and eastern parts
of the forest can be said to represent a striking example of the variable nature of
human reactions to broadly similar environmental conditions.

Polly Hill, ‘Some Characteristics of Indigenous West African Economic Enterprise’,

Economic Bulletin of Ghana, 6, 1962, pp. 3-14.
This suggestion has been made by J. Miege, ‘Les cultures viAurieres en Afrique occidentale’,
Cahiers d’Outre-Mer, 7, 1954, pp. 25-50.
 The domestic economy: structure and function

Agriculture is such a pervasive and long established activity in West Africa that it
is easy for economists, and even historians, to take its existence for granted. Yet the
domestication of plants and animals, the ‘neolithic’ revolution which Gordon Childe
did so much to elucidate,®^ was one of the great events in world liistory, and one of
the outstanding achievements of the indigenous inhabitants of Africa. Agriculture
provided more assured supplies of food; it made possible the creation (and appropria¬
tion) of a surplus; it stimulated a degree of urbanisation and specialisation; and it
permitted an increase in population, since the maximum size no longer depended
on the numbers that could be supported at the leanest time of the year by hunting
and gathering.
The origins of the food-producing revolution in West Africa have been the sub- ;
ject of considerable controversy among specialists.®^ The established view of the '
majority of archaeologists, headed by Clark, is that agriculture began in the savaima
around 2000 B.C., following the diffusion of ideas and plants from Egypt. However,
objections to this interpretation have been raised from several quarters during the
last ten or fifteen years. Murdock, an ethnographer, has argued that agriculture began
independentlyin West Africa about 5000B.c.Porteres, a botanist, has also suggested
that West African agriculture was an independent development, but considers that
it originated between 2800 and 1500 B.c. Wrigley, a historian, has advanced a case
to show that certain kinds of agricultural practices originated in West Africa, and
that the forest may have been an independent centre of origin. These arguments,
though often speculative with regard to dates and evidence, have brought to the
fore hypotheses which are beginning to receive serious attention. The diffusionist
theory, once imquestioned, is no longer stated with confidence, and the latest
archaeological research has tended to stress both the antiquity and the variety of pre¬
historic agriculture in West Africa.®®
If, as seems Hkely, new archaeological discoveries are made in the near future,
current views will almost certainly need radical revision. At the moment, and for
present purposes, it can be said that West African agriculture, besides being of pre¬
historic origin, did not lag far behind primary centres of origin, such as the Near
East; that at this early date the main staples were millet, rice and fonio in the savanna,
and yams and the oil palm in the forest; that while external contacts were of great
importance there is evidence to suggest that there was an indigenous. West African
neolithic agriculture; and that the assumption that agriculture developed earlier in
the savanna than in the forest must be regarded as dubious.
The development of agriculture was not a sudden event, nor did it place such
demands on the allegedly limited capacities of the indigenous people as to cause

What Happened in History, 1942.

For a useful survey of the literature see M. A. Havinden, ‘The History of Crop Culti¬
vation in West Africa: a BibHographical Guide’, Economic History Review, 23,1970, pp. 532-55.
Eighteen important articles from the Journal of African History have been selected by J. D. Page
and R. A. OHver and published under the title Papers in African Prehistory, Cambridge 1970.
Clark himself has taken account of this work in his latest book. See J. Desmond Clark,
The Prehistory of Africa, 1970, pp. 199-206.

29
 V

An Economic History of West Africa

f
j them to drift through subsequent centuries in a state of lassitude, bereft of initiative
and ripe for colonial rule. Connections with other parts of the world remained .
strong, and the flow of plants and seeds continued. Asian yams, cocoyams, bananas,
and plantains reached West Africa by of the Near East between the first and the
I eighth centuries a.d. By the time the first written records become available, it is
clear that agriculture was well established throughout West Africa. In the tenth
century al-Muhallabi, writing of the Kingdom of Kanem (north-east of Lake Chad)
reported that ‘the length of their land is a fifteen days’ journey through habitations
and cultivations all the way. . . . Millet chiefly is cultivated in the land, and beans,
also wheat. Most of the ordinary people . . . spend their time cultivating and looking
after their cattle.’®^ In the thirteenth century, if not before, the ruler of Kanem
maintained an experimental farm, which grew a variety of cereals and fruits. When
the Portuguese arrived on the coast of West Africa two centuries later, they found
that upland and swamp rice were widely cultivated in the western part of the forest,
and that yams were the main staple in the east. The English traveller, Jobson, who
visited the Gambian coast in the seventeenth century, noted that ‘the generall Trade
from which none but the Kings and principall persons are exempted, is Husbandry,
whereto . . . the people of all sizes after their abilitie are subject’.®®
The coming of the Europeans in the late fifteenth century led to the introduction
I of a number of crops which are now regarded as typical of West African agriculture.
The most important of these were maize, cassava, groundnuts, tobacco and, later on,
cocoa, as well as a variety of fruits. The principal source of supply was South America,
and the two main channels of diffusion were a direct route from Brazil, and an
indirect route via Iberia, both of which were established by the Portuguese. There
has been some debate over the timing of the introduction of one of these crops,
namely maize. According to one school of thought, maize was present in West
Africa before the Europeans made contact with America. This is a possibility which
has not been proved, and the balance of the evidence favours the view expressed here
that maize was imported from South America.
The effect which these crops had on the local economy, though more important
than the precise timing of their arrival, has yet to attract serious historical attention.
The spread of Asian and American crops was undoubtedly a lengthy process, and is
still going on today, but the slow pace of change should not be taken as evidence that
indigenous farmers were unreceptive to new opportunities. First, it took time for
knowledge of foreign seeds and plants to spread throughout the region as a whole.
Second, new crops were tried out cautiously because no community was going to
place its established food supplies at risk through the hasty adoption of untested
novelties. Third, the rate of diffusion was sometimes inliibited by technical problems.
Cassava, for example, though introduced in the sixteenth century, did not begin to '
spread rapidly until the close of the eighteenth century, when it became known how

Quoted ill Roland Oliver and J. D. Page, A Short History of Africa, Harmondsworth
1962, p. 47.
Quoted in Basil Davidson, The African Past, Harmondsworth 1966, p. 205.

30
 The domestic economy: structure and function

to process the crop in such a way as to remove the prussic acid wliich some varieties
contained. Fourth, the speed of adoption was related to the growth of demand for
foodstuffs. In the twentieth century, for instance, the rise of a wage labour force and
the development of specialised export producers encouraged farmers in certain areas
to concentrate on producing food for the internal market.
where new plants and seeds were adopted, it was not because they caught the / j
fancy of a primitive people, but because they were seen as useful additions to the/ (
existing range of foods, being worth more than the extra cost of producing them/
or alternatively because they were regarded as good substitutes, yielding a highdr
return for the same input than the crops they displaced. Thus maize has spread i i
areas formerly dominated by yams and sorghum because it gives two crops a yea:,
both of which have fairly good yields, while cassava has become common in yan
producing regions because it is easy to grow and produces food throughout the yea:.
Yams are still the preferred food and they have greater nutritional value, but th( y
make heavy demands on the soil and they need a great deal more labour. The ho >t/A
communities also showed themselves willing and able to adapt existing forms if \
agricultural organisation where necessary. Three types of alteration were called for.
First, the length of time particular plots were farmed often had to be increased in
order to accommodate a greater number of new crops. Second, new techniques of
cultivation had to be adopted on occasion. For instance, the spread of swamp rice in
Sierra Leone during the nineteenth century was associated with a new method of
transplanting the seedlings from nursery beds to underwater fields.®® Third, a
certain amount of occupational change was required. The spread of cassava among
the Yoruba, for example, meant that women became more involved in agricultural
production, for they were allocated the task of processing the crop.
The foregoing analysis suggests the following conclusions. Agricultural history
in the pre-colonial period is a story of innovation rather than stagnation. The assump¬
tion that the economy was static, having been frozen at the very dawn of African
history, is untenable, and the timeless concept of the ‘traditional’ society needs to be
used with care, or, better still, not used at all. Although contact with other continents
led to the introduction of some troublesome weeds, such as spear grass, there is no
doubt that on balance the import of seeds and plants was of great benefit to West
Africa. The new crops offered the means of improving nutrition, they reduced the
risk of famine, and they made it possible to support a larger population.®’^ A study of
pre-colonial history offers a new perspective on the rapid and well publicised expan¬
sion of export-crop production in the twentieth century. Export growth should be
seen not as the miraculous reaction of a backward people to wholly novel external
demands, but as one further development in a long history of agricultural experi¬
ment and adaptation.

This technique is thought to have originated in Casamance, on the southern coast of

present-day Senegal.
Other continents gained in similar ways. Another South American export, the potato,
became a staple food in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

31

2*
An Economic History of West Africa

To demonstrate that African farmers were flexible in their attitude towards the
adoption of new crops is certainly a step forward. Nevertheless, it could still be
argued that the indigenous system of cultivation was primitive, that technology
remained crude, that the rules governing land tenure shackled enterprise, and that
for these reasQns agriculture was stuck virtually at subsistence level. An examination
of these beliefs, which have been nourished by repetition in textbooks of economic
development, will show that they rest on evidence which is either incomplete or
misinterpreted.
Colonial officials formed a generally unfavourable impression of the capabilities
of African farmers. They looked at unoccupied land and thought that it was unused
or spare territory, which Africans, through lack of skill or initiative, were incapable
of developing. They noted the absence, especially in the forest, of the neat, hedged
fields which were so familiar to them at home, and concluded that the standard of
farm management was poor. They pointed to the lack of the plough, and decided
that local farmers were uninventive. These observations, recorded in reports over
many years, influenced policies during the colonial era, and can still be found in some
secondary works today. However, an account of traditional farming which is con¬
fined to sliifting cultivation and to allegedly wasteful slash and bum techniques,
though it accords well with Trevor Roper’s notion of African history as the story of
the ‘unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes’,®® scarcely does justice to the com¬
plex reality revealed by geographical research. Indeed, according to Morgan and
Pugh’s authoritative work, no less than seven headings are needed to classify the
leading systems of cultivation practised in West Africa.®® These are: shifting cultiva¬
tion; rotational bush fallow; rotational planted fallow; mixed farming; permanent
cultivation; tree cultivation; and floodland and irrigated farming. All seven systems
were in use by about the sixteenth century, and were almost certainly present long
before then.
Shifting cultivation involves the periodic movement of settlement. Virgin land,
or land having abundant secondary vegetation, is cleared with the aid of fire, and
the resulting irregular, tree-studded plots are cropped for one or two years before
being abandoned, as the community moves on to new land elsewhere. Shifting
cultivation may well have been the principal system of agriculture in West Africa
during prehistoric times, but today (and contrary to a common assumption) it is
dominant in only a few areas. The chief method of cultivation in recent centuries
has been rotational bush fallow, which is widespread in savanna and forest, and is
used for growing both cereals and roots. In this system settlement is fixed, and the
land under cultivation rotates over a defined area of fallow grasses or woody plants,
though the woodland itself if not allowed to regenerate. Cleared land is usually
cropped for between three and six years (though in the rice-growing forest lands of
the west one or two years is the norm), and the period of fallow ranges from four to
ten years. The relatively long cropping period entails careful farm management and

Hugh Tre\ or Roper, The Rise of Christian Europe, 1965, p. 9.

W. B. Morgan and J. C. Pugh, West Africa, p. lOO.

32
The domestic economy: structure and function

CD
(/)
CD
£
CD CD
£ 13
4-*
CD
CO
0 0
0-1-0
CO LO

Map 3. Present-day Agricultural Regions: Subsistence and Internal Market Crops.

0-^0

o =

33
An Economic History of West A frica

the use of annual rotations, crop mixtures and successions.’^*’ Rotational planted fallow
is a distinct, but comparatively unimportant, system, which differs from rotational
bush fallow in that the fallow cover is selected and deliberately planted. Mixed
farming involves a combination of cultivation and animal husbandry. Only a few
communities, such as the Serer of Senegal, employ mixed farming as their principal
system of production, though other groups, such as the Fulani, may keep cattle and
cultivate the land without fully integrating the two'activities. Where permanent
cultivation is practised, the same land is farmed annually and is rarely allowed to
revert to fallow. Few communities rely on permanent cultivation for the greater
part of their supplies of food, but most have some small plots near the village or com¬
pound, which are kept under crops continuously.'^^ Tree cultivation, like permanent
cultivation, is found in conjunction with other systems, especially rotational bush
fallow. The most important tree crops in the pre-colonial period were the oil palm,
the kola tree and the shea tree, all of which are indigenous to West Africa. Floodland
and irrigated cultivation is found in restricted areas, such as the south-west coast,
where swamp rice is grown, and on the flood-plains of the Niger and Senegal rivers,
where millet, maize and rice are cultivated.
The question now arises as to whether there is any unifying principle linking these
different methods of agriculture. Gourou’s contention that the system of land use is
determined chiefly by soils and climate is unsatisfactory because rotational bush
fallow, the dominant system in West Africa, is practised over a wide range of geo¬
graphical conditions, while sliifting cultivation was used in parts of Europe, a
temperate zone, as late as the nineteenth century.Boserup’s stimulating argument
that systems of cultivation are determined basically by population density also
needs qualification, for different systems can be found in parts of West Africa which
do not show marked demographic variations.'^^ It is suggested here that land use is
best understood in terms of a continuum ranging from virgin land to permanent
cultivation, and containing a number of subdivisions at intervening points, these
being decided by the length of the fallow period. Rotational bush fallow occupies
one of these intermediate spaces. The length of the fallow period represents an
adjustment to some or all of the following variables: population density; the avail¬
ability of fertiliser; and the range of crops. The concept of a continuum of land use is
best illustrated by the two extremes of shifting cultivation and permanent cultivation.

Rotations make certain that demands on the soil are varied from year to year;
mixtures, that is growing several crops on the same plot and in the same season, ensure a
high density of plants and economy of weeding; and successions, that is planting crops one
after another durmg the same season, spread labour requirements and provide a more even
flow of foodstuffs by staggering the harvests.
For a study of the ways in which communities combine various systems of land use,
including permanent agriculture, see W. B. Morgan, ‘The Zoning of Land Use around Rural
Settlements in Tropical Africa’, in Environment and Land Use in Africa, ed. M. F. Thomas and
G. W. Whittington, 1969, pp. 301-19.
Pierre Gou.-ou, The Tropical World, 1954.
Ester Boserup, The Conditions of Agricultural Growth, 1965.

34
 The domestic economy: structure andfunction

Shifting cultivation and other forms of extensive agriculture were found where
some or all of the following conditions prevailed: a low population density; a short¬
age of fertiliser; and an insufficient variety of crops. Where population was sparse
and land abundant, farmers realised that it was important to maximise output per
man rather than output per acre. European observers, obsessed by the notion (derived
from their own experience) that output per acre was a priority of universal applic-
abihty, failed to grasp the principles underlying sliifting cultivation. Yet clearing the
land by burning the undergrowth was the quickest and cheapest method in terms of
labour costs, and had the added advantage of returning mineral matter to the soil
rapidly. Output per man hour under this system was extremely liigh, which partly
explains its tenacity in the face of alternative methods which, though technically
superior, increased overall costs and reduced net returns to the farmer. Where there
was a shortage of manure, a long period of fallow was needed to restore nutrients to .
the soil. This deficiency was common in various parts of West Africa, but was
particularly marked in the forest, where disease and the difficulty of maintaining
pasture severely restricted animal husbandry. Where there was a lack of variety in
the crops available, the number of rotations was hmited, the soil soon became
exhausted, and farmers were forced to move on to new land. European commenta¬
tors were scandalised by this ‘wasteful’ means of cultivation because they failed to
appreciate that unused land was an integral part of a method of cultivation which
involved the maintenance of long fallows, and that to usedt for another purpose
(such as European plantations) was to risk dislocating the indigenous system of
production.
Permanent cultivation, at the other end of the continuum, was found chiefly in
areas where population was relatively dense, where there was a regular supply of
fertiliser, and where a considerable variety of crops was available. This system was
geared to achieving high returns per acre rather than (or as well as) per man hour, and
it demonstrates the abffity of African farmers to adjust factor proportions in order to
achieve optimum results with the resources at their disposal. Animal manure and
household refuse were used as fertffisers, and crop mixtures, rotations and successions
were employed to ensure that as much use as possible was made of cleared land.
Intensive agriculture was not an important mode of production in what, in terms of
economic and pohtical development, are usually regarded as the most advanced
areas of West Africa. On the contrary, it was dominant among some of the most
underprivileged and least powerful of West African peoples. For example, the
inhabitants of the Mandara uplands (on the border between Nigeria and the Camer-
oons) developed a system of intensive agriculture which included soil conservation,
the use of fertilisers, crop rotations, the planting and protection of trees and animal
husbandry. A British official, who was sent to inspect the area in 1939 with a view to
improving its agriculture, reported that the methods in use already included ‘practic¬
ally every principle that Agricultural Departments throughout Africa are trying to
instil into the “backward” peoples.”^^ What is particularly interesting about tliis case

Stanhope White, ‘The Agricultural Economy of the Hill Pagans of Dikwa Emirate,
Cameroons (British Mandate)’, Empire Journal of Experimental Agriculture, 9, 1941, pp. 66-7.

35
 An Economic History of West Africa

is that permanent agriculture was not a result of favourable soils or climate in the
micro-environment, but was the outcome of political pressures, for the dense settle¬
ment and the relative immobility of the inhabitants were brought about originally
by a desire to escape the predatory attentions of more powerful slave-raiding
neighbours.
Historians and economists are inclined to rank agricultural systems in linear pro¬
gression from ‘backward’ to ‘advanced’. However, the idea of an agricultural league
table can be very misleading. Different systems of cultivation, including those
commonly regarded as advanced, co-existed in pre-colonial West Africa, as they
did in pre-industrial Europe. None was anachronistic, for each was subtly adapted
to particular circumstances. Furthermore, to equate permanent agriculture with
market activity, and shifting cultivation with subsistence farming, is tempting, but
mistaken. The methods varied, but the economic goals of both systems were often
the same.
It is hoped that enough has been said to indicate that Africans were expert farm
managers. Nevertheless, it could still be argued that agriculture remained stuck in a
subsistence groove because indigenous farmers failed to invent or adopt the tech¬
nology needed to raise productivity. This contention is usually based on assumptions
about the role of the plough. White has shown that the plough played a crucial role
in the development of European agriculture from the sixth century onwards,"^® and
Goody has argued that its absence from Africa south of the Sahara helps to explain
some major economic and political contrasts between the two continents.'^® To cite
the plough as an example of the technological disparity between Europe and Africa
is to draw attention to an important, if undisputed, fact. To imply that the presence
of the plough would have transformed the development potential of West Africa is
to advance a very different case, and one that is open to question.
African farmers relied on simple tools, such as the digging stick, the hoe and the
^ inatchet, though a hand plough, which, technically, was half-way between a hoe
and a simple mouldboard plough, was used in the Gambia at an early date. It is
possible that West Africans did not employ the heavy, European plough because
they did not know of its existence. This explanation is unsatisfactory because West
Africa had long-standing and close connections with North Africa, where ploughs
other than the simple, scratch plough, were common. Perhaps West Africans were
aware of the existence of the plough, but, being stuck in a ‘traditional’ society, were
unvalling or imable to adopt progressive techniques. This, too, must be regarded as
an unlikely explanation in view of the arguments developed so far in connection with
the orgamsation of the labour force, the history of agriculture and the variety of
systems of cultivation.
It is suggested here that the plough was not used in West Africa because it was
unsuitable, or too costly, or both. The plough is of greatest use in areas where soils
are heavy and land cannot be cleared by fire. These conditions are more typical of

Lynn White, Medieval Technology and Social Change, Oxford 196a, pp. 39-57.
Jack Goody, Technology, Tradition, and the State in Africa, 1971, pp. 25 and 76.

36
 The domestic economy: structure andfunction

Europe than of Africa. Moreover, draught animals are needed to work a plough
effectively. Draught animals could not survive in the forest, where, in any case, the
plough was ill-suited to the dominant pattern of irregular, tree-studded plots.
Ploughing in the savanna could easily lead to soil erosion, as experiments undertaken
in French West Africa during the 1920s amply demonstrated. All the same, the
plough could have been used in some parts of West Africa, where the soils were not
likely to erode easily, where draught animals were available, and where cereal culti¬
vation favoured the creation of a field-type landscape. The plough was not adopted
in these areas because its greater cost did not guarantee a more than proportionate
increase in returns. Ploughs and draught animals were expensive to buy, and the
latter were also expensive to maintain. The plough can prepare more land in a shorter
time than can manual labour, but this achievement often involves a fall in output
per man hour,’'^ and, in some cases, in output per acre as well."^®
Farmers’ incomes need to rise some way above the level needed for subsistence
before they can afford to adopt new techniques, such as the plough. Even so, a more
advanced technology will be used only if it is more profitable than existing methods
of production, or if it is essential to ensure survival,. Neither of these conditions
appears to have applied to pre-colonial West Africa, which, like India, developed a
relatively simple technology, but one that was well suited to its requirements.'^^ If
ploughs had been available in West Africa in the pre-colonial era, they would have
been treated as conversation pieces rather than as agricultural implements. Indeed,
that is just what many of them became during the colonial era, when officials tried
to convert Africans to the use of technically superior, but economically unrewarding,
farm implements. It is as well to remember that virtually the whole of the massive
expansion of domestic foodstuffs and export crops which occurred during the
twentieth century was produced with the aid of traditional tools. To suppose that
the failure to adopt a more complex agricultural technology was a cause of under¬
development in Africa is to put plough before ox, and invention before need.
It remains to see whether or not the system of land tenure which prevailed in the
pre-colonial period inhibited the development of natural resources. According to
Pedler, ‘land, an essential factor of production, has been prevented by custom and
law from coming under the influence of economic forces’and it is still common,

Boserup, The Conditions of Agricultural Growth, pp. 32-4.

Peter M. Weil, ‘The Introduction of the Ox Plow in Central Gambia’, in African Food
Production Systems, ed. Peter F. M. McLoughlin, Baltimore 1970, pp- 251-2.
For a comparative analysis on similar lines see Irfan Habib, ‘PotentiaHties of CapitaHstic
Development in the Economy of Mughal India’, Journal of Economic History, 29,1969, pp. 62-4.
Lack of space has confined this discussion to the case of the plough. However, the argument
developed here could also be used to explain the relative unimportance of irrigated agriculture
in West Africa. Geographical considerations aside, irrigated agriculture will not be widespread
in areas where extensive agriculture is possible because of its high capital and maintenance
costs. The wells and irrigated works found in parts of the Sahara and savanna were operated
by slave labour. When slavery declined in the twentieth century, so, too, did the wells and
oases because of the high cost of employing wage labour.
F. J. Pedler, Economic Geography of West Africa, i955> P- 215-

37
 An Economic History oj West Africa

especially in non-specialist works, to find indigenous land law summarised simply as

‘communal’ ownership, measured against the presumed advantages of individual
tenure, and finally condenmed as a primitive obstruction to economic development.
A full review of African land laws is impossible here, but some general observations,
based on recent research, need to be made in order to correct a few of the more wide-
. spread and mistaken assumptions.®^
I In the first place, the conventional dichotomy between backward, communal
ownership and advanced, individual tenure is very misleading. African land laws, no
less than indigenous systems of cultivation, varied greatly even within restricted
areas, and ranged from land that was indeed communally ovmed and worked, to
land that was held virtually as freehold.®^ Households frequently made use of
■' common land and individual holdings simultaneously, as they did in medieval
Europe. If individual tenure is to be the criterion of a progressive system of land law,
then there was undoubtedly an element of modernity in the rules governing the use
and disposal of land in West Africa. Secondly, even if it is acknowledged that the
greater part of the land was, in some sense, owned communally, it would be wrong
to conclude that this arrangement was a barrier to progress. Under systems of
extensive agriculture, such as shifting cultivation and rotational bush fallow, it was
important for the farmer to Secure the general right to cultivate land within a given
area, but the actual ownership of a specific plot, which was destined to lie fallow for a
number of years, was not a matter of great significance. Usufructuary rights were
more crucial, and these were clearly delineated and could often be inlierited. Further¬
more, the household or individual concerned usually had a clear title to the crops
produced on communally-owned soil, and received guarantees regarding tenure.
In other words, it was the product of the scarce factor, labour, which was closely
defined, whereas rights over land, which was in general an abundant resource, were
less specific. W^here population was dense and the period of fallow short or non¬
existent, as was the case with permanent cultivation, then claims on individual plots
became stronger, and in these circumstances freehold tenure, pledging, and even the
sale of land were recognised in customary law.
It is important to note that methods of acquiring, holding and disposing of land
differed not only spatially, but also through time. As yet, however, little attention
has been paid to the historical development of African law in the pre-colonial period,
and most research in this field has focused on the effect of the introduction of Euro-
, pean law in the twentieth century on indigenous legal systems. An interesting
\ exception, and one which is mentioned here in the hope that it will prompt further
\ research, is Gueye s study of the legal consequences of the establishment of Muslim

j Readers who wish to consider this subject further should begin by looking at the excellent
collection of papers in African Agrarian Systems, ed. Daniel Biebuyck, 1963.
For two of many cases where individual tenure was common see Ronald Cohen, ‘From
Empire to Colony: Bornu in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, in Colonialism in
Africa, 1870-1960, 3, ed. Victor Turner, Cambridge 1971, p. 100, and Olga Linares de Sapir,
Agriculture and Diola Society’, m African Food Production Systems, ed. Peter F. M. McLoughlin,
Baltimore 1970, pp. 207-8.

38
 The domestic economy: structure cmd function

rule in Fouta Toro (now part of northern Senegal) at the close of the eighteenth
century.®^ Gueye shows how Muslim law, by establishing the equality of all male
heirs, contributed to the fragmentation of holdings, encouraged a greater degree of
individual exploitation of land, and led to the migration of heirs whose inheritance
was too small to provide them with a living.®^ This study provides a glimpse of the
movement and dynamism of pre-colonial legal history, and it serves as a reminder
that the concept of traditional law, like the concept of the traditional society, is a
convenient fiction which achieves order at the expense of reality.
In summary, indigenous land laws were neither irrational nor antediluvian, but f
were a reflection of the conditions governing agricultural production in West
Africa. There was a factor market in land, though it was very limited. The explana¬
tion of this limitation is not that Africans were busy maximising social rather than
economic values, but that land was not scarce enough to acquire a market value.
Households (and individuals within households) had scope for enterprise in securing
and exploiting land within the dominant, so-called communal system of property
ownersliip. Those who claim that indigenous land laws were a constraint on develop¬
ment must explain how it was that these laws were consistent with a widespread and 1
rapid expansion in the production of export crops during the early part of the \
colonial period. African systems of land tenure undoubtedly underwent important '
changes in the twentieth century, but these were a consequence and not a prerequisite
of export growth.
Animal husbandry, the other feature of Clnlde’s neolithic revolution, is at least
as old in West Africa as agriculture. Pastoralists first appeared in the Sahara about
5000 B.C., and are known to have kept both long- and short-homed cattle, as well
as sheep and goats. Animal husbandry was not indigenous to West Africa, and is
thought to have been introduced from Asia via Egypt, though there may also have
been a North African centre of domestication. Cattle, goats and sheep remained the
most important livestock, though different breeds and different animals were intro¬
duced in subsequent centuries.®® A survey of sources relating to the period between
the tenth and the sixteenth centuries shows that animal husbandry was already well
developed in those parts of West Africa which are major centres today.®® In contrast
to agriculture, which was practised throughout West Africa, animal husbandry was
significant only in the northern part of the Western Sudan and the southern part of

Youssouf Gueye, ‘Essai sur les causes et les consequences de la micropropriete au Fouta-
Toro’, Bulletin de ITFAN, B, 19, 1957, pp. 28-42.
It would be interesting to know whether there was a connection between these migrants
and the development of groundnut farming in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For a
comparative study of the relationsliip between dispossessed heirs, migration and innovation
(among the Basques) see Leonard Kasdan, ‘Family Structure, Migration and the Entrepreneur’,
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 7, 1965, pp. 345-57-
The role of camels, horses, oxen and donkeys will be considered in section 3 of this
chapter.
Tadeusz Lewicki, ‘Animal Husbandry among Medieval Agricultural People of Western
and Middle Sudan’, Acta Ethnographica, 14, 1965. PP- 165-78.

39
40
An Economic History of West Africa

Map 4. Estimated Dry Season Distribution of Cattle (1961).

 The domestic economy: structure and function

the Sahara, where there was comparative freedom from fatal diseases, such as trypano¬
somiasis, and where pasture was available. The principal specialists in this region
were the Moors, the Tuareg and the Fulani. Certain breeds of cattle, such as the small
Ndama variety, had a high resistance to trypanosomiasis, and so could be kept in the
south, providing pasture could be found, but these hardy survivors were poor in
quality and few in number.
The activities of specialists in animal husbandry, no less than the behaviour of
African farmers, have been cited as typifying many of the presumed characteristics
of the ‘traditional’ society. Their mobility, the pastoral counterpart of shifting
cultivation, has been seen as an expression of endemic wanderlust. Their pride in
their cattle has been interpreted (and not only in the case of Africa) as proof of pre¬
industrial man’s pre-occupation with social rather than economic values. These
beliefs, which themselves rank high among the ‘sacred cows’ of development theory,
need revision.
Migration was a well ordered and necessary feature of animal husbandry in West
Africa. The movements of pastoralists, far from being aimless, are divisible into three
analytically distinct categories: transhumance, which involved a regular, annual trek
from the Saharan margins down to the savanna and back again; migratory drift,
which involved a shift in the orbit of transhumance; and full migration, which
entailed a transfer to a completely new area and the creation of a fresh orbit of trans-
humance.®’^ The nature and extent of pastoral migration are explicable in terms of
a combination of three factors. First, the size of the herd owned by a particular
community had an important influence on the amount of land required. An increase
in numbers, through breeding or purchase, meant that more land was needed. A
decrease, through disease or sale, had the opposite effect. Loss of cattle was a disaster
for the herdsman, as loss of crops was for the farmer. The tlireat of disaster explains
why the annual trek into the savanna was reversed when the onset of the rainy season
spread fly-bome diseases. Second, the extensive character of animal husbandry was
partly a reflection of the natural distribution of essential foodstuffs. Water and salt
were scarce, and pasture tended to be poor and sparse. Hence the herdsmen moved
down into the savanna during the dry season in search of better grazing land.
Third, migration was undertaken for purposes of trade. Pastoralists and cultivators
in West Africa, as in other parts of the world, developed a symbiotic relationship.
Each needed the products of the other, and one of the main purposes of transhumance
was to exchange animal products for grain. Yet farmers feared the destructive effects
of livestock on their crops, and conflicts between the two parties sometimes led to a
shift in the orbit of transhumance, or to migration to an entirely new area. In this
way pastoralists became colonists too. Successive changes in the pattern of their
migratory movements created new economic and sometimes political frontiers, as
in the case of the Fulani, who spread across the Western Sudan between the eleventh
and seventeenth centuries.

D. J. Stenning, Savannah Nomads, 1959. On the movement of pastoralists in Mauritania

see J. Cauneille and J. Dubief, ‘Les Reguibat Legouacem: chronologie et nomadisme’. Bulletin
de ITFAN, B, 17, 1955. PP- 528-50.

41
An Economic History of West Africa

Livestock were kept for their meat, milk, manure, hides and, in the case of sheep,
for their wool. The belief that Africans refused to sell their cattle rests on a mis¬
understanding of the way in which the pastoral economy operated. It is clear from
numerous sources that the cattle trade long antedates the coming of the Europeans
in the fifteenth century, and was certainly not a result of the presumed disintegration
of ‘tribal’ values in the twentieth century. Admittedly, only a small proportion of
the herd was sold, but tliis was not because of limitations imposed by a pre-capitaUst
value system. Cattle in pastoral societies were not simply a consumption good, but
were also its main stock of capital. Returns on capital took the form of sales of milk
and manure to farming communities. It is not surprising that the herdsman took care
to conserve his capital, for cattle were a long term investment, and one which could
easily be lost through disease, as happened for instance in the late nineteenth century,
when rinderpest decimated herds in many parts of the continent. Cattle were indeed
highly prized, but their function as a status symbol derived from society’s apprecia¬
tion of their economic worth. The man who possessed a large number of cattle was
respected not for his unthinking devotion to ascribed values, but for his skill in
controlling a major resource.®®
The concept of a neolithic revolution is useful for focusing attention on develop-'^
ments which are of fundamental importance in world history, but the term ‘revolu¬
tion’ can be misleading if it is interpreted to mean that previous ways of securing a
livelihood, notably by gathering, hunting and fishing, speedily became redundant.
All three means of subsistence survived and were adapted to the new, agricultural
economy. Gathering was the least speciaUsed and most widespread of these activities.
However, it would be wrong to envisage a situation where, as one nineteenth-
century explorer put it, the ‘fruits of the earth grow spontaneously, or with little
cultivation; so that wherever rivers run, the land may be truly said to overflow with
milk and honey’.®® Equally, it might truly be said that wherever rivers ran there was
a danger of water-borne diseases and of serious flooding during the rainy season.
The stereotype of the contented tropical dweller gathering his daily breadfruit and
then relapsing into a state of chronic lethargy until roused by a passing foreign
explorer (or nowadays by a television crew) has no basis in fact and should be ban¬
ished from book and screen alike. Collecting wild grains, roots and fruit was usually
no more than an occasional supplement to agriculture. Where gathering was
important to the local economy, as in parts of the savanna during the dry season, it
was an indication not of luxury but of hardshi].^—the inhabitants being driven by
necessity to seek additional food supplies.®®

For a similar viewpoint on East Africa see the valuable essay by Harold K. Schneider,
‘Economics in East African Aboriginal Societies’, in Economic Transition in Africa, ed. Melville
J. Herskovits and Mitchell Harwitz, 1964, pp. 53-75. It is hoped that these comments will lead
to further study of the economic history of animal husbandry (including goats and sheep, as
well as cattle) in the pre-colonial period.
John Whitford, Trading Life in Western and Central Africa, Liverpool 1877, p. 334.
This is still true today. See Edmond Bernus, ‘Cueillette et exploitation des resources
spontanees du Sahel nigerien par les Kel Tamasheq’, Cahiers ORSTOM, 4, 1967, pp. 31-52.

42
 The domestic economy: structure and function

Hunting and fishing were more specialised activities than gathering because they
required a greater degree of skill. Hunting was especially important in the forest,
where there was a shortage of meat, and it reached a seasonal peak during the dry
season, when the demand for farm labour was at its lowest, and when restricted
water supplies made it easier to locate game. Little is known about the historical
development of hunting in West Africa. There are examples of hunting communities
colonising an area, settling down and becoming cultivators. This almost classical
evolution appears to have happened in the case of the Adioukrou after they arrived
in the southern part of the Ivory Coast at the close of the eighteenth century. On the
whole, however, it seems more realistic to treat hunters as semi-specialists who were
integrated with the farming community, rather than as antiquated survivors from a
pre-liistoric, pre-agricultural age. Traditionally, professional hunters used traps,
spears, clubs and bows and arrows, but with the expansion of trade with Europe
after the fifteenth century they began to use guns as well.®^ Provided they worked
properly (and some of the imports were of poor quality), firearms must have
increased the efficiency of the hunters, and so may have helped to improve the diet
of communities living in the forest. Firearms also enabled hunters to play a part in
some of the major state building (and destroying) movements of the pre-colonial era.
Fishing was practised along the coast, particularly in the region of Senegambia and
the Gulf of Guinea, and also in many inland waters, two of the largest centres being
Lake Chad and the great bend of the Niger in the Western Sudan. Specialised com¬
munities of highly skilled fishermen are known to have developed in these areas at
an early date. In the sixteenth century, for example, the Sorkawa and Bozo, who
fished the middle Niger, paid their taxes to the rulers of the Songhai empire ex¬
clusively in dried fish. There was no technical innovation in fishing comparable to
that brought about in hunting by the introduction of firearms: canoes were the main
craft in use, and harpoons, nets, lines and traps remained the principal means of
catching fish. In other respects the history of fishing was far from static. The avail¬
ability of fish fluctuated with the tidal movements of the sea and with the different
flood periods of the rivers, so fishermen tended to migrate in search of their catch.
On the coast the Fante moved periodically from the Gold Coast west to the Ivory
Coast and east to Nigeria, while in the interior the Sorkawa and Bozo travelled
hundreds of miles each year along the Niger. Once again a connection can be per¬
ceived between migration and innovation in West Africa: migration led to the
development of new fishing grounds and also to the foundation of new settlements.
Lagos, now the capital of Nigeria, was itself first colonised by fishermen in the
sixteenth century.
The discussion of production will be completed by a survey of mining and manu¬
facturing activities. These subjects are often treated in a cursory manner in surveys
of underdeveloped economies, principally, it seems, because it is assumed either that
they were unimportant in the ‘traditional’ economy, or that they are of little rel¬
evance to modern industrialisation programmes. In reality, a consideration of pre¬
colonial mining and manufacturing raises a number of significant questions regarding
And to produce ivory for export as well as meat for domestic consumption.

43
An Economic History of West Africa

the acquisition of technical skills, the type and degree of speciaUsation, the supply of
capital to non-agricultural, non-mercantile occupations, and the volume and
character of demand for manufactured goods. Furthermore, indigenous manu¬
factures are worth considering in the context of current industrialisation policies.
Modern manufacturing in West Africa began not with heavy industries, but with
relatively simple import-substituting activities, some of which can be based (with
suitable modifications) on established crafts.®^
Iron, gold and salt were the most important minerals produced in pre-colonial
West Africa, though copper, tin, and silver were also mined in small quantities.®®
The region has few deposits of coal, and the principal domestic and industrial fuels
were wood and charcoal.
Knowledge of iron working reached West Africa during the first millennium.
Iron was being smelted at Nok, in what is now northern Nigeria, around 500 B.c.,
and iron-producing teclmiques had spread throughout the region by about the
fourth century a.d. Iron implements, chiefly hoes, knives, spearheads and swords,
marked a great advance on stone and wooden tools: they improved the efficiency of
hunters; they made it easier to clear the forest; and they placed more power in the
hands of the builders (and destroyers) of towns and states. Relatively accessible
deposits of iron ore were distributed fairly widely in West Africa, though mostly on
a small scale. However, there were a few large centres, such as Oume in the southern
Ivory Coast, where the remains of 100 furnaces and about 10,000 tons of slag were
discovered in the 1920s, and also around Oyo in South-west Nigeria, where a com¬
plex of highly specialised mining villages flourished during the pre-colonial period.
In 1904 one of these settlements had a population of between 100 and 120, all of
whom (including women and children) were engaged in the various stages of iron
mining and manufacturing. The output of tliis settlement supplied an area which
covered several hundred square miles. It is no coincidence that these large centres
were located in well-wooded regions, for the greater part of total production costs
was accounted for by timber, which was needed to make charcoal.
Pig iron was produced by digging lumps of ironstone out of shallow pits and
quarries, and heating them with a flux in a clay furnace fired by charcoal. However,
the methods in use were neither simple nor uniform. In the eighteenth century the
Mandingo used a circular kiln about ten feet high and three feet in diameter with
seven vents at the base.®^ The kiln was filled with alternate layers of ironstone and
charcoal and heated for three days. The contents were allowed to cool and then
reheated again until pig iron of an acceptable quality was produced. The miners near
Oyo used a rather different method in the nineteenth century.®® To begin with, they
Archibald Callaway, ‘From Traditional Crafts to Modern Industries’, Odu, 2, 1965, pp.
28-51.
For copper see Lars Suirdstrom, The Trade of Guinea, Lund 1965, pp. 217-51; on tin see
A. O. Anjorin, ‘Tin Mining in Northern Nigeria during the Nineteenth aird Early Part of the
Twentieth Centuries’, Odu, 5, 1971, pp. 54-67.
Naval InteUigence Division, French West Africa, i, 1943, pp. 236-7.
C. V. Bellamy, ‘A West African Smelting House’, Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute, ii,
1904, pp. 99-126.

44
 Map 5. Principal Pre-colonial Mineral Workings.
The domestic economy: structure and function

45
 V

An Economic History of West Africa

prepared the ironstone by heating it over an open fire. It was then pounded, washed
and screened before being placed in the kiln. In this case the kiln was about four feet
high and seven feet in diameter, and had six vertical vents. The kiln was charged for
about thirty-six hours, and fed with ore ten times during this period. At least a dozen
tools were used in the course of filling, regulating and emptying the kiln. The pig
iron was allowed to cool, and then sold to smiths, who puddled it and fashioned
implements of various kinds. An analysis of samples carried out in 1904 showed that
producers had selected the best possible flux, and that the finished product was
puddled or forged steel, and not simply wrought iron.
The smiths in Oyo had crude iron brought to them. Similarly, Bambara smiths,
who were settled among communities along the middle Niger, purchased iron from
traders. Sometimes, however, the smiths themselves travelled to the mining centres,
worked pig iron with portable tools, and then returned home to peddle their wares.
The Awka and Nkwerri, for example, were itinerant smiths who served between
them virtually the whole of Ibo country. Future research on pre-colonial mining
operations will clarify the reasons underlying these variations in production and
distribution. Meanwhile, it seems clear that ‘primitive’ mineral production, no less
than ‘primitive’ agriculture, was a more complex and a more efficient undertaking
than a superficial assessment of the techniques employed would suggest.
Gold was mined in West Africa as early as the first millennium, but it was not until
about the eighth century A.D., with the development of commercial contacts with
the Arab world, that production underwent a marked expansion. The greater part
of total output was exported, though a proportion entered the domestic economy in
the shape of ornaments and as currency. Output is commonly assumed to have
reached a peak in the late Middle Ages, when West Africa became the principal
source of supply for Western Europe. However, the quantitative basis for this judge¬
ment is virtually non-existent,®® and it is interesting to note that as late as 1937 there
were still many thousands of independent African producers, whose total output in
French West Africa was estimated in that year to be three and a half tons. Gold was
found in four main areas; around Bambouk, Boure and Lobi in the Western Sudan,
and in Ashanti in the forest. The chief methods of production were panning alluvial
streams, which was a simple, though time-consuming, task, and quarrying gold-
bearing ore, which was a more complex operation. Akan miners in the eighteenth
century dug slanting pits with broad steps to a depth of as much as 150 feet. The
miners at the bottom dug out the ore and loaded it on trays, which were then passed
up to the surface by means of a human chain. At Boure, on the other hand, parallel
vertical shafts were sunk to a depth of about forty feet and then joined underground
by a horizontal tumiel. The miners at the face used picks to dislodge the ore, which
was then put in a calabash and hauled to the surface. This system required a consider¬
able degree of specialisation and co-ordination within each unit of production, and
involved, typically, miners, carriers, washers, a smith to maintain tools in good
condition, and a foreman, who directed operations, sold the gold to smiths and

Mauny’s oft-quoted estimate of total production {Tableau giographique . . . , p. 301) is

best treated with caution.

46
 The domestic economy: structure and function

traders, and bought necessary supplies of foodstuffs. The ore extracted by these means
was either pounded, washed, screened and packaged in the form of gold dust, or
placed in a furnace and heated with a flux in order to purify it, in which case the
final product was made up into bars or wires.
Rulers who were fortunate enough to have gold deposits in their territories sought
either to control production or to tax the sales of independent producers. The extent
of the wealth which a privileged minority was able to acquire by these means is
illustrated by the famous pilgrimage of Mansa Musa, the ruler of the Mali empire,
who left West Africa for Mecca in 1324. His splendid passage through Cairo had an
unsettling effect on exchange rates, as al-Omari noted: ‘the people of Cairo earned
incalculable sums from him whether by buying and selling or by gifts. So much gold
was current in Cairo that it ruined the value of money. .. Such profligacy also
nearly ruined Mansa Musa, who experienced serious political troubles on his return
to West Africa.
Salt was in many ways the most interesting and important of the minerals pro¬
duced in West Africa. Salt, like water, is a biological requirement of both humans
and livestock, a regular intake being necessary for survival. Salt deprivation is a
particularly acute problem in hot areas, where salt resources are limited or far from
the centres of demand, where the consumption of meat or fish is generally low, and
where the diet is based largely on cereals. Much of West Africa, and especially parts
of the Western Sudan, fell into this category.^® In Gao, the capital of the Songhai,
salt was so rare that it was kept in the stores of the royal treasury in the tenth century.
Security arrangements are understandable because salt sometimes exchanged at par
with gold on a weight for weight basis. No wonder Arab travellers of the period
remarked that to avoid waste rock salt was always licked, and never ground and
sprinkled!
Along the coast of West Africa salt was obtained by boiling sea water and occa¬
sionally by natural evaporation. In the interior, however, salt was harder to come by
because the main sources lay far from the centres of demand. The Western Sudan
drew its supplies from five major deposits situated in, or close to, the Sahara. At
Awlil in the west and Bilma in the east salt was obtained by leaching saline soils.
Production at Awlil, which was close to the sea, was a seasonal and ancillary occupa¬
tion of local fishermen. The resources at Bilma were in the hands of the Tuareg, who
controlled the oases of the area. In the second half of the nineteenth century Bilma
exported over 50,000 camel loads of salt annually, and the trade continues today,
though on a reduced scale. Rock salt was obtained from Idjil, Teghaza and Taoudeni.
The resources at Idjil, seven layers deep, were developed between the eleventh and
fifteenth centuries. Teghaza, east of Idjil, was probably the leading source of supply
from the eighth century until its capture by the Moroccans in 1585. Taoudeni, about
one hundred miles to the south, began to expand after the decline of Teghaza, but

Quoted in Basil Davidson, The African Past, Harmondsworth 1966, p. 85.

So, too, did India, as is shown by T. Baneqee, Internal Market of India, 1834-1900, Calcutta
1966.

47
 JEivrJomir ffoiV)- v\*' 11 ^-ifrica

mav not have been on aJcN>uate suKctitnte, tor the period tollo\\-ing l sSs also saw an
increase in the production ot an inferior tN-pe of vegetable salt in the area of the middle
Niger. Xex'ertheless. the biannu.il carav.ms which set out from Timbuctu to Taou-
deni in the late nineteenth century commonly had a cv'inbined tot.il of 25-30,000
camels, and carried aK^ut 4-5.000 tons of s.ilt on the reuini journey. Slaves were
emploved at Idjil. Tegh.ira .uid Taoudeni to cut .ind kxid s.ilt bars. The work was
arduous .md had to be pertbmied in the mc>st gruelling conditions: it was so dry at
Teghaza that even some of the buiklings were made of salt. Hisrori.ms of Africa who
are apt to praise great states and himous men should remember that the glittering
courts of Ghana. Mali and Songh.ii were m.iint.iined at a considerable cost in human
life.
Non-specialists may be surprisevl to leant that pre-colonial W'est Afrioi had a
range ot manufrcturing industries which closely resembled those of pre-industrial
scK'ieries in other parts of the world.’^^ The composition of the m.mufacturing sector
in M*est Africa, as in pre-industri.1l Europe, retlected the embryonic nature of the
market, and was Kised on clothing, metal working, ceramics, construction, and food
processing.
The m«2st imporr.mt ot tliese m.mufactures w.is clothing, which consisted chiefly
ot cotton cloth, though silks, woollens and raflia cloth were produced in some
localities. Conon, a long-esrabHshed crop in West Africa, was mmufactured at a
very early date, though it seems probable that the cxp;msion of the industrv began
tvith the spread ot Islam from the eighth century onwards. Muslim influence led to
greater contact with the markets of the Arab world .md Europe, .md iilso stimulated
domestic dem,md by introducing new ;md more exacting srmdards of dress. By the
twelfth century cotton goods from the W’estem Sud.m had become well knovm in
Europe, so much so tliat the terms houmcan or hou^Mi, which were derived from
Mandingo words, were being used there to describe certain U'pes of cloth.^°° All
suges ot the manufacturing process—giiming, carding, spimiing, dyeins; and
wea\'ing—were performed locally. At the close of the sixteenth cenuiry the city of
Timbuctu, on tlie soutliem border of the S.ih;ira, had twenty-six master tailors,
many ot whom emplot'ed between titty ;md one himdred apprentices ;md workers.
By the middle ot tlie nineteenth century K.mo (in what is now northern Nigeria)
had become in influence, if not in org.misation, the M.mchester of West Africa. The
famous traveller, Banh, advertised the tovm’s achievements in the following way:

There is really sometliing grand in this kind of industry, which spreads to the
north as far as Murzuk, Ghat, ;md even Tripoli; to the west not only to Timbuctu,
but in some degree even as tar as the shores ot the Atlantic, the very inhabitants of
Arguin [an island oft the West Africm coast] dressing in tlie cloth woven and dyed
in Kano; to the east all over Bomu, although there it comes into contact with the
native industry’ of the coimtry’; ;md to the south it maintains a rivalry with the

See, tor example, L. A. Clarkson, T)ie Pre-InJustrial Eiomvny in En^iuiJ, 1971, pp. 75-85.
100 p__j_ Nicolas, Le bouracau ou bougran: tissu soudanais du nio^’en .%e’, Atithropos, 53,
1958, pp. 265-8.

48
 The domestic economy: structure andfunction

native industry of the Igbira and Igbo, while toward the southeast it invades the
whole of Adamawa, and is only limited by the nakedness of the pagan sans¬
culottes, who do not wear clothingd°^

Barth estimated that Kano’s cloth sales amounted to at least 300,000,000 cowries a
year in the 1850s, which was equivalent to about ^{^40,000. There were, in addition,
many smaller centres besides Timbuctu and Kano, each known for its speciality,
which was based on producing cloth of a particular weight, design and colourd”^
Hides and skins, and the leather goods made from them, were produced mostly
in the Western Sudan, where the main centres of animal husbandry lay. Many of
these products were exported and became known in Europe as ‘Moroccan’ leather,
though in fact a proportion of the goods passing under this name originated in West
Africa. Metal working, as noted earlier, was a long-established craft, and black¬
smiths were especially important. At the beginning of the seventeenth century
Jobson, an English traveller on the Gambian coast, observed that the smith ‘makes
their Swords, Assegay heads, Darts and Arrow heads barbed; and instruments of
Husbandry, without which they could not hve. Hee hath his Bellowes, small Anvill,
and Cole of a red wood, which alone will give the heat to our Iron.’^°^ Pottery was
also a widespread craft, and provided the majority of the containers needed for
hquids and foodstuffs. The elements of a construction industry existed too. Most
dwellings were probably built by the household concerned with some assistance
from neighbours and other kinsmen, but the erection and maintenance of substantial
dwellings in large towns created a demand for more specialised groups of builders,
plasterers and woodworkers. Finally, it is worth noting that the processing of staple
foods and drinks for sale outside the household was a common, and predominantly
female, activity in urban centres and on trade routes.
In the absence of a sufficient number of case studies of pre-colonial manufactures,
it is impossible to set down a series of summarising and definitive statements regard¬
ing the organisation and location of West African industries. Nevertheless, some
speculative comments are caUed for in order to suggest that ‘primitive’ industry, like
‘primitive’ agriculture, can be understood in formalist terms, and also to direct the
attention of other scholars to this neglected subject.
Most craft production was on a small scale, and was based on the household unit.
The majority of crafts were governed by guilds, which often represented one or
more households.^°^ Guilds exercised control over entry to a craft, methods of
production, standards of workmanship and prices. Consequently, memhership of a

101 H. Barth, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa, centenary ed., i, 1965,
p. 511. Barth was in Kano in 1851.
For a comprehensive list of centres of cloth production in West Africa, see Sundstrdm,
The Trade of Guinea, pp. 147-86.
Quoted in Basil Davidson, The African Past, Harmondsworth 1966, p. 204.
10^ For a detailed case study see P. C. Lloyd, ‘Craft Organisation in Yoruba Towns’, Africa,
23, 1953, PP- 30-44-

49
 t

An Economic History of West Africa

craft was usually inherited, though it was sometimes possible for outsiders to join a
guild once they had completed an apprenticeship. The household employed little
fixed capital and used its liquid resources to buy necessary inputs, such as raw
materials and labour. The purchase of some raw materials was unavoidable, but
there was scope for economising on labour costs. Hence the use of inexpensive
family labour, and the preference found over a wide range of crafts (including cloth¬
working, gold-smithing and canoe-building) for slave*rather than wage labour. The
economics of small scale production can be illustrated by the example of ceramics.
Pottery was a widespread craft because the necessary raw materials were readily
available and easily worked, and because the transportation of hollow-ware was
difficult (since there was a high risk of breakages) and costly (since the finished
product took up more space than the constituent raw materials). It was virtually
impossible to sustain a long distance trade in pottery, apart from a few, high quality
items. Dispersal was sound policy because it avoided the diseconomies which
centralisation would have brought. Since each unit of production catered for a
restricted market, it made sense to hmit the degree of specialisation. Hence pottery
tended to be a part-time occupation, reaching a peak of activity during the dry sea¬
son, when the clay was more easily fired, and when labour demands on the farm
were light.^“® Equally, there was little point in investing in capital equipment.
Consequently, even relatively simple pieces of machinery, such as the potter’s
wheel, were not used.
Industrial concentrations were most Ukely to be found where raw materials were
comparatively rare and needed some initial processing before they could be trans¬
ported, and where the existence of a nearby and substantial market reduced the cost
of delivering finished goods to the consumer. The Kano cloth industry provides a
good example of the application of these two conditions. Concentrated employ¬
ment was favoured by the presence of the two principal raw materials, cotton and
indigo, both of wliich were grown in the area, by proximity to a large domestic
market in and around Kano itself, and by the highly efficient distributive network
organised by Hausa traders, which secured access to markets in other parts of West
Africa. In these circumstances the Kano cloth industry could support a number of
specialised artisans and some sizeable imits of production. Nevertheless, it would be a
mistake to contrast the organisation of the Kano textile industry too sharply with
that of smaller centres. Kano producers used the same narrow loom as was found in
other parts of West Africa, and most cloth workers were semi-specialists, who
operated independently or were co-ordinated in a putting-out and collection system.
In the absence of cost-reducing technical innovations, Kano’s prominence derived
from the external economies which it enjoyed, together with the product differenti¬
ation (based on colour and pattern) wliich it achieved, rather than from genuine
economies of scale within the manufacturing firm itself.

1“® Every generalisation has its exceptions, and it should be noted that there were specialised
women potters in some areas.

50
 The domestic economy: structure and function

3 The distributive system

The preceding discussion has emphasised the variety of pre-colonial systems of

production and analysed their logical basis, but so far little has been said about output
targets—the economic goals of productive activities. A consideration of the exchange
sector should remedy this omission. It will be argued that the concept of a subsistence
economy needs to be modified substantially to take account of the fact that exchange
was widespread; that the organisation of trade and markets was both complex and
efficient; that the channels of recruitment to, and the prestige rankings of, mercantile
occupations demonstrate that the conventional distinction between ascribed
(traditional) and achieved (modem) status has little connection with reality; that a
general purpose currency and an embryonic capital market had evolved at an early
date; and that established statements regarding pre-colonial transport systems have
succeeded in entrenching a series of misconceptions about a subject which has yet
to be fully investigated. 1
V All the products considered so far, from neohthic rice to nineteenth-century cloth,\
were traded within West Africa. Descriptive evidence showing that exchange was
widespread in the pre-colonial period is overwhelming, and refers to the greater
part of the region, whether forest or savanna, whether influenced by Islam or
animism, whether in areas controlled by large, centralised ^ates or among small
cominumties-4ii-whi^^olitical authority was dispersed. Quantitative data, un¬
fortunately, are less plentiful, though a few estimates are available for the nineteenth
century. In the 1850s Barth reckoned that the trade of Kano amounted to about
j{)ioo,ooo a year; at the close of the nineteenth century the commerce of Timbuctu,
then in decline, was estimated to be worth roughly ^80,000 a year; and in 1900
Badlaud published a map showing some fifty towns (excluding those in Nigeria and
the southern part of the Gold Coast) which between them had an annual trade of ^£1
million. The majority of households undoubtedly produced the greater part of the
goods they required as consumers, but the pure, subsistence economy was an excep¬
tion rather than the rule. Most households regarded trade as a normal and an integral
part of their activities, and planned their production strategy accordingly. To grasp
this point is also to reformulate the question of market growth in at least some under¬
developed societies. The problem ceases to be one of introducing exchange to
closed, self-sufficient communities, where wants are limited and commercial
institutions non-existent, and becomes the more realistic and interesting issue of

1“® Evidence representing a variety of disciplinary approaches is contained in Paul Bohannan

and George Dalton, eds., Markets in Africa, Evanston 1962; Elliott P. Skinner, ‘West African
Economic Systems’, in Economic Transition in Africa, ed. Melville J. Herskovits and Mitchell
Harwitz, 1964, pp. 77-97; Lars Sundstrdm, The Trade of Guinea, Lund 1965; Centre of African
Studies, Markets and Marketing in West Africa, University of Edinburgh, mimeo., 1966; B. W.
Hodder and U. 1. Ukwu, Markets in West Africa, Ibadan 1969; Marvin P. Miracle, ed., ‘Markets
and Market Relationships’, African Urban Notes, 5, 1970, pp. 1-174; and Claude Meillassoux,
ed.. The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa, 1971.
I am grateful to Marion Johnson for the examples which follow.

51
 An Economic History of West Africa

identifying the constraints inhibiting the further development of an already estab¬

lished exchange sector.
Social scientists have given considerable thought to the problem of understanding
the internal trade of pre-colonial Africa. The most publicised analysis of this subject
is that proposed by Bohannan and Dalton, 'which is based on a distinction bet'ween the
market place and the market principle.^®® Bohannan and Dalton have advanced a
three-fold classification: first, societies -which lack markets and in 'which market
principles are hardly present; second, societies -which have market places, but in
wliich market principles operate peripherally; and third, societies in -which the
market place has declined, but in -which market principles have become dominant.
The first two categories are said to apply to Africa, while the last is typical of indus¬
trial societies. Communities of the first two types can be thought of as being multi¬
centric, having distinct transactional spheres distinguished by difierent goods and
services, and operating according to discrete principles of exchange. In multicentric
economies the laws of supply and demand are less important in determining the
terms of exchange than are principles of reciprocity and redistribution.. The aim of
economic endeavour is to ‘convert’ goods from one sphere (such as subsistence) to
another (such as prestige) in order to achieve goals which are essentially social in
character.
\ This is a subtle analysis, and it has stimulated, directly and indirectly, a great deal of
further research. However, Bohannan and Dalton’s classification will not be used
here for the following reasons (which, because of limitations of space, will have to
be stated briefly). The chief criticism is one, curiously, which has not been stressed
before, possibly because most commentators have been economic anthropologists
rather than historians. Although Bohannan and Dalton claim that their first two
categories are applicable to ‘traditional’ societies in Africa, neither author has made
more than brief use of sources which historians would regard as necessary to the
/ analysis of the pre-colonial period. It so happens that during the past ten years
I historical research has shown that both the market place and the market principle
I were more important than Bohannan and Dalton allowed in their publication of
I 1962. Their claim that peripheral markets do not influence production decisions is
at variance with the evidence. The extent to which market activity failed to mobilise
the factors of production fully is better explained in terms of economics (technologi-
■ cal limitations and constraints on demand) than in terms of social controls based on
anti-capitalist values. Even if it is assumed that the market principle was in some
sense peripheral, this insight turns out to be less helpful than it appears at first. The
crucial problem is to find a way of measuring the degree of peripherality, but this,
admittedly daunting, task is not one wliich Bohannan and Dalton have attempted.
Their case rests on the assumption that there is a sharp contrast in the values governing
multicentric and unicentric economies. However, this belief is based on ideal types
rather than realities. It is not values and goals which distinguish pre-industrial from
y
1°® ‘Introduction’, to Markets in Africa, ed. Paul Bohannan and George Dalton, Evanston
1962, pp. 1-26.

52
 The domestic economy: structure and function

industrial societies so much as the structure of the two types of economy, which
provide different means of achieving what, in general terms, are similar ends. Prin¬
ciples of reciprocity and redistribution undoubtedly operated to some extent in
Africa,^”® but they can also be found in industrial societies both in private and in
public sectors. Moreover, industrial societies are concerned with social as well as
economic values. The American millionaire remains at his desk not to make money,
but to exercise power and to maintain his prominence in the community, or, in
African parlance, to be regarded as a ‘big’ man. Similarly, a successful English
businessman may well put money into a football club instead of opening a new
factory. In short, all societies are to some extent multicentric, but until means are
devised of distinguishing differences of degree this observation is of limited use.
The classification adopted here is a simple one based on a distinction between local
and long distance trade. Local trade refers to transactions which took place within a
radius of up to about ten miles of the area of production. This was the range which
could be covered in one day by foot or by donkey, while still allowing time to
exchange products and return home. Beyond this radius it was necessary to make
arrangements for overnight stops, to reallocate work in the household, and some¬
times to make use of professional carriers and commercial intermediaries. This
distinction has been criticised, though mainly by those who have been influenced in
varying degrees by the substantivist viewpoint.^^° However, it is worth pointing out,
in anticipation of an additional objection, that classifications of trade, as of other
economic and social institutions, are best judged according to their suitability for the
particular purpose their advocate has in mind, rather than with reference to an ideal,
comprehensive classification which will be fully revealed to the diligent scholar
providing he searches hard enough. Having estabhshed that trade was widespread,
the distinction between local and long distance commerce becomes helpful because
it draws attention to differences in degrees of specialisation, in types of commercial
institution, in the composition of the goods traded, and in the nature of consumer
demand. In other words, instead of discussing constraints on the development of the
market as a whole, as if the market were homogeneous, this distinction permits
some refinement of analysis by making it possible to identify the blockages appro¬
priate to each category of trade.
The first issue to be considered concerns the origins of local trade. Hodder has
questioned the view that local exchange and local markets arose naturally in West
Africa as a result of the complementary needs of communities which were in close
proximity to each other, and has suggested instead that local trade was stimulated

1®® See, for example, Ronald Cohen, ‘Some Aspects of Institutionalized Exchange: a Kanuri
Example’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines, 5, 1965, PP- 353-<59-
^1® Richard Gray and David Birmingham, ‘Some Economic and Social Consequences
of Trade in Central and Eastern Africa in the Pre-Colonial Period’, in Pre-Colonial African
Trade: Essays on Trade in Central and Eastern Africa Before 1900, ed. Richard Gray and David
Birmingham, 1970, pp. 2-5, and Claude MeiEassoux, ‘Introduction’ to The Development of
Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa, ed. Claude Meillassoux, 1971, pp. 67-8. However,
it should be noted that these authors also quahfy the argument advanced by Bohannan and
Dalton.

53
An Economic History of West Africa

primarily by long distance, and especially external, commercedThis interpreta¬

tion, it is said, helps to explain the existence of certain marketless areas in West
Africa, and also the contrast with East Africa, where, so it is claimed, there was no
comparable long distance trade in the pre-colonial period and less local exchange too.
However, the historical evidence provides no clear justification for choosing be¬
tween these two views. It will be argued here that local exchange needs were
important in the creation of local markets, and that long distance trade had a stimu¬
lating effect on marketing activity at all levels. As for the contrast with other parts
of the continent, recent research has indicated that the assumption that East Africa
had little long distance trade is mistaken.^^^
Short distance trade resulted from the production strategy of local households,
and from variations in the natural and human resource endowment of the micro¬
environment. The basic aim of most households was to secure the products needed
to maintain their customary standards of living. In order to reach this target each
household tried to plant the amount of crops needed for survival in what, from
experience, was known to be a poor year. In planning for disaster, there would be
more crops available in an average year than the household could consume. Some¬
times these crops were stored for future use, but this was not always possible with
perishable varieties. Sometimes they were consumed in harvest ‘festivals’, but there
were limitations to the amount of food which one community could eat in a short
period of time. Sometimes, if neighbouring villages lacked foodstuffs, local produce
was traded. This type of trade can be thought of as a system of compensation,
equalising losses experienced elsewhere. A surplus was plaimed, but trade was
unpremeditated. This example has been cited to show that exchange potential was
present even where production levels were governed by the siege mentality associ¬
ated with pure, subsistence economies. A more typical case was that of households
which regularly plarmed their production of foodstuffs and crafts with a certain
amount of exchange in mind. Trade of this kind was made possible by the presence
of complementary needs within regions which are sometimes regarded, wrongly,
as being uniform. Variations in natural resources did not have to be profound for
local trade to develop, though marketing activity was especially intense on the
borders of ecological zones. Usually, it was not a question of sharply contrasting
specialisms, but of a subtle shift of emphasis between adjacent areas with very
similar economies. For example, one village might grow foodstuffs of a different
variety or better quality than the next, or produce a particular colour or design of
cloth. Human resources also lacked the homogeneity claimed in textbook generalis¬
ations about ‘traditional’ societies. The concept of the average household disguises
the possibility, discussed earlier in this chapter, that wealth could be distributed in an
unbalanced way even in a small community in an underdeveloped region. In¬
equalities meant that some members of the community could afford to trade, while

m B. W. Hodder, ‘Some Conunents on the Origins of Traditional Markets in Africa

South of the Sahara’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 36, 1965, pp. 97-105.
Richard Oray and David Birmingham, eds, Pre-Colonial African Trade: Essays on Trade
in Central and Eastern Africa Before 1900, 1970.

54
 The domestic economy: structure and function

others needed to secure goods which they had failed to produce for themselvesd^*^
Most local exchange was conducted in the market place, though Muslim women
frequently traded within their compounds. A typical example of a local market near
the Senegal river was described by Cadamosto, a Venetian sailor, in the fifteenth
century.

Hither repaired, with their wares, both men and women, for four or five miles
about; and those who lived at a greater distance went to other markets nearer
them. The great poverty of this people appeared in the goods found in these
faires; which were, a few pieces of cotton-cloth, cotton-yarn, pulse, oil, millet,
wooden tubs, palm mats, and everything else for the use of life.^^^

Towns were capable of generating a greater and more varied demand for local
products. The expansion of the port of Lagos, for instance, set up demands which
stimulated production in the hinterland.^^® This ‘spread effect’ is illustrated by the
following list of African goods on sale in the nearby market of Ejirin in September
1892

Foodstuffs Raw Materials Livestock Manufactures

Asala nuts Cotton Bullocks Calabashes
Beans Indigo Ducks Cotton cloth
Benniseed Palm kernels Goats Pots
Egusi seeds Potash Guinea fowl Soap
Farina Horses Yarn
Groundnuts Pigeons
Locust seeds Sheep
Maize Turkeys
Okra
Palm oil
Pepper
Shea butter
Yams
Yam flour

Of these thirty-one items, only two (palm oil and palm kernels) were important in
overseas trade.
Markets were not distributed at random, nor was the timing of market days a
matter of‘custom and impulse’. Continuous markets, that is markets which were in
almost permanent session, were found mainly in large towns. Elsewhere, markets

Polly Hill, ‘The Myth of the Amorphous Peasantry: a Northern Nigerian Case Study’,
Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, lo, 1968, pp. 239-60.
Thomas Astley, ed., A New General Collection of Voyages and Travels, 1745, p. 587.
This example may be compared with that of London at an earher date. See F. J. Fisher,
‘The Development of the London Food Market, 1540-1640’, Economic History Review, 5,
1935, PP- 46-64.
C.O. 147/86, Carter to Ripon, 4 Oct. 1892, Pubhc Record Office.

55
An Economic History of West Africa

were held at intervals of between two and eight days, and occasionally longerd^"^
Today, seven-day markets are the most common in West Africa as a whole, though
four-day markets are more typical of the forest east of Ghana. Periodic markets were
usually formed into rings or cycles, though the arrangement was by no means rigid
and it also changed in the course of time, as some markets fell into disuse and others
were founded. The frequency with which any one market was held depended on
the number of markets in a particular ring. For example, in a ring containing just
two markets each met on alternate days, and a two-day market week operated. The
sequence of meetings was decided by the principle that ‘proximity in space implies
separation in time’.^^® That is to say, two markets which were part of a larger ring
were unlikely to meet on consecutive days if they were only a short distance apart,
because to do so might lead to needless duplication. Periodic markets were often held
at places which were convenient to several settlements, but which did not coincide
with any one of them. It was possible for a local market to attract several thousand
people on the day it met, yet to be almost completely deserted during the rest of the
week.
Periodicity was primarily a function of the volume and spatial distribution of
purchasing power. Where effective demand was strong and concentrated in a small
area, such as an urban centre, continuous markets predominated. Where demand
was weaker and spread over dispersed settlements, periodic markets were the rule.
The formation of market rings provided each community in a given area with easy
and regular access to goods and services which it needed. At the same time the device
which ensured that each market met at a specified interval kept the costs of collection
and distribution to a minimum. Rotating markets, like systems of shifting and
rotational cultivation, were an expression of the principle that the costs of perman¬
ence were not justified by the returns.
The traders involved in local exchange tended to be predominantly female, part-
time, small scale, mobile and numerous. They were mainly female because local
trade was a convenient adjunct to household and, in some societies, farming activi¬
ties ; they were part-time because trade was regarded as a supplement, though often
an important one, to primary, domestic occupations; they were small scale because
they lacked the capital to be anything else; they were mobile (except in the towns)
because the most efficient way of connecting buyers and sellers was by bringing them
together in periodic, rotating markets; and they were numerous because local trade
was a generally accessible way of adding to farm incomes, since it required few
managerial or technical skills and little capital.

On periodic markets see Polly HiU, ‘Notes on Traditional Market Authority and Market
Periodicity in West Afiica.', Journal of African History, 7, 1966, pp. 295-3 ii; B. W. Hodder,
Periodic and Daily Markets in West Africa’, in The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets
in West Africa, ed. Claude MeiUassoux, I97i> PP- 347-58; and the comprehensive study by
Robert H. T. Smith, West African Market-Places; Temporal Periodicity and Locational
Spacing’, in ibid., pp. 319-46.
118 Vernon G. Fagerlund and Robert H. T. Smith, ‘A Preliminary Map of Market Period¬
icities in Ghana’, Journal of Developing Areas, 4, 1970, p. 343.

56
 The domestic economy: structure and function

It used to be thought that the employment of many hands increased distribution

costs unnecessarily. During the colonial period expatriate officials and companies
often complained about the large number of local traders, believing, with their
Tudor predecessors, that ‘middlemen’ (by which they meant other middlemen) were
‘Marchauntes of myschyefe that go betwixt the barke and the tree’.’^^® However, it
is now agreed that the distributive system was efficient, even if it did employ a
multiplicity of intermediaries. There was no cheaper way of serving a market in
which most consumers had low per capita incomes and were scattered in dispersed
settlements. Competition in local trade was fierce because there were hardly any
barriers to entry and few alternative employment opportunities. Consequently,
profit margins were slender. Of course, there were some imperfections in the
market, but these should be seen not as evidence of the ‘primitive’ nature of pre¬
colonial exchange, but as a reminder that perfect competition is an ideal which is
rarely foimd in the real world, even in industrial societies. A variety of traders’
organisations existed in West Africa, and these tried to exert a measure of control
over prices and competition.^^® However, the indications are that the prices of most
goods in local markets were determined mainly by supply and demand, and that the
haggling skills of the parties concerned played an important part in deciding the
exact price agreed in any single transaction. Traders’ organisations had greater suc¬
cess in representing the interests of their members in negotiations with state authori¬
ties, and in helping to enforce regulations regarding weights and measures, and laws
governing debt, contract and agency.^^’- The indigenous distributive system was
not made redundant by the ‘impact of modem capitalism’. On the contrary, the skill,
efficiency and adaptability of local traders assisted the rapid expansion of internal
trade during the colonial era.^^^
The conditions which gave rise to local trade also set limits to its expansion.^^® On
the supply side, pre-industrial costs of production meant that there was no way of
reducing the selling prices of foodstuffs and crafts to the point where consumers
could have afforded significantly greater quantities without any change taking place
in average per capita incomes. It seems likely that a greater volume of goods could
have been produced at constant unit prices with the factors already available, but
constraints on the demand side meant that this happened only sporadically. The
‘primitive’ consumer was perfectly willing to depart from established consumption
levels, but lacked the means of doing so. Variations in the resource base enabled a

R. H. Tawney and Eileen Power, eds, Tudor Economic Documents, 3, 1924, p. 49.
There is scope for further work on these organisations, especially those involving women
traders.
121 For a study of the most famous weights see Brigitte Menzel, Goldweights from Ghana,
Berlm 1968. For information on indigenous commercial law in one area see A. G. Hopkins,
‘A Report on the Yoruba, 1910', Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 5, 1969, pp. 88-92.
^22 As is shown in Chapter 7, section 2.
123 With more space and more information it would be possible to construct a detailed flow
chart of local goods and services along the lines developed by Frederick Barth, ‘Economic
Spheres in Darfur’, in Themes in Economic Anthropology, ed. Raymond Firth, 1967, pp- 149-74-

57
An Economic History of West Africa

certain amount of trade to take place, but limitations to complementarity in a small

area meant that it was usually possible for households to supply acceptable substitutes
for most of the goods offered for sale. In other words, the kinds of goods which
farmers were best able to produce and trade were already being produced and
traded equally cheaply by those who were their potential customers. Consequently,
the scope for exchange was limited and per capita incomes remained low. If per
capita incomes had risen markedly, the proportion of the increase spent on foodstuffs
would have declined, while that spent on manufactures, such as cloth, would have
grown. As this deyelopment did not occur, the effective demand for craft products
remained small. Consumers with net incomes above the average were able to spend
more on manufactures, but there were too few of them in any one locality to induce
producers to specialise and to introduce cost-reducing techniques.
Long distance trade can be regarded as an attempt by African entrepreneurs to
overcome the limitations of local commerce. Constraints still existed on the supply
side, because it was just as expensive to produce goods for long distance trade as for
sale locally. On the demand side, however, long distance trade presented an oppor¬
tunity of connecting social islands of purchasing power, that is consumers who,
though only a small proportion of the total population, had sufficient wealth
between them to support a market which was greater than that available to local
traders in any one area. The less affluent majority participated in this commerce to a
certain extent by using profits accumulated from local trading activities to purchase
cheaper types of cloth and small quantities of essential items, such as salt. In general,
however, long distance trade tended to cater for the needs of relatively high income
groups because only prosperous consumers could afford to pay prices which took
account of the scarcity value of items that were unavailable locally, and the greater
handling costs and risks of carrying goods beyond the area of production.^^^ These
principles help to explain the composition and organisation of long distance trade
not only in Africa, but also in other parts of the world, as the examples of the
fur trade of pre-industrial Europe and the silk trade of the Far East clearly
demonstrate.^^®
A complex network of trade routes had to be created in order to reach these
geographically dispersed islands of relatively wealthy consumers. Some of the most
important long distance routes were aligned on north-south axes, because these
crossed major geographical zones, which, as noted earlier, ran from west to east in
roughly parallel bands. Thus the pastoralists of the Sahara-savanna border traded
livestock, dairy produce and salt with the cultivators of the savanna in return for
millet and cloth. In turn, the savanna region traded livestock, salt, dried fish, potash
and cloth with the peoples of the forest, from whom they received slaves, kola

The assumption (criticised earlier in this chapter) that there were no marked mequalities
of wealth in pre-colonial African societies makes it extremely difficult to explain the existence
and longevity of long distance trade.
See T. S. Willan, The Early History of the Russia Company, 1553-1603, 1956, and C. G. F.
Simkin, The Traditional Trade of Asia, 1968.

58
 Map 6. Major Trade Routes of the Western Sudan in the Nineteenth Century.
The domestic economy: structure cmdfunction

59
J
An Economic History of West Africa

nuts/^® ivory, iron^vare and cloth. Finally, producers in the forest sold various food¬
stuffs and manufactures to coastal settlements in exchange for fish and sea salt. There
were other routes, however, which ran in a west-east direction, for complementary
needs could arise quite easily within regions as large as the savanna and the forest.
Slaves, dried fish and Kano cloth, for instance, were sold throughout the Western
Sudan. There was also some movement of foodstuffs outside the locality of produc¬
tion: the great entrepot of Timbuctu imported grain, vegetables and livestock from
the twelfth century onwards, and in the fifteenth century there was a considerable
trade in millet, rice, cotton and livestock within the empire of Mali. Similarly, slaves,
rare beads and Yoiruba and Ashanti cloth were traded throughout the forest.
The foregoing list of commodities and inter-regional connections makes it clear
that simple, bilateral exchanges were the exception rather than the rule. Long dis¬
tance trade in West Africa involved re-exports and multilateral relations, and was
equally as complicated, protracted and risky as the better known triangular trade
which spanned the Atlantic in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Long dis¬
tance commerce in Africa raises some fascinating, and as yet unanswerable, questions
regarding the terms of trade and the balance of trade between various regions, the
direction of money flows and their significance in settling debts outstanding on the
trading account, and the ways in which the balance of payments between states and
regions was affected by external commerce across the Sahara and Atlantic.^^^
The traders involved in long distance commerce were less numerous and more
specialised than those whose activities were confined to local markets. This broad
contrast needs further refinement, for it is clear that long distance traders were not
all of one type. It is suggested here, by way of preliminary classification, that they
can be divided, on the basis of size and specialisation, into four sub-groups.
First, there were target marketeers, that is occasional traders who made a few trips,
usually during the dry season, with cloth, salt or kola nuts in order to acquire a
specific sum of money for a particular purpose. These men usually provided their
own finance, and also carried their own goods. Target marketeers were relatively
unimportant, and their motivation was certainly not typical of long-distance traders
as a whole.
Second, there was a group of regular traders whose commercial operations were
integrated vertically (at least initially) with a specialised type of productive activity.
For instance, Kooroko blacksmiths from Ouassoulou (in southern Mali) built up
stocks of implements and weapons, sold them when prices were particularly
favourable, and used the proceeds to enter the salt and kola trades, moving alter-

Kola nuts are a mild stimulant containing caffeine. They were (and stiU are) chewed to
relieve tiredness and to overcome thirst. The most popular variety was cola nitida, which was
grown in the forest from Guinea east to the Gold Coast. The main centres of demand lay in the
Western Sudan, a dry region, and also one in which MusUm influence prohibited the consump¬
tion of alcohol.
Clearly, these are subjects which deserve further research.
Kwame Arhin, Atebubu Adarkets, ca. 1884—1930 > in The Deuelopyiietit of Indigenous
Trade and Markets in West Africa, ed. Claude Meillassoux, 1971, p. 207.

60
 The domestic economy: structure and function

nately north (for salt) and south (for kola nuts)d^® A further example is provided by
the intricate exchanges conducted by the tobacco farmers of Katsina (in northern
Nigeria) during the late nineteenth centuryd®° These farmers grew tobacco, stored
the crop for six or nine months until prices rose, and then sold it in Zinder and Agades
(lOO and 250 miles away). With the proceeds they bought cattle, sheep and goats,

and then returned home. They set off again a few weeks later, when the animals had
been fattened, this time travelling south to Ilorin, Ibadan and Abeokuta (between
375 and 450 miles from Katsina). They sold their livestock, and then went on to
Lagos to buy kola nuts, which they disposed of on their return home. This was a
complicated business operation, particularly since these farmer-traders had to leave
their land during the rainy season, a time of maximum inconvenience, and entrust
the harvest to relatives and slaves so that they could secure the highest price for their
tobacco. These two examples demonstrate that production strategies loere influenced
by market principles during the pre-colonial period.
Third, there were highly speciahsed and substantial professional traders. These
men had no direct control over the production of the goods they handled, but they
did establish a degree of horizontal integration with respect to particular staples,
partly by using kinsmen and slaves to staff a network of ‘branches’ along the main
trade routes. In the nineteenth century the merchants of Djenne, a large town on the
middle Niger, were said to have

organised ‘business firms’ in the European sense of the word, which were pro¬
vided with a routine and staff similar to our own. They established representatives
in important centres and opened branches at Timbuctu. They sent out travelling
agents who received percentages of the business they accomplished, and were, in
fact, none other than ‘commercial travellers’.

The two leading groups of professional, long distance traders were the Dioula and
the Hausa. The former were of Mande origin and were especially important in the
western part of West Africa, though they traded south-east as far as the forests of the
Ivory Coast, selling livestock, fish and cloth, and buying kola nuts and slaves. Hausa
traders were dominant in the eastern part of W^est Africa, spreading out from their
base in northern Nigeria as far south-west as the Gold Coast, where they exchanged
salt, cloth and livestock for gold, kola nuts and slaves.^®^

The Kooroko have now become more speciahsed as traders, and their activities are no
longer closely tied to their original craft. See Jean-Loup Amselle, Parente et commerce chez
les Kooroko’, in The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa, ed. Claude
MeHassoux, 1971, pp. 253-65.
130 poUy Hill, Studies in Rural Capitalism in West Africa, Cambridge 1970, pp. 141-5-
131 Felix Dubois, Tombouctou la mystaieuse, Paris 1897, p. I74-
133 There were also several other groups, such as the Diakhanke, who traded in the hinter¬
land of Senegambia and were especially prominent during the period 1600-1850. See Phihp D.
Curtin, ‘Pre-Colonial Trading Networks and Traders: the Diakhanke’, in The Development of
Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa, ed. Claude Meillassoux, I97^» PP- 228—39-

61
Aft Ecotioinic History of West Africa

Fourth, there were official traders, who transacted business on behalf of the state.
Given that the need for revenue was a common preoccupation of all governments,
it is not surprising that some states tried to raise money by participating in long
distance trade. In Ashanti official trade was conducted by functionaries such as the
batafo; in Dahomey royal rights over trade were delegated to a group of quasi¬
official merchants in return for a share of the profits; and in the Mossi states large
caravans were organised by senior officials. In their commercial dealings, these states
can be thought of as substantial firms. Public enterprise had access to the capital
needed for long distance trade, and it was also in a position to secure privileges which,
in theory at least, gave official traders a competitive advantage over private mer¬
chants. State enterprise was sometimes responsible for major commercial innova¬
tions, as, for example, in the case of the Ashanti government, which played a leading
part in the development of the kola trade in the nineteenth century.^'^^ Nevertheless,
it seems unlikely that state traders conducted a larger share of long distance trade
than did independent merchants. Indeed, in some cases, as among the Akan states of
the southern Gold Coast, public authorities deliberately refrained from engaging in
trade directly, not because they were insensitive to commercial opportunities, but
because they judged it more advantageous to encourage private traders and then to
tax them.^^^ The imposition of tolls and market dues was undoubtedly a widespread
means of raising revenue,and being a relatively simple and virtually riskless
exercise, it may well have been preferred, on the whole, to direct trading.
Directly or indirectly, trade seems to have been an important source of state
income, particularly since ‘feudal’ rents derived from land were far less common in
Africa than they were in medieval Europe. All West African states had a keen interest
in encouraging trade. Prudent rulers kept in close touch with leading traders and
mercantile organisations, and commercial policy formed a large part of state policy
as a whole. Pre-industrial states in other continents may well have hindered the
expansion of the market, as is sometimes alleged, by imposing bureaucratic controls
on private enterprise, and by directing policy towards the attainment of spiritual
rather than economic goals. These arguments have little relevance for West Africa.
It is worth while looking more closely at the organisation of long distance com¬
merce to see how African businessmen dealt with the problems of handling goods,
of dealing with ‘foreign’ customers, and of raising the capital required to invest in
costly, long term ventures. A study of the solutions devised for these difficulties
should provide some indication of the capabilities of indigenous entrepreneurs.
Long distance traders of all types banded together in caravans, which resembled
armed convoys, having guards, porters and drovers, as well as a leader, a guide, a

Ivor Wilks, Asante Policy Towards the Hausa Trade in the Nineteenth Century’, in
The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa, ed. Claude Meillassoux, 1971,
pp. 130-33.
134 Kwaine Y. Daaku, ‘Trade and Trading Patterns of the Akan in the Seventeenth and

Eighteenth Centuries’, in The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa, ed.
Claude Meillassoux, 1971, pp. 168-81.
Sundstrom, The Trade of Guinea, pp. 5-13, 61-5.

62
 The domestic economy: structure and function

treasurer and a quartermaster^^® Hausa caravans in the nineteenth century consisted

of 1-2,000 people, most of whom were armed, and an equal number of donkeys.
They travelled for five or six hours each day on well established routes, where water
and food were known to be available, and sent out scouts to search for brigands and
to negotiate for supplies. The round trip from Sokoto to Ashanti (a total of about
1,200 miles) took between six months and one year. Caravans were like slowly
moving markets, selling some of their goods on the route and paying for foodstuffs
and services as they went. Without them, long distance trade would have been
impossible. However, there were diseconomies of scale which became apparent
during the colonial period. With greater freedom of movement and more secure
markets, long distance traders began to travel in small groups, an arrangement which
gave them flexibility in timing departures and arrivals, offered them a wider choice
of routes, and reduced their overheads, since it was no longer necessary to contribute
towards the cost of guards and guides. Large caravans became redundant in the
twentieth century, but long distance trade survived: it was merely reorganised in
ways which were less readily identifiable.
The caravans of the pre-colonial period commuted ponderously between large
entrepots, many of which were located at points of overlap between different
ecological zones. A line of these markets ran from west to east along the Sahara-
savanna border, and included towns such as Segou, Djenne, Timbuctu, Gao, Sokoto,
Katsina and Kano. A similar chain existed in the south on the borders between the
savanna and the forest, and included Bouna, Bondoukou, Begho, Onitsha and the
Ashanti markets of Salaga and Kintampo. These entrepots were bulking and bulk¬
breaking centres, and also places where goods were transferred from one mode of
transport to another. On arrival at the entrepots, the caravan broke up and the traders
made contact with specialised agents, who helped them dispose of their goods and
buy other products for the return journey. The two most important agents were
landlords and brokers.^®’^ The former were wholesalers, who provided storage for
goods, pasture for livestock and accommodation for traders. The latter were com¬
mission agents and interpreters, who played a crucial role as intermediaries between
buyers and sellers, though sometimes they traded on their own account as well.
Many goods were sold in the market place,but negotiations over some of the more
valuable items, such as gold and salt, usually took place in the house of the landlord or
broker concerned. Landlords and brokers based their business on personal connec¬
tions, and were concerned to build up a reputation for fairness and honesty.
Clapperton, who visited Kano in the 1820s, noted that

if a tobe or a turkadee [cotton garments for men and women respectively] purchased
here is carried to Bornu or any other distant place, without being opened, and is

13® For further information see N. Levtzion, Muslims and Chiefs in West Africa, Oxford 1968,
pp. 23-5, and Paul E. Lovejoy, ‘Long-Distance Trade and Islam: the Case of the Nineteenth-
Century Hausa Kola Trude , Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 5, 1971, pp. 537-47-
131 Sundstrom, The Trade of Guinea, pp. 57-60; Polly Hill, ‘Landlords and Brokers: a West
African Trading System’, Cahiers d'^tudes Africaines, 6, 1966, pp. 349-66. It should be noted
that some agents acted both as landlords and as brokers.

63

3»
An Economic History of West Africa

there discovered to be of inferior quality, it is immediately sent back, as a matter of

course—the name of the dylala, or broker, being written inside every parcel. In
tliis case, the dylala must find out the seller, who, by the laws of Kano, is forthwith
obliged to refund the purchase money

This arrangernent suggests a degree of modernity which modem consumers them¬

selves might well envy.
Three of the chief requirements of long distance trade were capital, credit and
security. These needs encouraged a trend towards the control of a particular staple,
market or trade route by a family, by a lineage or even by a whole ethnic group.
This tendency resulted partly from the fact that mobilising funds and securing credit
depended largely on personal, face-to-face relationships,^®® and partly from a
recognition that integration had advantages of spreading risks over a number of
investors, of providing reliable agents in distant places, and of strengthening the
bargaining position of traders in relation to landlords and brokers. At the same time
it seems likely, though this is hypothetical, that this method of raising funds
ultimately limited the growth of a firm, for it was not always possible for a family,
still less for larger units, to co-operate successfully. A shortage of capital in any one
firm would tend either to increase the total number of firms engaged in a particular
trade, or (if new competitors were excluded) to keep the volume of trade below the
level of effective demand. Even where co-operation was achieved, expansion could
still be impeded by rival organisations. For example, Hausa merchants were en¬
couraged to buy kola nuts, but were prevented by the Ashanti from entering the
areas of production. Lack of capital, combined with political interference, often
meant that goods had to be handed over by one group of merchants to another at
staging posts and entrepots, thus giving rise to a system of relay trading.^^®
Successful integration required a formal moral code to sanction and control com¬
mercial relationships. The blueprint for the formation of a moral community of
businessmen was provided by Islam, which was closely associated with long distance
trade in West Africa from the eighth century onwards.^^^ Islam helped maintain the
identity of members of a network or firm who were scattered over a wide area, and
often in foreign countries; it enabled traders to recognise, and hence to deal readily
with, each other; and it provided moral and ritual sanctions to enforce a code of
conduct which made trust and credit possible. It was through Islam that Dioula and
1®® Quoted in Thomas Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives, i960, p. 217.
The successful businessman demonstrated his importance and credit worthiness by his
open-handed manner and conspicuous generosity. It is typical of the ethno-centric judgements
made about the underdeveloped world that these characteristics are regarded as evidence of
improvidence, whereas m the European context they are cited as examples of shrewd business
sense.
Sundstrdm, The Trade of Guinea, p. 54; Jean-Louis Boutilher, ‘La cite marchande dc
Bouna dans I’ensemble economique Ouest-Africam pre-colonial’, m The Development of
Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa, ed. Claude Meillassoux, 1971, pp. 240—52.
See Abner Cohen’s outstandhig contribution, ‘Cultural Strategies in the Organization
of Trading Diasporas’, in The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa, ed.
Claude Meillassoux, 1971, pp. 266-81.

64
 The domestic economy: structure and function

Hausa merchants established the commercial networks, or diasporas,^^^ which

made them so prominent and successful in long distance trade. Diasporas of various
kinds have been an important feature of migration and innovation in many parts of
the world besides Africa, as the contrasting examples of Chinese traders in south-east
Asia and white settlers in the British empire illustrate.
An additional perspective on these regional and inter-continental migrations is
provided by the concept of the frontier, which was applied originally to the develop¬
ment of the American west in the nineteenth century. This concept has been
considered in relation to the liistory of Europeans in Africa,^^^ but it has not been
used to identify and analyse the cultural and economic frontiers which existed
within the continent in the pre-colonial period. The analogy with nineteenth-century
America cannot be pressed too hard, but it is by no means as far-fetched as it might
seem at first sight. Caravans, like wagon trains, developed a pioneer ethic borne of
shared risk and common purpose; they often led to the foundation of new settle¬
ments {zongos); and they expressed a competitive and acquisitive spirit, which
manifested itself in a search for new sources of wealth, as well as in trade in established
staples. Muslim traders converted and clothed the ‘pagan sans-culottes’ with all the
zeal of the Faithful — Islam being as much the inspiration of capitalist enterprise in
West Africa as the Protestant ethic (which was once thought to have exclusive rights
in this sphere) was in parts of Europe. Further consideration of the concepts of
diasporas and frontiers in African history might well prove useful in focusing on
regional differences, on pressures towards the expansion of the market economy,
and on the reasons inhibiting the further advance of established boundaries of
exchange.
It is tempting to conclude that the foregoing analysis demonstrates that pre¬
industrial business organisation was entirely different from that of the modem
commercial world. This temptation should be resisted. Differences, of course,
existed, but these can easily be exaggerated. Kinship, it is said, is replaced by con¬
tract; ascription becomes less important than achievement; and businessmen acquire
more respect and status. These familiar contrasts are attractive partly because of their
clarity and simplicity, and partly because they express approved liberal and demo¬
cratic sentiments. Whether they relate to the realities of either the pre-industrial or
the industrial world is open to question.
In practice, a great deal of the most important business of the leading industrial
states today is transacted on a basis of mutual trust and confidence. Furthermore,
the cohesiveness of influential sections of the business community is maintained by
developing a value system which assists recognisability and reinforces trustworthi¬
ness.^^® Promotion to senior positions in merchant banks, insurance companies and

1*2 In Cohen’s phrase, a diaspora is ‘an ethnic group in dispersal’.

1*3 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History, New York, 1920.
1** W. K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 2, part 2, 1942.
1*3 Stewart Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: a Preliminary Study’,
American Sociological Review, 28, 1963, pp.
1*6 Hugh Thomas, ed.. The Establishment: a Symposium, 1959.

65
 If

An Economic History of West Africa

the Stock Exchange in the City of London is dependent on absorbing an ideology,

based on a secularised version of the Christian ethic, which defines the rules of the
game and provides instructions on how to play it. This ideology is acquired inform¬
ally in the home and formally through the public school system. The exercises chosen
for developing the qualities needed in later life are those which encourage members
of the group to play together (to express social solidarity against outsiders), yet also
to play competitively (to permit the emergence of leaders). The finished products
can be recognised by their dress and accent, which provide a generally reliable guide
to their behaviour. The identity of the group is reinforced by inter-marriage, which
ensures that kinship ties remain significant in business relationships.
Social, as well as educational, entry qualifications severely limit the extent to
which merit is rewarded by promotion in twentieth-century Britain. A recent study
has shown that over one hundred years after the beginning of the industrial revolution
‘leadership by inheritance applied in a great range of industrial activities’, and that
newcomers often found their advance blocked by family control. In the case of
the City of London recruitment is still restricted to members of the uppenand middle
classes, and preference is given to those who have been brought up in the Home
Counties. Commercial leaders are chosen from within this minority group, not from
outside it. In pre-colonial West Africa there was no lack of the will to achieve, and
there was scope for traders of ability to make their way in commerce. Admittedly,
those who became successful tried to entrench themselves and to ensure that their
families had advantages which others lacked, but such aims are scarcely a peculiarity
of the pre-industrial world.
Finally, it is worth noting that there is no evidence that businessmen were accorded
a low status in pre-colonial Africa, or that they suffered from any other form of
social discrimination. The indications are that successful merchants were highly
regarded, as indeed they are today. Furthermore, it is mistaken to suppose that
businessmen enjoy a notably superior status in advanced capitalist societies. Business
occupations do not rank at the top of the status hierarchy even in the United States,
and it is now clear that similarities in the occupational-prestige rankings of pre¬
industrial and industrial societies are much greater than used to be thought.^^®
Local trade, as explained earlier, had its own rationale, but it was also connected
to long distance commerce through the sale of supplies to passing caravans and, to a
small extent, through the distribution of the goods which they delivered. The net¬
work of long distance trade routes thus gave West Africa a tenuous economic unity,
linking, and partially integrating, different geographical zones and ethnic groupings,
and crossing many state boundaries. However, there were limitations to the develop¬
ment of a ‘national’ West African economy. The unity achieved through long

P. L. Payne, ‘The Emergence of the Large-scale Company m Great Britam, 1870-1914’,

Economic History Review, 20, 1967, p. 538.
Robert W. Hodge, Donald J. Treiman and Peter H. Rossi, ‘A Comparative Study of
Occupational Prestige’, in Class, Status, and Power, ed. Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martm
Lipset, 1967, pp. 309-21; and Robert W. Hodge, Paul M. Siegel and Peter H. Rossi, ‘Occu¬
pational Prestige in the United States’, in ibid, pp. 322-34.

66
 The domestic economy: structure and Junction

distance commerce was incomplete because the trade itself was restricted in volume
and because its principal effects were felt by a minority of the total population.
Further consideration will be given to the question of constraints on the growth of
this market in the final section of the present chapter, after the two remaining features
of the distributive system, money and transport, have been examined.
It is often supposed that West Africa failed to develop a monetary system which
was designed to facilitate exchange and could succeed in doing so. According to one
view, ‘primitive’ trade was conducted by barter. Another interpretation admits that
currencies of various types existed, but argues that they did not have the same
properties or perform the same functions as modern money. In neither case was it
possible for a capital market to develop, nor was there any need for a sophisticated
institutional device of this kind. If one or other of these arguments is correct then an
explanation of the limitations on commercial expansion must attach some weight to
deficiencies in pre-colonial monetary systems.
There is no doubt that a proportion of the goods entering the market were ex¬
changed by barter. A number of books refer to the so-called ‘silent’ trade or ‘dumb’
barter, which, supposedly, was an arrangement whereby goods were exchanged hy
altering quantities, hut without verbal consultation as to price. This curious behav¬
iour is in accord with the European image of quaint native life, and it is easy to believe
that these tribal traders, having kept silent for so long, compensated by dancing and
drumming even more vigorously than before. Reality, however, must intrude: the
only scholar to investigate the various accounts of ‘dumb’ barter decided that the
supporting evidence was so weak that it was necessary to resort to Gestalt psychology
to explain why Europeans continued to believe in it!^^® Barter aided by verbal
communication was common, but it was not the dominant means of effecting
exchange. Despite the evolutionist assumption that barter is the first stage in the
emergence of a market economy, this method of trade is not necessarily associated
with ‘simple’ societies, and it works efficiently if goods can be ‘paired’ easily. It is as
well to remember that a substantial, and increasing, proportion of world trade today
is conducted on a modified barter basis, whereby goods such as locomotives are
exchanged for products such as coffee, and deficiencies are made up by cash pay¬
ments or by vouchers redeemable elsewhere. Africans were more familiar with
this system in the pre-colonial period than they were with pure barter.
Since trade was widespread and involved multilateral relations, goods were not
always readily interchangeable, and money was needed to facilitate exchange. A
variety of currencies was in circulation in the centuries before colonial rule, the most
important being gold, cowries, strips of cloth, and copper and iron rods.
Gold was current throughout much of the Western Sudan and also in central parts
of the forest, such as Ashanti, from the eleventh century onwards and probably
earlier. Gold currencies took two main forms: gold dust, which was transported in
small bags and measured on a portable balance, and mithc^als (an alternative name

Sundstrom, The Trade of Guinea, pp. 22-31, 66—73.

15° The Times, 26 January 1972, p. I9-

67
An Economic History of West Africa

for dinars), which were in use both as coins and as units of weight for gold dust.^®^
The mithqals minted at Nikki, in what is now northern Dahomey, are thought to
have had an extensive circulation in the eastern half of the Western Sudan in the
early nineteenth century.
Cowrie shells, for centuries the major export of the Mai dive Islands, were used as
currency in several parts of the world, including much of Africa. ^^^They were first
imported into West Africa via an overland route from North Africa and the Middle
East, and were in use in the chief markets of the middle Niger from at least the
eleventh century. Cowries spread west to Mauritania before the fifteenth century;
€ast to Hausaland early in the eighteenth century, reaching Bornu in the second half
of the nineteenth century; and south to the forest between the Ivory Coast and the
Niger Delta, where they merged with cowries imported by European'traders by sea
from the sixteenth century onwards. Cowries were the most widespread currency in
West Africa, and they continued to expand in area and in volume until the late
nineteenth century, by winch time they were used in all parts of the region except
the Upper Guinea coast and its hinterland (from Senegal to Liberia), and eastern
Nigeria.
Cloth money and metal currencies other than gold were found in many parts of
West Africa, but were dominant only in areas where cowries had failed to penetrate.
Cotton strips were especially important in Bornu in the eighteenth century and in
parts of Senegambia, particularly among the Wolof, in the nineteenth century. Iron
money of various kinds was used on the Upper Guinea coast, and copper rods and
wires circulated in the eastern part of the Niger Delta and, before the eighteenth
century, in Bornu.^®® The origins of these metal currencies have been the subject of a
discussion which is noteworthy principally as a further illustration of the diffusionist
hypothesis that all complex social phenomena found in sub-Saharan Africa must
have originated elsewhere unless there is very clear proof to the contrary. However,
it seems unnecessary to resort to theories of the Egyptian or Eastern provenance of
metal currencies, since these could easily have been, and probably were, developed
in West Africa itself.
The problem now arises as to how to interpret the function of these pre-colonial
currencies. To classify them as transitional’ currencies is useful in drawing attention
to a category which lies between pure barter on the one hand and the monetary
systems of advanced industrial societies on the other, but it has the disadvantage of
grouping a wide range of currencies which may not share quite the same properties.
A more helpful classification is that which divides transitional currencies into two
types. First, there are general-purpose currencies, which are intended to assist
liquidity, and which can be exchanged readily for all goods and services irrespective

Marion Johnson, ‘The Nineteenth-Century Gold “Mithqal” in West and North

Africa’, Journal of African History, g, 1968, pp. 547-69.
The authoritative study on West Africa is Marion Johnson, ‘The Cowrie Currencies of
West AMca.’, Journal of African History, ii, 1970, pp. 17-49 and 331-53.
Manillas—^horseshoe-shaped currencies made of copper and brass—are noted in Chapter
3, part 2, in connection with external trade.

68
 The domestic economy: structure and function

of the social status of the parties concerned. The usefulness of these currencies can be
judged by their efficiency in promoting ‘modern’ exchange. Second, there are
special-purpose currencies, which are designed to control liquidity, winch can be
used to purchase only a limited range of goods, and which are not freely convertible
with other currencies. These currencies should not be analysed as if they were agents
of modernity, for they dominated societies where market principles were unimpor¬
tant, and their main purpose was to solidify the social structure.
The chief problem is an empirical one; whether West Africa’s pre-colonial
currencies should be classified as general-purpose or as special-purpose money.
According to the substantivist school, the transitional currencies of Africa were
special-purpose currencies. This conclusion follows from the assumption that
market principles were peripheral, and is also, so it is claimed, supported by historical
evidence. The substantivist interpretation deserves close attention because it has been
stated often and, on occasion, forcefully. Perhaps the best test of its accuracy is to see
whether it meets Polyani’s own precept that ‘the fount of the substantivist concept is
the empirical economy’.
Judged by this criterion, the basis of the substantivist case seems rather slender.
Dalton’s generalisations are derived mainly from a re-examination of a previous
scholar’s study of shell money on the Pacific island of R-Ossel.^®^ It is relevant to
observe in this connection that Pospisil and Epstein have shown that shell money did
function as a general-purpose currency in the Pacific.Bohannan’s argument is
drawn largely from his fieldwork among the Tiv, an important and interesting
people, but one who number less than one per cent of West Africa s present popula-
tion.^^® Latham’s investigation of the historical sources relating to copper money
demonstrates that Bohannan’s interpretation does not apply to eastern Nigeria as a
whole, and suggests that he may also have been mistaken with regard to the much
smaller area occupied by the Tiv.^®'^ Copper rods were valid for all goods and
services, and were split into small denominations (wires) in order to facilitate ex¬
change. Polanyi’s study of cowries is confmed to southern Dahomey in the eighteenth
century, and uses a limited selection of available sources.^®® Marion Johnson’s
comprehensive study has revealed important shortcomings in his work.^®® Cowries
and gold formed a single currency system over a large part of West Africa, the

George Dalton, ‘Primitive Money’, American Anthropologist, 67, 1965, pp. 44-65.
r®® Leopold Pospisil, Kapauku Papuan Economy, Yale 1963, andT. Scarlett Epstein, Capitalism,
Primitive and Modern, Canberra 1968, pp. 19-26. ^
i®8 Paul Bohannan, ‘The Impact of Money on an African Subsistence Economy’, Journal of
Economic History, 19, 1959. PP- 491-503-
1®'' A. J. H. Latham, ‘Currency, Credit and CapitaUsm on the Cross Paver in the Pre-
Colonial Era.’, Journal of African History, 12, 1971. PP- 599-605-
Karl Polanyi, Dahomey and the Slave Trade, Seattle 1966, pp. 173-94- Polanyi’s discussion
contains a number of ambiguities, but it is only fair to note that his book had to be prepared
for pubUcation after his death.
And also that Polanyi’s views on the related question of the omice trade need revision.
See Marion Johnson, ‘The Ounce in Eighteenth-Century West African Trade’, Journal of
African History, 7, 1966, pp. 197-214.

69
An Economic History of West Africa

exchange rate between them sometimes being fixed and sometimes being left to
float. The system was designed to assist trade, and it is no coincidence that it served
an area where long distance commerce was particularly active. The success of
the cowrie is readily explicable. Its size and shape made it easy to handle, conveni¬
ent to count and impossible to counterfeit, while its durability meant that it could be
stored safely for many years. Moreover, cowries, though often used as small change
for gold, could be multiplied for accounting purposes by standardised units (strings,
‘heads’ and bags). Finally, it is worth noting that Ames has shown that Wolof cloth
currency was available in standardised multiples, and was acceptable as payment for
‘subsistence’ and ‘prestige’ items.^®°
The foregoing review makes it clear that the major currencies of pre-colonial
West Africa functioned as general-purpose currencies, and had the attributes of
modern money. Each one acted as a medium of exchange, as a common measure of
value, as a store of wealth and as a standard for deferred payment. This interpretation
is fully consistent with the argument advanced earlier in this chapter that trade and
market principles were more common in the pre-colonial era than some writers have
thought. The concept of special-purpose money still retains its value as a theoretical
tool, and doubtless examples can be found to illustrate the ways in which it oper-
ated.^®^ Furthermore, it is only fair to point out that the general-purpose currencies
of West Africa did not share precisely the same attributes: there is room for consider¬
ing the merits of, say, cowries in relation to cloth; for examining the reasons under¬
lying the boundaries between different currency areas; and for analysing the varied
monetary functions of the state. However, the main conclusion still holds: the
principal currencies of West Africa served to extend trade, not to obstruct it. The
indications are that these currencies were adequate for the needs of the time. It was
only in the nineteenth century, when they became less efficient, that they were
replaced by the currencies of the industrial world.
The presence of extensive trade and general-purpose currencies provides grounds
for supposing that pre-colom'al West Africa also had a capital market. Srmdstrom’s
evidence confirms that this was indeed the case.^®^ It is suggested here (though mainly
to prompt others to consider this neglected subject in more detail) that West African
credit institutions can be divided, on the basis of their primary functions, into two
groups. First, there were small credit associations, such as the Yoruba esusu, which
were organised by kinsmen or by groups of friends, and were devoted mainly to
social purposes, such as raising money for funerals. Second, there was a commercial
capital market, which served economic needs at local and inter-regional levels. As
far as local needs were concerned, it is important to emphasise, once again, that small
communities were not necessarily homogeneous, and that it was possible for poorer
members of society to become indebted to wealthier neighbours. The extent and

160 j) Ames, ‘The Use of a Transitional Cloth-Money Token Among the Wolof’,
American Anthropologist, 57, 1955, pp. 1016-23.
Ration coupons and trading stamps are examples of special-purpose currencies in
industrial societies.
The Trade of Guinea, pp. 34-44.

70
 The domestic economy: structure and function

causes of local indebtedness (especially its relationship to the availability of land) are
subjects which require further research. At the inter-regional level, it is clear that
professional traders often needed to finance their activities by securing credit,
because their initial investment was high and returns were long delayed. Commercial
capital was obtained from fellow merchants and from specialised bankers and money
lenders. The large entrepots had bankers who invested money on behalf of depositors
and operated a system whereby credits could be transferred to third parties; exchange
brokers, who also speculated in currency values; and a futures market in the main
staples of long distance trade. Interest rates reflected the scarcity of capital and the
risks involved in most lending operations, and were rarely less than loo per cent per
annum. Security was given in various ways, though most credit agreements were
based on personal connections of the kind noted already with reference to the Dioula
and Hausa. Usually, credit facilities were arranged in the presence of witnesses, and
were guaranteed either by depositing bonds supplied by third parties, or by offering
property (livestock, houses and land) as security. Poorer members of society often
resorted to pawning as a means of guaranteeing the repayment of a debt. Pawning
was a system by which the debtor or a nominee (usually a kinsman) worked for his
creditor without payment until the debt was cleared. Legal sanctions were also
employed, and most societies had rules which defined various types of loan and laid
down regulations for recovering debts. This was true both of Muslim states in the
Western Sudan, where the Koranic injunction against usurious loans had little
influence on the operation of the commercial money market, and of the ‘pagan
states in the forest zone, as, for example, among the Yoruba kingdoms.
The remaining feature of the distributive system to be considered is transport. It
is easy to locate sources which dismiss pre-industrial means of transport as primitive,
but harder to fmd those which support this judgement by defining terms and by
examining the costs and benefits of various means of carriage in the pre-railway age.
As usual, the Dark Continent has suffered particularly in this respect, and the familiar
statement that ‘Africa south of the Sahara has never invented the wheel’^®^ is
commonly used as an index of the region’s backwardness in comparison with other
parts of the world. It will he contended here that general pronouncements about the
primitive nature of pre-colonial transport disguise complex and important prob¬
lems: in the first place, various meanings can be given to the adjective ‘primitive in
the context of transport, and not all of them apply to Africa; secondly, since Europe
did not invent the wheel either, it is not the independent origins of this device which
require investigation so much as the factors governing the spread and adoption of
technical innovations; finally, it is worth observing that to possess advanced tech¬
nical knowledge is not necessarily to be on the road to economic development, as
Needham’s remarkable study of China has demonstrated.^®®

A. G. Hopkins, ‘A Report on the Yovuha.', Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 5,

1969, pp. 90-2.
P. T. Bauer, Economic Analysis and Policy in Underdeveloped Countries, 1965, p. 47.
18® Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, i, Cambridge 1954. Other volumes
have been published, and this immense study is still in progress.

71
An Economic History of West Africa

Communications by land were based entirely on animal and human power. One
of the greatest transport innovations of the pre-colonial era was the introduction of
the camel. This extraordinary animal was the principal means of transport in the
desert for almost two thousand years. It was present in North Africa in the first
century B.c., .and it became known throughout the Sahara during the early centuries
of the Christian era. The camel was more efficient in desert conditions than were
horses and oxen, which had been used previously, and its supremacy remained un¬
challenged until the coming of the motor car in the 1920s. Camels were bred
specially for desert transport by nomads, such as the Tuareg, and could carry
between 3 cwt and 5 cwt across the Sahara. The camel did not travel very far into
the Western Sudan partly because it preferred the poorer fodder of the desert, and
partly because it was susceptible to diseases, such as sleeping sickness. At northern
entrepots, such as Timbuctu, goods were transferred to donkeys and oxen, which
were better suited to savanna conditions. Donkeys were the chief pack animal in the
Western Sudan. They carried about 100 lb, which was substantially less than the
amount carried by oxen, but donkeys were cheaper to buy and feed, they were
faster, and they were more effective over rough terrain. Donkeys, like camels, were
bred specially for transport purposes. Those raised by the Mossi had a particularly
high reputation in long-distance trade, and were bought in Salaga by Hausa traders,
who used them to carry kola nuts on their journey home. At the savanna-forest
border markets, such as Salaga, goods travelling further south were transferred to
porters, because the use of pack animals in the forest was restricted by a combination
of trypanosomiasis an d lack of pasture. Professional carriers, who were often slaves,
could head-load 55-65 lb and cover an average of twenty miles a day.
Water transport was used where possible, for it was known to be the cheapest
means of transporting bulky commodities over long distances. However, many
West African rivers were hard to navigate: a number had dangerous rapids; some
were flooded during the rainy season; and others lacked water in the dry season.
Canoes were better able to deal with these difficulties than were other types of craft.
West African canoes varied in size. Some were eighty feet or more in length and
could carry as many as one hundred men.^®® Most canoes were propelled by paddles,
though small sails were used in some areas. Commercial water transport was
particularly important on Lake Chad, the Niger, the Senegal, sections of the Volta
and numerous smaller rivers in the forest, and along the coast, especially where
estuaries and lagoons provided shelter from ocean waves and storms. The busiest
inland waterway was the middle section of the Niger, which linked Timbuctu to
the commercial and administrative centres of Djeime (250 miles upstream) and Gao
(about the same distance downstream).^®'^ Hundreds of craft were in use on this
stretch of the river from the thirteenth century onwards and probably earlier. Some
of these canoes carried twenty to thirty tons of merchandise, including foodstuffs as

Robert Smith, ‘The Canoe in West African History’, Jowma/ of African History, ii, 1970,
PP- 515-33.
M. Tymowski, ‘Le Niger, voie de communication des grands etats du Soudan occidentale
jusqu’a la fm du XVI® siecle’, Africana Bulletin, 6, 1967, pp. 73-95.

72
 The domestic economy: structure and function

well as the more luxurious items of long-distance trade. Water transport enabled the
middle Niger complex to become one of the great centres of pre-colonial trade in
Africa. It encouraged the growth of specialised occupations, such as building and
operating canoes; it led to the development of specialised ports, such as Kabara,
which served Timbuctu; and it contributed to the political and economic unity of
the empires of Mali and Songhai.
The efficiency of a transport system can be analysed in three ways. By following
this procedure it is possible to arrive at a clearer understanding of what is meant by
backward or primitive means of communication. First, the physical availability of
transport fixes the size of the market in geographical terms. West African transport
certainly provided a wide coverage, joining caravans to periodic markets and
offering, via head-loading, what was virtually a door-to-door service. Second, the
freight capacity of the system determines the volume carried. At first sight it might
seem that African transport was defective in this respect. Fortunately, this hypothesis
can be tested against the example of the nineteenth century, when there was a
massive increase in the volume of goods carried without any change taking place in
established modes of transportation. Therefore, it seems unlikely that there was a
shortage of freight capacity. Third, the cost of transport defines the depth of the
market in social terms. In this instance there is no doubt that African modes of
transport were deficient. Evaluating transport costs is a difficult task, but it is clear
that the value added in long distance trade was considerable.^®® Head-loading was
particularly expensive, and goods could be taken only a short distance by this means
before the cost of transport exceeded the profit on sales. This explains why head¬
loading was used in long distance trade only in parts of the forest, where there was
no alternative, and in cases where the carrier was a slave who was destined to be sold
at the end of the journey. Foodstuffs and other items of everyday use could rarely be
transported far beyond the area of production by any means of carriage. The case of
Timbuctu is an exception which proves the rule, for the city was able to use the
relatively cheap Niger route and could also pay for imported supplies from foreign
trade earnings. Even so, in the nineteenth century the price of imported cloth at
Timbuctu was two to three and a halftimes as great as it was on the coast. Kola nuts,
which today are common items of consumption, were a luxury enjoyed by the
relatively wealthy in the pre-colonial period. In the late nineteenth century one kola
nut bought at Gonja, in the area of production, for five cowries sold for 250-300
cowries by the time it reached Lake Chad (about 1,250 miles away).^®®
The principal deficiency of African transport was its high cost. The question to be
considered now is whether this drawback was made more serious by the absence of

To assess transport costs accurately it is necessary to take account of the capital cost of
a particular form of carriage, maintenance costs, the Hfe expectation of a vehicle and its resale
vdue, if any. Moreover, goods in transit in West Africa paid numerous tolls. This expenditure
was reflected in the price of a product at its final destination, and needs to be differentiated
from the cost of transport.
^®® C.O. 879/49, H. J. Reid, ‘Memorandum on the British Possessions in West Afnca’,
12 May 1897, Public Record Office.

73
An Economic History of West Africa

the wheel. It is possible to attribute the lack of wheeled transport to ignorance.

However, there is now evidence that horse-drawTi chariots or carts were crossing the
Sahara some five centuries before the birth of Christ, and since West Africa remauied
in contact with the Arab world in subsequent centuries, it seems improbable that
this explanation will suffice. Alternatively, it could be argued that Africans knew' of
the existence of the wheel, but, being rather slow'-witted in comparison with die
inhabitants of other continents, were unable to devise*'ways of using it to advantage.
It will be contended here that this view is also inaccurate. It seems more likely that
wheeled transport was not adopted either because it w'as inappropriate to West
African condition’s or because its greater cost was not justified by proportionately
greater returns.
In two areas of West Africa environmental circumstances meanf'that there was
little scope for wheeled transport. On the sand and rock of the Sahara the camel
was a more efficient means of carriage, so much so that it replaced the wheel at an
early date. In the forest the difficulty of keeping draught animals greatly reduced
the value of wheeled vehicles. In the Western Sudan, however, both horses and oxen
were present, and wheeled transport would have been possible. The problem in this
case was that the gain from greater traction would have been nullified by the capital
and maintenance costs of carts, wagons and draught animals, and by the slower rate
of progress of wheeled vehicles. Since draught animals were not used on the farm,
the cost of keeping them solely for transport purposes during the dry season was
much higher than in other parts of the world, where there was scope for combining
the two functions. The horse, the most powerful draught animal, was very expen¬
sive, needed a high intake of fodder and water, and succumbed easily to disease.^'^°
Horses were used in West Africa as cavalry and on ceremonial occasions, and they
remain symbols of prestige today. The poor quahty of the roads would have greatly
reduced the efficiency of wheeled vehicles, and the cost of imp roving the road system
would have been prohibitive, especially in an area where population was, in general,
rather sparse. Pack animals predominated because they were relatively cheap to buy,
inexpensive to operate and well suited to the terrain.
The foregoing argument can be tested against the evidence provided by one of the
earliest systematic attempts to introduce wheeled transport into part of the Western
Sudan.

In January 1905 the first cart convoy arrived at Zaria from Zungeru, and the
difficulties due to having to rely solely on human porterage were temporarily
obviated, though the carts were not able to continue rimning when once the rainy
season set in. Every effort was made to organise an efficient system during the dry
season of 1905-1906. Artificers and drivers had even been imported from India,
and proved to be of greatest use; depots were established for supplies of fodder
along the road; a veterinary surgeon was attached to the Department. In spite of

On the relative merits of horses and oxen see A. Burford, ‘Heavy Transport in Classical
Antiquity’, Economic History Review, 13, i960, pp. 1-18.

74
 The cioincsfic economy: stnicliire ami fimclioit

all these efforts, however, the cart transport proved little less expensive than
carriersd’^^

It seems reasonable to conclude that the absence of the wheel was a matter of decision
rather than of chance or ignorance, and that the presence of wheeled veliiclcs in
West Africa would not have reduced transport costs during the pre-colonial period.
Although the wheel is commonly regarded as a symbol of economic progress, it
is as well to remember that wheeled vehicles did not achieve a decisive advantage
over other forms of transport until the industrial revolution, with the development
first of the railway and then of the motor car. Before that time, the use of wheeled
vehicles in Europe was inhibited by many of the problems experienced in Africa.
In eighteenth-century Spain, for example, pack animals, especially donkeys, were by
far the most important means of transport, though ox-carts were available and were
used to a certain extent. The ox-cart carried three to four times as much as a large
pack animal, but since it was costly to purchase and operate, and travelled at half the
speed, it could not compete with donkey transport. Wagons did not become numer¬
ous in northern Europe until the sixteenth century, and even then they were used
mainly for short-haul work. Until the roads were improved, pack animals remained
the leading form of long-distance commercial transport on land. ‘Long trains of
these faithful animals, furnished with a great variety of equipment. . . wended their
way along the narrow roads of the time, and provided the chief means by which the
exchange of commodities could be carried on.’ This statement could well apply to
the Western Sudan in the pre-colonial period, though in fact it refers to England in
the early eighteenth century.^'^^ The evidence Suggests that while Africa’s transport
system was costly in relation to modern forms of transport, it was no more expensive
than that which operated in other pre-industrial societies.

4 Internal constraints on growth

The domestic economy has been examined at length because of its overwhelming
importance in the economy as a whole during the pre-colonial period and today,
and because it is customarily regarded as the point of departure for countries wishing
to achieve economic growth. Arguments about the means of attaining growth, and
indeed about the desirability of doing so, are greatly influenced by assumptions about
the characteristics of traditional economies, and by beliefs about the quality of life in
the pre-industrial world.
This chapter has criticised some of the more widespread of these assumptions and
beliefs, which have been characterised here as the myths of Primitive and Merrie

Sir Charles Orr, The Making of Northern Nigeria., 1911, pp. 184-5.
David R. Ringrose, ‘Transportation and Economic Stagnation in Eighteenth-Century
Castille’,>Mmfll of Economic History, 28, 1968, pp. 51-79-
173 x. Jackman, The Development of Transportation in Modern England, 2nd cd., 1962,
p. 141.

75
 An Economic History of West Africa

Africa. It has been shown that the pre-colonial, domestic economy was more varied
than is often supposed, and that it included manufactures as well as a wide range of
agricultural products. Output targets were geared not merely to subsistence needs,
but also to trade, which was regular, widespread and of great antiquity. A survey of
the principal economic activities has demonstrated that their history was far from
static, that their organisation was efficient, and that Africans were receptive to new
ideas, where these were suitable andprofitable.^'^* Several explanations of economic
backwardness, ancient and modem, have been considered and rejected: it has been
shown that geographical interpretations based on climate and on natural resources
are unsatisfactory; that sociological explanations relating to family structure, social
mobility, the status-liierarchy and supposedly anti-capitalist values are unacceptable;
and that economic explanations concerning the efficiency of the labour force, the
organisation of ‘primitive’ agriculture, communal land tenure and allegedly in¬
adequate commercial institutions, are inapplicable. In short, there is a corpus of
popular beliefs about African underdevelopment which needs to be jettisoned.
At the same time, it is clear that pre-colonial Africa was not moving in the direc¬
tion of an indigenous industrial revolution. Pressures towards the expansion of the
market coming from certain regions within West Africa and spear-headed by
professional merchants, such as the Dioula and the Hausa, were unable to overcome
the pressures towards self-sufficiency which were present throughout the area as a
whole. The greater part of total output consisted of foodstuffs and other everyday
necessities. These commodities could be traded locally, but not over long distances
because transport costs prevented them from competing with acceptable substitutes,
which could be produced on the spot in other areas. Local trade, by definition, served
a market which was too small in terms of numbers of consumers and purchasing
power to justify the introduction of cost-reducing innovations and greater special¬
isation. Moreover, the income-elasticity of demand for foodstuffs was low: if per
capita incomes had risen, demand would have shifted away from foodstuffs and
towards manufactured goods, such as textiles. In the absence of a general expansion
of incomes, trade in commodities with the greatest growth potential depended on
connecting social and geographical islands of purchasing power by means of long¬
distance trade. The problem here was that the costs of carriage were too great and
the number of relatively affluent consumers was too small to permit the development
of a mass market in manufactured goods. Consequently, the multiplier effects of
long-distance commerce were limited. Freight charges per ton/mile were no more
expensive in Africa than they were in other parts of the world, but transport costs
were higher for each consumer served than in many other areas because the popula¬
tion was small and scattered. Underpopulation was critical in preventing market
growth because it encouraged extensive cultivation, favoured dispersed settlement
and generated strong tendencies towards local self-sufficiency. Where population
was concentrated, it was partly for defensive reasons, and so was not indicative of
This conclusion is in line with that advanced by Theodore W. Schultz, Transforming
Traditional Agriculture, New Haven 1964, with the important quaUfication that ‘traditional’
agriculture in West Africa was not as changeless as Schultz suggests was generally the case.

76
 The domestic economy: structure and function

developed exchange activities, and partly for commercial motives, in which case it
was usually associated with slavery, and with a low level of purchasing power.
There were two possible escape routes from this situation. The first was through
an increase in population, which would have altered the land-labour ratio, encour¬
aged the adoption of more intensive forms of agriculture and provided a larger and
more concentrated market. This is exactly what happened in Western Europe during
the Middle Ages, though the reasons governing population changes in that period
are little better understood than they are in the case of pre-colonial Africa.^’^® The
second escape route was through technical innovation, which would have increased
the size of the market by reducing production costs. Technical innovation might
have occurred in response to an increase in demand brought about by population
growth (or by a rise in incomes among the existing population), or else to overcome
shortages of supply, such as a lack of raw materials or of labour. In Africa no pres¬
sures or incentives existed on the demand side, while on the supply side the main
deficiency, a shortage of labour, was dealt with by using slaves. This solution met the
needs of the time, for though labour was scarce in relation to land, the capital required
for technical innovation was even scarcer. Moreover, a reduction in production
costs would not have cut distribution costs significantly because transport charges
accounted for a large proportion of the retail price of goods entering long-distance
trade. Africa needed to make a huge and virtually impossible leap: the continent
required not merely the wheel, but steam and internal combustion engines as well.
To suggest these possibilities is not to argue that population growth and technical
innovation would have brought about an indigenous industrial revolution in
Africa. An expanding population might well have caused more problems than it
solved, and West Africa might have been faced, ultimately, with a Malthusian
situation. Technical advances might have been misapplied, or used merely to arrest a
fall in living standards brought about by an increase in population. Cumulative
economic growth allied to technical advance occurred in only one part of the pre¬
industrial world, namely north-west Europe. A unique departure from normality
took place not because the economic and social structure of this small region possessed
attributes which were totally lacking in other continents, but because, by a fortunate
coincidence, long-run changes in factor prices made continuous innovation both
necessary and rewarding. It was possible, from an early date, to begin to build a
ladder to economic progress by means of small-scale, and interacting, techmcal
inventions.Other societies possessed much the same ingredients, but were unable
to mix them in quite the same way. Commercial capitalism in W^est Africa failed to
promote industrialisation because there was little scope for the development of an
intermediate technology. Surplus trading profits were invested in slaves and
luxuries, not because Africans were doggedly pursuing non-economic goals, but
because of a lack of more profitable alternatives.

Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, ‘An Economic Theory of the Growth
of the Western World’, Economic History Review, 23, 1970, p. n.
See, for example, E. M. Carus-Wilson, ‘An Industrial Revolution of the Thirteenth
Century’, Economic History Review, ii, 1941. PP- 39-do-

77
three

External trade: the Sahara

and the Atlantic

Africa, like China, was not well known to the outside world before the nineteenth
century, and information about the interior was the product of occasional visits from
hardy travellers, such as Ibn Battuta—the Marco Polo of the tropics. However, the
assumption that the continent was also isolated from external contacts, though it has
served a useful purpose here in focusing attention on internal checks on the develop¬
ment of the market, is historically inaccurate and must now be discarded. In reality.
West Africa had well established and highly organised external commercial links
across the desert and the ocean. These highways, though slow and hazardous,
connected the region to the mtemational economy centuries before the industrial
revolution enabled the major European powers to increase their penetration of the
imderdeveloped world. The fact that West Africa conducted an extensive foreign
commerce is clearly relevant to the theme of stability and change in the market, for
it is a matter of historical experience that societies wliich have been inhibited by
domestic constraints have sometimes discovered a path to economic development
through international trade.
The theory of economic growth through international trade is basically an applica¬
tion to nations and continents of the concept of specialisation, as set out originally
by Adam Smith.^ Where foreign trade has acted as an engine of growth, it has done
so by establishing a link between societies whose resource endowment, whether
natural or acquired, differs in certain important respects. In this situation, each of the
societies concerned can supply goods which the other requires, yet cannot produce
itself, or at least cannot produce as cheaply. Of the numerous factors affecting relative
costs, transport has been particularly significant in the history of commerce between
nations. One country may be able to produce a commodity more cheaply than
another, but freight charges can easily cancel this superiority, and so prevent trade
from taking place. However, given the necessary commercial institutions, political
support and degree of success in overcoming the transport problem, the various
parties will find it beneficial to specialise according to their particular comparative

1 For expositions of the classical theory, and the elaborations made to it subsequently, see
G. Harberler, International Trade and Economic Development, Cairo 1959, and Ragnar Nurkse,
Patterns of Trade and Development, 1961. Some problems of current interest are considered in
Hla Myint, Economic Theory and the Underdeveloped Countries, 1971.

78
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

advantage, and trade will develop. Rising incomes in the export sector lead to in¬
creased consumer spending and to further investment in productive enterprises. In
this way the benefits of foreign trade spread to the rest of the economy. Typically,
additional economic activity is generated through the provision of goods and
services for the export sector and through the development of processing industries
making use of imports. The result is the mobilisation of factors which, because or
deficiency of demand, lack of necessary supplies, shortage of capital, or inadequate
teclmology, were not fully used before. In practice, the strength of linkages between
the foreign trade sector and the domestic economy is by no means the same in all
cases, and one of the tasks of international trade theory is to measure and account for
these differences by making a detailed examination of the structure of the export
sector, of the volume and disposition of income derived from foreign trade, and of
the capacity of the local economy to respond to external stimuli.
This chapter has a dual aim: to clarify what has long been a controversial aspect of
West African history, namely the external slave trade, by making use of research
which has been completed in recent years; and to analyse West Africa’s external
trade in terms of the model outlined above in order to identify the linkages which
were established, and explain why their beneficial effects were so limited. To achieve
these aims, the chapter has been divided into four parts. The history of trans-Saharan
commerce will be outlined first of all, as this was the earliest branch of external trade
to develop. Next will come a consideration of Atlantic commerce, with special
reference to the notorious traffic in slaves. Then there will be an investigation of the
reasons for the decline of these two trades. Finally, there will be an assessment of the
consequences of external trade for Africa and (very briefly) for other parts of the
world. Discussion of the new, replacement commerce, which arose in the nineteenth
century, will be reserved for Chapter 4.

1 Trans-Saharan trade

Trans-Saharan trade between West and North Africa began as early as 1000 b.c.,
when the desert crossing was made by oxen and by chariots or carts drawn by horses.
The trade was developed by the Carthaginians from about the fifth century b.c.,
and was given further impetus by the Romans three centuries later, following their
expansion into North Africa and the subsequent introduction of the camel.^ With
the collapse of Roman rule in the fourth century a.d., the trade diminished, and
may even have ceased altogether. It was not revived until after the Byzantine re¬
conquest of North Africa in 533-35. The rise of Arab power from the seventh cen¬
tury onwards, though at first a destabilising influence on North African politics,
eventually contributed substantially to the growth of trans-Saharan commerce.
Arab merchants and missionaries were present in the Western Sudan from about the

^ R. C. C. Law, ‘The Garamaiites and Trans-Saharan Enterprise in Classical Times’, Journal

of African History, 8, 1967, pp. 181-200.

79
An Economic History of West Africa

second half of the eighth century,® and their influence grew after the Almoravid
invasion of the negro empire of Ghana in 1077. The period which corresponds to
the Middle Ages in European lustory was a flourishing time for trade on the Saharan
routes, particularly from the middle of the thirteenth to the end of the sixteenth
centuries. This period saw an upswing in demand for West African products in
Europe and the Middle East, and at the same time a substantial increase in supply,
which was greatly assisted by an era of settled government in North Africa and the
Western Sudan.
The golden age of trans-Saliaran trade is usually thought to have ended in the
sixteenth century, as the expansion of sea-borne commerce led to a reorientation of
trade routes towards the coast, and as the Western Sudan entered j long period of
political instability followmg the overthrow of the Songhai empire by the Moroccan
army in 1591. ‘The story of the Moorish conquest,’ concluded Bovill, ‘remains one
of the darkest chapters in the liistory of the continent.’^ Indeed, in partial deference
to this weight of authority, the Western Sudan disappears from many history text¬
books after 1591, and only emerges two centuries later, when (the Moors having been
suitably discomfited) the jihads (holy wars) of the early nineteenth century noisily
claim attention. There are groiuids for thinking that this interpretation exaggerates
reality. In the first place, there is little evidence to show that the arrival of the Euro¬
peans on the West Coast had a dramatic or even an immediate impact on the eco¬
nomy of the interior. Trans-Saharan trade survived, and its value actually increased
during the nineteenth century. The final decline did not set in until after 1875, as
will be shown in Chapter 4. Secondly, research now in progress® makes it possible
to suggest that the events of 1591 were not as traumatic as has been thought, and that
the period which followed was not one of unchecked political anarchy and irrever¬
sible economic decline. It is likely that too much attention has been paid to changes in
personnel among the rulers—a common bias in the writing of African history. For
the great majority of the population, life probably went on very much as before;
they merely exchanged one set of tax collectors for another.
It is worth underlining three pomts arising out of this historical survey. In the first
place, it must be said that the deficiency of statistics is a serious handicap to any satis¬
factory interpretation of the rise and fall of trans-Saharan trade, and there is a need
for caution over the use of what little information of this kind is available. Secondly,
interpretations of fluctuations in the prosperity of trade at present rest on an incom¬
plete understanding of the determinants of booms and slumps in this imusual
commerce. Current explanations stress the importance of political factors, particu¬
larly stability and instability at the southern and northern ends of the trade routes.
These explanations require qualification and elaboration. There are many examples

® Tadeusz Lewicki, ‘L’etat nord-Afncaiii de Tahert et ses relations avec le Soudan occi-
dentale a la fin de VIII® et au IX® si^cle’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines, 2, 1962, pp. 513-35.
* Bovill, The Golden Trade . . . , p. 195. The Moors, presumably, took a rather different
view. See also Mauny, Tableau giographique . . . , p. 441.
® Notably by N. R. Laurent of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of
London, and J. R. WilHs of the University of California, Los Angeles.

80
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

in West African history (as in medieval Europe) where, contrary to all reasonable
expectations, long distance trade managed to steer a way through even the most
extreme political disturbances. Thirdly, as far as the initial effects of the European
presence were concerned, it is more likely that new areas of production were
stimulated near the coast than that the economy of the W^estern Sudan was under¬
mined. The economic effects of the coming of the Europeans now require detailed
investigation with reference to particular areas and specific items of trade, and the
liistory of the Western Sudan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries needs to
be rescued from its inappropriate association with the Dark Ages.
The variety of commodities traded was limited by two main considerations, apart
from the low level of purchasing power in West Africa. To begin with, the length of
the journey, which lasted from seventy to ninety days and sometimes longer, meant
that highly perishable goods could not be taken across the desert. Next, all goods
had to have a high value in relation to their weight. Freight charges across the
Sahara added about 100-150 per cent to the cost of most items, but formed a much
smaller proportion of the asking price of goods with a high value-weight ratio.
Slaves, it is true, transported themselves, but they still had to be guarded and fed,
and an allowance made for the fact that a proportion of them—^an estimate for the
nineteenth century suggests 20 per cent—died on the route. Trans-Saharan com¬
merce reached its optimum point of organisational efficiency at an early date with
the introduction of the camel, and no further internal or external economies were
possible (or at least were achieved) until the coming of the motor car in the
1920S.
The commodities traded can be divided into two categories, though the line
between them is not easily drawn. First, there were state necessities such as gold and
slaves, which were sent north, and cowries, salt,® and weapons,"^ winch journeyed
south. These items played an essential part in maintaining the economic and political
structures of the states which purchased them, whether in Europe, North Africa, the
Middle East or West Africa. Gold and cowries were major currencies; slaves formed
a sizeable proportion of the labour force and military strength in certain areas; salt
was a dietary necessity; and military equipment, including cavalry horses, was vital
to the preservation and extension of political power. Second, there were luxury
items, such as expensive cloth, pepper, ivory, kola nuts, leather goods and, in the
nineteenth century, ostrich feathers, which were carried north, and high quality

® As noted in Chapter 2, much of the salt imported into West Africa was brought by special
caravans which were not involved in trans-Saharan trade. However, some salt was picked up
on the way by south-bound caravans from North Africa.
Foreign trade enabled West Afnca to keep abreast of the main European developments in
the techniques of warfare. Between the thirteenth and the sixteenth centuries Tlemcen (in
North Africa) was the main entrepot for the trade in sword blades, which came mostly from
Marseilles, Bordeaux and Genoa. Guns were certainly present in parts of the Western Sudan
before the Moroccan invasion of 1591, for they were used to guard caravans early in the six¬
teenth century. The mihtary superiority which enabled Pizarro to topple the empire of the
Incas in 1533 was not achieved with respect to West Africa until the nineteenth century.

81
An Economic History of West Africa

textiles (especially those coloured with dyes not available locally), copper, preserved
foodstuffs, glassware, beads and miscellaneous ‘fancy goods’, which were sent south.
A proportion of the slaves exported from West Africa should also be classified as
luxuries, and so should the valuable foreign slaves who were imported into the
Western Sudan and kept in wealthy households mainly for prestige reasons.
Two items, gold and slaves, were important enough to require additional com¬
ment. The precise origin of the gold trade is unceftain, but it may date back to
Carthaginian times or even earlier. Exports increased during the eleventh century,
following the adoption of gold coinage throughout the Muslim world, and they
received a further boost after 1252, when gold began to replace silver as Europe’s
, main currency.® Between the eleventh and the seventeenth centuries West Africa
was the leading supplier of gold to the international economy, and in the later
Middle Ages accounted, according to one estimate, for almost two-thirds of world
production. West African gold flowed to Cairo and the Middle East, where it
helped to sustain Arab power until the end of the thirteenth century, when the basis
of the monetary system changed to silver. African gold contributed to the fimction-
ing of the domestic economy in Europe, and also helped to settle international debts.
In the later Middle Ages Europe needed bullion to pay for imports from the Far East
because most of her exports were too bulky to .be worth transporting such a long
^ distance overland. The Italian merchants of Genoa, Florence and Venice had a
favourable trade balance with North Africa from the end of the twelfth century, and
so were able to import gold. This advantage, together with their geographical
situation, enabled them to become the magnificent brokers of international trade.
Control over the gold trade also asfisted the expansion of Portugal and Spain in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when Seville became, for a while, Europe’s ‘capital
of gold’. Finally, the gold trade was important hi Africa itself: it assisted the rise of
the ports of North Africa from the end of the twelfth century, and it contributed to
■ the wealth of the great states of the Western Sudan. On present evidence it would be
unwise to conclude that there was a sharp decline in the trans-Saharan gold trade in
the seventeenth century, even though gold was being sent to Europe by ocean routes.
The overland trade, though greatly reduced, continued in the nineteenth century,
when new sources of supply had been discovered and other means devised to settle
the accounts of international trade.
With regard to the trade in slaves, it is important to note first of all that human
beings were exported from West Africa long before the rise of the more publicised
Atlantic traffic in the late fifteenth century. The trans-Saharan trade even antedates
the spread of Islam in the seventh century, though it is unlikely to have been very
large much before then, for in Carthaginian and Roman times demand was modest
and other sources of supply more popular. The expansion of Arab power led to an
increased demand for slaves in North Africa and the Middle East for use as soldiers.

® R. S. Lopez, ‘Back to Gold, 1252’, Economic History Review, 9, 1956, pp. 219-40; Aiadrew
M. Watson, ‘Back to Gold—and Silver’, ibid., 20, 1967, pp. 1-34.

82
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

labourers and servants.^ This north-bound trade continued without serious disrup¬
tion until the late nineteenth century, and in a clandestine way and on a much reduced
scale it survived well into the twentieth century. The size of the trade is hard to
assess. Mauny has estimated that the trans-Saharan routes may have carried as many
as two million slaves in each century during the late Middle Ages.^° More recently,
Lewicki has concluded that twelve to fifteen million slaves passed through Cairo in
the sixteenth century.^^ Since the majority came via Algiers and Tripoli, it is likely
that a proportion of the total was sent across the desert from West Africa. These
figures are astonishing, for, as Lewicki himself points out, liis estimate for the six¬
teenth century alone approximates to that usually suggested for the whole of the
Atlantic slave trade! Malowist, on the other hand, feels that Mauny’s figures are
exaggerated,^^ and Boahen, dealing with the early nineteenth century, has suggested
that only about 10,000 slaves per annum were being exported north across the
Sahara compared with approximately 70,000 being shipped west by the Atlantic
routes.^® Judgement on Lewicki’s claim must await the full publication of his
research. At present, the general assumption is that the trans-Saharan slave trade was
never as important as the Atlantic trade. If this view is to be proved false, it will also
be necessary to explain what happened to such large negro communities (assuming
that they existed), for they appear virtually to have disappeared from North Africa
and the Middle East today.
The expansion of trade, following the introduction of the camel and the subse¬
quent spread of Islam, led to the development of a complex network of routes across
the desert (Map 7). Moving from west to east, the most important of these were as
follows: Ghana to Mogador and Fez via Awdaghost; Timbuctu to Mogador and
Fez via Teghaza; Timbuctu to Tunis and Tripoli via Wargla, Ghadames and Ghat;
Kano to Tunis and Tripoli via Agades, Ghat and Ghadames; and Bomu to Tripoli
via Bilma and Murzuk. The most important route in Carthaginian and Roman
times was that centred on Murzuk, the capital of Fezzan, which joined Tripolitania
and Egypt with the Niger bend. In the period following the rise of Islam, the ‘golden
road’ from Timbuctu to Morocco was considered, notably by Bovill, to have been
outstanding. Flowever, more recent authorities, such as Mauny, Ol’derogge and
Boahen, are of the opinion that no single route achieved permanent dominance, and
that there was a progressive shift of emphasis from western to eastern routes. This
interpretation appears to be more acceptable, though care should be taken not to

® On this subject see the useful articles by Norman R. Bennett, ‘Christian and Negro
Slavery in Eighteenth-Century North Afnca’, Journal of African History, i, i960, pp. 65-82, and
L. Valensi, ‘Esclaves chretiens et esclaves noirs a Tunis an XVIII® siecle’, Annales, 22, 1967,
pp. 1267-88.
Mauny, Tableau geographique . . . , p. 379.
Tadeusz Lewicki, ‘Arab Trade in Negro Slaves up to the End of the XVIth Century’,
summary of an unpubhshed paper in Africana Bulletin, 6, 1967, pp. 109-11.
Marian Malowist, ‘Le commerce d’or et d’esclaves au Soudan occidental’, Africana
Bulletin, 4, 1966, p. 60.
A. Adu Boahen, Britain, the Sahara, and the Western Sudan, 1788-1861, Oxford 1964,
p. 128.

83
84
An Economic History of West Africa

Map 7. Saharan Trade Routes in the Pre-Colonial Period.

 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

exaggerate either the rapidity or the extent of the eastwards movement. On this basis
it can be said that the road from ancient Ghana was supreme up to about the thirteenth
century; that the routes from Timbuctu predominated during the time of the
empires of Mali and Songhai; and that those from Kano and Bomu became impor¬
tant from the seventeenth century onwards, the Kano route attaining particular
prominence in the nineteenth century.
The organisational needs of trans-Saharan trade encouraged the development from
very early times of centres of four main types, which were designed to minimise the
difficulties of desert trade and to increase the efficiency of the distributive system.^^
First, there were the southern termini, such as Timbuctu, Kano and Kvrkawa. At
these centres, which lay close to the desert, north-bound goods were packed and
loaded, and south-bound goods were transferred and divided among smaller
caravans for redistribution in other parts of West Africa. If camels were the ‘ships of
the desert’, then these towns were their ports, and their hinterlands in the south
stretched almost to the coast. Second, there were halting places on the routes, such as
Teghaza, In Salah, Ghat and Agades (until it was replaced by Iferuan in the nineteenth
century). These were desert oases, where camels, food and fresh water could be
obtained. Third, there were points such as Sijilmasa (until it was destroyed in the late
eighteenth century), Tenduf (which replaced it), Wargla and Ghadames, where
caravans travelling north unloaded their goods, and those bound for the south
gathered before departure. These places were located close to the northern fringe of
the desert, where provisions could be bought, and guards, guides and camels hired
Finally, there were the great northern termini, such as Mogador, Fez, Algiers, Tunis
and Tripoli. These entrepots were situated on or near to the North African coast,
where sales and shipments to Europe and the Middle East were arranged.
Trans-Saharan commerce also required specialised and experienced persormel. It
is sometimes said that the trade was dominated by Arab merchants, but this view
needs to be treated with care because pre-colonial writers tended to refer, inaccur¬
ately, to all Muslims as Arabs. At present there is little precise information about the
relative significance of various religious or ethnic groups. Arab merchants, properly
defined, were undoubtedly very important, but Berbers, Jews and Negroes also
played a major part in the trade, and on the north coast European merchants were to
be found. Many of the large entrepots, like ‘free’ ports in the other parts of the world,
reserved quarters for foreign merchants, guaranteed their security and granted them
special privileges. Thus expatriate firms were present in both North Africa and the
Western Sudan long before they came to the West Coast. Of the other specialists
who made a living out of trans-Saharan trade, the most important were desert
colonists such as the Tuareg, whose livelihood was based on the camel and on the
plunder or control of the trade routes. The exploitation of the opportunities presen¬
ted by desert trade encouraged the development of marked economic and social

I should like to acknowledge my debt here to Professor Adu Boahen’s book, Britain, the
Sahara, and the Western Sudan, 1788-1861, Oxford 1964, which contains by far the most
detailed and rehable study of the trans-Saharan caravan trade yet produced.

85
An Economic History of West Africa

inequalities in Tuareg society.^® In the sultanate of Air (on the route north of Kano)
Tuareg clans were divided into two basic groups: the nobles, who controlled the
ownership and use of camels, and their vassals, who were restricted to herding goats.
As early as the fifteenth century, specialisation and the division of labour had
destroyed the pristine ‘democracy of poverty’ in this remote area, assuming, that is,
that it had ever existed.
Long distance trade, with its considerable capital requirements and slow turnover,
called for extensive credit facilities and careful investment. In 1825 Laing observed
that the merchants of Ghadames ‘calculate with profound nicety the expense of
carriage to distant countries, duties, customs, risk, trouble, the percentage that their
goods will bear, and even do business by means of Bills and unwritten agreements or
promises.’^® It is interesting to note that business arrangements w“hich were very
similar to the better known and much criticised ‘trust system’ of West Coast trade
also operated in trans-Saharan commerce, and for the same reasons.^'^ The need to
mobilise capital and credit on a large scale was a barrier which tended to favour large
firms in Timbuctu as in Whydah. It is to be hoped that historians of Islam in Africa
will soon begin to extend their important work on religious and political matters,
and investigate the little known merchant princes of the caravan trade.
Clearly, the Sahara was not, as once used to be thought, an impenetrable barrier
isolating West Africa from the rest of the world. On the contrary, by a feat of daring
the more impressive because it was repeated annually over many centuries, African
and other merchants Succeeded in creating an overland trade which, in size and
organisation, deserves to rank with the most famous achievements of merchant
venturers in the era before industrialisation removed the physical hardship from
international commerce.^® The desert crossing was extremely dangerous, and could
be made only at certain times of the year. The traveller had to be prepared to risk
sandstorms, lack of water, sharp variations in temperature (from day to night) and
attacks from armed marauders. If he was not asphyxiated, dehydrated, frozen or
disposed of by fellow humans, he could easily lose his way—^with fatal consequences.
Ibn Battuta, who made the desert crossing in 1352, recorded that he used to stray
occasionally from the main caravan until the day when one of his party wandered off
and never returned. ‘After that,’ he noted drily, ‘I neither went ahead nor lagged
behind.’^® As late as 1910 over fifty people in the small outpost of Taodeni died of

Johannes Nicholaisen, ‘Political Systems of Pastoral Tuareg in Air and Ahaggar’, Folk,
I. I959> pp- 67-131, and ‘Ecological and Historical Factors: a Case Study from the Ahaggar
Tuareg’, Folk, 6, 1964, pp. 75-81.
Quoted in Boahen, Britain, the Sahara . . . , p. 113.
These arrangements were to be found in other parts of the world too. See, for example,
E. S. Crawcour, ‘The Development of a Credit System in Seventeenth-Century Japan’,
Journal of Economic History, 21, 1961, pp. 342-60.
For purposes of comparison see Owen Lattiniore’s essay ‘Caravan Routes of Iimer Asia’,
in his Studies in Frontier History, 1962, pp. 37-72.
Ibn Battuta, Travels in Asia and Africa, 1325-1^54, translated and selected by H. A. R.
Gibb, 1927, p. 318.

86
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

starvation owing to the delayed arrival of a caravan bringing food supplies. Today,
most of the routes once trodden by traders, slaves and pilgrims have fallen into disuse.
Those which remain carry the great lorries of modern commerce, and sometimes a
few adventurous European tourists taking a motorised journey into the African past.
Airborne pilgrims en route for Mecca now survey only briefly, and from a height of
30,000 feet, the terrain so familiar to generations of their pedestrian predecessors.

2 Trade across the Atlantic

Just as trans-Saharan commerce brought Africa into the international commerce of

the Middle Ages, so, too, the development of an overseas trade from the late fifteenth
century involved the continent in the creation of a new and extensive multilateral
trading relationship, this time with the New World as well as with Europe. In the
three centuries before the industrial revolution the focus of international trade moved
from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, from Venice and Genoa to Liverpool and
Nantes. This momentous shift of economic power was the product of fundamental
changes in the economic and teclmological basis of European society at the close of
the Middle Ages, and was not initiated, as is sometimes implied, solely by the
pioneering enterprise of the charismatic Prince Henry of Portugal, navigator
extraordinary.^® Furthermore, it would be quite wrong to assume that from the
fifteenth century onwards sea-borne exports from West Africa consisted almost
entirely of human cargo. Whenjobson was offered slaves on the West Coast m 1620,
he replied, disdainfully, that ‘we were a people who did not deale in any such
commodities, neither did we buy or sell one another, or any that had our owne
shapes.’^^ The motive behind the first ‘scramble’ for Africa was undoubtedly econo¬
mic, but it sprang from a desire to capture riches which were already known and
valued in Europe.^^ The overseas slave trade came later.
Before the rise of legitimate commerce in the nineteenth century, the main exports
from West Africa, apart from slaves, were gold, ivory, timber, dye-woods, gum,
beeswax, leather and spices, notably peppers. These commodities sometimes
supplemented the trade in slaves, but they were also treated as viable exports in their
own right. Initially, the principal aim of the European merchant mariners was to
gain control of the gold resources of West Africa. Hence some of the earliest and
busiest coastal bases were in Senegal and the Gold Coast, close to the main centres of
mining activity. In addition to their keen interest in minerals, the Europeans paid

Though whether the African quest was luidertaken by a Portuguese nobility anxious to
rescue its declining fortunes, or whether it was wealth won from the trans-Saharan gold trade
which encouraged an expanding Iberia to expand even further, is a matter which must be left
for historians of Europe to decide.
Jobson, The Golden Trade . . . , p. 112.
For further details see Marian Malowist, ‘Les fondements de I’expansion europeenne en
Afrique au XV® siecle: Europe, Maghreb et Soudan occidentale’, Acta Poloniae Historica, 18,
1968, pp. 156-79-

87
An Economic History of West Africa

some attention to the agricultural resources of the continent.^® An attempt was made '
to use West African products as substitutes for those from Asia, whose exports to 'i
Europe had fallen under Muslirn control in the later part of the Middle Ages. It was
for tlhs reason that the Portuguese began to ship pepper from Benin in the fifteenth
century. From the sixteenth century onwards efforts were made to develop the
production of crops such as sugar, cotton and tobacco. These ventures anticipated -
experiments which were to be tried again, and on a greater scale, in the nineteenth
century, but which meanwhile were to achieve much greater success in the West
Indies and North America. ;
Even after the Atlantic slave trade had become well established, some parts of
West Africa, particularly areas west of the Volta river, continue^ to conduct an
important export trade in other commodities. Detailed information about the size ;
and value of tliis commerce is hard to find at present, though according to one'esti-
mate about two-fifths of the income of the Royal African Company at the end of
the seventeenth century came from sales of goods other than slaves.^^ Gold was by
far the most valuable of these products, and was still the principal overseas export of
the Gold Coast at that time, even though the region had also become a maj or supplier
of slaves. It was only in the latter part of the eighteenth century that the situation '
changed, and Gold Coast exporters then sold slaves to European merchants in
exchange for gold. Further west still, in Sierra Leone, exports such as camwood,
ivory and beeswax were worth more than shipments of slaves vmtil at least the
middle of the eighteenth century. Another prominent example of an area where
trade in natural products was of considerable importance was Senegambia, which
developed initially as a centre for the gold trade. Later on, slaves were exported, but
significant quantities of other goods were handled as well, as Abdoulaye Ly has
made clear.^^ Gum was the major export from the Senegal Valley and the Mauri¬
tanian coast in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,^® and beeswax was as
important as slaves in the overseas trade of Casamance (southern Senegal) during the
same period. Both products had pharmaceutical and industrial uses, gum being
especially significant as a raw material in the manufacture of textiles. Finally, it is
interesting to note that Europeans sometimes acted as middlemen in African inter¬
regional trade, employing their ships to expand existing local markets and occasion¬
ally to create markets where none existed before. In the fifteenth century, for
example, the Portuguese exported slaves from Benin and sold them on the Gold
Coast for gold. Two centuries later they were using kola nuts from Sierra Leone to
buy slaves in Senegambia. In the seventeenth century, too, the Dutch shipped cloth
and beads from Benin to the Gold Coast, and in the eighteenth century Bristol slavers

Marian Malowist, ‘Les debuts du systeme de plantations dans la periode des Grandes
Decouvertes’, Africana Bulletin, lo, 1969, pp. 9-30.
K. G. Davies, The Royal African Company, 1957, pp. 179-80.
La compagnie du Senegal, Paris 1958.
This question has been dealt with by Andre Delcourt, La France et les etablissements frangais
au Senegal entre 1715 et 1763, Dakar 1952.

88
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

bought and sold rice, guinea com, millet and yams as they made their way along the
coast.
It is worth summarising the comments made so far, as they have often been under¬
played in the past,^'^ and they need to be borne in mind during the discussion of the
Atlantic slave trade which follows. First, the Europeans who came to West Africa
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were interested mainly in goods other than
slaves. Second, this commerce continued even after the overseas slave trade was well
under way. Third, there were marked regional differences in West Africa depending
on the nature of trade with the Europeans. Fourth, European shipping services
encouraged the growth of a new kind of long distance coastal trade in West Africa.
Finally, it may be useful to point out that further research is needed into the subject
of trade in non-slave products. Future work will undoubtedly lead to a more varied
view of what is now considered as the era of the Atlantic slave trade, and it will also
modify the way historians interpret developments in the nineteenth century, when
an export economy based entirely on ‘legitimate’ goods was created.
The Atlantic slave trade is perhaps the most discussed episode in the economic
history of West Africa, and is certainly the only one known to that notional being,
the general reader. Unfortunately, most of the popular books which appear regu¬
larly on this subject, though they may succeed in giving the more dramatic aspects
appropriately epic treatment, rarely contribute anything new in the way of facts or
ideas. Few make full use of the available secondary sources, and some perpetuate old-
fashioned views of Africa among a reading public which, understandably, is not in
touch with the latest developments in African studies.^® Age and repetition have
combined to entrench both myths and truths to such an extent that it is hard now to
tell one from the other. Fortunately, some valuable studies of particular aspects of
the Atlantic slave trade have been carried out recently, and it is certain that this
subject will look very different in a few years’ time. In the pages which follow an
attempt will be made to summarise and comment on the main themes as they appear
at present, and to explore a few of the problems which, hopefully, future research
will reveal as significant. The discussion will begin by briefly outlining the main
sources of demand for labour, and will then consider how the supply of slaves was
organised, dealing first with the European side of the trade, and second with the
situation on the West Coast itself No apology is made for mentioning regions other
than Africa, for the slave trade cannot be understood without reference to the inter¬
national setting within which it grew, flourished and declined.
Some Africans had been bought by Europeans from the beginning of their
contact with the West Coast in the fifteenth century, notwithstanding Jobson’s lofty
indifference towards this type of commerce. In the sixteenth century a few slaves
were used by the Portuguese to work sugar plantations on islands just off the coast of

An important exception is the study by Walter Rodney, A History of the Upper Guinea
Coast, 1545-1800, Oxford 1970, ch. 6.
An outstanding exception to these critical generaUsations is Basil Davidson’s Black Mother,
1961, though inevitably this book has been overtaken to some extent by research carried out
during the last ten years.

89
 Y

An Economic History of West Africa

West Africa, and others were exported to South America to mine the silver which
was discovered there in the 1520s. However, the demand for slave labour was not
very great at this time, and the export trade was unimportant. The rapid expansion
of the Atlantic trade began only in the middle of the seventeenth century, as a result
of the rise of sugar plantations in the West Indies.^^ This development revolutionised
the economy of the Caribbean. Until about the 1650s the main export from the
West Indies had been tobacco, which was grown on a'small scale by a few European
settlers.^® Sugar, however, was pre-eminently a planters’ crop, and it required land,
capital, and labour on a large scale. The land was there already; the capital came from
Europe; and, in the event, the labour came from Africa, not because the continent
was overpopulated, but because no other cheaper source of suitable manpower was
readily available. The indigenous inhabitants of the Americas had been tried and
found wanting, and many of the European pioneers on this particular frontier of the
New World chose to cultivate land for themselves elsewhere, especially in Virginia
and Carolina, where tobacco was becoming an important export crop. To retain a
free labour force where there was abundant land and alternative employment
opportunities would have meant paying high wages. Cheap and subservient labour
was preferred and was probably essential. Besides being relatively inexpensive and
readily available (thanks to the efficiency of the Afro-European delivery system),
negro labourers had a higher survival rate in the West Indies, and therefore had a cost
advantage over potential competitors in the labour market. The advantage was a
result of their greater immunity from diseases such as yellow fever and malaria, and
had nothing to do with the alleged inability of the white man to work in a tropical
chmate.®^ And so the venturers who had originally sailed to West Africa primarily
to trade in gold stayed on to supply labourers for the new sugar plantations of the
Caribbean.
The eighteenth century was the golden age of prosperity for the West Indies, the
time when the Islands became the chief supphers of sugar to Europe. The principal
centres of production were Jamaica, a British possession, and St Domingo, which
belonged to France. According to Sheridan, about two-thirds of all the slaves shipped
to the Caribbean worked on sugar plantations, and in the highly specialised economy
of Jamaica no less than 84 per cent of the slaves (160,000 out of 190,000) were em¬
ployed in the sugar industry in the lyyos.^^ Other crops, such as coffee, cotton, indigo
and tobacco, were grown, but sugar remained by far the most important export.
The expansion of sugar production was stimulated by a rise in demand in Europe

D. A. Farnie, ‘The Commercial Empire of the Atlantic, 1607-1783’, Economic History

Review, 15, 1962, pp. 205-18.
A. P. Thornton, ‘The Organization of the Slave Trade in the EngUsh West Indies,
1660-1685’, William and Mary Quarterly, 12, 1955, pp. 399-409.
This point has been elaborated by PhiUp D. Curtin, ‘Epidemiology and the Slave Trade’,
Political Science Quarterly, 83, 1968, pp. 190-216.
R. B. Sheridan, ‘The Commercial and Financial Organization of the British Slave Trade,
1750-1807’, Economic History Review, ii, 1958, p. 249, and ‘The Wealth of Jamaica in the
Eighteenth Century: A Rejoinder’, ibid, 21, 1968, p. 49.

90
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

following an increase in the consumption of tea and coffee; by a growth in the

capacity of the sugar processing industry, which had caught up with supply by
about the middle of the eighteenth century; and by government support, which
underpmned the structure of Atlantic trade. From 1651 to 1854, for example,
producers in the British colonies in the West Indies were protected by the imposition
of heavy duties on foreign sugar entering the United Kingdom. In the second half
of the eighteenth century the French government offered bounties to slave ships
leaving France for Africa, and made an additional payment for every slave they
landed in the French West Indies. This concern is understandable when it is realised
that by 1789 about two-thirds of French maritime exports went to her colonies in
the West Indies, and that sugar was the most valuable commodity sent to France
from overseas. Sugar was also the largest single item imported into England in the
eighteenth century. The average annual value of sugar imports rose nearly four times
from ^630,000 in the period 1699-1701 to ^3,364,000 in the period 1772-74.
Between 1714 and 1773 imports from the West Indies averaged about 20 per cent
of the annual value of all imports into England. Commercially, the Caribbean had
become more important to England than Asia, and was second only to trade with
Europe. To Malachi Postlethwayt, a spokesman of mercantilist orthodoxy, the
British Empire was a ‘magnificent superstructure of American commerce and naval
power on an African foundation’.'^^ His summary cannot be bettered.
The importance of the various Western powers engaged in trade with Africa was
largely a reflection of their changing political positions in Europe.^^ Portugal was
the leading foreign power in West Africa in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries;
the Dutch presence became significant in the seventeenth century; and England and
France dominated the eighteenth century. One useful index of the relative positions
of the major powers is provided by the number of slaves handled by each at the
height of the Atlantic trade.^^

Slave exports from West Africa by the three major powers, 1701-1810

England 2,009,700
France 613,100
Portugal 611,000

3,333,800

England’s supremacy is clearly demonstrated: she alone was responsible for about
two-thirds of the total number of slaves shipped by the three leading powers. Her
pre-eminence in West Africa was one striking illustration of the more general growth
of her foreign trade in the eighteenth century, and of the global dominance of her

33 Quoted in Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, 1964 edn, p. 52.

3^ Further information about the pohtical rivalries of the great powers in West Africa can
be found in J. D. Fage, A History of West Africa, 1969, chs 3 and 4.
35 Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: a Census, Madison 1969, p. 211.

91
An Economic History of West Africa

navy. Britain’s ascendancy was not seriously challenged until the close of the
nineteenth century, when French troops began their long, dusty march across what
Lord Salisbury was to refer to, ironically, as the dight soils of the Western Sudan. It
is sometimes said that French power in West Africa deteriorated in the second half
of the eighteenth century. However, it is important to realise that England’s supre¬
macy was the result of the relatively quick pace of her commercial expansion, and
was not brought about by an absolute decline in French commerce with West
Africa, though France still relied on Holland and Britain for many of her trade goods.
Indeed, the tempo of French activity in this part of the world actually increased after
1763, following Choiseul’s efforts to develop Africa to compensate for the loss of
Canada, and to free the French West Indies from dependence on British ships for
supplies of slaves. The position of the Portuguese is especially noteworthy. Far from
declining in the early seventeenth century, as is commonly supposed to be the case,
their commercial hold remained strong long afterwards. Admittedly, Portugal’s
share of slave shipments declined as the eighteenth century progressed, but it revived
again during the first half of the nineteenth century, when the trade entered its final,
and far from negligible, phase.
Before the nineteenth century the European powers were represented in West
Africa by large, state-chartered companies and by individual traders rather than by
regular soldiers and professional administrators. Chartered companies were promi¬
nent during the early phase of sea-borne trade with West Africa, and especially
during the seventeenth century. These companies were given trading monopolies
over various sections of the African coast in return for fulfilling certain obligations.
In the Netherlands the leading officially-sponsored firm was the Dutch West India
Company (1621), which, besides having interests in the Caribbean, was also active
along the West African coast during the seventeenth century. The most important
French companies were the Compagnie des Indes Occidentals (1664), founded by
Colbert on ideas formulated by Richelieu, the Compagnie du Senegal (1673), and
the Compagnie du Guinee (1684). The principal Enghsh concern was the Royal
African Company (1672), which succeeded the aptly named and unbusinesslike
Royal Adventurers into Africa (1660). The presence of joint-stock companies in
some branches of foreign commerce was mainly a result of the desire of subscribers
to share the risks of African trade, which was notorious for its uncertainty, though in
part it was also a response to the capital requirements of long distance trade, especially
the need to invest in fixed capital, such as forts and ships. The state issued charters
because it saw the companies as useful agents of foreign policy, and, hopefully, as a
means of enriching the rulers too. The promoters sought government patronage as a
means of attracting capital and eliminating competition. Interdependence was the
basis of mercantilism: the power of the state was increased by measures designed to
achieve a favourable balance of trade; at the same time particular interest groups
sought to use state power as a means to private gain.®® In the context of the inter-

Charles Wilson, Profit and Power: a Study of England and the Dutch Wars, 1957, p. 153.
On mercantilism see D. C. Coleman, ed., Reuisions in Mercantilism, 1969.

92
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

national rivalries of the seventeenth century, the chartered companies can be seen as
protagonists in the struggle between conflicting national, mercantilist policies which
aimed at controlling not only African trade, but the commerce of the Atlantic, and,
ultimately, of Europe.
The chartered companies were more impressive in their plans than in their
achievements. It is clear from the specialist works of Davies, Delcourt and Ly that
the compames shared much the same defects. In the first place, they were unable to
attract sufficient capital. French merchants were traditionally wary of putting their
money into government companies, which consequently required Subsidies from
public and court funds. English merchants were more prepared to invest in chartered
companies, but they rarely acquired large holdings, and were quick to switch their
money to alternative uses if more profitable opportunities arose. Second, the com¬
pames had large overheads in the shape of officials and forts, and they sometimes had
to carry extensive burdens of defence. Third, they were unable to secure staff of
sufficient quality, and their employees also failed to identify their interests with those
of the firm, with the result that mismanagement and private trading by company
servants seriously hindered the efficient conduct of business. Fourth, the companies
were required to meet specific obligations, such as supplying a fixed number of
slaves each year, and so had to continue trading irrespective of the conditions operat¬
ing at the time. It was tliis problem which led the Compagnie du Senegal into
difficulties after 1679. Finally, the chartered companies were attacked by a variety of
interests wliich opposed their monopoly powers. These included traders who were
kept out of the areas under the jurisdiction of the companies; manufacturers, who
were dissatisfied with restricted outlets for their goods; colonists (especially in the
West Indies), who objected to the terms on which they exchanged their products for
consumer imports; and the political opponents of monarchical power, who saw the
chartered companies as symbols of the royal prerogative. By about 1700 it was clear
that the chartered company, though not yet eliminated, had little future in West
African trade. Financially, the chartered companies were failures. They were asked
to perform the most difficult of all commercial feats, the reconciliation of the
capitalist ethic with public duty, an expectation which survives today only in certain
nationalised industries. Their main achievements were as frontier agencies of the old
colonial system, opening up markets which others were to exploit more effectively
later on.
It used to be customary for historians to contrast the mercantilist restrictions of the
seventeenth century with the development of free trade in the eighteenth century.
This interpretation can no longer stand without qualification. It is true that the
monopoly powers of the chartered companies were dismantled during the course of
the eighteenth century, but the process was a gradual one, and most of the companies I
managed to struggle on until about the middle of the century or even later. At thel
same time, it should be noted that, in practice, private traders had played an import
tant part in West African trade even in the seventeenth century. From the outset the
companies had been tmable to make exclusive use of their monopoly powers. They
had found it necessary to issue ‘passports’ or licences to private traders, and they had

93
An Economic History of West Africa

also been forced to tolerate interlopers, who traded in their territories without
permission. In more general terms, it would be quite wrong to equate the decline of
the chartered companies with the rise of free trade, at least in the sense that this
concept came to be used in the nineteenth century. It has been shown that the
eighteenth century saw a marked increase in high level duties on goods imported into
England, and that this change in the tariff structure had the effect of protecting domes¬
tic manufactures.^’^ Whether they reaUsed it or not,' at the close of the eighteenth
century Adam Smith and his disciples were attacking a comparatively recent
development in commercial policy, and not a tariff structure inherited from the era
of mercantilism.
The shift to free trade was therefore somewhat limited. As far as West African
commerce was concerned, it took the form of a relative increase in thl importance of
private traders and a relative decline in the position of the chartered companies. This
change was not the outcome of a mighty confrontation between conflicting econo¬
mic philosophies, but was made for practical business reasons. The chartered
companies, which had not been successful even in the conditions of the seventeenth
century, were quite unable to cope with the expanded scale of the slave trade in the
eighteenth century. The private traders prospered because they had smaller overhead
costs (a lower ratio of staff to turnover and less, money tied up in overseas bases);
they enjoyed a much greater degree of personal supervision on the West Coast,
which meant they could respond more quickly to changing circumstances; and they
were unhampered by public obligations and government directives, and so could
trade when, where and on what terms they chose.
The success of the private traders was to be seen in the spectacular rise of the two
greatest European centres of the slave trade, Liverpool and Nantes. In the eighteenth
century English ships carried about two-thirds of the total number of slaves sent
across the Atlantic from West Africa, and French ships rouglily one fifth of the total.
Liverpool and Nantes each accounted for no less than half of these national totals and
sometimes considerably more. In view of the marked concentration of trade on these
two ports it is worth while saying a little more about them, especially since Liver¬
pool’s role in the Atlantic slave trade has been curiously neglected by modern
scholars (the most recent study being an unpublished and little used M.A. thesis),
while the part played by Nantes, though well covered by the researches of Gaston
Martin, Jean Meyer and Pere Rinchon, is usually by-passed in works by English
historians.*^®

Ralph Davis, ‘The Rise of Protection in England, 1689-1786’, Economic History Review,
19, 1966, pp. 306-17.
J. E. Merritt, The Liverpool Slave Trade from lySg to 1791, University of Nottingham
M.A. thesis, 1959.
Gaston Martin, Nantes au XVIIP sihle: Vhe des negriers (1714-44), Paris 1931; Jean Meyer,
‘Le commercenegrier nantais (1774-1792)’, Annales, 15, i960,pp. 120-29; andPereD. Binchon,
Pierre-Ignace-Litvin van Alstein, capitaine negrier, Dakar 1964. Other work on Nantes by Meyer
and Banchon, and by Everaert and Maugat is hsted in the bibliography.

94
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

By 1712 the Royal African Company was in an advanced state of decay, and Lon¬
don, the headquarters of the company and the main English slave port in the seven¬
teenth century, was fast losing control of the African trade. Bristol, which began
slave trading in the 1690s, was the principal beneficiary of the decline of her rival, but
her own supremacy lasted for only three decades, reaching a peak between 1725 and
1735.^° Liverpool’s participation in the slave trade also began in the late seventeenth
century, but it was not until the 1730s that her involvement became significant.
Within ten years Liverpool had become the leading slave-trading port in Europe, a
position which she retained until 1807, when it became illegal for British subjects to
engage in the African slave trade. By 1750 Liverpool’s ships were carrying over half
the slaves exported from Africa in English vessels, and from then on the trade
expanded until the American War of Independence (1776-83), which struck the
port a hard blow. In 1779 only eleven ships left Liverpool for Africa, which figure
was the lowest in the history of the trade (1730-1807). With the conclusion of peace
there was a revival of trade: in the 1790s Liverpool’s merchantmen were transporting
between 25,000 and 50,000 slaves across the Atlantic each year, which was roughly
three-quarters of the total handled by English ships. In 1798 a record number of 149
vessels left Liverpool for the African coast. These fluctuations illustrate the extent to
which Atlantic commerce, with its long, perilous trade routes and widely separated
markets, was affected by hostilities between the great powers, and particularly by
naval warfare. What the figures do not reveal is the ability of shipowners to adapt to
these crises. Some sought compensation by sending their vessels to friendlier waters;
others took to privateering.
Liverpool’s dominance owed something to geographical advantages. The port
was more favourably situated for trade across the Atlantic than was London, and in
time of war it was less harassed by French privateers than either London or Bristol.
More important still, however, was Liverpool’s position as the chief entrepot of an
expanding hinterland, which covered not only Manchester, but more distant centres
such as Sheffield and Birmingham. Part of London’s early success in trade to Africa
was the result of her proximity to Europe, for down to the middle of the eighteenth
century over half the goods sent to Africa from the United Kingdom were re-exports
of items obtained from Holland, Sweden and other countries on the Continent. In the
second half of the century the position changed, and between two-thirds and tliree-
quarters of the goods destined for Africa were manufactured in the United King¬
dom. Liverpool became the main outlet for these new industrial products. Relatively
low internal transport costs enabled the port to ship cotton goods, hardware and
guns more cheaply than any of its competitors, an advantage which was strengthened
by the completion of the Bridgewater canal in 1772. The value of the link with
Manchester first became apparent in the second quarter of the eighteenth century,
when there was a boom in exports of Manchester goods to Spanish America. Once
the African trade was under way, Manchester manufacturers gave considerable help

Bristol’s role in the slave trade has been well covered by P. D. Pachardson, The Bristol
Slave Trade in the Eighteenth Century, University of Manchester M.A. thesis, 1969.

95
4*
Ah Economic History of West Africa

to Liverpool slave merchants by granting them credit for up to eighteen months.

This facility was particularly valuable in a trade which required a substantial outlay
of capital (largely because of the amalgamation of mercantile and shipping func¬
tions), and an ability to await returns on investments (because of the length of time
involved in completing transactions spanning several continents).
Finally, part of Liverpool’s success must be attributed to the ‘ruthless efficiency’
of her merchants, a feature stressed by specialist works'on the history of the port, but
one which is difficult to evaluate. Ruthlessness may well have had the edge over
efficiency: Liverpool slavers had lower running costs than their Bristol rivals, but
this was not because they carried fewer hands or more slaves per ton, but because
they paid their crews lower wages.^^ Liverpool slave traders came from all sections
of society, and had many other interests besides African commerce. Tliey counted in
their ranks landowners, manufacturers, tradesmen, merchants in other branches of
overseas trade, and a number of ships’ captains, such as the famous Billy Boats, a
self-made man who eventually became an independent shipowner. Their ventures
were financed from private savings, from the profits of other business activities
(including past slaving expeditions), and from credits granted by banks and manu¬
facturers. As the century advanced, there was a trend towards concentration among
the slave-trading firms. By the 1780s and 1790s the trade was dominated by about
ten firms, all conducting a regular trade, and each having roughly a dozen partners,
who were often members of the same family. In the period 1789-91, for example,
the seven largest firms undertook over half the total number of slaving ventures.
There was a second, and numerically larger, group of slave traders, which consisted
of small, speculative investors, many of whom had only 1/32 share in a voyage. It is
clear that the rise of private traders did not represent a shift from large scale to small
scale operations. This is not surprising, for many of the problems (of raising capital
and spreading risks) which had led to the creation of joint-stock companies in the
seventeenth century were still present in African trade long after the monopolist
concerns had lost their charters.
The case of Nantes presents some interesting comparisons and contrasts with that
of Liverpool. Nantes began slave trading in the 1690s, and expanded her activities by
acquiring concessions from the monopoly companies. In 1716 Nantes was one of
four French ports which were permitted to deal freely in slaves, and from the 1720s
she became the leading slave-trading port in the coimtry. By the middle of the
century her ships transported about 10,000 African captives a year across the Atlantic,
which was over half the total carried by French vessels. Gaston Martin argued that
this was the time of peak prosperity for the port, and that a permanent decline set in
after 1774. However, recent work by Meyer and Everaert has shown that the down¬
turn was only temporary, and that there was a boom between 1783 and 1792, when
ships from Nantes delivered more slaves than in any other decade of the eighteenth
century. In this period Nantes sent out an average of thirty-five slavers a year as

Lower wages may also have reflected a difference in the supply price of labour in the
two regions.

96
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

against twenty-one a year between 1749 and 1755. Moreover, the tonnage of the
vessels used in the trade increased towards the close of the century. This extension of
Gaston Martin s pioneering study demonstrates that the fluctuations experienced by
Nantes before 1792 were much the same in timing as those felt by Liverpool. The
chief cause in both cases was warfare between the great powers. It is also clear that
there was no absolute decline in slave trading at Nantes in the second half of the
century. However, it is true to say that there was a relative decline, as slaving became
proportionately less important to Nantes than other branches of foreign commerce,
and as rival ports began to participate in the slave trade on a greater scale than in the
first half of the century. By the 1780s, Nantes, though still dominant, was followed
closely by Le Havre, Bordeaux, La Rochelle and Honfleur, all of wliich expanded
their slave trading activities after 1763.^^ La Rochelle, for example, turned to slaving
in an attempt to secure compensation for the loss of the Canadian fur trade.
Nantes, like Liverpool, owed much of her success to a special connection, though
it was one of a rather different kind. Nantes had close ties with the Compagnie des
Indes (1719), a gigantic concern which played an important, if erratic, part in French
foreign trade imtil it was dissolved in 1767. Nantes, one of the Compagnie’s main
centres in France, enjoyed advantages in obtaining goods for shipment to West
Africa, especially cotton manufactures from India, which were a staple of the trade.
Nantes also acted as a carrier for the Compagnie, and was given certain tariff con¬
cessions on shipments to the French West Indies. The relationship between Nantes
and the Compagnie des Indes illustrates the dangers, noted earlier, of adopting a
simplistic view of the rise of free trade in the eighteenth century, for the private
traders of the port, though formally opposed to monopoly, in practice gained a
great deal from their association with a privileged company. It is no coincidence that
the ascendancy of Nantes began to be challenged in the second half of the eighteenth
century, when there was a marked increase in competition among French slave
traders.
In Nantes, as in Liverpool and Bristol, slave traders came from varied back¬
grounds, though the majority were already in business as shipowners or merchants
before they took to slaving. In Nantes, too, the distinction between mariner and
merchant was often hard to define. The career of Pierre van Alstein (1733-93) shows
that the captain of a slave ship had to be a good businessman as well as a good
navigator. Consequently, it was not hard for a successful captain to attain a more
desirable status, that of a bourgeois gentilhomme. Van Alstein began his career at
Nantes in 1748, became a captain in 1758 at the age of twenty-six, and retired thirty
years later. In common with other slave captains, he received only a small fixed wage

Information about these ports can be found in the following works, all of which deserve
to receive more attention from historians of AfHca: J. Cl. Benard, ‘L’armement honfleurais et
le commerce des esclaves a la fm du XVIII® siecle’, Annales de Normandie, 10, i960, pp. 249-64;
Pierre Dardel, Navires et marchandises dans les ports de Rouen et du Havre au XVIIH sikle, Paris
1963; G. Rambert, Histoire du commerce de Marseilles, 6, de 1660 d 1789, les colonies, Paris 1959;
and H. Robert, ‘Les trafics coloniaux du port de La Rochelle au XVIII® siecle’, Memoires de
la Sociki des Antiquaires de I’Ouest, 4, i960, pp. xii-2ii.

97
An Economic History of West Africa

and relied heavily on commission for boosting his income. Between 1748 and 1768
van Alstein’s total earnings amounted to 26,000 livres, which was not a vast sum, but
his last three expeditions (1768-84) enabled him to increase this figure ten-fold, and
by the time he retired he had made a fortune of about 300,000 livres. Far from being
treated as an outcast, van Alstein became a wealthy bourgeois, a respected, modest
and religious man. The fact that a slave trader could become a pillar of French
provincial society is an interesting comment on the values of the eighteenth century,
and one which highlights the need to make a clear distinction between relative and
absolute standards when making historical judgements.
Voyages from Nantes were financed in much the same way as those from Liver¬
pool and Bristol, that is by groups of about twelve subscribers using their savings,
past profits, local credit, and—in the case of the French port—capital'from Paris. In
the middle years of the century the slave trade was concentrated in a few hands.
Scarcely fifty merchants were engaged extensively in the trade, and three families
alone were responsible for financing over half the vessels leaving Nantes on slaving
expeditions. However, in the second half of the century there was a movement away
from specialisation, and the pattern became one of a larger number of merchants
equipping proportionately fewer slaving ventures. This trend was partly a result of
the Seven Years War (1756-63), which greatly increased the risks of the trade, and
partly a reflection of the reorientation of commerce at Nantes towards the close of
the century, when slaving became just one aspect of a merchant’s business rather than
his sole concern.
Research into the organisation of Europe’s overseas trade in the eighteenth
century has led, in recent years, to a revival of interest in the routes followed by slave
ships. Historians of Africa have not shown much awareness of the debate on this
subject, and have tended to adhere to the traditional notion of the triangular trade,
as established in the earliest textbooks of imperial history. According to the con¬
ventional view, the African trade was organised in three stages, in which vessels left
Europe for the West Coast to sell consumer goods and to buy slaves, then sailed to
the West Indies to exchange slaves for sugar, and finally returned home to dispose of
sugar and to settle their accounts. The accuracy of this description has been ques¬
tioned, and it has been suggested that the triangular trade existed only in the early
days of the Atlantic slave trade, when relatively little sugar was being sent to Europe,
and that for the greater part of the eighteenth century slaves and sugar were two
distinct trades.^^ This suggestion has encouraged historians to re-examine the
conventional approach, wliich certainly oversimplifies reality. At the same time,
however, the revised interpretation caimot be accepted as it stands because it rests on
a set of prima facie arguments rather than on empirical evidence.
The view adopted here is that Merritt and others are mistaken in claiming that the
triangular trade was exceptional in the eighteenth century, but correct in implying
that it was far from being the only, or always the most important, means of conduct-

J. E. Merritt, ‘The Triangular Trade’, Business History, 3, i960, pp. 1-7, provides a sum¬
mary of views expressed ear Her by other writers.

98
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

ing Atlantic commerce. With regard to the first point, evidence from Bristol,
Nantes and Honfleur, in particular, shows that the classical triangular trade was still
quite normal in the eighteenth century. As to the second point, it is equally clear that
the transportation of slaves and sugar cannot be understood simply in terms of the
triangular trade alone. A number of direct routes were very important, though they
have rarely been sufhciently emphasised. A direct route between Europe and Africa
was followed by sloips trading in non-slave products, notably gold and gum. In
addition, there were direct routes to the West Coast across the Atlantic from North
America, the West Indies and Brazil, which were used by colonists trading rum and
tobacco for slaves.^^ Finally, there was a very busy route between Europe and the
West Indies. This was used by fleets of merchantmen, which came from Europe
with supplies for the Islands, and returned home carrying a substantial proportion of
the sugar crop. The volume of traffic on this route is indicated by the fact that, in
1789, 116 ships left Enghsh ports for Africa, whereas no less than 449 left for the
West Indies. Liverpool, which was dominant in the slave trade, had roughly equal
shares with London and Bristol in the sugar trade. Nantes was the chief importer of
sugar into France, but several other ports, including Rouen, Le Havre, Marseilles and
St Malo, conducted a considerable direct trade with the Caribbean. In the case of
St Malo, Le Corre has estimated that for every ship engaged in the triangular trade
in the late seventeenth century fifty went straight to the West Indies.^®
Whether a vessel returned home from the West Indies with ballast or sugar was a
decision which, from the slaver’s point of view, depended largely on the availability
and price of produce. At the same time, there were good reasons why an additional,
specialised fleet was required to carry sugar on the last leg of the triangular voyage.
In the first place, slave ships were not entirely adequate as transporters of tropical
produce. They were not built to carry hogsheads of sugar; they were often in an
luisea worthy condition when they reached the Caribbean; the irregularity of their
arrival meant that planters could not be certain of evacuating their crop at the right
time; and, perhaps most important of all, the expansion of the sugar industry set up
a demand for freight which exceeded the physical capacity of the ships arriving
from Afiica. Secondly, by the middle of the eighteenth century the increasing use of
bills of exchange enabled accounts to be settled quickly, and made the exchange of
sugar for slaves less of a necessity.^® There is some evidence that the slave traders put
up the price of slaves to compensate for returning in ballast, but they also gained
from the new arrangement to the extent that payment in bills enabled them to make
a faster turnaround. Thirdly, the development of close ties between planters and
metropolitan sugar merchants during the eighteenth century tended to reinforce
direct trading links, with the result that captains of slave ships often found that the

On the latter see Pierre Verger, ‘Mouvements de navires entre Bahia et le golfc de Benin
(XVIIP-XDC® siecles)’. Revue Frangaise d’Histoire d’Outre-Mer, 55, 1968, pp. 5-36.
A. Le Corre, ‘Le grand commerce malouin en 1686-1687’, Annales de Bretagne, 3, 1958,
pp. 275-331.
On the use of bills of exchange in Atlantic commerce see S. G. Checkland, ‘Finance for
the West Indies, 1780-1815’, Economic History Review, 10, 1958, pp. 461-9.

99
An Economic History of West Africa

o o
O-T-O

ho
CO

0-^0

c
§

Map 8. Atlantic Commerce in the Eighteenth Century.

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Q.
£D
"u

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CN

100
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

planters had made alternative arrangements for shipping produce to Europe. In¬
creasing specialisation in the slave and sugar trades lowered the investment require¬
ments for entry into Atlantic commerce, reduced the risks of trade, and speeded the
turnover of capital, since the direct trip to the Caribbean could be completed in
about six months, whereas the triangular trade took a year or even longer. It was for
these reasons that the merchants of Marseilles, for example, preferred to concentrate
on direct trade to the West Indies, in spite of official efforts to encourage the port to
participate in the slave trade.
The African side of the Atlantic slave trade will be considered in three parts.
These will consist of an assessment of the numbers involved, a discussion of the
‘production’ of slaves, and an examination of the organisation of the coastal whole¬
saling centres. The important question of the consequences of the slave trade will be
reserved for the fmal section of this chapter.
A review of historical opinion on the numbers of slaves exported from Africa to
the Americas provides a classic example of how the repetition of untested statements
can create an almost unshakable orthodoxy. Figures derived ultimately from the
well-intentioned, but prejudiced, guesswork of nineteenth-century abolitionists
have been passed on, endorsed and elaborated right down to the present day. The
totals cited by the majority of writers range from 15-20 million African slaves
imported into the Americas, to 18-24 million shipped from Africa, the difference
being accounted for by losses on the way. Fortunately, Professor Curtin, with
characteristic originality, has recently carried out a meticulous investigation of the'
available evidence—an historical exercise which may seem obvious, but is so only
in retrospect.^"^ His main conclusion is that established estimates greatly exaggerate
the scale of the Atlantic slave trade. In Curtin’s view the total number of African
slaves reaching the Americas, the Atlantic islands, and Europe amounted to
9,566,000, of whom all except 175,000 were landed in the New World. This total,
which is about half the mean of the figures usually cited, is not to be treated as a set
figure ‘to be repeated in the textbooks’.^® It is to be used rather as an indication of a
range of possibilities, which extend from a minimum figure of 8,000,000 to a
maximum of 10,500,000.^® If 15 per cent is added, as seems a reasonable average, to
allow for losses during the voyage, then the total number of slaves exported from
Africa was about ii million, wliich again is about half the figure commonly cited.
In theory a further percentage should be added to allow for deaths caused by slave
raiding expeditions in Africa, but at present it is impossible even to guess at what this
amount might be.
Curtin’s data also supply important information about the chronological develop¬
ment and geographical incidence of the slave trade. As to the first, the figures of
slaves reaching their destinations can be broken down in the following way
Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: a Census, Madison 1969. But for the timely
publication of Curtin’s book, the present writer would also be counted among the unquestion¬
ing majority.
Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 86.
Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 87.
Ciutin, The Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 268.

lOl
An Economic History of West Africa

Slave imports into the Americas and Europe, 1451-1870

1451-1600 274,900
1601-1700 1,341,100
1701-1810 6,051,700
1811-1870 1,898,400

9,566,100

These lower totals are consistent with the emphasis given in this chapter to trade in
products other than slaves, and they confirm that the boom in slave exports coincided
with the expansion of sugar production in the Caribbean during the eighteenth
century. No less than 80 per cent of all slaves landed in the New World were
transported between lyor and 1850. The figures for the nineteenth century demon¬
strate that the slave trade remained significant even after it had been outlawed by
Britain, the greatest slave-trading nation, a point which the imperial school of
history, with its emphasis on Wilberforce’s triumph in 1807, never really explained.
With regard to areas of supply, Curtin’s figures indicate that rather more slaves
were exported from places south of the Cameroons, especially the Congo and
Angola, than is customarily assumed. A calculation made on the basis of Curtin’s
data suggests that about 6,300,000 slaves (55 per cent of the total shipped across the
Atlantic from Africa) came from West Africa.®^ Slaves were not exported in
identical proportions from all parts of the West Coast. Indeed, in the eighteenth
century the region between Senegal and the Ivory Coast played a relatively unim¬
portant part in the Atlantic slave trade, and the principal area of export was the
shorter stretch of coast running from the Gold Coast east to the Cameroons. In the
1780s, when the Atlantic trade was at its peak, annual exports from various sections
of the coast were as follows:

Senegambia 2,200 Gold Coast 10,000

Sierra Leone 2,000 Slave Coast to Benin 12,500
Grain and Ivory Coasts 4,000 Niger Delta to Cameroons 22,000

8,200 44,500

From these figures it can be seen that the area from the Gold Coast to the Cameroons
accounted for 82 per cent of all slaves shipped from West Africa at this time. The
region west of the Gold Coast may have been rather more prominent in the early
days of the trade, but it should also be remembered that far fewer slaves were
exported before 1700 than later on. There were successive shifts of emphasis within
the major regions of supply. Thus the slave trade tended to spread eastwards from the
Gold Coast after the middle of the seventeenth century, with the result that by 1800
the most important section of the coast was the sub-division from Benin to the

J. D. Page, A History of West Africa, 1969, pp. 84-8.

102
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

Cameroons. The Atlantic slave trade provides further evidence of regional economic
differences in West Africa during the pre-colonial era.
Figures relating to the destinations of slaves shipped across the Atlantic confirm
that the Caribbean and South America were the two leading reception areas.®^
Destinations of African slaves exported across the Atlantic, 1451-1870

Old World (Europe and die African Islands) 175,000

North and Central America 651,000
Caribbean Islands 4,040,000
South America 4,700,000

However, the extent of the dominance of the Caribbean and South America has
not been appreciated: these areas between them accounted for 91 per cent of all slaves
shipped across the Atlantic, the leading importers being Brazil, Haiti, Jamaica and
Cuba. North America, notwithstanding its current racial problems, received less
than 7 per cent of the total.
The Atlantic slave trade still remains one of the greatest migrations of all time.
However, it is clear that many of the generalisations commonly made about this
controversial phase of African history will need to be reassessed in the light of
Curtin’s evidence. His research is bound to stimulate a lively debate; it is to be hoped
that it will also be a profitable one.
The production, or, more accurately, the harvesting of slaves was one of the
biggest commercial ventures launched in Africa during the pre-colonial era. Un¬
fortunately, detailed information about this appalling form of business enterprise is
lacking at present, and as yet little attention has been paid to the economics of the
slave-producing firm. Many of the remarks which follow are deliberately specula¬
tive, and are designed to prompt others to consider this subject at greater length
than is possible here.
To begin with, little is known about the geographical and social origins of the
slaves shipped from Africa. The few pioneering attempts to grapple with the former
problem have confirmed the broad regional divisions noted earlier, and have stressed
the impossibility of generalising further at this stage.®® For the moment, all that can
be said is that the sources of supply included well populated regions in the immediate
hinterland of the ports of shipment, and sparsely populated areas located far from the
major centres of trade. The importance of the latter may well have been exaggerated
in the past, for a recent study has shown that in one prominent case the sparseness of
the population was the result not so much of slave raiding as of the general inhospi¬
tality of the environment.®^ It is probable that the relative significance of both types
Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade, pp. 88-9, 268.
Philip D. Curtin and Jan Vansina, ‘Sources of the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Slave
Ttude', Journal of African History, 5, 1964, pp. 185-208; Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade,
ch. 4; Walter Rodney, ‘Upper Guhiea and the Significance of the Origins of Africans Enslaved
in the New World’, Journal of Negro History, 54, 1969. PP- 327-45-
Michael Mason, ‘Population Density and “Slave Raiding”—the Case of the Middle
Belt of Nigeria’, Jour/wl of African History, 10, 1969, pp. 551-64- See also the further discussion
by M. B. Cleave and R. M. Prothero, ‘Population Density and “Slave Raiding”—a Comment’,
Journal of African History, 12, 1971, pp- 319-24. and Mason’s reply, ibid, pp. 324-7.

103
An Economic History of West Africa

of catchment area changed through time, as it seems likely that their initial selection
was related to features such as the size, distribution and defensive capability of the
population, which were bound to alter. It is even possible that major producers
established a regional cycle of exploitation, in much the same way as farmers alternate
arable and fallow land, though this suggestion may exaggerate the extent to which
slaving was an operation amenable to long term ‘development’ planning.
As to the social origins of the Africans sliipped across the Atlantic, it used to be
thought that the Europeans simply drew on an existing pool of slave labour in
Africa. Originally, this interpretation appears to have gained currency as a half¬
hearted justification of the slave trade, the argument being that if slaves were already
present in Africa then it was not quite so wicked merely to transfer them to another
continent. This view appears to imply that Africans kept paddocks full of slaves in
the fourteenth century in the hope that one day the West Coast would be discovered
by the Europeans, who would then purchase this carefully accumulated and super¬
fluous labour force. However, Walter Rodney’s study of the Upper Guinea coast
has shown that there was no servile class simply waiting to be exported,^® and work
carried out on the more important slave-exporting area east of the Ivory Coast tends
to support this view. Admittedly, there were various economically and socially
subordinate groups, including slaves, in many West African societies long before
the coming of the Europeans, but these developed, as was shown in Chapter 2, in
response to local needs, and were not surplus to domestic requirements. With the
advent of the Europeans, members of these groups may well have been among the
first to be sold, though of course this would have happened only if the profit on their
sale abroad exceeded their value to their owners or employers in Africa. As the trade
expanded, however, it became necessary to secure a massive increase in the numbers
of slaves and other saleable subordinates. The indigenous rulers then set about
creating a class of unfree Africans, with the result that by the close of the eighteenth
century there was indeed a servile group which was more numerous and more
closely defined than in the sixteenth century. It seems reasonable to suppose that the
bulk of the eleven million people shipped from Africa were not members of an
established slave population, but ordinary farmers and their families, who were
deprived of their liberty by fellow Africans in response to external demands.
There were various ways of securing slaves, including raiding, warfare, collecting
tribute, kidnapping, purchasing, and disposing of criminals, real and alleged. It
appears that the majority of flaves were gathered through raids, warfare and tribute,
all methods which impinged on other societies. Raiding and warfare were effective
means of direct action, while tribute was a type of extortion used by a dominant
power to secure a specified number of slaves from a satellite state or village. The
methods employed by the latter varied, but usually included raiding. By the stand¬
ards of the time slave raiding and trading were operations which required consider¬
able labour and capital, and so tended to be financed and directed by a few,
substantial entrepreneurs who concentrated their efforts in carefully planned drives.

A History of the Upper Guinea Coast, 1545 to 1800, Oxford 1970.

104
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

As Barbot noted in the late seventeenth century, slaving was ‘the business of kings,
rich men, and prime merchants, exclusive of the inferior sort of blacks.. .
Labour was needed to assemble a band of raiders, and capital to pay for equipment,
guides, agents, tolls, and for the maintenance of retainers and captives. Moreover, a
slave was indivisible, and his value was such that transactions were handled by large
dealers, and not by petty traders. Firms which were only just big enough to over¬
come these barriers can be thought of as marginal; they had no reserves for dealing
with unforeseen circumstances, and they were more likely to be liquidated. Once the
minimum conditions for entry had been met, the optimum size of the firm could vary
to some extent according to the number of slaves required, the distribution of settle¬
ment, and the defensive capacity of the people who were to be raided.
Fundamentally, the external slave trade existed only because the return on exports ,
was greater than on employing labour in the domestic economy. If this had not been |
the case a much larger number of slaves would have been retained for use in Africa
itself. The cost of gathering slaves was the same for both markets, and the cost of
moving them to local markets was often as high as the cost of transferring them to
coastal entrepots. It was mainly the price paid for them which differed, and this
difference reflected the greater productivity of labour in the Americas. The export
price of slaves never rose to the point where it became cheaper for Europeans to turn
to alternative sources of supply, and it never fell to the point where it caused more /
than a temporary check to the trade. Consequently, Africa was able consistently to (
undercut all other potential suppliers. Production and wholesaling remained in I
indigenous hands mainly because the African dehvery system, despite inevitable
disputes and occasional breakdowns, was flexible and efficient enough to supply the
slaves required at a price the Europeans were prepared to pay. The remarkable
expansion of the slave trade in the eighteenth century provides a horrific illustration
of the rapid response of producers in an underdeveloped economy to price incen¬
tives. The interaction of supply and demand merits further consideration because it
raises some interesting questions about the historical development of the trade. For
example, it is possible that part of the increase in the price paid for slaves in the
eighteenth century resulted from a growing scarcity of labour resources and from
better defensive arrangements on the part of those who had become frequent targets
of slave gathering expeditions. In other words, slave suppliers may have experienced
increasing marginal costs as a result of the growth of external diseconomies which,
given the extent of slaving, were mevitable. It is hard to see how producers could
have adjusted successfully to this situation: once the minimum conditions of entry
had been met, there appear to have been few important economies of scale to slaving
operations, and consequently little scope for reducing the internal costs of the firm.
The political implications of economic activities are not a major concern of this
book. Nevertheless, two aspects of tliis question need to be mentioned here. First, it
is clear that the growth of foreign trade encouraged the expansion of some states,
such as Dahomey and Oyo, and also changed their structure, with the result that

Quoted in Basil Davidson, The African Past, Harmondsworth 1966, p. 213.

105
 An Economic History of West Africa

contractual relationships became more important than kinship.®’’’ In these states

slaving was either in the hands of a small, wealthy oligarchy, or else was a state
monopoly. The firm acquired political functions; conversely, the state acted like a
huge corporation. The chartered companies operated by Europeans in the seven¬
teenth centuries must have been easily recognisable to Africans, whose own export
activities were organised in much the Same way. The parallel draws attention to an
j important general point, namely that the Atlantic slaV'e trade was made possible by
: an alliance of two groups, European shippers and African suppliers, who agreed, in
j effect, to exploit the less powerful peoples of the Continent. The trade may have been
initiated by Europeans, but it cannot be understood simply in terms of their role
alone. Second, care must be taken not to over-simplify the relationship between
trade and politics. It would be mistaken to imply that the slave trade was a necessary
condition for the formation of large, centralised states in West Africa.®® Benin, for
example, developed independently of the slave trade,®® while other areas, such as
the Niger Delta, conducted a substantial foreign trade, yet did not produce major
states, still less empires.®® Clearly, additional motives and means, non-economic as
well as economic, need to be explored if African state-building movements are to be
understood.
When a sufficient number of slaves had been, collected, they were marched to
coastal entrepots and sold to dealers, who held them pending shipment. Between
Senegal and the Gold Coast the exchange of slaves was on a fairly casual basis, and
ships put in at various places where they had access to the shore, in the hope of buying
slaves rather than in the certain knowledge of being able to do so. From the Gold
Coast eastwards, however, the trade was highly organised, and the slavers usually
made for recognised centres. These included European forts on the Gold Coast,
where many of the chartered companies had their headquarters, and large African
ports of call, such as Whydah, Badagri, Lagos, Bonny and Old Calabar. In purpose
and organisation the West Coast entrepots may be compared not only to the great
ports of the deSert, such as Timbuctu, but also to the great European centres, such
as Liverpool and Nantes. Their chief function, whether controlled by Africans or
Europeans, was to act as wholesaling depots, though they also performed the
subsidiary, but necessary, task of supplying slave vessels with provisions for the long
voyage across the Atlantic. The entrepots helped to synchronise exchanges between
slave gatherers, shippers and employers, so that slaves were delivered to the West

This point has been developed by I. A. Akinjogbin, Dahomey and its Neighbours, ijo8-
1818, Cambridge 1967. On Oyo see Peter Morton-Willianis, ‘The Oyo Yoruba and the
Atlantic Trade, 1670-1830’, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 3, 1964, pp. 25-45.
E. J. Alagoa, ‘The Development of Institutions in the States of the Eastern Niger Delta’,
Journal of African History, 12, 1971, pp. 269-78.
James D. Graham, ‘The Slave Trade, Depopulation, and Human Sacrifice in Benin
History’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines, 5, r965, pp. 317-34.
This question has been explored by Patrick Maniung, ‘Slaves, Pahn Oil and Political
Power on the West Afncan Coast’, African Historical Studies, 2, 1969, pp. 279-88, and E. J.
Alagoa, ‘Long-distance Trade and States in the Niger Delta’, Journal of African History, ir,
1970, pp. 319-29-
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

Indies at harvest time (December to June), when they were most wanted. The
majority of slavers visited the West Coast between October and March, which was
when the entrepots were at their busiest.®^ By holding stocks in anticipation of
demand, the wholesaUng centres attracted a regular business and enabled slave ships
to achieve a rapid turnaround. Naturally, this service was not provided free of
charge, and it was accepted that trade at the entrepots involved paying either customs
duties or higher prices for slaves, and sometimes both. However, excessive charges
could be countered by transferring to another port or by trading outside the entre¬
pots. These possibilities helped to stabilise relations between wholesalers and
shippers.
Two of the leading entrepots were Whydah and Old Calabar. Whydah achieved
prominence in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, and remained a centre of
the slave trade until about the middle of the nineteenth century.®^ As an entrepot
without any profound natural advantages, Whydah was particularly Susceptible to
external influences. Trade suffered after 1727, when the town was captured by
Agaja, the King of Dahomey, and again after 1774, when Oyo decided to send its
slaves to the nearby market of Porto Novo. Whydah was also seriously affected,
along with many other entrepots, by interruptions caused by the American War of
Independence and by the Napoleonic Wars. English vessels shipped 14-15,000 slaves
a year from the port in the i68os, and exports remained at about this level imtil 1727.
Thereafter a gradual decline set in. In 1776 about 10,000 slaves were exported, and
this figure was halved by the end of the century. However, business revived after
1810, when England and Portugal agreed to allow Whydah to continue as a centre
of the slave trade.
The Dahomeyan conquest was important because it led to the integration of
producing and wholesaling activities, though W^hydah still depended on additional
suppliers, such as Oyo. This merger was not planned, for Agaja’s initial aim in 1727
was to stop the slave trade.®® However, Agaja soon discovered that he needed
European support to counter the political threat from Oyo, and it was then that he
became involved in slaving. Under Dahomeyan rule the slave trade became a state
monopoly, and a governor was installed at Whydah to see that business conduct
conformed to ofiicial regulations and to ensure that the prescribed taxes were paid.
In practice, however, the slave trade was dominated by an oligarchy headed by the
king, and not simply by the monarchalone. Dahomeyan kings found it advantageous
to lease some of their royal privileges to senior chiefs, just as European rulers found it
politically advisable to grant concessions to their nobles. Some chiefs were allowed
to participate directly in slave raiding and trading, while others received a percentage
of the taxes derived from foreign commerce.

81 This was also the dry season, when Europeans experienced fewer health risks.
82 For further information see Rosemary Arnold, ‘A Port of Trade: Whydah on the Guinea
Coast’, in Trade and Market in the Early Empires, ed. Karl Polanyi, C. M. Arensberg and Harry
Pearson, Glencoe 1957, pp. 154-76. and Simone Berbain, Le comptoir frangais dejuda (Ouidah) au
XVIIE sikle, Paris 1942.
88 However, it should be noted that there is not complete agreement over this interpretation.

107
An Economic History of West Africa

Old Calabar was a leading slave port for nearly two hundred years (1650-1841),
and as late as 1828 was said to be shipping 6-8,000 slaves a year.®^ Its history was less
spectacular than Whydah’s because it was never dominated by a large state, such
as Dahomey, a kingdom which achieved notoriety in Europe as a result of
publicity given to the allegedly unenlightened despotism of its rulers and to the
exotic exploits of its Amazonian warriors. Old Calabar was founded by Efik
settlers in the sixteenth century, before trade with Europe began. The economy was
by no means self-sufficient even at that time, and the local inhabitants exchanged
fish and salt for yams and palm produce, which were obtained from the north. When
the external demand for slaves reached the eastern edge of West Africa, the Efik
established themselves as wholesalers, exploiting the natural advantages of their
estuarine site, and excluding all rivals from direct trade with the Europeans. The Efik
occasionally launched slave raids, but mostly bought slaves from other suppliers,
especially the Aro, and hy the eighteenth century they had a network of market
contacts which stretched two hundred miles inland.
The development of the slave trade had a profound effect on Efik institutions. In
the first place, economic inequalities became more pronounced as a result of the
varying success rates of households participating in foreign trade. Secondly, the
accretion of immigrants, mostly slaves, who were used as retainers, led to an imequal
numerical expansion of the original Efik household units. Thirdly, there was a trend
towards greater social differentiation as freemen took steps to secure the superiority
of their status over that of slaves and other subordinate newcomers. Because slave
buying and wholesaling were activities which required considerable capital, com¬
mercial success came to depend very largely on access to credit granted by the
Europeans. As a result, trade and political power became concentrated in the hands
of a small oligarchy, in much the same way as at Whydah, Liverpool and Nantes.
There were about a dozen important African dealers in Old Calabar in the middle of
the eighteenth century. The number was reduced to three by the end of the century,
and to one early in the nineteenth century. The survivor, Duke Ephraim, was the
greatest trader, the sole collector of customs duty, and, effectively, ruler of the town.
The Efik never established a highly centralised monarchy on the Dahomeyan model,
but they did set up a conciliar institution of federal kind, which was known as Ekpe.
Tliis institution developed early in the eighteenth century in response to the need to
integrate the new social groupings in the town. Ekpe was particularly important as a
debt-collecting agency, ensuring the viability of the credit system, and, through this,
the continued success of the port. Ekpe was dominated by freemen, and especially by
the heads of the principal lineages, who used it to reinforce their monopoly of credit
facilities and of commercial and political patronage. It was a device which the
leading worthies of Liverpool would have recognised, and perhaps even envied.
The relationship between European and African at their meeting points on the
West Coast was not that of employer and employee, but that of two complementary

The best study of Old Calabar is A. J. H. Lathani, Old Calabar, 1600—18^1: the Economic
Impact of the West upon a Traditional Society, University of Birmingham Ph.D. thesis, 1970.

108
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

and more or less equal trading partners, whose mutual business interests were
cemented by a mixture of goodwill and extensive credit obligations. The position
of African wholesalers was very similar to that of landlords and brokers in internal
trade, in that they provided accommodation, acted as interpreters, and linked buyers
and producers. Pursuing this analogy, it might be said that the European purchaser
was in much the same position as the indigenous ‘stranger’ who placed himself under
the protection of an African landlord.®^ The two groups formed what Christopher
Fyfe has aptly called a ‘moral community’, wliich was held together not only by
obvious economic ties, but also by cross-cultural links, which helped to create a
climate of understanding and trust. Some Africans, for example, became Christians,
just as, in a different context, the great traders of the Western Sudan had become
Muslims. Conversely, Europeans became members of some African institutions,
such as Ekpe, the Efik council, and secured representation in others, such as the Poro
society in Sierra Leone. Verbal communication was assisted by the development of a
form of pidgin-English, and also by the rise of a group of mulatto traders and agents.
These men became important commercial and cultural intermediaries in the seven¬
teenth and eighteenth centuries, particularly in Senegambia, Sierra Leone and the
Gold Coast.®® Their role may be compared to that of the comprador class which
arose in the Far East in the nineteenth century, following the growth of inter-
contmental and inter-cultural business connections.®'^ To cite evidence of collabora¬
tion between Europeans and Africans is not to deny that crude and unscrupulous
methods, including force, were used by both sides from time to time, but to point
to an aspect of commercial relations wliich, though significant, has not been given
much prominence in general studies of the Atlantic slave trade.
The co-operative element in Afro-European business transactions helps to explain
the operation of what has become known in the literature as the credit or trust system.
It was common practice for Europeans to advance goods against deliveries either if
slaves were unavailable immediately, or to book supplies for the following season.
Guarantees were sometimes given in the form of hostages or moveable property, but
it was quite normal for the purchaser to trust the wholesaler with advances which
often amounted to several thousand pounds sterling. Eyo Nsa (c. 1740-1820) of
Old Calabar became known to European merchants as Willy Honesty, such was his
reputation for trustworthiness and reliability. Two comments need to be made
about the trust system, which has been condemned by generations of European
commentators on the grounds that it encouraged improvidence on the part of
susceptible and morally vulnerable ‘natives’. First, credit would not have been so
widespread if it had not been needed to finance part of the operations of slave dealers
and suppliers. Since the export sector continued to require injections of foreign

V. R. Dorjahn and C. Fyfe, ‘Landlord and Stranger: Change in Tenancy Relations in

Sierra Leone’, Journal of African History, 3, 1962, 391-7.
Margaret Priestley has made a careful and most useful study of one such family, the
Brews, in West African Trade and Coast Society, Oxford 1969.
Yen-p’ing Hao, The Comprador in Nineteenth-Century China: Bridge between East and
West, Oxford 1970.

109
An Economic History of West Africa

capital, it is not surprising that the credit ‘system’ survived the abolition of the slave
trade, was a prominent feature of the colonial economy, and exists today in the form
of international loans and ‘suppliers’ credits’. Second, more remarkable than the
alleged iniquities of the trust system was the extent to which it operated satisfactorily,
especially in view of the cross-cultural nature of business transactions. That the
system remained workable over several centuries was a tribute to the practical value
of the moral community created by dealers and shippers. It was customary, for
example, for African wholesalers to accept responsibility for bad debts incurred by
unscrupulous or unfortunate traders to whom they had passed on advances of cash or
goods. At the same time, it would be wrong to leave the impression that defaulters
were solely of one race and colour. As John Newton, a prominent slave trader,
observed in 1788: ‘When I have charged a Black with unfairness and’dishonesty, he
has answered, if able to clear himself, with an air of disdain, “What! do you think I
am a White Man?”
Besides organising the sale and shipment of slaves, the coastal entrepots also super¬
vised the storage and distribution of the goods received in exchange. Detailed infor¬
mation about the commodities imported into West Africa during this period is
lacking at present. However, it seems clear that the leading items can be grouped
under a few main headings, and that these remained unaltered for the duration of the
Atlantic slave trade.
The leading import was cloth, which was in steady demand in an underdeveloped
economy.®® Textiles of all kinds accounted for between half and three-quarters of
the goods sent to West Africa from Rouen and Le Havre in the eighteenth century,
and it is likely that shipments from other leading European ports were of much the
same order of magnitude. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries cotton goods
from Bengal were particularly prominent, and it is interesting to reflect that on the
eve of the industrial revolution Europe still conducted a sizeable re-export trade in
Indian manufactures. In the second half of the eighteenth century, however, this
trade was adversely affected by the disorder which followed the collapse of the
Mogul Empire, and by competition from imitations produced in Holland, France
and England. By the late eighteenth century European textiles, especially cottons,
which had become more important both in volume and value than woollen goods,
were replacing Bengal cloth, though it was not until about the 1820s that the latter
became insignificant in West African trade. Guns and gunpowder were probably
next in importance after cloth, and represented about one fifth of the value of cargoes
shipped from England to Africa in the eighteenth century. The demand for muni¬
tions was partly a fimction of their role as inputs in the ‘production’ of slaves, and
partly a result of the need to make adequate defensive arrangements against slave
raids. However, guns and gunpowder were not causally related to the beginnings of
the Atlantic slave trade, for imports of these items did not become substantial until
after the trade was well established. Initially, the Dutch were the principal suppliers,

Quoted in Christopher Fyfe, The Sierra Leone Inheritance, 1964, p. 74.

J. Foumeau and L. Kravetz, ‘Le pagne sur la cote de Guinea et au Congo du XV® siecle
a nos jours’, Bulletin de ITnstitut d'Etudes Centrafricaines, 7-8, 1954, pp. 5-21.

no
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

but after the middle of the eighteenth century English manufacturers became
dominant. Hardware, principally utensils and tools, was probably third on the list of
leading imports. Other well-known trade goods were salt, beads, bar iron, gin and
brandy, all of which came from Europe, and tobacco and rum, which were shipped
from the Americas. Contrary to popular belief, cheap gin, though it may have been
the drink of the English poor, was not a widespread stimulant, solace or currency in
Africa at this time.
There was considerable variety within these main categories of imports because
there were many different types of cloth, guns and hardware. At the end of the
seventeenth century, Bosman, the distinguished Dutch trader, estimated that at least
150 items were required for trade on the Gold Coast alone. The variety of the
import trade has often been seen as proof of the unpredictable psychology of
‘primitive’ consumers. Yet there were sound commercial reasons why ships entering
West Coast entrepots resembled floating supermarkets. In the first place, the trade
was highly competitive and the Europeans found it necessary, and often to their
advantage, to bargain for slaves by varying the goods offered, as well as by altering
their price. Secondly, the slavers were unable to predict the state of the African
market in any detail, and by the time they had reached the West Coast they were a
long way from their sources of supply. There was no point arriving with a boat load
of guns, for instance, and nothing else, if these had just been delivered by a previous
vessel. Thirdly, European critics often overlooked the fact that African purchasers on
the coast were not final consumers, but wholesalers, who required a wide range of
goods because they had to supply a sizeable market over a long period of time.
Finally, the absence of an internationally acceptable currency on the West Coast
made it relatively difficult to substitute one item for another, so having as many
goods as possible (and having them in different quantities) increased the facility of
transactions.
It would be wrong to suppose that exchange at the entrepots was conducted simply
by barter. Imports into West Africa also included a number of currencies, such as
cowries, manillas, iron bars, copper rods and silver dollars, and these, together with
gold, were used in part or full exchange for slaves. The difficulty of evaluating slaves
in terms of assorted trade goods and commodity currencies led to the development
of various units of account, such as the mythical bar, the sorting , and the ounce.
The bar became a unit of account in the seventeenth century, principally in Sene-
gambia and eastern Nigeria; the sorting made its appearance at the same time, and
was used mainly between the Gold Coast and the Cameroons, though it was also
found in some western parts of the coast, such as Sierra Leone; the ounce was intro¬
duced into the Gold Coast early in the eighteenth century, and was adopted at
Whydah in the 1760s. These units were adapted from indigenous systems of currency
and accountancy, and provide a further illustration of the way in which Europeans
fitted in with African trading customs. Originally, the bar was simply an iron bar of

Marion Johnson, ‘The Ounce in Eighteenth-Century West African Trade’, Journal of

African History, 7, 1966, pp. 197-214.

Ill
 {

An Economic History of West Africa

differing lengths and weights, while the trade ounce was applied to goods exchanged
on the Gold Coast for one ounce of gold. At the same time, the slavers were anxious r
to adapt these units to the needs of external trade because they offered a solution to I
one of the main problems of barter, that is calculating in advance the likely profit- |
ability of a particular transaction. By adding together the proposed selling prices of j
diverse trade goods and expressing them in units of account, the European traders
could begin to build a margin of profit into the import trade. '
European traders were content to remain on the coast not only because of the j
difficulty and cost of moving inland, but also because the system of slave gathering
and wholesaling devised by Africans proved efficient, and was therefore acceptable, i
The African response to external demands has been explained here in terms of |
universalist or formalist assumptions because African economic behaviour in the '
export sector is recognisable as approximating to that of contemporary western
economic man. This approach contrasts with the substantivist viewpoint, and in ^
particular with Karl Polanyi’s stimulating analysis in Dahomey and the Slave Trade j
Space does not permit a lengthy review of Polanyi’s account of what he calls an j
archaic’ economy. It must suffice to say that his book has serious omissions in its {
historical sources, and that it does not satisfactorily define or apply certain character- (
istics of the archaic economy, particularly the concepts of ‘administered’ trade and
redistribution’. Nevertheless, Polanyi’s work, as always, provokes further thought. |
One idea, which others might like to consider, is that the principles of administered
trade and redistribution are more typical of independent African states today than
of states in the pre-colonial era. Administered trade (in the shape of large public
corporations) has become an ideological commitment, while redistribution (in the
shape of patronage and job creation) has grown to be a political necessity since the
rise of the mass party.

3 The abolition of the external slave trade

In 1807 it became illegal for British subjects to engage in the slave trade, and in 1833
the institution of slavery was abolished in all Britain’s imperial possessions. In spite
of these measures, substantial numbers of slaves were transported across the Atlantic
after 1807. This paradox was the result first of the development of new centres of
demand, especially in Cuba and Brazil (for the production of sugar and coffee) and
to a small extent in the southern states of North America (for cotton growing), and
second of the difficulties of giving practical effect to the new laws without the full
co-operation of other interested nations. However, having abolished her own share
of the trade, it was in Britain’s interest to see that others followed suit. The campaign
for abolition then moved into a new phase of long and hard international bargaining.
Sustained diplomatic pressure led to the passage of anti-slavery legislation by other

Seattle 1966.
For some perceptive reflections on parallel lines see Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political
Order, Chicago 1966, pp. 134-45.

112
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

nations in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and the Americas during the first
three-quarters of the nineteenth century. Three of the more significant events were
the rapid decline of the Brazilian slave market from the 1850s, the elimination of the j
Cuban slave trade in the 18 60s, and Lincoln’s decision in 1862 to co-operate with
Britain on the slavery issue, a move which was dictated largely by his desire to
deprive the southern states of a possible ally. Other measures adopted included the
deployment of an anti-slavery squadron in West African waters,”^*^ and the annexa¬
tion of certain key ports on the West Coast in an attempt to stop the trade at its
source. The year 1807 may mark the end of an era, but it was a rather protracted
ending. Not until the close of the 1860s was the Atlantic slave trade suppressed and
the trans-Saharan slave trade reduced to negligible proportions.
The problem of why Britain, the most important slave-trading nation, took the
lead in condemning the Atlantic traiSc is a matter of considerable controversy. For
a long time this radical change of policy was attributed to the influence of a group of
dedicated reformers led by Granville Sharp, Thomas Clarkson and William
Wilberforce. The classic statement of this view was presented by Sir Reginald
Coupland in The British Anti-Slavery Movement, first published in 1933.'^'^ Coupland
explained with great lucidity, and with that sense of the onward march of history
which characterised the ‘Wliig’ school of history, just how vested interests were
destroyed by a combined non-conformist and humanitarian pressure group. Coup¬
land and the other imperial historians, ‘the chaplains on the pirate ship’, were given
a rough passage by Eric Williams, a West Indian historian (now Prime Minister of
Trinidad and Tobago) in his book Capitalism and Slavery, which appeared in 1944.
According to Wilhams, the slave trade was abolished primarily for economic
reasons. When the industrial capitalism of the nineteenth century began to replace
the purely commercial capitalism of the eighteenth century, it became necessary to
destroy the sugar monopoly of the West Indies as a step towards dismantling the
ancien regime of mercantilist restrictions and establishing a new order of free trade
and economic efficiency. The role of the humanitarians, he claimed, had been
‘grossly exaggerated by men who have sacrificed scholarship to sentimentality and,
like the scholastics of old, placed faith before reason and evidence.”^®
Both interpretations are open to criticism. Coupland was stronger on narrative
than on explanation; he made no serious attempt to understand the economic aspects
of abolition; he failed to account adequately for the continuation of the slave trade

■^3 The anti-slavery squadron freed only about eight per cent of the total number of slaves
shipped from Africa in the period after aboHtion. However, the navy’s presence had a deterrent
effect which was much greater than this figure indicates. A recent study suggests that about
825,000 additional slaves (an increase of forty-three per cent) would have been transported from
Africa to the Americas between 1811 and 1870 had there not been an African squadron. See
E. Phillip LeVeen, British Slave Trade Suppression Policies, 1821-1865-. Impact and Implications,
University of California at Berkeley Ph.D. thesis, 1971 •
Although in many ways Frank J. Khngberg’s The Anti-Slavery Movement in England,
New Haven 1926, is a superior book.
Wilhams, Capitalism and Slavery, p. 178.
An Economic History of West Africa

after 1807; and he had a rather simplistic view of the composition and operation of
the abolitionist pressure group. Against Williams it has been said that he failed to fit
his argument into an acceptable chronological pattern; that he exaggerated the
importance of industrial interests as a compulsive force demanding, and achieving,
abolition; and that he misinterpreted the part played by Pitt, and, later, by Palmer¬
ston, and also the attitude of the abolitionists towards the sugar duties.'^® Neverthe¬
less, the general thesis put forward in Capitalism arid Slavery, though it requires
modification, comes much closer to understanding the problem than does Coup¬
land’s book. An examination of abolition in France and England shows that anti¬
slavery agitation was able to succeed when it did only because by the end of the
eighteenth century the basis of the old colonial system had been undermined by a
number of developments which were primarily economic in character.
In France, as in England, there was a long history of propaganda against slavery
and the slave trade.'^'^ Montesquieu, for example, had advanced an economic argu¬
ment against davery (based on its alleged inefficiency) as early as 1748. In 1788 the
French ‘humanitarians’ founded the Societe des Amis des Noirs in order to press for
abolition more effectively. Yet the decline of the French slave trade was the result
of changes which were largely independent of domestic agitation. First, a profound
split developed in the second half of the eighteenth century between French planters
and the metropolis. The colons, in debt and resenting it, dissatisfied with the French
tariff system, and suspicious of policies which prevented the development of colonial
manufactures, could no longer be relied on to stand firm, even against abolitionist
forces. Second, there was a relative decline in the importance of the slave trade at
Nantes in the late eighteenth century, with the result that the town was less com¬
mitted to defend the trade than it had been fifty years earher. It is true that other
French ports had become involved in the trade, but slaving remained a very minor
part of their total activities. Third, and most important of all, in 1792 there was a
major slave revolt in St Domingo which disrupted production in what, by that time,
was the most important sugar island in the Caribbean. Two years later, France
abolished slavery in her colonial possessions in a vain attempt to bring the revolt
under control. These events led to the rapid decline of the French slave trade.
Napoleon restored the institution of slavery in 1802, and he also tried to re-estabhsh
the slave trade, but this reversal of policy proved unsuccessful. Indeed, the Napoleonic
Wars disrupted French Atlantic commerce still further."^® In 1815 the restored
monarchy agreed, under pressure from Britain, to stop French subjects from trading
in slaves, though Nantes, the last of the great French slaving ports, still carried on a
clandestine traffic in slaves until the close of the 1820s. It is not surprising that the
anti-slavery movement in France gained so little momentum when it was also

Roger T. Anstey, ‘Capitalism and Slavery: a Critique’, Economic History Reuiew, 21,
1968, pp. 307-20.
’’’’ David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture, Cornell 1966.
Fran9ois Crouzet, ‘Wars, Blockade, and Economic Change in Europe, 1792-1815’,
Journal of Economic History, 24, 1964, pp. 567-88.
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

regarded as being anti-patriotic.'^® Not until 1822, when the energetic Due de
Broglie took command, did the French ‘humanitarians’ begin to acquire political
influence.®® Even so, it was only in 1848 that slavery was abolished, this time
permanently, in all French colonial possessions.
The case of England was analogous to that of France to the extent that changing
economic circumstances in the West Indies and in the metropolitan slave ports
seriously weakened her traditional commercial interests in the Atlantic. After the
middle of the eighteenth century the British sugar islands entered a long period of
decline, which was marked by falling profits, slave rebellions, and, above all, by
competition from newer and richer areas of production, such as Cuba, Brazil, and St
Domingo. (Ironically, the revolution in St Domingo helped to prop up the British
sugar islands for another fifteen years.) The British West Indies also declined rela¬
tively as a market for British goods, and by the end of the century Latin America had
become more important. Thus it was becoming hard to justify the tariff'advantages
which the Islands enjoyed, and sugar importers and manufacturers began to look for
newer and cheaper sources of supply to serve the expanding metropolitan market.
At the same time, the planters had difficulty in presenting a united front in defence of
their interests. The increased cost of slaves in the late eighteenth century caused a
number of planters to encourage their slaves to breed, with the result that by about
1800 they were far less dependent on imports. Consequently, there was a division
between those who were virtually self-sufficient and were prepared to make con¬
cessions to the abohtionists in order to prevent the development of competitors,
and those who were opposed to compromise because they had a continuous need
for fresh supplies of slaves.
At the English end of the trade, Liverpool, the principal slave port, had become
less dependent on slaving by the close of the century. Admittedly, Liverpool’s slave
trade had expanded, but capital had also begun to move into other fields; into indus¬
try, and into branches of trade which had become more important than slaving.®^
The interests of the outports had always been varied, and they could reallocate their
resources more easily than could producers in the West Indies. Those who had
backed the planters in prosperity began to leave them in adversity. Defections opened
the way for the growth of abolitionist feeling in Liverpool itself®® Bristol’s overseas
commerce was showing signs of a general decline at the end of the eighteenth
century. In 1793 there was a serious economic crisis, which hit the port s African and

This theme is developed in a neglected article by Y. Debbasch, ‘Poesie et traite; I’opinion

fran9aise sur le commerce negrier au debut du XIX® siecle’. Revue Frangaise d’Histoire d’Outre-
Mer, 48, 1961, pp. 311-52. ^ ^ j
Serge Daget, ‘L’aboUtion de la traite des noirs en France de 1814 a 1831 , Canters d Etudes
AJrkaines, ii, 1971, pp. 14-58.
The profitabihty of the cotton trade, for example, compared favourably with the slave
trade by the end of the century. See F. E. Hyde, B. B. Parkinson and S. Marriner, ‘The Cotton
Broker and the Rise of the Liverpool Cotton Market’, Economic History Review, 8, 1955, p. 80.
Jean Trepp, ‘The Liverpool Movement for the Abohtion of the English Slave Trade’,
Journal of Negro History, 13, 1928, pp. 265-85.
An Economic History of West Africa

American interests, and bankrupted many of the leading slave traders. From then
on Bristol ceased to provide active opposition to the abolitionist movement.®'^ The
London financiers, who, as creditors of the planters, had a disguised interest in slavery,
were eventually won over by the offer of compensation, for much of the f^20
million allocated to the slave owners in 1833 found its way back to the capital city.
The developments outlined above weakened the economic basis of the old
colonial system, and made possible a radical change of policy. Pitt’s death in 1806
was followed by the formation of a cabinet which was prepared to press ahead with
anti-slavery legislation, and the Act prohibiting British subjects from engaging in
the slave trade was passed in the following year. Those who expected the immediate
extension of this measure were to be disappointed. At length, the abohtionists, no
longer prepared to wait in hope, reorganised their movement in ^18 30. The bill
providing for the abolition of slavery was presented to a reformed Parliament, and
was passed in 1833. Duties on sugar imports were equahsed in 1851 in accordance
with Russell s Sugar Act of 1846. The British West Indies then entered a long and
difficult period of economic and social reconstruction.
It would be wrong to think that the political opportunities presented by these
economic changes were grasped simply and solely by a group of ‘humanitarians’,
defined rather vaguely as men of goodwill seeking to alleviate the suffering of
others, or else, as in many books, not defined at all. Some of the anti-slavery agitators
were far from disinterested, and few of the selfless men were radicals espousing the
cause of the downtrodden. Scrupulous in their concern for property rights, adamant
in their defence of the social and political status quo, and totally unmoved by the
industrial ‘slavery’ which existed around them, Wilberforce and the abolitionists
were a less romantic and more complex band than they have often been depicted.®^
Yet, precisely because of the kaleidoscopic nature of the movement, there was room
in it for some who did stand for reform of a more fundamental kind. James Cropper,
for example, a Quaker businessman and the greatest importer of East Indian sugar
into Liverpool in the early nineteenth century, found in the abolitionist cause a
perfect fusion of his idealistic and material aspirations.®® He, and others like him,
representatives of a developing industrial society and of a new economic philosophy,
stood in sharp opposition to the old order of bounties and monopolies, and, to some
extent, to the royal authority which upheld them. Abolition was not, as Fox told
the House of Commons in 1789, ‘a question between humanity on the one side and
interest on the other , but an issue between two opposing coalitions of interests, each
with its own ideology.

Peter Marshall, The Anti-Slave Trade Movement in Bristol, Bristol 1968, pp. 31—4.
Indeed, it has been argued by Ford Brown in Fathers of the Victorians, Cambridge 1961,
that the abolitionist movement became dominated by evangehcal reformers who selected an
issue (slavery) which would arouse support for their moral crusade, without at the same time
involving them in domestic issues.
8® See the excellent articles by David B. Davis, ‘James Cropper and the British Anti-Slavery
Movement, 1821-1823’, Journal of Negro History, 45, i960, pp. 241-58, and ‘James Cropper and
the British Anti-Slavery Movement, 1823-1833’, ibid., 46, 1961, pp. 154-73.
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

4 International trade and economic growth

It remains to assess the economic consequences of West Africa’s external trade in

terms of the model outlined at the beginning of the chapter. The two main branches
of trade, over the Sahara and across the Atlantic, can be conhdered jointly for this
purpose because their structural similarities, based on the nature of the goods traded
and the organisation of production and wholesaling, were more important than
their differences, which were mainly of direction and size. The external effects will
be outlined first of all, and then the repercussions on Africa itself will be examined.
The chief effect of the overseas slave trade in the New World was to populate and
develop the abundant land resources of the Americas and the West Indies. The trade
in negroes was the first great human migration across the Atlantic; as such, it pro¬
vides a striking historical example of international factor mobility, albeit of an
enforced kind. The subsequent fortunes of these reluctant colonists are closely
identified with the social and political liistory of the Americas. The type and degree
of assimilation achieved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries varied greatly
from region to region.®® In some countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, the absorp¬
tion of ‘strangers’ was harmonious and fairly complete,®'^ wliile in others, notably
the United States, the passage of time served to entrench marked economic, social
and political distinctions between settlers of different races. The legacy of the African
slave trade remains the major domestic issue facing the world’s richest and most
powerful state.
With regard to Europe, most attention has been focused on the profits of the
slave and sugar trades, and on the economic consequences of the re-investment of
these profits. Nevertheless, at present there is little precise information about the
amount of capital accumulating from African and Atlantic commerce or about its
subsequent investment role. Many voyages, triangular and direct, were outstanding¬
ly successful, and these have tended to attract the eyes of historians. However, it must
be remembered that the rate of profit had to take account of the slow turnover of
capital and the very real risk of total loss in the future.®® It is clear that large investors
could easily lose as well as win a fortune in the slave trade, and that small subscribers
tended to make modest gains by steady, but slow, accumulation, on much the same
scale and in much the same way as in other branches of commerce. When these
qualifications have been made, it remains true that the slave and sugar trades brought
great wealth to the principal entrepots, such as Liverpool and Nantes, and to many
of their leading citizens. It is impossible to account for the economic vitality of these
ports in the eighteenth century, their physical and demographic expansion, and the

Herbert S. Klein, Slavery in the Americas: a Comparative Study of Virginia and Cuba, Oxford
1967.
For an interesting account of continuing cultural interaction following the resettlement
of Africans in the Americas see Pierre Verger, ‘Nigeria, BrazU and Cuba’, Nigeria Magazine,
Oct. i960, pp. 113-23.
F. E. Hyde, B. B. Parkinson and S. Marriner, ‘The Nature and Profitabihty of the Liver¬
pool Slave Trade’, Economic History Review, 5, 1953) PP- 368-77.
 An Economic History of West Africa

remarkable overflow of money into cultural activities, without stressing the causative,
though not exclusive, role of Atlantic commerce. It is equally clear that the pros¬
perity of the ports had beneficial linkage effects in their hinterlands. Examples of
investment in the domestic production of goods for the export sector were to be
found in the impetus given to the cotton industries of Manchester and Nantes, to
the gun trade of Birmingham, and to the production of linen and hardware in
Rouen. Examples of the expansion of industries which made use of imports of raw
materials were to be seen in the sugar refineries of Liverpool, London, Bristol,
Nantes and Orleans, and in the gum processing works of Nantes and Paris. It should
be noted, too, that importing and exporting activities provided a stimulus to service
industries, such as shipping and banking.
African and Atlantic commerce undoubtedly brought substantial gains to indi¬
viduals and to certain regions. It does not follow, however, that the ‘triangular trade
made an enormous contribution to Britain’s industrial development’, or that the
‘profits from this trade fertilized the entire productive system of the country.’®® In
the first place, any stimulus which foreign trade gave to domestic production resulted
from links with other parts of the world besides Africa and the America^ It is as well
to remember that Europe alone accounted for over half the value of England’s
foreign commerce in the eighteenth century. Secondly, it is mistaken to suppose
that there was a simple, one-way relationship between trade and industry. The
connection between Liverpool and Manchester shows not only that overseas trade
assisted the growth of manufacturing, but also that manufacturers helped to finance
trade. Thirdly, by concentrating on foreign trade, Williams and others have tended
to under-estimate the part played by the home market, which was of central im¬
portance in the early phase of industrialisation as a source of factor supply and of
^ consumer demand.®® A fourth objection has been raised recently in a criticism of
R. B. Sheridan, whose approach is broadly in accord with that of Eric Williams.®^
It has been suggested that the profits of the British sugar trade came from the liigh
prices which resulted from tariff preference, and that if the trade had not been
subsidised in this way consumers would have been better off and capital attracted to
the West Indies would have been invested more profitably at home. On this view
colonies were, as Adam Smith alleged, a drain on the mother country. The first part
of the argument is well founded. It seems probable that the British taxpayer was
indeed subsidising an imperial venture which mainly benefited a relatively small
interest group. However, the second part of the argument breaks down, as do many
other stimulating counter-factual, or hypothetical, propositions, because it is im¬
possible to know now what the position would have been if tariff protection had

Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, p. 105.

See The Growth of English Overseas Trade in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed.
W. E. Minchinton, 1969, pp. 36-52.
Robert Paul Thomas, ‘The Sugar Colonies of the Old Empire: Profit or Loss for Great
Britain?’, Economic History Review, 21, 1968, pp. 30-45- See also Sheridan’s subsequent articlg.
‘The Plantation Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, 1625-1775’, Caribbean Studies, gfl
1969, pp. 5-25- ^

II8
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

not existed, and it is easy to think of plausible alternatives to those suggested by

Professor Sheridan’s critic.
On present evidence, quantitatively imprecise though it is, it can be concluded
that African and Atlantic commerce did assist English economic growth in the
eighteenth century, but that it was by no means the sole, nor even the most powerful,
propellant of the first industrial revolution. Eric Williams’s thesis may require
qualification, but it must be acknowledged that in originality of argument and liveli¬
ness of presentation his book sets standards which few historians attain, and for this
reason it will continue to command respect.
The effect of international trade on Africa is a subject which has provoked a
number of vehement and usually condemnatory historical judgements. It is widely
believed that foreign trade, and particularly the slave trade, retarded the economic
development of Africa, and may even have prevented the continent from achieving
an indigenous industrial revolution. These interpretations have been influenced,
understandably, by concern over the morality of the traffic in human lives, and by
hostihty to what is felt to have been colonial exploitation. The starting point of the
analysis advanced here will reverse the customary approach: instead of beginning
with the assumption that foreign trade delayed the development of Africa, and then
looking for supporting evidence, it will be supposed that foreign trade should have
benefited the continent in the ways suggested by the model outlined at the start of
this chapter. This standpoint, which some readers may find uncongenial, can be
ustifred in two ways. In the first place, it is the historian’s job to take account of bias
of all kinds, including his own. If historians are now willing to attack the many
absurd ideas which Europeans have held about Africa, then they should also be pre¬
pared to undertake the less palatable task of assessing the influences currently shaping
their own attitudes towards controversial problems such as the slave trade. Secondly,
the approach adopted here does not necessarily lead to conclusions which are entirely
different from those commonly held, but it may help to distinguish between sound
and unsound arguments cited in support of present orthodoxy.
International trade undoubtedly brought benefits, at least to some of the parties
concerned. Africans who controlled the production and wholesaling of exports,
whether gold, gum or slaves, gained a great deal from foreign commerce. In 1750,
for example, the King of Dahomey had a gross revenue of about ^250,000 from
overseas sales of slaves. A proportion of export earnings was spent on goods such as
cloth, hardware and salt, which helped to raise living standards. The prosperity of
the large entrepots on the coast and on the desert margin created some additional
employment opportunities for traders and transporters, and also for farmers, who
supplied foodstuffs to towns, caravans and slave ships. If the Western Sudan had not
conducted a thriving export trade, fewer kola nuts would have been produced in
the forests of Ashanti.
Nevertheless, the multiplier or ‘spread’ effects of foreign trade were far less pro¬
nounced in West Africa than they were in Europe, and the economy was not trans¬
formed, at least in a way conducive to further development. There were four main
reasons why Saharan and Atlantic commerce failed to overcome existing obstacles
 V
An Economic History of West Africa

to the expansion of the market. First, the export trade was confined to staples which
required little diversification of existing methods of production and no significant
aditional commercialisation of factors in West Africa. Second, the import trade
consisted of consumer goods which needed hardly any further processing, and so
provided few opportunities for productive investment in the domestic economy.
Third, the distribution of incomes, combined with the relatively high cost of
imports, prevented the emergence of a mass market-based on cheap manufactures.
Purchasing power was concentrated among a restricted group of wealthy consumers
because the conditions of entry into export production and wholesaling favoured
large concerns, and offered little scope for the majority of the population. Since the
openings which did exist were often filled by slaves and other dependants, no sub¬
stantial, independent, wage-earning group was able to develop. The high price of
imports was the result of pre-industrial costs of production and transport. Fourth,
the size of export proceeds was too small to stimulate either a wide range or a large
number of new enterprises. One estimate suggests that West Africa’s sea-borne trade
was worth about milhon a year at its peak in the late eighteenth century. This
figure was only about a quarter of the average annual value of total imports and
exports in the period 1901-1905. Even so, it was not until the middle of the twentieth
century, after a further, massive, fifteen-fold, increase in overseas trade between
1906-1910 and 1955-1959, that Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal succeeded in generating
a mass market which was capable of supporting local manufacturing activities of a
modem kind.®^
So far the analysis has concentrated on the reasons why external trade failed to act
as a leading sector. It remains to examine the argument that international trade, and
the slave trade in particular, positively retarded the economic development of the
continent.
Some of the more sweeping claims which have been made in support of this view
need to be treated with caution. First, it is sometimes said that the terms of trade (that
is the price received for exports in relation to the price paid for imports) exploited or
cheated Africans. It is unlikely that this charge can be sustained. Demand for slaves
was strong, and there was keen competition among buyers. Moreover, once Euro¬
pean slavers had reached West Africa they were committed to trade, and to do so as
quickly as possible. Suppliers, on the other hand, often had a local monopoly of
slaves, and their position was reinforced by the fact that prospective purchasers had
no certain knowledge that conditions would be better elsewhere. Furthermore, the
cost of temporarily withholding supplies was not a crippling one. Slaves could be
made to maintain themselves as subsistence farmers if necessary, and though they
were, like other capital assets, liable to physical deterioration, they did not depreciate
very rapidly. If, meanwlnle, they reproduced, their owner reaped what might be

The question of size is particularly relevant in considering trade in goods other than
slaves. Shipments of commodities such as gum and ivory were potentially more fruitful than
exports of human beings, but it was not until the nineteenth century, after the industrial revo¬
lution, that world demand for tropical raw materials underwent a marked expansion. The
consequences of this development are considered in the next chapter.

120
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

called an unplanned profit. Second, it is often suggested that the import trade con¬
sisted of shoddy goods. Evidence in support of this proposition is limited mainly to
imports of guns, some of which were not proved or bored. However, it is improb¬
able that the bulk of imported goods was sub-standard, and it is even less likely that
Africans would have put up with poor quality wares for very long. Concern over
the terms of trade and the quality of imports derives mainly from a feeling that
consumer goods were not items of ‘real’ value, the implication being, presumably,
that African states should have taxed foreign luxuries and adopted a vigorous policy
of import substitution. Tliis, to say the least, is an unliistorical point of view, for it
ignores both the aims of the rulers themselves, and the domestic obstacles to the
development of a different kind of commerce.
Third, it is often alleged that foreign imports led to the decline of local industries.
This claim will be familiar to historians of the underdeveloped world, and especially
to those with knowledge of India, which has been the subject of a long debate on this
question. Just as the European middle classes are always rising, so, too, traditional
crafts in other parts of the world are continually being ousted. In the case of West
Africa no general evidence has been presented in support of the claim. Many indigen¬
ous manufactures, such as cloth and pottery, remained important, and it seems more
likely that the market was enlarged (in terms of the volume and range of goods) than
that foreign imports replaced domestic craft products. Fourth, it is sometimes stated
that slaving expeditions caused widespread devastation. It is indeed highly likely that
slave raids increased the number of wars and made life insecure, but again little
research has been carried out to indicate the extent of the resulting disruption. Mean¬
while, the continuous history of internal trade, the regional variations in the incidence
of slave raiding, and the recent, lower estimates of the volume of slave exports
suggest that this point shotdd not be made without qualification.
Finally, it is necessary to consider the effect of the export of labour on the course of
African development. Once again, the information necessary forjudging this issue,
as opposed to guessing about it, is not available at present. It is obvious enough tnat
the immediate and most acute losses were suffered personally by the six million or so
unwilling West Africans who were shipped across the Atlantic, by the much smaller
number who were exported across the Sahara, and by those who were killed or
maimed in the process of slave-gathering operations. However, emigration, even
on this scale, was not necessarily a serious setback for the economy. The main
difficulty in analysing this question is that so little is known about the size of the
population during the pre-colonial period. One estimate, based on the admittedly
suspect procedure of using twentieth century data to reconstruct the distant past,
suggests that the total population of est Africa may have been around 25 nnllion in
1700, in which case the rate of loss during the eighteenth century, when the overseas
slave trade was at its height, was about 0-2 per cent per annum.^^ As this figure was

93 J. D. Page, A History of West Africa, pp. 85-7, and the same author’s article ‘Slavery and
the Slave Trade in the Context of West African History’, Journal of African History, 10, 1969,

PP- 393-404-

I2I
An Economic History of West Africa

roughly equal to the rate of natural increase, it can be said that in numerical terms the
chief effect of the export of labour between 1700 and 1800 was to keep the population
static. What would have happened if the Africans shipped abroad had remained in
Africa is now a matter of speculation. For the external slave trade to have been an
economic disaster, it is necessary to postulate that West Africa would have achieved a
major economic breakthrough before the nineteenth century if the supply of man¬
power had not been diminished by the amount specified. The evidence available
does not support this hypothesis, and it is hard to see how the retention of those
slaves sent abroad would have caused the economy to develop along significantly
different lines. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, when
the economy began to expand very rapidly, there was undoubtedly a serious
shortage of labour in many part of West Africa, and it could be argtied that at that
point the pace of advance would have been faster if the slave trade had not retarded
the growth of population.
It is possible that the aggregate approach disguises some of the consequences of
the export of labour. It is conceivable, for example, that those regions which were
most involved in slaving operations were affected particularly severely. In practice,
however, areas such as Senegambia and the seaboard between the Gold Coast and
the Cameroons, though prominent in the slave trade, were the leading zones of
export growth during the era of ‘legitimate’ commerce. Alternatively, it could be
held that shipments of slaves involved qualitative losses which are masked by the
figures for total exports. Since about two-thirds of the slaves exported were males,
it is possible that their removal might have affected female occupational roles. FIow-
ever, generalisation on this issue is difficult, partly because of lack of information,
and partly because the division of labour between the sexes was by no means the
same in all West African societies. If those sold abroad possessed scarce technical or
entrepreneurial skills, then the consequences of their emigration might have been far
greater than a consideration of numbers alone would suggest. However, it seems
probable that the majority of enslaved Africans were ordinary farmers, who were
engaged mainly in subsistence and local exchange activities. Other things being
equal, the principal effect of their removal would have been to reduce total output,
but by an amount which was matched by a fall in demand.
It is quite clear that international trade, though long established and efficiently
organised, failed to act as an engine of growth in West Africa, though the more
extreme claims regarding the destructive effects of Atlantic and Saharan commerce
have yet to be proved. The export sector, besides being comparatively small,
established few beneficial links with the rest of the economy. The result was that the
gains from international trade were severely limited, quantitatively, geograpliically
and socially. Export growth produced a type of‘enclave’ development, which had
few connections with the domestic economy.®^ The analogy with the mining and
plantation enclaves of the twentieth century cannot be taken too far. Nevertheless,

Benjamin Higgins, ‘The Dualistic Theory of Underdeveloped Areas’, Economic Develop¬

ment and Cultural Change, 4, 1956, pp. 99-115.

122
 External trade: the Sahara and the Atlantic

the West African enclaves of the eighteenth century, like those of the modern world,
were characterised by the importation of superior skills and technology, by a pattern
of income distribution that inliibited the growth of the market, and by a pronounced
leakage of foreign trade earnings. The first characteristic was to be found in European
control of ocean navigation. The second could be seen in the contrast between slave
labour and a wealthy elite.®® The third characteristic was present in the exchange of
export earnings for manufactured consumer imports, and in the repatriation of the
profits made by foreign firms. Early in the nineteenth century the French traveller,
Caillie, observed that in Timbuctu many Moors ‘are engaged in trade, and like
Europeans repair to the colonies in the hope of making their fortunes, usually return
to their own country to enjoy the fruit of their industry.’®®
If foreign trade is to act as a leading sector, it has to overcome the limitations
associated with enclave development. The chapter which follows will try to show
how and when the export trade of West Africa began to establish close links with
the domestic economy.

The West African case can be compared, in this respect, to the cotton plantations of the
American south in the nineteenth century. See Alfred H. Conrad and John R. Meyer, Studies
in Econometric History, 1965, pp. 223-33.
R. CadHe, Travels to Timbuctu, 1830, 2, p. 53.

123
four

The economic basis of

imperialism

Once the European powers had decided to abolish the external slaVe trade, West
Africa was faced with the problem of developing alternative exports. The outcome
was a period of transition and experimentation, which is customarily referred to as
the era of ‘legitimate’ commerce in order to distinguish it from the illegal trade in
slaves. This chapter will try to establish two conclusions about West African history
in the nineteenth century. First, it will be argued that the structure of legitimate
commerce marked an important break with the past and signified a new phase in the
growth of the market, a phase which can be seen as the start of the modem economic
history of West Africa. This argument contrasts with the traditional view, which
stresses continuities with the past and the ease of the transfer to legitimate trade.
Second, it will be suggested that the strains involved in creating this economy,
combined with fluctuations in its performance, are central to an understanding of
the partition of West Africa in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This
proposition, too, is intended to be set against current interpretations, most of which
hold that imperialism was the product of political motives stemming from Europe.
For these two reasons the analysis of legitimate commerce and partition has been
combined in one chapter.
These are large claims, and they require some initial elaboration before the his¬
torical evidence is presented. The main structural features of the new commerce will
be outlined first of all. The foreign trade statistics will then be used to support the
theoretical argument, and to indicate the relationship between commercial fluctua¬
tions and the economic and political history of West Africa in the nineteenth
century. Finally, the development of legitimate commerce will be considered with
reference to specific African and European interests in order to demonstrate how the
interaction of these groups produced the partition of West Africa. Two points need
to be borne in mind in evaluating the argument of this chapter. First, the economic
theme is emphasised here partly because this book is concerned with economic
history. It is argued that economic motives are a central and neglected feature of
partition, not that they provide a complete explanation of it. Second, in relating the
economic theme to the timing of partition, it is important to remember that though
the tensions caused by structural change were felt in West Africa from the early
nineteenth century, they became acute only in the last quarter of the century, when
they were aggravated by a serious downturn in the terms of trade.

134
 The economic basis of imperialism

1 The economy of 'legitimate' commerce

There is no novelty in saying that slaves and palm oil are commodities with obvious
physical differences. What has not been appreciated fully is that these differences had
far-reaching consequences for the structure of the export economy. The main
features of the new economy can be analysed by making use of staple theory, which
has been developed specifically to explain the particular type of growth stemming
from diversification around a well-defined export base.^ Staple theory has grown up
and been applied chiefly in North America and Australia.^ These are countries of
recent, European settlement, wliich at critical stages of their economic growth have
relied on primary exports, such as fur, wheat and wool, to stimulate the expansion of
the domestic market. The aspects of the theory which are especially relevant to the
West African case are those which stress the economic consequences of the physical
properties of the staple and the type of linkages which it establishes with the rest of
the economy.
The physical properties of the staple are important because they influence the
factor combination and the nature of returns to scale. In the case of West Africa the
basic point is a simple one, which may explain why it has not engaged much interest:
the vegetable oils which became staple exports in the nineteenth century could be
produced efficiently and on a small scale by households possessing little capital,
employing family labour, and using traditional tools. Palm products and ground¬
nuts, unlike slaves, were divisible into very small units, each of which was of low
value per unit of weight, yet was still marketable and yielded a return in the same
season. Land, moreover, was cheap and readily available. Admittedly, the new
exports could also be produced on sizeable estates, but the few farmers who did so
simply increased their inputs of land and labour without securing any of the econo¬
mies of large scale production because there was little scope for substituting machin¬
ery for labour, and few advantages to centralised management. Large producers
were not particularly inefficient, but they no longer had a monopoly of the export
market.
This change in the structure of export-producing firms was a key event in
African history. The capital and labour requirements of slave raiding and trading
had encouraged the rise of a relatively small group of large entrepreneurs, many of
whom became the rulers or senior officials of great states in the W^estern Sudan and
in the forest. Producing and selling palm oil and groundnuts, on the other hand,
were occupations in which there were few barriers to entry. Legitimate commerce
therefore enabled small-scale farmers and traders to play an important part in the

1 A good introduction to staple theory can be found in Melville H. Watkins, ‘A Staple

Theory of Economic Growth’, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 29, 1963 >
pp. 141-58.
2 It should be added that staple theory is generaUy thought to be inapplicable m cases where
export growth occurs in indigenous, subsistence economies. However, the reasons given in
support of this view rest on assumptions about ‘traditional’ societies which have been criticised
earher in this study (Chapter 2).

125
 An Economic History oj West Africa

overseas exchange economy for the first time. In so far as firms of this type and size
are the basis of the export economies of most West African states today, it can be
said that modernity dates not from the imposition of colonial rul&r-as-used„to be
thought, but from the early nineteenth century.
"~TE^Haracter of the staple also influences the nature and strength of the linkages
between export activities and the domestic economy. In an underdeveloped economy
dominated by an indigenous society linkages tend to* be weaker than in an area of
recent settlement, such as North America, where there were special advantages of
capital and modem skills in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the linkages
created by legitimate commerce were much stronger than those set up previously by
\ Saharan and Atlantic commerce.
The new export trade saw a marked increase in the commercialisStion of labour
and land in Africa, instead of, as in the eighteenth century, the export of one factor
of production (labour) and the comparative neglect of another (land), except for
domestic needs. Support forthis contention can hefound in the migration of peoples
from the Western SudanTtothe ‘grounc^ut cpasf _Q£Sen€^a4^ia, and in thejnfliix
d^ewcomers"into the forest m search of the wealth which could be won from the
^alnLlree. An idea of the scale of the new, legitimate enterprise is provided by an
estimate that in 1892 no less than 15 million palm trees were in production for the
export market in Yoruba country alone.^ The expansion of legitimate commerce
also provided additional employment opportunities in export-processing, even
though the methods in use remained technically simple.® Admittedly, it was not
until the coming of^ratlways and roads that areas in the interior could participate in
export production/ Nevertheless, a start had been made: after 1900 the colonial
rulers simply carrieHTurther a process which was already under way.
The import trade still consisted of manufactured consumer goods. However, as a
result of the industrial revolution, the consumer imports of the nineteenth century
r were mainly cheap, mass-produced goods, which offered large numbers of incon-
l^spicuous Africans opportunities of material improvement and of emulating the
superior, inherited status enjoyed by a minority of their compatriots. To the extent
that the revolution of rising expectations is an identifiable phenomenon, then it can
Cb£_sai^o have started in W^t Africa early in the nineteenth century. Furthermore,
it is worthf observmg at this point that iTiTports of cheap manufactures provide a more
favourable base for the introduction of modem industries than imports which con¬
tain a high proportion of luxuries. If the market for imports grows, then there may
well come a time when it is feasible and profitable to manufacture some of these
goods on the spot instead of buying them from other countries. This time came in
parts of West Africa after 1945.

® The discussion which follows should be compared with the conclusions reached in the
previous chapter, pp. 119-23.
^ Kew Bulletin, 1892, p. 208.
® Female labour appears to have been particularly important in preparing groundnuts and
palm produce for export. The division of labour between the sexes is a subject which merits
further research.

126
 The economic basis of imperialism

The change in the quality of consumer imports was made possible not only by cost
reductions .on. the supply side, but also by a shift in the distribution of incomes in
Africa. As a general proposition, it can be said that the more equal the distribution of
incomes, the smaller the ckmand for luxury items and the greater the demand for
cheap, ma^-produced_gpqds.® Down to the nineteenth century the distribution of
incomieslrom foreign trade had been very uneven, and purchasing power had been
concentrated in a relatively few, large units. With the development of exports of
vegetable oils, earnings from overseas commerce began to be spread over many
small unIFsTif consumption, and incomes achieved greater equality.'^ The evidence
for the nineteenth century suggests that imports were being distributed more widely,
socially as well as geographically. Furthermore, and again in contrast to the period
before the nineteenth century, the size of export proceeds increased as a result of the
growth of demand for tropical raw materials and of West Africa’s ability to meet
that demand. Goods other than slaves were exported before the nineteenth century,
but were unable to generate much additional income because the demand for them
was still limited. The expansion in the volume and value of trade in the nineteenth
century also gave a further stimulus to service industries, especially those providing
transport and accommodation, and it led to the development of market gardening
to supply foodstuffs to the larger commercial centres.
It is necessary now to show that the statistics of overseas trade are consistent with
the argument advanced so far. In particular, the value and volume of trade should
show an upward trend; the character of staple exports should conform in detail to
the specifications which have been outlined in brief; and the dominant European
powers on the West Coast should be those best fitted to supply manufactured goods
and to process tropical raw materials.
'^Although the dkalTs ofthe tranSion to legitimate commerce are not yet known,
it would seem that on the whole West Africa did not experience a prolonged period
of economic crisis, principally because many areas were able to export legitimate
goods and~slaves side by side dovyn to about the middle of the..nineteenth centmy.
It is clear that there was a remarkable expansion in the value of overseas trade in the
second quarter of the century. Newbury, who has carried out some much-needed
research on West African trade in the nineteenth century, has estimated that the
total value of the overseas commerce of the region in legitimate goods alone amoun¬
ted to a minimum of £3^ million a year in the early 1850s.® This figure may be
compared with Page’s estimate that at the end ofthe eighteenth century, at the height
of the Atlantic slave trade, West Africa’s overseas commerce was worth about £4.

® R. E. Baldwin, ‘Patterns of Development in Newly Settled Regions’, Manchester School of

Economic and Social Studies, 24, I95<5, pp- 161-79.
This change is analogous to the distinction between the cotton economy of the American
south, where plantations were dominant in the nineteenth cenmry, and the wheat belt of the
west, where the typical unit was the small, family farm. See Douglass C. North, ‘Agriculture
and Regional Economic Growth’, Journal of Farm Economics, 41, 1959, pp. 943-51-
® C. W. Newbury, ‘Trade and Authority in West Africa from 1850 to 1880’, in Colonialism
inAfrica, 1870-1960,ed.E. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, i. The History and Politics of Colonialism,
1870-1914, Cambridge 1969, pp. 76-9.

127

5*
An Economic History of West Africa

million a year.® In thg second half of tl^ century trade expanded roughly four times,
and by 1901-1905 amounted'to aE^t nnlhon a year. The rate of growth was
not evSi throughout tins period, and it was to be dwarfed by the expansion which
occurred during the colonial era'. Nevertheless, it was great enough to support the
proposition that the new economy was also a much bigger economy. It is worth
emphasising that European commercial involvement in West Africa was expanding
rather than diminislnng, as this is a factor which has not been taken into account by
historians who have argued that economic motives were of little significance in the
partition of West Africa.
No useful comp'arison of volumes can be made between legitimate commerce
and the slave trade. However, the main point to note with regard to the volume of
trade in the nineteenth century is that West African societies had to i’djust in a rela¬
tively short time to the immense physical task of transporting huge quantities of low
value, bulky commodities. Imports of palm oil into the United Kingdom from
West Africa reached 1,000 tons in 1810, 10,000 tons in 1830, over 20,000 tons in
1842, over 30,000 tons m 1853, and over 40,000 tons in 1855. Even this expansion
was dwarfed in the second half of the century, when there was a rapid growth in
shipments of gromidnuts, and a still more dramatic rise in overseas trade in palm
kernels. Two examples will illustrate the size of the increase. Exports of groundnuts
from Senegal rose from virtually nothing in the 1840s to an average of 29,000 tons a
year in the period 1886-1890, while exports of palm kernels from Lagos, one of the
great slave ports in the 1840s and 1850s, reached an average of 37,000 tons in the same
period. The palm oil trade failed to maintain its early rate of progress, but exports
still averaged about 50,000 tons a year between i860 and 1900. The organisation
required for moving, let alone producing, tomiages of this magnitude provides some
indication of the skill and adaptability of African entrepreneurs.^® The return trade
in imported goods also involved transporting much greater quantities than ever
before. For instance, the quantity of cotton goods (measured by the yard) exported
from the United Kingdom to West Africa increased tliirty times in the short period
between 1816-1820 and 1846-1850.^^ The increase was partly a reflection of the rise
in the value of trade, but was mainly an outcome of the industrial revolution in
Europe and of the sliift in the social composition of demand in Africa arising out of
the structure of the new export economy. It is safe to conclude that the volume of
exports and imports expanded considerably as a result of the rise of legitimate
commerce and the decline of the external slave trade.
Vegetable oils, as noted already, became the staples of legitimate commerce. Palm
oil was the pioneer export early in the nineteenth century, and it was joined by palm
kernels and groundnuts in the second half of the century. The fact that these products
already grew ui West Africa, where they were traded and consumed as foodstuffs,
^Ips to explain why the end of the Atlantic slave trade did not cause a complete

® Page, A History of West Africa, pp. 91-2.

The subject of internal transport in the pre-colonial period still awaits investigation.
Calculated from C. W. Newbury, ‘Credit in Early Nineteenth-Century West African
Trade’, Jourria/ of African History, 13, 1972, pp. 83-4.

128
 The economic basis of imperialism

C
disruption of overseas commerce, though it does not mean that the transition was
entirely smooth. The expansion of exports of palm products and groundnuts was a
response to industrial growth in Europe, which led to a rise in the demand for oils
and fats. Palm oil was used in the production of soap, lubricants and candles. Soap
was required for cleansing the population in the growing urban centres; lubricants
were needed to oil the new macliinery, especially the railways; and candles were
in demand for hghting the expanding towns and factories. Manufacturers, happily
uniting material and moral motives, urged the public to ‘buy our candles and
help stop thfe slave trade’.Palm kernels, though jointly produced with palm
oil, were not exported at first, and a large proportion were not used at all, even in
West Africa.^® This was not because the African producer was fickle, or because his
wants could be satisfied from the sale of palm oil alone, but because there was little
demand in Europe for palm kernel oil, which had a different chemical composition
from the oil extracted from the outer part of the fruit. Only in the late nineteenth
century was it found possible to employ kernel oil in the manufacture of margarine,
then a new product, and to process the residue for cattle food. Groundnuts were used
mainly in the manufacture of cooking oil and soap. Other commodities, many of
which had been shipped abroad before the nineteenth century, continued to be
exported after aboUtion. The most important of these were gum from Senegal, gold
from the Gold Coast, and timber, ivory and cotton from various parts of the
forest zone.
Four items accounted for about three-quarters of the value of all imports into
West Africa. These were textiles (a classification covering a wide range of cotton'
and woollen goods), spirits (especially rum and gin), salt and iron. Other prominent»
items were hardware, tobacco, guns and gunpowder.^^ Textiles remained the lead- \
ing commodity, as in the eighteenth century. In Senegal, for example, one popular
variety alone (known as ‘guinea’ cloth) accounted for no less than 25 per cent of the
value of total imports during the third quarter of the nineteenth century. At Lagos
(about 1,800 rmles away) textiles of all kinds averaged 44 per cent of total imports
in the period 1880-1892. Similarities between the types of goods imported before
and after the end of the external slave trade should not be allowed to disguise some
important differences; by the middle of the nineteenth century the quantity had
increased greatly, and (as will be pointed out) the price per unit had declined. j
On the European side of the trade, Britain and France continued to be the most
important foreign powers on the West Coast, as they had been in the eighteenth
century. Liyerpooldominated the new trade, just as it had the old, and was by far the
largest importer of palm oil in Europe. Nantes underwent a decline in the nineteenth
century, but Bordeaux and Marseilles, the ports which took its place, both had long¬
standing connections with Africa. Most of West Africa’s groundnut exports were

12 Quoted in Allan McPhee, The Economic Revolution in British West Africa, 1926, p. 31, n. 2.
Though some were used in Africa for fuel.
Rum and tobacco imports dwindled in the last quarter of the nineteenth century follow¬
ing the decline of trade with America and Brazil, the two principal suppHers.

129
An Economic History of West Africa

shipped to France, where they enjoyed tariff advantages over certain other vegetable
oils, including palm oil. The most striking aspect of the national distribution of trade
was the pre-eminence of Britain.^® In 1868 a French consul estimated that Britain
and France shared four-fifths of Europe’s trade with West Africa, and that two-
thirds to three-quarters of tliis total was in the hands of Great Britain. Furthermore,
as much as 70 per cent of Britain’s trade in the period 1860-1880 was conducted with
areas outside her few, small colonies. France’s trade, by contrast, was centred on her
traditional base and colony of Senegal, wliich accounted for between half and three-
quarters of her total trade with West Africa during the same period. A new feature
of the second half of the century was the rapid growth of German commerce. By the
1880S Hamburg was said to handle nearly one third of all West Africa’s overseas
trade.^® This expansion was the result of three factors: the rise of the palm kernel
market, which was dominated by Hamburg because German farmers were the main
buyers of cattle cake, and because the Dutch were the largest manufacturers of
margarine; the ability of Hamburg to supply cheap liquor; and the development of
steamship services between Germany and West Africa.
The abolition of the Atlantic slave trade and the rise of legitimate commerce were
events which undoubtedly favoured Britain, the first industrial nation. She, above
all others, was in a position to cater for the mass market which was beginning to
emerge in West Africa, though her supremacy was being challenged in the late
nineteenth century by new competitors. No other foreign powers were of any
account in West Africa apart from Britain, France and Germany. The Danes sold
their Gold Coastforts to the British in 1850, and the Dutch followed suitin 1872. The
Portuguese, once the great innovators of European enterprise in Africa, had difficulty
in maintaining even one tiny colony (Portuguese Guinea). All three countries had
been overtaken by a world in winch industrialisation had become the basis of
commercial and political power.^'^
The rapid expansion of overseas commerce has tended to overshadow the history
of West Africa’s external trade across the Sahara. It is commonly supposed that by
the nineteenth century this trade was only a fraction of the value it had attained in
the golden age of the sixteenth century. Professor Boahen, for example, has sug¬
gested that total trade on the trans-Saharan routes amounted to no more than about
^125,000 a year in the first half of the nineteenth century.^® However, the defic-

Newbury, ‘Trade and Authority in West Africa from 1850 to 1880’ in Colonialism in
Africa, 1870-1960, ed. L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, i, The History and Politics of Colonialism,
1870-1914, Cambridge 1969, pp. 79-80.
K. Vignes, ‘Etude sur la rivalite d’influence entre les puissances eiuropeennes en Afrique
equatoriale et occidentale depuis I’acte general de Berlin jusqu’au seuil du XX” siecle’, Revue
Frangaise d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer, 48, 1961, p. 14.
Shortage of space has caused this rather cavalier treatment of minority expatriate interests,
each of which is worthy of study in some detail. There was also an interesting trade between
North America and West Africa wliich has been investigated and, indeed, virtually discovered
by George E. Brooks, Yankee Traders, Old Coasters and African Middlemen, Boston 1970.
A. Adu Boahen, Britain, the Sahara, and the Western Sudan, 1788-1861, Oxford, 1961,
p. 131.

130
 The economic basis of imperialism

iencies in the evidence for both the sixteenth century and the early nineteenth cen¬
tury are so great as to make calculations and comparisons a matter of guesswork. Re¬
cent research indicates that the old caravan routes still had a surprising amount of life
left in them in the second half of the nineteenth century. To begin with, it is now
apparent that trans-Saharan trade was not seriously affected by competition from
goods brought by sea until the very end of the century. Indeed, Manchester textiles
were carried across the Sahara and achieved a wide distribution. As late as 1869, for
example, the town of Ilorin was said to be commercially nearer the Mediterranean
(some 2,000 miles to the north) than it was to the Bight of Benin, even though the
port of Lagos was only about 150 miles away.^® Secondly, in the most detailed
examination of the trade figures yet attempted, Newbury has shown that the total
value of trans-Saharan trade actually increased from the 1840s, and reached a peak in
1875, when it was worth around ^1,500,000.^° It was only after this date that a slow
and final decline set in. Thus the Sahara developed its own brand of ‘legitimate’
commerce. Because of transport limitations, however, the overland routes failed to
develop a sizeable export trade in bulky, low value goods, and the boom in the third
quarter of the century was based partly on the ephemeral demand of the Victorian
world for ostrich feathers.^^ Even with this boost to the trade, trans-Saharan com¬
merce was worth only a fifth of the value of the West Coast’s seaborne trade in 1875.
Economic development by way of staple exports can be a precarious and lengthy
process. supply and.demand can set back the progress,pf the staple, retard
the dpvplnpmeut of the economy as a whole, and have serious social and political
repercussions. West Africa’s raw material exports entered a wide range of manu¬
facturing processes, and the price paid for them and the volume required tended to
vary in accordance with the level of business activity in industrial Europe. West
African producers had to accept the world price as given because they were unable
to control the volume of palm produce and groundnuts placed on the market, and
because the industrial countries could buy alternative, competing products from
other underdeveloped regions. By the mid-nineteenth century the days when West
Africa enjoyed a monopoly as the sole supplier of labour to the plantations of the
Americas were over, and the silent imperialism of the steamship was beginmng to
bring vegetable oils and substitute products from other continents besides Africa.
The identification of fluctuations in West Africa’s external trade is a matter of con¬
siderable historical importance. The progress of the new economy of legitimate
commerce is best charted by changes in the terms of trade of West African export
producers: the net barter terms provide an index of the import-purchasing power
of a unit of exports, and the income terms measure the import-purchasing power of

A. Millson, ‘Yoruba’, Manchester Geographical Society Journal, 7, 1891, p. 92.

20 C. W. Newbury, ‘North African and Western Sudan Trade in the Nineteenth Century:
a Re-evaluation’, JoMtna/ of African History, 7, 1966, pp. 233~4d-
21 These decorated the hats of Victorian ladies m much the same way as they had adorned
the ostriches themselves. African traders may well have wondered at the strange values of the
white man, who was prepared to sell manufactured cloth for such an item, and for such a
purpose!
 An Economic History of West Africa

total exports.^^ Insufficient data are available at present to enable precise calculations
to be made, but the general trends are clear enough, and are confirmed by the
evaluation of contemporary observers. It is hoped that others will find this subject
important enough to carry out the research needed to improve the provisional and
approximate analysis presented here.^^
Information on the early nineteenth century is particularly sparse. However, as
far as the main staple, palm oil, wasxoncerned, pricfes on the West Coast and in
Europe appear to have pursued an upward trend, with the exception of falls in
1844-1846 and 1851-1852, reaching a peak in 1854-1861, when the Liverpool price
stood at around ^45 per ton. At the same time, the prices of manufactured goods
imported into West Africa fell dramatically as a result of the industrial revolution.
By 1850 staple items cost half and in some cases only a quarter of what they had at the
start of the century. Consequently, the barter terms of trade moved in favour of

Cprimary producers. Since the volume of exports was rising during the first half of the
century, the income terms also improved. The result was a period of prosperity for
West African trade. Indeed, since 1800 West Africa has experienced only three!
periods when both barter and income terms have moved sharply in favour of
producers for at least ten years. The first period played an important part in establish¬
ing the new commerce; the second, from 1900^-1913, helped to install the colonial
rulers; and the third, from 1945-1955, was a phase of expanding expectations and
economic diversification which was associated with the end of the colonial era.
In all situations of historical change there are elements of continuity. During the
first half of the nineteenth century, when legitimate commerce was in its infancy and
was also comparatively prosperous, producers and traders were encouraged to
believe that the transition from the slave trade would be an easy one. Initially, various
features of commerce on the West Coast were simply carried over from the
eighteenth century. For example, a number of established European traders and
African producers managed to adapt from the old trade to the new; some of the
minor exports of legitimate commerce continued to be shipped after abolitionjust as
they had been before; the credit or trust ‘system’ survived and expanded, in spite of
repeated complaints from those who thought that it was morally reprehensible and
economically risky; sailing ships remained in use on routes between Europe and
Africa; and business was still transacted by means of barter and ‘transitional’ cur¬
rencies, such as cowries and manillas. Above all, the effort to stop the slave trade and
to establish legitimate commerce, though it led to voyages of exploration, to
missionary enterprise, and to a slightly greater degree of official activity on the West
Coast, did not bring about any major alterations to the political map. Because an
adjustment was made to the economy without causing an immediate and total up¬
heaval, traders and officials felt confident that casual and limited political commit-

These terms are introduced here briefly, and are dealt with at greater length in Chapter 5,
where the data available are sufficient to justify more extended treatment.
Mention should be made of Patrick Manning’s excellent special study. An Economic
History of Southern Dahomey, 1880-1914, University of Wisconsin Ph.D. thesis 1969, which
contains a thorough investigation of the overseas trade of that particular region.

132
 The economic basis of imperialism

ments could be maintained, much as they had been in the eighteenth century. The
European frontier did not extend inland; it did not even cover all parts of the coast.
There was no partition of Africa in 1807 or 1833.
The position changed considerably in the second half of the century. The boom
came to an end in 1861, and there was a depression between 1862 and 1866, when the
European price for palm oil fell to around ^{^32 per ton. Although prices revived in
1866-1867, they never again reached the peaks of 1854-1861. On the contrary, they
underwent a serious decline from an average of ^37 per ton in 1861-1865 to fio a
ton in 1886-1890, the lowest on record since the early days of the trade. Thus in
twenty-five years prices were cut by nearly 50 per cent. There was a very slight
improvement in the 1890s, but it was not until 1906 that prices regained the levels
acliieved in the 1850s. Palm kernel prices fell by about a third from roughly ^{^15 per
ton in the 1860s to just over ^10 in the period 1886-1890. Groundnut prices at
Rufisque in Senegal also fell by roughly a third from 25 to 27^ francs per 100 kilos
in the period 1857-1867 to around 15 francs in the period 1877-1900. In both cases,
there was no recovery until after the turn of the century. There were two main
causes of this fall, though there were several contributory factors, such as reduced
ocean freight rates. First, there was an increase in the supply of mineral and vegetable
oils following the discovery of petroleum resources in the United States in the i86os,
and the entry into the market of Indian groundnuts and Australian tallow after the
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Second, European demand for a wide range of
raw materials, including oils and fats, was checked in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century with the advent of the so-called Great Depression.^^
There is little systematic information available about the local prices of goods
imported into West Africa in the second half of the nineteenth century. The trend
was probably a downward one, reflecting the fall in freight rates, an increase in
competition on the West Coast, and continuing improvements in industrial effic¬
iency. However, it is certain that the substantial price reductions of the early nine¬
teenth century were not repeated, and that any decline which occurred was relatively
slight and also gradual.^® In the third quarter of the nineteenth century, when export
prices fell particularly sharply, the barter terms of trade moved decisively against
primary producers.
The question now arises as to what extent and in what sense an increase in the
volume of exports can be said to have compensated for this adverse movement in
the barter terms of trade. The broad trend, as noted earlier, was a rising one, but with
few exceptions expansion levelled off in the late 1870s and in the 18 80s, and in some
cases the volume of exports actually declined. A few examples will illustrate how
widespread this experience was: in the Niger Delta palm produce exports showed no

The best recent analysis of what hi some respects was a non-event, is S. B. Saul’s The
Myth of the Great Depression, 1873-1896, 1969, though this study analyses the problem from a
British, rather than from a European, point of view.
26 See Lars G. Sandberg, ‘Movements in the Quahty of British Cotton Textile Exports,
1815-1913’, Journal of Economic History, 28, 1968, p. 19.

133
 t

An Economic History of West Africa

clear upward movement in the 1870s and 1880s, and there was a decrease at Opobo
during the period 1887-1893; at Lagos, one of the major centres of legitimate
commerce, there was a slight, but indecisive, trend towards expansion in the 1870s
and 1880s; on the Gold Coast oil and kernel exports were almost static from 1886-
1900; on the Ivory Coast palm oil exports fell sharply in the mid-i88os; and in Sierra
Leone the picture was much the same. The position with regard to groundnuts was
very similar; shipments from Gambia declined in the 1870s and 1880s; and in
Senegal exports reached a plateau in the late 1870s which was not substantially
exceeded until about the turn of the century. Even in cases where the volume of
exports rose to the'extent that total earnings were maintained, producers were still
not as well off in the 1880s as they had been earlier. In the absence of technical
improvements in agriculture or in internal transport during the secdlid half of the
century, a rise in the volume of exports could be achieved only in one of two ways:
first, by existing producers deciding to increase their labour inputs, thus reducing
net incomes by cutting down on leisure or other activities, or by paying for addi¬
tional labour services; and second by expanding the total number of independent
producers, thus causing the average per capita incomes of export producers to fall.
It seems likely that the income terms of trade either declined or maintained a
precarious stability during the last quarter of the, century. Even in the latter case there
is a strong probability that the real income of the average export producer was
reduced.
The foregoing analysis has referred to the major staples of overseas trade. How¬
ever, it is important to realise that the late nineteenth century was also a time of
crisis for minor staples and for trans-Saharan trade. The Senegalese gum trade
declined in the second half of the century as a result of the development of chemical
substitutes and the growth of competition from Egyptian gum. Gold exports from
the Gold Coast were static, cocoa exports were negligible, and rubber exports did not
expand until the 1890s. The Western Sudan was affected in the nineteenth century
by a series of political upheavals stemming from the jihads (holy wars), wliich were
launched by the protagonists of a revived Islam. The nature of these revivalist move¬
ments is still a subject of dispute.^® Their economic influence appears to have been
conservative, except, possibly in the case of Senegal. At best they preserved tradi¬
tional agricultural and trading activities; at worst they perpetuated archaic economies
based on plunder, tribute and slavery. To these troubles was added another, namely
the decay of trans-Saharan trade, which declined after 1875, and was reduced to a
trickle by 1900. Initially, this slump was the result of slackening demand in Europe,
but by the end of the century the desert trade had also been seriously affected by the

2® The Russian scholar, D. A. Ol’derogge, has argued that the jihad in northern Nigeria
was primarily a protest of Hausa and Fulani commoners against oppression by the ruling class.
So far, this view has not made much impression, at least on British scholars. However, Ol’der-
ogge’s interpretation deserves attention, not least because testing his theory involves writing
the history of ordinary Africairs, as opposed to that of prominent rehgious and political figures,
and this is surely highly desirable. On the jihad in Senegambia see Martin A. Klein, Islam and
Imperialism in Senegal, Edinburgh 1968.

134
 The economic basis of imperialism

disintegration of the slave system which supported the oases, and by competition
from ocean routes, which could deliver manufactured goods more cheaply.
The evidence indicates that West Africa’s external trade experienced a crisis in the
last quarter of the nineteenth century. Export producers had become caught in a
staple trap: the barter terms of trade had turned against them, and attempts to
increase the volume of exports had either failed or, where successful, had contributed
to a further decline in the terms of trade, with the result that growth had become
self-defeating. Within a relatively short space of time primary producers and traders
came under severe pressure to develop alternative exports and to adopt cost-reducing
innovations. This ‘general crisis’ of the late nineteenth century led to strains, mis¬
understandings and conflicts between all those, Europeans as well as Africans, who
in varying degrees had become dependent on legitimate commerce for their liveli¬
hood. The expansion in the volume of overseas commerce in the second half of the
nineteenth century, combined with the adverse movement in the terms of trade, led
to the modification or abolition of many of the early features of legitimate commerce
that had been inherited from the time of the external slave trade, and also caused the
European powers to discard the assumptions governing their traditional policy of
limited intervention in West Africa. Just as pronounced booms have had a marked
effect on the course of West African history, so, too, have serious slumps. Since the
beginning of legitimate commerce there have been two periods often years or more
when the barter terms of trade have moved against export producers and when the
income terms have either fallen or remained static. The first period of depression was
in the last quarter of tbe nineteenth century, and helped to bring the Europeans intq_
Africa. The second period, ccivermgjlie years iQ^o-i04-5, helped cr£ate,jJhe-mpve-
ment which was to expel them.

2 Economic motives in partition

Imperialism is seen here as a process of interaction and, ultimately, conflict between
the industrialised nations and the underdeveloped world. To analyse this process
parallel analyses are required, the first dealing with intra-group relations, that is
among African producers, traders and politicians on the one hand, and among
European manufacturers, traders and politicians on the other; the second covering
inter-group strategy, that is between Africans and Europeans at what, broadly, can
be called the national level. The principal difficulty, apart from the problem that
there is considerable controversy about the role of the Europeans, is that so little is
known about the part played by Africans both in assisting and in opposing the
invasion of their continent. The argument presented here is by no means complete,
but it does try to establish and explore a framework of analysis which it is hoped will
lead to further, more detailed research.^'^ This framework is in three different

2'^ In this respect the analysis is a response to the plea made by J. D. Hargreaves in an im¬
portant article written more than ten years ago, ‘Towards a History of the Partition of Africa’,
Journal of African History, i, i960, pp. 97-109. For the most recent statement of Professor

135
136
An Economic History of West A frica

Map 9. The West African Coast in the Nineteenth Century.

 The economic basis of imperialism

sections, all of which are concerned with the implications of the economic structure
created by legitimate commerce; the first will consider problems of supply and their
effect on intra-group relations on the African side of the frontier; the second will
focus on problems of demand and their effect on intra-group relations on the Euro¬
pean side of the frontier; and the tliird section will examine how the economic crisis
of the late nineteenth century affected inter-group relations at the national level, and
led to the decisions to move the established frontier inland, that is to partition West
Africa.
It was by no means easy to develop satisfactory substitutes for the Atlantic slave
trade, even though some of the staples of legitimate commerce were already grown
in West Africa, and the terms of trade favoured primary producers in the second
quarter of the nineteenth century. With the benefit of hindsight, historians have been
able to point, justly, to the success of palm produce and groundnuts. For contem¬
poraries, however, legitimate commerce was a long, precarious experiment, an era
of fluctuating fortunes which held out no guarantees for the future. This explains
why European interests, official and private, thought it necessary to tangle with a
series of risky ventures in tropical agriculture. In the 1820s, for example, the French
undertook an ambitious agricultural project in SenegalT^he main idea behind this
scheme was to grow in Africa, and with African labour, the crops which had been
produced on slave plantations in the Americas. A model farm was established,
several crops, including cotton and indigo, were tried out, and new techniques of
irrigation and ploughing were introduced. The experiment was abandoned in 1831
as a result of mismanagement, lack of capital, and ignorance of tropical conditions.
In the 1840s British commercial interests established a model farm at Lokoja on the
Niger, but this, too, was a failure.
The next important wave of experiments occurred just after the middle of the
century, and was prompted by a cotton famine in Europe arising out of the American
Civil War. Attempts were made to grow cotton at various points on the West
Coast, such as Senegal, southern Nigeria and the Gold Coast.^® In the 1860s the
French still thought that Senegal was destined to become a leading exporter of
cotton. Again they were disappointed. Many previous errors were repeated, and
American production recovered far more quickly than had been anticipated. Above
all, the Senegalese farmer, envisaging a rather different future for his country.

Hargreaves’s own view see his contribution ‘West African States and the European Conquest’,
in Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, ed. L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, i, The History and
Politics of Colonialism, 1870-1914, Cambridge 1969, pp. 199-219. I should like to acknowledge
my debt to Dr Martin Klein, Dr Patrick Manning and Dr C. W. Newbury, who (though they
may not be fully aware of it) have caused me to re-think my ideas on this subject over the past
few years.
Roger Pasquier, ‘En marge de la guerre de secession: les essais de cultme du coton au
S6n6gaV, Annales Africaines, 1955, pp. 185-202.
Plantation agriculture on the Gold Coast, where experiments sponsored by the Basel
Mission were of great importance, has been studied by Kwamina B. Dickson, A Historical
Geography of Ghana, Cambridge 1969, pp. 120-32.

137
 t "

An Economic History of West Africa

preferred groundnuts to cotton because they were more profitable. A greater degree
of success was achieved at Abeokuta in south-west Nigeria, though there, too, cotton
exports dwindled in the iSyos.'^® The promoters found that they were unable to
compete in international markets, partly, it is interesting to note, because of the high \
cost of free African labour. The final phase of experiments came in the i88os as a ,
result of declining profits in the palm produce trade. Many proposals were put for- j
ward to remedy the problem, and several of the more feasible were tried out. Arthur
Verdier, a prominent French merchant, began coffee plantations in the Ivory Coast;'
the Royal Niger Company started plantations of cocoa, coffee and rubber in the?
Niger Valley; and the colonial administration established botanic stations at Lago^
(1887) and on the Gold Coast (1889).
These experiments have implications which extend beyond the locdl details given
above. As a record of early European endeavours in tropical agriculture, they are
important for geographers and botanists, as well as for historians. They also represent
an interesting stage in the development of economic policy, for they stand mid-way
between the mercantilist concept of colonies serving the needs of the mother
country, and the realisation of tliis ideal in the different circumstances of the twen¬
tieth century. Furthermore, these nineteenth-century debates over the means of
achieving agricultural progress anticipate the controversy which arose in the
colonial period between the protagonists of peasant and plantation crops. For
historians the schemes are especially noteworthy because they expressed the realisa¬
tion that the external slave trade would not simply die of its own accord, and that a
positive effort was required to find substitute exports. Many of those engaged in this
search were energetic and commercially-minded Christians, who were intent on
converting the soul of Africa as well as its economy. These men, the militant arm of
the abolitionist movement, saw it as their mission to carry the moral convictions and
economic optimism of the industrial world into the Dark Continent.
The most important and successful experiments, however, were those undertaken!
by Africans themselves, without European supervision, indeed frequently without
expatriate officials and traders knowing what was happening. It is not always realised
just how varied the export economy was in some parts of West Africa during the era
of legitimate commerce. At Freetown, for instance, timber accounted for about ycr
per cent of all exports by 1829; by i860 timber exports had almost disappeared, and
the main items of overseas trade were gold, palm oil and groundnuts, each of which
accounted for about 20 per cent of total exports; by the i88os these three products
had also declined, and palm kernels had become the dominant export.^^ It was in
^the 1880S, too, and as a direct result of the economic problems of the period, that
Africans began cocoa farming in the Gold Coast and southern Nigeria, achieving
results which none of the European ‘experts’ could emulate. These example;

J. B. Webster, ‘The Bible and the Plough’, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 2,
1963, pp. 418-34-
P. K. Mitchell, ‘Trade Routes of the Early Sierra Leone Protectorate’, Sierra Leone Studies,
16, 1962, pp. 204-17.

138
 The economic basis of imperialism

illustrate that African responses to changing returns on their exports were flexible
and rapid, given the natural resources at their disposal and the technical con¬
straints operating in the nineteenth century, notably in internal transport.
Palm oil, palm kernels and groundnuts, the main staples of legitimate commerce,
were produced and delivered to the coast entirely tlirough indigenous enterprise.
Yet because of the widespread assumption that the transition to legitimate commerce
was easy and uneventful, some basic questions about the historical development of
these crops have still to be asked. For example, few historians have appreciated that
palm oil was not a homogeneous commodity. Some regions, such as south-west
Nigeria, produced a soft quality oil wliich fetched a high price; others, such as the
Gold Coast, supplied a harder oil which was less in demand. These distinctions
deserve further consideration, for they are likely to supply much-needed information
about the resource base of the various export regions, about differences in methods
of preparation, and about the motives for developing alternative exports, such as
why the Gold Coast expanded cocoa production at an earlier date than did Nigeria.
Similarly, not enough attention has been paid to the fact that palm kernels did not
simply join palm oil as an additional export, but were developed largely to compen¬
sate for the decline of the latter in the second half of the nineteenth century. Yet some
regions exported a much greater proportion of kernels to oil than did others, though
both products were in joint supply. This, too, is a difference which needs exploring
further, for it may provide a clue to important problems, such as the extent of internal
trade in palm oil, and the ability of various parts of the coast to adjust to the decline
of staple exports in the late nineteenth century. Finally, more thought needs to be
given to the remarkable ‘do it yourself’ character of staple export production, in
which each man became an entrepreneur in his OAvn right, albeit on a modest
scale. Traditional economic frontiers were broken down through the initiative of
African migrants and settlers, who colonised and developed previously underused
land, and in doing so brought about changes in settlement patterns, farming
practices, land tenure, and in the role, status and size of the labour force engaged in
export production.®^ This is a theme of epic proportions, which still awaits epic
treatment.
European demand for vegetable oils had far-reaching economic, social and politi¬
cal consequences in West Africa, though it is important to stress that these were not
identical in all parts of the region. Ultimately, it should be possible to define and
classify the various areas of West Africa according to the precise type of adaptive
challenge which confronted them, and the nature of their responses to it. At present
lit is hard to do more than sketch the outlines of a complex regional map. Three
tategories will be suggested here by way of preliminary analysis.

32 On migration see Marion Johnson, ‘Migrants’ Progress’, Bulletin of the Ghana Geographical
Association, 9, 1964, pp. 4-37, and 10, 1965, pp. 13-40; and R. K. Udo, ‘The Migrant Tenant
Farmer of Eastern Nigeria’, Africa, 34, 1964, pp. 326-39. On land tenure see Akin L. Mabo-
gunje, ‘Some Comments on Land Tenure in Egba Division, Western Nigeria’, Africa, 31,
1961, pp. 258-69. The expansion of‘peasant’ exports in the twentieth century is dealt with in
Chapter 6.

139
 V

Ati Economic History of West Africa

First, there were areas which experienced a decline in the staple export, slaves,
without securing adequate compensation in the form of new products. This was
particularly true of those parts of West Africa which were either unsuitable tor
growdng palm trees and groundnuts, or were too far from the coast for export
production to be remunerative. The Western Sudan, with its famous trans-Saharan
commerce in decline after 1875, was a case in point, for palm produce and ground¬
nuts were bulky items with a low value to weight ratio, unlike slaves, which could
be traded profitably over long distances. Secondjjhere were areas which had not
been involved in the external slave trade to any great extent, "5Hd which were pre¬
sented with new openings in the export sector. This was the case along parts of the
coast between Senegal and the Ivory Coast, which began to export vegetable pro¬
ducts in the nineteenth century. Third, there were areas in which'the change to
legitimate commerce meant a shift from the production of slaves (at least as an export
commodity) to the production of vegetable oils. This applied to Senegambia and to
most of the forest firom the Gold Coast eastwards. There is considerable justification
for concentrating on the third category, apart from the convenient fact that it hap¬
pens to be the best documented. Not only was this extensive region by far the most
important suppher of legitimate exports, despite its close involvement with the
Atlantic slave trade,^^ but it was also from points within this area that the Europeans
laimched their invasion of the interior at the close of the century.®^
Three aspects of the economic history of this region will be considered here. First,
its general development as an export centre will be outlined; next, the position of
export producers will be investigated with particular reference to the fortunes of the
large entrepreneurs who had dominated production during the time of the Atlantic
slave trade; finally, the situation of the coastal wholesalers will be examined, using
the Niger Delta as a case study.
The supply of West African palm produce came from an area which stretched
fiom Guinea to the Cameroons, though the most important source lay in the eastern
section from the Gold Coast to Old Calabar. The prominence of this sub-division
was the result of the abundance of its oil-palms, which occurred naturally in a broad
belt lying close to the coast,®® and of the network of lagoons and inland waterways
stretching from Porto Novo to Old Calabar, which made it possible to transport
produce relatively cheaply. In the period immediately after 1807 the leading centre

In some cases (Old Calabar and Whydah are two obvious examples) it is clear that the
overseas slave trade developed entrepreneurial skills and commercial institutions which greatly
assisted the rise of legitimate trade. However, it would be wrong to infer that the slave trade
was in any sense necessary to the successful expansion of legitimate commerce. Everything that
is known about African enterprise in internal trade in the pre-colonial period strongly suggests
that indigenous societies would have produced the required number of wholesalers and traders,
and in a short space of time, even if the Atlantic slave trade had never existed.
At the same time, it is worth while pointing out that areas in the second category also
experienced some of the difficulties of economic transition. See E. A. Ijagbemi, ‘The Freetown
Colony and the Development of “Legitimate” Commerce in the Adjoining Territories’,
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 5, 1970, pp. 252-6.
Many palm trees were also planted dehberately.

140
 The economic basis of imperialism

of production in West Africa was Old Calabar, which shipped well over half the
total palm oil imports entering Great Britain. In the 1830s Old Calabar was joined,
and for a while overtaken, by Bomiy, further west in the mouth of the Niger Delta.
In the 1840s exports from the Delta as a whole averaged 15-20,000 tons per amaum,
which was equivalent to about three-quarters of total oil imports into the United
Kingdom. Bonny’s supremacy lasted until the 1870s, when its suppliers and outlets
were captured by the nearby port of Opobo following a political coup. After the
middle of the century other centres sprang up, and the Niger Delta, though still very
important, no longer completely dominated the West African oil trade. The geo¬
graphical and quantitative expansion of legitimate commerce was closely associated
with the decline of the Atlantic slave trade, for until about the 1860s slaves still
competed successfully with palm oil at several points along the coast, especially at
Whydah and Lagos. By the tliird quarter of the century palm produce was the
leading overseas export along a broad stretch of the West Coast. During the last
twenty years of the century oil and kernels accounted for over 70 per cent of the
value of total exports from the Gold Coast, over 80 per cent at Lagos and over 90
per cent in Dahomey and the Niger Delta. A remarkable transformation of the
export economy had been achieved in a comparatively short space of time.
Grormdnuts, an annual crop, were grown for export in a region which extended
from Senegal to Sierra Leone, though as they prefer sandy soils and a long, reliable
dry season, Senegambia became by far the most prominent area of production.
Transport costs made it uneconomic to grow the crop for export very far inland, so
the main areas of production, as in the case of palm oil, lay near the coast. The Small
British colony of Gambia was the earliest focal point of the trade, partly, it is inter¬
esting to note, as a result of purchases made by American traders.'^® In the 1820s
about 90 per cent of Gambia’s exports consisted of beeswax and hides. Groundnuts
were exported for the first time in the 1830s, and by the middle of the century they
accounted for two-thirds of all exports. A proportion of the groundnuts shipped
from Gambia were grown in areas which would have made use of ports in neigh¬
bouring French territory, except for the fact that an export duty was levied on
agricultural exports from Senegal until 1855. With the removal of this duty, exports
from Senegal greatly increased. By the last quarter of the century the export trade
of Senegambia was as dependent on groundnuts as that of the forest was on palm
produce. The main areas of production were Casamance south of Gambia, and
Cayor to the north. (However, further north still, around St Louis, the export trade
rehed principally on gum, as it had in the days of Atlantic commerce.) The ground¬
nut trade, like the palm oil trade, saw the conversion of former slave ports into centres
of legitimate commerce. Kaolack, for example, became a large centre for the
groundnut trade from the i86os onwards.®’^ A great deal of additional historical
research needs to be carried out on most aspects of legitimate commerce, but

3® Brooks, Yankee Traders, Old Coasters and African Middlemen, pp. 184-9.
3'^ A. Dessertine, ‘Naissance d’un port; Kaolack, des origines a 1900’, Annales Africaines,

i960, pp. 225-59.

An Economic History of West Africa

especially on the development of groundnut production. Fouquet, Pelissier, and

others have made substantial contributions to the study of Senegalese groundnuts in
the modern context, but the economic history of the crop remains to be written.
In some parts of the underdeveloped world the requirements of the industrial
nations were consistent with the maintenance of the established social and political
order. Britain's demand for Argentinian beef, for example, strengthened the position
of an already existing class of large landowners in that area, since cattle rearing was
most efficient on sizeable units of land.^® Peaceful economic integration was also
associated with a policy of political neutrality in Latin America, though it was not
the only reason for'it. In West Africa, on the other hand, the accidents of geography
and history which enabled small farmers and traders to participate efficiently in
overseas commerce posed acute problems of adaptation for the traditional warrior
entrepreneurs who had co-operated so profitably with European slavers during the
days of the Atlantic trade. African rulers experimented with a number of modes of
adaptation to their new situation, and these can be classified according to their
negative or positive character. Four of the most important, which were adopted
singly or in conjunction, will be dealt with here.
The first negative response was to continue exporting slaves in defiance of th!e-
ban imposed by the European nations. Little is known at present about the relative
profits of slaving and legitimate commerce, but it seems that few African slave
exporters turned willingly to the new trade, even though the terms of trade were
more favourable in the second quarter of the century than they were to become later
on. This reluctance may be taken as an indication that for established exporters the
costs of legitimate commerce (in terms of diminished political power as well as of
cash income) outweighed the returns. The predicament of Ghezo, the ruler of
Abomey, was duplicated in other parts of the West Coast:

The state which he maintained was great; his army was expensive; the ceremonies
and customs to be observed annually, which had been handed down to him from
his forefathers, entailed upon him a vast outlay of money. These could not be
abolished. The form of his government could not be suddenly changed, without
causing such a revolution as would deprive him of his throne, and precipitate liis
kingdom into a state of anarchy.^®

As for the palm oil trade, that was ‘a slow method of making money, and brought
only a very small amount of duties into his coffers’. Ghezo’s support of the slave
trade ceased only with his death in 1858. After the withdrawal of European nations
from the Atlantic trade, the shipment of slaves was handled mainly by Brazilian
merchants, such as Domingo Martinez, who operated in the Bight of Benin between

H. S. Ferns, ‘Latin America and Industrial Capitalism—The First Phase’, Sociological Reuiew
Monograph, ii, 1967, pp. 18-20.
Brodie Cruickshank’s report of 1848, quoted in C. W. Newbury, The Western Slave
Coast and its Rulers, Oxford 1961, p. 51.

142
 The economic basis of imperialism

1833 and 1864.^° The Brazilians were eventually eliminated by the naval squadron,
by the closure of foreign slave markets, and by their own inability to procure the
necessary European trade goods. By the end of the i86os the overseas slave trade had
been reduced to a trickle. Responding to the new trade by trying to perpetuate the
old was no longer possible.
Next, African rulers attempted to bolster their fortunes by means wliich were,
familiar to pre-industrial governments throughout the world, namely by employing
armed strength to plunder and to exact tribute from their neighbours. The kings o
Senegambia used this tactic as an outlet for the energies of their hard-drinking, hard-
fighting warrior elite (tyeddo); Ashanti mixed force with diplomacy in order tc
control, or secure access to, the wealth of the coastal peoples; the kings ofDahome)/
made annual incursions into Yoruba country; and the Yoruba states themselves
fought a series of wars in wliich economic goals were prominent. Military operations,
and, perhaps more important, the constant threat of them, led to the abandonment
of fertile land, and to the creation of broad areas of neutral territory between hostile
states. They perpetuated conditions wliich were inimical to the growth of the petty
capitalism that had been fostered by legitimate commerce. They dramatised what
may be called the crisis of the aristocracy in nineteenth-century West Africa, a social
and political crisis stemming from a contradiction between past and present relations
of production. They were a last resort, and, as such, represented the ultimate failure
of the ancien regime to adapt peacefully and efficiently to the demands of the indus-
mal world.
' The first of the two positive modes of adaptation was for former slave suppliers to
develop an export trade in legitimate goods. Some of them became employers
rather than exporters of slaves, and they used servile labour to harvest palm trees, to
grow groundnuts and to transport produce to markets. The rise of legitimate com¬
merce, far from bringing about the abolition of domestic slavery, increased the
demand for cheap labour in Africa itself, and so perpetuated a service industry (the
supply of slaves) which was detrimental to the long-term development of the
natural resources of the region. The result was the growth of a small group of large
export producers in areas which were near enough to the coast for the transport of
bulky goods to be a feasible proposition. In Dahomey and some of the Y oruba states,
for example, the rulers and important chiefs established large palm oil estates worked
' by slave labourTHowever, these men now HaHToTkcrroinpetltion at tEeir palace
' gates from a multiplicity of small, efficient farmers who were only partly committed
to the overseas market, but who supplied the greater part of the produce shipped to
Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century. The large producers found that
they were unable to influence local export prices simply by controlling production,
as they had done previously, yet at the same time they themselves were highly vul¬
nerable to changes in the prices paid for produce by European merchants on the
coast, since a sizeable part of their total incomes was derived from export earnings.

David A. Ross, ‘The Career of Domingo Martinez in the Bight of Benin, 1833-64’,
Journal of African History, 6, 1965, pp. 79-90.

143
An Economic History of West Africa

States wliich were not situated close to the coast had great difficulty in making )
constructive adjustments to legitimate commerce. Ashanti, however, is an interest¬
ing example of a partially exceptional case.^’- Faced with a severe crisis early in the
nineteenth century, the rulers of Ashanti responded by expanding their export trade
to the north, selling kola nuts and buying cattle and slaves. Demand in the Hausa
states had grown following the jihads of the early nineteenth century because kola
was an approved stimulant in Muslim communities*, which were denied alcohol.
Supplies were increased partly by gathering kola nuts from wild trees, but mainly,
it appears, through the establishment of plantations worked by slave labour.^^ Good
fortune, commercial skill and a highly efficient system of government helped
Ashanti to adjust to the central economic problem which it faced in the nineteenth
century. Yet some important questions still have to be answered befcire the response
of Ashanti can be counted as an unqualified success. In the first place, not enough is
known about the total value and the rate of profit of the northern trade to say \
whether its expansion in the nineteenth century fully compensated for the diminu- \
tion of exports to the south. It has to be remembered that the size ol the internal
market was still severely limited by transport costs, and that the decline of trans-
Saharan trade after 1875 might well have affected purchasing power in the north.
Secondly, Ashanti still depended on the coast for supplies of munitions, salt and
cotton goods, wliich came through satellites, such as the Fante states. These states
now produced palm oil and kernels for export, and no longer relied on Ashanti for
supplies of slaves for shipment overseas. Thus it is likely that there was, from the
Ashanti point of view, an unfavourable shift in the balance of economic power.
What is certain is that the attempt to reassert control over the Fante in the second
half of the century brought Ashanti closer to conflict with the British. Finally, more
research is needed into the potentially disintegrative elements within the Ashanti
state: the implications for her long-term economic welfare and political stability of
the existence of marked inequalities of wealth, the growth of the slave labour force,
and the frustration of the merchant class, whose development was deliberately
restrained, lest private enterprise should harm the national interest, as conceived by
he king.^'^
The second positive mode of adaptation was for traditional rulers to recognise the
small producers as a serious new force, and to give them an increased stake in a

Very few historians of Africa can match Ivor Wilks’s achievement in reconstructing the
history of Ashanti. See, for example, ‘Ashanti Government’, in West African Kingdoms in the
Nineteenth Century, ed. Daryll Forde and P. M. Kaberry, 1967, pp. 206-38, and his study of the
‘war’ and ‘peace’ parties in Political Bi-polarity in Nineteenth-Century Asante, Centre of African
Studies, Edinburgh 1971.
Ivor Wilks, ‘Asante PoHcy Towards the Hausa Trade in the Nineteenth Century’, in The
Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa, ed. Claude Meillassoux, 1971,
pp. 124-41.
Some important work on these topics is being undertaken by K. Arhhi. See, for example,
‘The Structure of Greater Ashanti’, Jo«ma/ of African History, 8, 1967, pp. 65-85, and ‘Aspects
of Ashanti Northern Trade m the Nineteenth Century’, Africa, 40, 1970, pp. 363-73.

144
 The economic basis of imperialism

reformed political system. For example, Lat Dior, the ruler of Cayor in Senegal,
tried to forge an alliance with the groundnut farmers of his state in the 1870s in an
attempt to counterbalance the power of the traditional military estate. However,
support could not always be relied on, and aspirations, once encouraged, tended to
multiply. The small producers used their new wealth to purchase, among other
items, guns, and with these they could threaten the rulers who sought their co¬
operation.^^ The new generation of export producers in West Africa had every
reason to be wary of encouragement from their superiors, for rulers who allowed
independent producers to develop did so in the hope of taxing their wealth. Not
surprisingly, this aim became a cause of friction, particularly in the last quarter of the
century, when profits from the export trade were reduced to a minimum. Further¬
more, taxing small producers posed serious practical problems. Collecting tolls from
a convoy of slaves travelling on an established route was easy enough, but, as the Aro
of south-east Nigeria found, levying duties on palm oil was an entirely different
matter, for oil was produced and traded in small quantities at many diverse points.
Thus the attempt to accommodate the new capitalist class and secure the incomes of
traditional rulers was a difficult operation.
The negative responses may have helped to prevent a sudden decline in incomes,
but were ultimately self-defeating. The positive responses achieved better results,
but were still not wholly successful. The difficulties of the progressive rulers arose
first from an internal conflict of interest stemming from a basic change in the
structure of export-producing firms, and second from the fact that they were unable
or unwilling to make the necessary adjustments in the time allowed by impatient and
often unsympathetic foreigners. For a while it seemed that there was a chance of
stabilising the existing frontier between Europeans and Africans on the West Coast,
but in the last quarter of the century the indigenous rulers were called on to make
concessions over such matters as railways, internal tolls and slavery, which they
judged, quite rightly, would undermine their political independence. At that poinTl
the dialogue over peaceful coexistence came to an end. Possessing fewer internal i
assets, and experiencing at the same time greater external pressures, the modernising |
aristocracies of West Africa were less able to control their future than were their |
revolutionary counterparts in Japan after 1868.^^ —I
As a general proposition, it can be said that the traditional unit of trade was less
affected by the structural changes brought about by legitimate commerce than was
the traditional unit of production. This was because large wholesalers were still
necessary, whether the commodities to be handled were slaves or palm oil, whereas
large producers were not. Many established entrepots, such as Whydah, Lagos,
Bonny and Old Calabar, substituted palm oil for slaves and survived as major ports
right down to partition, and in some cases beyond. Their rulers continued to levy

** These developments are discussed by Martin Klein in ‘Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Legitimate Commerce m Late Nineteenth-Centiny Africa’, Etudes d’Histoire Africaine, 2,
1971, pp. 22-4.
A brief survey of this aspect of Japanese history is given in Thomas C. Smith, ‘Japan’s
Aristocratic Revolution’, Yale Review, 5, 1960-1, pp. 370-83.

145
 An Economic History of West Africa

traditional taxes on visiting ships, and their leading merchants received credit and
goods on a larger scale than ever before. Even the old trading premises survived:
after abolition, the barracoons (warehouses where slaves were kept pending ship¬
ment) were used to store the new, legitimate exports. Although the entrepots were
not affected in precisely the same way as producers in the hinterland, it does not
follow that they were not affected at all by the development of legitimate commerce,
or that they found it any easier to establish a lasting and satisfactory relationship with
their European customers. On the contrary, African rulers had to struggle in the
nineteenth century to control destabilising forces which threatened the cohesion of
the entrepots, and'sometimes their very existence. Some indication of the nature of
these forces is necessary for an understanding of the degrees of solidarity and disunity
exhibited by the middlemen states when faced with increased EuAipean pressure
towards the close of the century. The best illustration of their problems is provided
by the history of the area centring on the Niger Delta, which has been the subject of
some important research in recent years.^®
Legitimate commerce presented opportunities to a new generation of traders, as
well as producers, because it gave employment to a greater number of intermediaries,
who were needed to collect export crops and to distribute manufactured goods.
Entry into small scale trade was easy because there were few barriers of capital or
skill. The result was that existing wholesalers faced more competition than they had
in the past, though this is not to imply that such rivalry was unimportant during the
time of the Atlantic slave trade. The new traders won their most striking success in
the Niger Delta. Virtually all the ‘city states’, as Dike has called them, experienced
serious political unrest between 1850 and 1875, as slaves and ex-slaves challenged the
authority of the established wholesalers and rulers. This movement was personified
byja Ja, the former slave who rose to a position of economic importance in Bonny
in the i86os, but whose social origins prevented him from attaining the highest
political office. In i869jaja founded his own state at nearby Opobo, thus conferring
on himself the political power which he fell his commercial success deserved. The
career of Nana Olomu, the leading figure in Itsekiri trade and politics in the i88os,
provides another striking example of how advancement was becoming based on
commercial achievement rather than on inherited status, though Nana’s social
origins were less humble thanja Ja’s, and he was able to further his political ambitions
in his home territory.Ability put a man in a strong position; ability and acceptable
family connections made him almost unassailable,
r Indigenous commercial institutions in the Delta states were not entirely immune
I from change, and were affected by the alterations in persomiel. At Bomiy and

The major studies are K. O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885, Oxford
1956; G. I. Jones, The Trading Ngtes of the Oil Rivers, Oxford 1963; Obaro Ikime. Merchant
Pnnce of the Niger Delta,^ j_q6^^ and A. J. H. Latham, Old Calabar, 1600-1861: the Economic
Impact of the West upon a Traditional Society, University of Birmingham Ph.D. thesis, 1970.
On the problems of economic transition among the Itsekiri see P. C. Lloyd, ‘The Itsekiri
in the Nineteenth Century: an Outhne Social History’, Journal of African History, 4, 1963,
pp. 207-31.

146
 The economic basis of imperialism

Kalahari, for example, the rise of men whose success was a result of trading abilit^
rather than of ascribed social position had repercussions on the traditional cano/
house_^a_compact and well organised trading and fighting corporation capable 6£
maintaminga war canoe)r because increased social mobility led to agr^ater turnover
ofcommercial and political authoj;^ity. Jones has analysed the history of these states
'intbe nineteenth century m terms of a developmental cycle, wliich started with the
expansion of a canoe house, moved on to a phase of political accretion, in which
several houses coalesced, and culminated in varying degrees of disintegration, as
unity broke down. For present purposes it might also be useful to think of the
economic aspects of this cycle in terms of the theory of the firm, whereby a successful
company expands, takes over its rivals, and achieves a local monopoly, only to find
that its dominance is undermined from within, as managers leave to start their own
businesses, and challenged from outside, as new competitors move in to try and
secure a share of the monopoly profit.
Certain qualifications to the foregoing analysis have to be made, even at the risk
of complicating the story. In the first place it should be noted that legitimate com¬
merce speeded social change in the trading states, but did not initiate it, for social
‘upstarts’ had also found scope for their talents during the days of the Atlantic slave
trade.^® Secondly, some states escaped slave revolts, and in others slave risings were
not always movements of the downtrodden against their masters. In Kalahari, for
example, class conflict was minimised by integrating mechanisms which helped to
assimilate slaves into society.^® In Old Calabar slave risings were partly demonstra¬
tions in support of established, rival political factions, and so served a functional
purpose in reinforcing the status quo. Finally, care must be taken not to romanticise
the careers of the famous Delta traders. Some scholars, understandably anxious to
write African rather than Imperial history, have seen in these men the forerunners
of the nationalist movements which developed in the colonial period. This inter¬
pretation bestows on the actors a motive and sense of purpose which they themselves
would have had difficulty in recognising. The leaders of the Delta states were great
traders, and they certainly fought hard to maintain their independence, but their
world view did not extend much beyond their local commercial interests, their
vision of social justice did not include the emancipation of their own slaves, and they
resisted African as well as European rivals with the true impartiality of homo
economicus.
Besides the problem of internally-generated instability, the entrepdts-iacgd an
additional complication which did not aSect the producers directly, namely the
physical presenceoficommercial agents from the Western world. In the second half
of the nineteenth century the growth of a bulk trade, combined with the advent of
the steamship, led the European merchants to set up many more shore bases. With

See, for example, Kwame Y. Daaku, Trade and Politics on the Gold Coast, 1600-1720,
Oxford 1970, ch. 5.
Robin Horton, ‘From Fishing Village to City State: a Social History of New Calabar’,
in Man in Africa, ed. Mary Douglas and Phyllis M. Kaberry, 1969, pp. 37-58.

147
 t

An Economic History of West Africa

the merchants came missionaries and educated African ex-slaves. This development
was a serious threat to the position of the ruling oligarchy in the entrepots. In con¬
trast to the era of the slave trade, when European visitors tended to be sailors first
and traders second, the newcomers were permanent and competitive wholesalers.
Furthermore, the presence of an expatriate community, however small, had im¬
portant political consequences. It acted as a magnet for the disaffected, from slaves
seeking freedom to disgruntled members of the local'oligarchy looking for external
support for battles which they could not win on their own. Since the European
merchants were the main suppliers of credit, whatever action they took, whether
Machiavelhan or innocent in intent, was bound to have repercussions on the internal
political situation, either confirming the power of the existing rulers or building up
the claims of rivals. ^
Potentially the most serious destabilising influence was the possibility of a serious
trade depression, an event which would have affected the large wholesalers in much
the same way as the large producers because both depended on foreign trade for their
livelihood. Indeed, it could be argued that the middlemen were even more viitnef-
able than the producers since some of the entrepots relied on local imports for their
basic supplies of food, and they nearly all lacked an alternative means of maintaining
their incomes. AjaiskitLioreign trade would intensify internal rivalries by fostering
disputes over tne allocatiorrofshares in the export trade^ over the prices to be asked
and given, and over the distribution_of reduced profits. It would also increase external
pressures. OiTthe one hand, European traders would try to pay less for produce and
charge more for manufactured goods; they would become more closely concerned
as creditors of faltering and bankrupt African wholesalers; and they would be
tempted to give support to families and houses which appeared more capable of
safeguarding their interests than did the existing rulers. On the other hand, the
wholesalers would run into difficulties with their hinterland customers, as they tried
to pass on the price changes which they themselves had been forced to accept. While
trade remained prosperous these tendencies, though present, were held in check. In
the last quarter of the century, however, there was a radical change in the situation.
African producers and wholesalers were not alone in facing problems of adapta¬
tion in the nineteenth century. Commercial interests on the European side of the
frontier were also profoundly affected by the expansion of overseas trade and by the
change in its character following the rise of legitimate exports. Two developments
in particular helped to bring about a fundamental reorganisation of West African
trade after 1850, resulting in a greater degree of competition, the final liquidation of
eighteenth-century commercial practices, and the beginnings of a recognisably
modem organisational structure for the expatriate firms. The first development, in
terms of chronology, concerned ocean transport, and the second involved alterations
to the media of exchange used on the West Coast. Just as there were reactionary, as
well as progressive, elements on the African side of the frontier, so, too, contrary to
what might be supposed, there were those among the European community who
did their best to convince themselves and their customers that the industrial revolu¬
tion had never occurred.

148
 The economic basis of imperialism

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the products of legitimate commerce
were carried to Europe by sailing ships, and the leading trading firms all possessed
ocean-going vessels. The Bordeaux firm of Maurel et Prom kept a sizeable fleet of
three-masted ships in service on the route to Senegal between the 1830s and the
1880s, and other large merchants, such as the London firm of F. & A. Swanzy, which
traded to the Gold Coast, followed this practice. However, shortly after the middle
of the century the teclinical development of the steamship reached a point where it
could begin to compete successfully with sail.®° The African Steam Ship Company
was formed in England in 1851 and began a regular service to the West Coast in the
following year. This firm was joined by another, the British &: African Steam Navi¬
gation Company in 1868, first as a rival and then as an associate. The British Lines
were the most important serving West Africa, but other European interests were
also represented. In France a consortium of Bordeaux and Marseilles firms ran
steamships to parts of West Africa in the 1870s before the formation of the Fabre-
Fraissinet line in 1889, and in Germany the merchant house of Woermann began to
run steamers to the West Coast in the 1870s, before the establishment of the
Woermami-Linie in 1886. During the third quarter of the century the West African
carrying trade was converted to steam, and by the 1870s the sailing ship was playing
a secondary and diminishing role. In 1880 the number of sailing vessels entering
Lagos harbour, for example, was about a third of the number of steamers and
represented only one sixth of the tonnage of the latter.
The second change centred on the decline of the main transitional currencies, and
on an increase in the circulation of modern money (especially British and French
silver coins) in the key exporting areas.®^ In the present state of knowledge it is hard
to make firm generalisations about this process, but three points can be established.
First, the change was under way before the advent of colonial rule, though the timing
varied at different points along the West Coast. In the second half of the nineteenth
century" iron and copper currencies and cowries underwent a serious depreciation,
and by the close of the century had ceased to play an important part in external trade.
Francs were used extensively in the groundnut trade as early as the 1850s, and
florins and shillings became the main media of exchange for palm produce during
the last quarter of the century. Second, it seems clear that the decline of these cur¬
rencies was closely associated with a fall in the cost of supplying them to West
Africa. In Europe technical advances made it possible to manufacture manillas and
iron currencies more cheaply, and in Africa new resources of cowrie shells were

Technical supremacy, however, did not come until the 1880s. See Gerald S. Graham,
‘The Ascendancy of the Sailing Ship, 1850-85’, Economic History Review, 9, 1956, pp. 74-88.
Further information about the beginnings of steamship services to West Africa can be found
in P. N. Davies, ‘The African Steam Ship Company’, in Liverpool and Merseyside, ed. J. R.
Harris, 1969, pp. 212-38, and in a neglected article by Emile Baillet, ‘Le role de la marine de
commerce dans I’implantation de la France en A.O.F.’, Revue Maritime, 135, 1957, pp. 832-40.
For further details see A. G. Hopkins, ‘The Currency Revolution in South-West Nigeria
m the Late Nineteenth Century’, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 3, 1966, pp. 471-83,
and a more comprehensive article by Marion Johnson, ‘The Cowrie Currencies of West
Mrica.’, Journal of African History, ii, 1970, pp. 331-53-

149
An Economic History of West Africa

discovered on the East Coast around the middle of the century. Improvements in
ocean transport made it possible to deliver all these currencies at reduced cost.
European merchants, competing with each other for the purchase of produce, began
to flood the West African export market with transitional monies. Over-issue
undermined confidence and led to a fall in exchange rates with other currencies. By
the 18 80s traders in some centres needed porters to headload their small change, in
much the same way as workers in Germany needed suitcases to carry home their
weekly earnings following the depreciation of the mark in the 1920s. Third, the
collapse of transitional currencies undermined the barter system, which was closely
associated with it,' and the mythical ounce and bar trade too, though again little is
known at the moment about this aspect of African monetary history.^^
In the long run the advent of the steamship and the introduction of modern money
brought advantages to those engaged in overseas trade, principally because they
assisted the expansion of the market. Without these innovations West Africa would
certainly have become uncompetitive in international trade. The steamsliip was
cheaper per ton/mile than sail, and this was a vital consideration at a time when the
West African export trade had become centred on bulky vegetable products, which,
as noted earlier, were of low value per unit of weight compared with slaves. The
steamer was also faster than sail; in the middle of the century sailing ships took about
thirty-five days to reach West Africa, but by 1900 the steamer had reduced this time
by half. The speed of the steamship made it possible to transport a wider range of
perishable goods, and it enabled traders to complete their transactions more quickly,
thus helping them to economise on capital. Finally, the steamship, being less depen¬
dent on natural conditions than was sail, could guarantee regularity of service.
Fore-knowledge of the steamer’s arrival enabled traders to purchase and prepare
goods for shipment. Greater readiness reduced the time spent in port, and so lowered
rumiing costs.
Modern money helped to increase the number and variety of possible transactions.
British and French silver coins were almost perfect substitutes, that is to say they
were acceptable for virtually all goods and services. Africans who were paid in silver
coin for their produce received units of general purchasing power instead of a packet
of goods and transitional currencies. Export earnings could be diverted more easily
to domestic uses, or could be spent on imported goods supplied by a variety of fir ms.
African producers and traders had more freedom of choice: they were no longer tied
to the firm which bought their produce, and they enjoyed greater independence
from rulers who previously had exercised a degree of central control over export
sales and over the distribution of foreign trade earnings. It was no coincidence that
francs and shillings spread in areas where legitimate exports were developing most
quickly, and it was no coincidence either that low denomination coins were in great
demand, for they were an indication of the growing importance of small producers

Further work is also needed to clarify the consequences of the decline of transitional
currencies for African societies, particularly for fixed income groups and those wealthy enough
to hold stocks of money. It would also be interesting to know whether a depreciating exchange
rate assisted exports in the i86os and 1870s.

150
 The economic basis of imperialism

and traders in the new export economy. These men were not innocents who had a
modern money economy thrust upon them by rapacious expatriate firms; they
embraced the new system willingly because it gave them the means of striking a
better bargain.
In the short run, however, the steamship and modem money had a profoundly
unsettling effect on West African trade. Essentially, they can be regarded as external
economies which made it easier for newcomers to enter West Coast commerce. The
result was a marked increase in competition in the second half of the nineteenth
century. With the arrival of the steamship, the trader whose resources were very
limited could hire a small amount of cargo space for a short period of time. Mer¬
chants trading to West Africa did not need to buy a ship of their own, nor did they ,
have to join a consortium to charter one. Few of the established firms, apart from
Woermann, were able to convert to steam, partly because the initial capital invest¬
ment needed to build an ocean-going steamer was much greater than that required
for a sailing vessel, and partly because more working capital was needed to finance
the expansion of legitimate commerce.^® The result was that trading and carrying
became separate activities, and the established firms were less able to keep control of
new entrants than in the days when they also monopolised shipping space. Moreover,
and tliis is a feature which is often overlooked, the steamer also concentrated compe¬
tition at the ports of call, in contrast to the days of sail, when ships could adapt their
schedules to meet varying market conditions. Evidence of increasing concentration
was to be seen in the expansion of a few favoured centres, such as Dakar, Freetown
and Lagos, and, ultimately, in the decline of well-known trading stations, such as St
Louis, Cape Coast, and Opobo.
The commercial effect of the steamship has been commented on by McPhee and
subsequent writers, but the consequences of monetary change have not been fully
appreciated. The steamer brought new traders to the coast, but it could not help
them to trade once they had arrived. As long as barter and transitional currencies
remained firmly entrenched, newcomers were at a severe disadvantage, for they had
to master the complexities of a pre-industrial monetary system, itself a serious
barrier to entry; they had to acquire these strange currencies, in some cases from the
established firms; and they had to be prepared to engage both in importing and in
exporting. For example, a new trader hoping to sell cotton goods would have to take
produce in exchange, since transitional currencies were not an acceptable means of
payment in Europe. Cash payments made it possible to separate the two trades, and
enabled firms to specialise in one or other if they wished. This specialisation reduced
the capital required for entering West African trade and encouraged competition.
No wonder the old-established European firms, far from trying to ‘entangle Africans
in the web of a money economy’ strove to maintain the barter system for as long as
possible. In this respect some of the ‘natives’ of Liverpool and Marseilles were far
more conservative than those in the hinterlands of Dakar and Lagos!

C. W. Newbury, ‘Credit in Early Nineteenth-Century West African Trade’, Journal of

African History, 13, 1973, pp. 81-95.
An Economic History of West Africa

Evidence of increasing competition can be seen in the appearance of two new

groups of traders in the second half of the century. First, there were progressive
European merchants who had little or no previous connection with W^est Africa,
but who established themselves by taking advantage of the steamer and of cash
transactions. For example, Cheri Peyrissac began as a clerk at St Louis (Senegal) in
1862, and later built up a large independent import and export business based on
manufactured goods and groundnuts; the Hamburg industrial concern of G. L.
Gaiser expanded into W^est African trade in 1869 in order to secure supplies of palm
produce for its oil mills, and was one of the first firms to develop a cash trade, the
Manchester firm of John Walkden & Company started to trade with West Africa in
1868 as a mail order business, supplying manufactured goods on commission; and
John Holt, a Liverpool merchant, broke into the Niger Delta trade in the 1870s, and
later established branches in other parts of what was to become Nigeria.®^ Many of
the older firms tried to adapt to legitimate commerce, but very few lasted until the
end of the century. They had every incentive to adjust to the new conditions
because they had sunk capital into African trade, they had spent years building up
connections, and many of them were creditors of African suppliers. Thus John
Tobin, a Liverpool slave trader, pioneered the palm oil trade in the Niger Delta
early in the century. However, firms of this type were nearly all eliminated by the
steamship and by the collapse of barter. Perhaps the most spectacular rearguard
action was that fought by F. & A. Swanzy, which, with Forster & Smith, dominated
the overseas trade of the Gold Coast in the early 1850s. Swanzy s reaction to the
advent of the steamer was not to modernise their business, but to try to establish a
local monopoly of palm oil supplies. Unfortunately for them, the producers retali¬
ated by successfully boycotting the firm between 1858 and 1866.®® Swanzy’s
managed to survive, but the firm declined in importance. The steamer, it could be
said, had taken all the wind out of their sails.
^-^he second new group of merchants were Africans, consisting mainly of liberated
slaves and their descendants, men who grew up in settlements such as Freetown and
Libreville, where they were converted to Christianity, took European names, and
received some education from expatriate missionaries. These merchants, in sharp
contrast to their slave-trading predecessors, were noted for their Victorian dress,
bourgeois values and commitment to legitimate commerce. It was intended that
they should form the nucleus of an African middle class, which would develop the
continent’s economy and uplift its spiritual file. Although numerically a small
group, these liberated Africans had considerable importance in the second half of
the nineteenth century. Many of them returned to their homelands, and so made
their presence felt in most of the main urban centres on the West Coast. Furthermore,
since they became lawyers, civil servants and missionaries, as well as merchants.

On Gaiser and Holt see Ernst Hieke, G. L. Gaiser: Hamburg—Westafrica, Hamburg 1949;
and Cherry J. Gertzel, John Holt: a British Merchant in West Africa in the Era of Imperialism,
University of Oxford D.Phil. thesis, 1959.
Freda Wolfson, ‘A Price Agreement on the Gold Coast—The Krobo Oil Boycott, 1858-
1866’, Economic History Review, 6, 1953, pp. 68-77.

152
 The economic basis of imperialism

their influence spread over a wide occupational front. Essentially, their role was that
of cultural intermediaries, men who straddled the frontier between Europe and
Africa, interpreting, in the broadest sense of the word, one to the other. Europeans
often referred to them, contemptuously, as ‘trousered Africans’, and Africans have
criticised them for behaving as Uncle Toms. However, thanks to the painstaking
work of Christopher Fyfe and others, it is now appreciated (or at least it should now
be appreciated) that these were men of genuine dignity and considerable historical
significance.®® They performed an important function in introducing the Western
world to Africa, yet they were by no means as alienated from their indigenous culture
as has been alleged. They demonstrated to sceptical Europeans that Africans were
not barbarians, and they were among the first to proclaim that Africa had a history
of its own.
Helped by the steamer and by the transition to cash payments, these merchants
mostly became low-cost, import specialists, acting either as independent whole¬
salers and retailers, or as agents selling goods on commission for manufacturing
firms in Europe. Some were involved in the export trade, but the import business
was preferred because it required less capital and also spread investments over a wider
range of goods than the produce trade, which in addition experienced considerable
short-run price fluctuations. Before 1900, when trading conditions once again began
to favour large firms, a number of African merchants owned businesses which were
as large as some of the European firms, though of course the latter were much smaller
than they were to become in the twentieth century. Business profits tended to be
attracted into property and education, two assets wliich continued to appreciate
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries irrespective of political changes.
One of the most outstanding of this new generation of Africans was Richard
Blaize (1845-1904), who left Freetown in 1862 and made his business career in
Lagos.®'^ Blaize reckoned that he had earned the greater part of his fortune during
the 1860S and 1870s, and was appalled by the narrow profit margins which ruled
towards the end of the century. In the 18 80s he built a new house and shop, which
still stand on the Marina, and he also acquired ‘a landau and pair of greys with which
he drives out occasionally—footman and coachman on the box’. In 1896 a European
official estimated that Blaize was worth about ^150,000, which is a large sum even
today, when the value of the pound sterling is far less than it was in the nineteenth
century. Blaize’s business, like that of most of his African contemporaries, died with
him. However, the Blaize Memorial Institute, which was founded soon after his
death with money left by him for that purpose, still flourishes, and contributes to
what are now regarded as important functions, namely encouraging local manufac¬
turing activities and providing Africans with technical training.
These two groups of merchants will be considered in more detail in Chapter 6.
The main point to record in the present context is that there were pronounced

Christopher Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, Oxford 1962. See also Arthur T. Porter,
Creoledom, Oxford 1963, and Margaret Priestley, West African Trade and Coast Society, 1969.
A. G. Hopkins, ‘Richard Beale Blaize, 1854-1904: Merchant Prince of West Africa’,
Tarikh, i, 1966, pp. 70-9.

153
 An Economic History of West Africa

f economic rivalries among firms on the European side of the frontier, just as there
V^were among African suppliers. Competition between European firms was character¬
ised by bouts of co-operation and conflict which bore some resemblance to the
accretion-fission cycle experienced by the canoe houses of the Niger Delta. Typic¬
ally, a newcomer trying to become established in one of the West African markets
would begin by fixing his prices atlevels which weremore attractive than those of the
established firms. These firms retaliated, and a price* war followed. If this failed to
drive out the new entrant, a compromise was eventually reached which allowed
him to trade in the area on the understanding that competition was kept within
‘reasonable’ bounds. However, usually it was not long before the equilibrium was
upset once again, either by the defection of an existing firm, or by the arrival of
another outsider.
The trend was undoubtedly towards greater efficiency. In order to survive, firms
had to adjust to the advent of the steamship, and to the development of cash trans¬
actions, and they also had to make internal improvements, as did John Holt, by
employing better staff and by buying manufactures in bulk where possible. By the
last quarter of the century evidence from the Gold Coast, Dahomey, Lagos, the
Niger Delta and Old Calabar indicates that profit margins had been greatly re¬
duced. The commercial practices of the eighteenth century had finally disappeared,
and the merchants, though not all of them realised it, were, in terms of business
history, on the brink of the twentieth century, when wholesalers became accustomed
to relying on narrower margins and on a much larger turnover. In 1875, however,
the import and export market was still confined to a few coastal enclaves, and no
additional cost-reducing innovations were possible within the existing political
framework.
The adverse movement in the terms of trade in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century had a serious effect on those engaged in the difficult process of adapting to
legitimate commerce. Normal, non-violent commercial relationships started to
break down, and the ‘moral community’ of traders, already under some strain, began
to dissolve. The trade depression intensified rivalries within the various interest
groups and between African producers on the one hand, and European firms on the
other. Essentially, the dispute was over the distribution of reduced profits. The
decline in the barter terms of trade affected the European firms in West Africa as
well as primary producers. Initially, it was these firms which received lower prices
for produce in Europe, and it was up to them to try and pass on reductions to their
African suppliers. The extent to which they were successful depended on the balance
of commercial power in individual West African markets. Not surprisingly, there
was a fierce struggle in the late nineteenth century as each party sought to control the
local market and to dictate terms to the other.
Evidence from various parts of the West Coast suggests that there were five main
aspects of this struggle. None was entirely new, but each became more pronounced
during the last quarter of the century. First, there were malpractices, such as diluting
palm oil and misrepresenting the quality and length of cloth, which both sides
adopted in an attempt to secure a better bargain than could be contrived by legitimate

154
 The economic basis of imperialism

means. Second, there were demarcation disputes over functions and areas of in¬
fluence. For example, some European firms, such as the Royal Niger Company,
tried to move inland in the hope of buying export crops more cheaply from the
producers than from the coastal wholesalers.®® These moves often provoked retali¬
ation, as when traders from Brass destroyed the Niger Company’s base at Akassa in
1894. Similarly, some Africans tried to sell their oil direct to Europe. It was Ja Ja’s
threat to bypass the European middlemen in this way that was largely responsible
for his expulsion from Opobo in 1887. Third, there were serious disputes, common
everywhere at times of depression, and aggravated in the African case by the
depreciation in the value of transitional currencies, about the repayment of the ad¬
vances which European firms had made to African suppliers. Fourth, there were
deliberate interruptions to the supply of produce. The Moors withheld supplies of
gum in 1885-1886, the Yoruba closed their export markets at one time or another
during the i88os, and the Itsekiri held up palm oil exports in 1886-1887. The aim in
all cases was to force European merchants to accept the suppliers’ terms of sale, a
policy which was to be repeated in the 1930s, when West Africa’s foreign trade
underwent its next great crisis. Finally, there were arguments about escaped slaves,
many of whom sought refuge in the European colonies on the coast. Large scale
African producers and traders resented the loss of their human capital, especially at a
time when trade conditions dictated that slave labour should be fully exploited.
The outcome was a compromise which affected both parties adversely, and so
satisfied neither. Africans were hit at a time when they were unable to achieve
economies in production and transportation, and Europeans were hit at a time when
their profit margins had already been reduced by increased competition. In these
unprecedented circumstances the merchants, though traditionally suspicious of
moves to expand the role of government, which they associated with increased
regulations and additional taxes, began to press for a more active policy.®® What is
more, they also displayed an unaccustomed willingness to accept liigher taxation to
pay for action taken on their behalf. In making this decision, the merchants were
undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the cost of coercion had been greatly reduced
in the late nineteenth century by the invention of two daunting pieces of military
equipment, the Gatling gun and the Maxim gun.
The merchants’ call for action was backed, and indeed, often led, by colonial
administrators.®® Ambitious officials were well aware that posts in West Africa were
rarely springboards to fame even at the best of times, and that a trade depression was
scarcely the ideal setting for a distinguished career. They were charged with the task
of protecting trade, yet when diplomacy failed, as it frequently did, they were unable
to influence the policies of the African states which were the main trading partners

See J. E. Flint’s important study. Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria, i960.
Information about mercantile pressures can be found in many of the items listed in the
bibliography; see especially Aderibigbe, Dike, Dumett, Flint, Hopkins (1968), Latham, and
Newbury (1959, 1968, 1969 and 1972).
C. W. Newbury and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, ‘French Policy and the Origins of the Scramble
for West Mncz', Journal of African History, 10, 1969, pp. 253-76.

155
 i

An Economic History of West Africa

of the European colonies. The administration’s difficulties were increased at a time

of depression because the colonies had overheads (in the shape of public debts and
staff) which were fixed, and incomes which, because they were dependent on
customs revenues, were either Static or declining. In their own career interests and
in the cause of duty, local officials decided that a radical change of policy was re¬
quired. The missionaries, too, acting on their traditional postulate about the rela¬
tionship between commercial prosperity and the progress of Christianity in Africa,
urged the metropolitan governments to adopt more positive policies. Their views
were of some significance in the nineteenth century, though ironically the missions
were to be overtaken by the rush of events which they had helped to encourage. In
the colonial period the missionaries found themselves pushed to one side, and they
became, in political terms, mere clerical notes in the margins of erripire.
There was some confusion about what was meant by an active policy, and there
was a certain lack of reahsm about what it was expected to achieve. In broad terms,
however, the merchants and officials made five main demands, though the stress laid
on each varied at different parts of the West Coast. First, there was a call for the
imposition of law and order in places such as Senegal, the Gold Coast, Yorubaland
and the Niger Delta, where inter-state conflict was thought to be interrupting the
supply of produce and the distribution of manufactured goods. Second, there were
widespread complaints against the coastal middlemen, who were blamed (in much
the same way as Africans were later to blame the expatriate firms) for using their
monopolistic powers to impose one-sided trading contracts. Some European firms
wanted to end the ‘unproductive middleman system’; others were prepared to make
use of a reformed trading organisation providing internal free trade was established.
Third, there was pressure for the abolition of the tolls levied by African states. This
issue w'as important because the European merchants were concerned not simply to
increase the volume of produce on offer, but to see that export crops were dehvered
to the coast as cheaply as possible.
The last two demands were more positive. The fourth request, for example, was
for the construction of railways. The railway, the White Hope of the nineteenth
century, was thought to be capable of transforming the economies of West Africa,
iust as it had those of Europe. In 1879 the French adopted an ambitious scheme for
building a railway line from Senegal into the interior, and in the 1890s the British
made similar plans for their colonies. Finally, there was a realisation that the time
had come to advance the frontier of expatriate trading influence by creating a much
larger market for European goods than had ever existed before. Some expatriate
firms, as Gertzel has pointed out, were still content to remain on the coast, either
because they were willing to work through a reformed middleman system, or
because they lacked the capital to set up branches inland.®^ Others, however, and
especially the large firms, were now prepared to move inland once the government
had cleared the way. A bigger turnover was needed if profits were to grow; firm

Cherry J. Gertzel, ‘Relations between AfHcan and European Traders in the Niger Delta,
1880-1&96', Journal of African History, 3, 1962, pp. 361-6.

156
 The economic basis of imperialism

political boundaries were required to prevent trade from falling into the hands of
other European rivals; and new products had to be found to re-establish the pros¬
perity of the export trade. France and Britain hoped that there was more than fool’s
gold in the interior, and that some of the fabled wealth of the Western Sudan
would rub off on them.
It is now necessary to take a closer look at the policies of the three main European
nations "with interests in West Africa, because ultimately it was decisions made by
them which led to the partition of the continent. As far as Great Britain was con¬
cerned, her trading success appeared to support the anti-colonial arguments of Adam
Smith and Ins followers, and it was certainly hard to see what Britain could gain by
creating colonies in West Africa when she already dominated trade without them.
In contrast to a once popular view, Britain’s policy makers were not itching to
establish colonies throughout the world.®^ Britain’s chief aim in West Africa was to
maintain free trade without political involvement, and to persuade France and
Germany to do the same. Free trade, though sometimes presented as a high-minded
principle capable of bringing prosperity with honour to the comity of nations, was
in reality a passport to British supremacy. In conditions of ‘equal’ competition
Britain was likely to dominate most world markets because she could produce and
transport manufactured goods more cheaply than could any of her rivals. Given this
advantage, it is understandable that Britain was unlikely to initiate a forward policy.
At the same time, it is important to remember that the maintenance of the status
quo in West Africa depended on factors which were largely beyond Britain’s con¬
trol. If Britain’s European rivals decided not to co-operate in upholding her supre¬
macy, or if there was a serious threat to trade as a result of developments on the
African side of the frontier, then Britain might be forced to change her traditional
policy, for she had a moral obligation to support her traders in international markets.
The obligation was not binding in all cases, and it had to be judged in relation to the
wider, national interest, but it was a factor to be considered in the formulation of
policy. In 1865 a Parliamentary Committee had recommended withdrawing from
several parts of the West Coast, but by the 1880s it was realised in the metropolis
that Britain’s commitments were too large for disengagement to be possible.
Superficially, French policy appeared to have much in common with that of
Great Britain. France, like Britain, wanted to develop a flourishing and peaceful
trade with West Africa, and she was willing to work through indigenous authorities
where possible.®*^ From the 1830s she began to move towards a liberal tariff regime
on the West Coast, and she also exercised a degree of political restraint which,
broadly speaking, kept her in step with Britain. Yet it is now recognised that France

Two of the best studies of British poUcy towards Africa are Ronald Robinson and John
Gallagher with AHce Denny, Africa and the Victorians, 1961, and John D. Hargreaves, Prelude
to the Partition of West Africa, 1963. For a global perspective see D. C. M. Platt, Finance, Trade
and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815-1914, Oxford 1968.
On French pohcy see Henri Brunschwig, French Colonialism, 1871-1914: Myths and
Realities, 1966, and, for more detail on West Africa, Bernard Schnapper, La politique et le
commerce franfais dans le Golfe de Guinee de 1838 a 1871, Paris 1961.

157
An Economic History of West Africa

took the initiative in the ‘scramble’ for West Africa. Gallagher and Robinson have
argued that it was a political crisis in Egypt in 1882, a rebufffor France, which caused
her to adopt a more aggressive policy in West Africa, but so far this view, stimulating
though it is, has not been confirmed by the research it has helped to inspire.
Brunschwig has explained French expansion in terms ot a search for national prestige,
but this interpretation is not quite as helpful as it seems at first sight, since without
close definition the phrase ‘national prestige’ becomes a vague and all-embracing
concept. It will be suggested here that there was an important economic motive in
French imperialism, and that France altered her policy not because her basic aims
had changed, but because she came to realise that different means were required if
they were ever going to be achieved. This conclusion did not come as a sudden flash
of insight. It was a gradual acknowledgement of long-standing facts, namely that
with the passage of time the disparity between French and British economic pro¬
gress and global influence had increased rather than diminished, and that France was
also being overtaken in Europe by German industrial and military power.
France had long-standing, global commercial ambitions, but few of these had
been realised. Where she laboured^^it^seemed. Great Britain collected the rewards.
India and Canada were lost to Britain in the eighteenth century, and France herself
was defeated in Europe in 1815 after a series of wars which played a large part in
retarding her economic development in the nineteenth century.®^ Britain, by
contrast, emerged from the Napoleonic Wars with her industrial revolution already
under way. Since the victors of Waterloo then pressed the French into declaring the
slave trade illegal, it is not surprising that France viewed abolition as the final move
in a British plot to destroy what was left of her Atlantic commerce. Any illusions
that France had recovered her former power by the middle of the nineteenth century,
at least in Europe, were shattered by the defeat which she suffered at the hands of
Germany in 1870.
France was anxious to emulate Britain’s industrial progress, which, according to
some observers, was closely related to the growth of her trading and political
influence overseas. Africa was regarded as a hopeful starting point for a French
recovery because it was reasonably close to Europe, it had long-standing connections
with France, and, above all, it was still largely unclaimed—except, of course, by
Africans. Senegal was re-occupied in 1817, and some fortified posts were established
at Assinie, Grand Bassam and Gabon in the 1840s. These moves, together with the
conquest of Algeria in the 1830s, gave some momentum to the notion that France
had an imperial destiny in Africa: the idea of linking West and North Africa was
current in Paris long before the British began talking of joining the Cape to Cairo.
Yet France gained no spectacular successes. The fortified posts, as Schnapper has

See two essays by F. Crouzet, ‘England and France in the Eighteenth Century: a Compara¬
tive Analysis of Two Economic Growths’, in The Causes of the Industrial Revolution in England,
ed. R. M. Hartwell, 1967, pp. 139-74, ^ud ‘Wars, Blockade and Economic Change in Europe,
ijgz-iSi s’, Journal of Economic History, 24, 1964, pp. 567-88, which between them revise many
of the standard views about the French economy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries.

158
 The economic basis of imperialism

shown, achieved very little, and the expansion of legitimate commerce benefited
Britain more than any other European power. Only in Senegal was there some basis
for optimism. French commercial interests there had been saved by the fortuitous
development of the groundnut trade, and also by the adoption of measures wliich
limited the entry of foreign traders. Even in the mid-nineteenth century France had
not allowed herself to be mesmerised completely by Britain’s advocacy of the free
trade cause. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century she was to move even
closer to protectionist policies, and in doing so was to undermine the basis of Britain’s
position in West Africa.
France, unlike Britain, had an incentive to upset the status quo in West Africa.
She did not want to provoke Britain by a direct challenge, but she still had plenty of
room for manoeuvre, for it was the weakness as well as the strength of the British
position that her commercial supremacy had not been accompanied by the large
scale annexation of territory. French imperial policy in the late nineteenth century
was driven by a potent combination of forces: on the one hand by a fear that British
economic expansion, spearheaded by Manchester textiles and backed by the world’s
strongest navy, would frustrate her ambitions once again; and on the other by an
optimism about the wealth of Africa which had not been equalled since the Moroc¬
cans trekked hopefully across the desert in 1591.
German interests in West Africa will be noted briefly in order to explain their
influence on the pohcies of the two major powers.®® The German presence became a
factor of some weight in the deliberations of London and Paris during the last quarter
of the century, when, as has been pointed out, Flamburg merchants were rapidly
expanding their share of West African trade. German firms were concentrated at
some sensitive points: in Liberia, which was flanked by British interests in Sierra
Leone and French interests in the Ivory Coast; in what was to become Togoland, a
thin wedge of territory between the Gold Coast and Dahomey, centres of British
and French activity respectively; in Dahomey itself, where they had succeeded in
capturing the greater part of the region’s overseas trade by the 1880s; and in what
were to become Southern Nigeria and the Cameroons, which coincided with
Britain’s major trading interests in Lagos, the Niger Delta, and Old Calabar. In the
18 80s the German government made an increasing show of protecting its traders on
the West Coast, partly as a result of direct mercantile pressures, and partly as an off¬
shoot of a campaign for tariff protection started by industrialists in response to the
onset of the Great Depression.®® Britain and France regarded the German presence
as a serious threat to their own West African interests, and feared that a forward
move by her might result in the exclusion of their trading firms from the unclaimed
markets of Africa. For France, already worried about British commercial dominance,
this new danger appeared to justify a more decisive, forward policy, for Britain,

For further information see Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial
Rule, ed. Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis, New Haven 1967.
s®'Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, ‘Germany’s Colonial Expansion under Bismarck’,
Past & Present, 42, 1969, pp. 140-59; and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ‘Bismarck’s Imperialism 1862.-
1890’, Past & Present, 48, 1970, pp. 131-9.

159

6*
An Economic History of West Africa

slowly waking up to the fact that the era of laissez-faire might not last indefinitely, it
meant that she had to consider defensive action against two ambitious rivals, not
just one.
The demands made by British and French merchants were very similar, but rivalry
between the European powers meant that they did not co-ordinate their policies to
produce a joint invasion of Africa, though gentlemen’s agreements were occasionally
made with regard to specific areas. On the contrary, the economic crisis between
1875 and 1900 intensified the antagonism between Britain and France, and led to
competition for African territory. There were two main features of this rivalry. The
first was characterised by a more aggressive element in the relationship between
British and French firms. The foundation of the Compagnie Fran9aise de I’Afrique
Equatoriale in 1880 and the Compagnie du Senegal in the following year marked a
new phase in French efforts to break into richer and predominantly British markets
in West Africa.®'^ These firms started trading in the Niger Delta, quickly established
branches as far as the River Benue, and threatened to expand further still into what is
now northern Nigeria. This enterprising exercise of the rights of free trade caused
Britain some initial embarrassment. However, the French could not' compete for
long against the might of the National African Company, which bought out the
French firms in 1884.®® This episode demonstrated that British supremacy could not
be challenged successfully by purely commercial means, at least by France. The
French did not give up their hopes of penetrating the interior from the Guinea coast,
but future efforts were to be launched from bases in their own colonies of Dahomey
and the Ivory Coast, and were to be directed by soldiers rather than by traders.
The second feature of Anglo-French commercial rivalry was growing friction
over areas of customs jurisdiction and levels of tariffs. The economic crisis of the late
nineteenth century intensified the search for revenue, and led officials to extend the
boundaries of their colonies, sometimes with, but usually without, instructions from
the metropolis. These moves caused serious disputes, as rival administrations,
expanding laterally along the coast, met each other, as they did for example in the
area of Sierra Leone, on the Gold Coast, and at the frontier between Dahomey and
Lagos. At the same time France began to adopt differential tariffs in West Africa as a
means of increasing revenue and assisting her trade. The shift to a more protectionist
policy was mainly a result of pressure from French metallurgical, textile and chemical
industries, which had difficulty m competing with British products in world mar¬
kets.®® Many of the traders in centres such as Nantes, Bordeaux and Marseilles were
opposed to protection to begin with, but were won over in the 18 80s. Differential
tariffs were imposed in Senegal in 1877 and in the Ivory Coast in 1889. Britain, of
course, protested that these actions were contrary to the principles of free trade. The

C. W. Newbury, ‘The Development of French PoUcy on the Lower and Upper Niger,
1880-98’, Journal of Modern History, 31, 1959, pp. 16-26.
Tliis firm began Ufe as the United African Company in 1879, became the National
African Company in 1882, and finally turned itself into the Royal Niger Company in 1886.
C. W. Newbury, ‘The Protectionist Revival in French Colonial Trade: the Case of
Senegal’, Economic History Review, 21, 1968, pp. 337-48.

160
 The economic basis of imperialism

French replied that tariffs in British colonies already had a differential effect because
they were high on certain goods, such as brandy and wine, which were mainly
French, and low on textiles, which were mainly British. By the i88os the concept of
free trade in West Africa was coming under attack, and the weak spots in Britain’s
empire of informal rule were being revealed.
In Britain, France and Germany West African affairs were taken up by specialised
organisations, such as chambers of commerce, and by an assortment of more
broadly-based imperial movements which were developing rapidly in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century.'^® The chambers of commerce in Liverpool,
Manchester, Bordeaux, Marseilles and Hamburg publicised African problems in the
press, lobbied local members of parliament, and made direct contact with leading
figures in the government. Outside the chambers of commerce African questions
were drawn into a variety of campaigns: some dominated by economic interest
groups which, without necessarily having any specific involvement in Africa, were
agitating in France for protectionist measures, and in Britain for what, more circum¬
spectly, was called ‘fair’ trade others led by politicians who saw imperialism as a
means of saving Europe from socialism; and others still, headed by geographers,
journalists, intellectuals and sundry eccentrics, who were beginning to talk in some¬
what mystical terms about the relationship between empire and national greatness.
Of course, the imperial movement was by no means united. Some industrialists
wanted colonies in order to create guaranteed markets for their exports, but others
were indifferent to colonial expansion because in the late nineteenth century, with
the terms of trade moving against primary producers, they were able to buy raw
materials cheaply.
It is clear that further research is needed to identify all the channels of communica¬
tion which existed between the men on the spot in Africa and those who formally
announced decisions in London and Paris, and to evaluate the extent to which
politicians were susceptible to pressures from pro-imperial interest groups represent¬
ing what might be called the ‘unofficial mind’ of imperialism.'^^ At present it can be
said that governments were subjected to considerable and increasing pressures in
the later nineteenth century, and that these pressures were more effective in France
than in Britain because French businessmen were less divided by entrenched commit¬
ments to free trade, and were more inclined to put their faith, if not always their
investments, in imperial expansion.
What seems beyond dispute is that those in power in France were more inclined to
take notice of imperial pressure groups than were those in Britain. Under the Third

Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform, i960.

The best general study is still B. H. Brown, The Tariff Reform Movement in Great Britain,
1881-95, New York 1943. For a case study of one area see R. J. Ward, The Tariff Reform
Movement in Birmingham, 1877-1906, University of London M.A. thesis, 1971.
■^2 Two interesting local studies are John F. Laffey, ‘The Roots of French Imperialism m the
Nineteenth Century: the Case of Lyon’, French Historical Studies, 6, 1969, pp. 78-92, and W.
Thompson, Glasgow and Africa: Connexions and Attitudes, 1870-1900, University of Strathclyde
Ph.D. thesis, 1970.

161
An Economic History of West Africa

Republic the political influence of provincial businessmen increased, and a group of

leaders emerged, such as Freycinet, Jaureguiberry and Rouvier, who were prepared
not merely to be influenced by others, but actually to direct the movement for
colonial expansion^® In Britain, by contrast, policy-makers in both parties were
reluctant to admit that circumstances had altered, and that attitudes would have to
change too. In the i88os British policy was still based on two estabHshed notions:
first, an unrealistic optimism about the possibility of equalising tariffs and preserving
free trade, an optimism which France was happy to encourage while her troops
advanced inland; and second, a belief in the value of appeasement, that is the distribu¬
tion of other peoples’ territories in the hope of stabilising an inherently unstable
situation. Since the facts refused to change, no matter how long British politicians
kept their eyes closed, it was the pohticians themselves who eventually had to
modify their traditional attitudes towards empire. By the 1890s both Liberals and
Conservatives were beginning to recognise that a more active policy was required if
any ofBritain’s traditional spheres ofinfluenceinWest Africa weretobe preserved. It
would be a mistake to think that Joseph Chamberlain came, like a bolt from the blue,
and created, single-handed, a new attitude towards imperial affairs. Nevertheless, it
was not until he became Colonial Secretary in 1895 that Britain had a Rouvier of
her own.
^By the time Britain had decided that a more positive policy was needed, the
partition of West Africa was well under way. In 1879 the French began to advance
across the Western Sudan from Senegal, reaching Bamako (six hundred miles inland)
in 1883, Timbuctu in 1893, and Lake Chad (two thousand miles from Dakar) in 1900.
At the same time, the invasion forces branched south, striking deep into the Fouta
Djallon (later part of French Guinea), the Ivory Coast and Dahomey, and meeting
the northwards advance of French troops from the Guinea coast. As a result of this
strategy, tight boundaries were drawn around the coastal settlements of Gambia,
Sierra Leone and Liberia. In the niid-i88os Germany made two relatively unam¬
bitious forward moves, one into Togo (between the Gold Coast and Dahomey), and
one into the Cameroons (on the eastern flank of the Niger Delta). By the mid-i890s
France had successfully claimed the greater part of West Africa, and Britain was left
with the task of defending her two most important interests; the Gold Coast and
what was to become Nigeria. The former, as Dumett has shown, was saved for
Britain mainly as a result of mercantile pressure.Kumasi, the Ashanti capital, was
captured in 1896, and expansion further north gave Britain a sizeable colony. In the
case of Nigeria, it was again successful mercantile agitation in the 1890s that kept the
French out of Yorubaland and the Lower Niger.'^® Conspicuous in the latter area

C. M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, ‘The French “Colonial Party”: its Compo¬

sition, Aims and Influence, 1885-1914’, The Historical Journal, 14, 1971, pp. 99-128.
R. A. Dumett, British Official Attitudes to Economic Development on the Gold Coast, 1874-
1905, University of London Ph.D. thesis, 1966, pp. 149-80.
A. G. Hopkins, ‘Economic Imperialism in West Africa: Lagos, 1880-92’, Economic
History Review, 21, 1968, pp. 580-606, and Flint, Sir George Goldie, chs 10, ii and 12.
The economic basis of imperialism

163
An Economic History of West Africa

was the Royal Niger Company, which, in the classical manner of chartered com¬
panies, used administrative as well as commercial weapons to drive out its competi¬
tors, English as well as French. By 1900 the partition of West Africa was over.

3 An explanation of imperialism in West Africa

The invasion of West Africa occurred in such a short space of time, and marked such
a radical break with past policy, that historians have been tempted to fasten on'
specific military or diplomatic events as causes. Some writers have emphasised the
importance of the Egyptian crisis of 1882, or of the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.
Others have drawn attention to the rise of particular military and political figurfesr
men who were keen to do more than merely chalk hopeful arrows on departmental
maps. A number of names come to mind; the French Prime Minister, Freycinet;
his Minister of Marine, Admiral Jaureguiberry; the British Secretary of State for the
Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain; and men on the spot, such as Archinard, Gallieni,
Goldie and Lugard. These events and these men undoubtedly played 4 part, and in
some cases a very important part, in determining the timing and the nature of the
partition of West Africa, but their responsibility for causing it was of much the same
Order as that of the unfortunate Archduke Franz Ferdmand, whose assassination
sparked off the First World War. The central problem is to clarify the circumstances
which enabled these prominent politicians and soldiers to make a mark on history
where others before them, men of similar ambitions, such as Faidherbe and Glover,
had been frustrated.
This chapter has tried to show that the solution to this problem lies in the economic
history of the nineteenth century. Economic motives do not constitute a complete
analysis of imperialism, but there is considerable justification for concentrating on
them here because on the whole they have been neglected in the past. This neglect is
understandable in view of the current dominance of political and diplomatic interpre¬
tations of imperialism, but it has the fundamental disadvantage of abstracting from
West African realities. Trade first brought the Europeans to Africa in the fifteenth
century, and trade remained the basis of their relations with the continent from then
onwards. It is the economic historian’s task to see whether, and, if so, in what ways,
commercial ties were related to the scramble for Africa.
What happened to Africa was part of a global confrontation between the develop¬
ing and the underdeveloped countries in the nineteenth century, though the nature
of the interaction between them, and its outcome, varied in different parts of the
world. The economic expansion of Europe in the nineteenth century had a profound
and destabilising effect on West Africa because it changed the structure of export
production and involved the region in the trade cycle of the new, industrial economy.
The Afro-European alliance which had made the external slave trade possible and
profitable started to dissolve early in the nineteenth century. A new generation of
African producers and traders began to develop outside the limits of the old, foreign
trade enclaves, but was miable to establish a completely satisfactory partnership with
 The economic basis of imperialism

merchants on the European side of the frontier. In some cases difficulties arose
because of obstruction from traditional rulers, but even where the indigenous
authorities were willing to co-operate, and achieved a measure of success in doing so,
there were Hmits to the concessions which they were prepared to make. In the event,
time was also against them. During the early, prosperous phase of ‘legitimate’
commerce, each side could afford to tolerate the economic imperfections (real and
alleged) of the other, and it seemed possible that economic integration could be
achieved by informal means. But the serious decline in the terms of trade in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century upset the precarious balance which maintained the
frontier between Europe and West Africa. Those on the European side of the
frontier had no further scope for improving their efficiency, and they now feared
that West Africa, with its pre-industrial transport system and its numerous tolls, was
in danger of becoming, by international standards, a high-cost producer. Those on
the African side of the frontier decided that if modernisation meant railways, the end
of internal customs duties and the abolition, for whatever reasons, of slavery, then it
also meant the end of their political independence. At that point they decided to
resist and to defend their sovereignty, though there were some who, for reasons
which have been indicated, were less than wholehearted in their opposition to
European demands.
The economic depression transmitted by the industrial nations caused England,
France and Germany to come into conflict with each other, as well as with African
states. Their rivalry was partly a reflection of shifts in the balance of economic and
political power in Europe following industrialisation, and partly the outcome of
particular problems which arose during the Great Depression. These problems
affected interest groups in the leading industrial states, as well as merchants trading
to the West Coast. The extent to which interest groups succeeded in generating a
forward policy depended on the strength of the pressure they exerted and on the
responsiveness of those in power at the time. Reasons have been advanced under both
headings to explain why, in the case of West Africa, it was France rather than Britain
which took the initiative. The resolution of the problems which led to partition can
be seen in the creation of colonial economies in the first half of the twentieth
century.
It is for future research to elaborate and improve the analysis advanced here, and
also to modify it, where necessary. The aim of this chapter has been to establish a
framework of analysis which contains the main variables, but not, it must be
stressed, to rank them in a fixed order of importance applicable to every point on the
West Coast. At one extreme it is possible to conceive of areas where the transition
from the slave trade was made successfully, where incomes were maintained, and
where internal tensions were controlled. In these cases an explanation of partition
will need to emphasise external pressures, such as mercantile demands and Anglo-
French rivalries. At the other extreme it is possible to envisage cases where the
indigenous rulers adopted reactionary attitudes, where attempts were made to
maintain incomes by predatory means, and where internal conflicts were pro¬
nounced. In these cases an explanation of imperialism will need to place more weight

165
An Economic History of West Africa

on disintegrative forces on the African side of the frontier, though without neglect¬
ing external factors. Current contributions to the study of nineteenth-century
imperialism frequently fail either to take adequate account of interests and attitudes
on the indigenous side of the frontier with the Western world, or to organise local
case studies in such a way as to permit systematic comparisons with other parts of
other continents. The typology established here, based on the identification and
interaction of interest groups, may prove useful in understanding the decisions
which regulated the frontier between the industrial powers and the Third World in
the nineteenth century.

l66
five

An economic model of
colonialism

The colonial era has ceased to be regarded as the sole substance of African history,
and there are sound reasons for thinkins: that colonial rule itself had a less dramatic
and a less pervasive economic impact than was once supposed. Little more than half
a century elapsed between the end of the partition of West Africa and the beginning
of independence. The first fifteen years of this period were devoted to pacifying
recalcitrant peoples, the last fifteen years were spent trying to cope with African
nationahsm, and the intervening years provide plenty of evidence of the super¬
ficiality and impermanence of colonial rule, even though this was the time when
the rulers themselves beheved that their paternal control would remain unchal¬
lenged for several centuries.
Nevertheless, a good case can still be made out for according the colonial era
separate treatment on economic as well as, more obviously, on political grounds,
quite apart from the organisational necessity of allotting enough space to treat, with
some pretence at adequacy, the vast amount of description, analysis and polemic
which this period had generated. Essentially, and expressed in terms of the main
theme of this study, colonialism marked a new, and, broadly speaking, expansionist
phase in the evolution of the modem market economy: its main achievement was to_
remove the constraints which had hindered the development of the export sector in
The nineteemFcentury. Of courseTthe colonial economy also had its limitations in
' terms "^of inherent ^ficiencies and of expectations which it aroused, yet seemed
incapable of satisfying. As the colonial period advanced, the limitations appeared, in
the eyes of African participants and an increasing number of sympathetic foreign
observers, to outweigh the advantages, and the expectations began to find political
expression. The colonial economy was not, however, a changeless economy, and it
started to acquire important new features (notabl.Y.iL^uh&tjgR,tial public sector_and
modem manufacturing plantl, shortly before the coming of independence in the
period 1957-1960. The beginning of tins novef, and still uncompleted, phase in
WesF Africa’s economic history (and its relation to the process of decolonisation)
serves as an appropriate terminal point for the present study.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a synoptic view of the evolution of the
colonial economies of West Africa between 1900 and i960. It will fixst present an
economic model of colonialism, which is intended to carry further the analysis begun

167
An Economic History of West Africa

in Chapter 4, where the rise of legitimate commerce was considered in terms of

staple theory, and it will then outline the statistical basis for charting the progress of
the export economy. The aim of this approach is to provide analytical and chrono¬
logical anchorage points for the detailed, discussion which follows in Chapters 6
and 7.^

1 Open and closed economies

The analytical framework adopted here is derived from a model formulated by

Professor Dudley Seers, originally with reference to Latin America.^,Seers suggests
that coimtries whose exports are heavily dependent on primary products can be
placed in one of two categories, known as ‘open’ and ‘closed’ economies. An open
economy was already beginning to emerge in West Africa in the second half of the
ninteenth century, and it developed fully in the first half of the twentieth century.
Before considering the main structural features of this type of economy, three pre¬
liminary points need to be borne in mind. First, notions of open and closed economies
are ideal types, which approximate to reality but which are not identical to it. Some
general modifications will be incorporated into the discussion which follows, and
specific qualifications will be made in the next two chapters. Second, Seers was
interested primarily in the transition to a closed economy. This was a phase of
evolution which did not occur in West Africa until around the time of indepen¬
dence, and then only in a few countries. The interpretation presented here will use
the concept of an open economy to analyse the colonial period as a whole, and not
merely its final years. Third, Seers was concerned almost exclusively with the export
sector. This pre-occupation will also be followed in Chapter 6 of the present work,
but in Chapter 7 the analysis will be enlarged to take account of internal economic
activities. It is hoped that these amendments will assist an understanding of the
historical development of the West African economy, without at the same time
doing an injustice to Seers’s original schema.
Coimtries in the open phase of development have the following principal charac¬
teristics.® First, they export a limited range of agricultural and mineral products in
exchange for a variety of manufactures, chiefly consumer goods. Second, expatriate
interests usually dominate one or more sectors of the economy. In West Africa this
domination was especially marked in overseas (but not internal) trade. Third, the
major industrial powers are able to exert considerable influence on economic policy,

^ Students requiring an explanatory economics text to accompany this and the following
two chapters are advised to consult H. W. Ord and I. Livingstone, An Introduction to West
African Economics, 1969.
^ Dudley Seers, ‘The Stages of Economic Development of a Primary Producer in the
Middle of the Twentieth Century’, Economic Bulletin of Ghana, 7, 1963, pp. 57-69.
® It must be emphasised that this paragraph, and the two which follow, present a formal
statement of an ideal-type rather than a description of historical reality.

168
 An economic model of colonialism

and in the case of colonies are able to control it completely. The chief aim of expatri¬
ate policy is to assist the flow of primary products, and to keep the door open for the
sale of manufactured goods. Hence tariffs are kept low, though differential duties
and quotas are sometimes imposed in order to restrict the entry of goods manufac¬
tured by rival industrial powers. Otherwise, there are few, if any, restrictions on the
volume of imports apart from the limit set by the purchasing power of local con¬
sumers. Fourth, the metropolitan power aims at minimising its fiscal obligations, and
expects its colonies to balance their budgets without external assistance. Fifth, an
open economy has a monetary system which is an appendage of that of the major
power, while banking arrangements are concerned mainly with financing the activi¬
ties of the expatriate firms. The system assists the development of trade with the
major power, without involving that power in any monetary responsibilities
towards its colony or satellite trading partner.
The long-term rate of growth in an ideal-type open economy is determined by
two major variables; the size of export proceeds and the income-elasticity of
demand for imports (that is, the degree of responsiveness of demand for imports to
changes in income). Export proceeds form a high proportion of national income,
though far less than do earnings from internal economic activities, and are commonly
subject to pronomiced fluctuations.^ Instability results on the one hand from varia¬
tions in supply caused, typically, by changes in the weather and by adverse political
conditions,® and on the other from factors governing the demand for tropical agri¬
cultural products in the industrial countries. West African countries have to accept
the world price as given, even though they supply a considerable proportion of the
cocoa, palm produce and groundnuts entering international trade. Cocoa prices are
especially affected by changes in the size of the harvest, while palm produce and
groundnut prices are greatly influenced by the fact that these commodities are to
some extent substitutes, and so compete against each other (and against alternative
oils and fats) in the world market. At the same time, the prices of all West Africa’s
agricultural exports reflect changes in the level of incomes in the industrial countries,
as determined by the general state of business activity. A large proportion of the
incomes which producers derive from exports is spent on imported consumer goods.
Demand for imports tends to be highly income-elastic for three main reasons. In the
first place, as incomes rise the proportion of the increase spent on manufactures
grows, while that spent on food undergoes a relative decline.® Second, consumer
tastes in the key importing areas are influenced to a considerable extent by standards
set by advertising, by Westernised Africans and by the expatriate community.

^ Though the degree of instabihty experienced by the underdeveloped countries should not
be exaggerated. See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries, 1966,
pp. 58-64.
® The importance of variations on the supply side has been stressed by Alasdair MacBean,
Export Instability and Economic Development, 1966.
® For a specific investigation of this tendency see Rowena Lawson, ‘Engel’s Law and its
Apphcation to Ghana’, Economic Bulletin of Ghana, 5, 1962, pp. 34-46.

169
An Economic History of West Africa

Third, manufactured goods have to be imported because the open economy has few
modern industries of its own.
Thus, the open economy responds readily to external influences. Any increase or
decrease in export earnings will be accompanied by a roughly parallel movement in
expenditure on consumer imports. Quantitative changes occur easily enough, but
qualitative, structural transformation is far more difficult. The circularity of the
system is reinforced by restrictions on the volume of investment, which is limited by
the level of export earnings, by the tendency for capital to be leaked abroad, by the
cautious nature of bank-lending policy, by 'the colonial tradition of maintaining a
balanced budget, anxl by the conservative attitude of the large expatriate firms. Such
investment as there is in an open economy tends to be directed into the existing
export sector rather than towards new projects outside it. t
Although Seers was not concerned in his original article to explore possible
variations in types of open economy, it is important for present purposes to recogmse
that certain distinctions can be made, and that these are necessary for a more precise
understanding of the way in which a particular kind of open economy functions.
One striking difference is that between economies in which export production has an
indigenous base, as was the case in colonial West Africa, India and Burma, and those
where the export sector is dominated by expatriate lyjping or plantation enterprises,
as in parts of Central and East Africa, and in South-East Asia."^ This difference cor¬
responds roughly to Hancackls_distinction between traders’ and settlers’ frontiers,
tEongb ir-shnn1d be remembered tharexport produCCTPrrtair’hF^ controlIed~'h'y
expatriate interests, akintEe Con^o, without necessarily Hemg 'asS'SaateJ^thlarge-
scale white settlement. These two categories of open economy display marked con¬
trasts in the size of the units of production, in the sources of capital supply, in the
complexity of technology, in the numbers employed in the export sector, and in the
distribution of export proceeds.® Above all, their ability to generate additional
productive employment in the domestic economy is by no means the same. In West"
Africa, where ‘peasant’ production dominated the export sector, the foreign-trade
multiplier was stronger and the capacity for structural change greater than in some
other parts of the world, where the classical, enclave economy developed.® The
economic distinction between peasant and plantation economies is profound enough
to have far-reaching social and political consequences. For example, because there
were at most only about 130,000 transient Europeans in the whole of West Africa at
any one time, racial conflict was minimised. In comparison with many other parts of

Two excellent studies of East Africa, which are invaluable for comparative purposes, are
Cyril Ehrlich, ‘The Uganda Economy, 1903-1945’, and C. C. Wrigley, ‘Kenya: the Patterns
of Economic Life, 1902-1945’, both in History of East Africa, 2, ed. Vincent Harlow and E. M.
Chilver, 1965, pp. 395-475 and pp. 209-64 respectively.
® For an early statement of these differences see H. W. Singer, ‘The Distribution of Gains
Between Investing and Borrowing Countries’, American Economic Reuiew, 40, 1950, pp. 473-85.
For a broader and more recent survey see Hla Myint, The Economics of the Developing Countries,
1964, chs 3 and 4.
® This proposition is developed in Chapter 7.
 An economic model of colonialism

the world, the political struggle which arose towards the close of the colonial era
was on the whole orderly and evolutionary. In contrast to Rhodesia, there was no
movement to keep Nigeria white. Knowledge of these differences must affect the
evaluation of foreign rule in the underdeveloped world, and must throw serious
doubts on the wisdom of attempting to generalise about the costs and benefits of
colonialism without close reference to the particular region concerned. The question
of why the traders’ rather than the settlers’ frontier should have dominated West
Africa is thus no mere antiquarian issue. A reappraisal of the problem will be made
in the chapter which follows.
Closed economies, though still heavily dependent on exports of primary products,
are distinguished, as their name implies, by the adoption of measures designed to
diminish their rehance on external influences and to assist diversification. First,
expatriate dominance of some sectors of the economy is subjected to regulations of
varying kinds, ranging from controls over the issue of profits, to nationalisation,
and even expulsion. Second, though external interests may still bring pressure to bear
on the government, economic policy is more firmly in the hands of the indigenous
authorities. Increased independence is reflected in the imposition of exchange
controls, which are designed to stem the leakage of capital overseas, and in the
adoption of import restrictions, which are aimed at encouraging domestic manu¬
facturing activity and non-factor services. Third, closed economies usually have
their own monetary system headed by a central bank. This means that the supply of
money can be increased without an equivalent amount of foreign exchange having
to be acquired first of all, that a contra-cyclical policy can be operated to moderate
the effects of extreme booms and slumps, and that the techniques of deficit financing
can be used for development purposes.
The transition to a closed economy in West Africa followed the attainment of
political independence in the period 1957-1960, though not all countries have been
able to close their open economies, and some have not been concerned to do so. Two
comments about the process of transition need to be made at this point. First, political
independence was i^elfdq^selj linked to particular stage in the development of the
open economy. It will be argued in Chapter 7 that the motivation and timing of the
movementfor political independence were related to the inability of the colonial
system to cope with the demands ihade upon it. it is important to stress that this
-Failure^drdliot occuTsimpTyTecau^he open economy was immobile and un-
' fespohstve,’popuiar though ^^view ’nnght^be. On the contrary, the West African
vaflilit orthis ^onomy showed some ability to raise incomes and finance diversifica¬
tion, especially in the period after the Second World War. The problem was rather
that African expectations were expanding too fast to be contained within a colonial
system, whatever its attributes. Second, the history of West Africa since indepen¬
dence has demonstrated that the closed econoi^js not necessarily a tneanpo
economic progress. ThcT doijed'^e^JfioniyTfmgs new possibilities, but with these
'"come hew dangers: exchange controls may discourage investment; import restric¬
tions combined with the operation of an independent monetary system may
lead to shortages of consumer goods and to inflation; and political pressures for
 An Economic History of West Africa

development may induce the new rulers to make concessions in the form of wages,
jobs and contracts, which in turn may lead to external debts and to internal
- inefficiencies^”

2 The performance of the open economy, 1900—60

The liistory of the open economy in West Africa will now be outlined by surveying
the statistical data relating to the value and volume of overseas commerce, the
direction of trade, the nature of the main exports and imports, the geographical
location of the export sector, and the terms of trade. These figures are subject to
quite a wide margin of error, as indeed are all statistics relating to the underdeveloped
world. Nevertheless, they provide an indispensable guide to the recent economic
history of West Africa, and one, moreover, which is not readily available in second¬
ary publications. Only a summary view is attempted here; it is hoped that other
economic historians will soon begin to explore the relevant primary sources in
greater detail.
It is clear that there was a substantial growth in the value and volume'of overseas
trade, and that the period of colonial rule gave a considerable boost to an economy
which, as argued in Chapter 4, was already begiiming to expand, but which ap¬
peared to have reached its ceiling in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
However, it is not easy to measure changes in the real value of trade. The figures
usually cited by historians fail to take account of the fall in the value of sterling and
the franc in the twentieth century, especially after 1914. If some very approximate
adjustments are made to the uncorrected money values recorded in the primary
sources, then it appears that in real terms the value of West Africa’s overseas trade
increased about fifteen times between I906-I9i0an3 1955-1959. The rate of expan¬
sion,'tEough imeven, was certainlyTapdj being about lourtimes as great as in the
preceding period of comparable length between 1850-1855 and 1901-1905. Imports
tended to follow the path taken by exports for the greater part of the colonial era.
Deficits in the visible balance of trade were possible, and were almost the rule in
French West Africa after 1925. Until 1945 these deficits were small, and were met by
capital transfers from the metropolis, so that the overall balance of payments was in
surplus. After the Second World War, however, the relationship between visible
import and export values became far more tenuous, and imports began to exceed
exports by a considerable amount, a development which was made possible by
greater capital aid from external sources, and by the expenditure of reserves built up
in the 1940s and 1950s. The change in the composition of the balance of payments
indicates that the open economy was no longer operating in its purest form.

An important case study of these tendencies can be found in Douglas Rimmer, ‘Th^,
Crisis in the Ghana Economy’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 4, 1966, pp. 17-32.
The evidence which follows has been derived mainly from Board of Trade, League of
Nations and United Nations pubhcations, details of which are given in the bibUography.
After 1945 in the case of French West Africa, and after 1955 m the case of the British
territories.

172
 An economic model of colonialism

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173
 ♦

An Economic History of West Africa

The volume of overseas trade grew about ten times between 1906-1910 and I955~
1959.13 Two of the most spectacular increases were Gold Coast cocoa exports,
which rose from a few hundred tons a year in the 1890s to 305,000 tons in 1936/1937,
a figure which was not exceeded until 1959/1960, and groundnut products from
Senegal, which averaged around 50,000 tons in the 1890s, and reached a peak of
723,000 tons in 1937. Until about 1945 import and export volumes tended to move
together, but after the Second World War imports were on the whole greater than
exports, as Figure 2 illustrates with reference to French West Africa. This trend was
the result of a change in the composition of the import trade to include a larger
proportion of heavy capital goods and ancillaries, such as cement and petrol.
Trends in the direction of overseas commerce are not easy to assess precisely,
mainly because of the difficulty of accounting for re-exports. In broatl terms, how¬
ever, it can be said that the trade of the colonies became increasingly oriented towards
the ruling power in the period following partition, though in the eyes of the more
fervent protectionists and fair traders the immediate results were not entirely
satisfactory.
In 1898 about 40 per cent of the total trade of French West Africa was conducted
with France. By 1930 this figure had crept up to about 50 per cent, chiefly as a result
of the expansion of the Senegalese groundnut industry, which was dominated by
French merchants and by French markets. France also remained the most important
trading partner of the tiny, British colony of Gambia, again because she bought
virtually the whole of the groundnut crop. However, in some of her own colonies,
such as Guinea, the Ivory Coast and Dahomey, France had only a minor share of
total trade. It was not until the 1930s, with the adoption of protectionist measures,
that commercial ties between France and her West African colonies as a whole were
greatly strengthened. Between 1935 and i960 roughly 75 per cent of the total trade
of French West Africa was conducted with France. This gain, which was especially
marked in the case of exports to West Africa, was made largely at the expense of
Britain and other countries in the sterling zone.
After about 1900 Britain conducted more trade with her West African colonies
than with other parts of West Africa. This alignment contrasted with the position
in the nineteenth century, though of course it should be remembered that the size
of these colonies had increased as a result of the partition of Africa. Between 1900
and 1930 Britain supplied about 75 per cent of British West Africa’s imports and
received approximately 50 per cent of her colonies’ exports. There was still room for
other trading nations within the British empire: German firms in particular made
good use of the opportunities presented by the expansion of British rule in West
Africa, especially through their domination of the palm kernel trade. Although
these firms were expelled from the British colonies during the two World Wars, they
showed remarkable resilience in re-estabHshing themselves thereafter. The imposi¬
tion of quotas in the 1930s helped Britain to maintain her share of the import trade

The expansion of exports from Nigeria, whose products were broadly representative of
West Africa as a whole, is shown in Figure i.

174
 An economic model of colonialism

__Price

Figure i. Nigeria: Indices of Export Volume and Price, 1911-60.

(base 1953 = 100)

(Source: G. K. Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic

Growth in Nigeria, Homewood, Illinois 1966, table IV-A-2, pp. 494-5.)

Exports
Imports

Figure 2. French West Africa: Indices of the Volume of

Overseas Trade, 1925-55.
(base 1949 = 100)

(Source: J.-J. Poquin, Les relations economiques exterieures des pays

d'Afrique noire de Vunion frangaise, 1925-1955, Paris 1957, tables IV
and V, pp. 24 and 27.)

175
An Economic History of West Africa

to West Africa, and the Second World War effectively eliminated competitors in
the export trade, with the result that by 1945 Britain, like France, accounted for
about three-quarters of the total overseas commerce of her West African colonies.
Unlike France, however, Britain’s dominance became less marked in the later
1940s, and by i960 she was responsible for only about half the imports and half the
exports of her possessions in West Africa. It is interesting to note that in the import
trade the main beneficiary of Britain’s decline was Japan, the country whose com¬
petitive threat to the Lancashire textile industry had been an important motive for
the introduction of the quota system before the Second World War.
The growth of-the export sector was based principally on agricultural and forest
products, most of which were either established staples, such as palm oil, palm kernels
and groundnuts, or had been introduced in an experimental way before the expan¬
sion of European rule, as was the case with cocoa and coffee. There were a few excep¬
tions, such as mineral exports from Sierra Leone, but these qualify the generahsation
rather than disprove it. Evidence regarding the composition of exports, it is sugges¬
ted, supports the argument developed in the previous chapter that the chief purpose
of colonial rule was to speed a process of economic change which was already under
way. Indeed, for some colonies, notably Gambia and Dahomey, there is a sense in
which it can be said that the era of legitimate commerce survived virtually untouched
throughout the colonial period! Even in Liberia, the one independent country in
West Africa, the nineteenth-century pattern of trade was not disturbed until the
1940S, when rubber came to dominate the export list. To the extent that there was
some diversification of exports, then it affected the huge Federation of French West
Africa less profoundly and at a later date than it did the three main British colonies.
In the first half of the colonial period (1900-1930) about three-quarters of the value
of all overseas exports from French West Africa were derived from groundnuts
(50-60 per cent), which were farmed in Senegal, and palm products (15-20 per cent),
which came mainly from Dahomey. These two exports underwent a relative decline
in the second half of the period (1930-1960), and especially after the Second World
War. In the 1950s groundnuts and groundnut oil still accounted for about 3 o per cent
of total exports, but palm products had fallen away to about 5 per cent.. The decline
was the result of the expansion of coffee and cocoa exports from the Ivory Coast.
Coffee production was of little importance before the Second World War, but it
developed rapidly after 1946, and in the 1950s accounted for 25-30 per cent of all
exports from the Federation. Cocoa exports increased more slowly, and rose from
about 10 per cent to about 15 per cent of the total during the same period. At the time
of independence in i960 the two older staples and the two newer ones together
accounted for roughly 75 per cent of all exports. Mineral exports were insignificant
during the colonial period, and in 1955 were responsible for only 4 per cent of total
export values. Nevertheless', by the late 1950s it was clear that minerals, especially
iron ore from Mauritania and bauxite from Guinea, would become increasingly
important in the era of independence.
In British West Africa palm products accounted for about 50 per cent of the value
pf total exports at the beginmng of the period of colonial rule, dropped to about 33

176
 An economic model of colonialism

' per cent by 1930, and fell away to approximately 15 per cent in the 1950s. Before
1930 this decline was almost entirely the result of the rise of the Gold Coast cocoa

y industry, which expanded very quickly during the first three decades of the twentieth
century, and by the close of the 1920s was responsible for 80 per cent of all exports
from the colony. Cocoa has remained dominant ever since, though gold—one of
the oldest exports—enjoyed a brief revival in the 1930s, following a price rise in
world markets. Two other important innovations in the 1910s and 1930s were the
7 development of Nigerian cocoa and groundnut exports, which between them

accounted for about a quarter of all exports from Nigeria in the later 1920s, though
palm produce still supplied half the total. In the second part of the colonial period
the two new products continued to make progress at the expense of the traditional
staples, with the result that by the late 1950s cocoa provided about 20 per cent of all
Nigerian exports, groundnuts and groundnut oil a further 20 per cent, and palm
products about 25 per cent. In Sierra Leone there was a more dramatic change in
the 193OS. Palm products, which until then had formed about 70 per cent of total
exports, declined rapidly as a result of the exploitation of diamond and iron-ore
deposits. Mineral exports, negligible in 1930, formed 45 per cent of total exports in
1934, and by the close of the decade had reached over 60 per cent, a figure which,

after some fluctuations, was attained once more in the 1950s.

Minerals were always of greater significance in British than in French W est Africa,
even without taking into account the contribution made by Sierra Leone. In the late
1920s tin represented about 10 per cent of the value of all Nigerian exports, and gold,
diamonds and manganese were each about 5 per cent of Gold Coast exports. All
f these products had declined slightly by the end of the colonial period, but the dis¬
covery of new resources, notably Nigerian oil, indicated that minerals were certain
to be important in the future development plans of the more fortunate countries.
The composition of the import trade presents some interesting continuities and
contrasts with the pre-colonid era, though these cannot be measured with great
precision because the categories by which imports were classified were altered from
time to time and also varied between British and French colonies.^^ Manufactured
consumer goods were still the chief import, as in the nineteenth century, and textiles,
principally cotton goods, but including an increasing proportion of man-made
fibres, such as rayon, remained the leading single item, accounting for about a third
of the value of total imports into French West Africa and about a quarter of total
imports in British West Africa in the period down to the Second World War. At
the same time, two long-established staples lost their former prominence. Imports of
guns and ammunition were curtailed after the partition of Africa, when the colonial
authorities took steps to ensure that the chief means of coercion were kept in their
own hands. Next came the decline of the liquor trade after the First World War. A

There are also many minor frustrations, which will be familiar to those who have wrestled
with the Blue Books and similar pubhcations. Imports of motor vehicles, for example, though
easily counted, were sometimes hsted in terms of their total tonnage only. This formula doubt¬
less served some obscure purpose of the Customs and Excise Department, but it gives the
historian a severe headache.

177
 ¥

An Economic History of West Africa

combination of reasons was responsible for this: hostilities cut off Hamburg, the
main source of supply, from West African markets; an increase in the circulation of
British and French currency diminished the demand for liquor as a medium of
exchange; the colonial powers, somewhat tardily, introduced measures to hmit the
trade by raising customs duties and by imposing liigher standards on the quality of
imported spirits; and consumer tastes, influenced by the availabflity of a wider range
of goods, became more sophisticated^®
Several new items began to appear in the import hsts during the early part of the
colonial period. Imports of food, especially rice, fish, sugar, flour and salt, began to
increase in the inter-war years, particularly in Senegal, the Gold Coast, Nigeria and
the Ivory Coast, where some export producers and urban workers were no longer
self-sufficient, and where the development of the overseas exchange sector had led
to a demand for a higher quality and more varied diet.^® After the Second World
War the rapid expansion in the number of Europeans in French West Africa (from
about 3 0,000 in 1946 to about 100,000 in 1960) contributed to this trend, for they were
the main consumers of imported foodstuffs. By the end of the colonial period manu¬
factured consumer goods and foodstuffs between them accounted for about 60 per
cent of the value of all imports into French West Africa, and about 45 per cent in the
case of British West Africa. After the Second World War, however, the import hsts
of the wealthier colonies showed an increasing shift to capital goods, such as mach¬
inery and motor vehicles, to semi-finished products, and to raw materials. This was
a significant development because it indicated that in the 1950s, on the eve of
independence, the open economy was showing signs of diversification.
The frontiers of trade were pushed back by this export-led development, so that
by i960 the area directly involved in production for the overseas market was very
much larger than it had been in the nineteenth century. All the same, it is important
to emphasise that most exports were drawn from a small part of the total area covered
by West Africa, and that the contributions made by various regions also remained
more or less constant throughout the colonial period. British West Africa, for
example, though only a third of the size of French West Africa, supplied an average
of 72 per cent of the value of total exports from West Africa as a whole, while the
French, colonies accounted for only 25 per cent of the total. The remaining territories
(Liberia and Portuguese Guinea) were left with a mere 3 per cent.^’^ Moreover, there
was a considerable degree of concentration witliin the British and French territories.
Nigeria and the Gold Coast were responsible for 90-95 per cent of total exports from
the four British possessions, a figure which was equivalent to 37 per cent and 29 per
cent respectively of all West African exports. Thus the trade of Nigeria alone was
far more important than that of the whole of French West Africa, which was roughly

The liquor trade is a profitable subject of future research, whether it is considered as a

commercial undertaking, as an ideological controversy, or as an issue in hitemational politics.
W. B. Morgan, ‘Food Imports of West Africa’, Economic Geography, 39,1963, pp. 351-62.
The two German colonies of Togo and Cameroon were occupied by tire Allies during
the First World War, and in 1919 they were each spht into two parts and placed mider British
and French mandate.

178
 An economic model of colonialism

on a par with the Gold Coastd® In French West Africa itself two colonies, Senegal
and the Ivory Coast, were pre-eminent, supplying between them about 75 per cent
of the total exports from the Federation during the whole of the colonial period.
Senegal was the leading centre in the first half of the twentieth century, but after the
Second World War the Ivory Coast’s foreign trade expanded rapidly, with the result
that by the 1950s the two colonies were of approximately equal importance.
Many parts of West Africa which lay outside the main export-producing regions
were able to participate in the colonial economy by supplying necessary inputs into
export activities, such as labour. Other areas, however, were scarcely touched even
by indirect economic influences, and some may well have suffered an absolute fall in
living standards as a result of colonial rule. Mauritania, for example, with its tradi¬
tion J export, gum, in decline, found an imperfect substitute in trading foodstuffs
(fish, millet and livestock) to Senegal. The area around Lake Chad is another instance
of a part of West Africa which experienced the decline of an important traditional
activity without at the same time receiving adequate compensation in the form of
new opportunities. The Buduma, who inhabit the territory south of Lake Chad,
originally arrived there without any knowledge of water transport, but they adopted
the techniques of the people they subjugated, and by selling slaves were able to buy
expensive wooden canoes from the distant forest region to the south. This superior
means of transport enabled them to dominate much of the Lake Chad region.
However, colonial rule brought the internal slave trade to an end. The prosperity of
the Buduma declined, and they were forced to adopt cheaper reed skiffs, which are
still in use today. The example of the Buduma, paddling their inferior skiffs and
reflecting nostalgically on prosperous days gone by, serves as a reminder that market
expansion was not a universal phenomenon in twentieth century West Africa.^®
The pre-eminence of four colonies, Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Senegal and the
Ivory Coast, points to a considerable degree of continuity with the past, for all of
them had been centres of legitimate commerce in the nineteenth century, and the
first three had been prominent earlier still in the days of the Atlantic slave trade. The
overwhelming dominance of Nigeria and the Gold Coast is additional evidence that
the British, with luck allied to judgement, were more determined and at the same
time more subtle in the defence of their West African interests in the nineteenth
century than is often suggested. Certainly, any assessment of French supremacy
based simply on a comparison of the size of the territories ruled by the two great
powers is very misleading. Finally, it is worth observing that considerable regional
inequalities exist in West Africa, though without there being any marked dualism
between the so-called traditional and modern sectors of the economy. Inequalities
were present in the pre-colonial period, but colonial rule often accentuated and
occasionally altered regional differences. Local disparities are sometimes ignored in

However, if exports are related to population, then the Gold Coast ranks above aU other
colonies in West Africa.
18 The Buduma’s loss was others’ gain; for a discussion of the ending of internal slavery

see Chapter 6, part 2.

179
 t

An Economic History of West Africa

Net Barter Terms of Trade

Income Terms of Trade

Figure 3. Nigeria: Terms of Trade, 1911-60.

(base 1953 = 100)

(Source: G. K. Helleiiier, Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic

Growth in Nigeria, Homewood, Illinois, 1966, table IV-A-6, p. 500.)

Figure 4. Gold Coast-Ghana: Terms of Trade, 1900-60.

(base 1953 = 100)

(Source: Stephen H. Hymer, ‘The Political Economy of the Gold Coast

and Ghana’, in Government and Economic Development, ed. Gustav Ranis,
New Haven 1971, pp. 136-7.)

180
 An economic model of colonialism

Net Barter Terms of Trade

Income Terms of Trade

Figure 5. French West Afnca; Terms of Trade, 1925-55.

(base 1938 = 100)

(Source: J.-J. Poquin, Les relations economiques exterieures des pays

d’Afrique noire de Vunion frangaise, ig25-ig55, Paris 1957, p. 135.)

Figure 6. French West Africa (including Togo):

Bank Notes in Circulation, 1928-38.
(in milhons of francs)
(Source: Huguette Durand, Essai sur la conjoncture de I'Afrique noire,
Paris 1957, graph XXII, p. 119.)

181
An Economic History of West Africa

the debate about the alleged ‘widening gap’ between the living standards of the
advanced and the underdeveloped nations.^®
A liistorical survey of the terms of trade of West African export producers comes
as near as is possible to providing a film of the performance of the open economy,
though, since some of the reels are missing, the result is necessarily jerky and in¬
complete. The net barter terms of trade, that is the ratio between the indices of
average export and import prices, measure changes in the quantity of imports
which can be derived from a given unit of exports. The income terms of trade, that
is the barter terms of trade multiplied by a.h index of the volume of exports, provide
information about the total import-purchasing power of the country concemed.^^
In evaluating trends in the terms of trade the following points have to be borne in
mind: first, the indices measure changes in relation to one base year rather than
absolute gains and losses; second, they do not take account of alterations in the
quality of imports and exports; and third, because the indices are derived from aver¬
ages they tend to disguise the behaviour of individual commodities. In the 1930s,
for example, the export trade of Sierra Leone changed its character, but the indices
at present available for West Africa do not take this particular shift fully into account.
The three principal sources are Helleiner’s data on Nigeria, which are presented in
Figure 3, Hymer’s figures for the Gold Coast,(Fig. 4), and Poquin’s important, yet
virtually unused, work on French West Africa (Fig. 5). Since the trade of Nigeria,
the Gold Coast and French West Africa included all the main items of West Africa’s
external commerce, there is reason to tliink that composite indices relating to these
areas are broadly representative of the region as a whole. In the analysis which
follows, the three main sources have been supplemented by evidence relating to the
period 1900-1911, by Cox-George’s work on Sierra Leone between 1914 and 1945,
by Bauer’s material dealing with the Gold Coast between 1935 and 1951, and by
Berg’s survey of real income trends in West Africa from 1939 to 1960.^^
■'^Taking the period 1900-1960 as a whole, it is clear that economic progress in the
underdeveloped world was largely dependent on circumstances affecting the major
industrialpowers. Particularly outstanding in tliis comiection was theimpact of what,
in terms of the theory of international trade, must be called fortuitous events, notably
the two World Wars. More orthodox movements, such as the transmitted effects

The emphasis given here to differences within regions and countries (in addition to the
obvious comparison between national and colonial units) is paralleled by recent studies of
Enghsh and American history at critical points of economic development. See, for example,
E. A. Wrigley, Industrial Growth and Population Change, Cambridge 1961, and Douglass C.
North, ‘Agriculture and Regional Economic Growth’, JoMrna/ of Farm Economics, 41, 1959,
pp. 943-51-
For a fuller explanation of these terms see Ord and Livingstone, An Introduction to West
African Economics, pp. 363-7, and, more generally, Gerald M. Meier, The International Economics
of Development, New York and London 1968, pp. 41-65.
N. A. Cox-George, Finance and Development in West Africa, 1961; P. T. Bauer, West
African Trade, Cambridge 1954, pp. 410-21, and EUiot J. Berg, ‘Real Income Trends in West
Africa, 1939-1960’, in Economic Transition in Africa, ed. Melville J. Herskovits and Mitchell
Harwitz, 1964, pp. 199-238.

182
 An economic model of colonialism

ofJuglar cycles of under nine years, are harder to discern. With regard to the contro¬
versy about the long term prospects of primary producers in the underdeveloped
world, the evidence available does not lend decisive support to either optimists or
pessimists.^^ The barter terms of trade fluctuated around a falling trend from 1913-
1945, but then recovered between 1945 and i960. The income terms of trade, though
clearly affected by changes in the barter terms, tended to move upwards, reflecting
the geneimexpansion of export volumes during the twentieth century. By the close
of the colonial period7West Africa’s total import-purchasing pov^r was about four
tigi.^.as great as it had been at the beginning of the_,century. Allowing for the fact
that the population had roughly doubled during the same period, it can be said that
average per capita importing capacity was twice as high in i960 as in 1900. Not all
export earnings went straight to the producers, and the distribution of benefits was
also uneven geographically and socially. Nevertheless, it is certain that Africans
gained considerably from participating in international trade.
A more detailed historical analysis of the terms of trade can be made by dividing
the period 1900-1960 into the following five sections: 1900-1913,1914-1921,1922-
1929,1930-1944 and 1945-1960. It will be argued here that there is a significant rela¬
tionship between these five phases and the general economic and political history of
the region, though no simple, mechanistic interpretation is intended. It is hoped that
the connections briefly noted in the ensuing analysis will be explored more fully by
others, and by political scientists as well as by economists and historians.
The period from 1900 to 1913 was marked by a steady improvement in the barter
terms of trade of African producers. Since the volume of exports was expanding at
^ the same time, the income terms of trade also rose, finally pulling the economy out
of the slump which had affected it so seriously in the late nineteenth century. This
favourable trend had three main consequences. First, it helped to reconcile Africans
to colonial rule, and so made the task of the new administrations much easier than it
would otherwise have been. S^c'^^drit tnadcpiossible the financing of development
projects, notably railways, which were necessary if the economy was to expand
beyond the HmlfskHTy nihefeenth-centuryiaHlditioiis of eig^^ production. Third,
it induced more Africans to enter the export market, and so led to a further growth
in the volume of exports, and to plantings of tree crops which were to bear fruit in
the I920s'and 1930s. Developments between 1900 and 1913 were not quite as smooth
and uneventful as the foregoing summary may suggest. The partition of West Africa
ended in an atmosphere of bonanza, as traders and producers hoped for a lucky strike
to compensate for the lean years they had endured. At the turn of the century there
was a minor gold rush in the Gold Coast, and, more prosaically, a rubber boom,
which resulted from the discovery of wild rubber trees in parts of the forest zone
from Guinea to Nigeria. When the gold rush came to an end, which it did very
quickly, when most of the rubber trees ceased to be worth tapping, and when the
first geological surveys dispelled some of the more fanciful hopes of those whose

These prospects depend, of course, on the development of new exports, as well as on

price movements affecting existing exports.

183
An Economic History of West Africa

judgement had been seriously affected by a consuming desire to get rich quickly,
then the great majority of West African export producers settled down soberly to
a slower, harder grind towards prosperity.
These favourable trends were interrupted by the First World War. The barter
terms of trade declined as a result of the shortage and consequently the high price of
imported goods. Export expansion was checked by the closure of some European,
especially German, markets, and by a lack of shipping space. The outcome was a fall
in the income terms as well. In 1919 West Africa participated briefly in the post-war
iboom, but then suffered severely in the slump of 1920-1921, which was signalled by a
Idramatic collapse of export prices. These years saw the elimination of many smaller
import and export firms, European as well as African, and the consohdation of the
position of a few large concerns. The fluctuations of the period revealed to a new
generation of Africans the extent to which their fortunes depended on external forces.
They in turn demonstrated their disenchantment with colonial rule by organising
protests in the main centres of trade. The First World War had serious consequences
for West Africa; it was an unpleasant foretaste of the greater conflict of 1939-1945,
which v/as to have an even bigger impact on the tropical colonies.^^
In 1922 there began a recovery which lasted until 1929. The barter terms of trade
improved, though they were not as favourable as in the pre-war years, and the
ihcome terms also revived as a result of a rise in the volume of exports. The exact
degree of recovery is hard to judge. According to Helleiner, Nigeria’s total import¬
ing capacity was only slightly greater in the late 1920s than it had been just before the
First World War. In the absence of technical advances in agriculture, the capacity to
import was maintained only by increased inputs of labour and land. Existing export
producers had to work harder, and new producers had to be attracted into the export
sector. The latter development was made possible by the arrival of the motor lorry,
which enabled new areas of export production to be opened up. All that can be said
at present, pending further, more detailed investigation, is that the recovery of
1922-1929 was a limited one, and that most export producers were unlikely to have
experienced any marked improvement in their living standards.
From 1930-1944, the barter terms of trade declined once more, apart from a brief
recovery in 1935-1937, and during the Second World War reached their lowest
point of the century. More remarkable still, the income terms also showed a down¬
ward trend (though again there was a limited recovery in the mid-i930s) in spite of
the fact that there was some expansion in the volume of exports.^® The Second
World War had a much more serious effect on West Africa than did the world
slump of the 1930s because of an acute shortage of consumer imports and because of
the abrupt closure of many export markets in Europe. French West Africa, having

Some of the effects of the First World War have been explored in a valuable article by
Michael Crowder, ‘West Africa and the 1914-18 War’, Bulletin de VIFAN, B, 30, 1968,
pp. 227-45. See also Cox-George, Finance and Development in West Africa, ch. 8.
An interesting illustration of the depressive effects of tliis trend can be seen in Figure 6,
which plots the fall in currency circulation in French West Africa, and also demonstrates the
extent of seasonal variations in the size of the money economy.

184
 An economic model of colonialism

declared for the Vichy government in 1940, found itself blockaded by the Allies, and
so was particularly badly affected. By the end of the war West Africa’s total import¬
ing capacity was lower than at any time since 1900 (with the possible exception of
1921), though population and public debts had both increased greatly since the
beginning of the century. The adverse trends of the period 1930-1944 had two
principal consequences. In the first place, investment was curtailed and ambitious
projects postponed. Retrenchment was the theme, safety first the motto, and indirect
rule the philosophy cut to suit the narrow cloth of the time. The main exceptions to
this generalisation arose, perversely, during the Second World War, when a few
schemes, such as the development of a harbour at Monrovia, were undertaken to aid
the Allied war effort. Secondly, the long period of economic hardship led to the rise
of a movement which was eventually to bring colonial rule to an end. This move¬
ment had its beginnings in the economic crisis of the 1930s, and, as a result of the
Second World War, it became more widespread, more articulate, and ultimately
irresistible.
After 1945 there was a rapid and unexpected improvement in the barter terms of
trade brought about by a revival in demand for tropical products, which were re¬
quired to assist the post-war recovery of Europe, and later to meet the need for raw
materials during the Korean war. The upward trend levelled off in the second half
of the 195OS, but the barter terms still remained more favourable than at any point
since the period before the First World War. The volume of exports grew at the
same time, slowly at first, but then more swiftly in the 1950s, with the result that the
total importing capacity of West Africa achieved record levels. Several important
developments were closely associated with this final, and generally prosperous,
phase of colonial rule. First, there was a. rapid, and seemingl^irreversible,_expansion
of the public sector. Second, there was a revival of confidence and a renewed inflow
~oFinvestment7just as therelSffbeen in the period 1900-1913, which al^ followed a
time of^onomk,sIump and political crisis. ThlrdT^TuITtEr^owth in the volume
of exports was acliieved mainly By^Tfablished means, it also resulted from an
in ^igci^idiwaLpimdiirtivitv brought about by the adoption of insecticides,
fertilisers and better quality seeds. Fourth, in the 1950s the expansion of the market
reached the point where i^ge-scale manufacturing could begin. Finally, this phase
saw the end oi colomaTrule. On theone hand the coIomaT^wers felt a need to
placate and reward colonial subjects who had endured the hardships of the war
effort; on the other hand, Africans were more organised and better fmanced
than they had been, and could make sure that the required concessions were
forthcoming.
The analysis of the colonial period which follows is divided into two chapters,
each corresponding to a stage in the history of the open economy. Chapter 6 will
examine the construction of the open economy. Accordingly, the main focus will
be on the first half of the colonial period (1900-1930), but subsequent events will be
dealt with if they contributed to the maintenance of the open economy in its classic
form. In contrast. Chapter 7 will concentrate on the difficulties experienced by the
open economy and on the alterations which were made to it in the second half of the

185
An Economic History of West Africa

colonial period (1930-1960). Accordingly, the chief emphasis will be on disfunc-

tiohal developments, that is those which tended to modify the open economy. Most
historical accounts of the colonial period have followed the political divisions
established by the major pow'ers, and have dealt, in turn, with British and with
French West Africa. This procedure is not suitable for the thematic, economic
analysis proposed here. Chapters 6 and 7 will treat the economies of French, British,
German and Portuguese West Africa as a whole, on the grounds that the similarities
between them in terms of structure and evolution were more marked than the
differences, though these will be noted wherever they were important. This ap¬
proach has two secondary advantages: it includes Liberia, a country which, though
politically independent since 1847, developed a typical open, export economy in the
twentieth century; and it may also help to break dovm the insularity which
academics have inherited from their colonial past.^®

The adverse effects of this iusularity continue to be felt. For example, French scholars
write about the Senegalese groundnut industry, but rarely mention northern Nigeria, and
British scholars discuss the monetary system of British West Africa without making any
reference to the system operating in the neighbouring French colonies.
SIX

Completing the open

economy

This chapter is devoted to an analysis of the open economy during the first half of the
colonial era. The evidence is organised around two themes which are central to the
economic history of the period. The first theme is the introduction of the economic
and pohtical institutions wliich were needed to complete the structure of the open
economy. The second theme concerns the way in which the component parts of the
open economy combined to activate domestic resources and to expand West Africa’s
overseas trade.
Two alternative views are commonly expressed about the development of export
economies during the early part of the colonial period, though other, less prominent,
interpretations can easily be found. The first, and more traditional, argument makes
thejcolonial government primarily responsible for introducing and managing eco-
nomic change. This behef iwisTedTurturn, to two opposed schools of thought. One
suggBtTtEat Africans were tutored, in the event swiftly and efficiently, by a benign,
though necessarily paternal, regime. McPhee, for example, told the story of The
Economic Revolution in British West Africa (1926) very much from this official stand¬
point.^ The other also emphasises the role of the administration, but disputes the idea
that colonial rule was beneficial to Africans, and criticises official policy for disrupting
and exploiting allegedly stable and prosperous traditional societies. This approach
can be found in Suret-Canale’s Afrique noire occidentale et centrale: I’ere coloniale,
i^oo-ig43 (1964).^ The second, more recent, view has been advanced in different
contexts by a number of development economists, and is concerned primarily with
the mobilisation of land and labour resources in the indigenous economy. This
approach is very different from that of McPhee and Suret-Canale; it bypasses the
historical problem of the costs and benefits of colonial rule, and it seeks chiefly to
analyse the contribution made by Africans to the process of export expansion.
Both views have their merits, but neither is acceptable without some modification.
The first, though it has the advantage of paying attention to detail and chronology,
is particularly suspect because it underplays the role of Africans themselves, while the
conclusions it reaches about the welfare consequences of colonial rule over-generalise

1 See also Alan Pirn, The Financial and Economic History of the African Tropical Territories,
Oxford 1940.
2 Now in translation under the title French Colonialism in Tropical Africa, 1900-1945, I97i-

187
 t

An Economic History of West Africa

on a limited amount of frequently ambiguous evidence. The second view is more

sophisticated and reflects recent trends in development economics, but it tends to
\ exaggerate the ease and simplify the process of growth by suggesting that colonial
\ development was essentially a matter of taking up the slack in existing, underutihsed
j resources—in much the same way as a prefabricated building can be erected by
persuading ehough men to pull on a rope. What is required for present purposes is
an approach wliich combines the historical depth of the first view with the analytical
strength of the second.
The central problem is to identify and evaluate the main formative influences on
the open economy. The particular difficulty lies in striking a balance between causes,
when the nature of the evidence is such that these cannot be measured with great
precision. For example, any book which claims to be based on ri^ent research is
bound to stress the contribution made by indigenous producers and traders. At the
same time, however, care must be taken not to dismiss the history of European
enterprise in West Africa as the unfashionable preoccupation of those who have
failed to keep up with the somewhat exhausting pace of change in African studies.^
/ AT^lslhffinary classifigation suggests that the chief formative influences can be divi-
'' ded into two broad categories; imported and indigenous. TheTormefwere signifi-
cant in four'^as: econ^unc^olicvrtmns^f t7lEe^istr^u5v^~sv^muand^nion^
and banking. The latter can be analysed in terms of land and labour inputs. In brief,
it wfll be argued that imported, colonial influences were invarying degrees necessary
to the completion of the open economy, but were not a sufficient cause of it, and that
it was indigenous entrepreneurs, by accepting and creating market opportunities,
who ensured that export production did in fact expand.
These two categories will be dealt with in turn, though it will become evident
that there was considerable interaction between them. The organisation of the
chapter will have so take account of tlois overlap: for instance, while dealing with
externally-induced changes in the distributive system it will be convenient to exam¬
ine the position of Africans as well as of Europeans; similarly, in discussing the
j, indigenous utilisation of land resources, it is appropriate at that point also to look at
colonial policy regarding plantations and mines.

1 The expatriate role

It is customary for historians to contrast the attitudes of the two major colonial
powers towards the business of government. The French approach is said to have
been characterised by centralisation, administrative rigidity, and assimilationist

Non-specialists may be under the impression that European activities have been fully
investigated. This is not the case. For example, no one has written an economic history of the
radway systems in West Africa, and there have been hardly any studies of expatriate trading,
mimng and plantation enterprises, or of official economic policy. These are important subjects,
and it would be mifortunate if research students avoided them for fear of being thought old-
fashioned in their approach to African history.

I88
 Completing the open economy

tendencies. Britain’s policies, on the other hand, are usually thought of as being based
on the delegation of authority, on political empiricism, and on the toleration of
diverse indigenous institutions. Differences between the policies of the two colonial
powers undoubtedly existed, and were almost certainly perpetuated by a notable
lack of inter-colonial contact and co-operation. Nevertheless, the contrast was
stronger in principle than in practice, and as far as economic policy was concerned
France and Britain had more in common than is often appreciated.^
Economic policy was limited both in its philosophy and in its techniques. Govern¬
ments were not envisaged as playing a central and dynamic part in developing the
estates they had acquired, and in any case they had little of the necessary expertise at
their disposal. This is not surprising. At a time when the ideas of Keynes and
Beveridge had still to make their mark in Europe, it was unlikely that the economic
principles which were applied to the colonies would differ markedly from those in
force at home. The leading colonial civil servants were political officers, and there
were few economists in government service. Those most closely involved with the
economy tended to be practical men, such as agricultural and forestry experts, who,
though recognised by their superiors as being necessary, were at the same time
peripheral to what was regarded as the main task of government. These men went
through their careers with much the same degree of obscurity and status deficiency
as, for example, the staff of the Ministry of Transport still experience in Britain in
relation to their counterparts at the Foreign Office.
Once pacification had been achieved, government activity reverted to its tradi¬
tional role; the art of light administration. In economic affairs the political officers
merely acted as Great White Umpires, ensuring that the rules were observed, not
that they were changed. The general belief, inlierited from the nineteenth century,
was that private enterprise and the free play of market forces would lead to inter¬
national specialisation based on the comparative advantage of the nations concerned,
and that this would promote economic growth by bringing about a more efficient
allocation of factors of production. Development by this means, so it was held, would
be to the advantage of all parties. Of course, the main purpose of having colonies in •
West Africa was to secure a profitable trade for the mother country, and in some cases
tariff regulations were devised to see that this happened.® All the same, it was ’
necessary to make sure that some of the gains from international trade accrued to
Africa because, in the last resort, if Africans remained poor they could not afford to
buy manufactured goods. The belief that colonial rule should be based on co¬
operation and mutual interest rather than on crude exploitation found compre¬
hensive expression in Lord Lugard’s book The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa
(1922). The concept of the dual mandate, which admirably combined philosophical
largesse with financial economy, became acceptable rather later in France (according
to British writers anyway) than it did in England, though with the publication of

^ For a complementary view regarding similarities of administrative and educational policy

see M. Semakula Kiwanuka, ‘Colonial Policies and Administrations in Africa; the Myths of
Contrasts’, African Historical Studies, 3, 1970, pp. 295-315.
® Tariff policy is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.

189
An Economic History of West Africa

Albert Sarraut’s influential work La mise en valeur des colonies frangaises in 1923 it can
be said to have found a small niche in the official mind of French coloniahsm.
A few attempts were made to swim against the still powerful tide of laissez-faire
thinking, but they were never wholly successful. At the turn of the century Joseph
Chamberlain talked boldly about developing the tropical estates of the British
Empire, but his schemes for financial aid were either blocked or whittled away by the
Treasury.® The world which Gladstone had so recently departed was to continue to
feel his influence in the field of public finance until well into the twentieth century.
Two more plans of development were put forward immediately after the First
World War. These were reflections of recent experience, both of the increased role
wliich governments had been forced to assume during the war, and of the hastily
awakened appreciation of the economic importance of the colonies St a time when
the metropolis was under siege. Governor Guggisberg formulated a ten-year plan
for the Gold Coast covering the period 1919-1928, and involving the expenditure of
about fzs million, mainly on improving the transport system.''^ This plan, which
was to be financed out of the colony’s own resources, and therefore caused no alarm
among Treasury officials in London, was cut back as a result of the years of indifferent
trade in the early 1920s. However, there were some important achievements, notably
the completion of the Accra to Kumasi railway line in 1923, the building of a deep
water harbour at Takoradi, which was finished in 1928, and the construction of
about 3,000 miles of motor roads. In France, Albert Sarraut, a former Governor-
General of Indo-China and Minister of Colonies, put forward a similar, though more
extensive, scheme of public works in 1921.® His plan, which was designed to exploit
the resources of the Empire more fully, also had to be severely modified as a result of
the post-war slump and the failure of Germany to pay reparations. Nevertheless,
some projects were advanced; the Thies-Kayes section of the Senegal railway was
completed in 1923, improvements were made to Dakar harbour, and a start was made
on a plan to irrigate the Middle Niger. All these schemes were designed to complete
the structure of the open economy. Their aim was to expand the export economy, in
contrast to current development plans, which are concerned mainly with growth
in other sectors of the economy.
The prevailing view of the role of government in the economy found character¬
istic expression in the principles underlying colonial finance. The basic aim was self-
sufficiency. As far as the British colonies were concerned, Earl Grey’s famous dictum,
enunciated in 1852, still held true: ‘the surest test for the soundness of measures for
the improvement of an uncivilised people is that they should be self-supporting’. In
France budgetary reforms were adopted in 1900 which gave the colonies a greater
degree of fiscal autonomy, but which also required them to pay their own way.

® S. B. Saul, ‘The Economic Significance of “Constructive Imperialism”,’/oMrM<i7 of Economic

History, 17, 1957, pp. 173-92.
’’ D. K. Greenstreet, ‘The Guggisberg Ten-Year Development Plan’, Economic Bulletin of
Ghana, 8, 1964, pp. 18-26.
® Suret-Canale, Afrique noire, pp. 350-60.

190
 Completing the open economy

From 1904 to 1957 the colonies were linked in a Federation (with its capital at Dakar)
which controlled the collection and distribution of nearly all indirect taxes.® The
main aim of the Federation was to ensure that the rich colonies (Senegal and the
Ivory Coast) paid for their poor relations, thus preventing the latter from becoming a
drain on the metropolis. The four British colonies in West Africa remained finan-
ciallv independent of each other, andjl^ two smaUer territories (Sierra Leone and
Gambia) had to receive support from Brkam when they ran into financial difficulty.
To achieve financial self-sufficiency, both British and French colonies relied
mainly on revenue from customs duties, which accounted for about two-thirds of
total revenue for the greater part of the colonial period.^® The proportion was even
higher beforeme First World War, liut it declined as a result of the expansion of
direct taxes, such as head tax and income tax, and the growth of revenue from
pubhc investments. Nearly half the revenue was spent on the salaries and pensions
of expatriate officials, a fact wliich helps to explain the introspective nature of
official attitudes in the critical period between the two World Wars: at a time when
discontent was brewing in Africa, government records seem to be dominated by
information about promotions and pensions. Another large slice of public income
went to repay the capital and interest on loans raised for development purposes. In
the case of Nigeria this item rose from 14 per cent of total revenue in 1926 to 33 per
cent in 1934. The amount left for the economic departments, such as agriculture and
forestry, was minute. Furthermore, the official budget was subject to large and un¬
predictable variations of the kind which were typical of open economies. Revenue
was most likely to grow during a trade boom, which meant that spending from
current income could expand only fitfully. In the event of a slump, however,
expenditure could not be reduced very easily because of the high proportion of fixed
outgoings on salaries and debt repayments. The result was that the fiscal burden
grew more onerous when trade was depressed, and was particularly heavy during
the period 1930-1945.
There were two additional sources of public finance; grants-in-aid and loans.
Grants-in-aid did not amount to large sums, and they were of no general importance
in colonial development programmes. They were used selectively to help out
colonies such as Gambia and Sierra Leone, which occasionally ran deficits, and to
assist in emergencies, such as the need to increase defence expenditure during the
First World War. Public loans, floated on the stock markets of London and Paris,
were much more important. All the same, Frankel’s pioneering study has shown
that investment in tropical Africa in the period before the Second World War was
very limited compared with what was required, what was to come in the future,
and what was already being invested in other parts of the world. “ Gross public and

® C. W. Newbury, ‘The Formation of the Government General of French West Africa’,

Journal of African History, i, i960, pp. 111-28.
For a detailed case study see Sir Alan Pirn, ‘Pubhc Finance’, in Mining, Commerce, and
Finance in Nigeria, ed. Margery Perham, 1948, pp. 225-79.
“ S. H. Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa, 1938, and Suret-Canale’s comments on his
figures in Afrique noire, pp. 205-14.

191

7*
 H

An Economic History of West Africa

private foreign investment in West Africa amounted to about million in the

period 1870-1936. Approximately 50 per cent of this sum was public investment,
which was mostly spent developing the transport system, notably railways. Regional
disparities were marked: only'about one fifth of total investment in West Africa
(roughly ^30 :nillion) was placed in French territories; the rest went to the smaller,
though more populous, British colonies. The ability to raise loans depended entirely
on the resources of the colonies theijiselves, which helps to explain why the differ¬
ences between rich and poor colonies increased rather than diminished with the
passage of time. The borrowing capacity of the colonies, like the size of their current
revenues, fluctuated with the trade cycle. The result was that down to I945 invest¬
ment tended to follow rather than cause growth, and capital flows magnified the
effects of booms and slumps instead of reducing them. ''
Given the economic philosophy and financial stringency of the early colonial
period, there was little scope for basing development policy on anything other than
the well-tried Victorian principle of self-help. The validity of this conclusion is
illustrated by government policy towards the important questions of commerce,
land and labour. These three subjects will be examined in detail later, and are men¬
tioned briefly at this stage simply to indicate the orientation of official thinking.
With regard to commerce, the administrations created free trade areas within each
colony, and then allowed market forces to operate more or less without restraint.
An indulgent attitude towards the expatriate trading firms is understandable when
it is remembered that these firms had been in the forefront of the clamour for govern¬
ment intervention in West Africa at the close of the nineteenth century. As to land,
British and French policy confirmed African rights, and encouraged the develop¬
ment of an indigenous class of independent export producers. In the case of the labour
force, colonial policy aimed at permitting, and sometimes even encouraging,
mobility, so that key areas could secure an adequate supply of workers. Only in the
field of transport, as will now be shown, was official enterprise dominant. For the
^ rest, lack of techniques and personnel, lack of money, and lack of commitment to
the idea of active government involvement in economic affairs meant that the
colonial authorities played a less prominent part in creating the open economy than
is sometimes thought.
According to Lord Lugard, ‘the material development of Africa may be summed
up in one word—Transport’. One-word summaries of complex problems cannot
be expected to achieve a high degree of accuracy. Nevertheless, it remains true that
economists invariably assign modern transport facilities an important place in
bringing about economic growth. W. W. Rostow, for example, has claimed that
railways v/ere the most important single cause of industrial ‘take-off*’ in North
America, Germany and Russia, and that they were very influential elsewhere,
notably in England.^® It is not hard to see why this should have been the case.
Modern transport has the effect of discounting space, that is to say it moves goods

The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, p. 5.

13 Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge i960.

192
Completing the open economy

Map 12. West African Railways.

193
An Economic History of West Africa

and people over longer distances faster and more cheaply than was possible previous¬
ly. This innovation has had profound consequences. It has released capital and labour
tied up in traditional transport operations for more productive employment else¬
where; it has led to the rise ofilew resources, such as coal and iron, which are basic to
industrial development; and it has stimulated the export sector, which in turn has
generated capital for internal investment. In view of the real and alleged significance
of modem transport in the development of West Africa, it is surprising that econ¬
omic historians have conducted so little research into the subject.^^ The survey that
follows will concentrate on internal innovations, namely railways, harbours, motor
transport and waterways. Improvements in ocean transport, principally the change
from sail to steam, have been outlined already in Chapter 4.
Plans for the construction of railways in West Africa had been canvassed by
private promoters since at least the middle of the nineteenth century.Spacious in
conception, obscure in purpose, and all too clearly astronomical in cost, these
Ichemes required, and failed to obtain, gqyemmenf supporfiTdowever, with the
afivent of a serious economic crisis irT the last quarter of the’ nineteenth century,
commercial interests and government officials became convinced that railways were
needed to maintain West Africa’s competitiveness in international markets. The
construction of railways began in the 1880s and concluded in the 1920s at the end of
the first phase of colonial rule. The ideas of private sponsors quickly became govern¬
ment property. The French aimed to drive east from Senegal and capture the
Western Sudan, which could then be linked with lines from North Africa and from
the southern coast of West Africa, thus enabling France to control the greater part
of Africa west of Egypt and the Congo. British policy was on the whole less ambi¬
tious, being based on the maintenance of existing spheres of influence, though the
possibility of a line which would run from southern Nigeria up to Lake Chad and
beyond to Egypt was considered at the turn of the century during a mood of tem¬
porary euphoria.
The present railway map of West Africa clearly reflects these half-realised pro¬
jects. The three main developments were in Senegal, the Gold Coast and Nigeria.
The Senegal railway was begun in 1881, and after several changes of plan and many
delays Dakar was finally joined to Bamako (a distance of 720 miles) in 1923 On the
Gold Coast a line from Sekondi to Kumasi was finished in 1903, another from Accra
to Kumasi was ready in 1923, and a third completed the triangle by joining the two
coastal ports in 1927. In Nigeria the principal line was begim at Lagos in 1896 and

The starting point is still McPhee, The Economic Revolution, ch. 3. For one of the few
recent case studies see Jacques Mangolte, ‘Le chemin de fer de Konakry au Niger (1890-1914)’,
Revue Frangaise d’Histoire d'Outre-Mer, 55, 1968, pp. 37-105. The only comprehensive account
of railways in tropical Africa is that by Andre Huybrechts, Transports et structures de developpe-
ment au Congo: etude du progrh economique de igoo a igjo, Paris 1970.
Olufemi Omosini, ‘Railway Projects and British Attitudes Towards the Development of
West Africa, 1872-1903’, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 5, 1971, pp. 491-507.
The construction of this Hne over a period of fifty years is an epic which certainly merits
a study of its own.

194
 Completing the open economy

reached Kano (a total of 711 miles) in 1911. A second line, joining Port Harcourt in
eastern Nigeria to Kaduna via Enugu and Jos, was completed in 1926. There were
shorter railways running from Freetown to Pendembu (completed in 1906); Lome
to Atakpame (1913); Conakry to Kankan (1914); Cotonu to Parakou (1936); and
Abidjan to Bobo Dioulasso (1936). By 1940 West Africa had a total of 5,200 miles of
railway line, which was divided roughly equally between the British and French
colonies.
Although the French experimented at an early stage with railway construction by
private contract (and the British were nearly persuaded to do the same), in the event
virtually the whole of the West African railway system was built by the colonial
governments and with public capital. There seem to have been three main reasons
for tliis exceptional degree of official entrepreneurship^ First, building railways in
territories which had been acquired not only recently, buTby force, raised a number
of potentially explosive issues regarding land rights, labour supplies and, ultimately,
political controO French and British governments felt that all these matters were
best kept in official hands. Second, (from the outset jjie railways had a mihtary and
administrative function as well as an economic on^Colonial governments had a
close interest in the direction of railway routes and in the timing of construction
because they wanted to be able to move soldiers and officials to key points as quickly
as possible. Finall^^rivate contractors and investors did not rush to build railways
in West Africa. Those who did come forward wanted subsidies or other concessions,
and frequently proved to be inefficientCapital requirements were high because the
railways had to serve a wide and sparsely populated area. Furthermore, some lines
had to be built in anticipation of demand and not simply in response to it. Their
ultimate profitabifity was not guaranteed, and in any case was certain to be a distant
event. Where private capital was wary, government enterprise became necessary.
Harbour improvements were closely related to programmes of railway con¬
struction.^® The steamship had already begun to expose the limitations of West
African ports, many of which could not cope with vessels larger than traditional
sailing slips. The steamer, however, did not have a marked effect on export produc¬
tion, whereas the railway did. By 1900 it was clear that existing harbours were unable
to handle the volume of produce that the railway was capable of delivering. As a
result, substantial alterations were made to the major ports beginning around 1900
and continuing throughout the colonial era. In some places, established centres,
such as Dakar, Lagos and Freetown, were improved. Elsewhere, entirely new ports,
such as Port Harcourt and Takoradi, were developed. The result was the decline of
smaller centres, such as Badagri, St Louis and Old Calabar, and the increasing con¬
centration of the export trade on a few, large ports served by railways. In the 1930s
no less than 65 per cent of the total tonnage of French West Africa’s overseas trade
passed through Dakar. Takoradi on the Gold Coast and Lagos in Nigeria were
For a comparative study (of Dahomey, Togo and south-west Nigeria) see C. W. New¬
bury, The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers, Oxford 1961, pp. 141-7.
18 A collection of case studies of the development of West African ports can be found in
B. S. Hoyle and D. Hilling, eds. Seaports and Development in Tropical Africa, 1970.

195
An Economic History of West Africa

equally dominant. The leading European ports for West African trade remained,
as in the nineteenth century, Liverpool, Bordeaux, Marseilles and Hamburg.
Once the early, superficial talk about ‘tapping the wealth of the interior’ had
vanished into the hot, tropical air, it became apparent that the influence of the rail¬
way was restricted to a small area on either side of the track. Large numbers of widely
dispersed producers had not been brought into the export economy because the cost
of taking their crops to the railway station would still have been too high in relation
to the price obtamable. Before 1918 there were very few all-weather roads in West
Africa outside the towns. The reason for this was simple: the motor car was a new
invention, and the type produced at that time was slow, expensive, and so heavy
that it tended to devour the roads it travelled on. Contrary to what might be assumed,
at that time few officials or expatriate firms saw any future for the fiiotor car in the
underdeveloped world. In 1907, for example, the British Cotton Growing Associ¬
ation recorded its opinion that with regard to West Africa ‘metal roads and motor
transport are, as far as one can judge, a mistake’.^® In the 1910s the pioneers of com¬
mercial passenger and freight services were Africans, the most prominent of whom
was a Nigerian named W. A. Dawodu.
Prevailing attitudes were rendered as obsolete as the early vehicles themselves by
the introduction of faster, cheaper and lighter Ford models, which reached West
Africa in 1918. In 1923 the first motor car crossed the Sahara from Algeria to
Timbuctu, an epic journey, though it was soon to become a commonplace one. By
1930 commercial haulage firms were operating in and around the main centres of
economic activity in West Africa and the Sahara. By 1940 French West Africa had
about 10,000 vehicles compared to a mere sixteen in 1913. The expansion of motor
transport in British West Africa was even faster: in the 1920s the vehicles imported
by the Gold Coast and Nigeria were double the number and twice the tonnage of
those entering the French colonies.^® The importation and operation of motor
transport was in the hands of private firms, both African and European. Road
building, however, was undertaken mainly by the colonial governments, which on
the whole planned routes to feed the railways rather than to compete with them,
though in West Africa, as in other parts of the world, there was a growing rivalry
between the two systems of transport after the Second World War. It is important
to note that Africans whose needs were not met by the official road-building pro¬
gramme, and who could command the necessary resources, also contributed to the
new infrastructure. The cocoa farmers of Nigeria and the Gold Coast, for example,
built their own roads and bridges in the 1910s and 1920s and ran fleets of motor
lorries to speed the evacuation of their crop. The framework of the present West
African road system, without which the expansion of motor transport could not
have taken place, was erected in the 1920s and 1930s. For some officials and local
communities the construction of a road to join the outside world was the outstanding

C.O. 520/55, British Cotton Growing Association to Colonial Office, 8 August 1907,
Public Record Office.
For a case study, see A. M. Hay, ‘The Development of Road Transport in Nigeria,
1900-1940’, Journal of Transport History, n.s., i, 1971, pp. 95-107.

196
 Completing the open economy

event of their time, an Ihstorical and personal drama that has been captured by
Joyce Cary’s evocative novel, Mister Johnson (1939).
The development of inland waterways was on a modest scale, principally because
the Europeans found, as Africans had found before them, that river transport was
severely hampered by rapids and by marked seasonal variations in the water level.
However, relatively simple improvements, such as the clearing of existing water¬
ways, stimulated the local economy in some areas, as, for example, in parts of south¬
ern Nigeria. Not surprisingly, the main innovation, the use of paddle steamers,
occurred on stretches of water such as the Niger, the Benue and the Senegal, which
Africans had already made into well-known highways. Although steamers were
owned mainly by private firms, some attempt was made to co-ordinate river and
rail transport. The Senegal railway, for example, though it ended at Bamako, linked
up there with the Middle Niger, thus comiecting Dakar with Timbuctu and Gao.
At the same time, however, traditional canoe transport occasionally provided
serious and unforeseen rivalry for the railways, as in the case of the Lagos line, which
had difficulty attracting traffic during its first ten years of operation because of
competition from canoes on the river Ogun.
West Africa, along with other parts of the world, benefited from modem trans¬
port in many of the ways predicted by the classical economists. Freight rates were
greatly reduced. In 1909 the cost of head-loading ranged from 3 s id to 5 s per ton/mile
on the Gold Coast, depending on the. commodities carried. Hand carts and cask
rolling cost from is 2|d to is iid. The charge by rail averaged iijd in 1903, but
dropped to between 46. and 7|d in the 1920s, wliile the motor lorry cost as little as
3d per ton/mile in 1930. These dramatic reductions had two main effects. First, in
substituting machinery for human power, modern transport encouraged a more
efficient combination of factors of production by releasing scarce labour resources
for other employment, by increasing mobility, and by spreading information about
market opportunities. Europeans moved into the interior; Africans travelled to
cocoa and groundnut farms, and to the towns. Second, the fall in the cost of transport
was an external economy which accelerated the expansion of the export sector by
making production profitable over a wider area and for a larger number of farmers,
and which permitted the development of new resources, such as the coal deposits
found near Udi in eastern Nigeria in 1909. Railways and roads pushed back and
reshaped the traditional frontiers of trade. The arrival of the Lagos railway at Kano
in 1911, for example, was an event of great significance in African commercial
history. It marked the final decline of the old, north-facing, trans-Saharan trade, the
reorientation of the markets of the interior towards the coastal ports, and the
coalescence of two centres of exchange which, in previous centuries, had been in
only sporadic contact with each other.
The foregoing assessment of the impact of modern transport requires qualification,
both to avoid the sweeping character of traditional interpretations, which have
tended to follow the spirit of Lord Lugard’s pronouncement on this subject, and to
take account of recent research, such as Fogel’s study of North America, which has
shown that the importance of railways in economic development can easily be

197
An Economic History of West Africa

exaggerated.^^ Four main reservations should be home in mind in the case of West
Africa. In the first place, generalisations about the effects of modern transport often
refer, at least by implication, to the area as a whole. Yet Liberia had no harbour or
motor roads until the 1940s, andno railway until the 1950s. Large parts of the interior
of former French West Africa are still without modern transport today. The benefits
of modern transport were felt most strongly in a few territories, notably the Gold
Coast, Nigeria and Senegal, whose resources were large enough for them to invest
in a modem infrastructure. Once again the point emerges that the regional effects of
colonial economic development were very varied. Secondly, it is a mistake to think
of modern transport as creating an export economy out of nothing. Most of the
leading exports were being shipped abroad before the introduction of railways and
motor transport. Indeed, it can be said that modem transport was attracted primarily
to regions which, though still full of uncertainties, had already begun to demonstrate
their economic potential.^^ Thirdly, the provision of modem transport did not
guarantee an automatic and dramatic expansion of exports. In Dahomey railways
had relatively little impact, while in Nigeria long stretches of track were unsuccessful,
either because they passed through barren land, or because freight rates on certain
products were too high. Finally, it should be remembered that communications were
designed mainly to evacuate exports. There were few lateral or inter-colonial links,
and little attempt was made to use railways and roads as a stimulus to internal
exchange.
The distributive system associated with overseas trade changed considerably
during the first phase of colonial rule. Discussion of these changes has to proceed
cautiously, however, for they have long been the subject of a political and economic
controversy concerning the rple of the expatriate firms. This debate owes much of
its longevity to a lack of hard evidence, for conjecture thrives where refutation is
impossible, and assertions, if repeated often enough, eventually assume the dignity
and title of facts.^® The analysis presented here has three aims: first, to outline the
main changes affecting the expatriate commercial houses; second, to explain why
they occurred; and third, to consider their effects on African firms.
The most striking changes involved innovations in geographical location and
commercial structure. The expatriate firms, which had been situated on the coast
ever since overseas trade with West Africa began, started to move inland in numbers
in the 1890s. They were carried into the interior by the railway, and they travelled
in the wake of the administration, having become the willing camp followers of

Robert W. Fogel, Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History,
Baltimore 1964.
In this respect the West African case was similar to that of Colombia, where economic
growth began before the appearance of modern transport facibties. See Everett E. Hagen, On
the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins, Homewood 1962, p. 363.
Two exceptional, pioneering studies must be mentioned, as they have both tried to
disentangle fact and fiction: J. Mars, ‘Extra-Territorial Enterprises’ in Mining, Commerce, and
Finance in Nigeria, ed. M. Perham, 1948, pp. 43-136, and P. T. BaUer, West African Trade,
Cambridge 1954.
 Completing the open economy

those they had roused to action. By the 1920s the leading firms had branches in the
main centres of trade throughout West Africa.^^ Structural changes were of two
kinds. First, the expatriate firms, from being relatively small concerns dominated by
one man or by a partership, began to form limited liability companies. A few of many
possible examples will suffice to illustrate this development, which began at the close
of the nineteenth century: John Holt & Co. became a limited company in 1897;
Cheri Peyrissac in 1908; R. & W. King, founded at the close of the seventeenth
century, followed suit in 1911; and Maurel et Prom in 1919. Second, there was a
move towards concentration. Many small businesses were eliminated, and the
survivors amalgamated to produce a handful of very large firms. This trend was
already apparent in the 18 80s, and it developed still further during the first phase of
colonial rule, vmtil by 1930 there were three outstanding firms (the United Africa
Company, the Compagnie Fran9aise de I’Afrique Occidental, and the Societe
Commerciale de 1’Quest Africain). Between them these giants handled roughly
two-thirds to three-quarters of West Africa’s overseas trade, and their commercial
network may be compared in size and importance with the administrative system
operated by the colonial powers. Indeed, sometimes the ‘District Officer’ of U.A.C.
had more local influence (and was certainly better paid) than the ‘branch manager’
of His Majesty’s Government.
The most prominent of the three firms yras the United Africa Company, which
alone handled nearly half of West Africa’s overseas trade in the 1930s. U.A.C.
dominated British West Africa, and its subsidiaries bought and shipped about a
quarter of the principal exports of French West Africa. U.A.C. was the weighty
offspring of two sizeable parents; the Royal Niger Company, which was formed in
1886, and the African Association, which was established three years later. Although
the Niger Company lost its royal charter in 1900, it continued to trade on a large
scale, and in 1920 was bought by W. H. Lever, the soap magnate, for ^^8 million.
The African Association survived until 1919, when it merged with Miller Bros and
F. & A. Swanzy to form the African & Eastern Trade Corporation Ltd. In 1920
Lever just failed in a bid to buy this company too, but in 1929 the African and Eastern
came to an agreement with Lever Bros., and the result was the formation of a gigantic
combine known as U.A.C. The next most important firm was the Compagnie
Fran^aise de I’Afrique Occidental, which was established in 1887. C.F.A.O. also
had a long West African ancestry, being descended from the Compagnie du Senegal
(1881), which was itself heir to the Marseilles house of C. A. Verminck, whose West
African interests dated back to the 1840s. The third large firm, the Societe Commer¬
ciale de I’Ouest Africain, was created in 1907 by a Swiss and French consortium out
of another established West African concern, Ryff, Roth et Cie. S.C.O.A. had less
than half the capital and far fewer branches than C.F.A.O. when it started, but over¬
took its rival after the Second World War. Good business histories of these three
firms, which are still the leading expatriate trading concerns in West Africa today.

24 For a contemporary guide to the expatriate firms, see A. Macmillan, The Red Book of
West Africa, 1920.

199
 V

An Economic History of West Africa

would help to resolve the controversy which has long surrounded their
activities.^®
The chief survivors among the smaller firms were John Holt, Paterson Zochonis,
Maurel et Prom, and Peyrissac. Of the few newcomers to West African trade, the
most significant (apart from specialist firms like Cadbury Bros and the mining
companies) wfere those customarily referred to as Levantines, a term which covers
nationals from a large number of countries bordering the eastern Mediterranean.
Levantine migrants, especially Lebanese, began settling in West Africa at the close
of the nineteenth century. Most of them had originally planned to go to America,
hut for various reasons they failed to progress further west than the African coast.
By 1929 there were just over 3,000 Levantines in French West Africa, and a slightly
smaller number in the British colonies. These immigrants began trading in a small
way, but because they were enterprising, low-cost operators they quickly achieved
success in certain fields. They first made their mark in Guinea, where they started a
boom in rubber exports in 1898. By paying in cash, they put an end to barter and
forced a number of European firms out of business. Subsequently, they bought other
export crops, such as groundnuts and cocoa, and sold cotton goods. In the 1920s and
1930S they spread into motor transport, and also ran hotels and restaurants. Their
numbers continued to increase, and they remain important today.^® The Levantines,
though not beyond criticism, have often been treated with unjustified hostility by
Europeans and Africans. Theirs is a misfortune commonly experienced by aliens
who lack political influence.
It is worth noting that a high degree of concentration was also apparent in banking
and shipping. Unlike the commercial firms, however, banking and shipping
interests were never very numerous. The leading companies owed their positions
less to successful take-overs, and more to government support, at least at the outset.
The steamship companies received subsidies, and the banks were given monopolistic
rights over currency issues. The result was that a few, privileged firms were able to
achieve an almost unassailable ascendancy. In 1890 the British shipping companies
serving the West Coast were brought fully under the control of A. L. Jones’s firm.
Elder, Dempster & Co. Ltd.^'^ Jones’s fleets increased from 3 5 vessels totalling 5 3,000
tons in 1884 to loi vessels totalling 301,000 tons in 1909, the year of his death.
French shipping became concentrated on two Marseilles companies, Chargeurs
Reunis, and its smaller associate, Fabre et Fraissinet, both of wliich had financial and
managerial links with C.F.A.O. In 1895 Elder, Dempster and the leading German

A certain amount of information on U.A.C. can be found in Charles Wilson’s The History
of Unilever, 2 vols, 1954, and Unilever, 1945-1965, 1968. A descriptive account of the operations
of the French firms is given in Jean and Rene Charbonneau, Marchis et marchands d’Afrique
noire, Paris 1961.
For further information, see Fuad I. Khuri, ‘Kinship, Emigration, and Trade Partnership
among the Lebanese of West Afnca’, Africa, 35, 1965, pp. 385-95, and Wilham R. Stanley,
‘The Lebanese in Sierra Leone; Entrepreneurs Extraordinary’, African Urban Notes, 5, 1970,
PP- 159-74-
P. N. Davies, ‘The African Steam Ship Company’, in Liverpool and Merseyside, ed. J. R.
Harris, 1969, pp. 212-38.

200
 Completing the open economy

firm, Woermann Linie, reached an agreement which limited competition between

them and established a joint policy towards newcomers. The French firms were not
associated with this agreement because they did not compete on the same routes as
the larger English and German companies. The shipping ‘conference’ (as such
arrangements are called) enabled the two major firms to control the bulk of the West
African shipping trade. Their principal weapon was the deferred rebate system, by
which shippers who agreed to use only conference vessels received a refund on a
proportion of their freight payments. The rebate was paid retrospectively to prevent
those of wavering loyalty from switching to another line. The conference was
suspended during the First World War, but it was reconstituted in 1924, and was
not challenged with any measure of success until the 1930s, when U.A.C. began to
run ocean-going vessels of its own.^®
Commercial banking was dominated in the British territories by the Bank of
British West Africa (1894), and in the French colonies by the Banque de I’Afrique
Occidentale (1901). Not until the arrival of Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial &
Overseas) in 1926 was there a serious threat to the position of B.B.W.A. Even so,
rivalry between the two banks was limited by mutual understandings of the kind
which habitually restrain members of the professions from competing too fiercely
with each other.
The foregoing developments are best explained as a response to changes in the
commercial environment between 1880 and I930' Essentially, the conversion to
limited hability and the emergence of a few large firms were results of the need both
to conserve and to augment commercial capital. Between 1870 and 1936 nearly ^^50
milhon was invested in West Africa by private foreign interests. Most of this money
was contributed by trading firms, and, understandably, virtually all of it went into
commerce. The need to safeguard existing investments by eliminating competition
was an important motive for amalgamation during times of unsatisfactory trade, as
in the 1880s and 1920s. These periods were also characterised by temporary ‘cease¬
fire’ arrangements. The export firms, for example, would often agree to share total
purchases on the basis of their past performance. Pooling agreements of this kind
nearly always broke down when trading conditions improved, and when member
firms decided that they could do better on their own. The need to increase capital
came with the geographical advance of the expatriate firms, which was itself a pro¬
duct of the adverse conditions of the late nineteenth century. At a time when profit
margins on traditional staples had been greatly reduced, expansion inland was
necessary to secure a larger turnover, and to capture a share in any new, and more
profitable, trade that might be developed. However, expansion could not be achieved
without mobilising more funds than the average expatriate firm in West Africa had
at its disposal. Hence the trend towards company formation and amalgamation, a
trend which continued in times of prosperity, as during the years 1900-1914, as well
as in periods of depression.

28 For further details, see Charlotte Leubuscher, The West African Shipping Trade, 1909-1959,

Leyden 1963, chs 3 and 4.

201
An Economic History of West Africa

Larger firms had a number of important advantages over their smaller competi¬
tors. First, they could afford to establish branches in the interior, and to employ a
greater number of skilled, but costly, expatriate staff. Second, they had the resources
to finance the activities of an increased number of enterprising, but impecunious,
indigenous traders, -who were to play an important part in the colonial economy.
Third, they hard the capacity to finance stocks over a long period of time, for the
scattered nature of the market in West Africa, as well as its distance from Europe,
meant that turnover was habitually slow. Fourth, they could withstand sudden
fluctuations in overseas trade, as occurred in 1919-1920 and 1929-1934, more easily
than could small firms. Fifth, by integrating horizontally (by acquiring other trading
firms) and vertically (by acquiring interests in shipping and manufacturing), the
larger firms could exert a greater degree of influence over the trade as atwhole. Sixth,
they benefited from economies of scale: for example, by placing bulk orders they
were able to buy manufactured goods more cheaply than their rivals, and they were
also in a position to secure sole agencies with respect to particular brands. Finally, the
large firms could count on a considerable amount of government co-operation as
far as their local interests were concerned. The administration, though formally
neutral in such matters, in practice showed a preference for dealing with a few,
established, expatriate companies. Colonialism thus created a new ‘moral com-
mtinity’ of traders, the higher echelons of whicn were staffed by a smSd group of
men who shared a common natiomIit:vr7ehgion~and social background-
Conflicting arguments concerning the role of the expatriate trading firms have
long been current. On the one hand, these firms have been accused of exploitation,
a charge that has rarely been closely defined, and is certainly difficult to analyse. On
the other hand, the expatriate firms have complained about African traders, alleging
that there were too many of them, and that their presence reduced the profits not
only of the large firms themselves, but of African producers as well.
The idea of exploitation revolves around two recurrent themes: first_thaL_the
large firms made excessive profits; and second, that they eliminated an emerging
generatioiioFAfricannierchants. At fts most extreme, the view that the expatriate
firms were able to make exceshve profits is based on the notion that they had
complete control of the market, both in Europe and in Africa. Strictly speakmg, this
is incorrect. Important though they were, the large commercial firms took world
prices for produce as given; their profit lay in their ability to adjust their own prices
(and costs) accordingly. Flowever, the large firms did not have complete control over
the African market either. Technically, it was not a monopoly which existed, but an
oligopoly, that is a situation in which the market was dominated by a few competing
firms. The scope for excessive profits was narrower than is sometimes assumed.
African producers and consumers may well have benefited from competition among
the expatriate firms, from the economies of scale which they were able to achieve,
and from the regularity and continuity of service which they could offer. All the
same, it is undeniable that oligopoly was closer to monopoly than it was to perfect
competition, and it is also true that the large firms regarded concentration as being
primarily in their own interests. John Mars, in a detailed study of the operations of

202
 Completing the open economy

expatriate enterprises in the 1930s, has shown that in certain areas and on specific
commodities the large firms were occasionally able to make profits which were
excessive in relation to what would have been obtained had there been greater
competition.^® On the rare occasions when competition was fully effective, as when
Saul Raccah broke into the Nigerian groiuidnut trade in the 1930s, the farmer
received a higher price for his produce.®® Whether this example can be generalised
for the trade as a whole, and over a longer period of time, is an interesting counter-
factual proposition, though not one that would be easy to test.
In assessing the role of the expatriate firms it is important to distinguish between
two different questions :^rst, what would the economic situation of West Africa
have been without these companies; and second, how does their performance
compare with the optimum contribution which might have been madeTJwith
regard to the first question, the chief functions of the expatriate firms were to provide
and display the consumer goods which were the main incentive to export produc¬
tion, and to ensure that exports were marketed in the industrial countries. In carrying
out these activities they incurred risks in holding stocks and promising future deli¬
veries, and they also financed the operations of many African traders. Without the
expatriate firms there would have been less investment in comm^ce, less expertise
in international markets, and a much smaller foreign trade secto^As to the second
question, it is clear that the record of the expatriate concerns feUshort of what was
theoretically possible. Once established, the large firms became conservative in out¬
look. They were concerned more to defend their existing positions than to open up
new fields of enterprise. For example, down to the 1950s they showed little interest
in developing local industries, partly because this was, in any case, a difficult task,
and partly because they did not want to tackle unfamiliar projects.®^ The large firms
also did little to encourage trainii^ in modem business mmagement. Africans had
to acquire the necessary skills onthdr own, and, in the event, slowly. Furthermore,
it is at least an arguable probability that greater competition would have given
Africans a rather better deal in terms of the prices they received for produce and paid
for consumer goods. Finally, there is no doubt that a large proportion of trading
profits, surplus funds and expatriate salaries were transferred abroad instead of being
invested in Africa.
The position of African businessmen under coloniahsm was not quite as simple as
it has often been made to appear. The main trends in the fortunes of indigenous
import and export firms were as follows. African merchants were able to flourish
during the period 1850-1880 because trading conditions at that time gave no over¬
whelming advantage to large firms. The restricted size of the market, the introduc¬
tion of cash payments, and the advent of the steamer were circumstances which
enabled small firms to achieve a considerable degree of success. From the i88os

29 ‘Extra-Territorial Enterprises’, in Mining, Commerce, and Finance in Nigeria, ed. M.

Perham, 1948, pp. 76-87.
30 For an outline of Raccah’s career see Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs,

II, part 2, pp. 216-17.

31 This question is considered in greater detail in Chapter 7.

203
An Economic History of West Africa

onwards the commercial environment began to favour large firms, and many
smaller concerns, European as well as African, found that they lacked the capital and
skills to survive. African merchants did not give up easily, however, and by the 1920s
they, too, were experimenting with company formation in an attempt to mobilise
more capital. But by then the large expatriate concerns had established almost total
doirunance, arid thereafter small firms, whatever their nationality, found the
barriers to entry almost insurmountable. The two successful attempts which are
often quoted were made by Levantines, not by Africans: Saul Raccah won a sizeable
share of the Nigerian groundnut trade in the 1930s, and A. G. Leventis broke into
the Gold Coast import and export trade during the Second World War.'^^ These
men found a space for themselves at the point where the economies of scale enjoyed
by the large firms were outweighed by the diseconomies which resulted from the
comprehensive and relatively unspecialised nature of their business. That is to say,
the newcomers began by exploiting particular markets and specific lines of goods;
they were in a position to make decisions on the spot instead of having to refer
matters to a head office in Europe; and they were able to match pioneer aggression
against an established, bureaucratic outlook. However, these exceptions, being so
few in number, prove the rule, for Raccah and Leventis were particularly skilled,
highly motivated and adventurous businessmen.
The conclusions which can be derived from this survey of changing busines^
fortunes need to be stated carefully. In the first place, it is likely that African import
and export firms suffered a decline in the proportion of overseas trade which th^
handled, at least as far as the established staples were concerned. However, the extmt
of this decline should not be exaggerated, for the European firms already domina/ed
the trade of the main ports in the period 1850-1880—a fact that is not always Em¬
phasised. In terms of value, on the other hand, the external trade in African hinds
was probably greater in the 1920s than it had been in the mid-nineteenth century.
What happened was that all groups gained from the expansion of trade during the
first phase of colonial rule, but that the expatriate firms gained relatively more than
the indigenous firms. Secondly, it is misleading to point to the decline of Africans in
the traditional import and export trades without at the same time recognising their
enterprise in other branches of commerce. Many Africans were astute enough to
realise that their best course lay in developing new types of trade rather than in
trying to compete with the large two-way firms. In Nigeria, for example, Africans
were the first to import and operate commercial motor vehicles, to market sewing
machines, to build cinemas, and to establish a bread-making industry. Thirdly, it is
important to remember that externally-induced changes in the economic environ¬
ment were only partly responsible for the shift in the relative positions of expatriate
and indigenous firms. Internal structural weaknesses, such as the existence of inlierit-
ance laws which made it hard to keep an African business together after the death of
its founder, were also very significant.
Considerable disagreement also exists over the fortunes of the African middlemen,

On Leventis see Bauer, West African Trade, pp. 79-86.

204
 Completing the open economy

the intermediaries who linked producers and consumers to the import and export
firms. Some sources claim that the middlemen were swept away at the close of the
nineteenth century; others give prominence to the attacks made on them by
expatriate firms in the 1930s! The first claim has arisen mainly because undue atten¬
tion has been paid to the downfall of a few prominent individuals, such as Ja Ja and
Nana Olomu, who ran big trading monopolies in the nineteenth century, while the
activities of an expanding number of smaller traders in the twentieth century have
been largely ignored. Studies by Gertzel and Ikime have made it clear that, in
southern Nigeria anyway, many expatriate firms were quick to realise that they could
not afford to disrupt the indigenous distributive system completely.®^ The expansion
of the market in the period 1900-1930 was made possible not only by the movement
inland of the expatriate firms, but also by an increase in the number of African
intermediaries. In 1908 the manager of Lagos Stores Ltd, which had several branches
in the interior of Nigeria, estimated that less than one per cent of his firm’s total
trade was transacted with the final consumer.®^ The census figures for the large
towns in West Africa confirm that trade was an expanding occupation, not a
dechning one.
The Hfe of Omu Okwei (1872-1943), a prominent woman trader in Onitsha,
provides an interesting example of indigenous enterprise during this less publicised
phase of African commercial history in the period following the decline of the great
middlemen of the nineteenth century.®® Omu Okwei’s trading career was greatly
helped by the inland advance of the expatriate firms after 1900. She developed close
commercial relations with the Niger Company, selling palm produce to the company
and retailing imported goods. By 1910 her business had grown to the point where
she was allowed credit of a month. By the 1920s she was diversifying her
interests, putting money into property, investing in lorries and canoes, and making
cash advances to other traders. At her death she left a small fortune, which included
twenty-four houses in Onitsha and about ^$,000 in the bank. Omu Okwei’s career
serves as a reminder of the presence and influence of women traders in West Africa,
and as a particular illustration of the proposition that colonialism, having destroyed
some of the great figures of the nineteenth century, helped to create new opportuni¬
ties for at least some sections of the indigenous population.
^^In short, the middlemen lost the political power which formerly they had used to
support their market demands, and they also had to adapt to new developments,
such as the coming of the railway, but as a group they survived. However, contrary
to the allegations of expatriate officials and merchants, the continued presence of a
multiplicity of indigenous traders was not a wasteful allocation of human resources.
- As Bauer has made clear, the so-called middlemen were highly competitive and

33 Cherry J. Gertzel, ‘Relations Between African and European Traders in the Niger Delta,
1880-1896’, Journal of African History, 3, I9'52, pp. 361-6; Obaro Ikime, Merchant Prince of the
Niger Delta, 1968, pp. 187-8.
34 C.O. 520/68, Egerton to Crewe, 16 December, 1908, PubUc Record Office.
35 For further details see Fehcia Ekejuiba, ‘Omu Okwei, the Merchant Queen of Ossomari:
a Biographical Sketch’, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 3, 1967. PP- 633-46.

205
An Economic History of West Africa

generally efficient channels of collection and distribution.^® The idea of direct trade
with the producers, though appealing at a time when expatriate firms were trying
to cut their costs, was an economic fantasy. In a situation where producers and
consumers were both numerous and scattered, abolishing the middlemen would
have meant reducing the size of the market.
The last of the external influences to require examination is the colonial monetary
system. As noted in Chapter 4, the decline of transitional currencies and the spread
of British and French coins date from about the middle of the nineteenth century.
Thus the introduction of the colonial monetary system was not a sudden event.
. Once again, the role of the colonial authorities was to speed a process which was
already under way. The administrations encouraged the adoption of modern money
in three ways: by demonetising transitional currencies; by payingtits expanding
labour force in European coin; and by insisting on receiving taxes in cash rather than
in kind. Some of the expatriate firms were also keen to see a cash trade develop, but
others clung to barter for as long as possible. The Niger Company, for example, did
not conduct a cash trade until after about 1905. The most potent agents of change
were Africans themselves, especially the new generation of small export producers
who realised that cash transactions would enable them to strike a better bargain. By
about 1910 European currencies were widespread in West Africa. In the period
1906-1910 exports of sterling silver to British West Africa averaged f^666,i90 per
annum, wliich was almost as much as was issued for the United Kingdom itself.
Naturally, there were some areas which continued to use transitional currencies for
local transactions during the greater part of the colonial period. Perhaps the best
example was eastern Nigeria, where the government’s decision to ban further
imports of manillas in 1902 inadvertently had the effect of stabilising their value. In
1948-1949, when manillas were finally called in, no less than 30 million were
collected 1®'^
The increasing circulation of European currencies led to the introduction of
modern banking institutions. The first successful bank in West Africa was the
Banque du Senegal, which was established at St Louis in 1854. This bank was
founded primarily to assist the development of legitimate commerce, and specifically
to handle compensation payments to former slave owners following the abolition
of slavery in the French empire in 1848. In 1901 the Banque du Senegal was replaced
by the Banque de I’Afrique Occidentale. B.A.O., which was designed to serve the
wider area that had just been brought under French rule, was the most important
bank in French West Africa during the colonial period. Towards the close of the
nineteenth century several attempts were made to set up banks in the British posses¬
sions, notably in Sierra Leone and the southern part of Nigeria, but none was
successful until 1894, when a group of businessmen headed by A. L. Jones, the
shipping magnate, founded the Bank of British West Africa. B.B.W.A. expanded

3® Bauer, West African Trade, pp. 22-34. The general point remains, even though Bauer
may well have over-emphasised the extent of competition among African traders.
3^ United Africa Company, ‘The Manilla Problem’, Statistical and Economic Review, 3,
1949, pp. 44-56.

206
 Completing the open economy

rapidly. By 1910 it had established branches in most of the leading commercial

centres in the British colonies, as well as in Monrovia, the capital of Liberia. The
bank’s paid up capital, a mere ^12,000 in 1894, had grown to ^200,000; the number
of its employees had increased from six to 114; its depositors from a few dozen to
4,410; and its deposits from about ,(^30,000 to just over million. B.B.W.A.,
though joined by a second large and successful expatriate bank, Barclays (D.C. & O.),
in 1926, remained the leading bank in British West Africa throughout the colonial
period.
The largely xmplanned infiltration of an underdeveloped region by an advanced
monetary system was a global phenomenon in the nineteenth century. The expan¬
sion of international trade and the adoption of the gold standard among the industrial
powers had repercussions in India, Ceylon, Australia, Indo-China, Puerto Rico,
Mexico and the Philippines—to list just some of the leading examples. It was also a
process that gave rise to a number of problems. In West Africa these included the
provision of satisfactory controls over the supply and repatriation of currency; the
equitable division of seignorage (the difference between the bullion value and the
face value of the coinage) between the metropolis and the colonies; and the main¬
tenance of adequate reserves for currencies circulating in the colonies.®®
The French dealt with these problems by utilising an existing private institution,
the Banque de I’Afrique Occidental, and subjecting it to an increasing degree of
government control.®® In 1901 B.A.O. was granted the privilege of becoming the
sole bank of issue for French West Africa. In return, it had to make some financial
contribution both to the metropolis and to the colonies; it had to ensure that currency
circulating in French West Africa was freely convertible with the metropolitan
franc and it had to maintain a specified ratio between reserves and currency issues.
These arrangements, which were evolved between 1901 and 1929, remained sub¬
stantially unchanged until 1945, when the franc zone was created and a separate
currency issued for the colonies. B.A.O. continued to preside over the French West
African monetary system until 1955, when a new public institution with some of the
powers of a central bank was set up to handle the issue of currency. Thereafter,
B.A.O. confined its activities to commercial banking, and it also lost ground to
newer competitors. Between 1894 and 1911 the British also used a commercial bank,
the Bank of British West Africa, as the sole bank of issue. In 1911, however, the
Colonial Office and the Treasury decided that the difficulties experienced by the
haphazard expansion of sterling in West Africa were best solved by creating a
separate colonial currency and by establishing a new, independent institution. The
outcome was the foundation of the West African Currency Board in 1912. The

These questions are discussed further in A. G. Hopkins, ‘The Creation of a Colonial

Monetary System: The Origins of the West African Currency Board’, African Historical
Studies, 3, 1970, pp. 101-32.
There is no satisfactory study of the colonial monetary system in French West Africa. A
certain amount of historical information can be found in M. Leduc, ‘Les institutions monetaires
africaines: pays francophones, Paris 1965.
In practice, there was no problem of convertibihty until after 1945.

207
An Economic History of West Africa

W.A.C.B. supervised tlie issue of the new colonial currency; it managed the
reserves (gold and securities); it invested and distributed the profits arising out of
the introduction of the colonial currency; and it acted as a large scale money-changer,
converting the colonial currency into sterling and vice versa. This system survived
virtually intact until the time of independence.
Although the institutional mechanisms adopted by France and Britain differed,
the operation of the colonial monetary systems was essentially the same. In both
cases the monetary system was effectively an extension of that of the major power.
It was related closely enough to the metropolitan system to ensure that international
trade would not be misettled by changes in the rates of exchange. At the same time,
the colonial monetary system had sufficient independence, by having its own
reserves, to avoid involving the parent economy in any additional monetary
responsibilities. The system itself was largely self-regulating. The W.A.C.B. and
B.A.O. were sole channels of supply, but they had no control over the volume of
currency in circulation. In practice, the latter was tied closely to the balance of
payments; the currency in circulation and the necessary reserves had to be earned by
the colonies, principally through the sale of exports. Thus, the supply of money
expanded at a time of boom, and contracted during a slump. Deficits were settled
automatically. For example, if a colony had an excess of imports over exports the
balance was settled by withdrawing money from local circulation. This reduction
in the local money supply lowered incomes in the colony. The result was that im¬
ports declined to the point where they were equated with exports once more, though
at a lower equilibrium level. In short, money was regarded mainly as a medium of
external exchange.
Judged by nineteenth-century principles of sound money, the colonial monetary
system had certain points in its favour. In the first place, the operation of the system
prevented the colonies from accumulating deficits. Its self-regulating qualities,
combined with the colonial tradition of balancing the budget, virtually eliminated
the risk of uiflation and the danger of a balance of payments crisis. Secondly, because
the colonial system had close connections with the metropolis, currencies circulating
in the dependencies enjoyed an international reputation and a degree of stability,
though the latter advantage was more pronounced in the case of sterling than in the
case of the franc. Tliirdly, the profits derived from seignorage and from investing
the currency reserves gave the colonies some additional revenue which had not been
available previously.
The system had also had its limitations.^^ The chief disadvantage was that the
growth of the internal exchange economy tended to be inhibited by monetary
tightness, except when there was an export surplus. Tliis favourable situation was
often short-lived, and always unpredictable. Theoretically, there was nothing in the
monetary system to prevent the commercial b.inks from expanding the money

For a full discussion see two pioneering studies: J. Mars, ‘The Monetary and Banking
System and the Loan Market of Nigeria’, in Commerce, and Finance in Nigeria, ed. M.
Perham, 1948, pp. 177-224; and W. T. Newlyn and D. C. Rowan,' Money and Banking in
British Colonial Africa, Oxford 1954.

208
 Completing the open economy

supply through lending operations, but in practice banking policy was passive, and
remained so, as Killick has shown with reference to the Gold Coast, down to the time
of independence.^^ Three particular features of banking policy are worth noting in
this connection. First, the banks usually invested their money in the metropolis, in
the same way as the W.A.C.B. and B.A.O. invested the currency reserves outside
the West African colonies. The underdeveloped colonies found themselves loaning
money to the advanced countries, principally because of a lack of acceptable local
investment opportumties. Second, bank lending policy generally followed the trade
cycle by expanding credit during a boom and reducing it at a time of slump. This
practice tended to magnify rather than diminish the fluctuations in trade experienced
by primary export producers in the colonies. Third, bank loans were confined mainly
to the large expatriate firms, thus reinforcing their dominant position in commerce.
The banks were willing to accept deposits from Africans, and as early as 1910
^^263,000 (about a quarter of B.B.W.A.’s'total deposits) belonged to African
customers. When it came to borrowing, however, Africans ran into difficulties.
They found it hard to present themselves as being personally trustworthy in the eyes
of expatriates, and they also faced problems of supplying the kind of security thought
normal in Europe, chiefly because indigenous customs regarding the ownership of
property often meant that individuals were not free to negotiate mortgages.
The foregoing discussion of government policy, transport, the distributive
system, and money and banking has attempted to clarify what might be called the
external contribution to the development of the open economy. The main conclu¬
sion to emerge, whatever judgements are made about the beneficial or deleterious
effects of colonialism, is that the expatriate role was less dynamic and more circum¬
scribed than is often supposed. Within the limits indicated, external influences were
important and necessary, but it would be mistaken to conclude that they were
sufficient to guarantee an automatic expansion of the export sector. Indeed, it is
possible to conceive of circumstances in which the efforts of expatriates might have
produced only meagre results. The fact that, with certain regional qualiflcations, the
results were substantial implies that other factors, especially those relating to the
responsiveness of African societies, were of critical significance. The remaining task
is to assess the nature and extent of the indigenous contribution by focusing on the
utilisation of land and labour resources.

2 The African contribution

There is one important preliminary issue which has to be settled, namely, why it was
that agricultural production remained almost exclusively in African hands, especially
since colonial rule was regarded by its advocates as an agency for modernisation, and
modernisation involved a reappraisal of the means of exploiting the natural resources

Tony Killick, ‘The Monetary and Financial System’, in A Study of Contemporary Ghana,
I, The Economy of Ghana, ed. Walter Birmingham, I. Neustadt and E. N. Omaboe, 1966,
pp. 294-331.

209
 t ■

An Economic History of West Africa

of the region. For reasons outlined in the previous chapter, the limitations imposed
on foreign firms in this sector had a profound effect on the course of West African
development in the twentieth century. Yet the motives for constraining expatriate
enterprise in agriculture have not received serious attention since Professor Hancock
published his celebrated Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs thirty years ago.^^
Indeed, some recent accounts, in summarising Hancock’s views, or views derived
ultimately from Iris work, have tended to oversimplify and distort the issue. It is
often suggested that colonial policy towards the alienation of land was fully defined
by about 1900, and that the confirmation'of African rights was a triumph for the
custodians of the humanitarian conscience over powerful commercial interests—
the last act of a long-running melodrama which began with the campaign for the
abolition of the Atlantic slave trade. Both interpretations require revision.
At the begimiing of the colonial period, official policy regarding expatriate
participation in production was still Very flexible. Had this not been the case, it
would be impossible to explain how it was that expatriate interests did establish a
foothold, though a restricted one, in mining and agriculture. European mining
operations in West Africa began in the late 1870s and continued throughout the
colonial period. Production was dominated by a few large concerns, such as Ashanti
Goldfields Corporation (1897), the Sierra Leone Development Corporation (1929),
the Consolidated African Selection Trust (1932)—later the Sierra Leone Selection!
Trust (1935)—and Amalgamated Tin Mines of Nigeria Ltd (1939). The prominence
of expatriate firms in tliis sector is usually explained by saying that modern mining!
operations require considerable capital and a liigh degree of technical skill. Without
denying the general truth of this proposition, it is important to point out that in
West Africa a number of minerals can be worked on a small scale and without
massive financial resources. In these cases it would seem more accurate to explain the
prominence of expatriate companies in terms of the need to confer rights in order to
encourage prospecting in the first place, and of the convenience of collecting
royalties and taxes from a few substantial and reliable concerns. The Nigerian coal
mines (near Enugu) were managed by the colonial government, and arc interesting
not only as an example of an unusual degree of official participation in production,
but also because coal was the only local mineral to be used extensively in West Africa
instead of being exported. Africans were not completely excluded from mineral
production, and small scale indigenous enterprise was found in areas where minerals
could be extracted by inexpensive and simple methods, as was the case to some
extent with gold, diamonds and tin.
At the turn of the century there was also a reasonable chance that extensive,
foreign-owned plantations would be established in West Africa. French firms
received substantial concessions in the Ivory Coast in the 1890s and in Dahomey in
1901. German merchants established plantations in Togo and, on a larger scale, in
the Cameroons in the 1890s. In 1913 there were 58 plantations in the Cameroons
covering an area of about 75,000 square miles and employing 18,000 African
workers. In British West Africa a few expatriate plantations were established on the
II, part 2, 1942, pp. 175-200.

210
 Completing the open economy

Gold Coast (near Accra) and in southern Nigeria (in the Lagos hinterland) at the turn
of the century. The British Cotton Growing Association (1902) advanced plans for
planting and ginning operations, and W. H. Lever, the Liverpool soap and margarine
magnate, mounted a powerful campaign in favour of plantations in West Africa.
This campaign, which began in 1906, came near to success after the First World
War, but ended with Lever’s death in 1925.
The demand for plantations arose during the trade depression of the late nineteenth
century, and was revived whenever expatriate business interests felt their prosperity
and security threatened by the commercial fluctuations of the early colonial period.
Plantations, so it was claimed, would be highly efficient, and would produce a
greater yield per tree as well as better quality produce. For a manufacturer like Lever
they were also a means of regulating supplies and controlling the cost of raw
materials. The campaign for plantations received a degree of official backing which
made it respectable, and consequently influential, in government circles. In British
West Africa, Lord Lugard and Governor Slater of Sierra Leone both showed some
sympathy with Lever’s petitions in the 1920s, and at least two Colonial Secretaries,
Harcourt and Ormsby-Gore, were prepared to consider the case with more than
formal interest. Their concern was not simply a response to Lever’s pressure, but
arose out of a fear that the greater technical efficiency achieved by plantation develop¬
ments in other parts of the world would make it impossible for indigenous producers
in West Africa to compete in international markets. Their attitude shows that
British policy at least was not clearly laid down right at the start of the colonial era.
Nevertheless, the planters’ frontier made little headway in West Africa. In the
French territories concessions were limited shortly after the turn of the century, and
some were cancelled altogether. The only plantations worth noting were those in
the southern part of the Ivory Coast.^^ These expanded briefly in the 1920s, but
declined rapidly after the Second World War. By 1955 little more than 200 French
planters remained, and they produced only a very small proportion of total exports.
In German West Africa the initial rate of expansion was not maintained, and
plantation development was brought to a halt by the First World War.^® In British
West Africa the oil mills which Lever had been allowed to start in Sierra Leone
proved unsuccessful, his more ambitious plans for palm oil plantations were frustra¬
ted, and he was forced to transfer his interest to the Congo, where the Belgian
government adopted a more generous approach to the distribution of African land.
Lever fulminated against the backwardness of indigenous methods of extracting

** H. Frechou, ‘Les plantations europeennes en Cote d’Ivoire’, Cahiers d'Outre-Mer, 8,

1955. PP- 56-83. A small number of banana plantations were established in French Guinea in
the 193OS.
After the First World War the plantations were run by Britain under the mandate of the
League of Nations. They reverted to Germany in the 1920s, but were taken over again by
Britain after the Second World War. See S. H. Bederman, ‘Plantation Agriculture in Victoria
Division, West Cameroons: an Historical Introduction’, Geography, 51, 1966, pp. 349-60,
and, for a study of the operation of these plantations, E. Ardener, S. Ardener, and W. A.
Warmington, Plantation and Village in the Cameroons, i960.

2II
An Economic History of West Africa

palm oil, but these methods, though technically inferior, had overall advantages
which expatriates found hard to match.^® Ironically, the one area where expatriate
plantations did become important was Liberia, the only politically independent
state in West Africa. The Liberian economy had limped along from crisis to crisis
since the second half of the nineteenth century, unable to find a permanently suc¬
cessful export, and accumulating a number of external debts. By the 1920s it was
clear that a substantial injection of foreign capital was needed to retrieve the situation,
and in 1926 the government leased one million acres to a large American firm, the
Firestone Rubber Company, for a term of 99 years.^'^ Rubber exports began to
expand in the late 1930s, and by 1950 accounted for about 90 per cent of the value of
all Liberia’s exports.
The reasons why the colonial powers decided to Umit foreign concessions in West
Africa are more complex than is usually thought. To start with, it is necessary to
dispose of two traditional explanations which have long camouflaged more impor¬
tant influences. In the first place, it is often said that plantations failed to become
established in West Africa because the climate was unsuitable for white settlers.
There is no force in this argument. The alleged unhealthiness of the tropics did not
prevent the establishment of European plantations in the Belgian Congo, French
Equatorial Africa, or Malaya, and it did not discourage serious applicants in West
Africa either. Furthermore, the control of malaria and other tropical diseases was
becoming more effective by the start of the twentieth century, and the so-called
White Man’s Grave was beginning to lose some of its unsavoury reputation.'^®
Secondly, in the case of the British colonies it has been argued that the government
was committed by its policy of trusteeship to maintaining the land in African hands.
This is an unsatisfactory explanation because trusteeship was an eclectic concept, at
least as far as means were concerned. The Dutch, for example, had a policy of trustee¬
ship which was used to justify the introduction of plantations into Indonesia;
Britain, too, was prepared to permit plantation developments in certain parts of the
empire; and substantial concessions were granted in French Equatorial Africa.^®
The problem cannot be solved simply by a general reference to the notion of the dual
mandate; the question that has to be answered is why trusteeship took the particular
form it did in West Africa.
There were four main reasons why Europeans failed to play a dominant part in
the production of West African exports. The first reason relates specifically to
minerals; the remaining three concern agricultural production. In the case of
mineral resources considerable weight must be given to a fortuitous geological fact,
Peter Kilby, Industrialization in an Open Economy: Nigeria ig45-ig66, Cambridge I969,h
pp. 146-68.
Firestone’s, of course, had its own reasons for entering Liberia. For further information
see the items by Brown, McLaughhn and Taylor listed in the bibUography.
Raymond E. Dumett, ‘The Campaign against Malaria and the Expansion of Scientific,
Medical and Sanitary Services in British West Africa, 1898-1910’, African Historical Studies, i,
1968, pp. 153-97-
S. Amin and C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, Histoire economique du Congo, i88o-ig68, Dakar
1970, part I.

212
 Completing the open economy

namely that known and commercially exploitable deposits were not distributed
profusely throughout West Africa. Had the gold mining boom of 1899-1903 lasted
beyond the Boer War, and had many other mineral resources been found about the
same time, then the economic liistory of West Africa might well have taken a very
different course. It is conceivable that trusteeship would have been interpreted in a
way which was more favourable to expatriate interests, for it would have been hard
to resist the argument that European capital and skill were needed to benefit Africans
as well as Europeans. The discovery of iron and diamonds in Sierra Leone in the
1930S, and their exploitation by expatriate firms, is an exceptional case which
supports this hypothesis.
Of the three reasons why expatriate plantations were of little significance in West
Africa, two have been almost entirely ignored, and the third needs to be given
greater emphasis than it has in the past. First, it is important to appreciate that the
planters’ frontier was held back partly by strong opposition from established trading
interests. Many of those who pressed for agricultural concessions, men such as
Verdier and Lever, were also engaged in buying, sliipping and selling produce.
Other expatriate traders who lacked either the capital or the inclination to enter
production feared that their more adventurous rivals would be in a position to under¬
cut them by a considerable margin and to establish a monopoly over the supply of
export crops. This anxiety explains why German traders opposed concessions in
Togo, why C.F.A.O. was hostile to plantations in French West Africa, and why
Manchester and Liverpool traders mounted a powerful campaign in opposition to
Lever’s demands between 1906 and 1920. In the latter year Lever bought up the
Niger Company and with it much of the opposition to his schemes. Neverthe¬
less, the profound split among expatriate business interests in West Africa
midoubtedly did much to weaken the case put forward by those who wished to see
extensive European plantations established in that part of the continent.
The second and equally neglected reason is that the few European plantations
which were established in colonial West Africa nearly all failed. They started with
two serious drawbacks, a considerable ignorance of tropical conditions and a notable
lack of capital, which had also characterised previous experiments during the era of
legitimate commerce. These handicaps often proved fatal at the outset. Even if they
were overcome, two more problems arose almost immediately. The first was a
shortage of labour, which also meant that wages had to be relatively high. The
second problem was that plantations, being highly specialised, were particularly
susceptible to shifts in world supply. Many of the early expatriate planters in West
Africa committed themselves heavily to coffee production, and were eliminated by
competition from South America soon after the turn of the century. Both problems
are illustrated by the history of French plantations on the Ivory Coast, which
survived in the second half of the colonial period only because they received large
subsidies in the form of forced labour and tariff preference. The record of expatriate
plantations in the West African colonies was scarcely one to encourage either a very
widespread demand for concessions, or wholehearted government support for
European adventures in African agriculture.

213
 1 '

An Economic History of West Africa

The tliird reason is perhaps more obvious, but it still needs to be stressed. It is that
by the time controversy over concessions was at its height, Africans had already
succeeded in generating an export economy by their own efforts. Exports of palm
products recovered from the difficulties of the i88os and 1890s, and expanded after
the turn of the century; the Gold Coast cocoa industry had become the largest in the
world by 1910; and groundnuts, long established as the main export staple in
Senegambia, and in any case not suited to plantation production, had become very
important in northern Nigeria by 1914. Peasant production had proved itself;
plantations had not. Furthermore, plantations were bound to interfere with tradi¬
tional land rights', and to lead to disputes over labour recruitment. Both matters
were guaranteed to arouse widespread protests from Africans. Their hostility could
easily find political expression, and so threaten the colonial authorities and colonial
rule itself. This evidence, and its implications, proved decisive. The French gave
their backing to indigenous farmers in West Africa specifically to avoid the compli¬
cations which expatriate enterprise had brought in Algeria and fiido-China, and the
majority of British officials, led by Clifford, the influential Governor of the Gold
Coast (1912-1919) and Nigeria (1919-1925), agreed to a similar course of action. In
I"
Chapter 4 it was argued that the nineteenth century saw the rise of a new generation
of export producers, and that the partition of West Africa was motivated partly by
the need to create an economic environment which would allow them to flourish.
In restricting the planters’ frontier in West Africa, and in supporting African pro¬
ducers, the colonial powers were carrying nineteenth-century pohcy to a fruitful
conclusion.
I The foregoing argument can be summarised in three statements. First, official
policy towards concessions was not settled by 1900, but evolved gradually during the
initial phase of colonial rule. Second, the controversy was not simply between en¬
lightened, liberal civil servants on the one hand, and the ‘soap boilers of the world’,
as Hancock called them, on the other, but between combinations of various interests
with officials and businessmen represented on both sides. Third, to understand why
expatriate plantations were unimportant in West Africa it is necessary to focus not
on climatic or vaguely humanitarian explanations, but on the failure rate among
those plantations which were established, on the ability of the indigenous society to
produce the required exports, and on the relative strengths of expatriate traders and
expatriate planters. The hypothesis advanced here is that expatriate plantations were
more likely to become established in parts of the tropics where opposition from
traders was non-existent or ineffective, and where peasant exports were slow to
respond to external demanS^
To these three statements may be added a final comment about the wisdom of the
policy adopted by the colonial powers. Some writers have argued that by preventing
the development of a free market in land the authorities deprived the community of
the benefits which would have arisen from a more efficient utilisation of resources.®^
This criticism is open to question. It fails to appreciate that policy was fluid enough at

For example, F. J. Pedler, Economic Geography of West Africa, 1955, pp. 38-9.

214
 NOUAKCHOTT

215
Completing the open economy

Map 13. Main Areas of Export Crop Production in the 1960s.

 An Economic History of West Africa

the start of the colonial period to allow some plantations to be started, and that these
experiments were unable to survive without official aid. Furthermore, there was no
guarantee that the benefits of plantation development would have accrued mainly
to the producing country. Plantations have often formed enclaves which have failed
to transmit growth to the domestic economy. The oft-predicted downfall of West
African palm produce exports has not occurred. Plantations of palm trees can supply
better quality produce, but the achievement may involve higher production costs.
! Where plantations have succeeded in reducing poduction costs, their advantage
has sometimes been cancelled by political instability, as in the cases of Indonesia and
the Congo.^^ The'moral is an important one: decisions on agricultural policy should
also consider the wider social and political impHcations of changes in the means of
working the land.
Ten years ago, an historical analysis of the African contribution to the develop¬
ment of the export economy would have had to rely heavily on a mixture of
untested traditions and speculation. Today, as a result of some painstaking empirical
research, reliable information is available for certain areas and products, though
more work still needs to be undertaken.®^ Two contrasting regions and exports will
be considered here; the Gold Coast cocoa industry, which has been examined in a
series of important studies by Polly Hill,®® and the origins of the northern Nigerian
groundnut trade, which has Keen reconstructed, most valuably, byjan Hogendom.®^
Both examples will be supplemented by evidence relating to French West Africa.
In less than twenty years (1892-1911) shipments of cocoa from the Gold Coast
grew from nothing to around 40,000 tons, making the colony the largest cocoa
exporter in the world. Tins position has been maintained ever since. Today, Ghana
exports around 400,000 tons of cocoa a year, the cocoa belt covers some 4 million
acres, and the industry provides employment for several million people. The rapid
expansion of the early days is all the more remarkable when it is remembered that
the cocoa tree is not indigenous to West Africa, that it takes several years before it
begins to yield, and that it does not reach maturity until it is about fifteen years old.
Cocoa farming was a thorouglily capitalist enterprise from the outset: it involved
taking risks with an unfamiliar product; substantial investments of time and money;
the ability to plan ahead; and a willingness to defer present consumption for the sake
of future returns. This major innovation used to be explained by stressing the role of
i government sponsorship and supervision, and by underplaying the contribution

Peasant exports have also been affected by poHtical instability in the post-colonial era, as
the example of eastern Nigeria makes clear.
The chief gaps are as follows: groundnuts in Senegambia; palm products in Sierra Leone
and Nigeria; cocoa on the Ivory Coast and in Ashanti on the Gold Coast. These topics have
been considered to some extent by geographers, anthropologists and economists, but not by
economic historians. The Nigerian cocoa industry has been investigated by Dr Sara Berry
and also by the present writer.
See especially The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana, Cambridge 1963.
J. S. Hogendom, The Origins of the Groundnut Trade in Northern Nigeria, University of
London Ph.D. tliesis, 1966.

216
 Completing the open economy

made by Africans. In particular, it was thought that cocoa was simply added piece¬
meal to the traditional activities of small scale, settled farmers, and so made few
demands on the indigenous economic and social structure.
The reality was very different. Although the government played some part in
making seeds and plants available, it is now clear that neither colonial officials nor
expatriate firms had much idea of what was happening in the interior until after the
cocoa industry was firmly established. Polly Hill’s field work has revealed that the ?
innovators were not settled ‘peasants’, but migrant farmers in the south-east part of
,the Gold Coast, who began to move in the 1890s from the Akwapim ridge to virgin
land in nearby Akim Abuakwa.®® The migrants were pulled into this adventure
mainly by a desire to find a replacement for the flagging staples of legitimate com¬
merce, in which they were involved as producers or traders. They may also have
been pushed into colonising new land by population pressure in their home areas.
These farmers did not merely add cocoa to their traditional activities; they migrated
specifically to grow cash crops for export, and food production had to be fitted into
this primary objective. Indeed, specialisation in cocoa production by some farmers
soon led others to concentrate on growing foodstuffs for sale. Finally, it is important
to realise that generalisations about the scale of agricultural operations in West
Africa can be very misleading. While it is apparent that the majority of cocoa far¬
mers operated on a small scale in comparison with the plantations (of several hundred
acres) which dominated production in other parts of the world, it is equally true that
the size (and shape) of farms on the Gold Coast varied greatly, and that individual
farmers might own one plot or several plots. Diversity was both a sensitive adapta¬
tion to local geography, and an indication of the varied skills, ambitions and fortunes
of export producers.
K^he so-called ‘traditional’ social structure proved to be an asset rather than a j
li^ilit)^® Established forms of co-operative enterprise were harnessed or adapted to
finance the migration itself, and to purchase land in new areas. Two types of group
organisation were especially prominent: first the ‘company’, which was an association
of non-kinsmen similar to the traditional huza system of the Krobo people, and was
common among migrants from patrilineal societies; and second, a system of pur¬
chasing family lands, which was adopted by groups of kinsmen from matrilineal
societies, such as the Aburi and Akropong. Both arrangements gave individuals
group support, yet neither inliibited them from exercising their initiative or from
profiting by it. For example, migfants from matrilineal societies allowed their kins¬
men usufructuary rights on part of the land they had purchased, but they also retained
large tracts for themselves. Furthermore, the migrants did not find themselves
fettered by communal obligations when it came to ruiming their farms. On the

Dr Hill is careful to point out that in dispelling one myth she is anxious not to create
another. The migrant farmers studied by her are only part of the story; the subsequent develop¬
ment of cocoa farming in the large Ashanti region in the 1920s and 1930s has yet to be examined
in a work of comparable scope or depth.
The brief discussion in this paragraph should be related to the extended analysis of the
‘traditional’ economy presented in Chapter 2.

217
 t
An Economic History of West Africa

contrary, they usually found it advantageous to employ cheap family labour, at

least at the outset, and to continue to co-operate with kinsmen and friends in tasks
which were beyond the reach of individuals, such as the construction of roads and
bridges. Hired labour became significant only after the turn of the century, when
some established farmers found that they could afford to supplement their family
labour force by employing outsiders, and so could expand their farming activities.
Migration was a continuous process ^nd is still going on today. As nearby lands were
taken up, and as motor transport became available in the 1920s, the migrants began
to move further afield, though they never lost contact with their homelands. Thus
the cocoa belt has changed its size and shape over the years as new lands have been
developed through the reinvestment of past profits, and as old farms have gradually
fallen into disuse.
The development of cocoa in the Ivory Coast presents some interesting parallels
with the Gold Coast. There, too, migrants were first in initiating and then in expand¬
ing cocoa farming.®'^ The earliest migrants were Dioula from north of the forest,
who travelled south to take up land in the 1910s. Many Dioula financed their agri¬
cultural ventures with funds which they had accumulated in pre-colonial trading
activities. Some were rich enough to buy land outright, and also to hire labourers
from the outset. A second group of migrants, the Baoule, came from a poor farming
area in the savanna, and so started with few resources. They often had to begin as
abusa labourers, that is men who harvested the crop in return for a one third share
of it. Dioula and Baoule farmers used family labour as well, especially migrants
who came south to work for their relatives on a seasonal basis. The host communi¬
ties were sufficiently adaptable to meet these new demands, and local farmers also
took up cocoa farming Successfully, as Kobben’s studies of the Agni and Bete have
demonstrated.®® Strangers were welcomed not only because of the rents they paid,
but because they added to the manpower, and hence to the political importance, of
the local community. Indeed, in some villages immigrant farmers came to out¬
number their hosts. Although land was occasionally sold, the indigenous authorities
preferred to alienate the use of land rather than land itself. This arrangement pre¬
served the interests of the local community, and at the same time allowed scope
for individual enterprise. Usufructuary rights gave the immigrant farmer sufficient
incentive and security, for he acquired absolute rights over property created by his
ovm efforts, such as cocoa trees and food crops.
The main contrast between cocoa production on the Gold Coast and on the
Ivory Coast is that the French colony developed later and also more slowly. The
explanation of this distinction must remain tentative, at least until a full comparative :
analysis has been undertaken. The main reason, however, appears to lie in the nature
of the external authority rather than in a sharp contrast in the geographical endow¬
ment or in the receptivity of indigenous societies in the two colonies. The effect of
French policy was to retard the development of cash crops in the Ivory Coast. InJ

Marguerite Dupire, ‘Planteurs autochtones et etrangers en basse Cote d’Ivoire orientale’,

Etudes EburnSennes, 8, i960, pp. 7-237.
A. J. F. Kbbben, ‘Le planteur noir’, Etudes Eburneennes, 5, 1956, pp. 7-185.

218
 Completing the open economy

1908 Governor Angoulvant tried to revive the colony’s flagging export trade and
public revenue by making cocoa farming compulsory. The timing of this effort was
scarcely propitious, for the governor, beneath whose iron exterior there beat a heart
of steel, was also engaged in vigorous military operations in the forest zone in an
attempt to complete the pacification of the country. Without adequate monetary
incentives, the local inhabitants showed no enthusiasm for growing export crops.
Later on, in the 1920s and 1930s, French officials favoured expatriate cocoa and coffee
planters rather than indigenous farmers, notably by supplying the expatriates with
forced labour. Not surprisingly, the local inhabitants reacted sharply against the
government’s measures: many Africans spent a great deal of unproductive time
hiding from the administration, while the administration occupied itself, equally
unproductively, in trying to find them. Forced labour was abolished in 1946, and
Africans were then able to enter export production in conditions that were much
?
closer to those which had long pertained on the Gold Coast. The results were /Jor
dramatic. Within a few years the expatriate planters had almost been eliminated by So
African competitors; there was a massive increase in the volume of exports; and the
Ivory Coast joined Senegal as France’s richest West African colony.
The production of groundnuts differs from cocoa in several obvious respects.
Groundnuts are found mainly in the savanna; they are an annual crop, yielding a
return in the season in which they are planted; and some varieties are indigenous to
West Africa, where they have long been grown as foodstuffs. Yet the rapid expan¬
sion of groundnut exports, no less than the story of cocoa farming, is worth studying
because it, too, raises questions of why and how African farmers decided to commit
themselves to production for an overseas market, and so illuminates the process of
growth from an indigenous base.
Exports of groundnuts from northern Nigeria were negligible before the First
World War, yet within a few years had become one of Nigeria’s most important
sources of foreign earnings. In 1913,19,300 tons valued at ^175,000 were exported,
and in 1920, after some war-time fluctuations, shipments reached 45,000 tons worth
^1,120,000. By the 1950s Nigeria and Senegal produced between them, and in
roughly equal proportions, over three-quarters of the world’s exports of groundnuts.
An additional amount, equivalent to about half the volume of exports, was produced
for home consumption. In the early 1960s, according to Helleiner’s estimate, as
many as nine million people were involved in groundnut production in northern
Nigeria.®® The initial expansion in northern Nigeria was made possible by the
completion of the Lagos railway, which reached Kano in 1911. Once again, however,
it is important to emphasise that changes within the agricultural sector itself owed
little or nothing to external influences. Indeed, the British spent their time trying to
promote cotton rather than groundnuts. These cotton growing experiments ran
true to West African form: they failed. In any case, farmers near Kano had already
taken up groundnut farming for export, and for the best of reasons. They found that

Gerald K. Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria,

Homewood 1966, p. 107.

219
 t

An Economic History of West Africa

groundnuts gave a better return than cotton, which required more labour, took more
out of the soil, and, in the last resort, could not be eaten.
The innovators were a readily identifiable group, not migrant farmers in this case,
but Hausa traders. The Hausa had been involved in long distance trade throughout
West Africa for several centuries before the advent of colonial rule.®° They had
commercial skill, organisation and capital. They also had an incentive to develop
new activities, for their traditional trades were no longer as secure or as profitable
as they had been; to the north, trans-Saharan commerce was in decline, and in the
south the traditional kola routes were shifting to the coast. A small group of Hausa
traders perceived that groundnuts offered a new, and potentially lucrative, com¬
mercial opportunity. They contacted their established agents and suppliers in the
villages around Kano, persuaded farmers to grow more groundiiilts, or to grow
them for the first time, offered financial assistance, and gave guarantees regarding
the purchase of the harvest. The fact that local farmers were prepared to trust the
Hausa traders and to treat them as opinion leaders was vital to the success of the
enterprise. European advisers, whose record was in any case rather poor, made far
less of an impression. These Hausa buyers sold the crop to the expatriate firms,
which purchased it somewhat reluctantly at first, and then rather more eagerly
when it was found that shipments fetched good .prices. It was the sudden rise of the
groundnut trade which finally forced the Niger Company to complete the modern¬
isation of its business—a very different story from the conventional notion of
expatriate firms dragging Africans into the commercial world of the twentieth
century!
The Kano area had long produced grain and cotton for the market, so agriculture
was far from being stuck in a subsistence groove. Farmers were keen to develop a
profitable export crop in order to pay taxes, to finance their trading activities in the
dry season, and generally to expand their purchasing power. Agriculture in the Kano
region was a subtle mixture of shifting and permanent cultivation, the latter being
associated with manuring, water and soil conservation, and, wherever possible,
irrigation. Traditional rules governing the tenure and use of land did not present an
obstacle to capitalist enterprise. Household farming was organised on an individual
as well as on a communal basis, and measures were taken to ensure that, as far as
possible, the products of labour went to the person concerned, and that usufructuary
rights could be inherited. The massive increase in groundnut production was
achieved partly by reducing the amount of land under other foodstuffs and cotton,
but mainly by introducing minor, though highly effective, changes in teclmique,
wliich made more efficient use of existing land and labour resources. These changes
involved shorter fallow periods, increased manuring, and a greater degree of inter¬
planting. It was only in the 1920s and 1930s, with the advent of the motor car and
better roads, that expansion took the form of increasing the amount of land and the
number of labourers employed in the industry. Between 1911 and 1937 about one
million acres around Kano were brought under groundnut cultivation, and many

See above, pp. 58-66.

220
 Completing the open economy

thousands of migrants from other parts of northern Nigeria came in to swell the
numbers engaged in groundnut production. Despite the simplicity of the techniques
used and the intensity with which the whole area is now farmed, yields per acre are
still among the best in the world.
The case of northern Nigeria is paralleled in certain important respects by the
example of Senegal.®^ The main historical difference, as noted in Chapter 4, is that
groundnut exports from Senegambia date from the era of legitimate commerce.
The rise of the industry again resulted from the initiative of African farmers at a time
when European interests in the region were centred on other products. From the
18 80s onwards groundnuts expanded on the extensive margin following the pro¬
gress of the Senegal railway. By 1908, before exports from Nigeria had even begun,
Senegal was already the world’s leading supplier. In due course, societies such as the
Wolof, the Fulani and the Serer, which had different institutions and economies, all
became involved in groundnut farming. Each adapted successfully by releasing
individual skills and energies, by developing co-operative organisations, and by
modifying traditional agricultural practices, as the Serer, for example, substituted
groundnuts for millet, while at the same time keeping their cattle economy intact.
These societies made use of family labour, but they also showed a willingness to
accept outsiders, and adjust to their presence. Immigrant labourers (known as
navetanes in Senegal, and as ‘strange’ farmers in Gambia) were an important feature
of export production right from the start of the groundnut trade. Sometimes they
simply rented land and farmed it; often they agreed to work for two or three days a
week on their landlord’s farm in return for food, lodging, and enough time to grow
groundnuts on their own account.
The new economy even found a new ideology. The Mourides, a Muslim sect
/founded in 1886, began to win converts in the groundnut areas of Senegal from the
1890s, notably among the Wolof. An important doctrine of this sect was the belief
that hard physical work in this world was a passport to salvation in the next.®^ This
tenet was turned to practical advantage through the establishment of groundnut
'farms managed by lay instructors and worked by initiates. When these novices had
demonstrated their mastery of Mouride doctrine, and had also shown themselves
to be proficient farmers, they spread out, set up farms of their own, and attracted a
new set of followers. The Mourides, who now have about 700,000 adherents,
became prominent groundnut producers during the colonial period, and they also
acquired considerable political influence. They provide a good example of how pre¬
colonial, Islamic frontiers came into contact with influences from the Western
world, were modified by them, but survived to exert a strong and constructive
economic influence under colonialism.®® A parallel may be drawn with the onward

See the publications by Fouquet, Jarrett, Pehaut, PeHssier and Pitot Hsted in the bibli¬
ography.
Abdoulaye Wade, ‘La doctrine economique du mouridisme’, Annales Africaines, 1967,
pp. 175-206.
It should be added that in many respects the Mourides have now become a conservative
force. For a recent account see Donal B. Cruise O’Brien, T/ie Mourides of Senegal, Oxford 1970.

221
An Economic History of West Africa

march of the Christian frontier in the cocoa regions of the forest zone, where the
religion of the West was also adapted to give effective support to new economic
activities.®^
The preceding survey of agricultural developments shows that societies in '
different parts of West Africa were willing and able to supply innovators, to recon- 'J
cile and capitalise on individual and communal loyalties, to venture into new regions y
in order to make money, to draw upon existing skills and established sources of /
finance, and to pursue capitalist undertakings unimpeded by indigenous or acquired
values.®® These conclusions reinforce the argument developed in Chapter 2 that
‘traditional' societies are far more flexible and far less hostile to ‘modern’ economic/
activities than is often assumed.
This account of the ways in which Africans contributed to the creation of the
colonial economy will be completed by an outline of changes affecting the labour
force during the early phase of colonial rule. The information presented here will
enlarge on points which were either made briefly or were implicit in the preceding
description of the development of export crops. The purpose of the discussion is to
underline the contributions made by Africans to the expansion of the open economy
by showing that unskilled labour, whether self-employed or not, responded posi¬
tively to monetary incentives, and did not need to be coerced into wage employ¬
ment, except when the rewards were inadequate. Shortages occurred, but these were
often in the relatively small, though highly publicised, government sector, and can
be attributed more to mismanagement on the demand side than to blockages in
supply. One preliminary warning is necessary: West African demographic material
tends to be patchy and unreliable for the twentieth century, as for earlier periods,
so the few figures quoted in this discussion are to be interpreted merely as illustrative
approximations.
Employers in the twentieth century faced much the same basic difficulty as had
African employers in the past: that is to say, their main task was to transfer man¬
power from huge areas of dispersed and scanty settlement to a relatively few points
of concentrated demand. However, the colonial labour ‘problem’, as it came to be
known in official circles, had a number of distinctive features. The demand for
labour was much greater than it had ever been before; it developed rapidly between
1890 and 1920; and, with a few exceptions, it was located in a number of favoured
coastal areas. By far the most important demand for labour (outside subsistence
farming) came from commercial agriculture. The main export-producing regions
were unable to supply all the labour they needed from local sources, so extra hands
had to be imported from other parts of West Africa. In the 1920s the groundnut

J. B. Webster, ‘Agege: Plantations and the African Church, 1901-1920’, Nigerian Institute
of Social and Economic Research, Conference Proceedings, 1962, pp. 124-30.
The examples cited should be sufficient to estabUsh these conclusions. For two further,
supporting case studies see Sara S. Berry, ‘Christianity and the Rise of Cocoa Growing in
Ibadan and Ondo’, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 4, 1968, pp. 439-51, and Raymond
Dumett, ‘The Rubber Trade of the Gold Coast and Asante in the Nineteenth Century:
African Innovation and Responsiveness’, Journal of African History, 12, 1971, pp. 79-102.

222
 Map 14. Migrant Labour in West Africa in the 1950s.

22
Completing the open economy
 ♦

An Economic History of West Africa

farms of Senegal and Gambia attracted between 60,000 and 70,000 temporary
imniigrants each year, and in the 1950s 150,000 to 200,000 labourers entered the
Gold Coast annually to work on the cocoa farms. Mining was an additional, though
less significant, source of demand. The gold mines of the Gold Coast employed an
average of about 15,000 unskilled workers a year between 1905 and 1918, while in
the Nigerian tin fields between 1918 and 1939 the labour force ranged from 15,000
men a year to a peak of 40,000. Finally, labour was required by the colonial govern¬
ments in connection with various public works, and, to a lesser extent, by the
expatriate commercial firms, principally for handling stocks. Much of tliis demand
was urban based, but labourers also followed official enterprise outside the towns,
notably to build railways and roads, and to carry equipment in the pre-lorry age.
The supply of labour can be considered under four main heading^, though these
by no means exhaust the subject: population growth; geographical mobility; social
change; and official policy.
In 1910 West Africa’s population was about 36 million. This figure is rather
greater than others which are sometimes quoted, as there are grounds for thinking
that early estimates were the result of substantial undercounting.®® By 1965 the
population had reached roughly 88 million. It seems safe to say that on a conservative
estimate the total population has doubled in about fifty years. In general terms this
rapid increase was the result of a high birth rate coupled with a falling death rate.
However, it is important to note that the rate of increase was much slower during
the early phase of colonial rule than it was in the period after 1945, because it was
only after the Second World War that medical and sanitary services underwent
major improvements, and so began to have a marked effect on the death rate. Indeed,
before 1945 it is likely that the increase in the mobility of West African peoples may
have assisted the spread of fatal and incapacitating diseases. The conclusion which
can be drawn from this information is that while the growth of population is
necessary to an miderstanding of the process of economic change during the colonial
period as a whole, it is far less relevant to an explanation of the early expansion of, for
example, cocoa farming on the Gold Coast or groundnut exports from Nigeria, for
both occurred in a relatively short space of time, and long before the population
‘explosion’ had begun.
Much more important in the present context was the increased geographical
mobility of the population. As has been stressed on several occasions already, the
mobility of the labour force was a long-established feature of the West African
economy; it ante-dated the Atlantic slave trade, and its importance grew during the
era of legitimate commerce. In the pre-colonial period there had been a sizeable
movement of manpower northwards as far as the desert oases. In the twentieth
century, by contrast, it is the inhabitants of the Western Sudan who travel to the
coast, and as wage-earners rather than as slaves. Greater mobility was achieved by the
imposition of a common political authority over wide areas, by the introduction of
modern transport, and by the emergence of a free (wage) labour force. These

I should like to thank my colleague. Dr P. K. Mitchell, for assistance on this question.

224
 Completing the open economy

innovations have sometimes led to the movement of whole settlements, which

have abandoned defensive and often crowded hilltop sites, and ventured down into
the plains.®'^ They have also brought about an expansion in the number of what
might be termed ‘shuttle migrants’, that is men who leave their homes for a short
period to work in agriculture or in the mines, often travelling great distances to do so.
Migrant labour has frequently been condemned by commentators who have seen
little difference between a shifting and a shiftless labour force. However, thanks largely
to Elliot Berg’s pioneering work, it is now realised that migrant labour, though it
has drawbacks, also makes sense in West African conditions.®® In the first place, the
demand for labour in agriculture is highly seasonal, and is best met by a temporary
increase in the work force. Moreover, the increase can usually be achieved without
disrupting the domestic economy of the migrants.®® For example, many of the
workers on Nigerian cocoa farms come from the north, where the peak demand for
labour occurs at a different time of the year. Secondly, where migrant labour persists
in sectors such as mining, where there are no marked seasonal demands, it is indicative
not of backwardness on the part of Africans in committing themselves fully to wage
employment, but of backwardness on the part of expatriates in persisting with a
low-wage policy. The reasons for this policy will be considered later on.
The improvement in geographical mobility was closely associated with an
important social change in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, namely
the decline of internal slavery and the rise of a free (wage) labour force. This event,
which is certain to become one of the central themes in the as yet unwritten labour
history of Africa, deserves a great deal more attention from historians than it has
received so far. In the context of the argument advanced in Chapter 4 on imperialism,
the ending of slavery is to be seen as a major feature of the social revolution which
originated early in the nineteenth century, when the new export economy began to
offer wider opportunities to ordinary Africans, free as well as unfree. Not surpris¬
ingly, the unfree were among the last to be allowed to participate independently in
activities which would enable them to assert themselves against their masters. With
regard to the utilisation of labour resources under colonialism, the significance of the
collapse of slavery is not that the traditional slave labour force was markedly
inefficient in performing the duties allotted to it, but that many of the numerically
preponderant farm slaves were employed outside the expanding export sectors, and
were also highly immobile—for reasons which are obvious enough.

This movement has been investigated with reference to Nigeria, Togo and Dahomey by
M. B. Gleave in ‘Hdl Settlements and their Abandonment in Tropical Africa’, Transactions of
the Institute of British Geographers, 40, 1966, pp. 39-49-
See especially ‘The Economics of the Migrant Labour System’, in Urbanisation and Migra¬
tion in West Africa, ed. Hilda Kuper, Berkeley 1965, pP- 160-81. Mention should also be made
of Walter Elkan’s Migrants and Proletarians, i960, a model of careful scholarship wliich deals
principally with Uganda.
For a recent survey of the Uterature on this question, see Marvin P. Miracle and Sara S.
Berry, ‘Migrant Labour and Economic Development’, Oxford Economic Papers, 22, 1970,
pp. 86-108.

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An Economic History of West Africa

French and British attitudes towards internal slavery are classic illustrations of the
struggle between the normative and the pragmatic that characterised imperial policy
in so many fields. The formal position was quite clear: France and Britain had made
opposition to slavery part of official policy, and were committed to its abolition in
all their territories. At the same time, however, both governments sought for
practical reasons to control the pace of emancipation. In the first place they did not
wish to risk disrupting export production by provoking sudden social upheaval.
Secondly, they needed the co-operation of at least some of the indigenous rulers, and
therefore could scarcely demolish one of th? bases of their power. Thirdly, they faced
some very real problems of defining slavery, of identifying slaves, and of enforcing
anti-slavery legislation. Fourthly, the colonial powers themselves made use of forced
labour in the twentieth century. Faced with a shortage of unskilled labour, they, like
African rulers before them, had recourse to compulsion. Forced labour was never
very widespread in West Africa as a whole, though it survived in French West
Africa until 1946, and it had some local importance, as, for example, in the European
plantations on the Ivory Coast and in the construction of the Dakar-Bamako rail¬
way. Despite these four qualifications, it remains true that the colonial powers
regarded slavery as obstructing their long-term economic interests. Their presence
in West Africa undoubtedly encouraged emancipation, though the practical difficul¬
ties which they encountered meant that slavery was not abolished overnight, but
tended instead to wither away.
The main stages of emancipation in West Africa can be outlined quite briefly. A
start was made early in the nineteenth century, but at that time official action was
confined to a few coastal colonies, and consequently did not have any direct effect on
the interior. Freed slaves were enrolled in various apprenticeship schemes, they were
recruited into the armed forces, and the French even experimented with a dubious
plan for ‘free’ emigration to North America. The Act of 1833, abolishing slavery
throughout the British empire, did not have much effect on West Africa. However,
when the French parliament passed a similar measure in 1848, some further steps
were taken, especially at Goree and St Louis in Senegal, where several thousand
slaves were freed and their masters compensated.’'^® Nevertheless, no serious attack
on internal slavery was made until the 18 80s, and then it came as a by-product of the
partition of Africa.
When the Europeans advanced inland, they quickly realised that they had under¬
estimated the size of the problem of slavery. According to an estimate made in 1905,
there were about two million slaves in French West Africa, and it was reckoned that
in the heart of the large Muslim states between a quarter and a half of the total
population was in a state of enslavement. In these circumstances hasty and enforced
emancipation might have had unwelcome consequences. Indeed, by the start of the
twentieth century the exodus of slaves had deprived the desert oases of the cheap
labour they needed to maintain their complex systems of irrigated agriculture, and
M’baye Gueye, ‘La fin de I’esclavage a Saint Louis et a Goree en 1848’, Bulletin de VIFAN,
B, 28, 1966, pp. 637-56, and Roger Pasquier, ‘A propos de I’emancipation des esclaves au
Senegal en 1848’, Revue Frangaise d’Histoire d’Outre-Mer, 54, 1967, pp. 188-208.

226
 Completing the open economy

so had accelerated the decline of the already waning trans-Saharan trade.”^^ Beginning
in 1887, the French attempted to stabilise the situation by establishing a series of
villages de liberte, which had the declared aim of resettling homeless slaves and
achieving gradual emancipation. The reality was rather different.'^^ The villages, far
from developing into the Freetowns and Librevilles of the interior, acted as dis¬
incentives to emancipation, for their luckless inhabitants became the captifs du
commandant, the unfree labourers and porters of the local administration. The limita¬
tions of the villages were eventually acknowledged by the French government, and
most of them were closed down between 1907 and 1910. The problem of rootless
ex-slaves was less serious for the British than it was for the French, though after the
turn of the century Lugard did establish a few settlements for freed slaves in northern
Nigeria, including in Bornu one memorial to Victorian principles called Liberty
Village.
Emancipation progressed more quickly after 1900. In 1905, following an incident
in which a weU-connected French official in Senegal was shot by an equally well-
connected African who had been accused of slave trading, a decree was issued
authorising stronger action against internal slaveryIn the period 1905-1907 about
300,000 slaves were freed in French West Africa, and substantial numbers continued
to be released in the years which followed.'^^ The liberators, judging all slave-holders
to be bad, but regarding some as more dangerous than others, concentrated on areas
where unfree labour was thought to underpin the opposition of indigenous rulers to
the French presence. In 1911, to take one example, about 1,500 slaves were given
their freedom after the collapse of the Fulam revolt in Guinea. The British also
tightened up their legislation against slavery during this period, though without
becoming involved in such extensive military activities. From the 1920s the process
of hberation was greatly helped by the spread of motor vehicles, which released
labour previously tied up in the costly business of moving goods by head-loading.
By about 1930 emancipation was well advanced, though instances of slavery and
slave trading are still occasionally reported today.
On the whole, the transition from slave to free labour was achieved without
widespread economic and social dislocation. The quiescence of the change has
undoubtedly contributed to the neglect of what was nevertheless an event of funda¬
mental importance in West African history. To some extent the relative ease of
transition was the product of the delaying tactics adopted by the major powers. The
British, whose policy of indirect rule gave support to indigenous authorities in
certain areas, were more successful in this than the French, whose military vigour
led to the elimination of a number of important African rulers, and to greater

J. Aymo, ‘Notes de sociologie et de linguistique sur Ghadames’, Bulletin de Liaison Sahari-

enne, 10, 1959, pp. 129-57.
■^2 Denise Bouche, Les villages de liberte en Afrique noire, Paris 1968.
'=’2 M’baye Gueye, ‘L’Affaire Chautemps (avril 1904) et la suppression de I’esclavage de case
au Senegal’, Bulletin de VIFAN, B, 27, 1965, pP- 543-59-
J-L. Boutillier, ‘Les captifs en A.O.F. (1903-1905)’. Bulletin de VIFAN, B, 30, 1968,
pp. 513-35-

227
An Economic History of West Africa

problems of resettlement. To some extent, too, the ease of transition reflected the
fact that many so-called slaves -were virtually indistinguishable from free men, and
were not interested in supporting sudden social revolution. Yet neither of these
explanations is wholly satisfactory: colonial policy was unable fully to control
events, and slavery, in the sense of well-defined economic and social deprivation,
was a reality fbr numerous Africans in many areas.
The explanation advanced here is that the smoothness of the transition was largely
a function of the availability of acceptable alternative opportunities.’^® In the first
place, land suitable for export cultivation was at hand, and could be taken up at little
cost save the labour involved in clearing it. Secondly, much of the critical period of
emancipation coincided with a trading boom after the turn of the century, which
made export production attractive. Thirdly, social change, in this context at least,
did not involve widespread occupational mobility. That is to say, most slaves were
farmers, or, if not, they knew how to farm, and they either remained in or entered
the agricultural sector, the main difference being that now they worked for them¬
selves instead of for an overlord. Problems of resettlement, it is suggested, arose
chiefly in areas where these opportunities did not exist. This was especially the case
in the far-flung and poor French colonies. As Verdier has pointed out, there are
former slaves in Niger who still constitute a servile labour force largely because they
have great difficulty in becoming anything else.’^® In short, most slaves stayed in
agriculture and assisted the expansion of the colonial economy. Unlike nineteenth-
century England, men were not pushed off the land to make way for a new type of
agriculture, and to provide labour for a growing industrial sector. In West Africa
there was no landless proletariat shifting, as it were, from parish to parish. A perma¬
nent urban labour force was slow to develop, but migrant labour was purposeful
and anchored to the land. No extensive retraining was needed because traditional
techniques and implements remained dominant. There were no machine breakers
because there were few machines to break.
The rise of this generation of independent export producers inevitably brought
about a decline in the position of former slave holders. Some ovmers lost their
wealth overnight as a result of the escape of their slaves. A British official noted one
instance in 1898, where
a great change arose as over 400 of tliis cliief’s slaves, whose average value at that
time was ^^lo to £12, ran away and never returned. He thus lost at least ;^4,ooo
and is in consequence a poor man now. This speaks for itself and I think explains
the dread with which rich natives in the Interior view our advance into the
country.’^
For a siinilar conclusion in a different context see Benedicte Hjejle, ‘Slavery and Agri¬
cultural Bondage in South India in the Nineteenth Century’, Scandinavian Economic History
Review, 15, 1967, pp. 71-126.
R. Verdier, ‘Problemes fonciers nigeriens’, Penant, 74, 1964, pp. 587-93.
’’’’ Quoted in A. G. Hopkins, ‘The Lagos Strike of 1897: an Exploration in Nigerian Labour
History’, © The Past and Present Society, Corpus Christi College, Oxford. The extract from
this article is reprinted with the permission of the Society from Past and Present, A Journal of
Historical Studies, 35, 1966, p. 141.

228
 Completing the open economy

Nevertheless, it would be naive to conclude that all former slave owners were
completely eliminated. Some managed to adapt by becoming rentiers, collecting
dues from ex-slaves in exchange for granting rights of cultivation. Others acquired
the skills needed for survival by going into trade or agriculture, or by selling their
political expertise—if they had any—to the colonial rulers. As Toupet has shown with
reference to Mauritania, the Littama, formerly a tribe of warriors and slave-owners,
moved south and became settled cultivators, whereas the Haratin, a group of freed
slaves, did not adapt so well.'^® For them, the abandonment of the nomadic way of
life led to poverty, and to the forced sale of their only asset, their cattle. Assessing the
rise and fall of social classes is acknowledged to be one of the most subtle of historical
problems; further research will doubtless show that this is as true of Africa as it is of
Europe.
Although the African labour force managed to adapt itself in the ways indicated,
there was still a shortage of unskilled labour in the period 1890-1930, especially in
the expatriate sectors. Some perplexed officials advocated importing ‘the industrious
Chinaman’ to fill the gap; others preferred Indian labour; while the real enthusiasts
wanted Indian elephants as well! The reasons originally given by colonial observers
for the shortage of labour have led to a number of misconceptions which, regrettably,
can still be found today in some textbook generalisations about development
problems.
Traditional explanations stress factors such as the tenacity of pre-industrial social
systems, the lack of psychological preparedness for modern employment, and the
limited wants of the potential labour force. The latter notion has given rise to the
concept of the target worker, that is someone who enters wage employment with a
specific aim in mind—the stock example is to buy a bicycle—and then leaves for
home again. However, in spite of his desire to own a bicycle, the African labourer, so
it has been alleged, was characterised by inefficiency and by a high rate of absentee¬
ism. This interpretation of the motivation and performance of African workers has
had far-reaching practical implications. For example, it was largely responsible for
the persistence of a low wage rate during the early phase of colonial rule. According
to conventional supply and demand analysis, employers should have responded to a
shortage of labour by raising wages. But the belief that Africans were target workers
was used to justify the payment of low wages in order to prevent employees from
reaching their targets too quickly. High wages, it was argued, would have dimin¬
ished the volume of labour in employment by making targets attainable in a short
time. On these assumptions, the predominance of migrant labour was held to prove
that Africans had cultural and psychological blockages which prevented them from
committing themselves fully to wage employment. Migrant labour was also thought
to be responsible for the low productivity of wage-earners, and so contributed to the
low wages which were paid. Forced labour was justified, though never too loudly,
on the grounds that by helping to overcome these blockages it had an educative
effect on primitive peoples.
‘Quelques aspects de la sedentarisation des nomades en Mauritanie sah61ienne’, Annates de
Geographic, 73, 1964, pp. 738-45-

229
An Economic History of West Africa

The evidence now available makes it clear that the conventional view, though it
may be relevant in certain cases, can no longer remain the central explanation of the
general shortage of wage labour in West Africa during the first phase of colonial rule.
The point made by Adam Smith with reference to eighteenth-century England is
equally applicable to the African labour force during the colonial period: ‘Some
workmen indeed, when they can earn in four days what will maintain them through
the week will be idle the other three. This however is by no means the case with the
greater part.”^® With regard to the so-called tenacity of traditional social systems,
this book has attempted to show that to categorise pre-industrial societies in this way
is to lose contact with reality, and that in any case West African peoples were
reorganising to meet the new demands of the Western world in the period of legi¬
timate commerce—before the advent of colonial rule. The related noti&ns of psycho¬
logical unpreparedness and limited wants founder on the import and export figures,
which show that Africans were eager to expand their purchases of consumer goods,
and that to do so they created a series of export economies in ways which have al¬
ready been indicated. Wage-earners responded positively to monetary incentives;
the aggregate supply curve of labour did not become regressive at an early point;
and the concept of West Africans as target workers needs to be seriously modified.®®
As to the alleged inefficiency of African labour, this, too, is a subject where prejudice
has long survived unquestioned. By looking at the facts of this particular matter
Peter Kilby has made an unusual and most welcome contribution to African labour
economics.®^ His survey in 1961 of 63 establishments in Nigeria employing some
50,000 workers revealed that the performance of the labour force was related
primarily to working conditions and levels of pay, and not to culturally determined
attitudes towards wage employment. Where conditions were good and wages high,
the labour force was efficient, stable and regular in its attendance.
The problem was not that Africans suffered from a general reluctance to enter
wage employment, but that they were particularly unwilling to take unskilled jobs
with expatriate employers. There were two main reasons for this. First of all, the
work tended to be hard, uncongenial and of low status. In these respects it compared
unfavourably with farming, where the work was familiar, where the relationship
between employer and employee was more fluid, and where the wage-earner kept
his self-respect. An idea of the gruelling conditions experienced by some of these
early African wage-earners is conveyed in the following quotations from the records
of the Gold Coast Transport Department for the year 1908 :®^

with constant walking for a twelve month averaging 400 miles a month, the work
this year having been rather harder than usual, a large number of carriers have been

Quoted in Phyllis Deane, The First Industrial Revolution, Cambridge 1965, p. 141.
Elliot J. Berg, ‘Backward-Sloping Labor Supply Functions in Dual Economies—the
Africa Case’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, 1961, pp. 468-92.
‘African Labour Productivity Reconsidered’, Economic Journal, 71, 1961, pp. 273-91.
Quoted in D. K. Greenstreet, ‘The Transport Department—the First Two Decades’,
Economic Bulletin of Ghana, 10, 1966, p. 42.

230
 Completing the open economy

incapacitated from sore feet, the metalling of new roads making matters worse.
In one gang ... the majority had their soles almost completely worn through, to
say nothing of cracks.

However, the official mind, though not quite equal to the problem, did not lack
inspiration:

The experiment was then tried of tarring the carriers’ feet. Coal tar is most
suitable. It fdls the cracks and is good antiseptic, besides affording some protection
if applied thick. The results have proved quite good and many carriers are now
able to keep to the road who would otherwise have to lie up.

Fortunately, the introduction of the motor car, and the spread of an even older
Western product—boots—quickly consigned this experiment to the locker of dis¬
carded colonial remedies, and so forestalled the rise of a new breed of heavy-footed
porters throughout the tropical colonies.
The second reason for the shortage of labour was simply that the pay offered was
not high enough to tempt the labour force of an underpopulated area into taking
disagreeable jobs, when there were more rewarding alternatives available, notably
in agriculture. If the Chinaman was an industrious government employee, it was
mainly because he had fewer options open to him. On the occasions when high
wages were paid in West Africa, labour was usually forthcoming. But the notion of
the target worker died hard, and there were always additional reasons for holding
down wages, ranging from the almost permanent need for budgetary economies to
a stubborn reluctance to admit that the African labourer was worthy of his hire.
Instead of migrant labour producing low wages, as expatriates alleged, it was the
low level of wages which encouraged the development of migrant labour in non-
seasonal occupations, for low wages were only acceptable to Africans providing they
did not have to sacrifice their main source of income, which came mostly from
farming. The justification for forced labour was entirely bogus; Africans did not
need educating in the ways of the modern money economy, and even assuming they
did, there were better ways of setting about it. Forced labour could put a man off
capitalism for life, even if the path to modernity did not always have to be trodden
with tarred feet.

3 The mechanics of export growth

It is now possible to offer a more formal analysis of the process of export expansion
in West Africa in terms of factor mobilisation. A large part of the explanation
advanced here derives ultimately from Adam Smith’s vent-for-surplus theory of
international trade, which has been elaborated in recent years by Myint, applied to

231
 i

An Economic History of West Africa

the Gold Coast by Szereszewski, and to Nigeria by Helleiner.®® The theory will
first be summarised, and then a number of modifications will be introduced to take
account of additional points arising out of the historical evidence presented in this
chapter.
The vent-for-surplus theory is based on three assumptions which are held to be
generally consistent with the known facts of West African development.jThese are
that the massive growth in the volume of exports was achieved without a com¬
parable increase in population, without a significant reduction in the amount of land
and time involved in the production of traditional goods and services, and without
the adoption of afiy major improvements in agricultural techniqu^ Given these
conditions, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the rise in output resulted mainly
from increased inputs of land and labour, and therefore that both factors had been
to some extent underemployed previously.
The economics of labour utilisation in this situation require careful consideration.
It is particularly important to distinguish between overpopulated parts of the
world, where underemployment may arise because insufficient land is available to
provide full employment for all members of the household, and under-populated
regions, such as West Africa, where the agricultural labour force may be under¬
employed because of a lack of effective demand for its potential output.®^ A certain
number of man-hours was spent unproductively, not through choice, and not as a
result of a culturally-determined rejection of profitable opportunities, but because
the only alternative was to produce goods for which there was no market. The
increased demand for West African exports in the early colonial period altered the
traditional relationship between goods and leisure. In terms of foregone opportuni¬
ties, leisure became more expensive because Africans could now choose to improve
their material incomes by earning the cash to buy imported goods. This option was
taken up; existing export producers decided to work harder, and newcomers were
attracted to the export sector. The allocation of labour inputs between various
alternatives was determined by the relative efficiency of these alternatives in purchas¬
ing consumer goods, as witness the swing away from traditional staples in the i88os,
the rubber boom at the turn of the century, and the preference which farmers in the

H. Myint, The Economics of the Developing Countries, 1964; R. Szereszewski, Structural

Changes in the Economy of Ghana, 1891-1911, 1965; and Gerald K. Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture,
Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria, Homewood 1966. Myint’s book, which combines
brevity, lucidity and originaHty, must rank as one of the very best of the numerous attempts
which have been made to comprehend the process of economic growth. Szereszewski’s study
is fuU of bold and stimulating ideas, though it is handicapped somewhat by a theoretical frame¬
work which is too sophisticated for the evidence. Helleiner’s work has set a high standard in
relating data and theory, and is indispensable for serious students of African development
problems.
For a useful summary of the literature on this subject see Charles H. C. Kao, Kurt R.
Anschel and Carl K. Eicher, ‘Disguised Unemployment in Agriculture: a Survey’, in Agri¬
culture in Economic Development, ed. Carl K. Eicher and Lawrence W. Witt, New York 1964,
pp. 129-44.

232
 Completing the open economy

savanna showed for groundnuts instead of for cotton. Thus West Africa had a built-
in capacity to increase its production of exportable commodities, and the main
function of expatriate influences was to create the conditions which gave Africans a
better vent for their latent, surplus resources.
Myint has stressed the value of this theory for an understanding of the speed and
relative ease of ‘peasant’ export development in underpopulated regions such as
West Africa. Four main points emerge from liis analysis. First, the expansion of out¬
put was achieved without an agricultural revolution. Productivity per man in¬
creased. but prodiirtivity ppr man hour or per acre remained unchanged. Second,
export production was self-financing in the sense that farmers employed family
labour, used traditional tools, and had access to land that was virtually costless. Third,
the risks involved in entering export production were minimised because Africans
did not have to reduce their output of foodstuffs at the same time. This favourable
situation contrasts with certain overpopulated parts of the world, where the export
sector has been slow to develop partly because farmers have had to choose between
these two types of activity, and have been understandably reluctant to place their
supply of essential foodstuffs at risk. Fourth, Myint has suggested that the pattern of
export development in miderpopulated regions falls into two stages: the first occurs
when farmers take up export production in an unspecialised way as an adjunct to
subsistence farming; the second arises later on, when a certain number of farmers,
encouraged by their early success, decide to devote more of their resources to export
production, and become dependent on others for part of their food supplies.
The vent-for-surplus theory has the advantage of being much closer to the facts
than many previous development theories, which tended to assume that under¬
development was a homogeneous, as well as a global, phenomenon. Myint’s theory
also takes an important step towards reafity by attempting to distinguish between
various kinds of underdevelopment. It divides the overpopulated from the under¬
populated parts of the Third World, and it separates the foreign enclaves from the
peasant economies. In dealing with peasant economies the theory has the further
merit of focusing on the positive contribution made by indigenous societies. As a
corollary, it places the expatriate role in what is regarded here as its proper perspec¬
tive, that is as being important in specific fields, but by no means being synonymous
with the whole development process. However, the vent-for-surplus theory cannot
be applied to West Africa without some modification. Its basic limitation springs
from the economist’s highly compressed view of liistory. Compression sometimes
has advantages in producing a degree of synthesis and clarity which the historian
himself, with his nose pressed too faithfully to his documents, often fails to achieve.
At the same time, as the following comments will suggest, it can lead to the omission
not merely of trivia, but of significant facts.
The three main assumptions of the vent-for-surplus theory cannot stand without
modification. In the first place, while it is true that the growth of total population is
not vital to an explanation of the increase in labour inputs, the mobility of the
population is relevant, as has been shown with reference to the development of
migrant labour. Thus the expansion of population in specific areas, albeit on a

233
An Economic History of West Africa

temporary basis, is necessary to a full understanding of the rise in output. This

qualification need not contradict the view that the migrant labour force was under¬
used in its home area, but it does suggest that the argument needs to be checked care¬
fully by case studies of the domestic economy of labour-exporting regions. Secondly,
it is oversimple to assert that the rise in exports was achieved without a decline in the
production of traditional goods and services. There was no wholesale liquidation of
traditional crafts,^® but there were examples of farmers committing themselves to
export production at the expense of food crops, and of the decline of some pre-

with the result that large quantities of rice had to be imported from the 1930s on¬
wards. The collapse of indigenous military systems, and of the slavery which was
associated with them, also led to a certain amount of occupational change.®®
Particularly important, and virtually ignored, in this context was the reallocation of
labour between the sexes, as men gave up their military fimctions and became more
involved in farming, an occupation which traditionally had been dominated by
women in many areas.®"^ Thirdly, greater output was sometimes the result of
improved techniques arising out of a reorganisation of farming practices, as was the
case at the start of the Nigerian groundnut industry, when relatively minor changes
produced a substantial increase in productivity.
Modifying the assumptions on which the theory is based also has implications for
its capacity to explain the speed and alleged ease of West African export growth. It
may well be true that most Africans did not have to grapple with the problems of an
agricultural revolution in the conventional sense, but the case of northern Nigeria
shows that there was at least one exception to this rule, and since research into the
agricultural history of West Africa is only just beginning, it would be unwise at this
stage to assume that this particular example is of limited importance. It is also true
that agricultural development was self-financing in the sense of not requiring
expatriate capital, but it is inaccurate to suggest that each household, was capable of
entering export production without additional help from indigenous sources. The
examples of cocoa and groundnut farming have shown that, in the initial stages,
group co-operation and financial reserves accumulated from previous economic
activities were essential to the success of these ventures. Next, the idea that risks were
minimised because of the unspecialised nature of early exporting activities pre¬
supposes a greater degree of homogeneity in the structure of agricultural production
than was actually the case, and it fails to do justice to the considerable entrepreneurial
abilities of the innovators. Those who started the cocoa industries of the Gold Coast

This subject is dealt with in Chapter 7, section 2.

See J. Clauzel, ‘Evolution de la vie economique et des structures sociales du pays nomade
du MaH, de la conquSte fran9aise a I’autonomie interne, 1893-1958’, Tiers-Monde, 9-10, 1962,
pp. 283-311, and D. J. Siddle, ‘War Towns in Sierra Leone: a Study in Social Change’, Africa,
38, 1968, pp. 47-55.
An important general survey of this subject is the study by Ester Boserup, Woman’s Role
in Economic Development, 1970.

234
 Completing the open economy

and Nigeria, and the groundnut industry of northern Nigeria, were heavily commit¬
ted to export production right from the outset. For them, novelty and risk were two
of the most prominent features of these ventures. Finally, Myint’s concept of two
stages of peasant export expansion, though not invalidated, is too schematic, for
there were specialised and unspecialised producers in both phases of development.
In the case of West Africa, it may be more realistic to think in terms of three over¬
lapping stages: the first in which small groups of innovating entrepreneurs experi¬
mented in a fairly specialised way with a variety of export crops; the second in which
their total or partial success led to widespread imitation by small scale, semi-
speciahsed farmers; and the third in which rural differentiation encouraged the
appearance of a new and much larger group of specialists.®®
r Colonial rule did not create modernity out of backwardness by suddenly dis- .
^ rupting a traditional state of low-level equilibrium.^n the contrary, the nature and ^
pace of economic development in the early colonialperiod can be understood only (Hrhf
when it is realised that the main function of the new rulers was to give impetus to a
process which was already under wa^An economic structure based on ‘peasant’
(export production and offering the prospect of a mass market had begun to emerge
early in the nineteenth century. Towards the close of the century, however, it became
apparent that this economy could not attain its full potential simply by relying on
the working of the natural laws in which mid-nineteenth century liberals had placed
such faith. Foreign intervention was needed to remove constraints which threatened
to make West Africa uncompetitive in world markets, which retarded the develop¬
ment of expatriate commercial interests, and which inhibited the growth of indige¬
nous capitalist enterprise. These problems led first to partition, and then to the
colonial solution described in the preceding pages. By creating the conditions which
gave Europeans and Africans both the means and the incentive to expand and
diversify legitimate commerce, colonial rule completed the integration of West
Africa into the economy of the industrial world, and marked a further stage in the
growth of the market. Important though it was, the expatriate role did not extend
much beyond this general function of connecting West Africa to international
markets. It was Africans who grasped the new opportunities, made the key entre¬
preneurial decisions, and introduced fundamental changes in the vital agricultural
sector. They did so by utilising established and allegedly antiquated economic and
social institutions.
The export economy which had emerged by 1930 came as close to the ideal-type
open economy as West Africa was to reach. Since the foregoing pages have concen¬
trated on the role of man, especially African man, in creating this economy, it is
appropriate at this point to recall that the influence of rulers and ruled alike was
constrained, above all, by the resource base of the region. Factor endowments can
change, but the change is rarely accomplished quickly. West Africa’s comparative
advantage lay in supplying the world market with tropical produce. It was this
activity which offered the region the best prospect of expanding its domestic, as well

This third stage is considered in Chapter 7, part i.

235
An Economic History of West Africa

as its overseas, market. The colonial rulers did not need to legislate against industrial¬
isation®® because there were already weighty reasons—such as low incomes, poor
infrastructure, and lack of capital and skills—why modem manufacturing plant was
not established in West Africa during the first half of the colonial era. However, the
open economy was not a frozen economy, and after 1930 it underwent important
modifications, as will now be shown.

The claim that the pacte colonial operated to prevent industriahsation needs to be recon¬
sidered in the Hght of Mark Karp’s article, ‘The Legacy of French Economic PoHcy in Africa’,
in French-Speaking Africa, ed. WiUiam H. Lewis, 1965, pp. 145-53.

236
seven

The open economy under

strain

In the 1920s and 1930s the colonial economy was considered as much part of the
natural or der as was the House of Lords or the Third Republic. N one of the respected
commentators on imperial affairs envisaged or desired any radical alternative, and it
was generally agreed that the colonial, export economies would continue to function
in such a way as to bring about prosperity and progress for all concerned. Similarly,
orthodox wisdom held that colonial rule would endure to a point so remote in time
as to defy precise calculation. Independence was an event which was an arguable
possibility, hke the agnostic’s view of the Day of Judgement, but not one to be
prepared for seriously. In the second half of the colonial period these assumptions
about normality were challenged with a speed and insistence that made even British
empiricism seem a doctrine of inflexibility. During the 1940s and 1950s the open
economies of West Africa underwent important modifications, with the result that
by about i960 few operated in their original, classical form. Moreover, between
1957 and 1965 the whole of colonial West Africa (with one exception) achieved
political independence. The exception was Portuguese Guinea, a tiny possession that
continues, so it is claimed, to move slowly (indeed, virtually imperceptibly) towards
the realisation of the assimilationist ideals which are advertised as the chief motive
for the continued presence of West Africa’s first colonial power.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and account for the modifications which
were made to the open economies of West Africa during the years 1930-1960. More
has been written about this phase of African history than about any preceding
period of comparable length. The problem is no longer to secure enough historical
information, as was the case in Chapter 2, but rather to compress, without too much
distortion, the important specialised work which has been carried out in recent years,
notably by economists and political scientists. There is the further complication that
some of the major developments of this era were not peculiar to West Africa, or even
to Africa as a whole, but had global significance. The Second World War, for
example, was as important for the ending of colonialism throughout the world as
were the American and French Revolutions in encouraging the rise of liberal
nationalism in Europe during the nineteenth century. Consequently, any explana¬
tion of economic and political change which focuses solely on relations between
Africans and their rulers is bound to be incomplete. An attempt will be made to take

237
 ♦

An Economic History of West Africa

account of extra-African influences, though restrictions of space will prevent them

from being treated on a scale appropriate to their importance. In spite of these
difficulties there is still room, even within the compass of one brief chapter, for a
degree of novelty both in presentation and in argument, if only for the reason that no
general interpretation of this concluding phase of colonial rule has been advanced
by an economic historian with respect to French and British West Africa.
In essence, it will be argued that modifications were introduced as a consequence
of severe strains experienced by the open economy in the second half of the colonial
era. It will be suggested that these strains wfere of two contrasting kinds. The first was
imposed by a long period of hardship between 1930 and 1945, when export expan¬
sion was checked and the frontiers of the markefeicdhomy contracted. It was at this
time that Africans began to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the open economy
and with the alien rulers who presided over it. Initially, the response of the colonial
powers was slow and inadequate, but by 1945 Britain and France had acknowledged
the need for changes in official policy. The second strain was imposed by the expan¬
sion of the open economy after the Second World War, when there was a vigorous
revival of exporHandmiewed growth In the domestic market. This period saw not
only the implementation of changesmade necessary by^the pressures built up between
1930 and 1945, but also a novel development in the capacity of the open economy to
generate structural change (albeit on a modest scale) through the establishment of
modem manufacturing activities. African opposition to coloniaUsm was not dis-
sdlved by this economic recovery. On the contrary, aspirations multiphed, and
prosperity helped to finance the rise of political organisations which were to lead
eventually to independence.
The simplest way of presenting this argument would be to proceed immediately
to an examination of the two periods of strain noted above. However, two issues
require investigation first of all, if this analysis of the pressures on the open economy
is to be complete. To begin with, it is necessary to give further consideration to
occupational roles in the export sector, and to degrees of specialisation within these
roles, in order to stress the differential effects of fluctuations in the performance of the
open economy. Next, it is essential to explore developments in domestic exchange
activity, since the West African variant of the open economy grew out of the
indigenous economy and continued to interact with it. These subjects have been
neglected in the past, yet both should be central to the study of African economic
and social history in the twentieth century.

1 Specialisation in the export sector

The previous chapter showed that Africans played an important part as farmers,
traders and labourers in creating the colonial economy, but it did not attempt to
investigate differentiation within these occupations. In the case of the farmers there
came a stage, though its timing was not the same in all parts of West Africa, when
groups of specialised producers began to emerge. Little is known about the elements

238
 The open economy under strain

of luck, skill and necessity which led to the development of this ‘kulak’ class. Never¬
theless, the evidence points to the growth of inequalities among farming com-j
munities in the second half of the colonial period.
On the Gold Coast a small group of wealthy farmers, who were responsible for a
disproportionately large amount of the cocoa shipped from the colony, had already
appeared by 1930.^ In Nigeria about a quarter of the farmers in Oyo province
depended primarily on the production of cocoa in the 1930s, and no longer grew all
the foodstuffs they needed.^ By the 1950s about 10 per cent of cocoa farmers held 41
per cent of the land under cocoa in Nigeria, and over half the total volume of cocoa
Was grovm by a minority of producers each of whose aggregate holdings exceeded
six acres.® A parallel trend appeared on the Ivory Coast following the rapid expan¬
sion of cocoa farming after the Second World War, though there it was often
‘strangers’ who accumulated large holdings. Evidence for the regions exporting
palm oil and kernels is harder to find because the economic history of these products
in the twentieth century has been unjustly neglected, but there are indications, at
least in eastern Nigeria, that a similar process of differentiation occurred. The \
groundnut producing areas have been better documented. In northern Nigeria
inequalities in one rural community have been studied in depth,^ while in Senegal it
is clear that a relatively small number of wealthy Mourides managed to perpetuate
the dominance they had achieved in the late nineteenth century.
Specialisation in export production did not lead to the creation of a distinct class
of large landlords, which explains, perhaps, why the phenomenon of rural inequality
has almost escaped attention. Typically, the holdings of substantial producers were
scattered, and their employees were either members of their families, or were
labourers who usually had some land of their own. Nevertheless, the appearance of
groups of specialised producers had a considerable effect on the local economy. First,
the expansion of their activities speeded the commercialisation of land. The twentieth .
century saw an increase in the amount of land in the export producing regions held /
virtually as freehold. This trend resulted partly from a general rise in the demand for/
farm land, and partly from a specific need to secure rights to a particular plot for!
more than one season, especially in areas where tree crops were grown. Secondly, the!
large farmers, though sometimes temporarily in debt themselves, stood as creditors\
at the head of an extensive network of financial relations, and frequently advanced j
\ money (usually on a seasonal basis) to the smaller farmers in the locality. Finally, the
\ large farmers had the capital to introduce certain kinds of costly imiovations. For
I example, with the mechanisation of groundnut farming in Senegal after the Second
U
1 S. Rhodie, ‘The Gold Coast Cocoa Hold-up of 1930-31’. Transactions of the Historical
Society of Ghana, 9, 1968, pp. ios-18. ■ 1, c 1
2 Daryll Forde, ‘The Rural Economies’, in The Native Economies of Nigeria, ed. Daryll Forde
and R. Scott, 1946, PP- 86-7. ^ r- j
3 R. Galletti, K. D. S. Baldwin and I. O. Dina, Nigerian Cocoa Farmers, Oxford 1956,

Pcally Hill, ‘The Myth of the Amorphous Peasantry: a Northern Nigerian Case Study’,
Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 10, 1968, pp. 239-do.

239
 I
An Economic History of West Africa

World War, the leading producers bought tractors, which they used themselves
and also leased to the poorer farmers, thus reinforcing, by means of modem tech¬
nology, their established position in the rural areas.
A similar process of differentiation occurred among African commercial firms
operating in the overseas trade sector. This is not to deny, of course, that the distribu¬
tive chain included many petty traders. Some, such as the ‘pan’ or ‘basket’ buyers in
the cocoa regions, specialised in purchasing small quantities of produce. In 193 8 it was
estimated that there were no less than 37,000 of these small traders (sometimes called'
sub-brokers) on the Gold Coast. Other small traders retailed manufactured imports
of the cheapest possible kind, such as yellow dusters—those banners of underdevelop¬
ment which are still flaunted in every urban centre. However, it is a mistake, though a
common one, to interpret African commercial history in the twentieth century as J
being concerned entirely with the activities of these numerous, minor traders.
There were substantial merchants too, men and women whose operations, though
restricted in comparison with the expatriate firms, were on a scale which made them
seem giants in the eyes of the average African trader.
Some of these African merchants concentrated on the export trade. On the Gold
Coast in 1938, for example, there w'ere about 1,500 cocoa brokers, that is large
traders who bought from the sub-brokers and sold direct to the expatriate firms.
Successful brokers sometimes became producers as well, as did Chief J. A. Obesesan
of Ibadan, who started as a cocoa buyer in 1914 and subsequently invested some of
his profits in farms, which were managed by paid agents. In northern Nigeria
groundnut purchases were made by chains of buyers, many of which were con¬
trolled by substantial Hausa merchants. Agents (or clients) purchased groundnuts
and brought them to the house of their principal (or patron), where they were
bulked and re-sold to the expatriate firms. This organisation can be thought of as
the commercial equivalent of indirect rule. On the import side there were a number
of prominent wholesaling and retailing concerns. One of the most important was
the Nigerian firm established by J. H. Doherty (1866-1928) and continued by his
son, T. A. Doherty, down to the present day.® Doherty, the son of Christian,
Egbado parents, started life as a clerk in an African firm in Lagos, and began trading
on liis own in 1891 with ^47 capital. The expansion of colonial rule did not inhibit
the growth of his business, for during the three years 1899-1901 Doherty’s average
net receipts from sales amounted to nearly ^50,000 per annum. By 1904 Doherty
had established branches in Lagos and in the interior, and by 1911 he was referred to
as ‘the leading native trader in Lagos in imported textiles’.® The firm’s growth was
checked in the 1920s, but at his death Doherty was still a very wealthy man. His son
modernised the business by forming a limited liability company in 1930, and by
introducing the structure and style of a department store after the Second World
War. Some of the trading profits were reinvested in the company: the remainder

® I should like to thank Chief T. A. Doherty for helping me reconstruct the history of his
family.
® C.O. 520/106, Egerton to Harcourt, ai September 1911, PubUc Record Office.

240
 The open economy under strain

went, in sizeable sums, into property, education and, inevitably, politics. When
Chief Doherty’s Rolls-Royce sweeps by, the yellow dusters wave in acknowledge¬
ment of an indigenous commercial success.
Developments affecting the wage labour force are also relevant to the argument
advanced in this chapter. To begin with, the number of Africans in paid employment
underwent a marked increase during the second half of the colonial period, and
especially with the expansion of the economy and administration after 1945.
Occasionally, the growth of employment opportunities occurred in an almost
dramatic way, as in the case of Guinea, where the discovery and rapid exploitation of
minerals in the 1950s created a paid labour force where previously almost none had
existed. By i960 the wage labour force in West Africa was estimated, conservatively,
to be roughly two million strong, though this was still only about six per cent of the
total labour force of 33 million.'^ In addition, a reserve army of unemployed arose in
the towns during and after the 1930s, by which time the acute shortage of unskilled
labour had been overcome.
Various explanations have been advanced to account for this persistent search for
employment in the second half of the colonial period.® What might be called, loose¬
ly, an anthropological argument suggests that the expedition to secure work is a
modem version of traditional initiation rites, after which the returning migrant,
having overcome a series of hazards, can present himself to his elders as a fully-fledged
adult. This view, though not without value, has been exaggerated in the past mainly,
it seems, because for some time after it became established no one thought of an
alternative. What might be termed, even more loosely, a psychological explanation
holds that Africans continue to be lured to centres of employment by the promise
of bright lights and excitement. Again, there may be some truth in this interpreta¬
tion, but as it stands it rests on a naive assumption regarding the motivation of
African migrants. A more recent view, which has achieved popularity among a
number of economists, suggests that the increase in the number of Africans presenting
themselves for paid employment in the towns was thejresult of 9- differential between
urban wages and rural incomes. Belief in the significance of this differential has led
some commentators to referto African urban employees as an ‘aristocracy’ of labour.
It is true that some highly qualified Africans held well paid and attractive jobs, but
the majority of urban employees were unskilled men who earned relatively low
wages. By the time their higher outgoings (urban rents, food and the maintenance of
incoming relatives) have been taken into account, the net differential, if it existed,
was scarcely sufficient to maintain seigneurial standards of consumption.
An alternative explanation of the growth in the volume of labour on offer should
be based on the following considerations, which are extensions of the approach

^ K. C. Doctor and H. Gallis, ‘Size and Characteristics of Wage Employment in Africa:

Some Statistical Estimates’, International Labour Review, 93, 1966, pp. 149-73.
® These explanations have been put forward mainly with urban migrants in mind, though
some of the reasons summarised here have also been thought to apply to agricultural migra¬
tions.

241
An Economic History of West Africa

adopted in the last chapter.® In the first place, knowledge of employment opportuni¬
ties'was more widespread after 1930 than before. Secondly, with the spread of
motor vehicles the means of reaching the centres of demand were more readily
available and were also cheaper; Thirdly, improved conditions of work, reflected in
a fall in accident and mortality rates, increased the attractions of certain kinds of
employment^® Fourthly, family connections and ethnic organisations had been
developed to assist newcomers, and these eliminated some of the problems which
had faced the early, pioneer migrants.Finally, the assessment which individualsy
made of their employment prospects was more optimistic than was warranted by a/
detached appraisal of the total employment situation.^^ Towns were regarded as
places where advancement was possible, and African immigrants were no more
deterred by the existence of widespread unemployment than w^s that famous
English migrant, Dick Whittington, when he set out to make his fortune in London
in the fourteenth century.^® The ‘aristocratic’ urban employee was important as an
ideal rather than as a reality.
Certain features of this enlarged wage labour force need emphasising. To begin
with, an increasing proportion of wage earners took permanent jobs in the second
half of the colonial period. Next, a substantial part of the wage labour force outside
agriculture shared a common and readily identifiable employer, namely the colonial
government, while most of the remainder worked for expatriate commercial and
mining firms. Furthermore, employees in the ‘modern’ sector tended to be located
in concentrated settlements. Indeed, immigration was largely responsible for a
remarkable expansion in the size of West African towns in the second half of the
colonial era. Increases of between three and ten times over a period of twenty to forty*
years were common, as the following examples show: the population of Dakar rose
from 94,000 in 1939 to nearly 400,000 in i960; that of Abidjan from 18,000 to 180,000
during the same period; Freetown grew from 44,000 in 1921 to 128,000 in 1963 ;
and Lagos from 99,000 in 1936 to 675,000 by 1962. Finally, institutions were intro¬
duced to help employees cope with their new environmental and work situations.
Africans adapted indigenous associations to deal with these urban problems, just as
they did in agriculture and trade, so there was no sudden destruction of that once
popular textbook figure—tribal man. As some of the migrants became proletarians,
they also adopted modem organisations, notably trade unions. Modem trade unions
existed in West Africa even before the First World War, but were confined to a very
small minority of skilled workers, such as civil servants. During and after the Second
World War, however, came the growth of‘new unionisin’, which began to em¬
brace the unskilled wage earners. These unions were urban based; they relied heavily

® See above, pp. 222-31 •

Marvin P. Miracle and Bruce Fetter, ‘Backward-Sloping Labour Supply Functions and
African Economic Behaviour’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 18, 1970, pp. 240-51.
K. Little, West African Urbanization, Cambridge 1965.
This point emerges clearly from Guy Pfeffermaim’s study, Industrial Labour in the Republic
of Senegal, New York 1968.
The fact that much of Dick Whittington’s story is myth merely underlines the point!

242
 The open economy under strain

on permanent wage earners for their membership; and they were particularly
strong in the public sector. The part they played during the periods of strain experi¬
enced by the open economy will be considered later in this chapter.
The foregoing survey of three major occupations is intended in general to con¬
tribute to the writing of indigenous history, and in particular to correct the con¬
ventional portrayal of the role of Africans in the export sector. The analysis has
questioned the belief that Africans (or Chinese for that matter) can be referred to in
aggregate, as if their daily lives approximated closely to a notional idea of unremark-
aUe and uniform simplicity. In tins instance the economist’s formal assumption that
each factor of production is homogeneous is seriously at variance with reality. A
more complex view, it is suggested, is more accurate, and is of greater value in
understanding the final phase of colonial rule. There has been a tendency, for example,
to exaggerate the so-called ‘buffer capacity’ of African producers. It is often said that
Africans can absorb the effects of a slump in the export sector because the typical
cocoa or groundnut farmer grows his own foodstuffs as well, the typical trader is
also a farmer, and the typical labourer is a migrant who can easily return to the land.
This argument ignores the existence of specialised groups in each category, men who
could revert to self-sufficiency only by restructuring their economic activities and by
taking a substantial cut in their living standards. The large farmers, the leading
traders and the permanent wage earners stood to gain most from the expansion of
the open economy, but were also most at risk when it entered a stagnant phase.
These men, though numerically a small proportion of the total population, were
highly significant in economic and political terms. Knowledge of the composition
of the independence movements, it is suggested, helps to explain the nature of their
demands, their relations with the colonial powers, and the character of the new
governments which were established in W^est Africa after I957*

2 The domestic economy

The discussion can now move on to consider the domestic economy. This topic is
jjjj^portant in relation to the main theme of this book, namely the development of a
market economy, and to the specific interpretation advanced in this chapter. ^J^^ith
regard to the first aspect, it was argued in Chapter 4 that the early nineteenth century
saw the emergence of an export economy which was recognisably modern, in the
sense that its structure resembled that which exists today. The growth of the new
economy has been examined already with reference to changes within the export
sector itself, but it remains to be shown (though it has been asserted) that this pattern
of development established close links with the domestic market. As to the second
aspect, a study of the domestic economy is necessary for an appreciation of the full
extent of the strain experienced in West Africa during the period I930-I945, and
also for an understanding of the capacity of the open economy to generate a market
which was large enough to sustain modern manufacturing industries in the period
after 1945.

243
 t

An Economic History of West Africa

The domestic economy was largely ignored by the colonial administration because
it was not, on the whole, an important source of public revenue, and it was also
neglected by the expatriate commercial firms, which chose to concentrate on the
staples of the import and export.trade. Oddly enough, the very success of the African
distributive system, which transferred goods and services with unobtrusive efficiency,
seems to have confirmed the low priority accorded by expatriates to internal trade.
Had indigenous channels proved inadequate, serious shortages would have occurred;
the administration would have had to intervene; reports would have been written;
and scholars would probably have become-interested in the subject at an earlier date.
In fact, it was not until the 1950s that economists discovered the existence of internal
trade,^^ and it is only in the last few years that they, together with geographers and
anthropologists, have begun to examine this topic in detail.^^ As yet, no one has
attempted to write an economic history of the domestic trade of West Africa during
the period of colonial rule. However, lack of comprehensive descriptive information
and statistical data has not prevented a number of assertions from gaining currency.
Perhaps the most widespread of these is the generalisation that many items of tradi¬
tional trade declined in the twentieth century as a result of competition from
foreign imports. It will be argued here that the evidence available at present shows
not only that internal trade survived, but that it underwent considerable expansion.
This interpretation is not intended as a defence of colonialism, but rather as a tribute
to the skill and adaptability of Africans at a time when unprecedented demands were
being placed on indigenous production and marketing arrangements. It is hoped
that the remarks which follow will encourage other historians to investigate this
important subject in greater depth.
^■''“''■^panding demand for domestic goods and services in the twentieth century was
/ brought about by a reduction in internal transport costs, by rising per capita incomes,
particularly in the towns and in wealthy, export-producing, rural areas, by increased
specialisation, and by population growth. Indigenous marketing channels were
called on to supply new geographical regions, to adapt to modern transport facili¬
ties, to adjust to the colonial monetary system, and to fight foreign competition.
The response of African entrepreneurs to this situation will be illustrated in the
following ways: by taking foodstuffs as an example of what, traditionally, was a
local trade, by using kola and livestock as case studies of long distance trade, and by
looking at the position of domestic manufactures, which were traded locally and
over long distances.
X Figures showing the expansion of food production are hard to come by, and.
when found, are subject to a wide margin of error. Nevertheless, specialised studies,
clearly indicate that there was a substantial increase in the volume of foodstuffs /
placed on the market, particularly in the period following the Second World War. /

A. R. Prest and I. G. Ste-wart, The National Income of Nigeria, 1950-51, 1953, and P. T.
Bauer, West African Trade, Cambridge 1954, ch. 27.
See, for example, Bernard Vinay, L’Afrique commerce avec VAfrique, Paris 1968; Alan M.
Hay and Robert H. T. Smith, Interregional Trade and Money Flows iti Nigeria, Ibadan 1970;
and Paul Bohaiman and George Dalton, eds., Markets in Africa, Evanston 1962.

244
 The open economy under strain

In the case of French West Africa, for instance, Capet has estimated that production
of the main foodstuffs grew by an average of about 50 per cent between 1947 and
I954d® Bd^g demand was met by the development of specialised food-producing
regions in West Africa. These'served the main towns, and, less obviously, the food
deficient rural areas, typically where farmers had concentrated on export production,
Fut occasionally whefepopulation density was too great for self-sufficiency to be
possible, as in the case of the area around Onitsha and Owerri in eastern Nigeria.
Reliance by rural areas on external supplies was on the whole unusual, and of two
kinds. The first was found in places where the pattern of export production placed
an exceptional strain on the domestic economy. The best example is the huge ground¬
nut-producing region of Senegal, which began to import sizeable quantities of rice,
mostly from Indo-China, in the 1930s. Dependence on foreign imports derived
from the fact that groundnuts compete with foodstuffs for land and labour to a
much greater extent than do cocoa, coffee and palm products. The Gambia also
needed additional foodstuffs, but met the demand from wit^ West Africa, chiefly
by purchasing rice from Sierra LeoneTNorthern Nigeria, the other large groundnut-
"producing region in WBt Africa, has not experienced the same problem. Its econo¬
my is more varied than that of Senegambia, and it has received a degree of natural
protectionTfom imports by being located so far from the ^a. The second type of
locaTdeEcrericy was in certain quality foods, such as sugar, wheat and wheat flour,
imports of which increased during the 1950s. This was a special case, brought about
partly by the presence of expatriates, and partly by the diversification of tastes among
wealthier Africans, and did not reflect a failure in indigenous production of basic
foods.
Two novel features of the trade in foodstuffs during the twentieth century are
worth noting for purposes of comparison with the pre-colonial period. First,
improved crop storage facilities have tended to reduce seasonal variations in the
market availability of food. This innovation has been influential not only in enlarging
the business of food traders, but also in making possible the maintenance of a
permanent labour force outside agriculture. Second, transport developments, especi-
ally the introduction of motor vehicles, have blurred the distinction drawn in
lCta^''2Fetween localand_long,distance.trade. For the first time it has become
profitable to trade staple food crops outside the area of production, as the case of
Accra illustrates.^’’' In 1957-1958 Accra imported 144,000 tons of foodstuffs (mainly
plantains, processed manioc and root manioc) from the interior. A proportion of
this total was supplied by local market gardens, but 55 per cent was brought from
between fifty and one hundred miles away, and no less than 30 per cent came from
distances of more than a hundred miles, stretching as far as the Northern Territories.
Moreover, since the food trade is highly competitive, each region in the hinterland

E ia Marcel Capet, Traits d’economie tropicale, Paris 1958, pp. 276-7. Tliis neglected work
ontains a great deal of useful information about French West Africa during the period 1945-54-
H. P. White, ‘Internal Exchange of Staple Foods in the Gold Coast’, Economic Geography,
32, 1956, pp. 115-25, and Thomas T. Poleman, ‘The Food Economies of Urban Middle
Africa! the Case of Ghana’, Food Research Institute Studies, 2, 1961, pp. 121—74*

245
An Economic History of West Africa

has been, encouraged to specialise in the production of a particular type of food for
the Accra market. A similar extension of the food trade can be seen in other parts
of West Africa: in the Ivory Coast, for instance, where the cocoa and coffee farmers
in the south imported about 12,000 tons of rice a year from northern parts of the
country in the 1950s; and in Nigeria, where rice, cowpeas and guinea corn are sent
several hundred miles to southern destinations, and palm oil travels from the forest
the^savanna.
The main items of long distance trade also survived colonial rule, and at least some
grew in volume. As was shown in the last chapter, the movement of labour increased
in the twentieth century following the dechne of slavery and the rise of wage em¬
ployment opportunities. It is highly probable that the traditional fish trade also
expanded. The specialised communities which paid their taxes in fish on the middle
Niger during the sixteenth century now supply urban centres hundreds of miles
away: in 1954, for example, Mopti and Segou sent 10-12,000 tons of dried fish to
the Ivory Coast alone.^® Similarly, local salt from Bilma in Niger continues to have
a wide sale in northern Nigeria, where it is exchanged against grain.^® Certain other
minerals, notably gold and iron, are still produced by traditional means and traded
over long distances, though information about quantities is insufficient to permit
comparisons with the pre-colonial period. There is enough evidence, however, to
demonstrate the impressive development of two of the greatest traditional trades—
kola and livestock.
The western part of the savanna continues to receive its supplies of kola nuts from
the Ivory Coast and, to a lesser extent, from Sierra Leone, as in the pre-colonial
period.^® Exports by land and sea from the Ivory Coast grew from two or three
thousand tons a year at the beginning of the present century to 28-30,000 tons in
1954, by which time kola had become the colony’s most valuable export after coffee
and cocoa. About a third of this total was destined for consumption in Senegal,
where the expansion of groundnut exports had raised domestic purchasing power.
This increased trade, however, no longer passes along the ancient caravan routes.
Most exports now move north by lorry to Bamako, the capital of Mali, and are then
taken by rail to Senegal, while the remainder are sent by steamer to Dakar. The
eastern part of the savanna is supplied by Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast) and by
Nigeria.^^ Northern Nigeria, long estabhshed as the major market, became even
more important during the colonial period as a result of the development of the

Jean Tricart, ‘Les echanges entre la zone forestiere de Cote d’Ivoire et les savanes soudani-
ennes’, Cahiers d’Outre-Mer, 9, 1956, p. 219.
Capitaine Grandin, ‘Notes sur I’industrie et le commerce du sel au Kawar et en Agram’,
Bulletin de VIFAN, B, 13, 1951, pp. 488-533; Maurice Fievet, ‘Salt Caravan’, Nigeria Magazine,
41, 1953, pp. 4-20.
Jean-Loup Amselle, ‘Les reseaux marchands Kooroko’, African Urban Notes, 5, 1970,
pp. 143-58.
A. G. Hopkins, An Economic History of Lagos, i88o-igi4. University of London Ph.D.
thesis, 1964, pp. 407-13, and Paul E. Lovejoy, ‘The Wholesale Kola Trade of Kano’, African
Urban Notes, 5, I970, pp. 129-42.

246
 Timbuctu

Map 15. Distribution of Kola and Kola Trade Routes about 1910.
The open economy under strain

247
An Economic History of West Africa

groundnut trade. Traditionally, the main channel of distribution for this region was
an overland route from the Gold Coast, which delivered about 500 tons of kola nuts
a year in the late nineteenth century. Two innovations have brought about a funda¬
mental reorientation of this pre-colonial marketing arrangement. First, in the
1880s a group of Hausa merchants began to use the regular steamship service to
transport kola to Lagos from Accra and Cape Coast. The modernisation of the kola
trade was completed in 1911, when the railway reached Kano; from then on it was
no longer necessary to use porters and pack animals to carry the nuts north from
Lagos. The trade expanded, and in 1924 almost 10,000 tons of kola were imported
into Nigeria by way of the new sea route. Second, during the 1920s kola trees of the
type found in the Gold Coast began to be grown in Nigeria itself, with the result
that domestic production eventually supplanted imports. In 196^ no less than
54,000 tons of kola were sent to northern Nigeria from the south. However, this
Nigerian initiative did not lead to the demise of the Gold Coast kola industry.
Traders in that colony reacted, in characteristic fashion, by seeking out new markets,
and with the aid of the motor lorry they succeeded in establishing themselves else¬
where, notably in Upper Volta and parts of Mali and Niger.
Although the history of commerce in livestock has still to be written, there is no
4oubt that this trade also expanded in the twentieth century.^^ Today, the produc¬
tion of cattle and sheep is especially important in the territories of former French
West Africa, particularly Mali, Upper Volta and Niger. The sale of livestock pro¬
vides these countries with one of their few close connections with the leading
export-producing regions, and helps them to buy imported consumer goods and
local products, such as kola nuts. In 1936 Niger and Soudan exported at least 65,000
head of cattle to other parts of West Africa; twenty years later, this trade had reached
the 200,000 mark. The chief recipients were Senegal, the Ivory Coast, the Gold
Coast and Nigeria. The largest single market is still southern Nigeria, which is
supplied by the northern part of the coimtry as well as by Niger and Chad. In 1906
about 8,000 cattle, sheep and goats were recorded passing into southern Nigeria
from the north. In the 1930s the figure rose to just over 200,000, and by 1964 no less
than 300,000 head of cattle alone were imported into thesouthtogether with 118,000
sheep, rams, goats and pigs. As in the case of the kola trade, the railways have
captured a great deal of this traffic, though substantial numbers of livestock are still
brought to market on the hoof Contrary to a common assumption, the growth of
the trade was not the result of colonial tutelage overcoming an ingrained preference
for hoarding cattle, for commerce in livestock is as old as the earliest written records
relating to West Africa.^^ Nor should the negative stimulus of cattle taxes, such as
the jangali, which was first imposed in northern Nigeria in 1905-1906, be exagger¬
ated. Essentially, the trade expanded because it became more profitable, and it
became more profitable because the effective demand for meat increased as Africans
earned money through the sale of export crops.

22 For an account of one branch of this trade see Polly Hill, Studies in Rural Capitalism in
West Africa, Cambridge 1970, pp. 80-140.
22 See Chapter 2, part 2.

248
 Oudelka

Map 16. Present Day Livestock Trade Routes.

The open economy under strain

249
 An Economic History of West Africa

From the number of assertions made about the elimination of traditional crafts, it
might be supposed that the subject had been thoroughly investigated. This is not the
case. In practice these assertions rest on the assumption that domestic products must
have declined because they were in competition with cheaper imports. The argu¬
ment is appealing, but it is also misleading. While it is likely that certain types of
craft products in particular areas suffered from European competition, what little
work has been carried out indicates that there was nd wholesale liquidation of local
manufactures, even though expatriate officials and merchants emphasised the
advantages of discarding traditional crafts in favour of export production. It is
interesting to note' that one of the few detailed studies made of this question reaches a
broadly similar conclusion with reference to the fortunes of the Chinese textile
industry.^^ The proportion of manufactured goods supplied by domestic industry
undoubtedly fell sharply from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards:
by 1962 only about eight per cent of textiles intended for consumption in Nigeria
were produced by traditional hand-weavers. However, a substantial proportionate
decline is still consistent with an absolute rise in the volume of traditional production
because the market underwent a massive expansion during the same period. Indeed,
the evidence suggests that some African crafts, having resisted the initial impact of
imports delivered to the interior by rail, received a new lease of life during the latter
half of the colonial era.
It is quite clear, for example, that the manufacture and sale of leather goods
increased with the growth of the livestock trade. It is equally certain that the produc¬
tion of clay pots also survived. One local study has shown that the pottery industry
of the Shai people in the southern part of the Gold Coast expanded during the
colonial period, and now has an output of about half a million pots a year.^^ Thus
part of the demand for palm wine and water containers is still met by domestic
products, even though the Gold Coast has long been one of the greatest importers
of European manufactures in West Africa! Another specialised piece of research has
drawn attention to the continuing dynamism of the traditional cloth industry at
Iseyin in western Nigeria.^® It is known, too, that the production of expensive and
weighty Kente cloth still flourishes in Ghana, for in 1962 output was estimated to be
about two million square yards, or almost 900 tons.^'^ These two cases are not isolated
exceptions. Even as late as 1964, when modem textile factories had been established
in West Africa, traditional hand-weavers using hand-spun yarn produced about
9,000 tons of textiles, which was roughly a third of total domestic output. The main

Albert Feuerwerker, ‘Handicraft and Manufactured Cotton Textiles in China, 1871-1910’,

Journal of Economic History, 30, 1970, pp. 338-78.
2® A. K. Quarcoo and Marion Johnson, ‘Shai Pots’, Baessler-Archie, 16, 1968, pp. 47-88.
28 Jennifer M. Bray, ‘The Craft Structure of a Traditional Yoruba Town’, Transactions of

the Institute of British Geographers, 46, 1969, pp. 179-93, and ‘The Economics of Traditional
Cloth Production in Iseyin, Nigeria’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 17, 1969,
pp. 540-51.
22 United Nations, ‘The Textile Industry in the West African Sub-region’, Economic Bulletin
for Africa, 7, 1968, pp. 103-25.

250
 The open economy under strain

areas of production in that year were Nigeria, Mali, Upper Volta, Ghana, the Ivory
Coast and Senegal. Again, it is striking that the regions where traditional manu¬
factures continue to thrive include countries wliich are also the largest importers of
consumer goods. Finally, it is worth noting that the growth and diversification of the
open economy has encouraged the rise of new types of‘cottage’ industry, such as
bicycle repairing, which have helped to offset losses suffered by those crafts that were
affected by European competition.
There are four main reasons for the survival of traditional manufactures in the
twentieth century. First, certain products are protected by proximity to the market
and by low overheads at the manufacturing stage. This is particularly true of hollow-
ware, such as pots, which are costly to transport over long distances, and which are
produced in West Africa mainly by cheap family labour. Second, some products
continue to sell, even though they compete directly with cheaper European imports,
because they are highly regarded by consumers. Local salt remains in demand because
its taste is preferred and because it is thought to enhance virility. Similarly, local iron¬
ware is held to be stronger and more durable than imported substitutes. It is easy to
deride these beliefs as examples of the ‘primitive’ nature of consumer behaviour in
the underdeveloped world. However, it is as well to remember that the agents of
what is, technically, the modem world also sell their products—from beer to cars
by appealing to human ambitions and weaknesses. It would be fairer to say that
modern advertising has failed to dissolve established brand loyalties. Third, tradi¬
tional crafts survived because they were able to secure a niche as special lines in a
differentiated product market. Consumers bought imported and domestic textiles
because there were hundreds of varieties of cloth, and not all served the same purpose
or suited the same tastes. Indeed, as the colonial period advanced, traditional textiles
became increasingly fashionable as an index of status and as a symbol of identification
with African culture and with the nationalist movement.^® Fourth, some crafts
survived by employing new techniques. Thus the use of sewing machines enabled
tailors to cut their production costs and increase their output.
P By far the greater part of domestic trade remained in the hands of Africans them¬
selves. The success of local traders in expanding and redirecting internal trade in the
twentieth century is a feat which has not been fully acknowledged, yet one which
merits comparison with the more publicised achievements of Africans in export
production. Just as indigenous, and allegedly antiquated, institutions proved their
dyfiamism in agriculture, so, too, the pre-colonial distributive system fostered the
growth of trade in the twentieth century. All the main features of commercial
organisation discussed in Chapter 2, such as rotating markets, landlords, brokers,
credit and the family firm, survived. It was the attributes of the family firm, particu¬
larly its flexible size, low overheads, familiarity with local conditions, reserves of
skill, goodwill and capital, and wide geographical coverage, that made expansion

In England the traditional crafts of sadlers and thatchers have experienced a revival since
the Second World War as a result of the increasing affluence and changing aspirations of new
social classes.

251
An Economic History of West Africa

possible. On the whole, the economic unity of areas which had been linked by
market transactions in the pre-colonial period was not severed by European rule.
Under the French and British, as in the time of Mansa Musa, long distance trade
continued to span pohtical divisions. Ironically, it was the achievement of political
independence wliich led to the erection of barriers to the internal flow of goods and
services, the claims of territorial sovereignty proving in this instance more than a
match for the ideals of pan-Africanism.
Continuity with the past is exemplified by the way in which the Hausa and Dioula,
the great long distance traders of the pre-colonial period, managed to perpetuate
their dominance in the twentieth century. Admittedly, their success has been helped
by the continued presence of long-established barriers to entry. Capital, for example,
remains scarce, and credit tends to be issued by a relatively few substantial traders,
with the result that small groups control the main items of long distance trade. The
oligopoly which Bauer identified in external trade is paralleled in certain branches
of internal trade as well: each has its own commercial Establishment. Nevertheless,
supremacy was not maintained automatically, and traditional groups have been
involved in a sustained struggle with new competitors and with changing economic
opportumties. As to the first, Abner Cohen has analysed how the Hausa community
of Ibadan manipulated traditional religious and political means of maintaining group ,
solidarity in order to protect its control over the kola trade.^® With regard to the ^
second, Peter Garlick has shown how the Kwahu, a Gold Coast people with a long
tradition of commercial specialisation, adapted from trading to the north in slaves
early in the nineteenth century, to sending rubber to the south in the period 1874-
1914, then to selling imported goods in the expanding cocoa-farming areas, and
finally to becoming settled shopkeepers in Accra from the 1930s onwards.^®
The success of the indigenous distributive system owed a great deal to its capacity
to innovate as well as to its ability simply to perpetuate, and occasionally modify,
essentially unchanged virtues. Three iimovations in particular seem to have been
significant, though doubtless the number will be extended by future research. In the
first place, there were important changes in personnel. As traditional ties of depen¬
dence, notably slavery, were loosened, a large new group of independent traders
began to make its mark. Ja Ja represented such a change in the export trade, and Omu
Okwei, though not a slave, may stand as an example of a similar departure in internal
trade.®^ Women traders have always been important in West Africa, but the growth
of the economy in the twentieth century, and especially since the Second World
War, has enabled some of them to expand their activities and to invest in other
enterprises, as the ubiquitous ‘Mammy wagons’ testify. A rather different illustration
of increased social mobility in commerce is provided by the Saharan salt trade.
Today, the trade from Bilma is conducted in independent family units by those who

Abner Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa, 1969.

Peter C. Garlick, ‘The Development of Kwahu Business Enterprise in Ghana since 1874—
an Essay in Recent Oral Tradition’, Journal of African History, 8, 1967, pp. 463-80.
See above, pp. 146 and 205.

252
 The open economy under strain

were slaves and vassals of the Tuareg, while their former masters, reluctantly break¬
ing with tradition, now have to work for a living. Second, the pre-colonial distribu¬
tive system has had to adjust to the advent of modem technology. Traders who used
to patrol the frontiers of the exchange economy on foot have reorganised to take
advantage of the steamship, the railway engine and the motor lorry. Production for
internal exchange has also been affected by Western technology. The traditional
fishermen on the middle Niger have been joined by migrants who employ more
modern techniques,®^ while on the coast fishing is becoming mechanised.®® Third,
just as wage-earners established trade unions, so, too, the indigenous distributive
system spawned new commercial organisations, where these were needed. The
traditional communal network, for example, is not well suited to the motor trans¬
port business, which demands a particularly individualistic pattern of labour
organisation. This problem has been solved by the development of novel institu¬
tions, such as the Ivory Coast Transporters’ Association, which grew up in the
I950s.®^
^he foregoing examination of domestic exchange is related to the analysis of the
\train exerted on the open economy in two ways. To begin with, it is important to
appreciate that growth in the domestic economy was determined primarily by the
performance of the export sector: that is to say, the amount of money spent on local
^oods and services fluctuated with the level of receipts from exports, given that the
Proportion of earnings exchanged for imports remained more or less constant for
/the greater part of the colonial period. Thus the poor terms of trade in the period
1930-1945 had a serious effect on the internal market. In general it can be said that
when the export trade was depressed fewer cattle were sent south, fewer kola nuts
were imported into the savanna, fewer craft products were sold, fewer labourers
ere employed and so fewer foodstuffs were produced for exchange. In short, a
depression in world trade affected not only the export-producing regions them¬
selves, but a complex network of multilateral connections in the domestic econ¬
omy.®® This conclusion, though it has rarely been emphasised, is essential to a full
understanding of the stresses experienced in West Africa after 1930. Next, though all
traders in the domestic economy suffered to some extent from this long period of
depression, they did not suffer equally. In internal trade, as in the export-producing
regions, it was the specialised personnel who were hit hardest. An appreciation of the
differential effects of commercial fluctuations should lead to a more accurate view
of what is usually referred to simply as ‘African’ opposition to colonialism.

32 S. Jacquemond, ‘Les pecheurs de la boucle du Niger’, Bulletin du Comiti de Travaux

Historiques et Scientijiques: Section de Geographie, 71, 1958, pp- 103-35-
33 Rowena Lawson, ‘The Transition of Ghana’s Fishing from a Primitive to a Mechanized
Industry’, Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, 9, 1968, pp. 90-104.
3<t Barbara Lewis, ‘Ethnicity, Occupational Specialization, and Interest Groups: the Trans¬
porters’ Association of the Ivory Coast’, African Urban Notes, 5, 1970, pp. 95-115-
33 E. K. Hawkins, ‘The Growth of a Money Economy in Nigeria and Ghana’, Oxford
Economic Papers, 10, 1958, pp. 339-54-

253
An Economic History of West Africa

3 Strains on the open economy, 1930-45

From 1930 until the end of the Second World War, West Africa experienced a
period of severe and increasing hardship as the barter and income terms of trade of
export producers underwent a serious deterioration. After 1930 a given ‘basket’ of
exports purchased a progressively smaller ‘basket’ of imports, and Africans had to
step up the volume, and hence raise the value, of cash crop production merely to
maintain existing levels of import consumption. This course of action led to increased
production costs, in spite of the advent of the motor lorry, because at that time there
was no way of expanding exports without purchasing additional inputs of land and
labour. Even with a larger export volume, producers were still unable to halt the
slide in their total import-purchasing power, and the result was-that their real
incomes fell. The reactions of African farmers, traders and wage-earners to this
situation clearly show that they were, or at least considered themselves to be, worse
off than they had been before. As far as the historian is concerned, it is the subjective
evaluation of participants which is of chief interest, for it was this which caused them
to try and influence the course of events.
The principal tactic adopted by farmers in defence of their living standards was to
make adjustments to the supply of produce. The volume of exports expanded
considerably in the 1930s, and shipments of groundnuts and cocoa reached record
levels. This ‘perverse’ response of primary producers (so-called because the orthodox,
capitalist reaction to declining profits is to cut back production) is not hard to
understand. In the case of annual crops, such as groundnuts, investment in production
was short-term, and in theory could be varied from season to season. In practice,
however, exports continued to rise because farmers were committed to a standard of
living which was derived from export earnings, and no alternative means of buying
imports could be devised. Faced with a similar situation in the i88os and 1890s,
farmers had begun to develop new export crops, but in the 1930s no further diversifi¬
cation was possible, or at least was achieved. During the Second World War it
became very difficult to obtain imported goods, especially in French West Africa,
and at that point farmers did reduce production. In 1943 groundnut exports from
S enegal fell to 3 5,000 tons, a figure which was lower than at any time since the 18 8 os.
The frontiers of the exchange economy contracted, and there was a retreat into
subsistence as farmers began to plant millet instead of groundnuts. Clearly, the
process of market growth in the colonial period, as in preceding centuries, was fitful
and far from irreversible. In the case of tree crops, such as cocoa and coffee, farmers
were stuck with an investment which could not be reallocated easily. This lack of
flexibility in the production structure meant that Africans had little choice but to
harvest as much of their existing tree-crops as possible in an attempt to compensate
for falling produce prices. At the same time, however, they planted fewer new trees,
a decision which demonstrates that in the long run their response to declining profits
was entirely orthodox.'^® Thus the impressive expansion of exports during the 1930s
On this lagged response see Robert M. Stern, ‘The Determinants of Cocoa Supply in
West Africa’, in African Primary Products and International Trade, ed. I. G. Stewart and H. W.
Ord, Edinburgh 1965, pp. 65-82.

254
 The open economy under strain

was not an indication of prosperity (a response to high produce prices) but was
squeezed out of the economy by an adverse movement in the terms of trade.
At particularly critical times farmers demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the
state of the economy in more militant ways, principally by withholding supplies in
the hope of forcing buyers to offer increased prices. This was a well established tech¬
nique, and one which had given expression to African resentment, frustration and
despair during periods of unsatisfactory trade in the nineteenth century. A number of
protests of this kind took place in the years between the two World Wars, the best
known being the three principal cocoa hold-ups on the Gold Coast. The first was in
1921, when the post-war boom in cocoa prices suddenly came to an end;^'^ the
second occurred in 1930-1931 following the onset of the world slump and the
third, which also involved Nigeria, took place in 193 7 and was a reaction to a further
downturn in the terms of trade and to a market-sharing agreement made by the
European buying firms.'^® These rural ‘strikes’ were led by substantial, specialised
farmers, men whose ‘buffer capacity’ was limited and who strove to persuade the
small farmers (who had less to lose) to present a united front against the buying firms.
The hold-ups failed, but, in failing, worsened Afro-European relations, and in
particular increased the hostility of the larger farmers towards the expatriate firms
and towards the expatriate government, which was regarded as supporting the
existing marketing system.
The decline in the producers’ terms of trade also affected traders. Business became"
less profitable, but few traders were able to introduce compensating reductions in
operating costs because their overheads were already very low. They, too, expressed
their opposition by demonstrations against measures which weighed on them I
particularly heavily, such as increased taxation and the issue of trading licences'^
during the Second World War. Usually, however, their protests were small scale,
spontaneous, and of short duration. With the possible exception of the women’s
riots in eastern Nigeria in 1929, in which commercial interests played a prominent
part, none of the traders’ demonstrations had the impact of the hold-ups organised
by the farmers. Nevertheless, a group of merchants in Nigeria and the Gold Coast
did initiate one important and constructive move, and this is worth mentioning as
evidence of the reactions of ‘Westernised’ African businessmen to the problems of
the inter-war period.
At the beginning of the twentieth century the common assumption among the
educated, and the predominantly Christian, merchants in the large coastal entrepots
was that the implementation of colonial notions of partnership and assimilation
would present them with more opportunities for advancement than they had
enjoyed previously. The reality was rather different. By about the time of the post¬
war slump of 1921, it was clear that African import and export merchants had

3’^ David Kimble, A Political History of Ghana, 1850-1928, Oxford 1963, pp. 49-51-
38 S. Rhodie, ‘The Gold Coast Cocoa Hold-up of 1930-31’, Transactions of the Historical
Society of Ghana, 9, 1968, pp. 105-18.
39 Josephine Milbum, ‘The 1938 Gold Coast Cocoa Crisis: British Business and the Colonial
Office’, African Historical Studies, 3, 1970, PP- 57-74-

255

9*
An Economic History of West Africa

sufFered a serious decline relative to their European rivals. Some Africans dropped )
out of the direct import and export business. Those who remained recognised that it/
was necessary to adopt Western business institutions if they were to remain in whau
they termed ‘the commercial race’. In the 1920s and 1930s African merchants tried
to establish limited liability companies and modern banking institutions of theiil
own in an attempt to find ways of competing with the massive expatriate combines, \
which were themselves products of the new and more competitive commercial j
environment of the twentieth century. Perhaps the best examples of the commercial
ambitions of the time were the spectacular ventures mounted by the Gold Coast
businessman, Tete-Ansa, who became known, momentarily, as the ‘Napoleon’ of
West African commerce.^® Between 1925 and 1935 Tete-Ansa founded producers’
co-operatives in Nigeria and the Gold Coast in an attempt to strengthen the bargain¬
ing position of farmers and lower their costs; he formed the Industrial and Com¬
mercial Bank in Nigeria, which was intended to finance African participation in
external trade; and he set up an agency in New York to sell produce and to buy
imports for shipment to West Africa. The scheme was a radical one, but the aims
behind it were moderate enough. Tete-Ansa and his backers were seeking a better
place for Africans (especially educated Africans) within the colonial system, but they
were not asking for total African control of the economy, still less for political inde¬
pendence. Tete-Ansa’s plans were unsuccessful: but the Waterloo of this Napoleon
had its significance. The liquidation of Tete-Ansa’s companies and his own self-
imposed exile in Canada symbolised the failure of his brand of moderate leadership
and reformist proposals. By the late 1930s Africans were beginning to undertake a
more fundamental re-appraisal of their predicament.
As members of the coastal elite, African merchants suffered social humihation as
well as economic defeat. Educated, Christian Africans found themselves treated
with less consideration after the expansion of colonial rule than they had been in the
nineteenth century. Since their aspirations and life-styles were linked more closely
to those of the European commimity than was the case with the majority of African
colonial subjects, they were especially sensitive to social rebuffs stemming from racial
prejudice. They were excluded from a number of commercial organisations and
social clubs, some of which had begun on a multiracial basis. Even cricket, that most
imperial of games, failed to act as an integrative force. As early as 1898 one British
governor on the West Coast ordered two cricket pitches to be laid, ‘one for the
Europeans the other for the natives’.^^ Matches played between the two teams
became tests of the capacity of the races, a practical application of Carlyle’s bizarre
theories, though when the African side hit a winning streak the series was dis¬
continued! The French, lacking cricket, but possessing an alternative and more
explicit instrument in their policy of assimilation, were equally unsuccessful. In
practice very few Africans became ‘Frenchmen’. Fewer still wished to do so after

A. G. Hopkins, ‘Economic Aspects of Political Movements in Nigeria and in the Gold

Coast, 1918-1939’, Journal of African History, 7, 1966, pp. 133-52.
C.O. 147/116, McCallum to Chamberlain, 31 August 1897, Pubhc Record Office.

256
 The open economy under strain

1940, when the attractions of becoming citizens of a defeated nation and a declining
imperial power were scarcely compelling. On the other hand, a number of French¬
men ‘went native’, took African wives, and settled in Africa. This was assimilation
in reverse, and it was severely frowned on because it was regarded as diluting the
physical and moral strength of the ‘superior’ race. Thus the period 1930-1945 saw the
furthgr alienatioii of an elite of articulate and influential AlHcahs, men who had
Jioped-for..a^armership under colonial rulerTxit who discovered that there was no
way of‘playing, the white man’ and wimoing.
Evidence concerning the fortunes of African wage-earners relates mainly to
employees in the so-called modern sector, and even that is incomplete at present.]
.Nevertheless, it seems certain that urban employees suffered a serious fall in theirf
living standards during the period 1930-1945.^^ Some wage-earners were thrown
out of work as expatriate firms and government departments reduced the size oi|
their labour forces. Others experienced a cut in their rates of pay: the average weeklyj
wage of unskilled workers in the Nigerian tin mines, for example, fell from between
6sand 7s a week in 1928 to 3s 6d in 1937. However, most wage-earners remained in
employment, and were affected not by a downward pressure on money wages but
by un upward movement of costs as imported goods, urban rents and some foodstuffs
became more expensive, especially during the Second World War. The money
wages of the majority of urban employees remained stationary for a period of about
fifty years: from the 1890s down to about 1940 the ruling rate for unskilledworkers
in the main urban centres ofBritish West Africa was between 9d and is a day. During
the Second World War this stability was broken, and some wage increases were
granted. However, the increments tended to lag behind the rise in prices, and in any
case were inadequate to compensate for them. Consequently, real incomes fell.
—Africans reacted forcefully to this erosion of their living standards. Urban protests,
ranging from organised strikes to spontaneous demonstrations and riots, became
increasingly frequent. Public employees, especially railway workers, were the pace¬
setters in forming unions and promoting militant action. The history of strike action
in West Afnca goes back to the nineteenth century, but widespread labour protests
in the region as a whole date from the First World War. Thereafter strikes became
a fairly common way of expressing grievances, and reached a peak (in terms of
frequency and lost working days) during the Second World War. The following
are among the most prominent examples of urban protests between 1918 and 1945,
though only a few of these have been studied in detail. In French West Africa there
was a strike of dock workers at Conakry in 1919; serious riots in Porto Novo in
1923 a strike of railway workers on the Dakar-Niger line in 1925; disturbances
at Lome in 1933; another railway workers’ strike (at Thies) in 1938, resulting in
military intervention, six deaths and a further thirty men wounded; and a series of

^2 Elliot J. Berg, ‘Real Income Trends in West Africa, 1939-1960’, in Economic Transition
in Africa, ed. Melville J. Herskovits and Mitchell Harwitz, 1964, pp. 199-238.
John A. Ballard, ‘The Porto Novo Incidents of 1923: PoUtics in the Colonial Era’, Odu,

2, 1965. PP- 52-75-

257
An Economic History of West Africa

protests against the use and abuse of compulsory labour in Senegal and the Ivory
Coast during the Second World War. In British West Africa there were serious
strikes and demonstrations in all four colonies. In the Gambia there were strikes in
1921 and 1929.^^ In Sierra Leoiie the railway workers came out in 1919. 1920 and
1926; the miners struck in 193 5 and 193 7; a wide range of employees in the public and
private sectors stopped work in 1938-1939; and a peak of thirteen serious stoppages
was recorded in 1942.^® The Gold Coast experienced a strike of public employees in
1919 and 1921; strikes in the gold mines in 1924 and 1930; a series of stoppages
among railway workers, miners and Public Works Department employees in the
late 1930S, of which the most important was the railwaymen’s strike of 1939; and
ten major strikes in 1942. Nigeria had a strike of railway workers in 1920; disturb¬
ances in Benin in 1937-1939 mass protests by the railway workers, led by Michael
Imoudu, in 1941-1942; and a successful general strike in 1945, which involved
seventeen unions representing about 30,000 employees, and lasted for thirty-seven
days.
' It is appropriate at this point to consider expatriate economic policy during the
period 1930-1945. This subject will be related to the argument advanced in the
present chapter in the following ways: in the first place, it will be contended that the
nature of the problems demanding attention and the limitations on the range of
possible solutions were determined by the adverse economic circumstances of the
period rather than by any grand, independent conception of the imperial mission
in the tropics; secondly, it will be shown that the policies adopted by private enter¬
prise and by the public authorities not only failed to make any impression on the
economic problems facing West Africa, but also heightened the tension existing
between colonial subjects and their rulers.
The main aim of the expatriate firms during this period was self-preservation.
Mining and trading companies in Africa did not achieve immunity from the world
slump or from the conflict of 1939-1945 merely because they happened to be
foreign. The white man’s business magic (double-entry book-keeping and the
limited liability company) proved insufficient to ward off the effects of these two
great crises, and many firms went into liquidation. Mars calculated that 197 expatri¬
ate commercial companies existed in Nigeria at one time or another between 1921
and 1936, but that only fourteen of these enjoyed an unbroken existence as indepen¬
dent firms.^'^ The majority of the remainder either went out of business or were
taken over by more substantial rivals, thus completing a process of amalgamation

** Christopher Allen, ‘African Trade Unionism in Microcosm: the Gambia Labour Move¬
ment, 1939-67’, in African Perspectives, ed. C. H. Allen and R. S. Johnson, Cambridge 1970,
pp. 393-426.
H. E. Conway, ‘Labour Protest Activity in Sierra Leone During the Early Part of the
Twentieth Century’, Labour History, 15, 1968, pp. 49-63.
Philip A. Igbafe, ‘The Benin Water Rate Agitation, 1937-39: an Example of Social
Conflict’, jFoMuifll of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 4, 1968, pp. 355-75.
J. Mars, ‘Extra-Territorial Enterprises’, in Mining, Commerce and Finance in Nigeria, ed.
Margery Perham, 1948, p. 52.

258
 The open economy under strain

begvin in similar circumstances at the close of the nineteenth century. The most
spectacular failure occurred in 1931, with the collapse of Lord Kylsant’s shipping
empire, which included the main British steamship companies serving West Africa.^®
Almost as serious were the insolvencies of the Banque Commerciale Africaine and
the Banque Fran9aise de I’Afrique in the same year. The former concern was
rescued by the Banque de I’Afrique Occidental, but the latter went into liquidation.
Clearly, it was not only African banks and mercantile firms that ran into difficulties
at this time.
The surviving firms adopted two main defensive tactics. To begin with, they
decided to close many of their retail outlets and up-country branches in order to
economise on overheads. In 1929, for example, the newly-formed United Africa
Company possessed about 80 out-stations in the Kano area alone; by the close of the
1930S the number had been reduced to twenty-five. A similar policy of retrenchment
was pursued by Peyrissac in Senegal and by the Societe Commerciale de 1’Quest
Africain throughout French West Africa. Next, the large firms divided the import
and export trade on an agreed basis with the aim of restraining competition and
limiting risks. During the First World War a few substantial, mainly British, com¬
panies formed the Association of West African Merchants (AWAM), which was
designed to represent their interests in official quarters and to co-ordinate policy
in the private sector. The import trade was divided among the leading companies
by the Staple Lines Agreement (1934), and by a more comprehensive Merchandise
Agreement which replaced it in 1937 and survived until shortly after the end of the
Second World War. Market-sharing arrangements were made in the produce trade,
too, through the formation of ‘pools’, in which member firms aggregated their
individual purchases and then divided them according to previously agreed propor¬
tions. Some mining interests operated much the same system on an international
scale: Nigerian tin output, for instance, was controlled by the terms of the Inter¬
national Tin Agreement between 1931 and 1946. Measures to restrain competition
reached their high point during the Second World War, when the large expatriate
firms became the main agents of the official Marketing Boards, and also received
{preferential treatment in the issue of import licences.
f The policy of ‘safety first’ enabled most of the leading expatriate firms to keep
/ afloat. However, survival was bought at a price. In pursuing what they regarded as
I their legitimate business interests the expatriate companies helped to foster African
[_discontent. By failing to diversify, and by reducing their existing commitments, the
j main agents of capitalist enterprise in the colonies acknowledged their inability to
lanitiate a move from slump to boom conditions. Disinvestment, though understand¬
able, simply depressed the economy further, and was regarded by Africans as an
indictment of foreign private enterprise in the empire. Moreover, the widespread
and hostile publicity which appeared whenever ‘secret’ trade agreements were
concluded ensured that African dissatisfaction was directed firmly towards the

P. N. Davies, ‘The African Steam Ship Company’, in Liverpool and Merseyside, ed. J. R.
Harris, 1969, pp. 231-4.

259
An Economic History of West Africa

expatriate firms concerned. The standing of the authorities also suffered: it was hard
to see how the doctrine of trusteeship was being apphed impartially when govern¬
ments gave protection to those most fitted to stand on their own feet, wliile allowing
African businessmen, such as Tete-Ansa, to remain exposed to the full rigour of
market forces.
A study of government policy between 1900 and 1945 reveals that the colonial
authorities, far from imposing themselves on events, as the Annual Reports contrived
to suggest, were engaged in the less majestic task of coping with developments which
they had not initiated, which they understood imperfectly, and which threatened to
undermine their position in Africa. The colonial powers made some attempt to
influence the performance of the open economy, but on the whole their efforts were
unsuccessful. The official record during this period can be considered under four
headings: capital investment and economic planning; agriculture; manufacturing;
and overseas trade.
The depressed state of trade affected the colonial governments directly because of
the close connection between public revenue and customs receipts. In French West
Africa the Federation’s income from customs duties dropped by 47 per cent between
1930 and 1931. Elsewhere the fall, though not so dramatic, was still serious. The case
of Sierra Leone, where customs receipts declined by about a third between 1928 and
1934, was typical of the British colonies.^® At the same time, fixed outgoings (chiefly
salaries, pensions and repayments on loans) were very much greater than they had
been earlier in the century. Consequently, the colonies entered a phase of budgetary
crisis. The authorities reacted to this unwelcome situation in three ways. First, they
increased customs duties in a bid to maintain total revenue at its customary level.
This tactic was imsuccessful, and its main result was to increase the prices Africans
paid for imported goods. Second, they pursued a policy of retrenchment, the
orthodox response of the time, and one which was also adopted in Europe. Retrench¬
ment involved drastic reductions in expenditure on public works together with
staffing economies, such as early retirement in the case of European oflicials and loss
of work in the case of unskilled African labourers. Expenditure on new public works
in both French and British colonies did not regain the levels of the 1920s imtil the
close of the 1930s, by which time military considerations were begiiming to influence
the direction as well as the size of additional investment. Third, public money in the
form of grants and loans was made available by the metropolitan governments to
help the colonies through their financial difficulties. This pohcy marked a further
departure, albeit an enforced one, from the prevailing doctrine of colonial self-
sufficiency; it implied acceptance of a more active government role in the economy;
and, more specifically, it represented an advance from the endeavours of Chamber-
lain, Guggisberg and Sarraut in the direction of economic planning. Yet these were
tentative beginnings. There was no sharp break with the past; loans remained more

One of the few detailed studies of pubHc finance during this period is to be found in
N. A. Cox-George, Finance and Development in West Africa: the Sierra Leone Experience, 1961,
ch. 13.

260
 The open economy under strain

important than grants; the sums advanced were relatively modest; and the results
were far from dramatic, as the examples which follow show.
In France the Great Colonial Loan was authorised in 1931, and its expenditure tied
initially to the Maginot Plan, which was promulgated in the same year. The great¬
ness of this loan owed more to the interest rates charged than to the generosity of the
sums advanced, for by 1939 only about ^7 million (less than half the amount
authorised) had been spent in French West Africa. This sum, which was roughly the
same as was expended in pubHc works from the Federation’s own resources in the
1920s, was invested mainly in transport improvements and in the ill-fated Niger
agricultural scheme. The Maginot Plan itself was as ineffective in developing the
empire as was that unfortxmate minister’s more notorious Line in repelling German
troops in 1940. A further economic plan for the colonies, drawn up by the Popular
Front government in 1936, was buried as speedily as was its sponsor. Britain’s
approach to the financial problems of the colonies was symbolised by the Colonial
Development Act of 1929. The Act was designed as much to reduce unemployment
in the United Kingdom (by stimulating exports) as to help the colonies.^® About
^6,500,000 was advanced under the terms of the Act down to 1939. A substantial
proportion of this total was in the form of grants to assist insolvent colonies balance
their budgets; the remainder took the form of loans, on which interest was payable.
A great deal of the expenditure went on projects such as the provision of mining
equipment, which mainly benefited industrialists in the United Kingdom, at least
in the initial stages. British West Africa’s share of funds amounted to only ^500,000,
and the largest single sum (about ^250,000) went to support the activities of the
Sierra Leone Development Company (DELCO), an expatriate firm formed in 1930
to exploit the iron ore resources of the colony. The investment proved successful,
and from the 1930s Sierra Leone’s economy of ‘legitimate’ commerce, inherited
from the nineteenth century, at last began to change. The shortcomings of the 1929
Act were recognised in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, which
aimed at giving the colonies more comprehensive and more generous assistance.
However, this Act achieved few practical results because war-time needs caused a
diversion of funds and led to a shortage of skilled administrators.
The limited influence of the colonial governments is further illustrated by their
endeavours in the huge agricultural sector. This is not to deny that a measure of
success was attained by a number of dedicated officials, men who really did ‘serve’
in the empire. One of the most notable achievements was the elimination of rinder¬
pest, which spread into Africa in the rSpos, and decimated herds in many parts of the
continent before being brought under control in the 1920s and 1930s. On the whole,
however, the efforts of officials were seriously hampered by shortage of money, lack
of knowledge of tropical agriculture, and by the long-term nature of research in this
field, which meant that many of the experiments undertaken in the 1930s did not

George C. Abbott, ‘A Re-examination of the 1929 Colonial Development Act’, Economic

History Reuiew, 24, 1971, pp. 68-81.

261
An Economic History of West Africa

begin to yield results until after the Second World War.®^ At a time when Africans
were looking for cost-reducing innovations and alternative exports, government
policy was memorable chiefly for its failures, some of which were spectacular.
Between 1930 and 1934 the French established Societes Indigenes de Prevoyance
(S.I.P.) throughout their West African colonies. These organisations, which origi¬
nated in Senegal in 1909, were supposed to improve agricultural methods, organise
the storage of food crops and provide credit for fa'rmers. In practice the S.I.P.
became officially-sponsored tax gathering agencies, and were also used as a means of
political control. Compulsory co-operatives were a contradiction, and it is not
surprising that they won little local support.®^ The next failure was the attempt to
create, in Governor Garde’s phrase, ‘an island of prosperity’ in the interior of French
West Africa. The original plan, put forward in 1919 and backed by French textile
manufacturers, was to use the Niger to irrigate land for the production of cotton in
Soudan. Preliminary work started in 1924, and in 1931 the scheme was incorporated
in the Maginot Plan, which made provision for the cultivation of rice as well as of
cotton. The Office du Niger was created in the following year to carry out the pro¬
ject. The officials of this new institution certainly did not lack imagination. Their aim
was to irrigate nearly 2 million acres and to settle i J million African colonists in the
area. Unfortunately, the technical expertise of the administrators did not match
their breadth of vision. By 1937 the Niger scheme had cost over fi million; by 1940
there were about 12,000 settlers on three sites which were more like refugee camps
than model villages; and by 195 3 only about 62,000 acres had been irrigated. In 1929
the British administration also began to introduce co-operatives. These were planned
on a more modest scale than in French West Africa, but the results were equally
disappointing.®® The failure to invest sufficient money in agricultural research was
exposed in a dramatic way by the outbreak of a disease known as swollen shoot,
which began to attack cocoa trees on the Gold Coast in the late 1930s. The only
remedy that could be devised was the drastic one of cutting down infected trees.
This solution, however necessary, was scarcely calculated to improve relations
between farmers and officials, especially at a time when the export trade was seriously
depressed.
The subject of industrialisation is introduced at this point solely with reference
to the present argument, and will be accorded more general treatment in the next
section of tliis chapter.®^ The history of modern manufacturing in West Africa dates

W. K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, igiS-igjg, II, part 2, 1942,

pp. 326-69; R. H. Green and S. H. Hymer, ‘Cocoa in the Gold Coast: A Study in the Relations
Between African Fanners and Agricultural Experts’, Journal of Economic History, 26, 1966,
pp. 299-319; A. Pitot, ‘L’homme et les sols dans les steppes et savannes de I’A.O.F.’, Cahiers
d’Outre-Mer, 5, 1952, pp. 215-40.
J. Suret-Canale, Afrique noire occidentale et centrale: L'he coloniale 1900-1945, Paris 1964,
pp. 299-310.
J. C. de Graft-Johnson, African Experiment: Co-operative Agriculture and Banking in British
West Africa, 1958, chs 4-7.
It is hoped that the comments in this and the following paragraph will stimulate further
research into the early phase of industrialisation in West Africa.

262
 The open economy under strain

from the First World War, though down to 1945 progress was very slow and was
confined to a few centres and to a narrow range of products. Constraints on indus¬
trial development were not determined simply by colonial policy, as is sometimes
suggested. Nevertheless, the conservatism of the expatriate firms, combined with
the indifference of the colonial authorities, meant that opportunities which did exist
were not exploited fully. It seems fair to suggest that before 1945 industrial enter¬
prise in West Africa sprang neither from official plans to develop the colonies, nor
from market growth in the region itself, but from a need to support the Allied cause
during two World Wars.
During these periods of emergency the colonial powers were concerned to secure
tropical raw materials while at the same time economising on scarce sliipping space.
Hence the main form of industrial activity, and one which usually involved govern¬
ment participation or encouragement, was export processing. Perhaps the best
example is the groundnut crushing industry of Senegal.^® This industry began during
the First World War, but afterwards experienced some difficulty in making pro¬
gress, and in the 1920s most of its output was consumed locally. However, in 1933
vegetable oils from the French colonies were given preference in the metropolitan
market, and in 1936 groundnut oil began to be shipped from Senegal. Small though
the industry was, it ran into opposition from processing firms in Marseilles, and a
limit was placed on the volume of refined oil shipped to France from West Africa.
With the outbreak of the Second World War the needs of France became more
pressing than those of Marseilles; additional mills were set up in Soudan, Upper Volta
and Niger in 1941-1942, and exports of groundnut oil increased from less than 6,000
tons a year to a peak of 31,000 tons in 1945. Other export-processing industries which
expanded in West Africa as a result of war-time needs were saw-milling, palm-oil
bulking, cotton ginning, and fish canning. The conditions of siege which prevailed
during the two World Wars also stimulated the development of import-substituting
industries. These were attempts to achieve self-sufficiency in essential items, such as
cement and other building materials, and to maintain the flow of exports by supply¬
ing scarce consumer manufactures, such as household goods, cigarettes and pro¬
cessed foodstuffs, notably sugar. When these local industries proved unable to
compensate for war-time deficiencies, the Allies made use of forced labour in export
production. The establishment of modern industries failed to mitigate the hardship
suffered by indigenous interest groups between 1930 and I945> but it did demon¬
strate that manufacturing plant could operate in tropical Africa. This was a lesson
which African leaders were to use against their mentors after 1945.
Discussions of government intervention in overseas trade between 1930 and 1945
usually concentrate on the Marketing Boards established in British West Africa
during the Second World War. There are grounds for thinking that this bias has led
to the neglect of issues which are relevant not only to an appreciation of the historical

J. Suret-Canale, ‘L’industrie des oleagineux en A.O.F.’, Cahiers d’Outre-Mer, 3, 1950,

pp. 280-8.

263
An Economic History of West Africa

context in which the Boards were conceived and established, but also to an under¬
standing of changes in the role of government in the economy during this period. It
will be suggested here that the Marketing Boards were just one feature of a search for
security which was the prime concern of the two major colonial powers in the years
between the onset of the world slump and the end of the Second World War. It will
be shown that the Boards were part of a package of measures, including tariff
changes, which were designed to influence the performance of the economy after
1930; that plans for Marketing Boards ante-date the Nowell Commission, whose
report in 1938 is customarily regarded as inspiring their foundation; and that the
French experimented with broadly similar arrangements at an earlier date than did
the British, a point which is not mentioned in the standard works on Marketing
Boards in the British territories. French commercial strategy will be considered first
in the hope that the analysis, though necessarily brief, will by its prominence en¬
courage historians and economists to treat the comparative aspects of official policy
more seriously than they have done in the past.
French commitment to free trade had long been half-hearted. As early as 1892 a
limited range of measures aimed at protecting French exporters had been applied to
certain West African colonies, and would probably have been extended had not
Britain succeeded in 1898 in negotiating an agreement which guaranteed equal
treatment for her traders and goods in the Ivory Coast and Dahomey. Disappoint¬
ment with the results of this modified system of free trade, combined with a desire to
ensure that the colonies assisted the reconstruction of France after the First World
War, led to renewed clamour for the introduction of protectionist measures. In 1928
the Federation (with the exception of the Ivory Coast and Dahomey) was brought
under the preferential tariff regime already operated by France with respect to various
other parts of her empire.®® Steps were taken to reinforce this legislation as a result
of the world slump. Durand has estimated that no fewer than fifty measures regulat¬
ing the overseas trade of French West Africa were introduced between 1931 and
1941.®'^ The most important of these were the imposition in 1934 of quotas on foreign
goods imported into parts of the Federation not covered by the Anglo-French con¬
vention of 1898, and the ending of the convention itself in 1936, with the result that
the Ivory Coast and Dahomey were included in the tariff arrangements introduced
in the rest of French West Africa eight years earlier.
The system of imperial preference was supported by two new institutions. As far
as exports from West Africa were concerned, caisses de compensation were formed for
rubber and coffee (1931), bananas (1932) and vegetable products (1933-1934). These
compensation funds were built up by levying a surcharge on foreign imports of
these products at the ports of entry in France, and were then paid out to support
producer prices in the colonies at times when these fell below a certain minimum
level. The aim, price stabilisation, was clearly an anticipation of measures which
were adopted by Britain and France during the Second World War, though at tliis

Poquin, Les relations iconomiques . . . , pp. 145-57.

Durand, Essai sur la conjoncture . . . , p. 52.

264
 The open economy under strain

stage there was no attempt to establish a government monopoly of exports. On the

import side, comith de surveillance were created in 1936 to keep a check on the prices
of goods shipped to the colonies. A price freeze was imposed in 1937 and again in
1939, though it is hard to see how practical effect could have been given to this
intention. Between 1939 and 1941 the metropolitan government took over the
functions of the various funds and boards, and assumed complete control of overseas
trade, though still employing the expatriate firms to act as its agents.
In Britain, as hi France, the First World War helped revive interest in tariff re¬
form, though in the event only slight changes were made to existing customs
regulations. In 1919 duties were imposed on palm kernels and tin leaving West
Africa, and a rebate allowed on imports of these commodities entering the United
Kingdom. The rebate on palm kernels failed to divert trade to Britain and was with¬
drawn in 1922, but the duty on tin remained until 1938. The world slump caused a
more widespread conversion to protectionism, and the Ottawa Conference of 1932
had an important effect on the tariff regime of the West African colonies. Sierra
Leone and the Gambia were brought into the new system of imperial preference
immediately. Nigeria and the Gold Coast could not be assimilated fully because of
treaty obhgations to other powers. Nevertheless, from 1932 the exports of all four
colonies were allowed free entry into the United Biingdom, whereas those from
outside the Empire had to pay duties, and from 1934 quotas were applied to goods
sent to British West Africa from countries such as Japan, which had no formal rights
guaranteeing equal treatment. The days when Britain’s commercial policy was
based on maintaining an open door in all parts of the world had ended.®®
The slump (and the cocoa hold-up of 1930-1931) also led to a number of proposals
in favour of official intervention in the export market. The most prominent of the
schemes put forward in the early 1930s was the Bartholomew Plan of 1931, which
was designed to use government power to influence the world cocoa market and to
stabilise prices on the Gold Coast.®® This plan was rejected by the Gold Coast
government, which argued against official intervention in 1931 on much the same
grounds as Professor Bauer was to use in 1954 in his more comprehensive attack on
the marketing monopohes which the authorities did eventually establish!®® The
persistence of the depression in overseas trade, together with the hold-up of I937>
caused the government to modify its position to the extent of appointing a com¬
mission to investigate the arrangements for marketing cocoa. The Nowell Com¬
mission’s Report, which appeared in 1938, recommended the creation of collective
marketing agencies, but no action had been taken by the time of the outbreak of
war, and in the event it was the emergency caused by hostilities which led to official
control of overseas trade. The Ministry of Food took over the purchase of the cocoa
crop in 1939; the West African Cocoa Control Board was set up in 1940; and the

The open economies of British ^^est Africa still remained open, of course, with respect
to Britain.
West Africa, 19 September 1931, pp. 1146-7-
West Africa, 17 October 1931, p. 1262, and a further comment by Bartholomew in ibid,
25 February 1933. P- I77-

265
An Economic History of West Africa

West African Produce Control Board, which handled all the main export crops, was
established in 1942. Under the new arrangements, private firms still purchased
exports in Africa, but they sold to one buyer, the official Board, which also fixed the
prices to be paid.
Official intervention in overseas trade failed to solve West Africa’s problems, and
was of little ‘help to France and Britain either. In the case of the French colonies,
imperial preference strengthened bilateral trading links and gave both parties a
measure of certainty with respect to markets for their products. Flowever, French
West Africa had to pay for this security'by becoming integrated in a high-cost,
high-price trading system, which, among other disadvantages, meant that the colo¬
nies had to buy relatively expensive French consumer goods. Imperial preference
was worth even less to British West Africa. Britain’s attempt to ‘shelter tropical
exports was unsuccessful, first because she consumed only a small proportion of the
empire’s total output of the main staples, and second because the new tariff system
did nothing to diminish competition among producers within the Empire. At the
same time, the colonies failed to derive any advantages from the privileges accorded
to imports from Britain. The imposition of quotas, for example, prevented Africans
from buying cheaper Japanese textiles and footwear. African producers also failed
to benefit from the various Funds and Boards which were set up to stabilise prices
and incomes. Indeed, the low buying prices fixed by the Marketing Boards in British
West Africa amounted, in effect, to a forced loan in aid of the war effort. The main
beneficiaries of the statutory monopolies were the large expatriate firms. Official
patronage confirmed and extended the private ‘pooling’ arrangements which they
had operated previously. These firms not only supported state intervention; they
even helped to plan it.®^
The stress experienced by the open economy between 1930 and 1945 had a pro¬
found influence on the course of West African history. The favourable terms of
trade, the swelling public revenues and the optimism of the early twentieth century
had first made possible, and then sustained, a policy of co-operation between colonial
rulers and key interest groups among their African subjects. The unfavourable terms
of trade, the declining revenues and the pessimism of the period 1930-1945 were
reflected in the discontent expressed by African farmers, traders and wage-earners,
and led to mounting criticism of the colonial regime.
Expatriate reactions failed either to improve the performance of the open economy
or to dissolve African hostility. Officials and firms retrenched and waited for a boom
that did not come until the end of the Second World War. After 1930 there was some
pretence, but little reality, about developing the estates of the Empire. Many of the
poorer parts of West Africa, though they still found a place in the speeches of
politicians and on the maps of Empire, were in effect abandoned by the colonial
rulers. To the extent that the colonial governments and commercial firms did take
effective action, it was in support of expatriate rather than African interests. It was

P. T. Bauer, ‘Origins of the Statutory Export Monopolies of British West Africa’,

Business History Review, 28, 1954, pp. 204-7.

266
 The open economy under strain

possible to discern the beginnings of a change in government attitudes early in the

193os, and more explicit recognition of the need for reform was made during the
Second World War, but there was no New Deal for the colonies before 1945. This
was a time when the white man’s burden consisted of the politicians of Europe
rather than the subject peoples of Africa.
The depressed state of trade and the bankruptcy of colonial policy had a funda¬
mental influence on the nature and organisation of African opposition to foreign
rule. By the close of the 1930s the gradualist approach of moderate Africans, such as
Macaulay, Diagne and Tete-Ansa, had been discredited, and new, more radical
leaders, such as Azikiwe, Danquah, Wallace-Johnson and Lamine Gueye, had
begun to emerge. Instead of calling for a reinterpretation of the dual mandate within
the imperial context, some of these men, in their different ways, pressed for political
independence and for a re-structuring of the colonial economy. ‘It is not enough,’
proclaimed Danquah, ‘to Hve in the old agricultural economy. We must manu¬
facture and buy our own goods. We must industrialise our country.’®^ Whereas the
following of the moderate leadership had been confined to the elite of a few large
urban centres, the new leaders began to mobilise mass support by incorporating
farmers, traders and wage-earners into modem political organisations. Thus the
period 1930-1945 is to be treated as an integral part of an explanation of the rise of
nationalism in West Africa, and not merely as a ‘background’ to the more publicised
events of the years which followed the end of the Second World War.

4 Strains on the open economy, 1945-60

The period from 1945 to i960 was one of economic expansion and returning
prosperity. The barter terms of trade recovered from the depths plumbed during the
Second World War and remained highly favourable to primary exporters until the
close of the 1950s. Furthermore, between 1945 and 1955 the volume of exports
quadrupled, and there was a six-fold increase in West Africa’s total importing
capacity. The boom in the export sector was transmitted to the domestic economy:
as receipts from overseas sales rose, Africans not only bought more consumer im¬
ports, they also spent more money on local goods and services. Indeed, there is some
evidence, admittedly sketchy, to show that the domestic market may have grown
even faster than the export sector in the post-war era.®®
Important modifications were made to the open economies of West Africa in the
years between 1945 and i960. Undoubtedly the most fundamental change was the
discarding of the doctrine of colonial self-sufficiency. Substantial infusions of metro¬
politan capital made it possible to remove, for the first time, the constraint by which

j_ g Danquah, Self-Help and Expansion, Accra I943) p- rS-

/ E. K. Hawkins, ‘The Growth of a Money Economy in Nigeria and Ghana’, Oxford
Economic Papers, 10, 1958, p. 353.
An Economic History of West Africa

the level of demand in West Africa had been determined almost entirely by the size
of export proceeds. Other developments associated with this innovation were an
expansion in the economic role of government, seen chiefly in the growth of the
public sector and in the beginnings of development planning; a move towards
structural economic change, following the introduction of modem manufacturing
activities; and increased Africanisation in public and private sectors, a process which
culminated in the achievement of political independence.
These modifications, it is suggested, were the result of four interacting causes.
First, the improved performance of the open economy helped to foster structural
change, and also influenced the cHmate of Afro-European relations. Second, inter¬
national pressures arising out of the new power relationships which had grown up as
a result of the Second World War altered the attitudes of both Africans and Euro¬
peans towards colonial rule. Third, African agitation for economic and political
reforms, though generated before 1945, increased greatly after the war. Fourth,
modifications were brought about partly through the self-interest of the colonial
powers. Ideally, these four themes should be treated simultaneously in order to
emphasise the interaction among them; unfortimately, the medium of the printed
word does not allow this freedom. The compromise adopted here is to deal in turn
with the history of African pressures and European policy, and to relate the remaining
themes (the performance of the open economy and the changing climate of inter¬
national relations) to them.
Although economic expansion began in 1945, prosperity did not return to West
Africa immediately the war ended. The barter and income terms of trade started to
recover, but it was not imtil the close of the 1940s that the losses suffered during the
war years were made good, and it was only in the 1950s that living standards rose
clearly above the levels of the 1930s. There were two main reasons for this delay: on
the import side consumer goods were in short supply during the immediate post¬
war years, and so were expensive—in Europe as well as in Africa; and on the export
side part of the earnings of producers continued to be withheld by official marketing
agencies, which fixed prices at levels lower than those ruling in world markets.
Farmers and traders were not worse off than they had been during the war, but their
living standards did not improve as fast as they had expected. The same was true of
employees in the public sector, whose wage rates, though beginning to move up¬
wards, still lagged behind increases in the cost of living. In understanding African
reactions to this situation it is important to appreciate that what mattered was not so
much the relationship between the standard of living and an objectively-defined
poverty line, as the failure of slowly rising living standards to catch up with rapidly
rising expectations. In attempting to retain the loyalty of their subjects during the
war years, the colonial powers had not only used the stick of compulsory labour,
but had dangled some carrots as well. Statements on colonial policy held out the
promise of a ‘New Deal’ once the struggle to safeguard democracy and freedom had
been won. Around the comer were better times and homes fit, as it were, for
African heroes to live in. When, inevitably, reforms took longer to implement than
had been anticipated, African disappointment was the more acute.

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 The open economy under strain

The outcome of this set of circumstances was predictable: some of the most
widely-supported demonstrations of discontent in the whole colonial period
occurred between 1945 and 1950, and governments in Africa were subjected to
greater pressures than they had ever experienced. African discontent continued to
find expression in ways which had become familiar during the period 1930-1945.
The best known examples of these protests are the Nigerian national strike of 1945
(noted in the previous section of this chapter), the strike on the Dakar railway in
1947-1948,®^ the riots on the Gold Coast in 1948, involving a boycott of European
firms and mass demonstrations by African ex-servicemen,®® and the highly publicised
shooting incident at the Enugu coal mines in 1949, in which twenty-one miners lost
their hves.®® One, admittedly imperfect, index of militancy among wage-earners
is provided by the record of man-days lost through strike action. A recent study of
Nigerian labour history during the period 1940-1960 has shown that the greatest
number of withdrawals occurred between 1945 and I950» when over 100,000
man-days were lost every year.®"^
African protest movements acquired one additional, highly distinctive feature in
the post-war era: they assumed a more organised and a more overt political form.
This development began, as has been shown, in the 1930s, but during the Second
World War political expression in the colonies was restricted for security reasons.
After 1945, however, continuing discontent in Africa supplied the incentive to
mobilise and co-ordinate sectional interests, and to provide them with a political
forum. The years between 1945 and 1950 saw an upsurge of militant, anti-colonial
activities in the West African territories—in the Press, in mass demonstrations and in
confrontations between African leaders and colonial officials. At the same time, it
was becoimng hard for the victors of a war fought to preserve free speech to justify
restraining political expression among their colonial subjects. The creation of the
United Nations in 1945 provided an international platform for the declamation of
anti-colonial sentiments, while at the national level the rise to power of the Labour
Party in Britain and the prominence of the Communist Party in France brought
about a more sympathetic attitude towards colonial grievances. Consequently,
colonial officials were inhibited from adopting extreme punitive measures. In West
Africa political leaders were ‘agitators’; they were never forced to become
‘terrorists’. t • 1
It is not the purpose of this book to provide a detailed account of the political
parties which arose after the Second W^orld W^ar.®® Nevertheless, some of the more

A semi-fictional, and most readable, account of this strike has been given by Sembene
Ousmane, Les bouts de hois de Dieu, Paris i960. u r-’
Colonial Office, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast,

Agwu Akpala, ‘The Backgroimd of the Enugu ColHery Shooting Incident in 1949,
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 3, 1965, PP-335-64- • r
Robin Cohen, The Role of Organised Labour in the Nigerian Political Process, Umversity of
Birmingham Ph.D. thesis, 1971, p. 248. ^ , r r u
68 See Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties, Harmondsworth 1961. Only a few of the
many studies of West African pohtics can be mentioned here. Three valuable books which

269
An Economic History oj West Africa

prominent organisations need to be mentioned in order to illustrate the evolution of

political parties in West Africa, and to support the contention that specialised
interest groups of farmers, traders and wage-earners were an important source of
their strength. At the same time, it should be recognised that the leading parties also
drew support from other quarters, particularly from the professions and from ethmc
associations in which occupational role was a secondary consideration, and that there
were some parties which did not represent the interests specified here, and which
evolved partly to counterbalance them. A good example of this type of conservative
party is provided by the Northern People’s Congress, which was formed in 1949
partly to champion the cause of the traditional elite of northern Nigeria.
In French West Africa the most influential of the parties claiming to represent the
region as a whole was the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (R.D.A.), which
was founded in 1946. The R.D.A. had close links with the Commumst Party in
France, and was supported in Africa by trade unions, export-crop producers and
traders. The Dioula, who were specialists in long-distance trade, played a consider¬
able part in building up the R.D.A., which they saw as a means of safeguarding their
cosmopolitan commercial interests. The R.D.A. also had a number of sections based
on the constituent territories of French West Africa. Two of the most important of
these sections were the Parti Democratique de la Cote d’Ivoire (P.D.C.I.) and the
Parti Democratique de Guinee (P.D.G.). The P.D.C.I. was founded in 1945 by Felix
Houphouet-Boigny, a wealthy planter, and drew much of its support from local
coffee and cocoa farmers. The P.D.G. was established in 1947, but did not achieve
prominence until the 1950s, with the emergence of a wage labour force and a strong
union organisation following the discovery of mineral resources in the territory.
The Bloc Democratique Senegalais (B.D.S.) was linked to another inter-territorial
grouping, the Independants d’Outre-Mer. The B.D.S. was founded in 1948 by
Leopold Senghor and derived most of its strength from the groundnut farmers in the
provinces, though it also established connections with wage-earners in the industrial
complex around Dakar.
In British West Africa political development after the war took place mainly on a
territorial basis. The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.),
launched by Nnamdi Azikiwe in 1944, was based initially on urban immigrants and
trade unions, but later became identified with Ibo economic interests. In 1951 there

deal with the region as a whole are Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, 1956, Ken
Post, The New States of West Africa, Harmondsworth 1964, and Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating
Political Order, Chicago 1966. Important studies of specific territorial units are Demiis Austin,
Politics in Ghana, 1946-60, Oxford 1964; James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism,
Berkeley and Los Angeles 1958; Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, Princeton 1963;
Martin L. Kilson, ‘Nationalism and Social Classes in British West Africa’, Journal of Politics,
20, 1958, pp. 368-87; and the same author’s Political Change in a West African State: a Study of
the Modernization Process in Sierra Leone, Cambridge, Mass., 1966; John R. Cartwright, Politics
in Sierra Leone, 1947-1967, Toronto 1970; Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, Political Parties in
French-Speaking West Africa, Oxford 1964; and Aristide R. Zolberg, One-Party Government
in the Ivory Coast, Princeton 1964.

270
 The open economy under strain

arose another party, the Action Group, which stood for the cocoa farmers and
wealthy traders of the country’s Western Region. On the Gold Coast the first im¬
portant party was the United Gold Coast Convention (U.G.C.C.), which was
founded by J. B. Danquah and others in 1947. Two years later the U.G.C.C. was
joined, and soon eclipsed, by the Convention People’s Party (C.P.P.), led by
Kwame Nkrumah. Both parties drew on support from cocoa farmers, traders and
trade unions, but the C.P.P. was especially successful in appealing to the younger and
poorer rural and urban migrants. The Sierra Leone People’s Party (S.L.P.P.),
formed in 1951, derived much of its initial inspiration and funds from provincial
Mende commercial interests.
It is hard to discern any detailed, constructive economic proposals in the pro¬
grammes of these political organisations, though economic grievances, and general¬
ised solutions to them, clearly occupied a prominent place.®® The main emphasis,
understandably enough, was on attacking colonialism, and there was a tendency to
assume that the end of colonial rule would itself be sufficient to solve basic economic
problems. Once African leaders controlled the ‘commanding heights’ of the
economy, sizeable gains, so it was said, would accrue to their supporters. A re¬
organisation of the Marketing Boards, combined with controls on the exporting
firms, would give farmers a better price for their produce; restrictions on the activi¬
ties of the expatriate commercial firms would provide more opportunities for
African traders; and industrialisation would lead to improved living standards for
wage-earners, and would also benefit the economy as a whole. Indeed, there was a
tendency to regard industrialisation as a cure-all: Durand has commented on the
mystique which surrounded the concept in the French territories,'^® and the same
phenomenon was found in British West Africa. The Commission of Enquiry
appointed to investigate the riots on the Gold Coast in 1948 reported that ‘at every
turn we were pressed with the cry of industrialisation. We doubt very much if the
authors of this cry really understood more than their vague desire for something that
promised wealth and higher standards of life.”^^ It was a sign of the times that the
Commission (which itself knew little about industrialisation) went on to recommend
the introduction of certain types of secondary industry.
The character of African opposition to colonialism underwent a change after
1950, as the bitterness and militancy which had characterised the immediate post¬
war years were replaced by a more conciliatory and co-operative mood. There
were two main reasons for this change. In the first place. West Africans were begin¬
ning to receive some of the benefits of economic expansion, and secondly the colonial
powers had started to make substantial concessions to African demands by promoting
a greater degree of self-government, and (as will be shown later) by introducing a
number of economic reforms. Two events symbolised this transition: in 1950

There is an interesting study to be made of the origins and evolution of African economic
thought between 1930 and i960.
Durand, Essai sur la conjoncture . . . , p. 144.
Colonial Office, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in the Gold Coast,
1948, p. 54.

271
An Economic History of West Africa

Houphouet-Boigny agreed to sever his links with the French Communist Party in
return for the introduction of a more progressive regime on the Ivory Coast; and in
1951 Nkrumah was released from prison and appointed Leader of Government
Business on the Gold Coast. In political terms the 1950s are best regarded as a period
of dyarchy, ip. which power was increasingly shared between the colonial rulers and
the wealthier, more articulate and more influential of their subjects. Neither pros¬
perity nor access to political power served to retard the movement towards indepen¬
dence. On the contrary, once Africans perceived that their aspirations were attain¬
able, progress was made at an even faster pace. As de Tocqueville remarked about an
earlier revolutionary process, ‘evils which are patiently endured when they seem
inevitable become intolerable when once the idea of escape from thern is suggested.
The new spirit of co-operation is illustrated by the improvement in the fortunes of
the three groups of specialists which supported the principal political parties. The
marked recovery in the barter terms of trade in the 1950s presented producers with
incentives and opportunities which had not arisen since the end of the First World
War, and then only briefly. Farmers found it profitable to increase the volume of
foodstuffs to meet the growing needs of the domestic market, and to expand export
production, which reached record levels in the 1950s, in spite of the fact that in the
British territories the Marketing Boards still retained a large slice of export proceeds.
The growth of agricultural output was achieved mainly by traditional means,
that is by applying underused labour to underused land. This further development
on the extensive margin was made possible by the expansion of motor transport and
by the increased use of bicycles, which helped farmers commute between plots.
However, there were also signs, which were important for the future of West
African agriculture, of a rise in productivity (an increase in output per man and per
acre) through the application of chemical fertilisers, higher yielding seeds and pest
controls. These innovations affected both established export staples and products
destined for domestic consumption. In the case of exports, the addition of potassium
fertilisers increased the yield from oil palms, pesticides eliminated some of the
diseases afflicting the cocoa tree, and new varieties of groundnut helped conserve
nutrients in the soil. With regard to the domestic economy, improved types of grass
provided better pasture, livestock selection and breeding schemes raised the quality
of cattle, and plans to expand the output of swamp rice, vegetables, poultry and
dairy produce were implemented.’^
The motives underlying agricultural improvements were of two kinds. Origin¬
ally, the colonial rulers wanted to ensure that West Africa was self-sufficient during
the war years, and could also produce the quantity of exports needed to aid the war
effort and to speed Europe’s recovery after 1945. Then, from the 1950s, concern was
expressed about the future of West African agriculture, which, it was feared, would
run into the problem of diminishing returns if, in the absence of scientific and
managerial improvements, labour continued to be applied in increasing quantities to

Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, New York 1856, p. 214.
For further details see W. B. Morgan and J. C. Pugh, West Africa, 1969, ch. 10.

272
 The open economy under strain

a fixed amount of land. Fortunately, West Africa still has time to avert this danger.
Although population is growing rapidly, farming land is still available in most parts
of the region.
Indigenous businessmen were equally quick to take advantage of the openings
presented in the 1950s by the growth and diversification of the economy, and by
the sliift in pohtical power—which put public funds into African hands. Besides
expanding domestic commerce in ways outlined earlier in this chapter, Africans also
increased their share of the direct import and export trade, which had long been
dominated by expatriate firms. Their success was especially marked in the wealthier
colonies, where the exchange economy was expanding rapidly. In Nigeria, for
example, the African share of the import trade rose from five per cent in 1949 to
twenty per cent in 1963. Furtherniore, as will be shown shortly, aspiring business¬
men gained substantially from the policy of Africanisation introduced by the large
expatriate firms during the 1950s. More significantly, Africans were among the first
to perceive and exploit entirely new opportunities: the growth of towns meant the
development of a construction industry rising urban incomes led to a demand for
better quality foodstuffs; increasing literacy created a market for books and Western
entertainment; and the spread of motor vehicles brought about a need for ancillary
services, such as garages. Some of the most prominent Nigerian entrepreneurs of the
post-war era have made their fortunes by providing for these needs: Ayo Otaru as
the manufacturer of‘Lion’ bread in Ibadan; Chief T. A. Odutola as a suppher of
tyres and spare parts for motor vehicles; Sir Mobolaji Bank-Anthony in construc¬
tion, road haulage, cinemas and bookshops; and Alhaji S. L. Edu as a government
food contractor. Many other, less well known, figures have engaged in similar
activities on a smaller scale.'^® One of the most important consequences of the
diversification of the open economy is that Africans have begun to acquire the tech¬
nical skills which they have lacked in the past.
Wage-earners benefited from the recovery which took place during the 1950s in
two ways. First, the expansion of the economy in general, and the growth of the
public sector in particular, brought new opportunities for wage employment.
Second, the decade saw a rise in real wages, though the exact extent of the gains
varied, being rather greater in the French territories than in British West Africa.'^®
The improvement should not be exaggerated. The rise in real wages was from a low
level, and it was not continuous, there being a check, for example, at the close of the
195OS. The broad, upward trend, while it did not retard the growth of trade unions

Practically every book on West Africa provides some information about the growth of
towns in the twentieth century; as yet little attention has been paid to the interesting question
of how they were built.
See, for example, the local study by R. A. Akinola, ‘The Industrial Structure of Ibadan’,
Nigerian Geographical Journal, 7, 1964, pp. 116-20.
Elliot J. Berg, ‘Real Income Trends in West Africa, 1939-1960’, in Economic Transition
in Africa, ed. Melville J. Herskovits and Mitchell Harwitz, 1964, pp. 199-238, and John F.
Weeks, ‘Further Comment on the Kilby/Weeks Debate: an Empirical Rejoinder’, Jowmal of
Developing Areas, 5, 1971, p. 171-

273
An Economic History of West Africa

or eliminate strike action,did remove much of the violence from labour protest in
the colonies. The emphasis of the organised labour movement was on negotiation
rather than on revolution, though strong words were often spoken on the way to the
conference room.
The causes of this rise in real wages are a matter of controversy, stemming on the
one hand from the economist’s concern with the problem of the relationsliip
between wage rates and the development prospects of African countries, and on the
other from the historian’s interest, imported from Europe, in the role of trade unions
as a force for economic and political change. Berg and Butler, supported by Weeks,
have taken the view that African trade unions had relatively little power.'^® They
have pointed out that wage-employment affected only a small proportion of the
total labour force, and that many wage-earners, being migrants, had no interest in
union activities. Consequently, trade unions had few members; they lacked soli¬
darity ; their financial resources were limited; and their leadership tended to be of
poor calibre. The conclusion derived from this analysis is that the decision to raise
money-wages in the 1940s and 1950s was made by employers, not as a result of union
pressure, but in recognition of the increased cost of living and of the need to maintain
a stable labour force. Against this view it has been argued by Warren and Kilby, with
support from Cohen, that unions had strengths as well as weaknesses."^® They were
located in strategically sensitive places, such as capital cities; their members were
well represented in key jobs, notably in public service; their activities attracted
publicity, both in Africa and in sympathetic newspapers in England and France; and
at times when discontent was widespread they were able to mobilise non-union
support, especially from the urban unemployed, and to mount demonstrations
wliich were impressive in size and threatening in appearance. The conclusion drawn
from this evidence is that unions were influential in extracting concessions from
employers during the 1940s and 1950s, even though results fell some way short of
expectations.

’’’’ There were major strikes in the Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone in 1955-6.
EUiot J. Berg and Jeffrey Butler, ‘Trade Unions’, in Political Parties and National Integration
in Tropical Africa, ed. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Berkeley 1964, pp. 340-81;
John F. Weeks, ‘A Comment on Peter Kilby: Industrial Relations and Wage Deternimation’,
Journalof Developing Areas, 3, 1968, pp. 7-17; EUiot J. Berg, ‘Urban Real Wages and the Niger¬
ian Trade Union Movement, 1939-60: a Comment’, Economic Development and Cultural Change,
17, 1969, pp. 604-17; and Jolm F. Weeks, ‘Further Comment on the Kilby/Weeks Debate;
an Empirical Rejoinder’, Jouma/ of Developing Areas, 5, 1971, pp. 165-74.
W. M. Warren, ‘Urban Real Wages and the Nigerian Trade Uirion Movement, 1939-60’,
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 15, 1966, pp. 21-36; Peter KUby, ‘Industrial Rela¬
tions and Wage Determination; FaUure of the Anglo-Saxon Model’, Journal of Developing
Areas, i, 1967, pp. 489-520; the same author’s ‘A Reply to John F. Weeks’ Comment’, Journal
of Developing Areas, 3, 1968, pp. 19-26; W. M. Warren, ‘Urban Real Wages and the Nigerian
Trade Union Movement, 1939-60: Rejoinder’, Economic Development and Cultural Change,
17, 1969, pp. 618-33; Robin Cohen, ‘Further Comment on the Kilby/Weeks Debate’, Journal
of Developing Areas, 5, 1971, pp. 155-64; and KUby’s ‘Final Observations’, ibid, 5, 1971,
pp. 175-6.

274
 The open economy under strain

The friction generated by this debate arises not merely because both sides believe
themselves to be correct, but because they probably are. Berg and Butler are right to
draw attention to weaknesses in African trade unions. It would be a mistake to regard
the unions as a compelling, or even as a dominant, force in the economic and
political history of West Africa between 1945 and i960. This is one reason why the
analysis presented in this chapter has concentrated on three major African interest
groups, and why the tliird group, the labour force, has not been treated as if its history
were synonymous with that of trade unions. At the same time, it is equally clear that
the authorities could not afford to ignore the presence of organised labour. Unions
were much stronger after 1945 than they had been beforehand, and they had a
special significance in certain colonies, such as Guinea. Governments may have been
prepared to grant wage increases simply in response to a rise in the cost of living, and
in the absence of any organised pressure to do so, but the fact that pressure existed is
likely to have influenced both the timing and the nature of the settlement. Generalisa¬
tions, if stretched too far, lose their explanatory power. The question of the effective¬
ness of unions in raising wages is one which needs to be decided with reference to
particular colonies and to particular points in time.
The foregoing survey completes the analysis of the evolution of African interests
between 1945 and i960. It remains to view this same period from the standpoint of
the colonial powers.
A ruling power (or class) can meet demands for radical reform in one or more of
three ways. It can do nothing at all, in the hope that the problem will solve itself; it
can adopt a policy of repression; and it can try conciliation. West Africa has experi¬
enced all three approaches. A policy of ‘wait and see’ prevailed during the period
1930-1945, and, as has been shown, proved unsuccessful. A policy of repression was
used occasionally during the Second World War and in the immediate post-war
years. Until about 1950 Britain and France were still unsure of the strength of African
opposition, and they had not appreciated the extent to which their own power had
declined. Consequently, coercion was used at times in an attempt to control the
growth of anti-colonial organisations. In 1949-1950 large numbers of Africans were
killed, wounded or imprisoned in an aggressive campaign against the P.D.C.I. and
Houphouet-Boigny, while on the Gold Coast strong action was taken against the
C.P.P. and Nkrumah, who was jailed in 1950. These measures were partly a reflec¬
tion of the belief, popular among defenders of the ‘free’ world at the time of the
‘cold’ war, that foreign nationalists were really communists in disguise.®® The
Colonial Office, though well stocked with historians, seems momentarily to have
forgotten the recommendations made by that expert observer, Benjamin Franklin,
on how to lose an empire without intending to. One of his rules for achieving un¬
premeditated decolonisation was for the imperial government to insist, despite the
evidence, that the complaints of subject peoples were ‘invented and prompted by a

Colonial Office, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast,
1948, p. 91, where the governor’s views on ‘communist’ methods are recorded.

275
An Economic History of West Africa

few, factious demagogues, whom if you could catch and hang, all would be quiet.’®^
On the whole, however, the period 1945-1960 was marked by the adoption of a
conciliatory policy, and coercion was the exception rather than the rule. Indeed,
concessions were already being made before the end of the Second World War. In
1944 substantial reforms were promised at a conference at Brazzaville presided over
by General de Gaulle. One important result of this meeting was the abolition in 1946
of forced labour, long a deep grievance in French West Africa. In 1945 Britain
revived the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1940) and presented it in a
more generous form. In the 1950s the policy of co-operation was developed even
more fully in French and British West Africa. The reasons behind this policy, noted
at the beginning of this section, will now be considered in greater detail, and its
consequences explored with reference to the modification of the open economy. To
complement the organisation of the previous section of this chapter, the expatriate
firms will be dealt with first, followed by an examination of government policy.
Insufficient attention has been paid to changes in the role and structure of the
expatriate firms. Historians tend to assume that the functions of these companies
were defined at an early point in the colonial period, and remained essentially un¬
changed down to the time of independence. It will be contended here that this view
is mistaken, and that after 1945 the expatriate firms implemented the most funda¬
mental reorganisation of their activities since the close of the nineteenth century,
when they began to move inland for the first time. It will be shown that notable
innovations were made not only by adapting traditional mercantile functions, but
also by introducing modem manufacturing activities, and it will be argued that these
changes were prompted by two considerations; the growth of the market and the
rise of African nationalism. Of course, innovations were more pronounced in some
countries than in others. It is entirely consistent with the interpretation advanced
here that smaller colonies with less developed markets tended to lag behind,®^ and
that the pace-setters were the relatively wealthy regions, such as Nigeria, the Gold
Coast, Senegal and the Ivory Coast, which offered new and more profitable oppor¬
tunities.®^

Benjamin Franklin, ‘Rules for Reducing a Great Empire to a Small One’, Works, 3,
1806, p. 343.
Sierra Leone is a case in point. See Ralph Gerald Saylor, The Economic System of Sierra
Leone, Durham N.C., 1967, pp. 95, 147-57.
®® Much of the foregoing interpretation, and virtually the whole of the exposition which
follows, is derived from the work of four scholars, all of whom arrived, quite independently,
at complementary conclusions. Elements of the basic argument were first advanced by Marcel
Capet in his neglected study of the period 1945-54 entitled TraitS d’economie tropicale: les
konomies d’A.O.F., Paris 1958, pp. 123-32, 163-72. Ten years later two studies of changes in
the mercantile functions of the expatriate firms appeared: Atse-Leon Bonnefonds, ‘La trans¬
formation du commerce de traite en Cote d’Ivoire depuis la demiere guerre mondiale et
I’independance’, Cahiers d’Outre-Mer, 21, 1968, pp. 395-413, and Charles Wilson, Unilever,
1^45-1^65, 1968, pp. 213-26. Then, in the following year, came Peter Kilby’s comprehensive
and indispensable volume. Industrialization in an Open Economy: Nigeria, 1945-60, Cambridge
1969.

276
 The open economy under strain

Expansion and diversification made West African trade attractive to newcomers,

and presented the expatriate firms with a degree of competition which they had not
experienced since the brief boom that followed the First World War. They faced
serious rivalry from low-cost operators, especially Indian, Levantine and African
traders, and from overseas industrial concerns, such as Imperial Chemical Industries,
which setup their own local outlets.The established, horizontally-integrated structure
of U.A.C., C.F.A.O. and S.C.O.A. was ill-suited to do battle with specialised
competitors. Engaging in trade in products such as motor veliicles and machinery
put pressure on capital resources; selling and servicing new imports, such as electrical
goods, required an expertise which the traditional firms did not possess; and stocking
an increasingly diverse range of commodities led to a rise in handling costs.
By about 1950 the established firms had realised that the market was too large and
competition too fierce tor them to continue to dominate virtually all branches of
the import and export trade, as they had done previously. Consequently, they, too,
began to transform themselves into specialists, thus reducing capital requirements,
focusing skills on a limited range of goods, and cutting handling costs. The leading
commercial firms completely reorganised their retail outlets, and concentrated
mainly on wholesaling activities. Direct retailing became centred on a few, large
department stores and supermarkets, such as Kingsway, Monoprix and Printania,
and most of the established retail outlets were handed over to Africans. In 1956, for
example, the Avion chain, making use of former S.C.O.A. shops and staffed by
Africans, was started on the Ivory Coast. In addition, subsidiaries with African direc¬
tors were set up to import and distribute particular items, such as motor vehicles,
and finance companies were formed to enable independent African traders to develop
their own businesses. The results were dramatic: whereas in 1949 the three leading
commercial firms in Nigeria accounted for 49 per cent of all imports, by 1963 this
figure had fallen to 16 per cent. One of the best examples of the process of‘African-
isation’ is provided by U.A.C. In 1939 Africans accounted for only seven per cent
of the company’s total management staff in West Africa: by 1957 the proportion
had risen to twenty-one per cent; and by the end of 1964 it had reached forty-three
per cent.®^ A similar pohcy of training African technical and managerial staff was
launched by the mining companies.®® Africanisation made sound commercial sense.
Africans were much cheaper to employ than Europeans; they knew the country and
its languages better; their local connections were frequently helpful in opening up

United Africa Company, Statistical and Economic Review, 20, 1957, pp. 39-45; 30, 1965,
p. 57. It is planned to increase the proportion to eighty per cent by 1980. Critics of the ex¬
patriate commercial firms have argued, with some justification, that these changes amounted to
httle more than ‘window dressing’. This criticism does not invalidate the pomt made here that
there was a gain in status and pay for a small, but important, indigenous interest group.
At least one firm was also affected by a type of unplamied Africanisation. The monopoly
of the Sierra Leone Selection Trust, granted in 1935, was undermined after the Second World
War by the iUicit activities of African diggers and Levantine traders. This development received
formal recognition m 1956, when AfHcan miners were granted Hcences. Saylor, The Economic
System of Sierra Leone, ch. 4, provides a summary view. For a comprehensive account of the
industry as a whole see H. L. van der Laan, The Sierra Leone Diamonds, 1965.

277
 An Economic History of West Africa

new markets and holding on to established ones; and they were often outstandingly
successful businessmen. The decision to make room for aspiring Africans was also
an astute political move. By the close of the 1940s it was apparent that the long term
interests of the expatriate firms lay in securing a stake for themselves in an Africa
ruled by Africans rather than by Europeans. By providing more opportunities for
indigenous traders, the expatriate firms advanced their ovm interests and also
improved their image in the eyes of their most vociferous critics.
^ The second, and more radical, innovation was the introduction of modern
I (industry. It is widely, but incorrectly, assumed that the expatriate companies were
1 firmly opposed to industrialisation in Africa throughout the colonial period. That
I they showed little or no interest in modern manufacturing before 1945 is undoubted-
/ ly true. Their skills were those of general merchants, and, as merchants, they presided
f comfortably over commercial empires in which market-sharing agreements had
blunted aggressive entrepreneurial drives. Moreover, industrialisation meant com¬
plications and risks. The establishment of local industries might have offended
metropolitan manufacturers and aroused the displeasure of the shipping companies
which dominated the West African carrying trade. Above all, there was no clear
indication that the local market was large enough to justify experiments of tliis kind,
, , especially in the depressed economic climate which existed between 1930 and 1945.
After the Second World War, a departure from traditional attitudes became less
risky and more compelling. By the 1950s the effective demand for manufactures had
reached the point in some parts of West Africa where it could sustain at least a few
firms of the size needed to produce the goods most commonly required, and for
those firms to operate at sufficient capacity to keep their costs down and the prices of
their products competitive with imports from Europe.®® Furthermore, the expan¬
sion of the market, by introducing a greater degree of competition, had reduced
profit margins on many staple imports. The traditional firms not only countered tliis
challenge by specialising, as has been shown, but also by becoming manufacturers,
in the hope that they could achieve sufficient savings in production and transport
costs to undersell their new rivals. It was no coincidence that the leading manu¬
facturers in West Africa during the 1950s were established commercial firms, such as
U.A.C., C.F.A.O., S.C.O.A., John Holt and Maurel et Prom, all of which had to
undertake considerable internal reorganisation and acquire staff with the necessary
technical skills. By starting modern industries, as by specialising in trade, these firms
^ also helped to further Afro-European co-operation during the fmal phase of colonial
rule.
The production of goods for domestic consumption, such as processed food, drink,
clothing and construction materials, accounted for the largest share of modem
manufacturing output in West Africa during the 1950s and 1960s. This emphasis is

These remarks barely hint at a complex problem. For a discussion of the importance of
economies of scale in different types of import-substituting industries, and of variations in
factor proportions among firms within particular hidustries see Kilby, Industrialization in an
Open Economy, ch. ii.

278
 The open economy under strain

understandable, given the relatively low level of purchasing power, the need to
manufacture for a mass market, and the motives of the first industrialists. However,
it was not feasible to produce a complete range of these items locally. The advantage
lay with industries wliich could achieve the greatest saving in costs by being located
near their final market. Factories using a high proportion of local materials, especially
items which were expensive to transport, such as timber, lime, clay and water, were
particularly favoured, as were industries in which freight charges on finished articles
were higher than on the constituent raw materials, as was the case with hollow-ware.®’^
Typical import-substituting industries established in the 1950s were those producing
cigarettes, beer, cement, footwear, textiles, furniture and utensils, and the principal
concentrations of modem manufacturing were in the four wealthiest colonies, the
leading centres being Lagos and Dakar. Export processing also underwent further
development in the 1950s, chiefly as a result of the introduction of power-driven
machinery. Once again, the main economy was the saving made in freight charges by
processing heavy raw materials, such as timber and minerals, at source. Finally, it
should be noted that the expatriate firms invested in service industries, especially
those requiring technical skills. This involvement became necessary to meet de¬
mands derived from the satisfaction of prior wants: the spread of motor vehicles,
for example, made it essential to set up service stations.
Changes in the economic role of colonial governments after 1945 were as striking
as those affecting the expatriate firms, and have certainly attracted more scholarly
attention. Innovations in the public sector were partly the result of African pres¬
sures, and were partly conceived in self-interest, but they were also influenced by
shifts in the global balance of power after the Second World War. Britain and
France emerged from the war as victors, but with their economies run down and
their international position irretrievably weakened. Large parts of their empires had
been overrun by enemy forces, and France herself had been occupied by German
troops. After 1945 both powers began to lose their grip on political developments in
their overseas territories. By the time nationalist movements were gathering
momentum in West Africa, important concessions had already been made elsewhere.
After much heart-searching, Britain granted independence to India in 1947, and
France was forced to relinquish her possessions in Indo-China between 1950 and
1955. Other commitments remained, and both countries found themselves engaged
in some painful rearguard actions, particularly in areas where the issue of self-govern¬
ment was complicated by the presence of white settlers, as in the cases of Algeria and
Kenya. Nevertheless, even colonial powers learn lessons in the end, and by the early
1950S, if not before, it was clear that Britain and France had decided not to try and
retain West Africa by force.
Alterations to government policy after 1945 centred on one outstanding develop¬
ment—the expansion of the public sector. This innovation involved changes in the
level of public investment, the introduction of economic planning, and the exercise

As pointed out in Chapter 2, these principles also influenced the location of manufacturing
activity m the pre-colonial period.

279
An Economic History oj West Africa

of controls over the marketing of export crops. These three features of official
policy will be considered in turn.
Assessing the volume of capital flows to underdeveloped countries is not an easy
task, partly because of the empirical difficulty of locating all the sources of supply,
and partly because of the conceptual problem of deciding what constitutes invest¬
ment. However, in the case of W^est Africa the main trend is not in dispute: there
was a marked increase in foreign investment after the Second World War. Between
1947 and the end of 1956 French public investment in her West African territories
amoimted to 106 billion 1956 C.F.A. francs, compared to 46 billion 1956 C.F.A.
francs for the period 1903-1946. Thus the volume of investment was more than
twice as great in the ten years between 1947 and 1956 as in the whole of the previous
forty-three years.®® Overseas public investment in British West ^Africa, though
running at less than half the level of French aid, was also greater between 1946 and
i960 than in the period between 1900 and 1945.®® These figures do not tell the entire
story. A substantial percentage of public investment after 1945 took the form of
grants rather than loans, which meant that the recipients carried proportionately
lighter burdens of repayment than in the pre-war era. Furthermore, fragmentary
though the available statistics are, it is clear that private investment also rose follow¬
ing the revival of the export market after the Second World War. Finally, it should
not be forgotten that the colonies had access to funds derived from local sources,
especially customs duties and (in the case of British West Africa) revenues supplied
by the Marketing Boards. A study of these sources reveals an important contrast. In
the case of French West Africa domestic funds accounted for twenty-five to thirty
per cent of official development expenditure between 1946 and 1958, whereas in the
four British territories the proportion was almost reversed: only about twenty-five
per cent of the total came from overseas public agencies in the period 1945-1959.®°
The increase in the resources at the disposal of public authorities made it possible
to undertake measures to expand exports and to assist new projects outside the
export sector. The rise in the volume of overseas aid, together with the funds accu¬
mulated by the marketing boards, weakened the relationship between overseas
earnings and domestic demand, and enabled the economy to grow to some extent
independently of the performance of the export sector. After 1945 imports into

Elliot J. Berg, ‘The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa’, American
Political Science Review, 54, i960, pp. 394-5. Capet’s estimate {Traiti d’konomie tropicale, p. 293)
suggests an even greater contrast between pre-war and post-war levels of investment. As there
is no obvious means of choosing between the two sources, I have used Berg’s more conservative
figures.
There is no work on British Africa to compare with Teresa Hayter’s French Aid, 1966.
For a general survey sec Leonard Rist, ‘Capital and Capital Supply in Relation to the Develop¬
ment of Africa’, m Economic Development for Africa South of the Sahara, ed. E. A. G. Robinson
1964, pp. 444-74-
®° Ona B. Forrest ‘The Financing of the Present Development Plans of West Africa’, m
International Finance and Development Planning in West Africa, ed. Sune Carlson and O. Olakanpo,
Lund 1964, pp. 55-6.

280
 The open economy under strain

French West Africa began to expand faster than exports. Ten years later the same
trend appeared in the British territories. The economy remained open, but it no
longer operated in its pure form. Two, more specific, comments should be added to
this general observation. In the first place, modifications to the open economy were
most pronounced in Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Senegal and the Ivory Coast, for it
was these richer colonies which attracted most of the foreign capital (public and
private) invested in West Africa, and wliich were in a position to tap substantial
domestic funds as well. Consequently, post-war economic development further
accentuated already established regional inequalities. Secondly, though the sources
of foreign capital proliferated after the Second World War, Britain and France
remained the chief suppliers.®^ Of the two, French investment was greater in
absolute terms, and it formed a higher proportion of total public funds available in
the colonies. Bilateral aid played a part in modifying the open economy, but it also
helped to maintain, and in the case of France to strengthen, ties between the metro¬
polis and the dependencies.
The considerable rise in public investment brought into being a new service
industry of economists and administrators. Indeed, the period after 1945 has some
claims to being termed the Age of the Planners. On this occasion there was no bonfire
of controls, as there had been at the end of the First World War.®^ The victors began
to talk of‘winning’ the peace, of a ‘strategy’ for growth, and of a ‘big push’ towards
development. The rise to power of left wing parties in Britain and France ensured
that these ideas were translated into plans and given high priority. Just as the Marshall
Plan (1948) was designed to aid the reconstruction of Europe, so the colonial powers
initiated programmes for speeding economic recovery in their empires.
This was the time, again following a precedent set during the war, when a whole
new language, a kind of Esperanto for planners, was created from initials. As far as
French West Africa was concerned, the main agency was F.I.D.E.S. (Fonds d’lnves-
tissement pour le Developpement Economique et Social), which was established in
1946. F.I.D.E.S., which had both general and local sections and a wide range of
specialised subsidiaries, was responsible for the P.M.E. (Plan de Modernisation et
d’Equipement). This was a ten-year plan, which was produced in 1946 and had the
distinction of not being revised until 1953. F.I.D.E.S. itself survived until 1959, when
it was replaced by F.A.C. (Fonds d’Aide et Co-operation). In the case of British West
Africa external public investment came mainly from successive C.D.W. (Colonial
Development and Welfare) Acts, and was tied to plans which were drawn up for
each colony in the immediate post-war years. This source was supplemented by the
C.D.C. (Colonial Development Corporation), which was formed in 1948. The
C.D.C., besides having borrowing powers of its own, also participated actively in
specific projects aimed at developing agricultural and mineral resources.
The first plans had fairly modest aims, and consisted mainly of‘shopping lists’ of

America was the leading foreign investor in Liberia.

R. H. Tawney, ‘The AboUtion of Economic Controls, 1918-1921’, Economic History
Review, 13, 1943. PP- 1-30.

281
An Economic History of West Africa

desirable items, very much on the Hnes of the plans devised by Sarraut and Guggis-
berg in the ipaos.®^ It was not until the close of the 1950s that more sophisticated
plans dealing with the economy as a whole, co-ordinating development between
sectors, and prescribing growth rates, were introduced. In the 1960s ‘the plan’
became the talisman of politicians anxious for quick results. However, in practice
the plans inttoduced around the time of independence proved not to have magical
powers; they were frequently over-ambitious; the.y were based on questionable
statistical data; and they were often overtaken by political events.®^ The early plans
had obvious theoretical limitations, and they sponsored a number of ill-judged
projects, but they were probably at least as effective as those produced in later years.
The plans of the British and French colonies allocated investment in broadly
similar ways.®® Substantial sums were set aside for the social services, especially
health and education. In the economic sectors priority was given to transport, which
accoimted for roughly forty per cent of the money spent by F.I.D.E.S. between 1946
and 1958, and for about thirty per cent of public investment in the four British
territories during the same period. Agriculture was next on the list, receiving about
twenty to twenty-five per cent of the total, and industry (mainly power and other
utilities) came third.
The greater part of public investment in transport was spent on road improve¬
ments. The only important railway developments were the construction of short
lines to serve mines in Mauritania, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, and extentions
from Jos to Maiduguri (in Nigeria) and from Bobo Dioulasso to Ouagadougou
(in Upper Volta). Measuring the expansion of road transport in terms of the number
of miles of road built is an exercise which may well be a cure for insomina, but as an
index of economic change it can easily be misleading. Apart from the fact that many
West African roads disappear during the rainy season, there is also the basic problem,
which is sometimes ignored, of deciding what constitutes a road in an under¬
developed economy. There seems little point in providing detailed lists of‘relevant’
figures, though this could be done without difficulty. All that will be said here is that
on a conservative estimate the number of miles of tarred roads increased about ten
times (admittedly from a very low base) between 1945 and i960. In the case of
Nigeria, which has been studied in some detail, there were about 8,000 miles of
tarred roads in 1963, compared with just over 500 miles in 1945. A more certain
indication of road improvements is provided by the number of motor vehicles,
which also grew about ten-fold in the period 1945-1960. In 1959 there were just over

D. K, Greenstreet, ‘Public Administration: Development and Welfare in the British

Territories of West Africa During the Forties’, Economic Bulletin of Ghana, i, 1971, pp. 3-23.
For an interesting comparative study of recent planning experiences see R. H. Green,
‘Four African Development Plans: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania’, JoKmal of Modern
African Studies, 3, 1965, pp. 249-79.
I have refrained from quoting detailed figures because I have been unable to reconcile
many of the statistics cited in the secondary sources. A thorough, comparative study is needed
to overcome this difficulty.

282
 The open economy under strain

180,000 motor vehicles in West Africa, of which total 94,000 were in the British
territories and 86,000 in the French colonies.
The rapid expansion of the road transport industry galvanised activity on several
fronts. It assisted the expansion of export crops; it stimulated internal trade; and it
helped manufacturers, both by reducing the cost of delivering raw materials to the
factory and by distributing finished products to a wider market. Although motor
vehicles were first envisaged as feeding the railway, they managed to capture a
substantial share of the import and export traffic after the Second World War. Road
transport benefited from cost-reducing innovations, such as the diesel engine, but it
was no cheaper than the railway, except on certain short-haul journeys. Its competi¬
tive advantage stemmed from its geographical mobility, its speed, and its organisa¬
tional flexibility, wliich meant that it could vary rates quickly, adjust schedules to
deal with particularly profitable (or unprofitable) items, and provide a door to door
service.
The 1950S saw the beginnings of consistent and widespread success in applying
scientific knowledge to tropical agriculture. The best results, as noted earlier, were
achieved by introducing new types of plants, seeds, fertilisers and pesticides to
existing agricultural systems. The failures, which received much more publicity,
were all in the established West African tradition of undertaking grandiose projects
that departed radically from long-standing practices. An extraordinary plan for
producing eggs in the Gambia, started in 1948 under the direction, appropriately
enough, of Dr Fowler, was wound up in 1951 at a cost of about million,®® and an
ambitious scheme to mechanise agriculture in Nigeria, launched in 1949, sank,
weighed down by its own rusty tractors, in 1953.®"^ A more cautious approach has
prevailed since the early 1960s.®® Mechanisation is no longer regarded as a way of
producing an instant agricultural revolution in the tropics, and officials have ceased
to assume that large farms can be equated automatically with high productivity. A
salutory side-effect of scientific research has been to give Western experts more
respect for the methods employed by African farmers.
Official enterprise has been important throughout West Africa in encouraging
industrial development since the 1950s. Government involvement of an indirect
kind has been most evident in measures to assist private manufacturers establish
import-substituting and export-processing industries. These measures included
protective import duties and quotas, grants and cheap loans, guaranteed purchases of
certain products, and tax relief for infant industries.®® In French West Africa part of
what was termed ‘industrial’ investment was also spent developing mineral resources,
particularly bauxite deposits in Guinea and iron ore in Mauritania. Direct public
enterprise has concentrated mainly on expanding public utilities, notably electricity.

Harry A. Gailey, A History of the Gambia, 1964, pp. 151-8.

K. D. S. Baldwin, The Niger Agricultural Project, Cambridge, Mass., 1957.
Although Ghana and Nigeria can provide some exceptions to this generaUsation.
For two case studies see Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Groivth
in Nigeria, pp. 310-20, and Saylor, The Economic System of Sierra Leone, pp. 147-57.

283
An Economic History of West A frica

The most striking plan of this kind was the Volta River Project, which was a compre¬
hensive and costly scheme for generating hydro-electric power, producing alu¬
minium from local bauxite and irrigating farms in the south-east part of the Gold
Coastd°° Since electricity is virtually the only form in which power for modem
industry is stored in West Africa (and production can be measured accurately), it
provides a useful indication of the level of industrial development in the region. In
1962 total electricity production for the whole of West Africa was 1745 kilowatt-
hours. By international standards this total was very low, being less than one fifth of
production in the United Kingdom, which had additional sources of power and a
much smaller population. The tmevenness of development within West Africa is
demonstrated by the fact that four countries accounted for eighty-six per cent of
total production, and Nigeria alone for forty-five per cent.^°^
No satisfactory comparison of French and British policy towards the overseas
trade of their West African possessions has been undertaken. Most research has
centred on the operation of the Marketing Boards in British West Africa; neither
the French marketing system nor tariffpolicy has been studied in depth. Much of the
discussion which follows must be regarded, inevitably, as tentative.^°^ It will be
suggested that the policies of the two principal colonial powers were broadly a
continuation of those formulated in the period 1930-1945; that these policies were
adapted to take account of two new requirements—the need to assist Europe’s post¬
war recovery and the desirability of making concessions to African pressures; and
that while there were, as is commonly accepted, important contrasts in the means
adopted by France and Britain, there were also some interesting similarities which
have gone largely unremarked.
Britain and France faced serious balance of payments difficulties after the Second
World War, and were particularly short of dollars, which were needed to settle
debts with the United States. In these circumstances empire trade assumed a vital role
because it could be conducted without touching scarce reserves of foreign exchange,
and it was a means of earning money to pay off debts elsewhere. The policy of
imperial preference, wliich was begun in the 1930s, was continued and elaborated
after 1945. Additional quotas were imposed on goods imported into the colonies
from outside the empire, and exchange controls were employed to conserve stocks
of gold and dollars. These controls were part of wider developments, namely the
growth of the sterling area and of the franc zone. The evolution of the sterling area
did not alter the existing monetary system in British West Africa. The creation of the
franc zone, however, was followed in 1945 by the introduction of the C.F.A.
(Colonies Fran9aises d’Afrique) franc and by the formation of a currency board, the
Plans for this project were drawn up during the 1950s, but not implemented until the
following decade.
The leading producers in 1962 were Nigeria (786 milHon kilowatt-hours), Ghana (431),
Senegal (172) and the Ivory Coast (120).
And is partly designed to stimulate further research into the neglected aspects of these
subjects. Anyone who undertakes a full study of the marketing systems operating in French
West Africa after 1945 will be making a useful contribution to the recent economic history of
the region.

284
 The open economy under strain

Caisse Centrale de la France d’Outre-Merd°® In this way French West Africa ac¬
quired a separate currency and a formal machinery which paralleled the arrange¬
ments made for the British territories in 1912.^°^
There was some relaxation of preferential policies in the 1950s. By then the dollar
problem had ceased to be acute; tropical raw materials were no longer in short
supply; manufacturers in Britain and France were making headway in markets
outside their empires; and African demands for wider trading opportunities could
not be ignored. In practice, however, liberalisation proceeded faster in British than
in French West Africa. By i960 Britain’s share of the overseas trade of her West
African colonies was about twenty-five per cent less than it had been in 1945. In the
case of France the decline was only about five per cent, and it was not until the
development of the European Economic Community in the 1960s that bilateral links
weakened noticeably. It was in the 1950s, too, that tariffs were used for the first time
to protect infant industries in West Africa, instead of being regarded solely as
instruments for raising revenue and controlling the direction of trade.
Imperial preference, though purporting to offer advantages to the colonies, was
inspired primarily by a desire to safeguard the interests of the colonial powers.
Marketing policy, as reshaped after the Second World War, was advertised as being
in the interests of Africans, and can be regarded as an attempt to modify the operation
of the open economy by eliminating fluctuations in produce prices and in producer
incomes.
In the immediate post-war years French governments were uncertain both about
the need for stabilisation, given the high prices ruling in the world and within the
preferential system, and about the means by which it might be achieved. However,
support funds [caisses de soutien) guaranteeing minimum produce prices were
formed for most export crops between 1946 and 1949. In the Ivory Coast, for
example, funds for coffee and cocoa were established by means of export levies
imposed at the ports of exit.^°^ This arrangement proved unpopular with the
farmers who were supposed to benefit from it, and in 1950 a proposal to raise the
levies was met by a number of protests in the true Gallic tradition of direct peasant
action. The farmers objected because a proportion of the levy went to the Federation
and was used to support groundnut prices in Senegal, and because the caisse had
ceased to act as a stabilising body and had become simply a tax-gathering agency. In
the period 1949-1950 the powers of the various caisses were reduced and the market¬
ing system became, in the words of Ramboz, ‘incoherent and ineffectual’. Between
1954 and 1956 a series of new stabilisation funds (caisses de stabilisation) were created
for the principal French West African exports. This development was prompted by

In 1955 an Institut d’Emission was set up for French West Africa, and in 1959 this body
became the Banque Centrale des Etats de I’Afrique de I’Ouest.
The principal difference was that the C.F.A. franc did not follow the several devaluations
of the metropolitan franc after the war, and therefore had a higher value, whereas currencies
in the sterling area continued to exchange at par.
A rare and neglected case study of the French marketing system is Yvonne-Claude
Ramboz, ‘La politique cafeiere de Cote d’Ivoire et la reforme de la caisse de stabilisation des
prix du cafe et du cacao’. Revue Juridique et Politique, 19, 1965, pp. 194-218.

285
An Economic History of West Africa

two events: the initiation of a more liberal tariff regime, which threatened, ulti¬
mately, to expose French Africa to the lower prices wliich prevailed outside the
preferential system; and the fall in world produce prices at the end of the Korean
war. The stabilisation funds aimed at fixing producer prices and guaranteeing mini¬
mum incomes, and were fmanced by levies on exporters, by export duties, and by a
central fund'in Paris (Fonds National de Regularisation des Cours des Produits
d’Outre-Mer). With some modifications, the reformed caisses survived down to,
and in many cases after, independence.
An accurate assessment of the effectiveness of the French marketing system cannot
be made until the’ necessary research has been completed. On present evidence it is
highly imlikely that any notable achievements were recorded before 1954. After the
reforms of 1954-1956 there seems to have been a considerable degree of success in
fixing producer prices, but there is little information about the more crucial issue of
the stabilisation of incomes. Producer prices were set well above world prices, but
consumer imports were, on average, equally higlily priced. However, it is worth
mentioning that the caisses, unlike the marketing boards in British West Africa,
made serious efforts to influence incomes by trying to control the volume of produce
placed on the market, and they also used their reserves to support prices when the
market weakened, as it did in the second half of the 1950s.
The British government had few doubts about the desirability of stabilising the
prices paid to producers, mainly because exports from the British colonies were
more exposed to the world market than was the case with French West Africa.
Officials were also confident that the marketing system estabhshed during the war
was capable of achieving this aim. Some institutional reorganisation was carried out
between 1947 and 1949, when the West African Produce Control Board was
replaced by separate commodity boards in each of the four colonies. Subsequently,
the only alteration of importance took place in 1954, when the Nigerian Marketing
Boards were reconstituted to operate on a regional basis. The Marketing Boards,
wliile still employing the expatriate firms as buying agents, used their monopoly
powers to fix the prices paid to producers. Their declared policy was to set this price
below the world price during times of prosperity, and to use the difference to form a
reserve, which would then be paid out to support producer prices when the world
market became depressed. In practice the pohcy pursued by the Boards took a
rather, different course. In the decade after the war, when world prices were buoyant,
substantial reserves were accumulated, as was intended. However, when the demand
for tropical raw materials slackened, as it did from the mid-1950s, the boards still
fixed prices slightly below the levels ruling in international markets, and so con¬
tinued to acquire funds, albeit on a much reduced scale. It has been calculated that
export producers in the Gold Coast lost as much as forty-one per cent of their
potential gross incomes as a result of deductions made by the Marketing Boards
between 1947 and 1961, and that Nigerian farmers lost an average of twenty-seven
per cent.^°® The reserves were certainly spent in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but
The figure for Nigeria is an unweighted average of the losses from cocoa, groundnuts
and palm produce.

286
 The open economy under strain

they were used, in the main, to finance government development projects, and not,
as originally planned, to compensate export-producers.
The initial policy of stabilisation, and the subsequent deviation from it, have
provoked a major controversy among economists concerned with African develop¬
ment. The claim that the Boards had stabilised prices was first attacked by Professor
Bauer in a now famous study of the marketing system in British West Africa.^°'^
Bauer pointed out that the imperial government never defined what it meant by
stabilisation. He showed that to stabilise producer prices was not necessarily to
stabilise incomes because the farmers’ total receipts depended on the volume of sales
as well as on their unit price. Volume could be neither controlled nor, of greater
practical relevance, predicted. Bauer’s analysis of the historical record led him to
conclude that while the Boards had virtually eliminated intra-seasonal price fluctu¬
ations, they had achieved little success in stabiUsing prices from season to season, and
had totally failed to stabilise incomes. Indeed, Bauer contended that incomes were
more unstable under the Marketing Board system than they would have been in its
absence. He went on to suggest that the Boards had had a generally depressive effect
on the economy by damping down demand and possibly by blunting the incentive
to invest in productive enterprises within and outside agriculture. Bauer’s critique
did not pass unchallenged at the time, but later research has substantiated his main
arguments.
Bauer’s study was published in 1954, at a time when the Marketing Boards were
still accumulating funds and pursuing their stated aim of price stabilisation. Helleiner,
writing in 1966, was in a position to assess their subsequent performance.^®® His
analysis confirmed that the Boards had failed to stabilise incomes, and also showed
that they had virtually abandoned any attempt to do so. Helleiner then went on to
argue that the role of the Boards had changed in the second half of the 1950s, and
that they were to be judged primarily as agencies promoting economic develop¬
ment. His detailed survey of Nigerian experience led him to conclude that while
some of the reserves had been mis-spent, most of the funds accumulated by the
Boards had been invested usefully in various government-sponsored projects,
notably agricultural research, road construction and local industries. Helleiner con¬
tended that the Boards had proved to be effective in mobilising savings for invest¬
ment which otherwise would not have been made: if the reserves had been paid out
direct to the farmers, the greater part of the additional income would have been
spent on imported consumer goods, thus perpetuating the open economy rather
than assisting diversification. The strength of Helleiner’s case lies in his ability to
point to factual achievements. To suggest that the reserves would have been spent
more wisely if they had been returned to the farmers is to pose a question about an
event that did not take place. Nevertheless, the evidence presented in this chapter
makes it possible to add one, possibly interesting, speculation. Since diversification

107 p_ X. Bauer, West African Trade, Cambridge 1954.

108 Gerald K. Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria,
Homewood, lUinois, 1966.

287
10*
An Economic History of West Africa

was taking place in the 1950s as a result of market growth, and not solely through
government initiative, there would seem to be a case for supposing that had the
funds accumulated by the Boards been left in the hands of the farmers, the market
would have grown faster and .expenditure on consumer goods would have given
further impetus to import-substituting industriesd°® Merely to raise the possibility
is to draw attention to the fact that the controversy over the Marketing Boards is also
a debate about wider issues, wliich are not always s,tated explicitly: about private
versus public enterprise; about the emphasis to be given to consumption as opposed
to investment; and about the meaning of' desirable expenditure in an era in wliich
‘development’ is sometimes a euphemism for redistribution.

5 The open economy modified

A study of the recent economic history of West Africa provides a new perspective on
events which have been the preserve of economists and political scientists. The
evidence presented in this chapter makes it possible to re-interpret two central and
controversial problems—the nature of colonial economic development and the rise
of African nationalism.
According to one popular belief, structural economic change in West Africa was
not possible until after the achievement of independence. To accept this view is to
mismiderstand the timing of economic change and the character of the governments
which came to power in the 1960s. Between 1945 and i960 the open economy
underwent substantial modifications, the chief of which centred on the expansion of
the public sector, the transfer of commercial and political power to Africans, and the
begimiing of modem industry. Just as the colonial period witnessed the continuation
of trends which were already apparent in the mid-nineteenth century, so, too, most
of the new African governments pursued policies in the 1960s which, in the main,
were already being implemented, or had been agreed on, in the 1950s.
Three observations about the nature of economic change before i960 should be
set down at this stage. To begin with, it is important to realise that the innovations
of the period 1945-1960 were not solely the result of government initiative, as is
often thought, but stemmed partly from the internal dynamics of the open economy
itself Export growth after 1945 enabled the domestic market to expand to the point
where it could support at least some kinds of modem manufacturing industries. This
novel opportunity was perceived and exploited by private enterprise, European and
African. It has not been widely appreciated that West Africa took this particular path
towards structural change, though the route is by no means unique. A similar
pattern of development occurred during the twentieth century in parts of the Far

An argument on these lines is developed further by Cyril Ehrhch, ‘Marketing Boards in

Retrospect—Myth and Reahty’, in African Public Sector Economics, Centre of African Studies,
Edinburgh 1970, pp. 121-45.

288
 The open economy under strain

East, such as Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan,^^° and also in some Latin American
countries, notably Argentina and Brazild^^
Next, it should now be clear that officials were instruments as well as originators of
change. Governments, whether European or African, have a common concern with
publicising their achievements and minimising their failures. Critics and defenders of
colonialism both share the assumption that the local administration exercised greater
control over events than it actually did. Governors were umpires rather than dicta¬
tors. Their task was to mediate between competing local and metropolitan interests.
Of necessity, their leadership was more like that of the Duke of York than that of the
Duke of Wellington. Innovations in policy were largely reactions, though often
delayed, to variations in the performance of the open economy, to African demands,
and to the less vociferous (but equally pressing) claims of the expatriate firms. In this
connection it is worth noting that insufficient recognition has been given to the
extent to which changes introduced after the Second World War had their origins
in pressures built up and remedies canvassed during the period 1930-1945. By about
1950 the major colonial powers were clearly moving with the new tide, trying on
the one hand to placate their African subjects, and on the other to safeguard the
future of the expatriate business interests which had played such an important part
in instalhng them in the continent in the first place. Judged by these criteria, decolon¬
isation m West Africa was one of colonialism’s greatest triumphs.
Finally, an examination of the role of the government in modifying the open
economy reveals a marked contrast between French and British West Africa. The
French colonies were on the whole poorer, and they relied heavily on French capital,
markets and personnel.The British colonies, besides being wealthier, were also
less dependent on imperial aid and markets. The modifications made to the econ¬
omies of French West Africa after 1945 had the effect of integrating the Federation
more closely with the metropolis, whereas in British West Africa economic innova¬
tion sprang mainly from the expansion of the open economy itself, and so was self¬
financing to a much greater extent. This distinction had far-reaching political
implications: it helps to explain why the Gold Coast and Nigeria took the lead in
demanding and achieving independence, and why the French colonies, when
offered independence in 1958, chose, with the exception of Guinea, to remain
temporarily within the French Community.
This chapter has offered an economic interpretation of the rise of African national¬
ism that also runs counter to some well known, if simplistic, beliefs. In the first place.

“0 Wontack Hong, ‘Industrialisation and Trade in Manufactures: the East Asian Experience’,
in The Open Economy, ed. Peter B. Kenen and Roger Lawrence, New York 1968, pp. 213-39.
Ill Qelso Furtado, Economic Development of Latin America, Cambridge 197O) PP- 75—8i.
This distinction has been drawn out by ElHot J. Berg in a typically incisive article, The
Economic Basis of Pohtical Choice in French West Africa’, American Political Science Review,
54, i960, pp. 391-405. .
The timing of independence was as follows: the Gold Coast (Ghana), I957’. Gumea,
1958; Nigeria, i960; the constituent states of the Federation of French West Africa (apart from
Guinea), i960; Togo, i960; Sierra Leone, 1961; and Gambia, 1965.

289
290
An Economic History of West Africa
lr

Map 17. The Independent States of West Africa.

 The open economy under strain

it should be clear that independence was not a result of the enlightened policy of
rulers who managed to steer their subject peoples towards self-government in
accordance with a grand plan laid down at the outset of the colonial period. Only
hindsight suggests that the granting of independence was anything other than a
belated recognition of the unforeseen. Secondly, it is equally certain that African
nationalism was not simply a spontaneous, mass movement of the downtrodden,
directed against sun-helmeted, exploiting masters and led by men whose readiness
for self-sacrifice was matched only by their determination to survive long enough to
improve the hving standards of their fellow countrymen.
Opposition to colonialism was based on an imperfect alhance of three major
interest groups of farmers, traders and wage-earners, all of whom shared a degree of
commitment to the exchange economy which distinguished them from the bulk of
the population. Political leaders were drawn from the higher, more affluent echelons
of these groups and from representatives of privileged, minority occupations, such as
teaching, journalism and the law. Discontent among the leaders and the upper ranks
of their supporters sprang not from their proximity to an objectively-defined
poverty hne (from which, indeed, they were far removed), but from their sense of
relative deprivation, which in turn derived from the fact that they aimed at European
standards of consumption. The leadership had to frame a programme which would
hold this alhance together and also appeal to those whose interests were by no means
the same as their own. Consequently, nationalist organisations began to extend the
political arena after the Second World War, in order to bolster their claims to be
representative and so exert greater pressure on the colonial powers.^^^
By taking a disaggregated view of what is often regarded simply as ‘African’
opposition to colonialism, it becomes possible to relate the evolution of nationahsm
to the performance of the open economy. The argument advanced here has com¬
bined elements of the Marxist approach, with its stress on declining living standards
producing a revolutionary situation, and of de Tocqueville’s theory that revolu¬
tionary change is likely to occur only after a period of social and economic pro-
gress.^^® It has been shown that nationalism, in its modem forms, had its origins in
the period 1930-1945, when a serious downturn in real and anticipated hving
standards occurred, following a phase of sustained, if modest, advance. Between 1945 *
and 1950 real incomes, though improving, did not rise fast enough to satisfy the
expectations of the three groups most heavily involved in the colonial economy.
After a brief trial of strength in the later 1940s the colonial rulers began to recognise,
in Coser’s terminology, the ‘clues’ which have to be followed before conflict can be
resolved with a measure of satisfaction to both sides.^^® During the 1950s the
nationalist movement was reinforced and subtly changed by the return of prosperity

This task was helped (and made necessary) by extensions to the franchise and by the
introduction of local elections after 1945.
James C. Davies, ‘Toward a Theory of Revolution’, American Sociological Repiew, 27,
1962, pp. 5-19-
Lewis A. Coser, ‘The Termination of Conflict’, Jowma/ of Conflict Resolution, 11, 1958,
pp. 170-83.

291
An Economic History of West Africa

and by the new spirit of co-operation which grew up between African leaders and
colonial officials. The leaders and their principal followers began to attain the goals
they had set themselves, they started to quarrel over the spoils of a victory that was no
longer in dispute,and they also acquired a more realistic appreciation of the
difficulties involved in achieving a fundamental reconstruction of the economy. This
explains why nationalism lacked a revolutionary edge, and why the period immedi¬
ately after independence saw a continuation of existing policies, rather than a sharp
break with the past,

French West Africa was split up at independence largely because the wealthy colonies,
especially the Ivory Coast, did not want to continue subsidising the poorer parts of the
Federation.
eight

The economy in retrospect

The strategy adopted in this book has been to state the argument at the outset, and
then to develop it, step by step, in successive chapters. Consequently, no revelations
have been saved for these final pages, which will recall, briefly, the main points of
interpretation.
The central theme of this study has been the interaction of the various internal and
external factors which have determined the structure and performance of the
market economy. Older views of the development of the West African economy
stressed the importance of external influences, principally colonial rule, and focused
on a comparatively short and recent time span. The colonial rulers were thought to
have started with a static, subsistence economy, and to have brought about a trans¬
formation which was almost as impressive as that once achieved Avith the loaves and
fishes. The present work has noted the inaccuracies of the myth of Primitive Africa,
has emphasised the role of the indigenous population, and has covered a long period
of time. However, this study has also shown that what has become known as ‘the
African point of view’ is to some extent a misnomer, which stems from the myth of
Merrie Africa and from an exaggerated belief in the communal solidarity of pre¬
industrial societies. In reality, there are various African points of view, each of which
needs to be analysed before a satisfactory account of indigenous economic history
can be constructed.
The interpretation put forward here has explained stability and change in the
market economy by making use of concepts which will also be familiar to historians
and economists specialising in other parts of the underdeveloped world. The
analysis presented in Chapter 3 was principally a commentary on the stereotype of
the ‘traditional’ society. It was argued that this concept is of questionable value
because it greatly exaggerates differences between the aims of pre-industrial and of
industrial societies, and because the institutional characteristics it describes have little
foundation in fact. Ideal-types are not designed to represent reality, but they are
supposed to illuminate it. W^hen they fail to do this, they serve only to direct research
along false trails. Like Platonic Ideas, they need keeping in their heavenly place. The
pre-colonial economy was complex, efficient and adaptable, and it had reached a
relatively advanced stage of commercial capitalism long before the impact of the
W^estern world was felt in Africa. It was not the will to achieve that was lacking, but

1 David C. McClelland’s stimulating theory, presented in The Achieving Society, Princeton

1961, has Httle relevance for West Africa.

293
An Economic History of West Africa

the means of achieving which were limited. The expansion of the domestic market
was retarded not by institutional rigidities determined by anti-capitalist values, but
by identifiable economic obstacles, especially by a deficiency of effective demand,
which was related, in turn, to the land-labour ratio and to high distribution costs.
This conclusion, it is suggested, is important for an understanding of the West
African past (and present), and is also in agreement with recent research on other
parts of the underdeveloped world.^
Chapter 3 considered the possibility that these internal obstacles might have been
overcome by means of international trade. The concept of dualism was used to
explain why the external commercial relations which existed before the nineteenth
century failed to establish strong, beneficial linkages with the domestic economy.
This approach involved a consideration of the economics of slave-producing, as
well as, more conventionally, of the role of Africans in slave-trading. It was con¬
cluded that Saharan and Atlantic commerce were privately profitable, but that their
social benefits were at best limited and in some cases were non-existent.
Chapter 4 argued that the early nineteenth century saw the start of the modem
economic history of West Africa, in the sense that the economic structure which
began to take shape at that time was essentially that which existed at the close of the
colonial era. The history of the nineteenth century was analysed in terms of staple
theory,® which was used to show how the growth in exports of vegetable oils
mobilised factors within the domestic economy, and led to the integration, for the
first time, of internal and external exchange sectors. This development created ten¬
sions within Africa by shifting economic power from a few, large exporters to
numerous, small-scale farmers, and it also involved producers in the cyclical fluctu¬
ations generated by industrial Europe. It was contended that the initial structural
changes and the subsequent performance of the new, ‘legitimate’ exports were
central to an understanding of the motives for, and the timing of, the scramble for
West Africa in the late nineteenth century.
A formal model of this developing, export economy was outlined in Chapter 5
and applied to the period of colonial rule. The model made use of the concepts of
‘open’ and ‘closed’ economies, and refined them to fit West African circumstances
and to suit the purposes of history rather than of economic policy. The performance
of the West African economies during the colonial era was charted by means of the
terms of trade, which were used to identify periods of market contraction and
growth. It was suggested that the multiplier effects of staple exports were weaker
in open economies based on indigenous, ‘peasant’ producers than in countries of
recent settlement, such as Canada and Australia, where there were considerable

® See Morris D. Morris, ‘Towards a Reinterpretation of Nineteenth-Century Indian

Economic History', Journal of Economic History, 23, 1963, pp. 606-18; T. Scarlett Epstein,
Capitalism, Primitive and Modern: Some Aspects of Tolai Economic Growth, Canberra 1968; and
David Pitt, Tradition and Economic Progress in Samoa, Oxford 1970.
® For a discussion of the historical role of foreign trade in promoting development see K.
Berrill, ‘International Trade and the Rate of Economic Growth’, Economic History Review,
12, i960, pp. 351-9-

294
 The economy in retrospect

advantages of capital and skills, and wliere economic policy enjoyed a greater
degree of independence. At the same time, it was contended that open econo¬
mies which relied on ‘peasant’ exports established stronger linkages than those
associated with mining and plantation enclaves, where there was little connection
between ‘modem’ and domestic sectors, and where the tendency for foreign trade
earnings to be leaked abroad was more pronounced.
Chapter 6 focused on export growth during the first half of the colonial period
(1900-1930), and evaluated expatriate and indigenous contributions to the comple¬
tion of the open economy. The expatriate role, though necessary to the expansion
which was achieved, was seen as encouraging a process which was under way before
the partition of Africa. Innovations in the key agricultural sector were made by
African farmers themselves. Indigenous producers of all ethnic groups, whether in
the forest or savanna, whether growing annuals or perennials, whether Muslim or
Christian (or neither), proved that they were responsive to monetary incentives, that
they were prepared to travel to distant places, that they were willing to experiment
with new crops and with novel teclmiques of farm management, and that they were
ready, on occasion, to provide their own social overhead capital (in the shape of
roads and bridges) in advance of government action. The so-called ‘traditional’
society was not eliminated: export expansion involved a certain amount of social
change, as the example of the decline of slavery made clear, but in general pre¬
colonial economic and social institutions survived and proved functional to the
development of the open economy. The mobilisation of domestic factors of produc¬
tion was considered in terms of the vent-for-surplus theory of international trade,
which was modified to take account of historical evidence relating to the role of
African producers.
Chapter 7 identified the disfunctional elements which caused the open economy
to be modified during the second half of the colonial period (1930-1960). To begin
with, attention was paid to differentiation within the export sector and to develop¬
ments in the domestic economy in order to stress the importance of the quantitative
size of the market, its geographical extent, and the social composition of those
involved in exchange activities.^ This analysis was then related to changes in the
barter and income terms of trade in an attempt to explain why the open economy
experienced severe strains after 1930. This period of stress, it was argued, was causally
linked to the rise of the nationalist movement and to the beginnings of industrialisa¬
tion. After 1945 governments started to intervene in the ‘natural working of the
open economy. At the same time, growth within the existing export sectors began to
lead, at least in some countries, to development, that is to structural change involving
the introduction of modem manufacturing industries. The appearance of these novel
features at the close of the colonial period makes the achievement of independence a
suitable terminal point for this study.

* In West Africa the ‘traditional’ sector survived and expanded because of export growth. In
some other parts of the world it survived because it remained isolated from the foreign trade
sector. See Chi—hling Hou, ‘Economic Duahsmi the Case of China, 1840—1937 » Journal of
Economic History, 23, 1963, pp. 277-97.

295
An Economic History of West Africa

There is a moralist in every historian. The moral of this book is mainly didactic,
though it has prescriptive implications. The history presented here has sought to
direct attention away from the adventures and triumphs of great leaders, past and
present, and towards the activities of the overwhelming majority of Africans, those
who have never ranked among the dite. This shift of emphasis may have beneficial
academic consequences if it encourages researchers to leave the air-conditioned
corridors of power and venture into, the farms and rrtarkets. It may also have some
practical use if it reminds those who formulate policy and exercise authority that the
skills and energies of ordinary Africans are probably the continent’s greatest assets.
This is one lesson which the present can, and should, learn from the past.

296
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Chapter 2 The domestic economy: structure and function

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Ikime, Obaro, ‘The Anti-tax Riots in Warri Province, 1927-28’, Journal of the Historical
Society of Nigeria, 3, 1966, pp. 559-73.

James, Rudolph W., ‘The Changing Role of Land in Southern Nigeria’, Odu, i, 1965,
pp. 3-23.

Karp, Mark, ‘The Legacy of French Economic Pohcy in Africa’, in French-Speaking Africa,
ed. Wdham H. Lewis, 1965, pp. 145-53.
Kilby, Peter, African Enterprise: the Nigerian Bread Industry, Stanford 1965.
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Kilson, Martin, ‘NationaUsm and Social Classes in British West Africa’, Journal of Politics,
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Laan, H. L. Van der. The Sierra Leone Diamonds, Oxford 1965.

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326
Index
Major states, e.g. Senegal, Nigeria, are not indexed, and authors are indexed only if they
are mentioned in the text.

Abeokuta, 6i Archinard, General Louis, 164

Abidjan, 195, 242 Argentina, 117
Abomey, 142 Arguin, 48
Aburi people, 217 Aro people, 108, 145
abusa labourers, 218 ascribed and achieved status, 51, 65
Accra, 190, 194, 211, 245, 248, 252 Ashanti, 20, 23,46, 62, 63,67,119,143,144
achieved and ascribed status, 51, 65 Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, 210
Action Group, Nigeria, 271 Assinie, 158
Adamawa, 49 Association of West African Merchants,
Adioukrou people, 21, 43 259
‘administered’ trade, 112 Atakpame, 195
African & Eastern Trade Corporation, 199 Atlantic trade, 87-112
African Association, 199 Avion stores, 277
African Steam Ship Co., 149 Awdaghost, 27, 83
Africanisation, 268, 273, 277-8 Awka people, 46
Agades, 61, 83, 85 Awlil, 47
Agaja, King of Dahomey, 107 Azikiwe, Nnamdi, 267, 270
Agni people, 218
agricultural technology, 36-7, i85) 211,
212, 272, 283 Badagri, 106, 195
Air, 86 Bamako, 162, 194, 197, 226, 246
Akan people, 46, 62 Bambara smiths, 46
Akassa, 155 Bambouk, 46
Akim Abuaka, 217 Bamenda, 21
Akropong people, 217 Bandama river, 28
Akwapim, 217 Bank-Anthony, Sir Mobolaji, 273
Algeria, 158, 196 Bank of British West Africa, 201, 206, 207,
Algiers, 85 209
al-MuhaUabi, 30 banking: pre-colonial, 70-1; colonial,
al-Omari, 47 200, 201, 206-9, 256, 259
Almoravid invasion of Ghana, 80 Banque Commerciale Africaine, 259
Amalgamated Tin Mines of Nigeria, 210 Banque de I’Afrique Occidentale, 201, 206,
American War of Independence, 95. 107 207, 208, 259
Ames, D. W., 70 Banque du Senegal, 206
Angola, 102 Banque Fran^aise de I’Afrique, 259
Angoulvant, Governor Gabriel L., 219 Baoule people, 218
animal husbandry, 39-42; see also hvestock ‘bar’ (unit of account), in, 150
anti-slavery movement, see slave-trade, Barbot, John, 105
abolition of Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial &
‘archaic’ economy (Polanyi), 112 Overseas), 201, 207

327
An Economic History of West Africa

barter, 67-8, iii, 112, 132, 150, 151, 200, Buduma people, 179
206 Butler, Jeffrey, 274, 275
Barth, Heinrich, 19, 48-9, 51
Bartholomew Plan, 265
batafo (Ashanti official traders), 62 Cadamosto, 55
Bauer, P. T., 182, 205, 252, 265, 287 Cadbury Bros (firm), 200
bauxite, 176, 283, 284 CaiUie, R., 123
bayi (first generation slaves), 26 Caisse Cehtrale de la France d’Outre-Mer,
beeswax, 87, 88, 141 285
Begho, 63 ' caisses: de compensation, 264; desot4tien,28s',
Bengal, no de stabilisation, 285-6
Benin, 19, 20, 88, 106, 258 camels, 72, 74
Benue river, 160, 197 canoe houses, 147 ,«;■
Berg, Elhot, J., 182, 225, 274, 275 canoes, 72-3, 197
Bete people, 218 Cape Coast, 151, 248
Bilma, 47, 83, 246, 252 Capet, Marcel, 245
Birmingham, 118 capital market: pre-colonial, 64, 70-1;
Blaize, Pdchard, 153 colonial, 252; see also investment
Bloc D^mocratique Smegalais (B.D.S.), caravans, 62-4; see also Sahara, trade across
270 Carde, Governor Jides G. H., 262
Boahen, A. Adu, 83, 130 Cary, Joyce, 197
Boats, Billy, 96 carriers, see porters
Bobo Dioulasso, 195, 282 Casamance, 141
Bohaiman, Paul, 52, 69 Cayor, 141, 145
Bondoukou, 63 Chad, Lake, 43, 72, 73, 162, 179
Bonny, 106, 141, 145, 146 Chamberlain, Joseph, 162, 164, 190, 260
Bordeaux, 97, 129, 149, 160, 161, 196 chambers of commerce, 161
Bornu, 48, 68, 83, 85, 227 Chargeurs Reunis (shipping firm), 200
Boserup, Ester, 34 chartered companies, 92-4
Bosman, Willem, in Clulde, V. Gordon, 29
Bouna, 63 Choiseul, Due de, 92
bougran, bouracan (cloth), 48 Clapperton, Hugh, 63
Boure, 46 Clark, J. Desmond, 29
BoviU, E. W., 2, 80, 83 Clarkson, Thomas, 113
Bozo people, 43 Clifford, Governor Hugh C., 214
Brass, 155 climate, ii, 13-14, 28, 212
Brazil, 103, 112, 113, 115, 117, 142-3 closed economies, 168, 171-2
Brazzaville conference, 276 cloth money, 68, 70
Bristol, 88-9, 95, 96, 115-16, 118 cocoa industry, 20, 138-9, 169, 174, 176,
British & African Steam Navigation Co., 177,214,216-19,224, 234,239, 254,255,
149 265
British Cotton Growing Association, 196, coffee production, 138, 176, 213, 219, 254
211 Cohen, Abner, 252
brokers (middlemen), 63, 240, 251 Cohen, Robin, 274
Broghe, Due de, 115 Colbert, Jean Baptiste, 92
Brown, George W., 2 Colonial Development Act (1929), 261
Brunschwig, Henri, 158 Colonial Development & Welfare Acts,
budgets, colonial, 190-1, 208, 260-1 281; (1940), 261, 276

328
 Index

colonial governments and economic pol¬ currencies, 66-71, ni-12, 132, 149-51,
icy, 155-6, 187-92; (1900-45), 260-6; 206-9, 284-5
(1945-60), 279-88 Curtin, PhiUp D., 101-3
colonialism, economic model of, 167-86 customs duties, see taxes
comitis de surveillance, 265
commercial community, pre-colonial, Dakar, 151, 190, 191, 194, 195, 197, 242,
64-6, 108-10, 154; colonial, 202 246, 257, 269, 270, 279
commercial law, pre-colonial, 57 Dalton, George, 6, 52, 69
communal labour, 21-3 Danes in W. Africa, 130
Compagnie des Indes, 97 Danquah, J. B., 267, 271
Compagnie des Indes Occidentales, 92 Davies, K. G., 93
Compagnie du Guinee, 92 Dawodu, W. A., 196
Compagnie du Senegal, 92, 93; (1881), debt, pre-colonial, 70-1, 109-10, 155;
160, 199 colonial, 239-40
Compagnie Fran^aise de I’Afrique Equa- de Gaulle, General Charles, 276
toriale, 160 Delcourt, Andre, 93
Compagnie Fran^aise de I’Afrique Occi- demarcation disputes, commercial, 155
dentale, 199, 200, 213, 277, 278 demography, 14-17; see also population
Conakry, 195, 257 Diagne, Blaise, 267
Congo, 102, 170 diamonds, 177, 213
Consolidated African Selection Trust, 210 diasporas, 65
construction industry, 49, 273 Dike, K. O., 2, 146
consumer goods: import of, 126-7, 132, Dioula people and traders, 61, 64, 76, 218,
177-8; domestic manufacture of, 48-50, 252, 270
263, 278-9, 283 distributive system: pre-colonial, 51-75;
continuous markets, 55-6 colonial, 198-205, 242-51
contract and kinship, 6, 21, 65, 106 Djenne, 19, 61, 63, 72
Convention People’s Party (C.P.P.), Gold Doherty, J. H., 240
Coast, 271, 275 Doherty, Chief T. A., 240-1
co-operative farming: African, 216-17, domestic economy: pre-colonial, 8-77;
256; sponsored by colonial govern¬ colonial, 243-53
ments, 262 donkeys for transport, 72, 75
copper currency, 68, 69, in, 149 ‘dual mandate’, 189-90
Coser, Lewis A., 291 Dumett, R. A., 162
Cotonu, 195 Durand, Huguette, 181, 264, 271
cotton-growing, 137-8, 219 Dutch in W. Africa, 88, 91, 92, no, 130
Coupland, Sir Reginald, 113-14 Dutch West India Co., 92
cowrie-shell currency, 67-9, in, 149-50
Cox-George, N. A., 182 Edu, Alhaji S. L., 273
crafts, traditional; see manufactures Efik people, 108, 109
credit system, African, 63-4, 70-1, 86, Ejirin market, 55
109-10, 132, 251, 252 Ekpe (Efik council), 108, 109
Cropper, James, 116 Elder, Dempster & Co., 200
crops, types of, 18, 28-31, 210-21, 254-5; electricity, 283-4
see also cocoa, coffee, etc. entrepots: coastal, 63, 106-12, 145-8, 151,
cucenawa (second-generation slaves), 26 195; Saharan, 85
cultivation, pre-colonial systems of, 32-6 environment and economic performance,
Cunningham, William, 2 11-14

329
An Economic History of West Africa

Enugu, 195, 210, 269 Fouta Djallon, 19, 162

Ephraim, Duke, 108 Fouta Toro, 39
epidemics, 17 Fox, Charles James, 116
Epstein, T. Scarlett, 69 Frankel, S. H., 191
esnsu (Yoruba credit association), 70 free trade, 93-4. i57. I59, 160-1, 162,
Everaert, J., 96^ 264-5
expatriate firms, 85, 88, 92-3, 123, 151-2, Freetown, 151, 152, 153, 195, 242
154, 156-7, 160-1, 198-203, 209-14, Freycinet; Charles de, 162, 164
258-60, 276-8 frontier, concept of, 64, 164-6
expectation of life, pre-colonial, 17; Fulani people, 19, 27, 34, 41, 221, 227
colonial, 224 Fyfe, Christopher, 109, 153
export-processing industries, 263, 279
external trade: pre-colonial, 78-123; and Gabon, 158
imperialism, 124-35; (1900-60), 172-85 Gaiser, G. L. (firm), 152
Eyo Nsa (WiUy Honesty), 109 Gallagher, John, 158
Galheni, Joseph, 164
Fabre et Fraissinet (shipping line), 149, 200 Gao, 19, 47, 63, 72, 197
Fage, J. D., 127-8 Garhck, Peter C., 252
Faidherbe, General Louis, 164 Gatling gun, 155
family labour, 21-3, 217-18, 220-1, 251-2 general- and special-purpose currencies,
Fante people, 43, 144 68-70
female labour, 21-2, 24n, 5on, I26n Genoa, 82, 87
female traders, 55, 56, 57n, 205, 252 geography of W. Africa, 11-14, 18
fertihty and mortality, 15, 17, 224 Gertzel, Cherry J., 156, 205
Fez, 83, 85 Ghadames, 83, 85, 86
Fezzan, 83 Ghana, ancient, 48, 80, 83, 85
Firestone Rubber Co., 212 Ghat, 48, 83, 85
First World War, 184, 263 Ghezo, ruler of Abomey, 142
Firth, Raymond, 6 Gladstone, W. E., 190
fishing, 43, 246, 253 Glover, John H., 164
floodland cultivation, 34; see also irrigated gold: currencies, 67-8, 69-70, iii; min¬
agriculture ing, 44, 46-7, 183, 213, 224; trade, 82,
Florence, 82 88, 134, 177, 246
Fogel, Robert W., 197 Gold Coast Transport Dept., 230
Fonds National de Regularisation des Goldie, George D. Taubman, 164
Cours des Produits d’Outre-Mer, 286 Gonja, 73
Fonds d’Aide etCo-op6ration(F.A.C.),28i Goody, Jack, 36
Fonds d’Investissement pour le D^veloppe- Goree, 226
ment Economique et Social (F.I.D.E.S.), Gourou, Pierre, 34
281, 282 Grand Bassam, 158
foodstuffs, 28; processing of, 49, 244-6; Great Colonial Loan (French, 1931), 261
imported, 178 Great Depression (1873-1896), 133, 159,
forced labour, 219, 226, 263; see also 165
slavery Grey, Henry (3rd Earl), 190
foreign commerce, see external trade groundnut industry, 125-6, 128-30, 131,
forest zone, ii, 13-14, 140, 216-18 133, 134, 137, 138, 139-40, 141-2, 143,
formahsm and substantivism, 6, 69, 112 169, 174, 176, 1-77, 214, 216, 219-21,
Forster & Smith (firm), 152 222-4, 234, 235, 254, 263

330
 Index

Gueye, Lamine, 267 Imoudu, Michael, 258

Gu^ye, Youssouf, 38-9 imperial preference, 264-5, 266, 284-6
Guggisberg, Governor F. Gordon, 190, imperialism, 124-66; economic explan¬
260, 282 ation of, 164-6
guilds, pre-colonial, 49-50 In Salah, 85
Gulf of Guinea, 43 Independants d’Outre-Mer, 270
gum, 87, 88, 99, i2on, 134, 141, I55 independence, political: and closed
economy, 171; movement for, see
Haiti, 103 nationalism
Hamburg, 130, 152, 159, 161, 178, 196 hidustrial & Commercial Bank, Nigeria,
Hancock, W. K., 2, 170, 210, 214 256
harbour development, 151, 195-6 industrial revolution (Europe), 126, 128
Harcourt, Lewis V. (ist Viscount), 211 industrialisation, 5, 185, 262-3, 268, 271,
Hardy, Georges, 2 278-9, 283-4
Hausa people and traders, 19, 26, 50, 61, inland waterways development, 197
63, 64, 72, 76, 220, 240, 248, 252 interest rates, pre-colonial, 71
head-loaders, see porters intermarriage, 14-15
Helleiner, Gerald K., 180, 182, 184, 219, intermediaries in trade, 57, 146, 156, 204-6
232, 287 internal trade, 51-66, 243-53
Hill, Polly, 3, 216, 217 investment (foreign), 185, 191-2, 260-1,
hired labour, see wage labour 267-8, 280-2; see also capital market
Hodder, B. W., 53 iron: currency, 68, in, 149; mining, 44,
Hogendom, J. S., 216 46, 213, 283; trade in, 176, 246
Holland, see Dutch. . . irrigated agriculture, 37n, 262
Holt, John, & Co., 152, 154, 199, 200, 278 Iseyin, 250
Honesty, Willy, see Eyo Nsa Islam and trade, 21, 48, 64-5, 144, 252
Honfleur, 97 Itsekiri people, 146, 155
horses, 74 ivory, 43n, 60, 87, i2on
Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, 270, 272, 275 Ivory Coast Transporters’ Association, 253
households as economic units, 21-3, 38-9,
49-50, 54, 221, 251 JaJa, 146, 155, 205, 252
human resources, 14-27, labour Jamaica, 90, 103
force and population jangali (cattle tax), 248
Hunter, J. M.,i8 Japan, 176
hunting, pre-colonial, 43 Jaureguiberry, Admiral Jean B., 162,164
Huntington, Ellsworth, 13 jihads (holy wars), 80, 134, 144
huza organisation, 217 Jobson, Richard, 30, 49, 87, 89
Hymer, Stephen H., 180, 182 Johnson, Marion, 69
Jones, A. L., 200, 206
Ibadan, 19, 61, 240, 252, 273 Jones, G. L, 147
Ibn Battuta, 78, 86 Jones, W. O., 6
Ibo people, 49, 270 Jos, 195, 282; plateau, 19
Idjil, 47, 48
Ife, 20 Kabara, 73
Iferuan, 85 Kaduna, 195
Igbira people, 49 Kalahari, 147
Ikime, Obaro, 205 Kanem, 30
Ilorin, 61, 131 Kankan, 195

331
 i
An Economic History of West Africa

Kano, 19,48-9, 50, 51,63, 83, 85,195,197, Lewicki, Tadeusz, 83

2-19-20, 248, 259 hberated slaves as merchants, 146, 152-3
Kaolack, 141 Liberia, 2, ion, 159,178,186,198,207, 212
Katsina, 61, 63 Libreville, 152
Kayes, 190 limited habdity companies, 199, 201, 204,
Kente cloth, 250 256
Kilby, Peter, 230, 274 Lincoln, Abraham, 113
Killick, Tony, 209 hquor trade, in, 129-30, 177-8
King, R. & W. (firm), 199 Littama people, 229
Kingsway stores, 277 Liverpool, 87, 94-6, 99, 115,117,118, 129,
kinship and contract, 6, 21, 65, 106 152, 161, 195, 213
Kintampo, 63 hvestock, see animal husbandry: colonial
Kipling, Rudyard, 10 trade in, 248 -5
Kobben, A. J. F., 218 Lobi, 46
Kofyar people, 21 local trade: pre-colonial, 53-8, 76; col¬
kola-nut trade, 6on, 73, 88,144, 246-8, 252 onial, 244-6, 250-1
Kooroko smiths, 60 Lome, 195. 257
Krobo people, 217 London, 95, 99, 116, 118
‘kulaks’, 239 long-distance internal trade: pre-colonial,
Kukawa, 85 53, 58-66, 76; colonial, 244-53
Kumasi, 162, 190, 194 Lower Niger, 162
Kwahu people, 252 Lugard, Frederick J. D. (ist Baron), 164,
Kylsant, ist Lord (Sir Owen PhiUps), 259 189, 192, 197,211, 227
Ly, Abdoulaye, 88, 93
labour force: pre-colonial, 17-18, 20-7,
76-7; colonial, 216-17, 218-19, 221, Macaulay, Herbert, 267
222-31, 239-41, 241-3, 255-6, 257-8, McPhee, Allan, 2, 151, 187
273-5 Maginot Plan, 261, 262
Lagos, 55,106,128,129,134,141,145,149, Maiduguri, 282
151, 153, 154. 159, 160, 194, 195, 211, malaria, 17, 212
219, 240, 242, 248, 279 Maidive Islands, 68
Lagos Stores, 205 Mah, 20, 23, 47, 48, 60, 73, 85, 246, 248,
Laing, Gordon, 86 251
land-tenure, 37-9, 214, 218-20, 221, 239 Malowist, Marian, 43
landlords (wholesalers), 63, 251 malpractices, commercial, 154-5
La Rochelle, 97 Malthus, Thomas R., 17
Lat Dior, ruler of Cayor, 145 Manchester, 95-6, 118, 152, 159, 161, 213
Latham, A. J. H., 69 Mandara uplands, 35
League of Nations, 2iin Mandigo people, 44
leather goods, 49, 87, 250 manganese, 177
Le Corre, A., 99 mandlas, 68n, in, 149, 206
‘legitimate’ commerce, see slave-trade, manufactures: traditional, 43-4, 48-50,
substitutes for 121, 250-1; modem, see industrialisation
Le Havre, 97, 99, no market, concept of, 5-6
Levantine settlers, 200, 204 market place and market principle, 52-3
Leventis, A. G., 204 Marketing Boards, 259, 263-4, 265-6, 271,
Lever, W. H. (ist Viscount Leverhulme), 272, 280, 284, 285-8
199, 211, 213 markets, see distributive system

332
 Index

Mars, John, 202, 258 Myint, H., 231, 233, 235

Marseilles, 99, loi, 129, 149,160, t6i, 196,
199, 200, 263
Nana Olomu, 146, 205
Marshall, Alfred, 10
Nangodi, 18
Martin, Gaston, 94, 96
Nantes, 87,94, 96-8, 99,114,117,118,129,
Martinez, Domingo, 142-3
160
Mauny, Raymond, 83
Napoleon I, Emperor of France, 114
Maurel et Prom (firm), 149, 199, 200, 278
Napoleonic Wars, 107, 114, 158
Mauritania, 179, 229, 283
National African Co., 160
Maxim gun, 155
National Council of Nigeria and the
measures and weights, pre-colonial, 57
Cameroons (N.C.N.C.), 270
Meillassoux, Claude, 3
nationalism, 185, 237-8, 267, 268, 269-72,
Mende people, 271
279, 288, 289-92
meningitis, 17
natural resources, 11-14, 18-19, 139, 235
mercantilism, 92-3, 113
navkanes (immigrant labourers), 221
Merchandise Agreement (1937), 259
Needham, Joseph, 71
Merritt, J. E., 98
‘neolithic revolution’, 29, 42
Meyer, Jean, 94, 96
Netting, Robert McC., 21
Middle Niger, 190, 197, 246, 253
Newbury, C. W., 127, 131
middlemen, see intermediaries
Newton, John, no
migrant labour, 217-18, 220, 221, 222-5,
Niger (territory), 246, 263
231, 233, 241-2
Niger agricultural scheme, 261-2
migration, 14-15, 20, 41, 43
Niger Delta, 106, 133-4, 141, 146-7, i54,
Miller Bros (firm), 199
156, 159, 160
mineral trade, 176, 177, 246; see also gold
Niger river, 43, 72, 197; see also Lower
etc. Niger, Niger Delta and Middle Niger
mining: pre-colonial, 43-8; colonial, 210,
Nikki, 68
212-13, 224
Nkrumah, Kwame, 271, 272, 275
mithqals (dinars), 67-8
Nkwerri people, 46
mixed farming, 34
Nok, 44
Mogador, 83, 85 Northern People’s Congress, 270
monetary systems, see currencies
Nowell Commission, 264, 265
Monoprix stores, 277
Monrovia, 185, 207
Montesquieu, Charles L., 25, 114 oases, 18, 85, 226
Moors people, 41, 80, 155 Obesesan, Chief J. A., 240
Mopti, 246 ocean transport, 148-9; see also sailing
Morgan, W. B. and Pugh, J. C., 32 ships and steamships
Morocco, 83 Odutola, Chief T. A., 273
mortahty rates, 15, 17, 224 Office du Niger, 263
Mossi people, 62, 72 official traders, pre-colonial, 62
motor transport, 196-7, 197-8, 282-3 Ogun river, 197
Mourides, the, 221, 239 oil (mineral), 177
multicentric economies, 52-3 Old Calabar, 106, 107, 108, 109, 140-1,
Murdock, G. P., 29 145, 147, 154, 159, 195
Murzuk, 48, 83 Ol’derogge, D. A., 83
Musa, Mansa (ruler of Mah), 47, 252 Omu Okwei, 205, 252
Muslim law and land-tenure, 38-9, 220-1 Onitsha, 63, 205, 245

333
An Economic History of West Africa

open economy, 168-71; performance of Polanyi, Karl, 6, 68, 69, 112

(1900-60), 172-86; completion of, 187- population, 14-17; distribution of, 18-20;
236; under strain, 237-92 and slave-trade, 121-2; growth of in
Opobo, 134. 141. 146, 151. 155 twentieth century, 224, 232-4
Orleans, 118 Poquin, J.-J., 181, 182
Ormsby-Gore, W. G. A., 211 Poro society. Sierra Leone, 109
ostrich feathers, 131 Port Harcourt, 195
Otaru, Ayo, 273 porters, 20, 24, 72, 73, 227, 230-1
Ottawa Conference (1932), 265 Portbres, Roland, 29
Ouagadougou, 282 Porto Novo, 107, 140, 257
Ouassoulou, 60 Portuguese in W. Africa, 82, 87, 88, 91,
Oume, 44 92, 107, 130
‘ounce’ (unit of account), 69n, in, 112,150 Portuguese Guinea, 178,^^37
overpopulation, 15, 17 Pospisil, Leopold, 69
Owerri, 245 Postlethwayt, Malachi, 91
oxen for transport, 72 pottery, 49, 50, 121, 250, 251
Oyo, 44, 46, 105, 107, 239 prices: in local markets, pre-colonial, 57;
of export staples, 132, 133, 169; of
imported goods in post-abolition
pack-animals, 72, 74-5 commerce, 133; see also terms of trade
palm products, 125-6,128-9,130,131,132, Printania stores, 277
133-4, 137, 138, 139-41, 143, 144, 169, protectionism, see taxes
174, 176-7, 211, 213, 214, 239 protest movements, African, 255, 257-8,
Palmerston, Henry J. T., (3rd Viscount), 266-7, 269, 291; see also nationahsm
114
Parakou, 195 quotas, 174, 264, 265, 266, 283
Parti Democratique de Guinee (P.D.G.),
270 Raccah, Saul, 203, 204
Parti Democratique de la Cote d’Ivoire racial tensions, 170-1, 256-7
(P.D.C.I.), 270, 275 railways, 156, 183, 190, 192-5, 196, 197-8,
partition (ofWest Africa), 124, 135-66 248, 282
Paterson, Zochonis (firm), 200 rainfall, ii, 13, 28
pawrung (debt redemption), 71 Ramboz, Yvonne-Claude, 285
peasant and plantation economies, 170-1, Rassemblement Democratique (R.D.A.),
210-14 270
Pedler, F. J., 37 reciprocity and redistribution, 5-6, 52, 53,
Pendembu, 195 112
periodic markets, 55-6, 251 Reyburn, William D., 21
permanent cultivation, 34, 35-6 Rhodesia (Southern), 171
Peyrissac, Cheri, 152, 199, 200, 259 Richelieu, Cardinal Armand Jean du
Pitt, William, 114, 116 Plessis de, 92
plague, 17 Rinchon, Pere D., 94
Plan de Modernisation et d’Equipement rinderpest, 42, 261
(P.M.E.), 281 river transport, 72-3, 197
plantations, 137-8, 170-71, 210-14 roads; pre-colonial, 74; colonial, 196, 197,
ploughs, 36-7 282-3
plundering, 25, 143 Robinson, Ronald, 158
political parties, African, 269-71 Rodney, Walter, 104

334
 Index

Rostow, W. W., 192 Slater, Governor Ransford, 211

rotating markets, 55-6, 251 slave-raiding, 27, 104-5, 121
rotational bush and planted fallow, 32, 34 slave-revolts, 26, 147, 226-8
Rouen, 99, no, 118 slave-trade, 79, 82-3, 87, 88, 89-92,94-112;
routes, see trade-routes abolition of, 112-16; economic effects
Rouvier, Mamice, 162 of, 117-23; substitutes for, 124-57;
Royal Adventurers into Africa, 92 continuing after abohtion, 142-3
Royal African Co., 88, 92, 95 slavery, internal, 23-7, 77,143,144, 225-8;
Royal Niger Co., 155, i6on, 164,199, 205, see also forced labour
206, 213, 220 slaves, liberated, as merchants, 146, 152-3
rubber, 134, 183, 212 sleeping-sickness, 17, 41
Rufisque, 133 smallpox, 17
Russell, John (ist Earl), 116 Smith, Adam, 25, 78, 94, 118, 157, 230,
Ryff, Roth et Cie (firm), 199 231
smiths, 46, 49
Sahara, ii, 15,18, 36,41, 48, 58, 60, 71, 74, Societe Commerciale de I’Ouest Africain
122, 126, 140, 196, 227; trade across, (S.C.O.A.), 199
63, 79-87, 130-1, 134-5, 197, 252-3 Societe des Amis des Noirs, 114
sailing ships, 95-101, 149, 150, 151-2 Societes Indigenes de Prevoyance (S.I.P.),
St Domingo, 90, 114, 115 262
St Louis, 141, 151, 152, 195, 206 soils, tropical, 13
St Malo, 99 Sokoto, 63
Salaga, 63, 72 Songhai, 20, 23, 24, 26, 43, 48, 73, 80, 85
Sahsbury, Robert Gascoyne-Cecd (3rd Sorkawa people, 43
Marquess), 92 ‘sorting’ (unit of account), in
salt, 44, 47-8, 8in, 252-3 Soudan (territory), 248, 262, 263
Sarraut, Albert, 190, 260, 282 special-purpose currencies, 269-70
savanna, ii, 13-14 speciahsation, occupational: pre-colonial,
Schnapper, Bernard, 158 21, 78-9; colonial, 238-41, 243
Second World War, 184-5, 261 Staple Lines Agreement (1934), 259
Seers, Dudley, 168, 170 staple theory, 125
Segou, 63, 246 steamships, 149, 150, 151-2, 195, 200-1
Sekondi, 194 strikes, 257-8, 269; rural (withholding of
Senegal railway, 190, 197, 221 supphes), 152, 255
Senghor, Leopold, 270 sub-brokers, 240
Serer people, 34, 221 subsistence economies, 5, 9
settlers’ frontiers, 170-1 substantivism and formahsm, 6, 69-70,112
Seven Years War, 98 Sugar Act (1846), 116
Shai people, 250 sugar industry and slave-trade, 90-1, 113,
Sharp, Granville, 113 114, 115, 116, 117, 118
Sheridan, R. B., 118-19 Sundstrom, Lars, 70
shifting cultivation, 32, 34-5 Suret-Canale, Jean, 187
Sierra Leone Development Corporation Swanzy, F. & A. (firm), 149, 152, 199
(DELCO), 210, 261 Szereszewski, R., 232
Sierra Leone People’s Party (S.L.P.P.), 271
Sierra Leone Selection Trust, 210, 2j7a. Takoradi, 190, 195
SijUmasa, 85 Tamourt valley, 24
silver currency, 149, 150, 206-7 Taoudeni, 47-8, 86

335
An Economic History of West Africa

target marketeers, 6o triangular trade, 98-101

target workers, 229-30 Tuareg people, 41, 47, 72, 85-6, 253
tariffs, see taxes Tunis, 83, 85
taxes, pre-colonial internal, 47,62,.73n, 80; tyeddo (warriors), 143
and Atlantic slave-trade, 94, 107; in era
of‘legitimate’ commerce, 130,145,156,
160-2; colonial, 189, 191, 206, 260, 264, underdevelopment, fallacies about, 9-10
265, 266, 280, 283-5 undererrfployment, 17-18, 232-4
Teghaza, 47, 48, 83, 85 underpopulation, 15, 17, 76, 232-4
Tenduf, 85 unicentric economies, 52-3
terms of trade, 60,' 120, 131-2, 133, 134, United Africa Co. (U.A.C.), 199, 259, 277,
135, 142, 172, 180-1, 182-5, 254, 266, 278
267, 268 United African Co., i6oh
Tete-Ansa, W., 256, 260, 267 United Gold Coast Convention
textiles, 48-9, 50, 121, 128, 177, 250-1 (U.G.C.C.), 271
Thies, 190, 257 United Nations, 269
Timbuctu, 19, 20, 48, 51, 60, 61, 63, 72, 73, Upper Volta, 248, 251, 263, 282
83, 85, 86, 162, 197 urbanisation, see towns
tin, 44, 177, 222, 259
Tinubu, Madam, of Abeokuta, 24n
van Alstein, Pierre, 97-8
Tiv people, 69
vegetable oils, see groundnut industry,
Tlemcen, 8in
palm products
Tobin, John, 152
vegetation zones, i i-i 3
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 272, 291
Venice, 82, 87
Togo, 159, 162, i78n
vent-for-surplus theory, 231-6
tolls, see taxes
Verdier, Arthur, 138, 213, 228
Tonnies, Ferdinand, 5-6
Verminck, C. A. (firm), 199
tools, agricultural, 36-7
villages de liberte, 227
Toupet, C., 229
Volta river, 72
towns: pre-colonial, 19-20; colonial, 242;
Volta Pdver Project, 284
see also entrepots
trade unions, 242-3, 257-8, 274-5
trade-routes: internal, 58-60; across wage labour: pre-colonial, 24-5; colonial,
Sahara, 83-4; of slave-trade, 98-101 218, 224-31, 241-3, 257-8, 273-5
traders’ frontiers, 65, 170-1 Walkden, John, & Co., 152
traders’ organisations: pre-colonial, 57; WaUace-Johnson, Isaac T. A., 267
colonial, 251-2 Wargla, 83, 85
‘traditional’ societies, 3-4, 6, 28, 217, 293 Warren, W. M., 274
transactional rules, 5-6 water transport, 72-3
transport: pre-colonial, 71-5, 76, 95-101, Weber, Max, 6
I28n, 149-52; colonial, 149-52, 190, Weeks, John F., 274
191, 192-8, 200-r, 282-3 weights and measiures, pre-colonial, 57
tree crops, 34, 183, 254; see also cocoa, West African Cocoa Control Board, 265
coffee, etc. West African Currency Board, 207, 208
Trevor-Roper, Hugh, 32 West African Produce Control Board, 266,
Tripoh, 48, 83, 85 286
True Whig Party, 10 West Indies and slave-trade, 90-1,98-101,
trypanosomiasis, 17, 41 103

336
 Index

Western Sudan, ii, 13, 15, 19, 39, 41, 43, Wolof people, 68, 70, 221
46, 48, 49, 60, 67, 71, 75, 79, 80-6, 92, working hours, pre-colonial, 17-18
125, 126, 134, 140, 162, 194, 224 Wrigley, Christopher, 29
wheel (in Africa), 50, 71, 73-5
White, Lynn, 36
Yoruba people, Yorubalaiid, 19, 21, 31, 70,
Whydah, 86, 106, 107, 108, i4on, 141, 145
71, 126, 143, 155, 156, 162
Wdberforce, WiUiam, 102, 113, 116
WiUiams, Eric, 113, 114, 118, 119
Woermann-Linic (shipping line), 149, Zinder, 61
151, 201 zongos (settlements), 65

337
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