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The Concept
of Pneuma
after Aristotle
Sean Coughlin
David Leith
Orly Lewis
(eds.)
EDITED BY
Sean Coughlin
David Leith
Orly Lewis
Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the
Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data are
available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.
ISBN 978-3-9820670-4-9
ISSN (Print) 2366-6641
ISSN (Online) 2366-665X
DOI: 10.17171/3-61
URN: urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-refubium-29034-0
www.edition-topoi.org
CONTENTS
PAVEL GREGORIC
Soul and Pneuma in De spiritu — 17
LUCIANA REPICI
Strato of Lampsacus on Pneuma — 37
MICHIEL MEEUSEN
Aristotle’s Second Breath: Pneumatic Processes in the Natural Problems
(On Sexual Intercourse) — 63
DAVID LEITH
The Pneumatic Theories of Erasistratus and Asclepiades — 131
TEUN TIELEMAN
Cleanthes’ Pneumatology. Two Testimonies from Tertullian — 157
IAN HENSLEY
The Physics of Pneuma in Early Stoicism — 171
PETER N. SINGER
Galen on Pneuma: Between Metaphysical Speculation and Anatomical
Theory — 237
JULIUS ROCCA
One Part of a Teleological Whole: Galen’s Account of the Lung as an
Instrument of Pneumatic Elaboration — 283
JULIA TROMPETER
How the Soul Affects the Body: Pneumatic Tension, Psychic Tension and
Megalopsychia in Galen — 313
BETTINA BOHLE
Proclus on the Pneumatic Ochema — 343
PETROS BOURAS-VALLIANATOS
Theories on Pneuma in the Work of the Late Byzantine Physician John
Zacharias Aktouarios — 365
Introduction
Summary
This volume explores the versatility of the concept of pneuma in philosophical and med-
ical theories in the wake of Aristotle’s physics. It offers thirteen separate studies of how
the concept of pneuma was used in a range of physical, physiological, psychological, cos-
mological and ethical inquiries. The focus is on individual thinkers or traditions and the
specific questions they sought to address, including early Peripatetic sources, the Stoics, the
major Hellenistic medical traditions, Galen, as well as Proclus in Late Antiquity and John
Zacharias Aktouarios in the early 14th century. Building on new scholarly approaches and
on recent advancements in our understanding of Graeco-Roman philosophy and medicine,
the volume prompts a profound re-evaluation of this fluid and adaptable, but crucially im-
portant, substance, in antiquity and beyond.
Keywords: pneuma; spirit; soul; body; history of life sciences; philosophy; medicine
Dieser Band erkundet die Vielseitigkeit des Konzepts Pneuma in philosophischen und me-
dizinischen Theorien in der Folge von Aristoteles’ Physik. Er bietet dreizehn Beiträge, wie
das Konzept Pneuma in körperlichen, physiologischen, psychologischen, kosmologischen
und ethischen Untersuchungen betrachtet wurde. Der Fokus liegt auf individuellen Den-
kern oder Traditionen und deren spezifischen Fragestellungen, unter ihnen die frühen Pe-
ripatetiker, die Stoiker, die großen hellenistischen medizinischen Traditionen, Galen, aber
auch der spätantike Proclus und Johann Zacharias Aktouarios im frühen 14. Jh. Auf neue
Forschungsansätze und Entwicklungen bezüglich des Forschungsgegenstandes griechisch-
römische Philosophie und antike Medizin bauend, bietet dieser Sammelband eine profunde
Neubewertung dieser fluiden, aber zentralen Substanz, in der Antike und späterer Zeit.
Sean Coughlin, David Leith, Orly Lewis (eds.) | The Concept of Pneuma after Aristotle | Berlin Studies
of the Ancient World 61 (ISBN 978-3-9820670-4-9; DOI: 10.17171/3-61) | www.edition-topoi.org
7
SEAN COUGHLIN, DAVID LEITH, ORLY LEWIS
Air is unmistakably important. Its importance was acknowledged from early on in the
Greek philosophical tradition, with Anaximenes of Miletus in the 6th century BCE,
who reportedly held that the cosmos developed in some way out of the condensation
and rarefaction of air as its original matter. The significance of air was elaborated further
in the 5th century BCE by such thinkers as Diogenes of Apollonia, and in the medical
tradition by the anonymous authors of the treatises On Breaths and On the Sacred Disease.
With Aristotle, however, the airy substance ‘pneuma’ took on a new and more sophis-
ticated role in explanations of animal life. His speculations seem likely to have been
inspired, at least in part, by questions concerning how the soul interacts with the body.
The incorporeality of the soul, as it was conceived by Plato and his disciples, posed prob-
lems for explaining the soul’s interaction with the corporeal body and its environment.
How, for example, might an immaterial soul affect the body so as to cause it to move,
or how might sensations impinge physically on the soul so conceived? The relative in-
substantiality of a pneumatic substance suggested itself as a plausible medium,1 and
Aristotle himself went so far as to dissociate it from the air which inspired it, conceiving
it as something ‘connate’ (σύμφυτον) and congenital, a material in us “analogous to the
elements of the stars.”2
Around Aristotle’s time, then, pneuma gained a novel and crucial significance that
it was to retain throughout the rest of antiquity and beyond. It came to feature promi-
nently in all manner of physical, physiological, psychological, cosmological and ethical
inquiries. The conceptual framework was still operative for René Descartes in the 17th
century in his understanding of the working of the body by means of ‘animal spirits’
and in the context of his more radical mind-body dualism. And it continued until the
18th century, when focus shifted to entities like Luigi Galvani’s electrical force and An-
toine Lavoisier’s oxygen. The longevity of pneuma as a concept makes it all the more
1 Dillon 2009. And more generally in Lloyd 2007, πνεύματι φύσις ἀνάλογον οὖσα τῷ τῶν ἄστρων
140–141, and Bartoš 2006. στοιχείῳ). See also Arist. Gen. an. 2.3, 736b29–
2 Arist. Gen. an. 2.3, 736b35–737a1: “the pneuma 737a1; 3.11, 762a19–b21; Arist. De motu an. 10,
and the nature in the pneuma, enveloped in the 703a4–28. For key discussions see: Jaeger 1913;
semen and the foam-like, being analogous to the Solmsen 1957; Nussbaum 1978; Verbeke 1978;
element of the stars” (τὸ ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενον ἐν Freudenthal 1995; Bos 2003; Corcilius and Gregoric
τῷ σπέρματι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀφρώδει πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ 2013; Bos 2018; Bartoš and King 2020.
8
INTRODUCTION
surprising, however, that there was little consensus concerning what pneuma was, what
qualities it had, how many kinds there were, how it came to be present in the body, and
what exactly it did there.
The scholarship on these variations and elaborations of the concept of pneuma after
Aristotle remains limited. While some of these issues have been addressed piecemeal in
earlier scholarship, there are few studies concerned with the concept of pneuma itself.3
Moreover, recent advancements in such areas as Hellenistic medicine, Galen’s medi-
cal system and its debts, Stoic physics and medieval medicine and philosophy call for
a detailed re-evaluation and revised analysis. There have been important methodolog-
ical developments in these fields as well. This is true particularly as regards the study
of authors for which we only have fragmentary citations and reports, as is the case for
most Hellenistic medical and philosophical authors. The change in method is appar-
ent also in scholarship moving away from the eager attempts to identify influence and
connections between different ancient authors based on (often incidental) lexical and
conceptual similarities. This approach often led to circular arguments, for example,
when the ideas of one ancient author were used to fill gaps in the ideas of another au-
thor.4 A bottom-up approach is more fruitful, both for the study of individual authors
and for the topic as a whole – an approach which examines each source in its textual
and historical contexts as the basis for the reconstruction and discussion of the ideas of
each author or historically-attested group of authors.5
The conference held at the Excellence Cluster Topoi in Berlin from 2 to 4 July 2015
sought to explore, and to underscore, the diversity and richness of ancient theories that
made use of pneuma. It also aimed to provide a more coherent basis for evaluating how
connected or disconnected the post-Aristotelian tradition of understanding pneuma
may have been. Fourteen papers were read at the conference, on texts and authors span-
ning the late fourth century BCE to the fourteenth century CE. Of these, ten have been
revised for publication here, with the addition of three articles to fill what were felt to
be particularly significant gaps (Hensley on Stoic pneuma; Lewis and Leith on early
Hellenistic physicians; and Coughlin and Lewis on the Pneumatist medical school).
Our decision to focus on the development of pneumatic theories after Aristotle,
and in his wake, was based partly on the desire to avoid unnecessary overlap with a re-
cent conference held at the Academy of Science of the Czech Republic, Prague (20 to
3 On the Stoics: Hager 1982; Tieleman 2014; on 5 By ‘historically-attested’ we refer here to cases in
Galen: Temkin 1951; Debru 1996; Rocca 2003, 201– which the ancient sources themselves explicitly
238; on Early Hellenistic physicians: Wilson 1959; testify a relation between two or more authors
Lewis 2017, 252–298. (e.g. as master and student or by a similar ‘school’
4 See the introduction to the chapter by Coughlin labelling).
and Lewis in this volume and the references there.
9
SEAN COUGHLIN, DAVID LEITH, ORLY LEWIS
22 June 2014), entitled ‘Aristotle and his Predecessors on Heat, Pneuma and Soul’, or-
ganised by Hynek Bartoš and Colin Guthrie King.6 But the decision was also informed
by our conviction that Aristotle’s ideas were a turning point in the history of the con-
cept of pneuma which shaped, whether directly or indirectly, the views of many of the
philosophical and medical theorists who came after him.
This volume does not attempt a comprehensive, linear history of pneuma from Aris-
totle’s pupils to the Byzantine period, or to replace Gérard Verbeke’s study L’évolution de
la doctrine du Pneuma du stoïcisme à S. Augustine.7 Rather, it examines a range of individ-
ual authors and texts in their own right, with a view to establishing what their specific in-
terests were, what sorts of questions they were asking, and how they employed pneuma
in answering them. Pneuma was never a single substance, homogeneous throughout
antiquity. Its extraordinary versatility is evidenced repeatedly in the ways it was used to
plug a range of theoretical gaps. In the hands of multiple thinkers from a wide variety
of intellectual backgrounds, pneuma was conceived as an innate substance or simply as
inspired air, as the substance of the soul or merely as its first instrument or vehicle, as
the moist and warm contents of the arteries producing the phenomenon of pulsation,
as the mediator of sensation and deliberate motion via the nervous system, as the cause
of the cohesion of the cosmos, and much else besides. To do justice to this diversity
and versatility, we believed that a more atomised and pluralistic approach was precisely
what was needed. In the articles which follow here, individual theories and approaches
are allowed to speak for themselves, to illustrate the many different purposes for which
pneuma was invoked, and the problems it was intended to solve. Pneuma in our sources
is often envisaged more as explanans than as explanandum. In fact, with the notable ex-
ception of the Peripatetic treatise On Pneuma, it rarely seems to have been a subject of
study in its own right in antiquity. Hence, we believe a series of studies focused on indi-
vidual thinkers, produced by experts in their respective fields, is the best way to deliver
a balanced, rigorous understanding of pneuma and its turbulent history. These inde-
pendent studies can then be used by other scholars to examine questions of reception,
relations and comparisons among authors.
Another key focus of interest here is the fruitful interactions that may be discerned
between philosophy and medicine. The philosophical and medical inquiries addressed
in this volume were clearly distinct in their overall approach, yet they share many basic
assumptions, and influences between philosophers and doctors were evidently working
in both directions. We leave for other and future studies the reception of the concept in
Jewish, Christian and Muslim theologies (‘ruah ha-qodesh,’ ‘Holy Spirit’, rūh).8
˙ ˙
6 See Bartoš and King 2020. 8 Frey and Levison 2014 offers a broad selection of
7 Verbeke 1945. studies on the Judeo-Christian tradition.
10
INTRODUCTION
The volume adopts a loose chronological structure, and in order to emphasise con-
nections, overlapping interests and continuities, we have not divided it up formally into
distinct sections. Nevertheless, general groupings will of course suggest themselves.
The volume opens with three papers on pneuma in the early Lyceum, represented by
the pseudo-Aristotelian tract On Pneuma (Gregoric), Strato of Lampsacus (Repici), and
the Problems (Meeusen).9 The fluidity and unevenness of approaches to pneuma and its
manifold possible applications are very much apparent in these early Peripatetic inves-
tigations. The inquiries opened up here are connected in various ways with key devel-
opments in physiology and anatomy that came out of the medical tradition, which are
explored in the next two papers, dealing with a series of physicians of the later Classical
and Hellenistic periods, namely Diocles of Carystus, Praxagoras of Cos and Herophilus
of Chalcedon (Lewis and Leith), and Erasistratus of Ceos and Asclepiades of Bithynia
(Leith). The Stoics’ conceptions of pneuma are addressed in the two following pa-
pers, analysing Cleanthes’ distinctive pneumatology on the one hand (Tieleman) and
revisiting some basic features of the physics of pneuma in the early Stoa on the other
(Hensley). The medical sect known as the Pneumatists, itself agreeing to some degree
with Stoicism, is the subject of the next paper (Coughlin and Lewis). Then come three
papers on Galen, reflecting both his pivotal position in the elaboration of the physio-
logical role of pneuma, as well as the recent explosion of scholarly interest in Galen’s
medical and philosophical system generally (Singer, Trompeter, Rocca). Finally, two
facets of the later elaboration of these traditions are explored, focusing firstly on Neo-
platonist inquiries into the soul’s vehicle, Proclus’ in particular (Bohle), and secondly
on the early 14th century physician John Zacharias Aktouarios, who further articulated
Galen’s analysis of pneuma in the contemporary context of Byzantine medicine (Bouras-
Vallianatos). There are some unfortunate omissions, such as on pneuma in the Epi-
curean tradition and in the writings of other medieval physicians and philosophers (e.g.
Razi, Asaph HaRofeh), and we hope this volume will encourage further study into these
and other thinkers.
Finally, we support the Berlin Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge in the
Sciences and Humanities10 and have insisted on a fully open-access publication. Edition
Topoi enabled us to do so while offering a rigorous multi-tier peer-review system.
9 The volume on Aristotle and his predecessors Bartoš phasises the continuity in the history of pneuma
and King 2020 includes a chapter on the treatise On while reflecting the traditional ambiguity concern-
Pneuma (namely, on its theory of heat). It is now ing its dating and authorship. On the date and au-
generally accepted that the treatise was written thorship see Lewis and Gregoric 2015 and Gregoric
shortly after Aristotle but that the author engages and Lewis 2015, and, for a different view, Bos and
directly with questions Aristotle left unanswered by Ferwerda 2008; Bos 2018.
making recourse to early Hellenistic medical ideas 10 Max Planck Gesellschaft 2003.
and debates. Including a paper in both volumes em-
11
SEAN COUGHLIN, DAVID LEITH, ORLY LEWIS
References to ancient sources use Latin titles. Following their first appearance in a chap-
ter, the abbreviated forms are used. Abbreviations follow the list in Simon Hornblower
& Anthony Spawforth, The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 4th edition, Oxford, 1996, where
applicable. For Galenic and Pseudo-Galenic works, we use the abbreviations in Robert
James Hankinson, The Cambridge Companion to Galen, 391–397. References to Galen cite
the volume and page number in the edition by Karl Gottlob Kühn (Claudii Galeni opera
omnia, 22 volumes, Leipzig, 1821–1833, reprint: Cambridge, 2011, abbreviated as K.)
and, when available, the page number in the more recent edition. References to works
from the Hippocratic Corpus cite volume and page numbers in the Littré edition (Oeu-
vres complètes d’Hippocrate, ed. Émile Littré, 10 volumes, Paris, 1839–1861, abbreviated as
L.) and, when available, the more recent edition. In some cases, authors have included
line numbers as well. References to the works of Plato and Aristotle cite the page, sec-
tion or line numbers in the standard editions of Stephanus and Bekker. References to
fragments of Early Greek (Pre-Socratic) philosophers are to their number in Hermann
Diels & Walter Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th edition (three volumes, Berlin,
1951–1952, abbreviated as DK). References to the fragments of the Stoics are to Hans
von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (four volumes, Leipzig, 1903–1924, abbreviated
as SVF). The edition and abbreviation used for each ancient work are listed in the bibli-
ographies of primary sources at the end of each chapter.
Acknowledgements
12
INTRODUCTION
tion Topoi have taken extraordinary care in seeing the project through, for which we are
thankful, and we would like to mention those who worked with us directly at various
stages: Nadine Riedl, Katrin Siebel, and Gisela Eberhardt and a special thanks to Martin
Pechmann. We are also humbled and appreciative of the nearly thirty anonymous refer-
ees who gave extensive comments on earlier drafts of individual papers. And to Sara von
Seggern, Evangelia Nikoloudakis and Martin Müller, who provided invaluable editorial
assistance in preparing the final typescript and indices. Finally, our deepest thanks to
Philip van der Eijk for his unwavering support of this project and his mentorship within
the community of scholars of ancient medicine, science and philosophy.
13
Bibliography
14
INTRODUCTION
SEAN COUGHLIN
DAVID LEITH
15
SEAN COUGHLIN, DAVID LEITH, ORLY LEWIS
ORLY LEWIS
16
Pavel Gregoric
Summary
This paper explores the conception of soul and its relation to pneuma in De spiritu, a short
and relatively neglected treatise transmitted with the Aristotelian corpus. Following a re-
view of all the relevant passages, it is concluded that the author was familiar with Aristotle’s
biological works and his conception of soul, but does not subscribe to it. It is shown that
various other conceptions of soul make appearance in the treatise. It is proposed that the
author aimed to make his physiological and anatomical theory – built on Aristotle’s no-
tion of pneuma – compatible with as many different conceptions of soul in circulation as
possible, which he viewed as a competitive advantage of his theory.
Dieser Beitrag erkundet die Konzeption der Seele und ihre Relation zu pneuma in De spiritu,
einer kurzen und relativ vernachlässigten Abhandlung, die im aristotelischen Korpus über-
liefert ist. Nach Sichtung aller relevanten Passagen wird geschlussfolgert, dass der Autor
vertraut war mit Aristoteles’ biologischen Werken und seiner Konzeption der Seele, ohne
sich aber dessen Meinung anzuschließen. Auch wird gezeigt, dass verschiedene andere Kon-
zeptionen der Seele in der Abhandlung vorkommen. Angenommen wird, dass der Autor
beabsichtigte, seine physiologische und anatomische Theorie – aufbauend auf Aristotles’
Vorstellung des pneuma – mit möglichst vielen verschiedenen Konzeptionen kompatibel
zu machen, was er als starken Vorteil seiner Theorie betrachtete.
Sean Coughlin, David Leith, Orly Lewis (eds.) | The Concept of Pneuma after Aristotle | Berlin Studies
of the Ancient World 61 (ISBN 978-3-9820670-4-9; DOI: 10.17171/3-61) | www.edition-topoi.org
17
PAVEL GREGORIC
De spiritu is a curious and largely neglected short treatise transmitted with the Aris-
totelian corpus. It contains claims about soul and pneuma which have been cited in
support of different views concerning the date and authorship of the treatise. For in-
stance, Abraham Bos and Rein Ferwerda think that the treatise features the same con-
ception of soul and its relation to pneuma that Aristotle championed, which supports
Bos’ view that the treatise was written by Aristotle himself.1 Werner Jaeger, by contrast,
thinks that De spiritu contains evidence of the Aristotelian as well as of a non-Aristotelian
conception of soul developed under the influence of the Stoics and Erasistratus (fl. c.
260 BCE).2 In this paper I would like to explore the conception of soul, its relation to
pneuma, and the role soul plays (or fails to play) in this treatise. To do so, I will draw
on the previous collaborative studies I have undertaken on De spiritu. For the benefit of
the reader, I provide a list of assumptions with which I approach this task, asking the
reader to consult the published studies for arguments and evidence in support of these
assumptions.3
First of all, despite a diversity of topics discussed and the author’s distressingly as-
sociative style, I assume that he operates with a unified picture of human physiology
and anatomy. The picture rests on the idea of three distinct but partly overlapping and
interacting systems in the body: the system of artēriai, by which external air is taken
in, turned into pneuma and distributed to different parts of the body. The system of
phlebes, by which ingested food is turned into blood and by which blood is distributed
around the body. And, finally, there is the system of bones and neura which supports
the body, protects vital organs, and enables locomotion.
Second, concerning pneuma in this treatise, I assume that it is the warm airy sub-
stance inside the organism. From the moment external air is inhaled and enters the
windpipe – which is part of the system of artēriai devoted to the intake of air and distri-
bution of pneuma – it undergoes qualitative changes: the inhaled portion of air is con-
densed, it receives moisture from the walls of the windpipe and bronchi (Ps.-Aristotle,
1 Bos and Ferwerda 2008, 2, 13, 22–25. The same 2 Jaeger 1913b, 55–74, esp. 68–73.
views, indeed with the same formulations, are found 3 Gregoric, Lewis and Kuhar 2015; Lewis and Gre-
also in Bos and Ferwerda 2007. goric 2015; Gregoric and Lewis 2015.
18
SOUL AND PNEUMA IN DE SPIRITU
De spiritu 483b6–10, 22–23), and it becomes warmer as well, since there is a lot of heat
in the chest. These qualitative changes, achieved simply by means of passing through
the artēriai, turn air into pneuma. Indeed, the author says that “the external air is mild,
whereas once it is enclosed (inside the body) it becomes pneuma, as it gets condensed
and distributed somehow” (ἔξω μὲν γὰρ πραΰς (sc. ὁ ἀήρ), ἐμπεριληφθεὶς δὲ πνεῦμα,
καθάπερ πυκνωθεὶς καὶ διαδοθείς πως, Spirit. 483b6–8). It is important to observe that
this process is supposed to be quick and simple: the inhaled portion of air acquires cer-
tain qualities simply by passing through the windpipe and other artēriai. This does not
involve transformation of one substance into another, as maintained by some authors
who are criticised in De spiritu. Nevertheless, because of the various and remarkable ef-
fects that it produces, the inhaled air very much deserves an appellation that marks it
off from the ordinary atmospheric air, and that appellation is πνεῦμα.
Third, I assume that, in the author’s theory, a large portion of inhaled air goes
through the windpipe into the lungs where it causes cooling. Another portion of in-
haled air goes into the stomach through a “passage along the loin” (πόρος παρὰ τὴν
ὀσφύν, Spirit. 483a20–21) where it helps digestion of food. From the large portion of
pneuma that ends up in the lungs, most of it is evacuated through exhalation, but a
smaller quantity gets distributed through the body for the purpose of nourishing the
connate pneuma. Here I add, without further elaboration, that pulsation may be linked
to the mechanism of distribution of pneuma from the lungs to the rest of the body. In
any case, the pneuma which flows through the system of artēriai is engaged in three vital
activities: respiration, digestion and pulsation (cf. Spirit. 482b14–17). It is important to
note the threefold role of respiration: it is to draw in air for the purpose of cooling the
chest, assisting digestion and supplying nourishment for the connate pneuma.
Fourth, the connate pneuma: I assume that it is the airy substance from which dif-
ferent tissues are composed. In Chapter 9 we learn that parts of the body – such as
bones, flesh, air-ducts, blood-ducts and neura – are all made of simple bodies (τὰ ἁπλά,
Spirit. 485b19, 22) mixed in different ratios. The difference in ratio accounts for the
difference in qualities, shapes and dimensions of these structures. The only component
of mixtures that the author singles out in addition to fire, is pneuma (Spirit. 485b10;
cf. 484a3–6). I assume that pneuma and heat/fire are singled out because they are taken
to be more important than the other simple bodies on account of their intimate con-
nection with the soul (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ὑπάρχει (sc. ἡ ψυχή), Spirit. 485b12). In any
case, it is clear that all parts of the body contain heat and pneuma. It is my assumption
that this pneuma at the level of composition is what the author refers to as the “connate
19
PAVEL GREGORIC
pneuma” (σύμφυτον πνεῦμα).4 More to the point, I assume that the connate pneuma
in the constitution of neura is what the author calls πνεῦμα κινητικόν at 485a7, whereas
the connate pneuma in the constitution of artēriai is responsible for their sensitivity.
When the author says that “the connate pneuma originates from the lungs and
goes through the whole body” (τὸ δὲ σύμφυτον πνεῦμα δι᾽ ὅλου, καὶ ἀρχὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ
πνεύμονος, Spirit. 482a33–34; cf. 481b19), I take him to mean that a portion of the
inhaled air that enters the lungs – possibly a specially fine portion of air of the right
temperature – gets distributed through the system of artēriai around the body for the
purpose of replenishing the airy substance from which all parts of the body are com-
posed in different ratios of mixture with other elements.5 The connate pneuma in the
artēriai and neura, more than the other elements, seems to account for two ‘psychic’
activities, sensation and motion respectively. Unfortunately, the text tells us nothing
about the way sensation and motion work, and hence it is exceedingly difficult to tell
what is the precise role of the connate pneuma in these activities and how it effects this
role.
Fifth, I take it that De spiritu was not written by Aristotle. Although the exact au-
thorship and date of De spiritux are likely to remain unknown, the fact that the author
shows no awareness of the epochal discoveries of the Alexandrian doctors suggests that
the text was written in the first half of the third century BCE, possibly in the decade
between 270 and 260.6
So much about the assumptions, let us now turn to soul.
The word ψυχή and its cognates occur 15 times in the treatise which spans over five
Bekker pages.7 Of the 12 occurrences of the word ψυχή directly relevant for our present
task of determining the author’s conception of soul, 6 are found in the first part of
Chapter 5, which happens to be one of the textually most problematic stretches of the
treatise.8 Any interpretation of this stretch of the text, as well as of the other passages
mentioning ψυχή, is bound to be controversial in points of detail, but I hope that my
4 The phrase ἔμφυτον πνεῦμα occurs once in the ficient supplies of material for the connate pneuma
opening line, at Spirit. 481a1, and ὁ φυσικὸς ἀήρ is required for normal growth of the body; cf. Spirit.
also once, at Spirit. 482a6. There is no reason to 481a1–2, 9–10, 14–15, 26–27; 482a22–27.
think that these two phrases refer to anything other 6 For more arguments in favour of this or even
than what is elsewhere called σύμφυτον πνεῦμα. slightly earlier dating, see Lewis and Gregoric 2015.
Roselli 1992, 69, says that the switch indicates lack 7 ψυχή (11): 481a17, 18, 482b22, 23, 483a4, 26, 27, 30,
of strict technical terminology. 483b11 bis, 485b12. ἔμψυχος (3): 481a5, 483a31–32
5 I take it that the connate pneuma requires replen- (εὔψυχον codd.), 485a32. ἄψυχος (1): 485a30.
ishment as the body naturally wears out. Also, suf- 8 See the critical apparatus in Roselli 1992, 97–101.
20
SOUL AND PNEUMA IN DE SPIRITU
T1 ἐάν τε γὰρ πυκνὸν ἐάν τε ὁμαλὸν ἐάν τε σφοδρὸν ἢ ἀραιὸν ἀναπνέῃ τις,
ὅ γε σφυγμὸς ὅμοιος καὶ ὁ αὐτός, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἀνωμαλία γίνεται καὶ ἐπίτασις ἔν τε
σωματικοῖς τισι πάθεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς φόβοις ἐλπίσιν ἀγωνίαις.
Whether one breathes rapidly or evenly, heavily or quietly, the pulse remains
the same and unchanged, but irregularity and agitation (of the pulse occurs) in
some bodily ailments and in fears, anticipations and conflicts of the soul.9
This passage tells us that soul is the subject of emotions such as fears, anticipations and
inner conflicts. Many would find this statement uncontroversial, I suppose, but Aristotle
warns us that, strictly speaking, this is not the correct way of speaking about soul: “…
to say that it is the soul which is angry is as if we were to say that it is the soul that
weaves or builds houses. It is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities or
learns or thinks, and rather to say that it is the man who does this with his soul.”10 This
should not lead us to conclude hastily that the passage is un-Aristotelian, since Aristotle
himself, despite his warning, occasionally uses precisely such locution.11 However, there
is another detail in the close context of this passage that is hard to explain if one assumes
that De spiritu was written by Aristotle himself.
The passage tells us that pulsation is a type of motion of pneuma that reacts to cer-
tain pathological states of the body, but also to certain states of the soul. This seems to
be a step towards the author’s conclusion that pulsation is prior to the other two types
of motion of pneuma and “bears resemblance to some activity, not to the interception
of pneuma – unless this contributes to the activity” (ἔοικεν ἐνεργείᾳ τινὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐνα-
πολήψει πνεύματος, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν ἐνέργειαν, Spirit. 483a17–18). Earlier
in Chapter 4, at 482b34–36, the author mentioned the Aristotelian view that pulsation
is a mere side-effect of the release of the pneuma intercepted in the nutritive liquid
9 Throughout this paper I print Roselli’s text and in- tion); see also 408b25–27.
dicate occasional divergences. Translations are all 11 E.g. Aristotle, Physica 4.11, 218b31; De sensu 7,
mine. 449a5–7; De memoria 1, 450b28.
10 Arist. De an. 1.4, 408b11–15 (revised Oxford transla-
21
PAVEL GREGORIC
processed by heat in the heart.12 In the conclusion of Chapter 4, the author seems to
distance himself from that view by saying that pulsation looks more like a purposeful
process or activity (ἐνέργεια) – though he is unable to specify what the purpose is. This
fact presents a difficulty for those who assume that De spiritu was written by Aristotle.13
Be that as it may, Chapter 4 seems to show that the author was familiar with Aris-
totle’s theory of pulsation. Let us now look at two passages which bear witness to the
author’s familiarity with Aristotle’s theory of soul. The first passage is brimming with
textual problems and allows for different interpretations.
T2 ἔχει δ’ ἀπορίαν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἀρτηρία μόνον αἰσθά-
νεται, πότερα τῷ πνεύματι τῷ δι’ αὐτῆς, ἢ τῷ ὄγκῳ [ἢ τῷ σώματι]; ἢ εἴπερ
ὁ ἀὴρ πρῶτον ὑπὸ τὴν ψυχήν, τῷ κυριωτέρῳ τε καὶ προτέρῳ; τί οὖν ἡ ψυχή;
δύναμίν φασι τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς κινήσεως τῆς τοιαύτης. ἢ δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς
ἐπιτιμήσεις τοῖς τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ θυμικόν· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ὡς δυνάμεις λέγου-
σιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τούτῳ, οὗτός γε κοινός. ἢ πάσχων γέ τι καὶ
ἀλλοιούμενος εὐλόγως, ἂν ἔμψυχον ἢ ψυχή,14 πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς φέρεται καὶ
τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον αὔξεται. ἢ οὔ; τὸ γὰρ ὅλον οὐκ ἀήρ, ἀλλὰ συμβαλλόμενόν
τι πρὸς ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν ὁ ἀήρ. ἢ οὐ; <…> τὸ ταύτην ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαν
τοῦτ’ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις.
12 See Aristotle, De respiratione 20, 479b26–480a15. 14 From οὗτός to ἢ ψυχή I follow Jaeger’s text and
13 Bos and Ferwerda 2008, 112, play down the discrep- punctuation. Roselli prints οὗτός γε κοινός, ἢ πά-
ancy between Aristotle’s view of pulsation and the σχων γέ τι καὶ ἀλλοιούμενος; εὐλόγως ἂν †εὔψυχον
one in the conclusion of Chapter 4 of De spiritu. η ψυχή†.
22
SOUL AND PNEUMA IN DE SPIRITU
The author’s reasoning at the beginning of the passage seems to be as follows. Assuming
that only artēria is sensitive, the question is whether this is due to the passage of air, to
the constitution of artēria, or to something “superior and prior” to both, which in all
likelihood refers to soul. This prompts the question what soul is, or perhaps what role
it plays in rendering the body sensitive (τί οὖν ἡ ψυχή, Spirit. 483a27). In response to
this question, the author refers to some people who claim that the cause of sensation –
or rather the cause of the sort of motion that brings about sensation – is a dynamis. This
is most probably a reference to Aristotle’s view that soul is a set of capacities. Indeed,
in Aristotle’s theory, the perceptual capacity (ἡ αἰσθητικὴ δύναμις) is one of the three
fundamental capacities of the soul, and he dedicates more space to it in De anima than to
all the other capacities taken together. However, the claim that a capacity is the cause of
sensory motion is here attributed to some unnamed people, with the verb in the third
person plural (φασί), which suggests that the author does not associate himself with
that view.
The following sentence, now with the verb in the second person singular, is no
less surprising: “[I]t is clear that you will incorrectly criticise (οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμήσεις)
those who posit the calculative and spirited (parts of the soul), for they also speak of
capacities.” This is clearly a (truncated) reference to the Platonic division of the soul
into three parts – the calculative, the spirited and the appetitive. Now the author objects
to a criticism of this division of the soul, but it is not at all clear what motivates him to
raise this objection.15
If the words “you will be wrong to criticise those who posit etc.” do not address
anyone in particular, but aim to make a general point, the author’s idea seems to be
the following: should one take Aristotle’s lead and maintain that a capacity of the soul
is responsible for sensory motion, one might be tempted to follow Aristotle also in re-
jecting the Platonic division of the soul, knowing that Aristotle criticised it extensively
in De anima; however, the Platonic division of the soul need not be seen as a compet-
ing account, because the logistikon and the thymikon (and the omitted epithymētikon) are
capacities of the soul also in Plato’s theory.16
15 Bos and Ferwerda 2008, 20, think that “the underly- 16 This is roughly how Roselli 1992, 100, understands
ing question here seems to be: what guarantees the the author’s train of thought. Needless to say, Aris-
unity of the soul? This is a question which Aristotle totle did consider Plato’s account of the soul as
often poses as a challenge to Plato”. I agree that this competing and indeed irreconcilable with his own:
is a problem which Aristotle raises to Plato at several Plato took the soul, or at any rate its calculative part,
places, but I confess that I cannot see anything in to be an extended entity which moves the body by
T2 pointing to the question of the unity of the soul. itself being in motion, which Aristotle discusses crit-
Towards the end of my paper, I offer an explanation ically in De an. 1.3–4. Moreover, Plato divided the
of the author’s motivation for raising this objection. soul spatially, assigning each part of the soul to a
Very briefly, he wants to make his physiological and different part of the body, leaving the soul’s unity
anatomical theory of pneuma compatible with as unexplained (Arist. De an. 1.5, 411b5–10).
many different conceptions of soul in circulation as
possible.
23
PAVEL GREGORIC
On the other hand, if the words “you will be wrong to criticise those who posit etc.”
address a particular person, the most probable target is Aristotle and his criticism of the
Platonic division of the soul in De an. 3.9–10.17 In that case, however, it seems that the
author misunderstood the point of Aristotle’s criticism. The point of his criticism is
not that the Platonic parts of the soul are not dynameis, but rather that they are wrong
dynameis into which the soul should be divided for the purpose of a systematic account.
Whatever one makes of the author’s objection to the criticism of the Platonic di-
vision of the soul, the first half of T2 (lines 23–30) seems to count as evidence against
the Aristotelian authorship of De spiritu: Aristotle would hardly attribute to other peo-
ple (φασί) the claim that a capacity of the soul is responsible for sensory motion, or be
quick to point out that Plato’s division of the soul is compatible with that claim and
with the underlying account of the soul as a set of capacities. Nevertheless, the first half
of T2 counts as a solid piece of evidence that the author was familiar with Aristotle’s
theory of the soul.
As to the second half of T2 (lines 30–35), they might be interpreted, with some
effort, as containing another piece of evidence that the author was familiar with Aris-
totle’s theory of the soul. Here is a tentative reconstruction of the author’s reasoning,
ignoring some details and textual difficulties. In response to the question what makes
artēria sensitive, one might argue that this is due to the passage of air or because “soul
is in air” (ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τούτῳ, Spirit. 483a30).18 Now, is soul in all air, including
the external atmospheric (κοινός) air – our author seems to be reasoning – or only in
the air which has undergone certain qualitative changes in a living being? It is more rea-
sonable to think that soul is only in the air which has undergone the requisite changes
and which contributes to rendering the living being sensitive.19 Or perhaps it is best to
suppose that soul is not even in that air, but is rather the principle and basis (ἀρχὴ καὶ
ὑπόθεσις, Spirit. 483a35–36) which makes it possible for the inhaled air to undergo the
requisite changes as it passes through the system of artēriai and thus to render the body
sensitive. This would be the author’s answer to the initial question whether artēria owes
its sensitivity to the passage of air, to the constitution of artēria, or to soul.
If this charitable reconstruction of the author’s train of thought is correct, soul
seems to be taken here as the formal cause which explains the structure of the body
such that the relevant physiological processes and psychological states can take place.
In other words, it is because of soul that artēria is constituted in the particular way and
that air is able to pass through it having acquired all the right qualities; so it is soul that
17 Apparently, that is what Bos and Ferwerda 2008, cf. Arist. De an. 1.2, 405a21–25 (= fr. 64A20 DK)
120, also think in their comment on this sentence. and Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physicorum libros com-
18 I presume this would be a position close to that of mentarius, Diels p. 151,28 14 (= frs. 64B3–5 DK).
Diogenes of Apollonia, who identified soul with air; 19 Of course, this air is pneuma.
24
SOUL AND PNEUMA IN DE SPIRITU
explains, first and foremost, why artēria is sensitive. With this reconstruction, then, the
second half of T2 contains an additional piece of evidence that the author was familiar
with Aristotle’s theory of soul. I admit, however, that the evidence is tenuous, not only
because my reconstruction is tentative, but also because in Chapter 9, as I will argue
later, the author shows no awareness of the concept of formal causation.
Here is another passage which mentions both soul and capacity of the soul.
T3 ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀναπνοὴ δῆλον ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐντὸς ἔχει τὴν ἀρχήν, εἴτε ψυχῆς
δύναμιν εἴτε ψυχὴν δεῖ λέγειν ταύτην, εἴτε καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ σωμάτων μῖξιν, ἣ
δι’ αὐτῶν ποιεῖ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁλκήν.
It is clear that respiration has its origin from the inside – whether one should
define it as a capacity of the soul, soul, or some other mixture of bodies – which,
by means of these, produces such intake (sc. of external air).
The principle of respiration is said to be inside the body, and the first two candidates
for this principle are “capacity of the soul” and “soul” (εἴτε ψυχῆς δύναμις εἴτε ψυχή).
Aristotle would be the most obvious philosopher who would think that soul, or, more
precisely, the nutritive capacity of the soul, is the principle of respiration, contrary to
some Hellenistic philosophers and physicians who think that vital activities such as res-
piration are due to nature (φύσις), not to soul. I take it that the third alternative, “some
other mixture of bodies” (ἄλλη τις σωμάτων μίξις), is mentioned precisely to leave room
for that possibility, for I am inclined to believe that the author accepts the distinction
between nature and soul, such that nature explains vital processes like respiration, pul-
sation, digestion and reproduction, whereas soul explains processes like sensation and
locomotion. I will return to this topic later.
I take T2 and T3 to constitute direct evidence of the author’s familiarity with Aris-
totle’s theory of soul. The close affinity of soul with pneuma, affirmed at several places
(see T5 and T6 below), can also be regarded as direct evidence to that effect. There
is also abundant indirect evidence for the author’s familiarity with Aristotle’s theory
of soul. For instance, De spiritu opens with the questions how the connate pneuma
is maintained and how it grows.20 These questions merit attention, we learn, “for we
see that it becomes larger and stronger with with change of both age and condition of
the body” (Spirit. 481a2–3). Of course, we can ‘see’ this only if we take it for granted
that there is such a thing as the connate pneuma, and that it is the source of strength
20 In the opening line, at Spirit. 481a1, and only there, seems to be synonymous with σύμφυτον πνεῦμα; cf.
the author uses the phrase ἔμφυτον πνεῦμα, which n. 4 above.
25
PAVEL GREGORIC
in animal bodies.21 Both of these ideas are found in Aristotle and probably originate
with him. Indeed, the very question in the opening sentence of De spiritu seems to go
back to a parenthetic remark in Aristotle’s De motu animalium 10: “How the connate
pneuma is preserved is stated elsewhere” (703a10–11).22 The fact that the author knew
Aristotle’s biological works such as De motu animalium and De respiratione can be taken as
indirect evidence of his familiarity with Aristotle’s theory of the soul, since it is unlikely
that one could have knowledge of the former without at least some familiarity with the
latter. Moreover, the author’s use of the term energeia with reference to purposeful or
vital activity (e.g. Spirit. 483a17, 18 and coupled with dynamis at 482b6–7), his insis-
tence on teleological explanations (e.g. throughout Chapter 3), his practice of testing
the adequacy of an account by appealing to other animals (e.g. in Chapters 2 and 8),
the analogy of nature and art (in Chapter 9), and many physiological details borrowed
from Aristotle – it is hard to imagine that one could pick all that up without gaining
some knowledge of Aristotle’s theory of soul.
Given the author’s familiarity with Aristotle’s theory of soul, however, some pas-
sages in De spiritu are puzzling. Consider the following passage:
T4 ἀλλ’ αἱ μὲν τέχναι ὡς ὀργάνῳ χρῶνται (sc. τῷ πυρί), ἡ δὲ φύσις ἅμα καὶ
ὡς ὕλῃ. οὐ δὴ τοῦτο χαλεπόν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν νοῆσαι τὴν
χρωμένην, ἥτις ἅμα τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν ἀποδώσει· τοῦτο
γὰρ οὐκέτι πυρὸς οὐδὲ πνεύματος. τούτοις δὴ καταμεμείχθαι τοιαύτην δύναμιν
θαυμαστόν. ἔτι δὲ τοῦτο θαυμαστὸν [ταὐτὸν] καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ
ὑπάρχει. διόπερ οὐ κακῶς23 εἰς ταὐτόν, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ μόριόν τι τὸ δημιουργοῦν,
καὶ τὸ τὴν κίνησιν ἀεὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν ὑπάρχειν ἐνεργείᾳ. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις, ἀφ’ ἧς
καὶ ἡ γένεσις.
But whereas crafts use it (sc. fire) as an instrument, nature uses it at the same
time also as matter. What is difficult, surely, is not that, but rather that nature
herself uses it and assigns not only sensible properties to (bodily parts) but also
their proper structure. For this is no longer the scope of fire or pneuma. So, it
is remarkable that such a capacity should be combined with these (two bodies,
21 See Arist. De motu an. 10, 703a8–10; De somno et 22 If this remark is a reference to De spiritu, I suppose
vigilia 2, 456a15–17; De generatione animalium 2.4, it is a later interpolation by an editor or scribe who
737b32–738a1; 5.7, 787b10–788a16. One might knew of the existence of De spiritu. Certainly this,
object that ἰσχυρότερον at Spirit. 481a2 does not and a similar parenthetic promissory remark few
really say that the body grows stronger by means of lines down, at De motu an. 10, 703a16–18, ostensibly
the connate pneuma, but rather it is the connate interrupt the train of Aristotle’s thought in De motu
pneuma that grows stronger (ἰσχυρότερον). This is an. 10.
a different way of expressing the same idea, I take it, 23 I follow the manuscript reading κακῶς, preferred by
and it will be borne out by the role of the connate all the editors save Roselli, who reads καλῶς.
pneuma in the movement of the limbs.
26
SOUL AND PNEUMA IN DE SPIRITU
namely fire and pneuma). Moreover, this is remarkable also with regard to soul,
for it is found in these (two bodies). For this very reason it is not bad (that they
are associated) with the same thing, either unqualifiedly or some particular
productive part of it, and that its uniform motion is always present in actuality.
For this applies also to the nature from which generation, too, comes about.
In this passage the author describes fire both as an instrument and as matter, and he finds
nothing particularly problematic with such a description. What he finds problematic,
rather, is that nature herself uses fire in such a way as to adorn the bodily parts with just
the right qualities, shapes and dimensions.24 The same problem is then extended to soul
(ἔτι δὲ τοῦτο θαυμαστὸν … καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς, Spirit. 485b11–12). Now, this indicates two
things. First, the author does not seem to follow Aristotle in identifying the nature of
a living being with its soul. As is well known, Aristotle defines nature as the internal
principle of motion and rest, and in the case of living beings this is their soul. The
author of De spiritu, by contrast, appears to distinguish a living being’s soul from its
nature. Nature seems to come first and at a lower level of organic complexity which is
common to all living beings, whereas soul comes second and at a higher level of organic
complexity manifest in living beings with sensation and locomotion. Whether this was
written under the influence of the Stoic physis-psychē distinction, as Jaeger and Roselli
argue,25 or perhaps as a forerunner of that theory, one has to admit that this detail does
not look very Aristotelian.
Second, the author’s wonder at the works of nature and its demiurgic agency in
Chapter 9 indicates that he does not subscribe to Aristotle’s conception of soul as formal
cause. As every Aristotelian knows, soul is what explains the shape and organization of
the living body. That is to say, the simple bodies are mixed in the right way and bodily
parts adorned with just the right qualities, shapes and dimensions because they constitute
the appropriate matter for the form they were meant to realize – and the form in question
is the soul. Only a person who does not accept formal causation sees a difficulty with
nature achieving the right ratios of mixture at all the right places.
It is reasonable to ask why the author does not accept Aristotle’s conception of soul
as formal cause. If the author is someone with solid knowledge of Aristotle’s biological
24 Dobson, Hett, Gohlke, Tricot and Roselli take φύσιν gument they give in favour of their reading is more
to be the subject of νοῆσαι, whereas Bos and Ferw- convincing: the alternative would grammatically re-
erda 2008, 45, take φύσιν to be the object of νοῆσαι. quire νοεῖν instead of νοῆσαι. I accept Bos and Fer-
They opt for this reading in order to avoid sad- werda’s reading, though nothing in my argument
dling the author of De spiritu with the distinctly un- depends on it.
Aristotelian claim that nature thinks. The other ar- 25 Jaeger 1913b, 70–73; Roselli 1992, 126.
27
PAVEL GREGORIC
works, surely he must be familiar with formal causation and hypothetical necessity. In-
deed, we have seen that T2 may contain evidence of the author’s understanding of soul
precisely in the role of the formal cause. So why does he not make use of it in Chapter
9?26 One possible explanation is that he operates with a different conception of soul.
But which conception is that?
The talk of mixture of the simple bodies in different ratios to achieve tissues of differ-
ent qualities, shapes and dimensions, with the result that there is an ensouled being, may
suggest that the author endorses a version of the “Pythagorean” harmonia-conception of
soul familiar from Plato’s Phaedo and later championed by the early Peripatetic philoso-
phers Aristoxenus of Tarentum and Dicaearchus of Messene.27 According to this theory,
soul is an epiphenomenon of the right balance of elements in the body, much like the
attunement of the lyre is an epiphenomenon of the right tension of the strings.
I do not think that the author of De spiritu subscribes to this conception of soul,
either. True, he does think that the simple bodies must be mixed in the right ratios at
all the right places, and he marvels at nature for achieving that, but for him this does
not seem to be a sufficient condition for the presence of soul. What is crucially required
– in addition to the right mixtures in all the right places that constitute an organism
with different tissues and systems – is pneuma with its various motions and mixtures
described in this treatise. For our author, pneuma (and fire) stand in a more intimate
relation to soul than the other simple bodies or mixtures of simple bodies – as visible
from T4 where soul was said to be “present in pneuma and fire” (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ὑπάρχει
(sc. ἡ ψυχή), at Spirit. 485b12, referring back to πυρὸς καὶ πνεύματος in line 10).
There are two further passages suggesting that the author took soul to be intimately
connected with pneuma.
For that which is connate to the soul (sc. the connate pneuma) is purer – unless
one were to say that soul too is generated later, following the separation of seeds
and their advancement to their respective nature.
26 This problem can be explained away by adopting 27 See Aristoxenus frs. 120a–d Wehrli (= Cicero, Tuscu-
the thesis of Neustadt 1909 and Jaeger 1913b, 73; lanae disputationes 1.10.19; 1.18.4; Lactantius, De opi-
Jaeger 1913a, xix, that Chapter 9 does not belong ficio dei 16) and Dicaearchus fr. 11 Wehrli (= Neme-
with the rest of the treatise. Against that thesis, see sius, De natura hominis 2); cf. Caston 1997.
Lewis 2020.
28
SOUL AND PNEUMA IN DE SPIRITU
T6 οὐκ ἄρα λεπτότατος (sc. ὁ ἐμπεριληφθεὶς ἀήρ), εἴπερ μέμεικται. καὶ μὴν
εὔλογόν γε τὸ πρῶτον δεκτικὸν ψυχῆς, εἰ μὴ ἄρα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον, καὶ οὐ
καθαρόν τι καὶ ἀμιγές.
So, if (the enclosed air) is mixed, it is not supremely fine. Yet it is very reasonable
that the primary receptacle of the soul is such – unless the soul too is of this
character (sc. mixed), i.e. not something pure and unmixed.
In T5, the connate pneuma is said to be something connate to the soul, i.e. something
with which the soul is naturally bound together. I take it that much the same idea is
expressed in T6 with the idea that pneuma is “the primary receptacle of soul” (τὸ πρῶτον
δεκτικὸν ψυχῆς, Spirit. 483b10–11). This privileged position of pneuma in relation to
soul, I think, rules out the possibility that the author endorses any sort of harmonia-
conception of soul.
On the other hand, he does not identify soul with air or pneuma, as some Preso-
cratics and the Stoics did.28 For our author, soul seems to be a dynamis (or perhaps a
set of dynameis) which a living being has owing to pneuma and its various motions and
roles in the body. Pneuma is connate (συμφυές) to the soul, it is the primary vehicle
of the soul, but it is not the soul itself. As we have seen, the author rejects the view
that soul is reducible to air – whether to all air indiscriminately, or even to the inhaled
air that has undergone suitable alterations by passing through the body (i.e. pneuma).
Our author seems to think that there must be a certain “principle and basis” (ἀρχὴ καὶ
ὑπόθεσις, Spirit. 483a35–36) which makes it possible for air to undergo these alterations
and to produce its various effects in the body. Although he does not explicitly equate
this principle with soul in T2, I have suggested that this is what he had in mind.
So, which conception of soul does the author endorse? Could it be Aristotle’s non-
reductivist conception of soul, after all? Bos is convinced that this is exactly what we find
in De spiritu. He believes that the intimate connection between soul and pneuma found
in this treatise is asserted also by Aristotle in De anima.29 Namely, Bos takes Aristotle’s
canonical definition of soul as the form of the natural organic body (σώματος φυσικοῦ
ὀργανικοῦ, Arist. De an. 2.1, 412b5–6) to establish a direct hylomorphic relationship
between soul and pneuma: soul is not the form of the whole body made of tissues
28 E.g. Anaximenes (Aëtius 1.3.4 = fr. 13B2 DK), Xeno- De historia philosopha 24, Diels 613; Tertullian, De an-
phanes (Diog. Laërt. 9.19 = fr. 21A1 DK), Diogenes ima 5; Iamblichus, De anima apud Stobaeum, Eclogae
of Apollonia (Theophr. Sens. 39–45; Aristotle, De 1.49.33 (Wachsmuth 367,17 ); Aëtius 4.21; Calc. In
anima 1.2, 405a21–25; Simplicius, In Arist. Phys. Tim. 220 (= SVF 1.135, 136, 137; 2.826, 836, 879); cf.
Diels 151,28 = frs. 64A19, 64A20, 64B4, 64B5 DK). Long 1982; Annas 1992, 37–70.
For the Stoic view, see Diog. Laërt. 7.1; Ps.-Galen, 29 Bos 2003; Bos and Ferwerda 2008.
29
PAVEL GREGORIC
and organs, but only of pneuma in the body. It is true that Aristotle establishes a tight
connection between the connate pneuma and soul at several places (e.g. Arist. De motu
an. 10: De an. 3.10; Gen. an. 2.3), but this connection should not be understood in
terms of the direct hylomorphic relationship. Very briefly, pneuma is not an ancient
counterpart to the Cartesian pineal gland that physically reacts to mental states in some
mysterious way; rather, it is a material thing which reacts physically to subtle thermic
alterations in the heart that accompany perceptions of pleasant and unpleasant things.
When heated or chilled, pneuma in the heart expands and contracts, thereby acting
mechanically on the tiny neura in the heart and this leads to the motion of the limbs.30
And if the connection between the connate pneuma and soul is not understood in terms
of the direct hylomorphic relationship, there is no reason whatsoever to understand
Aristotle’s notion of the natural organic body in his canonical definition of soul in De
anima with reference to pneuma only, as Bos insists.31
Earlier in this paper I listed some reasons to think that the author of De spiritu does
not subscribe to Aristotle’s non-reductivist conception of soul as the form of the liv-
ing body; notably, T4 could not have been written by someone who accepts Aristotle’s
view. What speaks even more decisively against the view that the author of De spiritu
subscribes to Aristotle’s conception of soul are passages in which the author intimates
that soul might be something “mixed” with the simple bodies from which living beings
are composed. In T3 the author of De spiritu speaks of a “capacity of the soul, soul or
some other mixture of bodies” (εἴτε ψυχῆς δύναμιν εἴτε ψυχὴν δεῖ λέγειν ταύτην, εἴτε
καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ σωμάτων μῖξιν, Spirit. 482b22–24) as being responsible for respiration,
which may imply that soul is also a mixture of bodies. In T4, nature or soul is explicitly
said to be something “mixed” with pneuma and fire (καταμεμείχθαι, Spirit. 485b10). In
T6 he entertains the idea that soul is “not something pure and unmixed” (οὔ καθαρόν
τι καὶ ἀμιγές, Spirit. 483b12). I suspect Aristotle would never venture such claims, since
they imply corporeality of the soul.32
We have made a full circle trying to determine which conception of soul the author
endorses, without a positive result.33 The conclusion we ought to draw at this stage, I
30 For more details, see Corcilius and Gregoric 2013; 32 According to Aristotle, only entities of the same
Gregoric and Kuhar 2014; Gregoric 2020, 427–438. type can mix; cf. Arist. Gen. Corr. 1.10 and Sens. 7,
31 Further difficulties for Bos’ position are specific 447a30–b3.
claims about pneuma in De spiritu which contra- 33 Jaeger 1913b, 73, writes: “In the other account, fire-
dict Aristotle. For example, the source of pneuma pneuma is the organ of the soul, the πρῶτον ὑπὸ
for Aristotle is the heart, whereas in De spiritu it is τὴν ψυχήν, which is entirely Peripatetic (483a26).
the lungs (482a33–34); there is nothing in Aristotle There the soul is ἀμιγής (sc. ‘unmixed’) and καθαρά
to suggest that pneuma flows only through artēria (sc. ‘pure’) (483b12), here (viz. in Chapter 9) it is
(Spirit. 483b12–13, 18–19), or that only artēria is sen- corporeally mixed with fire-pneuma, which marks
sitive. For other difficulties, see Gregoric and Lewis the whole distance between Anaxagoras and Zeno
2015. of Citium!”
30
SOUL AND PNEUMA IN DE SPIRITU
propose, is that the author is not committed to any particular conception of soul. If we
look carefully at T3, T5 and T6, we can see that he consistently hedges his statements
about soul, as if trying to leave room for different conceptions of it.
In T3 the author observes that the principle of respiration must be inside the body,
but he leaves it open whether it is a capacity of the soul, soul itself or “some other
mixture of bodies” (ἄλλη τις σωμάτων μίξις, Spirit. 482b23–24). As I have suggested, the
expression “some other mixture of bodies” may indicate that the principle of respiration
is neither soul, nor any particular capacity of the soul, but nature. If that is correct, this
again looks like a concession to the conception of soul favoured by the Alexandrian
doctors and the Stoics, but also a possibility compatible with the harmonia-conception.
In T5 he leaves room for the possibility that soul appears at some later stage of
development of an individual, notably once it has started to take part in the process of
digestion of food (the working premise here is that the connate pneuma is nourished
from the process of digestion of food). Perhaps this is not in line with Aristotle who
thinks that soul in its nutritive capacity appears with the formation of the heart, but it is
compatible with the harmonia-conception and even evocative of the Stoic theory and the
theory of Alexandrian physicians, where the development of the embryo is governed by
nature, whereas soul appears at birth.
T6 considers the possibility that the air enclosed in the system of artēria becomes
pneuma by actually mixing with moisture and coarse bits in there. In that case, the au-
thor concludes, pneuma would not be the finest substance (λεπτότατος, Spirit. 483b10).
However, it is reasonable to suppose that the first receptacle of soul is the finest sub-
stance, adding a caveat: “unless soul itself is also like that, i.e. not something pure and
unmixed”. This may very well be intended as a concession to a reductive materialist
conception of soul, notably the Stoic one.34
It is reasonable to ask why the author of De spiritu is not committed to any particular
conception of soul. It might be because he was agnostic, but it might also be something
programmatic. What I want to suggest is that he regarded it as a recommendation of his
physiological and anatomical theory of pneuma that it is compatible with a variety of dif-
ferent conceptions of soul, or at any rate not decisively bound to any one of them. I have
argued that the conceptions of soul in play, in addition to Aristotle’s non-reductive one,
are the epiphenomenalist harmonia-conception which enjoyed some popularity among
the early Peripatics, and the reductive materialist conception championed by the Stoics.
Another conception of soul that the author wanted to keep on the table was the Pla-
tonic one. That is why in T2 the author raised the objection to anyone who might think
that subscribing to the Aristotelian view that a capacity of the soul is responsible for
31
PAVEL GREGORIC
sensory motion automatically rules out Plato’s division of the soul into the calculative,
the spirited and the appetitive part. Our author urges that these three parts can also be
understood as capacities, so that even adherents of the Platonic conception of soul can
be sympathetic to our author’s theory.
If the author aimed to develop a physiological and anatomical theory around the
Aristotelian notion of pneuma and to demonstrate its superiority over the rival physio-
logical and anatomical theories, reminding the reader every now and then of his theory’s
compatibility with different conceptions of soul looks like a reasonable strategy, espe-
cially if the competing physiological and anatomical theories typically came in conjunc-
tion with certain conceptions of soul. Of course, one who chooses this strategy cannot
attach great explanatory value to soul, but perhaps one does not need to – if one aims
to present a physiological and anatomical theory of a limited scope, as seems to be the
case with the author of De spiritu.
Even though soul does not loom large in De spiritu, there are certain things that we can
say with a modicum of certainty about soul and pneuma in De spiritu. First of all, our
author thinks that soul, however one conceives of it, stands in a privileged relationship
with one type of stuff, and that is pneuma. This is in line with Aristotle’s theory but also
with the theories of the Stoics and the Alexandrian doctors.
Second, the privileged relationship between soul and pneuma is based on pneuma’s
purity and fineness. This is in line with the ancient tradition, noted by Aristotle, to iden-
tify or associate soul with supremely fine and the least corporeal stuff.35 This tradition
persists in Hellenistic times and was advocated also by Galen.36
Third, pneuma’s purity and fineness has something to do with the fact that pneuma
originates from external air which is considered by many philosophers and physicians,
at least from Diogenes of Apollonia onwards, to be the finest type of stuff.
Fourth, soul is relegated to a supporting role in this treatise. Typically, De spiritu
introduces soul in support of the claim about pneuma’s purity and fineness, as in T5 and
T6, or with reference to the principle of an activity under discussion, such as respiration
in passage T3 or sensitivity in passage T2.
Fifth, the author seems to separate soul from nature in T3 and T4, and he does so in a
way which is reminiscent of the physis-psychē distinction advocated by the Stoics. Nature
35 Arist. De an. 1.2, 405a4–7, 21–25; 1.5, 409b19–21. Ut. Resp. 5.5 (Furley/Wilkie 128 = K. 4.507); Galen,
36 See, e.g., Ep. Hdt. 63; Asclepiades (in Calc. In Tim. PHP 7.3.23–29 (De Lacy 444,12–446,10 = K. 5.606–
215 = Waszink ed. alt. 1975, 229,18–230,7); Galen, 609). See also the chapter by Leith in this volume.
32
SOUL AND PNEUMA IN DE SPIRITU
accounts for the vital activities of respiration, digestion and pulsation, whereas soul goes
with the characteristically animal activities of sensation and locomotion. I have argued
elsewhere that the crucial role in both sets of activities is played by pneuma, though
not in the same way. It is pneuma flowing through the system of artēriai that plays the
role in vital activities, and pneuma mixed in the right ratios with other simple bodies
in the constitution of artēriai and neura that plays the role in the “psychic” activities of
sensation and locomotion, respectively. Pneuma in the latter role, I have argued, is what
the author calls “connate pneuma”.
Sixth, if one goes along with my assumption that the author makes the distinction
between the pneuma flowing through the system of artēriai and the connate pneuma
as a building block of different tissues, De spiritu comes close to the Hellenistic physis-
psychē distinction in yet another way. Namely, if my assumption is correct, De spiritu
foreshadows the differentiation of pneuma into two different types, one in charge of
vital activities (respiration, digestion, pulsation) and the other in charge of “psychic”
activities (sensation, locomotion). This would constitute a clear anticipation of the his-
torically momentous distinction between vital and psychic pneuma, introduced by the
Alexandrian doctors and later worked out by Galen.
Finally, I think that the cumulative evidence I have provided in this paper speaks
quite strongly against Aristotle’s authorship of De spiritu. The author’s knowledge of
Aristotle’s biological works and his familiarity with the Aristotelian theory of soul in-
dicate that he affiliated himself with the Peripatetic school. However, his commitment
to Aristotle’s conception of soul was so weak that he did not see a problem in allowing
non-Aristotelian conceptions of soul to appear on equal footing across the treatise. I
have suggested that this is the result of the fact that the author had no particular need
for a robust concept of soul in developing his physiological and anatomical theory of
pneuma and questioning rival ones, but also because he wanted to make his theory ac-
ceptable to doctors and philosophers who may have held different views concerning
soul.
33
Bibliography
34
SOUL AND PNEUMA IN DE SPIRITU
35
PAVEL GREGORIC
PAVEL GREGORIC
Pavel Gregoric, BPhil, DPhil (Oxon.), taught Phi- Dr. Pavel Gregoric
losophy at the University of Zagreb from 2000 to Institute of Philosophy
2017, now holds the position of a Senior Research Ulica grada Vukovara 54/IV
Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy in Zagreb. HR-10000 Zagreb
He has held visiting positions at Central European Croatia
University in Budapest, Humboldt-Universität in E-Mail: [email protected]
Berlin, UC Berkeley and University of Gothenburg.
He is the author of the monograph Aristotle on the
Common Sense (OUP, 2007) and the co-editor of
Pseudo-Aristotle: De mundo. A Commentary (CUP,
2020) and Encounters with Aristotelian Philosophy of
Mind (Routledge, 2021).
36
Luciana Repici
Summary
From the fragmentary evidence we can infer only that Strato was interested in the applica-
tion of Pneuma in different areas of research, from biology to physiology, and to psychol-
ogy. But we are hardly informed about the context of his views and the general lines of
his arguments. The paper analyses the single accounts in their problematic features and is
mainly focused on comparing Strato’s views on Pneuma with Aristotle’s, that is the natu-
ral background for the views of a Peripatetic philosopher and an heir of the Aristotelian
tradition like Strato, whatever his contacts with Hellenistic doctors, scientists or philoso-
phers. Although unsystematic, Aristotle’s remarks appear to be decisive for both clarifying
single points and rescuing Strato’s position from the habitual charge of reductionism and
materialism.
Aus den Fragmenten können wir nur schließen, dass Strato Interesse hatte an der Anwen-
dung von Pneuma in verschiedenen Forschungsbereichen, von der Biologie über Physio-
logie zur Psychologie. Aber wir wissen nur wenig über den Kontext seiner Ansichten und
seine Argumentation. Der Beitrag analysiert die einzelnen Darstellungen hinsichtlich ihrer
Schwierigkeiten, wobei vor allem Stratos Ansichten zu Pneuma mit Aristoteles’ verglichen
werden, also den Hintergrund für die Ansichten eines peripatetischen Philosophen und
Erben der aristotelischen Tradition, was für Kontakte Strato zu hellenistischen Ärzten, Wis-
senschaftlern oder Philosophen hatte. Wenn Aristoteles’ Äußerungen auch unsystematisch
sind, so scheinen sie entscheidend, um einzelne Argumente zu erklären und Stratos Positi-
on vor dem Vorwurf des Reduktionismus und Materialismus zu bewahren.
I wish to thank gratefully the organization of the Conference “The Concept of Pneuma
after Aristotle” (Berlin, 2–4 July 2015) for kindly asking me to contribute and all those who
participated in the discussion of this paper, from whose comments and suggestions I greatly
benefitted: Sean Coughlin, Pavel Gregoric, Inna Kupreeva, Teun Tieleman, Philip van der
Sean Coughlin, David Leith, Orly Lewis (eds.) | The Concept of Pneuma after Aristotle | Berlin Studies
of the Ancient World 61 (ISBN 978-3-9820670-4-9; DOI: 10.17171/3-61) | www.edition-topoi.org
37
LUCIANA REPICI
Eijk, Heinrich von Staden. My special thanks to the editors of the volume Sean Coughlin,
Orly Lewis and David Leith for both their helpful comments and their careful revision of
my English. The responsibility for any possible error or misunderstanding is only mine.
1 Introduction
Our sources tell us that Strato used pneuma in explanations of several different natural
phenomena: from reproduction (the nature of semen and monstrous births) and phys-
iology (sleep) to psychology (sense perception and psychic activities). The evidence is
scanty and disappointing.1 Nine times out of ten we are faced with doxographical ac-
counts which, more often than not, diverge from each other; nine times out of ten his
views are coupled with other views with no attempt to distinguish between them; nine
times out of ten textual difficulties render the interpretation quite problematic.2 Finally,
nine times out of ten the name of Strato appears with no further qualification such as
the Peripatetic or the naturalist (φυσικός), thus rendering an identification with Strato of
Lampsacus uncertain. This is a particularly perplexing circumstance when the question
arises whether or not Strato of Lampsacus is to be identified with a Strato who was a
doctor and a pupil of Erasistratus. Yet, caution is needed in this case, mainly because,
apart from the chronological difficulties, the accounts related to the pupil of Erasistra-
tus are of a highly technical nature and pertain to therapeutic rather than to theoretical
issues.3 In addition, hardly any of these accounts on Strato the doctor hints at applica-
tions of the concept of pneuma, while this is precisely what is required if one would like
to identify the physician as Strato the naturalist.4
1 Quotations, translations and the numbering of the ographical accounts in antiquity can be found in
discussed texts are drawn from the collection of Mansfeld and Runia 2010.
Sharples 2011. Only few pieces of biographical in- 3 See Sharples 2011, 14–17, who therefore in his col-
formation on Strato are recorded. According to Dio- lection groups the reports assigned to Strato the
genes Laërtius, Vitae philosophorum 5.58–64 (= fr. 1 doctor by ancient medical sources in an Appendix
Sharples), he (a) was from Lampsacus and chiefly of dubious texts (1–13). According to Berryman
concerned with the study of nature; (b) taught 1996, 98–105, the technical nature of these reports
Ptolemy Philadelphus; (c) began to be scholarch of is so high that, even if he was the same person as
the Peripatos in 288–284 BCE, after Theophrastus’ Strato of Lampsacus, there would be hardly any
death and (d) was head of the school for eighteen difference whether or not they are included in an
years, i.e., until 274–270. Particularly uncertain for attempt to assess the latter’s position.
chronological reasons is his staying in Alexandria of 4 An exception might seem a text from Galen, De dif-
Egypt as a tutor of Ptolemy Philadelphus. Possibly, ferentiis pulsuum 4.17 (= K. 8.759.3–15) (see App. 3
he could have been there before 288–284 BCE. Sharples, with his commentary) on the definition
2 Illuminating studies on the constitution of dox-
38
STRATO OF LAMPSACUS ON PNEUMA
In what follows I shall analyse the relevant testimonia individually and try to interpret
them with reference to Aristotle. The surviving evidence hardly allows us to gain a
satisfactory overview of a hypothetical Pneumalehre of Strato and my analysis will show
that his application of the concept of pneuma to explanations of animal generation,
physiology and psychology may have found support in Aristotle’s views, although no
systematic version of the theory can be found, to my knowledge, in Aristotle’s writings
either.5
To begin with, two texts are focused on biology and the theory of reproduction, viz., re-
spectively the δύναμις of the generative semen (σπέρμα) and the generation of monsters
(τέρατα). The first, transmitted in a doxographical section consisting of three lemmas,
runs:
T1 Εἰ σῶμα τὸ σπέρμα. Λεύκιππος καὶ Ζήνων σῶμα· ψυχῆς γὰρ εἶναι ἀπό-
σπασμα. Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων Ἀριστοτέλης ἀσώματον μὲν εἶναι τὴν δύναμιν
τοῦ σπέρματος ὥσπερ νοῦν τὸν κινοῦντα, σωματικὴν δὲ τὴν ὕλην τὴν προχε-
ομένην. Στράτων καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ τὴν δύναμιν σῶμα· πνευματικὴ γάρ.
Whether seed is a body. Leucippus and Zeno (the Stoic) (say that it is) a body;
for it is a (portion) drawn off from the soul. Pythagoras, Plato (and) Aristotle
(say) that the power of the seed is incorporeal, like the intellect that causes
movement, but the matter that is emitted is corporeal. Strato and Democritus
(say that) the power too is a body; for it is (of the nature) of pneuma.
As can be seen, the name of Strato, mentioned without any qualification, occurs in the
third lemma, where he is listed together with Democritus as holding the thesis that even
of pulse. Galen reports that on this topic, the mem- definitions and it remains uncertain whether Apol-
bers of each individual medical sect disagreed with lonius preferred it to the others; (b) it is uncertain,
one another as much as they did with members of too, whether Strato can be credited with the same
other sects, and there were also cases in which some definition; (c) the background of the definition sug-
people formulated even three definitions, as in the gests, in accordance with Erasistratus, that the pulse
case of Apollonius “the follower (pupil?) of Strato” originated from the heart.
(ὁ ἀπὸ Στράτωνος). In fact, in one of his defini- 5 On this interpretation of Strato’s position, see
tions Apollonius had recourse to pneuma, for he Repici 1988, 85–90. On his surmised Pneumalehre
assumed that “pulse is the dilatation (διάστασις) as expression of a mechanistic and non-Aristotelian
from the filling of the artery with the pneuma sent point of view, see Diels 1893; Jaeger 1913.
out from the heart.” But (a) this was only one of his
39
LUCIANA REPICI
the power (δύναμις) of the semen is a body (σῶμα), because it is of the nature of pneuma
(πνευματική).6 But this coupling of their names, rather than pointing out a doctrinal
convergence between them, could be the result of a doxographical conflation. This
seems to be the case also both with the coupling of Leucippus the Atomist and Zeno
the Stoic in the first lemma,7 and with the coupling of Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle in
the second lemma.8 Strato and Democritus could likewise have been listed together not
for reasons of doctrinal convergence, whether methodological or in regard to content.
Besides, Democritus is nowhere credited with an interest in defining the incorporeal
δύναμις of the semen and, even if he was interested in referring the incorporeal δύναμις
of semen to the nature of pneuma, the question could have been sufficiently settled in
terms of atomic compounds and movements.9 Strato and Democritus should therefore
be separated and the doctrinal point on the incorporeal δύναμις of the semen in the dox-
ographical report should possibly be ascribed to Strato only.10 Consequently, granted
6 Notice that the text is uncertain precisely in the the value of an intelligent cause of movement, nor
point where pneuma is introduced. The whole thinks of the rational soul as coming from an exter-
sentence of the final lines, “the power too (καὶ τὴν nal demiurgical power.
δύναμιν) … (of the nature) of pneuma (πνευμα- 9 Instructive information on Democritus’ view of
τικὴ γάρ)” results from various emendations and pneuma can be inferred from the reports on his
is assembled following a parallel account by Ps.- explanation of respiration transmitted by Aristo-
Galen, De historia philosopha 108 (DG 640,16–20 = tle, De respiratione 4, 471b30–472a26 and De an. 1.2,
K. 19.322). Here, however, Strato is listed together 403b31–404a16. As to Democritus’ attitude towards
with Democritus and the corporeal nature of seeds’ the incorporeal, cf. Philoponus, In Aristotelis libros
δύναμις is confirmed, but no mention is made of its De anima commentaria Hayduck 83,27. Aristotle (De
consisting of pneuma. See on that Sharples’ critical an. 1.2, 405a6–7) ascribed to Democritus the qual-
apparatus ad loc. ification of fire as “the nearest to incorporeality” of
7 Aëtius, Placita philosophorum 4.3.7 (DG 388,11–12 = the elements (μάλιστα τῶν στοιχείων ἀσώματον, tr.
Stobaeus, Eclogae 1.49.1b), reports that to Leucip- Smith), by which Democritus justified his identifica-
pus soul was made of (ἐκ) fire. Aristotle, De anima tion of the soul with the nature of fire. Philoponus
1.2, 403b31–404a9, records that to Democritus and specifies that the above qualification of the fire had
similarly to Leucippus soul was “a sort of fire or hot to be intended “not in the proper sense” (κυρίως)
substance,” viz., of those atomic “forms” which are of the word, given that no Atomist admitted some-
spherical and the most adapted to permeate every- thing incorporeal; simply, fire was incorporeal ow-
where. On Zeno’s viewpoint, see Diog. Laërt. 7.58 ing to the smallness of its component parts.
and other reports included in Zeno Citiensis, SVF 10 The connection between Strato’s and Democritus’
1.128. explanatory patterns in physics is controversial, to
8 Cf. Plato, Timaeus 73b1–e1 and Aristotle, De gener- say the least. According to Cicero, Academica pos-
atione animalium 2.3, 737a7–9, on which see below. teriora (Lucullus) 2.121 (Plasberg 87,21–88,14 = fr.
In my opinion, the report fits much more Plato’s 18 Sharples), Strato refused to reduce the nature
account. For here the semen is said to derive from of things to atomic components interspersed with
the spinal marrow, in a part of which the Demiurge void, taking these to be “the dreams of Democri-
implanted the “divine semen,” viz., the rational soul, tus.” The contextual attribution to Strato of a mi-
while reserving the other parts of it to the consti- crovoid theory in other reports, and a conception of
tution of the bodily parts situated along the spine πόροι or passageways throughout matter, is far from
and in all the bones of the body, being they too a certain, as Sanders 2011, 263–276, and Berryman
seat of soul, though in a less degree. As we shall see, 2011, 277–29, have recently argued. But Strato’s
Aristotle neither gives to the δύναμις of the semen
40
STRATO OF LAMPSACUS ON PNEUMA
that this is the case, we are left with the problem of interpreting Strato’s view. As I see
it, his remark may have derived from some of Aristotle’s claims and may be explained
with reference to them.
Briefly, in a well-known though not uncontroversial passage, Aristotle first (a) argues
that in its matter the semen is a compound of pneuma and water, defining pneuma as no
more than hot air (θερμὸς ἀήρ).11 He then (b) individuates in this component the vehicle
of the psychic faculties (δυνάμεις), claiming that in its nature the semen contains a special
sort of productive heat analogous (though not identical) to the aether, presumably in
the sense that, like the element of the heavenly bodies, it is a special matter different
from the other elements and an invariable one.12 Finally (c), Aristotle commits the
transmission of reason (νοῦς), which belongs to those animals whose soul incorporates
something divine (τι θεῖον), to the part of the body (σῶμα) of the semen that is separated from
the body (χωριστὸν σώματος) and differs from its non separated part (ἀχώριστον) in so
far as the latter only melts and changes into a gas (πνευματοῦσθαι), being a humid and
watery substance.13 From (a) we can infer what the material constituents of the pneuma
in the semen were, i.e., air and heat. From (b) we can deduce that the pneuma in the
semen embodies a special heat, which renders it generative and, like the element of the
stars, does not undergo any process of coming-to-be and passing-away. From (c) we can
conclude that the material of the semen has in itself a special capacity. For only a part
of it turns into an evaporation and disappears; another part still maintains a persistent
potentiality, thus accounting for its ability to transmit potentially the principle of the
soul. An exception is the rational soul, which is separated from the body and has no
theory of elementary qualities, from what we are to be productive; I mean what is called vital heat.
told by the sources, is no less uncertain, unfortu- This is not fire nor any such force (δύναμις), but it
nately, and Keyser 2011, 293–312, concludes that is the spiritus (πνεῦμα) included in the semen and
only a probable account can be given. Traditionally, the foam-like, and the natural principle in the spiri-
however, the real problem is the mechanistic view- tus, being analogous to the element of the stars” (tr.
point which Strato could have adopted criticising Platt).
Aristotle in the relevant aspects of his physics such 13 Arist. Gen. an. 2.3, 737a7–12: “Let us return to the
as weight and time. Despite the controversial na- material (σῶμα) of the semen, in and with which
ture of the surviving evidence, several recent studies comes away from the male the spiritus conveying
are based on this reading: Pellegrin 2011, 239–261; the principle of the soul (ψυχική ἀρχή). Of this
Lefebvre 2011, 313–352, and Jaulin 2011, 353–365. principle there are two kinds; the one is not con-
11 Arist. Gen. an. 2.2, 735b37–736a1. nected with matter, and belongs to those animals
12 Ibid. 2.3, 736b29–737a1: “Now it is true that the fac- in which is included something divine (ἐμπεριλαμ-
ulty (δύναμις) of all kinds of soul seems to have a βάνεταί τι θεῖον) (to wit, what is called the reason)
connexion with a matter different from and more (τοιοῦτος δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς), while the
divine than the so-called elements; but as one soul other is inseparable from matter. This material of
differs from another in honour and dishonour, so the semen dissolves and evaporates because it has a
differs also the nature of the corresponding mat- liquid and watery nature” (tr. Platt).
ter. All have in their semen that which causes it
41
LUCIANA REPICI
community with the parts of the body, because it needs no bodily organs to actualise.14
Strato may have based his view on these Aristotelian premises.
Accordingly, despite the elliptical report of the doxographer, his reasoning may have
developed as follows. (a) The body of the semen contains a material, i.e., the nature of
pneuma, which enables it to be productive; it cannot be excluded that Strato too, like
Aristotle, qualified the pneuma as hot air. (b) As a sort of elementary constituent of the
semen, the nature of pneuma is the necessary ‘force’ (δύναμις) (the Aristotelian material
necessity, in fact) without which the semen could not fulfil its productive function. (c)
The special capacity (δύναμις) of the semen in reproductive processes, by which it trans-
mits somatic and psychic characteristics with the exception of the rational faculty, needs
to belong to a body to be actualised. But in the semen it is the nature of the pneuma
that enables it to be productive. Hence, from this point of view it is not impossible to
say that the above capacity has the nature of the pneuma. As far as we know, Strato
may have aimed at developing Aristotle’s lines of reasoning and at giving an exhaustive
study of the effects of pneuma in reproductive processes, rather than materialising the
δύναμις of the semen. And if the latter was not his aim, we can exclude, too, that Strato
went on to materialise the soul which the semen carries on, by reducing soul to the same
nature of pneuma which the δύναμις of the semen consists of. It seems, therefore, that
Strato’s position can be safely differentiated from that of Zeno the Stoic recorded in the
first lemma of the above doxographical scheme. For, Zeno is in fact credited with the
view that the semen is a part of the psychic pneuma, therefore reducing the δύναμις of
the semen to the movement of the same material out of which soul itself is composed.15
But no such conception is attributed to Strato in the surviving evidence.
Finally, mention should be made of a possible connection between Strato and Era-
sistratus. A brief survey of Erasistratus’ theory seems to exclude this possibility. For his
Pneumalehre is based on distinctions nowhere attributed to Strato; to be precise, that
14 This is the reason why at Gen. an. 2.3, 736b26–29, 14, tr. Smith).
Aristotle claims that the reason alone enters “from 15 Althoff 1999, 163, doubts the correctness of the testi-
the outside” (θύραθεν) and alone is “divine,” “for no mony in coupling Strato’s and Democritus’ names,
bodily activity has any connexion (κοινωνεῖ) with but does not exclude a closeness between Strato and
the activity of reason” (tr. Platt). But the separation the Stoic theory of pneuma as “a god-like” substance
of the rational soul should not be exaggerated in which pervades the entire cosmos’ and “material
a dualistic (Platonic) fashion. Reason too belongs basis” of the different psychic functions in human
to mortal human beings, as Aristotle argues in De beings. The problem is, however, that to my knowl-
an. 1.4, 408b13–15: “It is doubtless better to avoid edge there is no hint of a cosmic divine pneuma (in
saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks, and the Stoic fashion) in the surviving evidence to be at-
rather to say that it is the man who does this with tributed to “Strato the naturalist.” On Stoic doctrine
his soul” (tr. Smith). Besides, in his view the activity of the psychic pneuma, cf. Galen, In Hippocratis Epi-
of thinking depends on images (φαντάσματα) and demiarum librum VI commentaria, 5.5 (Wenkebach
“images are like sensuous contents except in that 272,15–273,2 = Κ. 17B.250), and other reports in-
they contain no matter” (Arist. De an. 3.8, 432a4– cluded in SVF 2.714–718 particularly.
42
STRATO OF LAMPSACUS ON PNEUMA
between a “vital” (φυσικόν; natural ) pneuma and a psychic pneuma with the function
of putting into action the psychic activities of sensation and voluntary action; that be-
tween veins and arteries, and that between sensory and motory nerves. As to Erasistratus’
Samenlehre on the other hand, to my knowledge he only viewed the semen as originating
from blood and endowed it with the intrinsic capacity to realise its own end in repro-
ductive processes, without assigning to it any special δύναμις connected or depending
on the pneuma.16 Yet, passing over the important lacunae in the surviving evidence on
Strato, modern scholarship usually maintains that a connection might be established be-
cause both of them adopted a mechanistic pattern of explanation, according to which
Erasistratus and Strato before him would have abandoned Aristotelian teleology.17
The other text to be considered with reference to Strato’s use of pneuma in ani-
mal generation is about the monstrous births (τέρατα). Here again we are faced with a
doxographical report:
How do monstrous births occur? Empedocles (says) that monstrous births re-
sult from an excess of semen or (its) lack or an upsetting of (its) movement
or (its) division in more numerous (parts) or (its) deviation. So he seems to
have anticipated almost all the aetiologies. Strato (says that they result from)
addition or removal or transposition (of certain parts) or inflation by pneuma.
Some physicians (say that they result) from a distortion of the womb which
sometimes is inflated by pneuma.18
16 See Ps.-Galen, Introductio seu medicus 9 (Petit 18,21– nothing rough or unrefined” (Plutarch, De amore
21,9 = Κ. 14.695–698). On the specific remarks on prolis 2, 495c = fr. 83 Garofalo), not so unlike sim-
the nature of the semen, cf. Vindicianus, De sem- ilar formulae of Aristotle’s teleology. For a more
ine 1 (Wellmann 201 = fr. 55 Garofalo), Galen, De cautious interpretation of Strato’s viewpoint on the
naturalibus facultatibus 2.3 (Helmreich SM 3.162,4 subject, mainly because of the deficient and preju-
= 2.84 K. = fr. 56 Garofalo) and Galen, De usu par- diced textual evidence, cf. Repici 1988, 85–90. For
tium 7.8 (Helmreich SM 1.392,25 = K. 3.540 = fr. 104 an analogous approach to the case of Erasistratus, cf.
Garofalo). Cambiano 2006, 233–243, and on the question see
17 Cf. chiefly Diels 1893; Jaeger 1913; cf. also Harris also von Staden 1997.
1973, 222–225. Erasistratus’ formula is also usu- 18 In Sharples 2011, however, only the lemma on
ally discredited, according to which “nature does Strato is recorded.
43
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