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Colombia and the United States
 NEW STUDIES IN U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mary Ann Heiss, editor

The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture
Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965
amy l. s. staples

Colombia and the United States: The Making of an Inter-American Alliance,

1939–1960
bradley lynn coleman
Colombia and the United States

The Making of an
Inter-American Alliance,
1939–1960

Bradley Lynn Coleman

The Kent State University Press

Kent, Ohio
 © 2008 by The Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio 44242
all rights reserved
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 2007044972
isbn 978-0-87338-926-6
Manufactured in the United States of America

library of congress cataloging-in-publication data

Coleman, Bradley Lynn, 1973–
Colombia and the United States : the making of an inter-American alliance, 1939–1960 /
Bradley Lynn Coleman.
p. cm. — (New studies in U.S. foreign relations)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isbn 978-0-87338-926-6 (hardcover : alk. paper) ∞
1. United States—Foreign relations—Colombia. 2. Colombia—Foreign relations—United
States. 3. United States—Military relations—Colombia. 4. Colombia—Military rela-
tions—United States. I. Title.
e183.8.c7c65 2008
327.730861—dc22  2007044972

British Library Cataloging-in-Publication data are available.

12 11 10 09 08   5 4 3 2 1
a mi esposa
 Contents

Preface ix

Introduction: A Global History xiii

Maps and Illustrations xix

1 Solidarity and Cooperation, 1939–1945 1

2 Old Problems, New Possibilities, 1945–1950 43

3 The Korean War and the Americas, 1950–1951 71

4 The Fighting Alliance, 1951–1953 97

5 Continuity and Change, 1953–1957 138

6 The Partnership Transformed, 1958–1960 171

Epilogue 199

Essay on Archival Research 205

List of Abbreviations 211

Notes 213

Bibliography 272

Index 294
 Preface

In 1997 I decided to write a book about the Korean War, a comparative history of
small-country United Nations (UN) military forces. At the University of Georgia,
I planned a series of seminar papers, each covering a different UN member state.
The sum of those essays, I thought, would form my doctoral dissertation, the first
draft of my intended book. After some preliminary research, I started with the
Colombian Army in Korea. I discovered, in the process, the fascinating and large-
ly untold story of Colombia, Colombian-American cooperation, and U.S.–Latin
American relations during the Korean War. Over the years that followed, my in-
ternational history of the UN army drifted away from its concentration on Korea.
A 2001 trip to Bogotá, in particular, altered the direction of the work. This book,
therefore, is the unintended product of an unexpected journey. Its publication stirs
contradictory feelings within me, the author: pride, humility, and gratitude. It is
the most comprehensive account of U.S.-Colombian security relations published
to date. It contains useful information and analyses. Still, my ability to reconstruct
that past is necessarily limited. I am responsible for any errors in fact, interpreta-
tion, or presentation. Yet above all, I know that the entire undertaking would have
been impossible without the assistance of many individuals and institutions.
Larry Bland, Thomas Davis, and D. Clayton James devoted special attention to
my historical education at the Virginia Military Institute. At Temple University,
Richard Immerman and Russell Weigley nurtured my interest in military and
diplomatic history. William Stueck supervised my doctoral studies at the Univer-
sity of Georgia. Among his many generous acts, Professor Stueck diverted money
from his personal research fund to support my work in Colombia. Lester Lang-
ley taught me about the inter-American neighborhood. William Leary, Reinaldo
Román, and Thomas Whigham also made lasting intellectual impressions. Julie
Dyles cheerfully attended to all my interlibrary loan requests. David Bushnell,
James Henderson, Stephen Randall, Russell Ramsey, Dennis Rempe, César Torres
Del Río, and Álvaro Valencia Tovar helped me learn more about Colombia, its
armed forces, and its relationship with the United States.
The staffs of the Archivo General de la Nación (Bogotá), Archivo de la Presi-
dencia de la República (Bogotá), Biblioteca Nacional (Bogotá), U.S. National Ar-
chives (College Park, Maryland), Library of Congress (Washington, D.C.), George

ix
x preface

C. Marshall Research Library (Lexington, Virginia), Franklin D. Roosevelt Presi-

dential Library (Hyde Park, New York), Harry S. Truman Presidential Library
(Independence, Missouri), Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (Abilene,
Kansas), Mariners’ Museum and Library (Newport News, Virginia), Dag Ham-
marskjöld Library (New York), U.S. Army Center of Military History (Washing-
ton, D.C.), U.S. Army Military History Institute (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), and
U.S. Naval Historical Center (Washington, D.C.) offered indispensable assistance
while I worked with their collections. The University of Georgia, Franklin & Elea-
nor Roosevelt Institute, George Mason University, and Virginia Military Institute
Foundation provided financial assistance.
Between 2001 and 2003 I served as a U.S. Army Central Identification Labora-
tory postdoctoral fellow, investigating the history of graves registration and forensic
anthropology. As part of the arrangement, the military supported my ongoing study
of U.S.-Colombian relations. I wrote first drafts of the chapters covering Colom-
bian-American cooperation from 1953 to 1960 during the fellowship. Without the
Central Identification Laboratory, this project might not have evolved into a book.
Later, in 2003, I joined a group of talented scholars at the Office of the Historian,
U.S. Department of State. They shared with me their diverse interests and insights;
they provided unfailing support when I most needed encouragement. In particu-
lar, Kristin Ahlberg, James Siekmeier, and James Van Hook read and commented
on the entire manuscript. As command historian, U.S. Southern Command, since
March 2007, I have enjoyed the company of the men and women responsible for
the development and implementation of U.S. military policy toward Latin America.
They have shown great interest in this book. Still, the views contained herein are my
own. They do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government.
A portion of this manuscript appeared as “The Colombian Army in Korea,
1950–1954,” in the Journal of Military History (October 2005). I presented other
sections as papers at the U.S. Army Historians Conference (August 2002), Ameri-
can Historical Association Annual Conference (January 2006), and U.S. Army
Combat Studies Institute Symposium on Security Assistance (August 2006). Au-
dience members, editors, readers, and panelists offered valuable comments and
suggestions. They made this a better book.
In 2003 I sent an early version of this manuscript to Joanna Hildebrand Craig
and Mary Ann Heiss at Kent State University Press. They identified the project’s po-
tential, recommended substantive improvements, and oversaw major revisions. To-
gether with Christine Brooks, Mary Young, and others, they then turned my work
into a finished product. Throughout, the Kent State editors and staff had tremendous
faith in my abilities. I will always be grateful for what they have done on my behalf.
On a personal note, I owe a particular debt to Kenneth Lee Myers for his unique
support and friendship. Juana Maria Rubio Fernández provided extraordinary as-
sistance and hospitality during my time in Bogotá. S. L. Dowdy expertly produced
 preface xi

the maps. Kirstin Julian helped me find the photograph of Vice President Richard
Nixon in Bogotá. Evan Ward offered keen insight into several important aspects
of this undertaking; Jack Walsh entertained me during my midnight coffee breaks
in Athens, Georgia. My parents, Lynn and Stevonna Coleman, taught me about
the importance of higher education. They suggested that I study business admin-
istration, but eventually warmed to history. In all aspects of my life, I depend on
the basic skills and values I learned from them.
Finally, I want to express my deepest gratitude to Keri-Lyn Coleman, my wife
and best friend, to whom this book is dedicated. She has been an invaluable source
of advice and assistance. She has provided unconditional love and support. Our
relationship began at roughly the same time as I started this project. At every
stage, she accepted far too many inconveniences, always with grace and dignity. I
hope this book justifies her sacrifice.
 Introduction: A Global History

World War II and the cold war transformed U.S.-Colombian security relations.
After decades of bilateral tension, the Western Hemisphere’s leading democracies,
Colombia and the United States, came together to defend the Americas during
World War II. Although Colombia contributed less to the Allied victory than some
other Latin American republics, Colombian-American cooperation promoted
hemispheric solidarity, inter-American military readiness, and regional stability.
Controversies surrounding economic development dominated U.S.–Latin Ameri-
can relations after 1945. Yet mounting Soviet-American competition encouraged
hemispheric military collaboration. During a time of Colombian domestic dis-
cord, culminating in the collapse of democratic practices, the two countries con-
verted wartime security measures into peacetime institutions. Then, Colombian
and U.S. servicemen formed a successful fighting alliance in Korea. A Colombian
infantry battalion and warship joined the U.S.-led UN Command in 1951. The only
Latin American country to serve with the UN coalition, Colombia demonstrated
to the United States its reliability in the campaign against international commu-
nism, setting the scene for greater postwar bilateral cooperation. Between 1953 and
1957, the two governments gradually shed their conventional defense affiliation in
favor of a partnership designed to promote Colombian tranquility. Finally, in 1959,
U.S. authorities dispatched a Special Survey Team to evaluate Colombia’s internal
security situation. The group’s final report, the resurgence of Colombian democ-
racy, Washington’s heightened appreciation for Latin American insecurity follow-
ing the 1959 Cuban Revolution, and some intense Colombian lobbying completed
the remodeling of the bilateral relationship. By 1960 the two countries had formed
the basis of the modern internal security partnership.
This book examines the making of the Colombian-American alliance from 1939
to 1960, describing and analyzing bilateral cooperation as a dynamic multinational
experience. While Colombia lacked the strength of the industrialized countries, it
played a prominent role in collective security matters during World War II, the Ko-
rean War, and the 1956 Suez crisis. For that reason, the republic’s security relation-
ship with the United States is an ideal subject for a truly global history. Throughout

xiii
xiv introduction

Political Map of Colombia

this study, comparative vignettes complement the international approach. Com-

bining military and diplomatic history, it explores U.S.–Latin American relations,
multinational coalitions, and international conflict through the intensive exami-
nation of U.S.-Colombian cooperation. Also, since Colombian and U.S. officials
frequently connected hemispheric defense with Latin American internal stability,
domestic law enforcement, and modernization, this study pursues a broad defini-
tion of security relations. By extension, it devotes attention to Colombian national
history, particularly the intense political, social, economic, and religious convul-
 a global history xv

sion known as la Violencia (1946–58). Employing multi-archival international re-

search and making use of available Colombian sources, this book de-centers the
great-power competition for Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. In doing so, it
exposes the North-South implications of two subjects, World War II and the cold
war, which are traditionally studied on an East-West axis.
Overall, historians have devoted little attention to U.S.-Colombian relations.
They consistently produce insightful work on the major World War II and cold
war combatants while neglecting small countries such as Colombia. Some promi-
nent writers have examined U.S.–Latin American relations, and their publications
reflect scholarly trends relevant to this topic. Early historians of U.S. foreign rela-
tions, including Samuel Flagg Bemis, looked to hemispheric affairs to celebrate
American exceptionalism. During the 1970s and 1980s, revisionist scholars like
William Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber found evidence of American
economic imperialism in U.S. relations with its southern neighbors. Recently,
Lester Langley and others have utilized cultural approaches and Latin American
sources to write innovative histories. In doing so, they present a more complicat-
ed, and vastly more interesting, account of inter-American relations. Colombia,
however, rarely appears in these histories. Scholars are often discouraged by the
complexity of the Colombian experience, its apparent inconstancy with broader
currents in Latin American history, and the relative scarcity of Colombian archi-
val sources. For these reasons, David Bushnell wrote in 1993, “Colombia is today
the least studied of the major Latin American countries, and probably the least
understood.”1 Bushnell’s observation is still valid.
As for Colombian-American security matters, English-language historians are
largely silent. The classic study, Colombia and the United States, 1765–1934 (1935), by
E. Taylor Parks, does not reach the outbreak of World War II.2 The only compre-
hensive treatment of bilateral relations, Stephen Randall’s Colombia and the United
States: Hegemony and Interdependence (1992), provides only cursory coverage of
military affairs.3 Bushnell looks at U.S.-Colombian relations during the Second
World War, although his narrative ends in 1942.4 The English-language literature
on Colombia and the Korean War includes only three articles and four master’s
theses.5 Dennis Rempe’s pioneering research examines Colombian-American af-
fairs between 1958 and 1960, albeit in ways unconnected to the World War II and
Korean War alliance.6 Collectively, these works, while admirable, present an in-
complete account of the Colombian-American partnership.
Spanish-language literature does not remedy this deficiency. In Colombia, tal-
ented scholars have focused on pressing economic, political, and social questions
to the detriment of military and diplomatic history. Indeed, la Violencia generates
far more literature than corresponding developments in Colombian foreign rela-
tions; most researchers ignore the Colombian military because of its historically
minor domestic political role.7 The 1940s and 1950s are chronically understudied
xvi introduction

for another logical reason: the Colombian archives contain few sources from the
years of conservative rule, 1946 to 1957. Still, several authors address germane issues.
Any study of the Colombian military begins with the collected works of General
Álvaro Valencia Tovar, particularly his six-volume Historia de las fuerzas militares
de Colombia (1993).8 Gonzalo Sánchez and César Torres Del Río offer impressive
accounts of twentieth-century Colombian national security policy.9 Álvaro Tirado
Mejía examines Colombian diplomacy in various international forums.10 Official
histories and nationalistic memoirs document Colombia’s experience in Korea.11
But none of these works systematically explores Colombian-American cooperation
or Colombia’s foreign military relations. Those writers (whether in Spanish or Eng-
lish) who cover related topics too often portray the United States as a hegemonic
power, fail to account for ideological variables, overlook domestic influences on for-
eign affairs, and disregard the multilateral dimensions of the bilateral partnership.
Recognizing these shortcomings, this global history of U.S.-Colombian rela-
tions concentrates on six major ideas. First, the Colombian-American alliance
developed in a truly international setting. Rather than a simple bilateral affair, it
must therefore be presented as a multinational event. Second, compatible values
allowed the two countries to capitalize on shared opportunities. Colombia and
the United States formed a broad-based partnership rooted in ideas such as de-
mocracy, liberty, Christianity, anticommunism, multilateralism, inter-American
solidarity, and collective security. Third, beyond ideology, material incentives and
self-interest stimulated Colombian-American cooperation. Colombian and U.S.
officials wanted to create in Colombia a prosperous and secure republic. Fourth,
internal affairs invariably shaped foreign relations. Importantly, la Violencia heav-
ily influenced Colombian-American relations. Fifth, Colombians, not Americans,
most often determined the conditions and pace of bilateral cooperation. Colom-
bia was not a pawn of the more powerful United States. Finally, Colombia lay in
a zone of transition between the areas of greatest U.S. influence in the Caribbean
and Central America and the more distant neighbors of South America’s southern
cone. Rooted in the geography of the inter-American neighborhood, a mixture of
independence and interdependence characterized U.S.-Colombian relations dur-
ing World War II and the cold war.
Organized chronologically, this book covers six distinct periods. The first
chapter examines the formation of the bilateral hemispheric defense partnership
during World War II. Geopolitical, ideological, pragmatic, and political forces
brought the two countries together; they simultaneously limited Colombia’s war-
time involvement. The second chapter shows how the republics carried their con-
ventional partnership into the immediate postwar era, 1945 to 1950. Colombia’s
rising domestic turmoil overshadowed larger hemispheric economic disagree-
ments and inspired U.S.-Colombian cooperation. Chapter 3 explores Latin Amer-
ica’s response to the Korean War, U.S. efforts to convince Latin American govern-
 a global history xvii

ments to dispatch troops, and Colombia’s decision to defend South Korea. The
only Latin American country willing and able to fight, Colombia’s contribution
assumed heightened significance in the face of regional inaction. The next chap-
ter follows the Colombian armed forces through the Korean War. The preexist-
ing U.S.-Colombian military affiliation gave Colombian forces a major advantage
over other small-nation units in Korea. The successful fighting alliance kept the
two countries connected during a time when Colombian domestic unrest might
have pulled the countries apart. Chapter 5 investigates continuity and change in
Colombian-American relations from 1953 to 1957. Officials remained interested in
collective defense, illustrated by Colombia’s involvement in Middle Eastern peace-
keeping. But American assistance followed the needs of the Colombian military,
which began accepting new domestic responsibilities during that time. The final
chapter evaluates the conversion of the Colombian-American partnership into
a full-fledged internal security alliance between 1958 and 1960. A confluence of
extraordinary national and international events altered the direction of the U.S.-
Colombian security alliance. A short epilogue returns to the book’s organizing
themes and links this study to contemporary issues.
Today, U.S. involvement in Bogotá’s campaign against leftist insurgents, right­
wing paramilitaries, and narcotics traffickers has attracted considerable attention. In
2000 the U.S. government pledged $1.7 billion in military assistance to support Co-
lombian president Andrés Pastrana Arango’s (1998–2002) ambitious state-building
program, Plan Colombia. At that time, U.S. president William J. Clinton (1993–2001)
and the U.S. Congress limited American military aid to counter-narcotics opera-
tions. The United States relaxed these restrictions after the September 2001 al
Qaeda terrorist attacks. In August 2002 President George W. Bush (2001–) formally
approved Colombia’s use of U.S. assistance to combat insurgent and paramilitary
groups the U.S. Department of State deemed terrorist organizations. As part of the
arrangement, American special forces moved into Colombia, where they are now
involved in nearly every aspect of Colombian domestic security.12 These develop-
ments have stirred a lively debate over American involvement in Colombian inter-
nal affairs. Regrettably, that discussion has been conducted in an ahistorical fashion
that leaves many with the impression that Colombian-American cooperation is a
recent occurrence. In fact, as this study shows, the current partnership began during
World War II.13
 Maps and Illustrations

Political Map of Colombia xvi

The Colombian destroyer ARC Antioquia in the Panama Canal, 1934 6
President Eduardo Santos (1938–42) 8
Political Map of the Western Hemisphere, 1939 10
Presidents Alfonso López (1934–38, 1942–45) and Franklin D.
Roosevelt (1933–45) 14
Latin American military leaders with General George C. Marshall, 1940 17
Colombian military pilots in the United States, 1942 28
U.S. Army Lend-Lease motor vehicles outside Bogotá, 1943 30
U.S. diplomats at the Bogotá Conference, 1948 54
The nueve de abril in Bogotá, 1948 56
Secretary of State Dean Acheson with Colombian ambassador
Gonzalo Restrepo 60
Map of the Korean Conflict, 1950–51 73
Ambassador Eduardo Zuleta (1949–55) 81
President Laureano Gómez (1950–53) 87
Colombian sailors in Hawaii, March 1951 99
Map of the 8th U.S. Army Advance, 1951 112
Colombian infantrymen defend a ridge in central Korea, 1951 115
Colombian troops fire at an enemy position, 1951 116
Colombia Battalion Headquarters Company, 1951 117
President Harry S. Truman (1945–53) 125
Colombian troops at Port Said, Egypt, 1956 145
Map of the UN Emergency Force, 1957 147
Lieutenant Colonel Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 149
Vice President Richard Nixon in Bogotá, 1958 173
Presidents Alberto Lleras (1945–46, 1958–62) and Dwight D.
Eisenhower (1953–61), 1960 196

xix
Colombia and the United States
 1
Solidarity and Cooperation, 1939–1945

In 1938 U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered three U.S. Army bombers to
Colombia. The airplanes and crew, a U.S. government spokesman said, symbolized
“the solidarity and community of interest between the two republics” during the
inauguration of Colombian president Eduardo Santos.1 The B-17s landed at Techo
Airport outside Bogotá around 11:00 a.m. on 5 August. They taxied across the
field before parking near the airport terminal. A huge crowd of spectators cheered
when the flight commander, Major Vincent J. Maloy, and his men jumped down
from the “flying fortresses.” Over the days that followed, the aviators mixed with
hundreds of Colombian citizens, servicemen, and elected officials. They attended
formal and informal events, including a bullfight with the mayor of Bogotá. The
uniformed Americans inspired “great popular enthusiasm” at cocktail parties and
state socials.2 On 7 August, after the inauguration, President Santos thanked the
U.S. flyers for coming to the ceremony. The president then delivered a proposal
to special U.S. envoy Jefferson Caffery, also in Bogotá for the inauguration. Im-
pressed by the airmen, Santos asked if the United States would send military ad-
visers to Colombia. American training missions, Santos reasoned, would improve
Colombian military capabilities and promote bilateral cooperation during a time
of international insecurity. Delighted by the proposition, Ambassador Caffery re-
layed the invitation to Washington that night.3 The first U.S. advisers arrived in
Colombia just five months later.
The Santos overture launched the Colombian-American security partnership.
During World War II, Colombia and the United States designed and implemented
a program of bilateral cooperation that included conventional security and coun-
terespionage measures. The republics also collaborated on a variety of pressing
diplomatic and economic matters. Together, these activities promoted regional
tranquility, secured the Panama Canal, stabilized Colombia, and encouraged Co-
lombian state-building. The country’s wartime contribution, combined with the
efforts of the other Latin American republics, allowed the United States to focus

1
2 colombia and the united states

on overseas operations. Latin Americans advanced the Allied cause by protecting

Washington’s southern flank. Within this larger hemispheric effort, shared values,
geographic proximity, and Colombian internal affairs shaped the U.S.-Colombian
alliance. World War II, in turn, promoted the integration of U.S. and Colombian
institutions with important long-term political, economic, and military conse-
quences. Opening an era of concentrated bilateral cooperation, the global con-
flict produced a system of Colombian-American cooperation that made future
undertakings feasible. It likewise represented a major departure from the years of
controversy preceding the war.

The Republics before World War II

The Colombian-American relationship began before World War II and produced

a burst of conflict, but it also revealed the possibility for successful collaboration.
U.S. political and social philosophers inspired Latin American revolutionaries dur-
ing the early 1800s. American merchants smuggled military equipment to armies
fighting Spanish rule. In 1822 U.S. diplomats formally recognized Gran Colom-
bia (now Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela), the first Latin American
state acknowledged by the United States. Although Britain then dominated Latin
American markets, Colombia and the United States signed their first trade agree-
ment in 1826. The volume of Colombian-American commerce thereafter exceeded
expectations in both countries. Around the same time, Colombian officials ac-
cepted U.S. opposition to the recolonization of the Americas as an expression of
hemispheric sovereignty. The U.S. government generally appreciated Colombian
president Simón Bolívar’s effort to form an inter-American confederation, even
though major cultural, economic, and political differences still separated the coun-
tries. In any case, more than foreign affairs, Colombia’s internal compartmental-
ization concerned Bogotá during the early national period. The rough landscape
divided the population, weakened the federal government, and limited internal
communications; tremendous internal diversities precluded the spread of national
sentiment. Venezuela and Ecuador left the union by 1830. A new constitution in
Bogotá created the Republic of New Granada in 1833.4
A competitive two-party political system soon developed in New Granada, the
legacies of which brought disastrous consequences in the 1940s and 1950s. At first,
clear ideological differences separated the political groups. The Liberal Party cam-
paigned for free trade, a decentralized government, and the separation of church
and state. The Conservative Party embraced the Spanish colonial legacy, authori-
tarianism, and the Catholic Church. While the parties differed on some important
issues, they had much in common. Elites endlessly debated political philosophy
but refused to disrupt the prevailing economic and social order. Controlled by
 solidarity and cooperation, 1939–1945 3

affluent citizens, parties enlisted Colombians of all classes and occupations. Fam-
ily affiliations usually determined an individual’s membership. Peasants typically
followed their landlords to the ballot box. Accounting for persistent regional dif-
ferences, political arrangements sometimes varied from one region to the next. But
in most areas, more complex than a simple ideological contest, heated personal
disputes quickly dominated Liberal-Conservative relations.
Like its political parties, Colombia’s modern structure of government origi-
nated in the nineteenth century. The Constitution of 1886, drafted by a bipartisan
national council, created a unitary republic, renamed the Republic of Colombia. A
strong executive, selected by popular vote, introduced legislation, issued decrees,
maintained public order, and commanded the armed forces. The president ap-
pointed department (state) governors, who then selected municipal officials such
as city mayors. The sitting president, therefore, controlled—directly or indirectly—
political and administrative offices throughout the country; the constitution did
prohibit any individual from serving two consecutive terms as chief executive. The
document gave legislative duties to a bicameral congress. Elected to serve four-year
terms, senators and representatives passed laws; appointed judges; and selected a
president designate, or vice president, to act as executive in extraordinary situa-
tions. The third branch of government, the judiciary, included a supreme court
and council of state. The court administered the republic’s legal system, while the
council reviewed the constitutionality of the congressional legislation and presi-
dential decrees. A durable document, the 1886 Constitution nurtured Colombian
democratic institutions and provided for relative internal stability. Attaching a vast
spoils system to the office of the presidency, it simultaneously fueled the Liberal-
Conservative competition.5
As Colombia’s reputation as Latin America’s leading democracy grew, so too
did its relationship with the United States. Bilateral trade and investment built
stronger commercial ties, and Bogotá happily dispatched a delegation to the First
International Conference of American States in Washington (1889–90). The con-
ference created the International Bureau of the American Republics, later called
the Pan American Union, to disseminate information and organize future inter-
American consultations. Most often, Colombian and American interests con-
verged in the Department of Panama. The Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty, negotiated
in 1846, guaranteed U.S. transit across Colombia’s strategic isthmus. American
involvement in the region swelled following the Mexican-American War (1846–
48), which expanded U.S. territory in the west. U.S. citizens who were headed to
California often crossed the isthmus. American entrepreneurs built a railroad in
Panama during the 1850s; others eyed the area as a possible site for an inter-oce-
anic canal. For Bogotá, the U.S. presence on the isthmus became a tremendous
source of revenue, and joint Colombian-American development pro­jects turned
the region into showcase of inter-American cooperation. But at the same time, the
4 colombia and the united states

meeting place became a source of some tension. Many Americans thought Bogotá
too weak to properly control the region. Some Colombians believed Americans
threatened Colombian cultural and administrative power in the Department of
Panama. Recurring lawlessness and political disarray reinforced apprehensions
on both sides.6
Panama remained at the center of the Colombian-American relationship
through the early twentieth century. As the United States became a formidable in-
ternational force with global interests, the construction of an inter-oceanic canal
surfaced as a key American objective in Latin America. Most Colombians, realizing
the project would become a national treasure, also wanted to cut a waterway across
the isthmus. Still, in 1869 the Colombian Congress, fearing a loss of sovereignty in
the department, rejected a treaty that would have allowed the United States to build
the passageway. The following year, a second agreement faltered in the U.S. Senate,
which was busy investigating allegations of corruption surrounding the Ulysses S.
Grant administration. When Americans turned their attention to Nicaragua as a
possible site for the inter-oceanic route, Colombians took their aspiration for a canal
to Europe. In 1879 Bogotá brought famed French canal-builder Ferdinand de Les-
seps to Panama. When construction began in 1881, the U.S. government reactivated
its dormant mission in Bogotá to monitor the work. In the face of uncompromising
terrain, ravaging diseases, and Colombian instability, the canal project collapsed by
the end of the decade, a failure that reopened the possibility of U.S.-Colombian col-
laboration.7
Colombia’s civil disorder complicated the canal enterprise. The Thousand Days
War began as a local Liberal uprising in Santander in 1899. A countrywide conflict
between Liberals and Conservatives erupted soon thereafter. As pitched battles un-
folded in central Colombia, Panamanian secessionists launched a vicious campaign
against Colombian rule. To the separatists, Bogotá was a distant and unresponsive
entity. The federal government collected heavy taxes from Panama without return-
ing basic services. Panama, they asserted, would be stronger as an independent
country. Losing its control over the region, Bogotá urged Washington to intervene
on its behalf. In 1901 the United States landed troops, as it had on several occasions
during the nineteenth century, to defend Colombian rule and protect American
citizens and property. In November 1902 Liberal and Conservative leaders boarded
a U.S. Navy battleship, the USS Wisconsin, to sign a peace agreement. Many as-
sumed a U.S.-Colombian canal accord would soon follow. During the war, U.S. and
Colombian diplomats had negotiated an agreement to build a canal in Panama. The
U.S. Senate ratified the Hay-Herran Treaty in March 1903, but Colombian reserva-
tions quickly surfaced. Amid a swirl of political bickering, the Colombian Senate
killed the treaty in August.
In the wake of the Colombian decision, President Theodore Roosevelt (1901–9)
accused Bogotá of blocking the forward progress of civilization. He promptly re-
 solidarity and cooperation, 1939–1945 5

vised American policy toward Colombia. If another revolt erupted in Panama,

the United States would act in the interest of regional stability, not Colombian
sovereignty. American power had long supported Colombian control over the
isthmus. Indeed, without U.S. assistance Bogotá might have lost Panama years
before. When news of the new policy reached Panama, a Conservative minor-
ity, concerned that the United States would take the canal to Nicaragua, figured
the opportunity for independence had arrived. While disappointed by the lack
of explicit U.S. assistance, separatist Manuel Amador Guerrero and his followers
rose against the government in Bogotá in November 1903. Unable to negotiate
the dense jungle between Bogotá and Panama, Colombian government troops
moving overland never reached the isthmus. American warships fettered the
movement of Colombian seaborne forces, and when a Colombian commander in
Panama threatened to kill American citizens, U.S. Marines moved ashore. Wash-
ington quickly recognized Panamanian independence, signed a treaty with the
new government, and began building the Panama Canal.8
Colombia and the United States needed the next thirty years to undo the dam-
age inflicted in 1903. At first, American collusion with Panamanian separatists
spawned widespread anti-American sentiment in Colombia, precluding an early
settlement of Colombian-American differences. Colombian citizens railed against
Yankee gunboat diplomacy and commercial penetration. Some even attacked U.S.
businessmen and missionaries working in the republic. Elected officials regularly
denounced the United States in public settings. But Colombians could not sus-
tain the intensity of their dissatisfaction. The country’s history of compartmental-
ization, after all, partially explained the separation of Panama. In a move toward
reconciliation, U.S. and Colombian diplomats negotiated the Thomson-Urrutia
Treaty in 1914 that settled the Colombian-Panamanian border and transferred $25
million to Bogotá for its territorial loss. Colombia recognized Panama’s indepen-
dence as part of the agreement. A short time later, President Marco Fidel Suárez
(1918–21) theorized that since Colombia could not escape contact with the United
States, Colombia should use the relationship to its advantage. The Suárez Doc-
trine helped Colombians discard the Panamanian controversy and capitalize on
the inter-American commercial boom of the 1920s; the Suárez mindset guided
Colombian foreign policy through World War II and the cold war. Also in the
1920s, U.S. policymakers adopted a new attitude toward Latin America. President
Herbert Hoover (1929–33) embraced a program of noninterference, began pulling
U.S. troops out of Nicaragua and Haiti, and calmly arbitrated a 1927 oil dispute
with Mexico. These and other actions began the Good Neighbor Policy, a phrase
Hoover coined during his 1929 goodwill tour of Latin America.9
Colombian-American friendship broadened during the decade before World
War II. A 1930 Conservative Party split allowed the Liberal Party to capture the
Colombian presidency. Liberal presidents Enrique Olaya Herrera (1930–34) and
6 colombia and the united states

The Colombian destroyer ARC Antioquia passes through the Panama Canal, June 1934.
The separation of Panama temporarily damaged U.S.-Colombian relations. Opened in
1914, the canal nevertheless benefited both countries. The defense of the Panama Canal
figured prominently in the minds of U.S. and Colombian authorities during World War II.
(Source: Department of the Navy, NARA)

Alfonso López Pumarejo (1934–38) launched state-sponsored development pro-

grams, not unlike those under Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, that accelerated
Colombian modernization. Colombian Liberals and American Democrats quickly
established warm personal relationships based on philosophical compatibilities.
Simultaneously, the Good Neighbor Policy flourished under President Roosevelt.
At the Montevideo Conference in 1933, Secretary of State Cordell Hull renounced
intervention as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. President Roosevelt visited
Cartagena in 1934 and revised U.S. tariff laws to expand inter-American commerce.
In December 1936 hemispheric officials at the Buenos Aires Conference accepted
the principle of inter-American consultations to maintain regional peace and secu-
rity. The delegates also adopted a general statement of inter-American solidarity.10
Cumulatively, Colombian president López observed, these changes in American
policy “helped to create an atmosphere of active friendship” that permitted hemi-
spheric collaboration during World War II.11 In other words, by 1938 Colombia and
the United States were ready to cooperate in the defense of the Americas.
 solidarity and cooperation, 1939–1945 7

The Inter-American Coalition

Nestled near the center of the Americas, adjacent to Panama Canal, Colombia
emerged as an important U.S. ally during World War II. The same distance that
had sparked conflict in 1903 encouraged wartime cooperation. The country’s war-
time strategic value resided in its proximity to the Panama Canal. Opened in 1914,
the inter-oceanic passage created important lines of commerce, communication,
and defense. It promoted international trade by shortening the distance between
producers and markets and helped Colombia connect (for the first time) its Ca-
ribbean and Pacific coasts. Since the United States also relied on the canal to move
U.S. naval assets between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, the canal occupied a
prominent place in the minds of U.S. strategic thinkers. The rise of air power after
World War I complicated canal defense. American officers realized that just a
modest airborne attack could close the canal until engineers repaired damaged
locks and dams. In 1939 the Roosevelt administration concluded that the threat to
the canal “could not be ignored,” nor could the United States neglect Colombia.12
The South American republic bordered Panama and controlled the coastal ap-
proaches at both ends of the canal. Hostile forces could easily strike the passage
from Colombia. Even a rogue group, operating from the Colombian backlands,
might render the Panama Canal inoperable, harming U.S. interests. Within the
larger U.S.-led multinational wartime alliance, the U.S.-Colombian partnership
therefore assumed special importance in the coalition against the Axis powers
during World War II.13
Liberal president Eduardo Santos emerged as the chief architect of Colombian-
American cooperation. Educated in Bogotá and Paris, Santos turned the fledg-
ling daily El Tiempo, which he acquired in 1913, into the country’s leading Liberal
newspaper. He held assorted political posts during the 1920s and 1930s, notably
as a Colombian senator and the governor of the Department of Santander. As
Enrique Olaya Herrera’s foreign minister, he headed the Colombian delegation at
the historic Montevideo Conference and represented the republic at the League of
Nations. A moderate Liberal, his tenure as president did not bring significant so-
cial or economic initiatives. He instead presided over the consolidation of reforms
adopted between 1934 and 1937. Santos, however, devoted considerable attention
to foreign relations, particularly Colombian-American cooperation. An “intel-
ligent and forceful” man, considered by U.S. officials to be “the most powerful
figure in the Liberal Party,” Santos admired Roosevelt and the United States.14 He
believed that democratic values made Colombia and the United States natural
partners. Moreover, strongly committed to the idea of inter-American solidar-
ity, he thought that the military, political, and economic security of each Ameri-
can republic depended on the welfare of the entire community. Over time, the
countries of the Western Hemisphere had created a system of interdependence
8 colombia and the united states

Colombian president Eduardo Santos

(1938–42). A strong proponent of
Colombian-American cooperation,
President Santos, pictured here in 1948,
guided Colombia through the opening of
World War II. (Source: New York World
Telegram & Sun Newspaper Photograph
Collection, Library of Congress)

that demanded further inter-American collaboration. Conversely, President San-

tos detested foreign totalitarianism, the ideas and actions of which were incom-
patible with Colombia’s republican principles. In November 1938 Adolf Hitler’s
Nazi Party mistreated three Colombian diplomats for collecting information on
anti-Semitism in Germany. The entire incident merely reinforced the Colombian
president’s low opinion of the Nazi government.15 These convictions shaped Co-
lombian foreign policy and determined Colombia’s position at the December 1938
Lima Conference.
The subject of Nazi aggression occupied delegates at the Eighth Conference of
American States. Earlier that year, Germany had annexed Austria and absorbed the
Sudetenland. Secretary of State Hull arrived in Peru expecting inter-American of-
ficials to pass a clear, unanimous resolution on the subject of hemispheric solidarity,
but he quickly encountered problems with the Argentine delegation. With strong
ties to Europe, a large German population, and aspirations to become a major in-
ternational actor, Argentina stubbornly opposed U.S. leadership. On the first day,
Argentine foreign minister José María Cantilo, doubting U.S. resolve in the face of
an Axis invasion, dismissed a proclamation of solidarity as unnecessary. The min-
ister then went fishing in Chile, entrusting Argentina’s interests to second-rate dip-
lomats, leaving Hull with the impression that Argentina “did not attach too much
importance to the conference.”16 The U.S. delegation brushed off the Argentine
antics and pushed for a declaration of solidarity. Colombian foreign minister Luis
López de Mesa supported the declaration, as did the Brazilian and Mexican repre-
 solidarity and cooperation, 1939–1945 9

sentatives.17 After considerable debate, a few heated exchanges, and the personal
intervention of Brazilian president Getúlio Vargas, the inter-American representa-
tives approved the Lima Declaration. Slightly weakened to accommodate Argentine
reservations, the document reaffirmed the sovereignty of the Americas, expressed
the U.S. and Latin American intention to resist extra-continental aggression, and
provided for further consultation as the international situation warranted. As part
of the agreement, Foreign Minister López de Mesa (together with the Dominican
representative) proposed a plan for the formation of an Association of American
Nations. The Santos administration, in short, wanted to replace the Pan Ameri-
can Union with a stronger inter-American organization. Considering the problems
they encountered passing a simple statement of solidarity in Lima, Colombian and
U.S. officials decided to shelve the plan until conditions improved.18
U.S.-Colombian cooperation accelerated after the Lima Conference. In early
1939 the American military missions opened in Colombia. Planned since the San-
tos inauguration in August 1938, the advisory groups immediately began laying
the foundation for wartime military cooperation. Also in January 1939, Bogotá
and Washington elevated their foreign legations to embassy status. The move,
recommended by Santos, increased communications and reflected the growing
importance of the bilateral relationship to both countries. Spruille Braden arrived
in Colombia that year as the first U.S. ambassador to Colombia. Miguel López
Pumarejo served as Colombia’s ambassador to the United States until Gabriel
Turbay arrived in Washington in November.
President Santos discussed these and other international developments during
his annual address to Congress in July 1939. The president reaffirmed Colombia’s
commitment to inter-American solidarity. He reviewed Colombian-American ini-
tiatives and reiterated the ongoing importance of bilateral cooperation. “The se-
curity of the Panama Canal is indispensable to the welfare of Colombia,” Santos
observed. The president pledged that “no one” would “be permitted to menace the
security of the canal from Colombian soil.”19 Colombian politicians and journal-
ists responded favorably to the president’s speech. Ambassador Braden, in frequent
contact with Santos, remarked that he was “deeply moved” by the president’s com-
mitment to hemispheric unity.20 The importance of inter-American solidarity, of
course, intensified as the international situation worsened. In September 1939, after
news of the outbreak of the European war reached Bogotá, the Colombian Con-
gress voted overwhelmingly to support Santos’s security program, including coop-
eration with the United States to defend the Panama Canal.
One month later, inter-American officials gathered Panama to study the hemi-
spheric implications of the European conflict. Undersecretary of State Sumner
Welles, head of the U.S. delegation, worked harmoniously with Latin American
officials. Most Latin American countries supported the U.S. program of accel-
erated economic collaboration in order to compensate for overseas instabilities,
10 colombia and the united states

Political Map of the Western Hemisphere, 1939. The U.S. Department of State prepared
this map for the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American States in Panama, October
1939. In the Declaration of Panama, inter-American officials proclaimed hostile action by
non-American belligerent nations within the shaded zone unacceptable. (Source: U.S. De-
partment of State)

especially the loss of foreign markets; the officials also endorsed a general state-
ment of neutrality. Diplomats then adopted the Declaration of Panama, proclaim-
ing that the “waters adjacent to the American continent” should be “free from
the commission of any hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation.”21 It
designated a three hundred to one thousand mile perimeter around the Western
Hemisphere, inside which it declared hostile action unacceptable.22
Military developments in the spring of 1940 heightened inter-American anxi-
ety. The spectacular German conquest of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg,
and France raised acute concerns among many hemispheric officials that Germany
 solidarity and cooperation, 1939–1945 11

would attempt to occupy western European colonies in the Caribbean. Facing this
possibility, inter-American officials convened in Havana, Cuba, in July 1940. Sec-
retary Hull proposed that the American republics both refuse to recognize any
transfer of colonies and, if necessary, place the possessions under a joint inter-
American trusteeship. Leopoldo Mezo of Argentina objected immediately, arguing
that such action would constitute a declaration of war. Hull eventually pulled the
Argentines into line, but only after direct communication with Argentina’s acting
president Ramón Castillo. The Colombian delegation, impressed by the need for
“complete agreement and unity in action as well as theory,” embraced the U.S. plan,
and had in fact arrived in Cuba with an independent study of the problem that
bore a striking resemblance to the U.S. initiative. Colombian diplomats played a
key role promoting hemispheric unity in Havana, going to great lengths to make
sure the meeting succeeded, efforts that earned Washington’s gratitude.23
The international conflagration swelled when Germany attacked the Soviet
Union in June 1941. Around the same time, the tone of Japanese-American rela-
tions pointed toward the possibility of a war in the Pacific. That summer, in a pri-
vate message to Roosevelt, President Santos reaffirmed his country’s commitment
to the “moral, religious, and political liberty” that Colombia and the United States
cherished.24 If the Axis powers prevailed, Santos told the Colombian Congress
in July, “Colombia would pass automatically into a state of slavery.” The republic
needed to work with the United States to defend the Western Hemisphere, particu-
larly the Panama Canal, which he described as “vital to the life of America and vital
to the defense of the United States.” The canal “constitutes for Colombia,” he added,
“an artery of communication whose interruption would occasion untold damage
on this country.”25
The president’s devotion to inter-American unity impressed U.S. authorities, but
some Colombians nurtured reservations. Considering the Axis successes in 1940
and 1941, several influential Conservatives thought Germany would win the war.
Open collaboration with the United States, they reasoned, might actually endanger
Colombia. While Colombia had few economic ties to Germany, Bogotá’s anti-Nazi
position might preclude future trade with a German-controlled Europe. If Ger-
many invaded the Americas, a neutral Colombia stood a fair chance of emerging
unmolested. In addition, Conservative Party chief Laureano Gómez Castro had
problems forgiving the United States for the separation of Panama. “The Panama
Canal affair is over and we don’t want to reopen it,” he said, “but it cannot be for-
gotten.”26 A New York Times writer, nevertheless, concluded in June that Colombia
was “the most likely of all South American republics to join hands with the United
States in the case of war.”27 Indeed, Colombia responded quickly to Japan’s attack
on Hawaii in December 1941. Bogotá broke relations with Tokyo less than twenty-
four hours after the Pearl Harbor raid. When Germany and Italy declared war on
the United States, the Santos administration severed ties with Berlin and Rome.28
12 colombia and the united states

An emergency inter-American meeting at Rio de Janeiro in January 1942 ad-

dressed problems connected with U.S. involvement in the war. Diplomats agreed
to expand hemispheric defense activities and formed the Inter-American Defense
Board “to study and recommend measures necessary” for continental defense.29
Colombian and U.S. officials also drafted a decree that would have ended all rela-
tions between the American republics and the Axis powers. Many Latin American
governments, like Colombia, broke with the Axis in December 1941; most Cen-
tral American countries declared war on the Axis. But several South American
countries, separated from U.S. forces by thousands of miles, refused to act, fear-
ing that hostile diplomacy would provoke an invasion. Colombians hoped the Rio
de Janeiro Conference would inspire a uniform response. Argentina and Chile,
however, refused to accept the draft declaration. Instead of a binding declaration,
attendees produced a resolution that merely encouraged Latin American govern-
ments to break with the Axis. Several uncommitted governments, notably Brazil,
honored the recommendation, but others did not respond. Concerned that its long
Pacific coast would be an easy target, Chile attempted to remain neutral. When a
U.S. diplomat assured Chileans that the American fleet would protect their coun-
try, Foreign Minister Gabriel Rosetto asked: “What fleet? The one sunk at Pearl
Harbor?”30 Santiago finally embraced the Allied cause in 1943. Buenos Aires, like-
wise, resisted the Rio Conference recommendation, maintaining its relationship
with Germany. Attempting to isolate Argentina, Washington declared Buenos Ai-
res ineligible for U.S. economic and military assistance. Argentina responded by
trying to buy military equipment from Germany. In 1945, when the outcome of
the war became a forgone conclusion, Argentina sided with the United States to
improve the chances of postwar bilateral cooperation.31
The German submarine campaign in American waters furthered Latin Ameri-
can involvement in World War II. Germany’s sinking of Latin American vessels
showed that the war affected all countries, not just the highly industrialized ones.
In May 1942 a German submarine attacked a Mexican oil tanker in the Caribbean.
Berlin responded to the Mexican protest by sinking another Mexican merchant
ship. Soon thereafter, the Mexican Congress declared war on the Axis.32 During
the first seven months of 1942 German U-boats in the Atlantic sank eleven Bra-
zilian vessels, resulting in the loss of more than eighty seamen. Then, in August
1942, a concentrated Nazi campaign against Brazilian shipping sent six vessels and
six hundred people, mostly civilian ocean-liner passengers and military person-
nel, to the bottom of the ocean. Rio de Janeiro promptly entered into a state of
belligerency with the Axis countries. Other Latin American republics, including
Colombia, followed a similar path.33 In June 1942 a Nazi submarine torpedoed the
Colombian Navy schooner ARC Resolute in the Caribbean. To make the incident
more egregious, after the schooner sunk, the U-boat crew surfaced and began
 solidarity and cooperation, 1939–1945 13

machine-gunning survivors as they clung to their life rafts. The Santos adminis-
tration condemned Germany and froze all Axis assets in Colombia but did not
join the war as a belligerent. That final step came only after a second submarine
attack and, even then, only as part of a growing internal political drama.34
Between 1903 and 1940, Colombia enjoyed a period of orderly political, social,
and economic development. A wave of interparty fighting followed the 1930 elec-
tion, but a 1932–34 border war with Peru inspired Colombian nationalism and
ended the domestic conflict. Partisan conflict, however, crept back into Colombian
public affairs during World War II. Minor problems first surfaced during the Santos
years. In October 1941, Conservatives used allegations of Liberal corruption to force
several cabinet officials from the government.35 Then, in 1942, the Liberal govern-
ment tried revising the Concordat of 1887, an agreement with the Vatican that al-
lowed the Roman Catholic Church special privileges inside Colombia. The move
succeeded only in upsetting Catholic clerics and Conservative citizens. Within the
Liberal ranks, the president’s moderate social agenda upset those who wanted more
radical change. The Liberal Party, in turn, divided between the santistas (Santos
supporters) and the lopistas (López supporters). Backers of former president López
wanted the government to push modernization and reform, much as it had dur-
ing the mid-1930s. The hotly contested 1942 election matched López—despised
by Conservatives—against Liberal-Conservative compromise candidate Carlos
Arango Vélez. When López prevailed, the long-standing Liberal-Conservative feud
seemed poised to erupt again.
Alfonso López had played an important role in Colombia prior to 1942. The
son of a prominent Colombian banker, he studied in the United States and Britain.
He later worked in New York City and founded a commercial bank in Colombia.
López emerged as a major political and intellectual force at the 1929 Liberal Party
convention, and he served as the Colombian minister in London during the early
1930s. As president from 1934 to 1938, he implemented the revolución en marcha, or
“revolution on the march.” Although hardly “revolutionary,” his presidency brought
major changes to Colombia. He employed a program of government economic
planning, passed agrarian reform legislation, initiated public works projects, and
introduced an income tax. López also managed to restructure the church-state re-
lationship and secured universal male suffrage. Economic nationalism during his
first presidency precipitated some hostilities toward U.S. interests in Colombia, es-
pecially the United Fruit Company. At times, the president’s own behavior showed
traces of anti-American sentiment. During the 1942 campaign, opponents charged
that López would not do enough to support the inter-American war effort.36 When
the mercurial López prevailed, U.S. policymakers questioned the implication for
U.S.-Colombian relations. To alleviate these concerns, president-elect López trav-
eled to Washington in July 1942, a month before his inauguration, to assure U.S.
14 colombia and the united states

Colombian president-elect Alfonso López (1934–38, 1942–45) confers with President

Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933–45) on the White House lawn, July 1942. (Source: Office of
War Information, NARA)

officials of his goodwill and support. The discussions convinced U.S. policymakers
that the bilateral partnership would continue. The trip did nothing to end the po-
litical fighting that would carry Colombia into World War II.37
Once in office, President López confronted a growing number of domestic crit-
ics. Predictably, Conservatives objected to every presidential word and deed, from
tax policies to religious initiatives.38 Colombian Conservatives despised López in
the same way Republicans in the United States detested Roosevelt. Colombian
labor turned against the president when he failed to respond to their demands
for better working conditions, evidenced during the 1943 Bogotá transportation
strike.39 Rising tensions between the National Police and the Colombian Army
also created problems. López favored the National Police, intending to build the
police into a “Liberal counterweight” to the armed forces, which he believed loyal
to the Conservative Party.40 The Colombian National Police therefore received a
disproportionate share of government funds and equipment during the first and
second López administrations. Army officers resented their low status during the
López years; corruption within the police forces put the president on the defen-
sive.41 Then, serious accusations of bribery and fraud surfaced, suggesting that
the president’s family and friends, particularly his son Alfonso López Michelsen,
 solidarity and cooperation, 1939–1945 15

had benefited from illegal wartime contracts and business dealings.42 At the same
time, Liberal political maverick Jorge Eliécer Gaitán accelerated his campaign
against Colombia’s oligarchy. Still other Liberals criticized the president for not
distributing the “spoils” of Liberal control evenly among various party compo-
nents.43 The López administration soon found itself in a tenuous position.
The situation deteriorated when, in July 1943, administration officials uncov-
ered a plot to overthrow the government. López ordered the police arrest of several
conspirators, including the popular Colombian boxer Francisco A. Pérez, known
simply as “Mamatoco.”44 But instead of arresting Mamatoco, National Police of-
ficers knifed the man to death. The incident and inept government cover-up that
followed brought criticism of the López administration to new heights.45 That year,
Conservatives and Liberals fought a vicious war of words. In September Liberal
and Conservative legislators brawled on the floor of the Chamber of Representa-
tives.46 During the entirety of the 1943 session, Congress was “agitated and ster-
ile” and accomplished little meaningful work. It barely managed to pass a budget
for the next year, and did that only by working deep into the Christmas recess.47
In late September a political commentator observed that the president had “com-
pletely lost” the political “prestige” he had carried with him into office in August
1942.48 Then, in early November 1943, President López decided to leave Colombia
to accompany his wife, diagnosed with cancer, to the United States for medical
treatment. Although her illness would prove fatal, skeptics believed the trip was
a maneuver to escape the domestic political controversy. On 19 November, just
before President and Mrs. López went to New York City, the Colombian Congress
transferred the presidency to Darío Echandía Olaya, who would serve as chief ex-
ecutive until López returned to Colombia.49
The republic’s final move toward belligerency came during this time of political
reshuffling. On the night of 17 November, a German submarine attacked a Colom-
bian warship, the ARC Ruby, in the waters between San Andrés Island and Carta-
gena. Four Colombian seamen died, and seven others suffered wounds. American
merchant marines delivered survivors to safety. After a series of emergency cabinet
meetings Echandía confiscated all Axis assets in Colombia. The administration
then called Congress into a special session to consider a proclamation of bellig-
erency. The Colombian Senate adopted the measure on 27 November, formally
acknowledging the existence of conflict between Bogotá and Berlin, committing
Colombia to increase its involvement in hemispheric defense. Thirteen Conserva-
tive senators voted against the measure; Gómez downplayed the U-boat attack in
his opposition to the Liberal administration. Other Colombians wanted a stronger
response—a declaration of war on Berlin. But Minister of Government Alberto
Lleras Camargo and Foreign Minister Carlos Lozano y Lozano urged caution. Un-
der the Colombian Constitution, a formal declaration automatically imposed a
countrywide state of siege. The move would have limited civil liberties, perhaps
16 colombia and the united states

even delaying the elections scheduled for 1946. Liberal policymakers openly feared
that such a declaration would “provoke a strong reaction from the Conservative
minority” in Colombia.50 The republic would “act internationally exactly as though
it were in the war,” Foreign Minister Lozano explained. Only for “internal reasons”
did the republic limit itself to a state of belligerency.51
As a result of the 1943 declaration, Colombia became a more active member of
the international alliance against the Axis powers. While Colombia could not give
“the coalition much material aid,” a New York Times editor wrote, the republic was
“a welcomed member of the growing coalition of the United Nations” due to its
“important strategic value” and “profound moral influence in Latin America.”52
But the Colombian declaration of belligerency was more than just a response to
the sinking of a Colombian schooner. Prior to November 1943, López considered
increasing Colombia’s part in the war through a belligerency declaration. One
U.S. State Department official reported that the president hoped such a declara-
tion would “divert public opinion from the Mamatoco case and [other] scandals”
and “unite the country.”53 Although López had not acted by the time he handed
his presidential duties to Echandía, the idea survived among Liberal government
officials. In similar situations, citizens in other Latin American countries erupted
in anti-German protests after the sinking of their ships. In Colombia, however, re-
porters recorded “a surprising lack of interest on the part of the local populace.”54
Even without public pressure, the Echandía administration jumped at the oppor-
tunity to expand its involvement in the war. In the United States, López signed the
United Nations Declaration, a statement of Allied war aims, for the Colombian
government in January 1944. The move failed to restore domestic political har-
mony. It did accelerate the pace of Colombian-American military cooperation.55

Military Cooperation

As fighting in Europe, Asia, and the Pacific endangered the Americas, the United
States and Latin America worked together to improve hemispheric defense capa-
bilities. Between 1938 and 1941, U.S. diplomats advocated a multilateral approach
to regional security. Sumner Welles and the Department of State expected that
an inter-American military committee would organize and implement defense
activities. The approach would advance the Good Neighbor Policy, extend multi-
lateralism, and seemingly ensure widespread U.S.–Latin American cooperation.
By contrast, U.S. military leaders considered the multinational strategy cumber-
some, inefficient, and insecure. For practical reasons, military planners pushed
regional security through bilateral relationships; some also feared that large inter-
American organizations gave too much power to Latin America, diluting Ameri-
can influence and compromising American security. Between 1938 and 1941, the
 solidarity and cooperation, 1939–1945 17

Latin American military leaders visit U.S. Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall
in Washington, October 1940. (Source: U.S. Information Agency, NARA)

U.S. government, unsure on the exact course to follow, mixed the two approaches.
The State Department promoted international cooperation in various diplomatic
settings while the U.S. military started building a network of bilateral relation-
ships. Then, just before the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Conference, President Roosevelt
expressed his preference for bilateral tactics. He wanted diplomats to create an
Inter-American Defense Board but insisted that it serve only an advisory role.
That decision accounted for the relative inactivity of the board during (and after)
World War II and smoothed the path for the U.S. government to pursue its secu-
rity goals in Latin America through bilateral arrangements.56 The United States
worked directly with individual countries to achieve stated objectives. In Colom-
bia, U.S. officials encouraged the development of a military establishment capable
of repelling “any probable minor attack from overseas.”57
In 1939 two important staff tours promoted bilateral understanding, critical
to accomplishing the Colombian-American military agenda in the years ahead.
In April Colombian Army chief of staff General Luis Acevedo and other Colom-
bian general officers traveled to the Canal Zone, inspected Fort Amador, studied
Balboa harbor defenses, and watched an American air power demonstration. The
Colombian officers visited the Panama Canal and observed a large U.S. Army field
exercise at Fort Clayton. They then met Panama Canal Department commander
18 colombia and the united states

Major General David L. Stone at his Quarry Heights headquarters. During that
session, the American general stressed the military and economic importance of
the canal. He also explained to the Colombians how mock air raids consistently
damaged the locks, spillway, and dams. In a real attack, even a minor enemy ef-
fort could render the passage inoperable. Speaking with Stone, the Colombian
Army chief of staff conveyed Colombia’s great interest in defending the canal and
expressed a keen appreciation for American regional security concerns.58
Two months later, in June 1939, General Stone led fifteen U.S. officers to Bogotá
to survey Colombian military preparedness. The Americans attended infantry,
artillery, and cavalry school maneuvers and inspected medical corps facilities and
the institute of military geography. General Stone met with prominent military
and political figures, including President Santos and his ministers. The conversa-
tions covered regional defense matters and helped officials from both countries
better understand their shared responsibility in the event war came to the Ameri-
cas. For his part, Stone left Colombia generally impressed with the readiness of
the Colombian military, at least the army, and returned to Panama convinced
that Colombia would help defend the Americas.59 Colombian officers believed
the visit successfully identified problems the two countries “held in common” and
“enlivened mutual respect.”60 These talks, the first serious discussions concerning
Colombian-American military collaboration, prepared both countries for future
cooperation.
The exchange, like other wartime goodwill gestures, increased contact between
the two militaries, nurtured bilateral confidence, made inter-American solidar-
ity tangible, and showed Colombians that U.S. forces were close enough to help
the country in the event of an emergency.61 Additionally, the visits brought real
improvements in Colombian-American military relations. In May 1939, after the
Panama visit, General Acevedo dismissed the German Army officer then serving
as the director of the Colombian War Department Administration Division. In
place of the German administrator, Bogotá asked Washington for an American to
“efficiently collaborate with the military-aviation and naval missions” and “better
install the administrative methods used by the United States Army.”62 Concerned
that the German had been working against American interests in Colombia, the
Roosevelt administration gladly complied with the Colombian request. Then, fol-
lowing General Stone’s trip to Colombia, the United States sent its first permanent
military attaché to Bogotá. At the time of the visit, Colombia shared an attaché
with its Central American neighbors: one American (stationed in Costa Rica)
served the entire region. In June, President Santos asked Stone to send a full-
time officer to Bogotá. Colombia would need the U.S. attaché, Santos believed, to
orchestrate the Colombian-American response to the Axis challenge. Later that
year, the first permanent U.S. military attaché to Colombia arrived in Bogotá to
coordinate a variety of bilateral security measures.63 The tours and these related
 solidarity and cooperation, 1939–1945 19

developments created an atmosphere of cooperation that served both countries

during formal bilateral security negotiations the following year.
In early 1940 the Roosevelt administration decided to open discussions with its
Latin American neighbors to determine how each state could best contribute to
hemispheric defense. President Santos agreed to the talks on 24 May, and a de-
tachment of U.S. military officials, headed by Major Matthew B. Ridgway, arrived
in Bogotá in June. The first meeting produced an agreement on the principles of
mutual defense. It also identified common security problems, especially with regard
to the Panama Canal.64 The second round of talks, held in Colombia in September
1940 under the direction of U.S. mission personnel, produced specific recommen-
dations as to how each country might support the other. The Colombian-American
discussions were cordial and productive. The only real problem came during the
September meeting when U.S. Army officers raised their concerns about German
espionage activities in Colombia, an intense U.S. fear the Colombians did not share.
In the final September agreement, the Santos administration committed itself to
prevent its territory from being used as a springboard for any attack on the Panama
Canal.65 The government would secure its territory against internal and external
enemies. Colombia, likewise, vowed to participate in regional defense. In case of
an Axis invasion of Colombia, the United States agreed to defend the South Ameri-
can republic. Should an extra-continental power attack elsewhere in the Americas,
Bogotá pledged to open the republic to U.S. forces as necessary to meet the threat.
In order to implement the agreement, the countries reiterated their dedication to
improving the Colombian military.66
During World War II, U.S. military advisers collaborated with Colombian of-
ficials in order to achieve fundamental Colombian-American security goals. Es-
sential agents of Colombian-American cooperation, they also coordinated activi-
ties like the 1940 bilateral military talks. In 1938 Santos asked the United States for
missions to help modernize the Colombian naval and air forces, thus improving
Colombian security. Most likely, Santos also sought to avoid a repetition of the July
1938 Colombian air show calamity, during which a military aircraft crashed into a
crowd of spectators, killing 53 and wounding 150; President López and President-
elect Santos narrowly escaped injury.67 The disaster confirmed Colombia’s needs for
foreign military assistance. Additionally, the Santos administration wanted Ameri-
can personnel in Colombia to encourage bilateral collaboration, provided that those
men did not force unwanted military equipment on Colombia.68 The Roosevelt ad-
ministration assured Santos that U.S. policy forbade American advisers from push-
ing arms on foreign governments. Foreign Minister López de Mesa and Secretary
of State Hull signed the mission contracts in Washington on 23 November 1938. The
agreements authorized American servicemen to work with the Colombian military
in an advisory capacity. Unlike the British and Swiss officers stationed in Colombia
before 1938, American personnel would not hold rank in the Colombian armed
20 colombia and the united states

forces. In fact, the Colombian-American agreement barred U.S. advisers from com-
manding Colombian military units. The contracts did not specify the exact number
of personnel that would work in Colombia. Instead, the teams would reflect the
republic’s need for expertise at any given moment. Finally, the Colombian govern-
ment agreed to finance the mission’s work, specifically salaries, travel, offices, and
transportation.69 Overall, the mission contracts gave Colombians great control over
the size, disposition, and influence of the U.S. military missions.
The first mission contracts did not assign American advisers to Colombian
ground forces. Between 1938 and 1940, Colombian policymakers, led by the na-
tion’s French-educated president, wanted the French Army to train Colombian
artillery, cavalry, and infantry units. President Santos considered the French Army
the most powerful in the world. Colombians, therefore, would benefit from an
affiliation with France.70 In early 1940, Paris sent three officers to teach at the Co-
lombian military college. Bogotá worked to enlarge the size of the French presence
in Colombia through May 1940.71 But Germany’s stunning conquest of Western
Europe forced the Santos administration to rethink its approach to improving the
Colombian Army. Renewing the mission agreements with the United States in
1942, Bogotá asked Washington to add ground force experts to the groups already
working in Colombia, an important development considering the army’s size and
influence within the Colombian military establishment.72
The military mission agreements promised to raise Colombian military readi-
ness during a time of great international upheaval. Most importantly, they initiated
a program of military cooperation that connected the two countries in a mutually
beneficial way. Colombian journalists broadly supported the government’s deci-
sion to hire American military advisers. The leading Liberal newspaper, El Tiempo,
owned and operated by President Santos and his brother, described Colombia’s
need for foreign assistance. It also explained the merits of working with the United
States. Geographic proximity made the United States a natural source of military
assistance. Moreover, Colombia and the United States shared a commitment to
military subordination to civilian authority.73 Reviewing the arrangement in June
1939, another Liberal paper, El Espectador, concluded that beyond the practical
benefit to Colombia, the U.S. teams embodied the “mutual trust” and “friendly
intercourse” between the two countries.74 Conservative writers also supported the
bilateral arrangement. Laureano Gómez’s El Siglo printed several favorable front-
page articles.75 Yet in their campaign to harass the Liberal Party, some Conserva-
tives objected to the arrangements for political gain. Diario de la Costa questioned
the financial wisdom of contracting with foreign military advisers.76 The Santos
administration, it charged, did not know how to manage the country’s economy.
American excellence, El Siglo editorialized, lay in the “building of excellent high-
ways . . . elevators, and moving pictures,” not in its military strength. Perhaps a
German military mission would better serve Colombia’s interests.77 These expres-
 solidarity and cooperation, 1939–1945 21

sions aside, Conservative and Liberal congressmen voted together to support the
administration’s decision to bring U.S. advisers to Colombia.
Americans were delighted to send military advisers to Colombia. A Washing-
ton Post writer claimed that the missions were “effective evidence of the growth of
practical inter-American solidarity.” U.S. advisers started working in many Latin
American countries during World War II. Yet Americans stationed in Colombia
were invaluable, as the strategically located country “has been of the first impor-
tance” to U.S. security since the Panama Canal opened.78 The U.S. War Depart-
ment expected that the U.S. servicemen would standardize inter-American mili-
tary practices, improve regional security, and foster hemispheric understanding. In
Bogotá, Ambassador Braden thought that new missions would become a tremen-
dous vehicle for Colombian-American cooperation. The Colombian president, he
added, likely had a compelling secondary reason to request the missions. Braden
thought Santos invited U.S. advisers to Colombia as an expression of confidence in
American leadership. President Roosevelt found this sentiment “extremely gratify-
ing” but hoped the missions would “prove their efficacy upon a purely professional
basis.”79 The first U.S. advisers set out to accomplish that very goal.
The U.S. military missions, arriving in Colombia in January 1939, found the
small Colombian military woefully unprepared for modern warfare. Since in-
dependence, a distinct class of professional Colombian soldiers and sailors had
played only a minor role in Colombian society, residing on the periphery of a
deeply embedded constitutional system. During the nineteenth century, Colom-
bians used personal relationships and wealth to acquire military commissions,
much like their counterparts in the U.S. armed forces. In Colombia, the promo-
tion and training systems lacked formal structure. Irregular militiamen (not ca-
reer servicemen) most often decided the outcome of Colombia’s internal conflicts.
In the early twentieth century, the Rafael Reyes administration (1904–9), enacted
a series of reforms that encouraged Colombian military professionalism. The gov-
ernment created service academies to educate and train officers and hired some
foreign officers to promote military proficiency. Still, the government invested
very little in its armed forces, and systemic problems persisted. The fight with
Peru in the early 1930s exposed the military’s ongoing weakness. Indeed, in 1939
the Colombian Army, the largest branch of the military, numbered just eighteen
thousand troops and lacked proper equipment and training. U.S. advisers found
Colombian naval and air forces in even worse condition. Colombian and Ameri-
can military personnel addressed these problems during World War II.80
In 1939 American naval mission chief Captain Lawrence F. Reifsnider encoun-
tered a Colombian Navy incapable of serious operations. The republic had so ne-
glected its two British-built destroyers (the heart of the Colombian fleet) that the
ships could not move under their own power. The lightly armed schooners and
patrol boats were not suitable for combat. After orienting themselves to their new
22 colombia and the united states

environment, the American naval mission concentrated on making the Colom-

bian force ready for battle. At the request of the Colombian naval commanders,
the U.S. advisers supervised the repair of the Colombian destroyers and outfitting
of coastal vessels. American officers taught classes on maintenance and logistics;
they also introduced Colombian sailors to U.S. naval customs, doctrine, and tac-
tics. But certain realities of life in Colombia frustrated the Americans. Captain
Reifsnider experienced difficulties communicating with the geographically scat-
tered elements of the Colombian Navy. After several months at the Colombian
naval base in Cartagena, he therefore moved the mission headquarters to Bogotá
in order to improve relations with the Colombian high command. The U.S. group
also lacked a sufficient numbers to meet all the Colombian requests for assistance.
Indeed, only six American servicemen worked in the naval mission during its first
year. The gradual enlargement of the advisory group eliminated that problem. By
the time Captain James Richard Barry assumed commanded of mission in August
1941, over twenty U.S. Navy personnel worked in Colombia.81
The U.S. aviation mission found Colombian pilots lacking skills and resources.
Unlike the U.S. Army Air Forces, the Colombian Air Force, established by Presi-
dent Suárez in 1919, functioned as an independent service branch. During its first
decades of operation, however, the Colombian Air Force confronted a terrible
shortage of qualified flyers, mechanics, and equipment. As late as 1941 the Colom-
bians operated only thirteen unarmed aircraft. The badly maintained Colombian
airfields posed great risks to incoming and outgoing flights. For example, in No-
vember 1941 two skilled American pilots demolished their P-40s trying to land
at one Colombian installation. Led by Major Wallace E. Whitson, the American
advisers labored to refurbish the existing air fleet but could find neither spare
parts nor qualified mechanics in Colombia. Those aircraft that did fly quickly
depleted Colombia’s reserve of aviation fuel, a precious wartime commodity. The
U.S. advisers made several trips to the Canal Zone to acquire basic supplies. They
then started teaching a variety of courses at the Colombian mechanics school (in
Madrid) and flight training center (in Cali). American airport engineers helped
Colombian officials enlarge and improve several key airfields. Flight school com-
mandant Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Santos Calvo and other talented Colom-
bian officers capitalized on the opportunity to work with U.S. advisers. As a re-
sult, the readiness of the Colombian Air Force greatly improved by 1943. Still, the
American aviation mission, then commanded by Colonel Charles D. Densford,
considered the Colombian Air Force incapable of modern warfare.82
Compared to air and naval units, the Colombian ground forces impressed the
U.S. military advisers. U.S. officers believed that the Colombian Army, while small,
simply needed better equipment and training. Beginning in 1942 U.S. instructors at
Colombian service schools taught classes on subjects ranging from infantry tactics
to leadership to conversational English. Lieutenant Colonel Ross Barr organized
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