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PROJECTION AND REALISM IN HUME’S
PH ILOSOPHY
This page intentionally left blank
Projection and Realism in
Hume’s Philosophy
P J E KAIL

1
 1
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Published in the United States
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 P J E Kail 2007
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First published 2007
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For Sarah
This page intentionally left blank
 Contents

Acknowledgements xviii
References to Hume’s Work xxi
Introduction xxiii

PA RT I . R E L I G I O N A N D T H E E X T E R N A L WO R L D
1. Projection, Religion, and the External World 3
2. The Senses, Reason and the Imagination 26
3. Realism, Meaning and Justification: The External World and
Religious Belief 56

PA RT I I . M O D A L I T Y, P RO J E C T I O N A N D R E A L I S M
4. ‘Our Profound Ignorance’: Causal Realism and the Failure to Detect
Necessity 77
5. Spreading The Mind: Projection, Necessity and Realism 103
6. Into the Labyrinth: Persons, Modality and Hume’s Undoing 125

PA RT I I I . VA LU E , P RO J E C T I O N A N D R E A L I S M
7. Gilding: Projection, Value and Secondary Qualities 147
8. The Gold: Good, Evil, Belief and Desire 175
9. The Golden: Relational Values, Realism and a Moral Sense 204
Bibliography 245
Index 255
This page intentionally left blank
 Detailed Table of Contents

Acknowledgements xviii
Introduction xxiii

PA RT I . R E L I G I O N A N D T H E E X T E R N A L WO R L D
1. Projection, Religion, and the External World 3
1.1 Projection: Initial Distinctions 3
Feature and explanatory projection; explanatory projection as non-detective
explanation; questions to be asked of explanatory projective accounts
1.2 Projection and the Origins of Religion 7
‘Invisible Intelligent Power’, the core content of religious belief; its
emergence in polytheism; anthropomorphism; anxiety, passions and
explanatory projection; motivated irrationality; the manifestation of a
psychological disposition to relieve uneasiness
1.3 Digression: A Brief Comparison with Freud 12
Projection as ‘expulsion’ and motivated irrationality; the overlap with
explanatory projection; the origin of malign spirits
1.4 Projection and the Origins of the External World Belief 14
The vulgar view; continued and distinct existence, the core content of
external world belief; detection and the senses; constancy and coherence;
constancy; the manifestation of a psychological disposition to relieve
uneasiness; compared with the emergence of polytheism
1.5 The Transmutation of the Core Contents: Further Parallels 17
Polytheism and the vulgar view easily shown to be false; transmutation into
monotheism and the philosophical view; not produced by reason but the
same projective sources as the earlier views; both sophisticated versions
have a tenuous grip on the imagination
1.6 Destabilization, Realism and Hume’s Projective Explanations 20
Such explanations do not foreclose on realism; rational destabilization and
the demand for justification
1.7 Summary 24
x Detailed Table of Contents
2. The Senses, Reason and the Imagination 26

2.1 Introduction 26
The senses and reason as detective sources, the former of basic contents, the
latter of normative considerations
2.2 The Senses 27
2.2.1 Impressions, Acquaintance and Detection 27
Impressions, what they are; impressions as objects and input; detection as
acquaintance; the ‘difference betwixt feeling and thinking’, a mitigation
2.2.2 Detection, Meaning and Meaninglessness 31
The Copy Principle as a theory of meaning; senses in which Hume has no theory
of meaning; meaninglessness and realism; meaning and Hume’s formulation
of the Copy Principle; meaning as possible object of acquaintance; simple and
complex perceptions; Hume’s approach; two senses of ‘meaninglessness’; sum-
mary
2.3 Reason 36
2.3.1 Preliminaries 36
ReasonF , reasonsN and reasoning I
2.3.2 Relations and Demonstrative Reason 37
Reasoning as comparison of relations; philosophical relations, constant and
inconstant; intuition and demonstration; demonstration as awareness of
necessitation relations grounded in analytic relations; demonstration not
deduction
2.3.3 Probable Reason and Causal Inference 40
Detection, projection and scepticism about probable reason; probable reason
and the philosophical relation of causation; reasonF not the cause of probable
reasoning I ; because reasonF cannot grasp reasonsN ; the UP; probable reason
as having projective (non-detective basis); this not equivalent to showing that
probable reason is not a detective source of belief
2.4 The Imagination 48
2.4.1 Ideas and the Imagination 48
Ideas as images fall under the imagination
2.4.2 Association and Power 48
Hume’s brief introduction of the principles; cause and effect and the association
of ideas; Leibniz, Spinoza and Hobbes on association and the failure to grasp
that which underpins manifest regularities
2.4.3 Resemblance, Association and Error 52
Resemblance and its background; the grounds for the dispositions behind the
external world and religious belief; ‘outness’ and the three-dimensional trick
 Detailed Table of Contents xi
3. Realism, Meaning and Justification: The External World and
Religious Belief 56
3.1 Realism and Threats to Realism 56
Realism as justified belief in the external world/God; justificatory and
semantic threats to realism
3.2 The ‘Absurdity’ of Monotheism and the Doctrine of Double
Existence: A Threat to Realism Removed 58
Monotheism and double existence both ‘monstrous’ and ‘absurd’; the
absurdity in monotheism extrinsic to its content; the semantic threat and
the doctrine of double existence; relative ideas; the supposition of
resembling external objects coherent; the semantic threat met; the
supposition of ‘specific difference’
3.3 A Different Semantic Threat: Reason and the Evacuation of
Content 62
Consistent reasoning on the like effects, like causes principle leaves an
‘unknown’ something as the cause of order in the universe or the cause of
perceptions; the relevance to realism
3.4 Realism and Justification: Religion and the External World
Contrasted 66
3.4.1 The Letter to Elliot 66
Hume’s differing attitudes to the propensity to our senses and religion
3.4.2 ‘Natural Belief ’, Justification and the External World 67
Principles of the imagination, permanent and irresistible; practical justification;
the propensity to believe our senses and experience; the doctrine of double
existence as having authority
3.4.3 Double Existence and the Evacuation of Content 69
Hume’s lack of enthusiasm for the doctrine of modern philosophy; the Title
Principle and the worrisome argument
3.4.4 Religious Commitment 71
Religious belief and its practical consequences; only the vacuous form survives
3.5 Conclusion to Part I 71

PA RT I I . M O D A L I T Y, P RO J E C T I O N A N D R E A L I S M

4. ‘Our Profound Ignorance’: Causal Realism and the Failure to Detect

Necessity 77
4.1 Introduction 77
xii Detailed Table of Contents

4.2 Causal Realism and Threats to Causal Realism 78

4.2.1 What is Causal Realism? 78
The justificatory threat and the semantic threat; the meaning tension; defla-
tionary approaches
4.2.2 Threats to Causal Realism 80
4.3 Meeting the Semantic Threat 82
4.3.1 The Semantic Threat and the Realist Strategy 82
Hume’s negative arguments as manifesting an understanding of causal power
sufficiently rich to specify that of which we are ignorant; the Bare Thought
meets the semantic threat
4.3.2 The Bare Thought of Necessity Articulated; Why We Cannot Detect
Causal Power 83
The cognitive consequences of a genuine impression of power; a priori inference
and inconceivability; this yields a way of specifying that which we cannot
understand; Hume’s general negative strategy
4.3.3 Powers and Absolute Necessity 85
Powers and absolute necessity; naturalism and occasionalism; Hume, Male-
branche and why Hume’s strategy is not ad hominem
4.3.4 The Bare Thought and the Threat of Incoherence: The Short
Argument 88
The threat of incoherence; the short argument for incoherence; an alternative
reading; ignorance of essence
4.3.5 Powers as Essences 90
Reason and the supposition of power; the switching argument; a causal nexus and
a causal straightjacket; powers as essences explains the switching argument
4.3.6 The Short Argument Dismantled: Conceivability, Metaphysical Pos-
sibility and the Objects of Conceivability 92
Conceivability briefly introduced; conceivability and Hume’s restrictions;
impressions cannot reveal modal properties of objects; essences and the epistemic
possibility of a change in the course of nature
4.3.7 Summary, Another Objection and ‘Meaninglessness’ Reconsid-
ered 98
Summary of this chapter; a final objection; the constitution of our faculties a
contingent matter

5. Spreading The Mind: Projection, Necessity and Realism 103

5.1 Introduction 103
5.2 Hume’s Projective Account of Necessity 105
5.2.1 The Determination of the Mind: Hume’s Non-Detective Explan-
ation of the Idea of Necessity 105
 Detailed Table of Contents xiii
The customary transition; Hume’s account of the idea thought to be hopeless;
the immediacy of the transition and psychological inseparability as mimicking
a priori inference and inconceivability
5.2.2 Spreading the Determination: Feature Projection and the Experience
of Causation 108
The feature projective element; its perceptual nature; Hume on the vulgar
epistemology of power; Malebranche and spreading the mind; singularists and
the phenomenology of causation
5.3 Thought or Quasi Thought? Realism, the Idea of Necessity and the
Bare Thought 110
A threat to realism; the idea does not represent; non-cognitivism;
non-cognitivism and the Bare Thought
5.4 Realism Reconsidered 116
5.4.1 Why Realism? 116
Hume’s references to powers; the Bare Thought and realism
5.4.2 Deflationary Strategies Rejected 118
Deflationary readings of hidden connections and ignorance rejected; micro-
regularities; expressivism; the Enquiry footnote; an alleged fallacy
5.4.3 The Character of the Supposition and the Justificatory Threat 121
The general assumption and the customary transition; a minimal preference;
agnosticism?

6. Into the Labyrinth: Persons, Modality and Hume’s Undoing 125

6.1 Introduction 125
6.2 The Projective Explanation of the Belief in a Substantial Self 126
Hume’s primary concern the origin of the false belief in a substantial self;
no impression that is ‘constant and invariable’; dissonance and the bias of
the imagination; our yielding to the bias and feigning a self; the relations
that trigger this projected belief
6.3 Sceptical Realism about Substantial Selves, and Denying the
‘proper identity and simplicity of a self’ 129
Hume confident the self is a collection of perceptions; sceptical realism
about self rejected; Hume’s reductio against the self as simple individual
substance upon which perceptions depend; perceptions nevertheless
dependent entities
6.4 The Labyrinth 131
6.4.1 A Causal Realist Reading of the Appendix Worry Outlined 131
Hume’s modal reasoning implies perceptions cannot be necessarily connected,
and so not causally connected; this is inconsistent with his account of self
xiv Detailed Table of Contents
6.4.2 ‘Distinctness’ 133
Hume does not assume a notion of ‘distinct existence’ that analytically implies
metaphysical independence; distinct existences as a phenomenal notion; avoids
circularity and explains conceptual independence
6.4.3 Distinctness, Conceivability and the Reification of Experience: Why
Hume Cannot Renounce His Principles and Escape the Labyrinth 136
Phenomenal distinctness as an intentional notion; representation and phenom-
enal distinctness; the reification of experiences and perceptions qua vehicles
of resemblance and representation; separability applied to those objects entails
that they cannot be necessarily connected; why Hume cannot renounce his
principles
6.4.4 Summary, Objections and Replies 138
6.5 Summary Outline of the Argument 142
6.6 Conclusion to Part II 143

PA RT I I I . VA LU E , P RO J E C T I O N A N D R E A L I S M

7. Gilding: Projection, Value and Secondary Qualities 147

7.1 Introduction 147
7.2 Hume and the Doctrine of Modern Philosophy: The View and its
Background 151
7.2.1 Modern Philosophy and the Vulgar 151
Hume’s alleged confusion over the doctrine of modern philosophy; Malebranche,
Bayle and Berkeley; the consequence of modern philosophy for the vulgar
concept of colour as of irreducible, manifest phenomenal qualities; Hume’s
response to Reid; the content of the vulgar view
7.2.2 Projection, Sensation and Experience 158
‘In the mind’ intentional and non-intentional; the feature projection of sensation
in Malebranche; feature and explanatory projection; colours as identical with
sensations; Malebranche again
7.3 The Comparison 162
7.3.1 Introductory 162
7.3.2 The Explanandum 163
Essential value; a moderate internalism; dispositions and grounds
7.3.3 The Mechanism of Projection 167
Low phenomenal intensity and secondary qualities; Hume’s reasons for why we
cannot detect essential value
7.3.4 Sentiment and Colour Sensation 170
The Comparison and the irreducibility of the response
 Detailed Table of Contents xv

7.4 Preliminary Conclusion: Questions and Issues 171

Summary: too much error? Sentiments as desires or constituents? Why
pleasure? Is the account really explanatory?

8. The Gold: Good, Evil, Belief and Desire 175

8.1 Introduction 175
8.2 Pleasure and Pain, Good and Evil, Desire and Aversion 177
8.2.1 The Identity Thesis 177
Natural Good and Evil, pleasure and pain; Hume and others; the efficient
causes reading of pleasure and pain unsatisfactory; pleasures and pains as
providing ideas of good and evil that figure in complex judgments concerning
the value of the objects of the passions; ideas of good and evil and belief
8.2.2 Why the Identity Thesis? Metaphysical Hedonism and the Sources
of Content 182
The Identity Thesis and the acquisition of ideas of good and evil; metaphys-
ical hedonism; convergence and explanation; pleasure and pain as states of
consciousness with essential value
8.2.3 Hume and Metaphysical Hedonism: Initial Support and Strat-
egy 187
Two initial points; the presence of the Identity Thesis and the regress of reasons
in Appendix I EPM; reasons clearly not decisive; strategy; re-read ‘Of the
influencing motives of the will’, offer an alternative target and integrated such
a view in the account of moral motivation
8.3 Re-Reading ‘Of the influencing motives of the will’ 189
8.3.1 The Standard Reading 189
The ‘Humean’ theory of motivation; its threat to metaphysical hedonism;
Smith’s general strategy rejected
8.3.2 ‘Reason Alone’ 192
What is meant be ‘reason alone’; the faculty of comparison and motivating
contents
8.3.3 ‘Reason Cannot Oppose’ 193
Reason alone, means, ends and false beliefs; three notorious passages
8.3.4 Calm Passions 196
General Appetite to good and evil not original but acquired
8.3.5 Cognition, Acquaintance and Belief 197
Belief and the manifestation of the power to actuate the will
8.4 Moral Rationalism and Morality Not a Matter of Fact 199
Rationalism a thesis about what moral facts consist in and not moral
cognitive internalism
xvi Detailed Table of Contents

9. The Golden: Relational Values, Realism and A Moral Sense 204

9.1 Introduction 204
9.2 Perceptions of ‘of good or evil, of pleasure and pain’: The Indicator
Function of Pleasure and Pain, and the Beneficial and the Harmful 206
Pleasure and pain as directing us toward the healthy and away from the
harmful; Descartes, Malebranche, Berkeley and Hutcheson; animal
nature, and the indication of relational goods; Malebranche and the
function of projecting pleasure and pain; indication, awareness and the
proper function of pleasure and pain
9.3 Modelling a Moral Sense: Hume in the Light of Hutcheson 213
9.3.1 Preliminaries 213
Hume’s awareness of the functional role of pleasure and pain; the letter to
Hutcheson and the parallel between bodily pleasure and moral sentiments;
proposal; a word on Hume and Hutcheson
9.3.2 Sentiments, Pleasure and Meaning 216
Peculiar pleasures and the phenomenology of morality; Hutcheson and Hume
against Hobbes and Mandeville
9.3.3 The Relational Values and Projection 219
Hutcheson, uniformity amidst variety and benevolence; Hume, the useful and
the agreeable
9.3.4 Reflex Sentiments & Sensitivity 222
Projection and the rendering relational values salient; reflective perceptions and
an objection; the empirical discovery of the foundation of merit
9.4 The Correction of Sentiment: Sensitivity, Secondary Qualities and
Realism 228
9.4.1 Realism, Identity and Correction 228
The identity of moral facts with relational values; standards of correction
9.4.2 Two Views of Power and Secondary Qualities Revisited 229
Causalism; causalism about virtues rejected; powers understood dispositionally;
normal conditions and observers as partly constitutive
9.4.3 Dispositionalism Rejected: Hutcheson 233
What makes for normality?
9.4.4 Dispositionalism Rejected: Hume 235
For what are we correcting?
9.4.5 Sympathy and the Common Point of View 236
Correcting for sympathy; an apparent tension dissolved
 Detailed Table of Contents xvii
9.4.6 Providence versus Reflection: A Key Difference between Hutcheson
and Hume 239
9.5 Conclusion to Chapter 9: Realism in Humean Morals 241
9.6 Conclusion to Part III 242
9.7 Appendix: A Puzzle about ‘Of the standard of taste’ 243
Bibliography 245
Index 255
 Acknowledgements

Some material in the present work appears, or is due to appear, in The British
Journal for the History of Philosophy, the Philosophical Quarterly, and The New
Hume Debate 2nd edition. I am grateful to the editors of each for their
permission to reproduce some small portions of it here. This project began with
a British Academy Post-Doctoral Fellowship, held at the Faculty of Philosophy,
University of Cambridge and at Darwin and St Edmund’s College Cambridge.
I am indebted to them for their help and support, as well as the Universities
of Edinburgh and Oxford, St Peter’s College Oxford and the Newberry Library
Chicago.
Many people have helped me in writing this book: my family with their moral
support; Peter Momtchiloff and Rupert Cousens at Oxford University Press
have been unfailingly helpful and supportive; the anonymous readers provided
excellent critical feedback at every stage of the process, and it is no exaggeration
to say that it would have been a worse book without it. I am extremely grateful.
Zoe Payne proofread a version of the manuscript, no mean feat given my
extraordinary ability to litter any piece of writing with typographical errors.
Thanks must also go to my copy-editor, Virginia Masardo. Versions of the
arguments given here have benefited from audiences and commentators at Hume
Society meetings in Monterey and Cork. Audiences in Dubrovnik, Vienna,
the APA in Chicago and New York, Cambridge, Oxford, Durham, Liverpool,
Birmingham, Edinburgh, St. Andrews, Stirling, Aberdeen, Central Michigan,
Bristol and Manchester Metropolitan have all helped me refine my thoughts.
In no particular order, James Harris, Martin Bell, Rae Langton, Arif Ahmed,
Richard Holton, Denis Walsh, Mike Ridge, Sandy Stewart, Galen Strawson,
John Gaskin, Tim Mawson, the late Philip Lakelin, Matthew Nudds, Huw Price,
Alexander Bird, Hugh Mellor, Barry Stroud, Peter Railton, Tito Magri, Louis
Loeb, Alessio Vaccari, Lorenzo Greco, Jane McIntyre, Mike Green, Hallvard
Lillehammer, Brooks Somerville, Jane Heal, Ken Winkler, Geoff Sayre-McCord,
Tom Baldwin, Simon Blackburn, Ross Harrison, the late Ian Tipton and John
Rogers have either read or heard versions of the present materials and have offered
very useful comments—I have learned much from many people. Some non-
philosophical but equally necessary debts are owed for friendship. Sara Austin,
Mike Green, Matthew Nudds, Russell Viner, Dasha Nichols, Carlo Caruso,
Annalisa Cipollone, Peter Milne, Alessio Vaccari, Lorenzo Greco, Emma Griffin,
Paul McGoay, Elisabetta Frontoni, Katherine Hawley and Jon Hesk, John Rogers
and lately Tim Mawson fall under that category.
Those deserving special mention I am proud to count among my friends.
Edward Craig’s wisdom and friendliness were a help right from the beginning of
 Acknowledgements xix

my career as a graduate student. I have had many fruitful discussions with John
Wright and enjoyed his sense of fun and humour in a world too often populated
by the earnest. Marina Frasca-Spada has been a friend and a true Humean for
years now, and helped me in many different ways aside from mere philosophy.
Finally, thank you to Edmund and Sarah for making my world golden.
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