For the exclusive use of J. Dicocco, 2017.

ID# CU53
PUBLISHED ON
AUGUST 4, 2011

THE CIBER CASE SERIES

Equity Bank: The Real Thing?
BY DAVID BEIM * AND MURRAY LOW †

Introduction
In early 2011, Kevin Stout, an MBA student with a background in international banking, sat
in the classroom and listened carefully as the CEO of Equity Bank (Equity), Dr. James
Mwangi, described the Kenyan bank:
Our mission is to serve people that the banking system has excluded, those
considered too poor to have a bank. Our mission is to empower these people,
to believe in them, to give them dignity. We are like family to our
customers—we give them services, we give them support, we want them to
become successful and rich. Our bank is based on emotional bonds rooted in
the African village. We want to be our customers’ caring, trusted partner.
We have provided hope to more than four million Kenyans but we are not
stopping there. We have opened in Uganda and Southern Sudan. We have
applied for licenses in Tanzania and Rwanda. Our goal is the socio-economic
transformation of East Africa.
As Mwangi continued on, Stout paused, impressed by the message he heard. But, he
wondered, “Am I being drawn in too easily by this energetic and charismatic leader?”
Determined to maintain his objectivity, he scanned a quick summary of the bank’s
performance and saw the following:

Author affiliation Copyright information

*
Professor of Professional Practice and Bernstein Faculty Leader, © 2011 by The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New
Columbia Business School York.
†
Director, The Eugene Lang Entrepreneurship Center, Columbia
Business School This case is for teaching purposes only and does not represent an
endorsement or judgment of the material included.
Acknowledgements
Bjarni Torfason, PhD’11, provided research support and direction This case cannot be used or reproduced without explicit permission
for this case. Marie Bell provided additional research support. from Columbia CaseWorks. To obtain permission, please visit
www.gsb.columbia.edu/caseworks, or e-mail
This case was sponsored by the Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. Center [email protected]
for Leadership and Ethics and the Chazen Institute and the
Columbia University Center for International Business Education
and Research (CIBER).

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FIGURE 1.EQUITY BANK PREFORMANCE

Equity Bank Growth

Deposit & Gross Loan Growth 8000 800

7000 700
120.0%
6000 600
100.0%
5000 500
80.0% 4000 400

60.0% 3000 300

2000 200
40.0%
1000 100
20.0%
0 0
0.0% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Customers (thousands) Employees
Total Deposit Growth Gross Loan Growth Borrowers (thousands) - right axis Branches - right axis

ROA Credit Quality

7.00% 10.0% Non-Performing Loans (%Total Loans)
6.00% 9.0% Allowances for Credit Losses (%Total Loans)
8.0%
5.00% 7.0%
4.00% 6.0%
5.0%
3.00% 4.0%
2.00% 3.0%
2.0%
1.00%
1.0%
0.00% 0.0%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Familiar with retail banking, Stout remained puzzled. Such growth was literally
unbelievable. Was it the real thing or something too good to be true? How had Equity Bank
managed such rapid expansion while increasing profitability? How can you possibly
expand lending at rates like those of Equity Bank to a poverty-level customer base without
being overwhelmed by losses and operating costs? Intrigued, he decided to explore further.

Country and Industry Background

A former British colony, Kenya won its independence in 1963. With a population of almost
40 million in 2010, the country’s median age was 18.8 years with 42% of the population
under the age of 15. The country was composed of several ethnic groups, the largest of which
was the Kikuyu (22% of the population), following by the Luhya (14% of the population) and
many smaller groups. Approximately 80% of the population was literate, with the average
Kenyan having completed 10 years of school. Kenya was also a country of income and
educational disparity.
Although often considered a political and economic anchor in East Africa, Kenya faced many
challenges. In the post-colonial period through the late 1970s, Kenya was led by Jomo
Kenyatta, a Kikuyu who built relationships with the western world and garnered both
foreign investment and economic assistance for his country. Upon Kenyatta’s death in 1978,
the then Vice President Daniel Arap Moi assumed the role of president. Arap Moi’s

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repressive leadership was characterized by preferential treatment toward his own ethnic
group, economic stagnation, and human rights concerns. The Kibaki-led government came
to power in 2002 in the first-ever truly democratic elections with a commitment to end
corruption. Despite some progress, with the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and
the Public Ethics Act, the Kibaki government was soon mired in graft scandals. In 2005 and
2006, the World Bank and IMF suspended aid programs for much of the year. In 2008,
following a controversial election, violence erupted with riots, more than 1,000 people dead,
and many times that number displaced. By 2010, the country seemed to have recovered
somewhat with the World Bank forecasting a 5.3% growth in GDP for 2011 and 2012.
KENYAN BANKING INDUSTRY
Although currently stable, the Kenyan banking industry had endured three systematic
crashes since 1960. In 2010, the Kenyan banking industry was characterized by 45 banks (in
addition to 2 mortgage finance companies, and 105 foreign exchange bureaus). The leading
20% of the banks controlled 70% of the sector across all lines of business. (See Exhibits 1 and
2 for Equity’s performance relative to other leading Kenyan banks.)
With the exception of Equity, traditionally the leading Kenyan banks were standardized,
offering typical banking products to the wealthier segments of the Kenyan population.
Recently, however, some competitors saw the expansion into non-traditional forms of
banking as an opportunity to make inroads in rural markets that had been perceived as too
expensive to reach and with customers too poor to offer value. For example, large players
such as Kenya Commercial Bank and Cooperative Bank were moving downstream to
capture some of the market they had ostensibly ignored for years.

Equity Bank
Equity Bank was founded in 1984 as Equity Building Society (EBS) to provide mortgage
financial services to the nwananchi—the ordinary Kenyan. By 1993, EBS was technically
insolvent: non-performing loans made up more than 50% of its portfolio, accumulated losses
totaled KSh 33 million, and the company’s liquidity ratio was 5.8%—significantly less than
the 20% required by Kenyan law. An extremely competitive market characterized by slow
growth had been a factor in the demise of the company, but more important was the lack of
professional management and poor board supervision.
One of the three significant depositors of the EBS was Mwangi, who had risen from a
humble village background to a position as financial controller with Trade Bank. Rather than
walk away from EBS, Mwangi joined the firm in 1994 as the director of finance and
operations but soon found he was effectively acting as the CEO of a turnaround. One of his
first actions was the conversion of his KSh 7 million deposit at the EBS into stock.
Key components of Mwangi’s turnaround strategy were a restructuring of the board,
reinvigoration of bank staff, a commitment to bank the unbankable, and a focus on the
burgeoning microfinance industry. The popularity of microfinance institutions (MFIs), which
strove to provide financial services to poor and low income people in order to foster self

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sufficiency, was fueled in the 1990s by the success of banking institutions such as Grameen
Bank in Bangladesh and BancoSol in Bolivia. While those banks served the poor, they solved
the problem of getting repaid by lending to “solidarity groups,” mainly groups of women
with small businesses who jointly agreed to repay. Such groups were offered a graduated
series of loans, starting with small and short-term loans, gradually growing in size and
length of term when previous loans were paid promptly. Numerous small-scale MFIs were
launched in Kenya through a variety of organizations (see Exhibit 3).
Equity utilized the MFI model to some degree but departed from it in major ways. Whereas
most microfinance banks were charities, Equity was distinctly for-profit. Whereas most
microfinance emphasized loans, Equity emphasized deposit accounts. In its early days,
Equity lent these deposits to corporations, but soon lending shifted to the deposit clientele.
Although at first most micro credit loans were group loans, the bank developed many other
approaches. Equity’s range of products became quite diverse, growing to include loans to
individuals, farms, and small businesses. It asked loyalty of its customers—and in fact
restricted its microfinance customers from having accounts at other financial institutions—
but in return showed loyalty to them as they grew and their need for loans increased.
By 2004, EBS had been transformed from mortgage provider to bank, and in August 2006,
Equity Bank was listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. Its total assets grew more than
twentyfold from KSh 6.7 billion at the end of 2004 to KSh 143.0 billion by the end of 2010.
Branches grew from 42 in 2006 to 165 by the end of 2010 and the number of customers grew
from 413,000 in 2004 to 5.9 million by the end of 2010. As the bank grew, however, its equity
ratio drifted downwards until the end of 2007, when the African investment fund, Helios,
acquired a 24.99% share of the bank. This purchase injected KSh 11.4 billion into the bank
and more than quadrupled the bank’s equity, strengthening the foundations of its previous
growth and preparing it for further growth. After that capital injection, the ratio of equity to
total assets was increased to over 28% with a significant part of those assets being cash and
liquid securities. By the end of 2010, subsequent growth had resulted in the ratio moving to
around 20%. (Exhibit 4 provides Equity’s Income Statement and Balance Sheet, 2004–10.)
CULTURE
Equity Bank described its purpose as the transformation of “lives and livelihoods of our
people socially and economically by availing them modern, inclusive financial services that
maximize their opportunities.” 1 The company’s stated vision was to be the champion of
socio-economic prosperity to the people of Africa. Its tag line was “Your Listening and
Caring Partner,” while the company’s motto was “Growing Together in Trust.”
Under Mwangi’s leadership, Equity Bank strived to make these statements more than words
for both its customers and its people. From an internal perspective, even as the bank grew,
senior executives maintained an open-door policy, hiring was based on merit, and earning
and maintaining a position at the bank depended on the employee’s commitment to the
Bank’s values. 2 Mwangi also insisted on two strictly enforced “house rules”: Every Equity
employee was directed to address their fellow workers, including Mwangi himself, by their
first names and there was to be no mention of Kenyan politics in the workplace. New

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employees were hired on a six month probationary basis so that the cultural fit could be
determined. Established employees unable to maintain the company’s values were
counseled out.
From an external perspective, Equity Bank’s vision and purpose were expressed in an
unwavering commitment to customer focus. Rather than ignoring the “unbankable”, Equity
developed ways to profitably serve even the most remote villages, building financial
products and services attuned to that population’s needs. In doing so, Equity delivered on its
promise to be a “listening and caring partner.” Customers felt a connection to the bank and
expressed pride in being a member of it.
DEPOSIT GATHERING
Deposits formed the bulk of the bank’s funding, representing over 90% of the bank’s
liabilities at the end of 2010. As its customers grew, so did deposits, with average deposits
per customer remaining almost constant around KSh 16,000. Equity had 45.5% of Kenya’s
deposit accounts in 2010 (representing only 7.7% of all deposits when measured by amount).
(Exhibit 5 summarizes Equity’s growth in total deposits, total accounts, and average account
size.) About 20% of the bank’s customers were borrowers.
As noted above, a defining characteristic of Equity was strong and widespread deposit
gathering. Whereas other banks charged prohibitively high fees for bank accounts that
effectively closed out the poor, Equity maintained low fees, allowing poorer customers to
open accounts at the bank. For many customers, the initial purpose in having a bank account
was its transactional value rather than a desire to accumulate savings. When in place,
however, customers found the account could help play an important role in smoothing out
consumption and saving. The bank also offered products to encourage customers to save in
an organized way through committed savings accounts, jijenge (Swahili for develop, build
yourself) accounts. The opportunity to save in a bank account, however, was not the only
reason for people to open accounts. Having had a deposit account with the bank was a
prerequisite for a loan.

Customer Loan Segments

In 2010, Equity focused its lending efforts across five customer/product segments: consumer,
micro credit, agriculture, small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), and corporate. The
segments were based on the purpose of the loan, size of the loan, collateral, and similar
factors. Table 1 shows how these segments evolved.

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TABLE 1. CUSTOMER/PRODUCT SEGMENTS 2005–10

By number
Concentration by sector 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 of
customers
Consumer 42% 41% 38% 24% 18% 26% 60%
Micro Credit 11% 14% 18% 14% 22% 9% 20%
Agriculture 3% 3% 2% 3% 4% 3% 5%
SME 26% 28% 27% 31% 20% 9% 10%
Corporate 18% 13% 15% 28% 35% 53% 5%
Total loans and advances (m.KES) 80,135 65,733 45,195 22,228 11,428 5,886
Source: Equity Bank, case writer estimates

Exhibit 6 outlines Equity’s loan and borrower size over time. Exhibit 7 highlights some key
areas of growth through early 2011. Exhibits 8 and 9 compare Equity’s deposit and interest
rate statistics to those of other Kenyan banks.
Equity Bank generally charged a single flat interest rate for each category of loan. The
amount of the loan varied; Equity rationed out credit that would be repaid rather than at
prices that incorporated a risk of default. As a result, only a small minority of loan
applications were completely rejected. When a customer was rejected, a senior loan officer or
the branch manager relayed the message and provided guidance as to how the client could
be successful in applying later.
See Table 2 below for historical data on rates and borrowing terms by segment.
TABLE 2.
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Average Lending Rates
Microcredit 24% Flat 18% Flat 18% Flat 18% Flat 18% Flat
Individuals 17% RD 17% RD 17% RD 16% RD 16% RD
SMEs 18% RD 17% RD 16% RD 15% RD 14% RD
Agriculture 17% Flat 15% Flat 15% Flat 15% Flat 15% Flat
Corporate 15% RD 15% RD 15% RD 13% RD 12% RD
Note: RD refers to “reducing balance.”

MICRO CREDIT:
In the micro credit segment, small loans were made to customers with some sort of trade or
business. About 30% of the micro portfolio was based on the classical group lending model.
Many of the others were secured by a chattel mortgage on objects such as a bed or television
set. Assuming loan obligations were met, the size of these loans might grow over time to
accommodate the customer’s needs.
CONSUMER:
The consumer segment was the largest and fastest growing segment of Equity. About half of
the time, the loans in this segment were made to individuals and often for consumption
purposes. The other half of the loans went toward some form of investment, property, or

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asset acquisitions. The loan periods were significantly longer than the micro loans and
ranged from one to five years.
About 80% of consumer borrowers were customers with salaries that were deposited by the
employer into the bank. In the case of smaller, shorter loans (less than KSh 100,000 and
shorter than 1 year), Equity permitted the employee to bring the salary to the bank, allowing
the bank to access customers with less formal employment. Defaults were less than 2%.
AGRICULTURE:
The smallest sector in Equity was agriculture, representing only 3% to 4% of the bank’s total
portfolio and the only segment centered on a segment of the economy. The loans were made
for business purposes in agriculture, to buy various farm inputs or to develop farm land.
Borrowers were individuals, close in size to micro borrowers, though a portion of the
borrowers were more similar to SME borrowers. About a third of the loans were group loans
(like micro), where an individual was the borrower but a group of up to 30 people
guaranteed the repayment of the loan. Default rates were a non-trivial 5% to 7%. Defaults
tended to be correlated with drought, as happened in 2008, and adversely affected everyone
at the same time. To mitigate the effects of such correlated climate risks, the bank was
introducing crop insurance.
SME (INCLUDING ASSET FINANCE):
The SME sector could largely be characterized as “grown up micro.” The bank’s growth
strategy for SME was progression and retention. As smaller customers grew and needed
more extensive financial services, they “graduated” from micro to SME (and ultimately to
corporate), with about half of the clients in SME previously having been customers in micro. 3
Unlike the micro sector, loans in SME were collateralized. The collateral might be land, cash,
or securities, and loan-to-value ratios ranged from 50% to 70%. Although these margins were
considered high, Equity had found that collateral had been difficult to secure when action
was taken.
Asset finance represented about one-third of SME providing financing when customers
acquired equipment, usually vehicles but also manufacturing equipment. The bank bought
and formally owned the acquired asset, which was only legally transferred to the client when
the loan was repaid. With many banks competing in the asset finance space, Equity had a
strong business but was not a market leader.
CORPORATE:
The corporate segment experienced more direct competition from other banks than any other
segment. About half of the accounts were new to Equity won through a bidding process,
whereas the other half of this sector’s clients had previously been customers at the micro or
SME sectors. Familiarity with the bank was important in winning a bid for the corporate
business. As one executive noted, 4
We target companies with a close affiliation with our customers and consider
the value chain. There may be a big corporation at the top of the chain, but
beneath them you may have distributors who mostly are our customers, and

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 For the exclusive use of J. Dicocco, 2017.

stockists and retailers at the next level down who are also our customers.
That corporation then is an ideal target for us because the decision isn’t just
about price—it is about how we support their distributors, retailers, and
stockists—if they are in good financial health the main beneficiary is the
corporation.

Technology
Equity operated four types of distribution channels: fixed and mobile branches, ATMs, and
agent-run channels (whereby third parties such as supermarkets and phone companies acted
for the bank in transactions). Until 2000, all transactions had been processed manually.
Branches were crowded and had long lines until the bank instituted Bank 2000, its first
automated system. Following a four-month installation period, there was an immediate
increase in efficiency—transaction times decreased to five minutes, and the active saving
accounts per staff grew by 59% in 2001 versus the prior year.
As Equity expanded, Bank 2000 began to reach the limits of its capacity. Moreover, although
a high-end product of its time, Bank 2000 could not accommodate ATM requirements into its
processing. In 2005, the bank invested KSh 650 million in a three-part system with significant
extra capacity so the bank could continue to scale its growth. The components of the system
were an Infosys core banking system called “Finacle,” an Oracle database, and an HP
hardware platform. An additional almost KSh 20 million was invested in training.
In September 2005, the new system, the transaction-based Finacle Core banking system, went
live. The system operated in real time and handled deposits, credit, trade finance, and
treasury among other functions. This, along with the connect24-engine, provided around-
the-clock connections between branches and ATMs, linking all of Equity’s banking channels
back to the central office for data collection and management.
Finacle consolidated the bank into one system in real time. Previously, each branch had its
own system, with information flowing slowly between the head office and the branches, and
cumbersome monthly reporting procedures. By having a central system that was connected
in real time, information could be accessed between branches and the head office instantly.
The new system also created infrastructure for rapid deployment. The bank was able to
establish a network of ATMs that rapidly grew to about 700, where customers could transact
quickly and cheaply for the benefit of both the bank and the customer. Finacle also
dramatically reduced the time required to set up a new branch—to just one day in some
instances.
When clients missed payments, it was automatically recorded. Two days after the payment
was due, an SMS text message was sent to the borrower. If the payment was not received
within four days of the due date, the customer received a personal phone call from a
collection officer at the head office, a different person from the loan officer that granted the
loan. If 15 days elapsed without payment, the loan officer that granted the loan made a
physical visit to the customer to inquire about the payment. At 30 days, the non-performing

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facility was logged with a debt collection company (a legal obligation) and was transferred to
the central office debt collection function. At 90 days, the collection of smaller loans was
outsourced to a debt collection company, which received a percentage of the debt on
collection.
Technology had also changed the way payments were made from employers to employees.
Previously, employees deposited checks that required up to four days to clear; they were
now able to access their wages instantly at Equity. Equity worked with employers, the
biggest of which was the government, to remit employees’ checks to the bank. The bank also
built software for employers to smooth this process. The bank also worked closely with
transactors in the agricultural trade, intermediating between buyers and sellers.
In the five years from the end of 2004 until the end of 2009, the number of staff increased
almost tenfold from 530 to just over 5000. Using its Oracle system, the bank standardized
and automated the recruitment function with i-Recruitment, which allowed prospective
employees to register their interest in the bank along with their qualifications, receive a
short-list message, an interview notice, and in the case of a non-hire, regrets and feedback.

Mobile Banking and M-Pesa

Growth in communications was an important driver of transformation in Kenya. At the
beginning of 2000, less than 3% of Kenyans owned a telephone, and mobile telephone service
was negligible. By 2010, there was a 90% mobile telephone subscription among Kenyan
adults (approx 18.3 million). Many of these telephones were being used as “mobile money,”
generally defined as electronic money accounts accessible via a mobile phone. 5 In fact,
increased use of mobile banking is thought to have significantly impacted the rate of bank
branch expansion in Kenya: in 2007, banks opened a record number 165 branches; by 2009,
this number had shrunk to 109, and Kenya had more than 700,000 customers conducting
mobile banking with KSh 400 million in deposits.
There were four licensed mobile telephone operators in Kenya, each with its own mobile
money system: Safaricom (part of the Vodafone Group) had operated M-Pesa since March
2007, Celtel/Zain had operated Zap beginning in January 2010, Yu operated YuCash, and
Telekom Kenya had operated Orange Money since November 2010. The most successful
mobile money firm was M-Pesa (M for mobile and Pesa the Swahili word for cash) with 7
million users. The firm first gained popularity as a means for migrant workers to send
money back to their families in the country but grew quickly to encompass a wider range of
transactions. The Economist noted of the technology,
Mobile money provides a stepping stone to formal financial services for
billions of people who lack access to savings accounts, credit and insurance.
Although for regulatory reasons, M-Pesa accounts do not pay interest, the
service is used by some as a savings account. Having even a small cushion of
savings to fall back on allows people to deal with unexpected expenses. 6

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Although M-Pesa had proven effective as a transaction processing tool, at least in its early
stages the service lacked the functionality of a bank (savings account, loan generation, bank
payments, etc.) and was limited in the amount of information that could be stored on the
system. Another challenge associated with M-Pesa had been the e-float, particularly for
third-party agents in rural areas. Since people in the city were more likely to transfer funds
out to the rural areas (often to family members in need of cash), rural agents had difficulty
maintaining their cash position, as they were more often paying out cash rather than
receiving it.
Seeing an opportunity, Equity worked with Safaricom to develop M-Kesho (M for mobile
and Kesho the Swahili word for tomorrow) on top of the M-Pesa platform. The M-Kesho
account was an interest-bearing account (0.5-3% depending on the balance) where customers
could withdraw cash from their Equity account to their M-Pesa accounts and were also able
to deposit through their M-Pesa accounts to their M-Kesho account. To qualify for the
account, the person had to be an M-Pesa subscriber. The customer had the option of linking
the M-Kesho account to his traditional Equity account.
At the time of the case, the relationship between M-Pesa and Equity was still emerging. M-
Pesa’s growth was extraordinary and was seemingly processing many of the financial
transactions at the heart of retail banking. Such rapid customer adoption was causing some
to question whether it would become a de facto competitor to banks, especially to those who
serviced the poor that required a more limited scope of financial services. Also, M-Pesa was
not exclusive in its relationship to Equity. As a telecommunication company with a
transaction processing platform, presumably M-Pesa had an interest in fully leveraging the
technology both as a stand-alone and across the banking industry, including to Equity’s
competition. As one writer noted of M-Pesa,
Agents blossomed across the country and total 19,000 today. Of Safaricom’s
16 million customers, 12 million have M-Pesa accounts—this in a nation of 39
million people. The secret of M-Pesa's success is simplicity. In a world where
sending money home used to require a hard-to-obtain bank account,
Kenyans can now send as little as $1.20 to one another for minimal cost, with
no risk, in seconds. The advantages over a regular bank are clear … Some
businessmen want to deposit too little for them to stand for a long time in a
queue. Others are shabbily dressed or illiterate or they forget their signatures.
It's just easier to operate with M-Pesa. 7

The Road Forward

As Stout completed his review of the bank and its extraordinary performance, he noted that
Equity’s rapid growth rate had been tempered post 2007. He wondered what the drivers of
the slowdown were. Although the global financial crisis might be a contributor, he would
have thought Kenya was relatively insulated from any significant impact. Could competition
have ramped up? Might Equity have reached a saturation point in the domestic market? In
any case, change was a constant, and in the life of Equity, change happened fast. For each of

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the issues on the horizon, Stout contemplated what it might mean for the bank’s growth
vehicle that had been fueled by strong cultural connections and processing efficiency.
• Equity had established its national footprint in Kenya, and future growth was
expected to be more moderate in that country. The bank had made headway into
neighboring countries (it already had branches in Uganda and South Sudan), and in
2011, it planned to open locations in Tanzania and Rwanda.
• In Kenya, the bank planned to increase its use of non-traditional banking to increase
growth. Increased use of agency banking and mobile banking were the anticipated
vehicles.
• Although the telecom companies, in particular Safaricom, have been valuable
partners to Equity, there was a growing sense of competition between the two since
both offered ways of transactions. The biggest emerging competitors in the field of
mobile banking are M-Pesa, SAP-Airtel, and Yucash.
• Infringement of competitive banks into Equity’s traditional sweet spot. Equity’s two
strongest competitors, Cooperative Bank (Coop) and Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB),
among others, were actively starting up micro divisions. Embodying the head-to-
head competition, KCB was building its new headquarters across the street from
Equity. KCB had the largest branch network of 141 compared to 120 at Equity though
it trailed in ATM distribution. Coop was Kenya’s second-largest bank in terms of
number of customers, with 1.2 million against Equity’s 5.5 million, though slightly
bigger than Equity in terms of assets. Lastly, there was Family Bank, which was still
much smaller than Equity, with only a quarter of the assets, but earned a rival status
for its direct copying of Equity’s model with its CEO being a former Equity employee.
• Maintaining the Equity Bank culture. A key driver of Equity Bank’s success had been
its unique culture. Equity Bank’s customers within Kenya had a connection to the
Bank that had given them, the poor, access to financial services. In Mwangi, a man
who had risen from the village, they perceived hope for themselves and their
children. They proudly saw themselves as members of a leading Kenyan bank. As the
bank grew and interaction became more based on technology rather than people,
some wondered whether the bonds between customers and the bank would remain
strong. Additionally, as Equity Bank moved into new countries, some questioned
whether the same bonds could be formed with non-Kenyans. What could Equity
Bank do to make sure its culture was robust and strong?
• Microfinance itself was under increasing scrutiny. In India, especially in Andhra
Pradesh, which accounted for one-third of that country’s microfinance loans, there
has been a political backlash. In Bangladesh, the government indicated it would cap
the annual rate the MFIs can charge at 27%. The expressed concern by the
governments was that MFIs were pursuing loans without concern for the customer’s
ability to repay.8 Further, The New York Times noted,

Page 11 | Equity Bank: The Real Thing?

BY DAVID BEIM* AND MURRAY LOW†

This document is authorized for use only by Joel Dicocco in 2017.

 For the exclusive use of J. Dicocco, 2017.

The attention lavished on microcredit helped the sector reach more

than 91 million customers, most of them women, with loans totaling
more than $70 billion at the end of 2009. . . . Most borrowers do not
appear to be climbing out of poverty, and a sizable minority is getting
trapped in a spiral of debt. . . . Even as the results for borrowers have
been mixed, some lenders have minted profits that might make Wall
Street bankers envious. 9

Equity Bank: The Real Thing? | Page 12

BY DAVID BEIM* AND MURRAY LOW†

This document is authorized for use only by Joel Dicocco in 2017.

 Exhibits
Exhibit 1
Comparison of Leading Kenyan Banks

Market Total Total

Capitalization Assets Revenue Net Income
[12/31/2010] [CY 2010] [CY 2010] [CY 2010] Net Return on Net Income,
($USDmm, ($USDmm, ($USDmm, ($USDmm, Return on Income Common 5 Yr CAGR
Historical Historical Historical Historical Assets % Margin % Equity % % [CY
Company Name rate) rate) rate) Rate) [CY 2010] [CY 2010] [CY 2010] 2010]
Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd. 795.2 3,114.7 353.4 88.9 3.2 25.2 23.2 40.2
Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd. 1,051.7 2,136.5 307.6 131.3 6.3 42.7 38.1 23.2
The Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited 822.3 1,912.5 184.3 56.8 3.5 30.8 25.0 59.3
Equity Bank Limited 1,227.4 1,772.2 250.9 88.4 5.9 35.2 28.5 83.3
Standard Chartered Bank Kenya Limited * 917.8 1,631.9 155.2 66.5 4.3 40.2 35.9 -
Diamond Trust Bank of Kenya Limited 272.7 1,035.9 88.4 28.3 3.3 32.0 28.7 50.6
National Bank of Kenya Ltd. 134.5 743.8 83.5 25.1 3.6 30.0 33.2 27.6
NIC Bank Limited 204.6 731.3 61.4 23.1 3.5 37.6 26.0 45.2
Investments & Mortgages Bank Ltd. * - 717.7 44.9 16.4 2.6 36.6 19.7 37.4
* 2009 financials
Source: Capital IQ.

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Page 13 | Equity Bank: The Real Thing?
BY DAVID BEIM* AND MURRAY LOW†
For the exclusive use of J. Dicocco, 2017.
 For the exclusive use of J. Dicocco, 2017.

Exhibit 2
Equity Bank Performance Relative to Competition 2004–2010

Net Income
12.00
Equity Bank Ltd
10.00
Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd
8.00
Billion KES

Diamond Trust Bank of

6.00 Kenya Ltd*
Investments & Mortgages
4.00 Bank Ltd
Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd
2.00
National Bank of Kenya Ltd*
0.00
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Return on Assets
7.0%
Equity Bank Ltd
6.0%
Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd
5.0%
Billion KES

4.0% Diamond Trust Bank of

Kenya Ltd*
3.0% Investments & Mortgages
Bank Ltd
2.0%
Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd
1.0%
National Bank of Kenya Ltd*
0.0%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Note: Comparable ROA data unavailable for 2004

Equity Bank: The Real Thing? | Page 14

BY DAVID BEIM* AND MURRAY LOW†

This document is authorized for use only by Joel Dicocco in 2017.

 For the exclusive use of J. Dicocco, 2017.

Exhibit 2 (continued)

Total Assets
300.00
Equity Bank Ltd
250.00
Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd
200.00
Billion KES

Diamond Trust Bank of

150.00 Kenya Ltd*
Investments & Mortgages
100.00 Bank Ltd
Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd
50.00
National Bank of Kenya Ltd*
0.00
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Operating Expense/Total Revenue

100.0%
90.0% Equity Bank Ltd

80.0%
Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd
70.0%
60.0%
Billion KES

Diamond Trust Bank of

50.0% Kenya Ltd*
40.0% Investments & Mortgages
Bank Ltd
30.0%
Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd
20.0%
10.0% National Bank of Kenya Ltd*
0.0%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Page 15 | Equity Bank: The Real Thing?

BY DAVID BEIM* AND MURRAY LOW†

This document is authorized for use only by Joel Dicocco in 2017.

 For the exclusive use of J. Dicocco, 2017.

Exhibit 2 (continued)

Equity /Assets
30.0%
Equity Bank Ltd
25.0%
Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd
20.0%
Billion KES

Diamond Trust Bank of

15.0% Kenya Ltd*
Investments & Mortgages
10.0% Bank Ltd
Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd
5.0%
National Bank of Kenya Ltd*
0.0%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Source: Central Bank of Kenya

Equity Bank: The Real Thing? | Page 16

BY DAVID BEIM* AND MURRAY LOW†

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 Exhibit 3
Comparative Financial Information on Microfinance Institutions in Kenya 2009

Average Average
loan deposit Yield on
Debt to balance balance Return Financial Operating gross
Gross loan Total Capital/asset equity per per on Return expense/ expense/as portfolio
Name Total assets portfolio Total equity Deposits borrowings ratio ratio borrower depositor assets on equity assets sets (nominal)
BIMAS 5,445,127 2,631,820 2,055,176 2,266,284 791,035 37.74% 1.65 254 116 -2.64% -6.55% 3.37% 9.52% 27.95%
ECLOF -
7,777,751 4,353,162 2,251,047 2,471,120 2,525,967 28.94% 2.46 258 59 3.42% 11.77% 5.35% 16.22% 33.87%
KEN
Equity
1,272,406,065 818,101,516 307,686,223 867,831,246 80,606,460 24.18% 3.14 1,143 215 5.23% 21.15% 1.62% 8.97% 18.26%
Bank
Faulu -
56,785,498 39,643,494 8,600,145 26,308,438 21,081,305 15.14% 5.60 387 62 -1.76% -12.02% 3.89% 22.39% 30.29%
KEN
Jamii Bora 9,568,460 5,733,641 121 22
Juhudi
1,601,291 983,400 343,349 451,856 361,045 21.44% 3.66 276 127
Kilimo
K-Rep 94,084,733 71,128,108 14,591,866 58,480,092 18,216,309 15.51% 5.45 1,258 196 -2.72% -18.61% 3.88% 17.75% 22.40%

KADET 10,653,755 6,288,097 3,058,757 3,984,144 3,431,348 28.71% 2.48 362 48 -9.41% -30.19% 2.42% 29.50% 27.08%

KPOSB 202,420,370 0 18,454,102 137,941,080 0 9.12% 9.97 163 -4.21% -36.75% 1.31% 15.28%

KWFT 194,457,034 134,240,567 36,058,352 56,468,095 94,882,175 18.54% 4.39 402 169 5.24% 28.04% 4.54% 15.60% 37.17%
Micro
6,688,319 2,146,539 3,869,796 0 2,284,970 57.86% 0.73 666 -0.93% -1.49% 2.81% 12.97% 24.83%
Kenya
Opportunity
4,719,912 3,377,015 -866,172 1,557,164 3,322,113 -18.35% -6.45 500 64 -18.14% 131.35% 3.09% 39.44% 36.76%
K
PAWDEP 8,695,291 8,207,836 217,483 6,264,538 2,058,889 2.50% 38.98 297 163 0.24% 8.77% 1.79% 16.96% 20.51%

SMEP 17,486,056 12,385,069 3,802,255 6,944,223 6,422,025 21.74% 3.60 145 81 1.01% 4.72% 4.19% 17.19% 29.49%

This document is authorized for use only by Joel Dicocco in 2017.

Source: MIX Database.

Page 17 | Equity Bank: The Real Thing?

BY DAVID BEIM* AND MURRAY LOW†
For the exclusive use of J. Dicocco, 2017.
 For the exclusive use of J. Dicocco, 2017.

Exhibit 4
Equity Bank Income Statement 2004 – 2010 (Millions of KES)
Income Statement
For the Fiscal Period Ending
12/31/2004 12/31/2005 12/31/2006 12/31/2007 12/31/2008 12/31/2009 12/31/2010
Currency KES KES KES KES KES KES KES
Interest Income On Loans 459.1 947.8 1,635 3,155 7,979 10,792 11,361.4
Interest Income On
0 0 0 0 0 0 2,416
Investments
Total Interest Income 459.1 947.8 1,635 3,155 7,979 10,792 13,777.4
Interest On Deposits 63.5 82.3 127 495 1,362 1,622 1,461.1
Total Interest On Borrowings 0 0 0 0 0 0 600.7
Total Interest Expense 63.5 82.3 127 495 1,362 1,622 2,061.8
Net Interest Income 395.6 865.5 1,508 2,660 6,617 9,170 11,715.6
Income From Trading
0 0 24 246 780 286 0
Activities
Income (Loss) On Equity
0 0 0 15 0 0 0
Invest. (Rev)
Total Other Non-Interest
640.1 937.2 1,839 2,915 5,208 6,220 10,436.4
Income
Non-Oper. Income (Exp.) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Non Interest
640.1 937.2 1,863 3,176 5,988 6,506 10,436.4
Income
Revenue Before Loan
1,035.8 1,802.7 3,371 5,836 12,605 15,676 22,152
Losses
Provision For Loan Losses 170.9 124.3 133 (25.0) 1,020 1,035 1,904.6
Total Revenue 864.9 1,678.5 3,238 5,861 11,585 14,641 20,247.4
Salaries and Other Empl.
0 0 952 1,469 2,954 4,339 5,236.7
Benefits
Amort. Of Goodwill & Intang.
0 0 0 0 0 0 145.4
Assets
Occupancy Expense 83.7 137.7 280 423 749 1,174 1,343.5
Selling General & Admin
562.9 1,040.3 99 182 375 645 637.4
Exp., Total
(Income)/Loss from Affiliates 0 0 0 0 (34.0) (58.0) (94.5)
Total Other Non-Interest
0 0 804 1,409 2,519 3,263 3,934
Expense
Total Non-Interest
646.6 1,177.9 2,135 3,483 6,563 9,363 11,202.6
Expense
EBT Excl. Unusual
218.3 500.5 1,103 2,378 5,022 5,278 9,044.8
Items
Impairment of Goodwill 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Unusual Items 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EBT Incl. Unusual items 218.3 500.5 1,103 2,378 5,022 5,278 9,044.8

Income Tax Expense 82.1 155.9 349 488 1,112 1,044 1,913.5
Earnings from Cont.
136.1 344.6 754 1,890 3,910 4,234 7,131.3
Ops.
Earnings of Discontinued
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ops.
Extraord. Item & Account.
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change
Net Income to Company 136.1 344.6 754 1,890 3,910 4,234 7,131.3

Equity Bank: The Real Thing? | Page 18

BY DAVID BEIM* AND MURRAY LOW†

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 For the exclusive use of J. Dicocco, 2017.

Exhibit 4 (continued)
Equity Bank Income Statement 2004 – 2010 (Millions of KES)
Minority Int. In Earnings 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Income 136.1 344.6 754 1,890 3,910 4,234 7,131.3
Pref. Dividends and Other
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Adj.
NI to Common Incl Extra
136.1 344.6 754 1,890 3,910 4,234 7,131.3
Items
NI to Common Excl.
136.1 344.6 754 1,890 3,910 4,234 7,131.3
Extra Items
Per Share Items
Basic EPS 0.05 0.127 0.277 0.687 1.056 1.144 1.93
Basic EPS Excl. Extra items 0.05 0.127 0.277 0.687 1.056 1.144 1.93
Weighted Avg. Basic Shares
2,717 2,717 2,720 2,750 3,702 3,702 3,695
Out.
Diluted EPS 0.05 0.127 0.277 0.687 1.056 1.144 1.93
Diluted EPS Excl. Extra Items 0.05 0.127 0.277 0.687 1.056 1.144 1.93
Weighted Avg. Diluted Shares
2,717 2,717 2,720 2,750 3,702 3,702 3,695
Out.
Normalized Basic EPS 0.05 0.115 0.253 0.54 0.848 0.891 1.53
Normalized Diluted EPS 0.05 0.115 0.253 0.54 0.848 0.891 1.53

Dividends per Share NA NA NA NA 0.3 0.4 0.8

Pay out Ratio % 13.9% NA 24.0% 9.6% 14.9% 26.2% 20.8%

Supplemental Items
Effective Tax Rate % 37.6% 31.2% 31.6% 20.5% 22.1% 19.8% 21.2%
Current Domestic Taxes 76.4 169.1 334.0 NA NA NA NA
Total Current Taxes 76.4 169.1 334.0 0 1,063.0 1,143.0 1,964.2
Deferred Domestic Taxes 5.7 (13.1) 15.0 NA NA NA NA
Total Deferred Taxes 5.7 (13.1) 15.0 0 49.0 (99.0) (50.8)

Normalized Net Income 136.4 312.8 689.4 1,486.3 3,138.8 3,298.8 5,653

Page 19 | Equity Bank: The Real Thing?

BY DAVID BEIM* AND MURRAY LOW†

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 For the exclusive use of J. Dicocco, 2017.

Exhibit 4 (continued)
Equity Bank Balance Sheet 2004–2010 (Millions of KES)
Balance Sheet as of:
12/31/2004 12/31/2005 12/31/2006 12/31/2007 12/31/2008 12/31/2009 12/31/2010
Currency KES KES KES KES KES KES KES
ASSETS
Cash and Equivalents 789.7 1,322.5 3,808.0 10,211.0 10,439.0 9,751.0 8,500.4

Investment Securities 2,492.4 2,825.8 1,656.0 13,985.0 13,396.0 13,399.0 15,870.0

Trading Asset Securities 0 0 0 0 0 0 22,577.7
Total Investments 2,492.4 2,825.8 1,656.0 13,985.0 13,396.0 13,399.0 38,447.6

Gross Loans 3,099.5 5,885.3 11,429 22,228 45,369.0 65,787.0 78,301.9

Allowance for Loan Losses (255.8) (360.9) (499.0) (392.0) (1,128.0) (2,409.0) 0
Other Adj. to Gross Loans 0 0 0 0 (49) 0 0
Net Loans 2,873.7 5,524.4 10,930.0 21,836.0 44,192.0 63,378.0 78,301.9

Gross Property, Plant &

619.1 1,362.1 2,020.0 3,504.0 6,396.0 9,074.0 0
Equipment
Accumulated Depreciation (211.1) (321.1) (555.0) (901.0) (1,600.0) (2,632.0) 0
Net Property, Plant &
408.0 1,041.0 1,465.0 2,603.0 4,796.0 6,442.0 6,970.5
Equipment

Goodwill 0 0 0 0 887.0 887.0 0

Other Intangibles 8.4 89.5 161.0 224.0 621.0 877.0 1,927.4
Investment in Real Estate 11.3 11.3 11.0 11.0 11.0 8.0 8.5
Accrued Interest Receivable 30.3 61.0 39.0 861.0 623.0 1,041.0 0
Other Receivables 89.5 65.9 244.0 292.0 589.0 1,022.0 192.1
Restricted Cash 0 506.4 901.0 1,785.0 2,327.0 3,243.0 4,802.4
Other Current Assets 0 0 750.0 1,212.0 813.0 549.0 29.3
Deferred Tax Assets, LT 0 4.6 0 0 0 6.0 61.1
Other Long-Term Assets 4.3 4.2 59.0 56.0 185.0 209.0 3,776.9
Total Assets 6,707.4 11,456.5 20,024.0 53,076.0 78,879.0 100,812.0 143,018.1

LIABILITIES
Accrued Exp. 0 0 34.0 92.0 108.0 50.0 0

Interest Bearing Depositis 5,074.3 8,179.4 13,565.0 25,681.0 40,947.0 56,149.0 104,930.4
Non-Interest Bearing Deposits 0 823.8 2,772.0 5,855.0 9,387.0 13,694.0 0
Total Deposits 5,074.3 9,003.3 16,337.0 31,536.0 50,334.0 69,843.0 104,930.4

Curr. Port. Of LT Debt 0 0 0 207.0 445.0 642.0 0

Long-Term Debt 0 0 485.0 4,314.0 6,018.0 5,845.0 7,463.7
Curr. Income Taxes Payable 12.0 168.2 147.0 209.0 514.0 20.0 701.4
Accrued Interest Payable 7.2 44.5 0 0 0 0 0
Def. Tax Liability, Curr. 0 0 0 45.0 94.0 0 0

Equity Bank: The Real Thing? | Page 20

BY DAVID BEIM* AND MURRAY LOW†

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Other Current Liabilities 0 0 0 1,756.0 1,786.0 1,504.0 2,714.0

Exhibit 4 (continued)
Equity Bank Balance Sheet 2004–2010 (Millions of KES)
Unearned Revenue, Non-Current 247.4 335.0 0 0 0 0 0
Def. Tax Liability, Non-Curr. 8.5 0 11.0 0 0 0 4.8
Other Non-Current Liabilities 86.8 311.6 810.0 0 0 0 0
Total Liabilities 5,436.2 9,862.6 17,824.0 38,159.0 59,299.0 77,904.0 115,814.2

Common Stock 90.6 452.8 453.0 1,811.0 1,851.0 1,851.0 1,851.4

Additional Paid in Capital 842.6 480.4 480.0 10,543.0 12,161.0 12,161.0 12,161.0
Retained Earnings 299.1 694.4 1,266.0 2,550.0 5,917.0 9,040.0 14,579.5
Treasury Stock 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Comprehensive Inc. and Other 39.0 (33.6) 1.0 13.0 (349.0) (144.0) (1,388.0)
Total Common Equity 1,271.3 1,594.0 2,200.0 14,917.0 19,580.0 22,908.0 27,203.9

Total Equity 1,271.3 1,594.0 2,200.0 14,917.0 19,580.0 22,908.0 27,203.9

Total Liabilities and Equity 6,707.4 11,456.5 20,024.0 53,076.0 78,879.0 100,812.0 143,018.1

Supplemental Items
Total Shares Out. On Filing Date 2,717.0 2,717.0 2,730.0 3,620.0 3,702.8 3,702.8 3,695.0
Total Shares Out. On Balance Sheet
2,717.0 2,717.0 2,730.0 3,620.0 3,702.8 3,702.8 3,695.0
Date
Book Value/Share 0.47 0.59 0.81 4.12 5.29 6.19 7.36
Tangible Book Value 1,262.9 1,504.5 2,039.0 14,693.0 18,072.0 21,144.0 25,276.5
Tangible Book Value/Share 0.46 0.55 0.75 4.06 4.88 5.71 6.84
Average Assets NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Average Loans NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total Debt 0 0 485.0 4,521.0 6,463.0 6,487.0 7,463.7
Cash Deposits Int. Bearing NA 523.0 2,241.0 4,060.0 5,669.0 3,594.0 NA
Net Debt (2,703.8) (3,416.8) (3,323.0) (5,690.0) (3,976.0) (3,264.0) (28,814.7)
Equity Method Investments NA NA NA 442.0 1,156.0 1,214.0 1,259.7

Page 21 | Equity Bank: The Real Thing?

BY DAVID BEIM* AND MURRAY LOW†

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 For the exclusive use of J. Dicocco, 2017.

Exhibit 5
Equity Bank Deposit Profile 2005–2010
Total Deposits Total Accounts Avg Account Size (Right Axis)
60.00% 20,000
18,000
50.00%
16,000
14,000
40.00%
12,000

KES
30.00% 10,000
8,000
20.00%
6,000
4,000
10.00%
2,000
0.00% 0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Source: Central Bank of Kenya

Exhibit 6
Equity Bank Loan/Borrower Size 2005– 2010
140

120

100

80 Deposit/customer
(KSH thousands)
60 Loan/borrower
(KSH thousands)
40

20

0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Source: Central Bank of Kenya

Equity Bank: The Real Thing? | Page 22

BY DAVID BEIM* AND MURRAY LOW†

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 For the exclusive use of J. Dicocco, 2017.

Exhibit 7
Equity Bank Performance through First Quarter 2011 (Unaudited)

Source: Equity Bank Group Un-Audited Financial Statements and Other Disclosures at 31st March
2011.

Page 23 | Equity Bank: The Real Thing?

BY DAVID BEIM* AND MURRAY LOW†

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 For the exclusive use of J. Dicocco, 2017.

Exhibit 8
Deposits across Banks 2010
Number of Average Account
Total Deposits Accounts Balance
Bank (M. KES) (M) (KES)
Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd 163,189 1.341 121,692
Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd 123,826 0.862 143,650
Equity Bank Ltd 95,204 5.406 17,611
Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd 124,012 1.452 85,408
Standard Chartered Bank Kenya Ltd 100,504 0.156 644,256
CfC Stanbic Bank Ltd 72,778 0.066 1,102,697
Investments & Mortgages Bank Ltd 45,995 0.039 1,179,359
Citibank N.A. Kenya 38,215 0.004 9,553,750
National Bank of Kenya Ltd 47,805 0.398 120,113
Commercial Bank of Africa Ltd 53,195 0.027 1,970,185
Diamond Trust Bank of Kenya Ltd 44,904 0.051 880,471
NIC Bank Ltd 45,318 0.033 1,373,273
Bank of Baroda Ltd 25,600 0.032 800,000

Source: Central Bank of Kenya

Exhibit 9
Common Interest Rates in Kenya 2000–2010
30.0%

25.0%

20.0%

15.0%

10.0%

5.0%

0.0%
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Deposit (Avg) Lending (Avg) 91-Day Tbill Inflation

Equity Bank: The Real Thing? | Page 24

BY DAVID BEIM* AND MURRAY LOW†

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 For the exclusive use of J. Dicocco, 2017.

Note: Inflation relates to Kenyan rate of inflation.

Endnotes

1 Equity Bank Annual Report 2010, 4.

2 The Bank’s values are professionalism, integrity, creativity and innovativeness, teamwork, unity of
purpose, respect and dignity for customers, and effective corporate governance.
3 Interview with Equity Bank, Nairobi, Kenya, December 2010.

4 Interview with Equity Bank, Nairobi, Kenya, December 2010.

5 Mobile money cash travelled in the form of a text message. Small “corner store” retailers that also

sold mobile phone time took cash and via a special text message credited the funds to a mobile money
account. The money could then be transferred to other registered users who could withdraw the funds
at their respective corner store. If funds were transferred to an unregistered user, they received a text
message with a code that could be redeemed for cash.
6 “The Power of Mobile Money,” Economist, September 26, 2009.

7 Alex Perry and Nick Wadhams, “Kenya’s Banking Revolution,” Time, January 31, 2011,

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2043329-2,00.html.
8 “Leave Well Alone,” Economist, November 18, 2010.

9 Vikas Bajaj, “Microlenders, Honored with Nobel, Are Struggling,” New York Times, January 5, 2011.

Page 25 | Equity Bank: The Real Thing?

BY DAVID BEIM* AND MURRAY LOW†

This document is authorized for use only by Joel Dicocco in 2017.