Case Title: Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp. vs. Balite Portal Mining Cooperative (G.R.

No. 135190, Apr 3, 2002)

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago,J

Facts:

The Diwalwal area, located in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve at Mt. Diwata in the
municipalities of Monkayo and Cateel, Davao Del Norte, became famous for its rich gold
deposits discovered during the mid-1980s gold rush. The ensuing gold rush led to an
unprecedented influx of claimants, rampant unregulated mining activities, frequent mine
accidents, and severe deterioration in peace and order in the area. On March 10, 1988, Mar
copper Mining Corporation was granted EP No. 133 covering 4,491 hectares, which included the
disputed Diwalwal area.The validity of Marcopper’s mining rights under EP No. 133 was
contested, notably in the Apex Mining Co., Inc. et al. v. Hon. Cancio C. Garcia case, where
procedural noncompliance by an opposing party was highlighted. In response to the gold rush
challenges, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076 on June 27, 1991, establishing the People’s
Small-Scale Mining Act. This statute created the People’s Small-Scale Mining Program and the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the control of the DENR Secretary. On
December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran issued DAO No. 66, declaring 729
hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale mining pursuant to powers
under Proclamation No. 369.A petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the proposal for a
Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) over Diwalwal was filed, reflecting the
discontent among various stakeholders. During the pendency of this petition, Marcopper
assigned EP No. 133 to Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), which later
applied for an integrated MPSA.The application by SEM was accepted and registered by the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. XI, triggering oppositions from multiple
parties through various MAC cases.

Issue:

Whether the issuance of DENR Memorandum Order No. 97-03, which directed studies on the
feasibility of direct state utilization of mineral resources, effectively violated SEM’s constitutional
or vested rights under EP No. 133?

Ruling:

Memorandum Order No. 97-03:– The Court upheld the CA’s view that the order merely
initiated a study on government options, not impairing SEM’s claimed rights. The petitioner
couldn’t prove definitive adoption of any utilization policy harmful to its rights. Vested Rights
Under EP No. 133:– The court recognized the rights as privileges subject to state regulations for
public interest, particularly relevant given the ongoing Consolidated Mines case questioning EP
No. 133’s validity. 3. Ore Transport Permits:– The court deferred to the RPA’s jurisdiction,
noting the unresolved status of the Consolidated Mines cases.
Doctrine:

Rights under exploration permits are conditional and subject to change by the state for public
welfare. – Administrative orders initiating studies do not constitute immediate legal rights or
obligations.

Case Title: Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (G.R. No. 135385, Dec 6,
2000)

Ponente: Puno, J
Facts:

Petitioners – composed of citizens and taxpayers – challenged Republic Act No. 8371 (the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997).They contended that certain provisions of RA 8371
violate the Constitution by granting indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) excessive rights over ancestral domains and lands. In particular, petitioners argued
that the law’s definitions of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” encompass not only
areas historically occupied by indigenous peoples but also include natural resources (such as
minerals, coastal waters, forests, and other non-agricultural resources) that the Constitution
mandates are owned by the State under the Regalian doctrine. They maintain that by
recognizing ownership (or quasi-ownership) over ancestral domains that include natural
resources, RA 8371 contravenes Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. Under the Regalian
doctrine, all non-agricultural lands (and natural resources) of the public domain are vested in
the State and are inalienable.Petitioners argue that the Act improperly uses the concept of
native title—derived from historical cases like CariAo v. Insular Government—to extend private
ownership rights to areas that, constitutionally, must remain state property.They further
contend that the law’s structure and its delegation of power to the NCIP (an agency that is
“independent” of the President) undermine the president’s constitutional authority over the
executive branch and may infringe upon due process rights by imposing dispute-resolution
methods based on customary laws.

Issue:

Whether RA 8371’s provisions that recognize indigenous peoples’ ownership and possession—by
means of native title—over ancestral domains and ancestral lands (which include non-
agricultural natural resources) conflict with Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, maintaining the constitutionality of the challenged
provisions. The Court explained that the IPRA did not violate the Regalian Doctrine, as it merely
recognized the indigenous peoples’ right to their ancestral domains and lands, a right
considered never to have been part of the public domain. Moreover, the IPRA provided
safeguards to ensure that the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains would not
infringe upon private property rights. The Court also found no merit in the argument regarding
the NCIP’s administrative relationship with the Office of the President, stating that it did not
diminish the President’s control over the executive department. Doctrine: The case reiterates
the doctrine that the rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains are recognized
and protected under the law. It emphasized that ancestral domains and lands, occupied,
possessed, and utilized by indigenous peoples and their ancestors since time immemorial, are
presumed never to have been public lands and are considered private.
Doctrine:
Regalian Doctrine (Section 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution) – All lands of the public domain and
natural resources belong to the State.

Case Title: SR Metals, Inc. vs. Reyes (G.R. No. 179669, June 4, 2014)

Ponente: Peralta, J.

Facts:

Petitioners challenged a Cease and Desist Order for allegedly exceeding a 50,000-MT annual
mining limit. SC upheld DENR's authority, ruling the limit applies to total extracted ore,
including gangue, and affirmed PD 1899's constitutionality. On March 9, 2006, SR Metals, Inc.,
SAN R Mining and Construction Corp., and Galeo Equipment and Mining Co., Inc. (petitioners)
were awarded 2-year Small-Scale Mining Permits (SSMPs) by the Provincial Mining Regulatory
Board of Agusan del Norte. These permits allowed them to extract Nickel and Cobalt (Ni-Co)
from a 20-hectare mining site in Tubay, Agusan del Norte. The Environmental Compliance
Certificates (ECCs) issued to them restricted their annual extraction to 50,000 metric tons (MT)
of Ni-Co ore, pursuant to Section 1 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1899. Governor Erlpe John
M. Amante of Agusan del Norte questioned the quantity of ore mined and shipped by the
petitioners. The petitioners denied exceeding the 50,000-MT limit, arguing that the extracted
mass contained only a limited amount of Ni-Co, with the rest being gangue (unwanted rocks
and minerals). They claimed that only 1,699.66 MTs of Ni-Co ore had been extracted.

Issue:

Whether Section 1 of PD 1899, which imposes a 50,000-MT annual production limit on small-
scale mining, violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed that PD 1899 and RA 7076 can coexist, with both applying
distinctively to businesses. The equal protection challenge failed because the enactments
anticipate different scopes (individuals, partnerships, and corporations vs. cooperatives). The
DENR’s interpretation stood firm in limiting extraction based on run-of-mine ore which includes
the gangue. The Court emphasized the potential environmental ramifications if exclusions
persisted, affirming the MGB’s moisture-exempt run-of-mine criterion
Doctrine:
Dual Laws Coexistence: PD 1899’s production limit stands in tandem with RA 7076, addressing
distinct entities. Regulation upholds the government’s broader environmental oversight duties.

Case Title: SR Metals, Inc. vs. Reyes (G.R. No. 179669, June 4, 2014)

Ponente: Carpio, J.

Facts:

Petitioners—Leonora P. Calanza, Eva M. Amoren, Gene P. Roao, Sanny C. Calanza, Gregorio C.

Yncierto II, and Angel M. Puyo—filed applications for small-scale mining permits on August 23,
1991, with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Development Service of the DENR, Region XI, Davao
City.They indicated that they intended to extract gold from an area purported to be within the
Municipality of Boston, Davao Oriental. On December 22, 1992, Governor Rosalind Y. Lopez of
Davao Oriental approved the applications and issued six small-scale mining permits in favor of
the petitioners.The controversy arose because the mining areas applied for by petitioners fell
within the logging concession of the respondent Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines
(PICOP) under existing Timber License Agreements (TLAs), covering vast forest lands across
several provinces, including Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Sur, Davao Oriental, and Davao del
Norte.Petitioners negotiated with PICOP for access to the mining site at Barangay Catihan,
Municipality of Boston, Davao Oriental, which set the stage for dispute.

Issue:

Whether the permits issued by the governor of Davao Oriental are valid given that Republic Act
No. 7076 vests the issuance of such permits in the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board.

Ruling:

Applications for mining permits must be submitted to the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board as
per Republic Act No. 7076.The Provincial Mining Regulatory Board consists of representatives
from various sectors, including small-scale mining and environmental groups. Disputes must be
referred to the respective sanggunians for resolution.If unresolved amicably within 60 days, the
sanggunian will formally try and decide the issue. The small-scale mining permits issued by the
governor were declared null and void due to improper authorization.

Doctrine:
The dispute involved critical statutory provisions, including: Republic Act No. 7076, which
governs the issuance of small-scale mining permits. Provisions of the Local Government Code of
1991 that delineate jurisdiction over boundary disputes between local government
units.Precedents affirming that a court rendering judgment without jurisdiction renders such
decisions null and void were also cited.

Case Title: Moncayo Integrated Small-Scale Miners Association, Inc. vs. Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corp. (G.R. No. 149638, Dec 10, 2014)

Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Facts:

Dispute over 729-hectare Diwalwal mining area; DENR, PMRB, and courts clashed on
jurisdiction, but Supreme Court deemed case moot due to supervening events. The dispute
centers on the Diwalwal Gold Rush area in Mt. Diwata, Mindanao—a site long embroiled in
mining controversies since the mid-1980s. At issue is a 729-hectare portion, which was
excluded from respondent Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation’s Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement application and subsequently declared as a People’s Small-Scale Mining
Area. Two petitions were filed for review: one by Moncayo Integrated Small-Scale Miners
Association, Inc. and another by DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles.The matter was previously
addressed before the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB), which in its January 6, 1998 decision
vacated an earlier panel decision by dismissing adverse claims against SMGMC’s MPSA
application based on DENR Administrative Order No. 66. The adverse claims, involving various
small-scale mining entities and individuals, were linked to the declaration of certain forestlands
for small-scale mining purposes.
Issues:

Whether the DENR Secretary’s decision to modify the PMRB’s declaration exceeded his statutory
authority and contravened the inherent mandate of the MAB decision and the objectives of
Republic Act No. 7076

Ruling:

The Supreme Court declared the petitions moot, referencing subsequent developments
including Presidential Proclamation No. 297 and a prior decision that rendered earlier mining
permits void. The Supreme Court did not rule on the merits of the forum shopping claim due to
the mootness of the case.The PMRB has the authority to declare and segregate areas for small-
scale mining, but actions must be in line with the overarching legal framework established by
the Mining Act and RA 7076.The Supreme Court's decision underscores the complexities of
mining regulation in the Philippines, particularly in the context of small-scale mining right.

Doctrine:

Proclamation No. 297 by President Macapagal-Arroyo, which declared the area as a mineral
reservation, effectively mooted the legal issues originally raised in these petitions.

Case Title: League of Provinces of the Philippines vs. Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (G.R. No. 175368; Apr 11, 2013)

Ponente: Bersamin, J

Facts:

On March 28, 1996, Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation filed an Application for
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with the DENR Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (MGB) Regional Office No. III covering 61,136 hectares in Bulacan.On April 29, 1998, the
MGB R-III issued an order denying Golden Falcon’s FTAA application on the ground that it failed
to secure necessary area clearances from the Forest Management Sector and Lands
Management Sector.Golden Falcon submitted an appeal on November 11, 1998 to the DENR
MGB-Central Office seeking reconsideration of the April 29, 1998 denial. On February 10, 2004,
while Golden Falcon’s appeal was still pending, Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz,
Gerardo R. Cruz, and Liberato Sembrano filed Applications for Quarry Permit (AQP) with the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan covering the same
area.On July 16, 2004, the MGB-Central Office reaffirmed the denial of Golden Falcon’s appeal
by issuing an order that was rendered final on August 11, 2004, as certified via postal
confirmation.Through correspondence in May 2005, AMTC indicated that the quarry permit
applications, which were originally filed by Mercado, Cruz, Cruz, and Sembrano, fell within the
scope of its prior valid AEP.On August 8–10, 2005, with endorsements by the MGB-RIII Director
and subsequent recommendations from the PENRO of Bulacan, the Provincial Governor,
Josefina M. dela Cruz, approved and issued Small-Scale Mining Permits by converting the
original AQP filings.

Issue:

Whether Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of RA. No. 7160 and Section 24 of RA. No. 7076 are
unconstitutional for providing the DENR and its Secretary with powers of control that infringe
upon the local autonomy of provinces.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the constitutionality of

the contested provisions and the DENR Secretary's authority.

Doctrine:

Presumption of validity of statutes unless proven unconstitutional beyond

reasonable doubt. The DENR Secretary's actions were deemed within the
bounds of the law.

Case Title: Reyes vs. People (G.R. No. 237172; September 18, 2019)

Ponente: Lopez, J.

Facts:

The case involves Mario Joel T. Reyes, then-Governor of Palawan, and his approval of the
renewal of a small-scale mining permit issued to Olympic Mines and Development Corporation
(Olympic Mines). Olympic Mines, in coordination with Platinum Group Metal Corporation
(Platinum Group), was engaged in nickel ore extraction in areas of Narra and Española,
Palawan, under permits duly issued by the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) and
approved by Governor Reyes. Shortly after, environmental concerns arose when the DENR
canceled Olympic Mines’ Environmental Compliance Certificates due to over-extraction,
although this cancellation was later reversed by the Office of the President. Mines unwarranted
benefits by renewing the permit despite clear evidence of over-extraction. Failing to ensure
that the conditions of the original permit were strictly observed. The specific allegations
included that Reyes approved the renewal while the previous permit was still valid and when its
extraction limits had already been exhausted. Baguyo was acquitted since his role was limited
to the technical or “certified machine copy” of the approval process.
Issue:

Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Reyes for the violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 by approving the renewal of the small-scale mining permit despite
Olympic Mines’ clear over-extraction.

Ruling:

The Sandiganbayan found no manifest partiality or evident bad faith but determined that
Reyes’ actions constituted gross inexcusable negligence. The court underscored the governor's
dual responsibility to promote resource conservation while allowing exploitation.

Doctrine:

Republic Act No. 7076: The People's Small Scale Mining Act of 1991, which defines small-scale
mining and does not impose a 50,000 metric ton threshold. Presidential Decree No. 1899:
Establishes limits on small-scale mining operations, specifically regarding extraction amounts.

Case Title: Province of Pampanga vs. Romulo (G.R. No. 195987; Jan 12, 2021)

Ponente: Leonen, J

Facts:

Shortly after the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga enacted
Tax Ordinances in 1992 regulating the extraction of quarry resources and imposing fees and
taxes on such activities. Tax Ordinance No. 1 (1992) imposed a 10% tax on the fair market value
of quarry resources extracted from public lands and water bodies, while Tax Ordinance No. 3
(1992) fixed extraction values and corresponding fees. On January 11, 1999, President Estrada
issued Proclamation No. 66 declaring lahar-affected areas in Pampanga, Tarlac, and Zambales
as environmentally critical areas and mineral reservations under DENR supervision. In 2002,
President Arroyo revoked Proclamation No. 66 via Proclamation No. 183.On July 4, 2003,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO No. 224 to rationalize the extraction and
disposition of sand, gravel, and lahar deposits in the three provinces’ 224 provided that: The
issuance of permits for extracting industrial sand and gravel/lahar deposits was to be governed
by Chapter 8 of the Philippine Mining Act. A Task Force would be established composed of the
MGB Regional Director (as Team Leader) and the Provincial Governor (as Deputy Team Leader)
to process permit applications and ensure regulatory compliance. Petitioner (Province of
Pampanga) asserted that EO 224: The Task Force created under EO 224 was only intended to
supervise the permit process and the collection of taxes, ensuring that the LGUs ultimately
received their proper share.
Issue:

Whether Executive Order No. 224 is valid and constitutional.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, maintaining the validity of
Executive Order No. 224.The ruling emphasized the executive's role in overseeing the execution
of laws concerning environmental protection and resource management.

Doctrine:

Local Government Code (R.A. 7160): Governs local taxation and revenue generation by LGUs.
Philippine Mining Act (R.A. 7942): Regulates the extraction of mineral resources in the
Philippines, establishing the roles of local and national authorities in permitting and oversight.

Case Title: La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos; G.R. No. 127882; Dec 1, 2004

Ponente: Panganiban, J

Facts:

The 1987 Constitution, in Section 2, Article XII, establishes that all non-agricultural natural
resources (including minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils) are owned by the State and
must be exploited under its “full control and supervision” for the benefit of the Filipino
people.It further mandates that the State may either undertake these activities directly or enter
into agreements with domestic entities (with at least 60% Filipino capitalization) or, in the case
of large‐scale projects, with foreign -owned corporations “involving either technical or financial
assistance” according to the general terms provided by law. Petitioners (including tribal
associations) and some dissenting justices argue that the Mining Act’s provisions and the
WMCP FTAA allow foreign corporations to acquire de facto beneficial ownership and
managerial control of the nation’s resources.They stress that such outcomes run counter to the
Regalian doctrine and the principle that natural resources must remain in Filipino hands.

Issue:

Do the provisions of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942) and its implementing rules that
authorize FTAA contracts with foreign-owned corporations, as well as conversion options into
MPSAs, conform to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution?

Ruling:

The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Act and its implementing rules
as respecting the State's full control and supervision. The FTAA with WMCP was also upheld
except for specific provisions (Sections 7.8 and 7.9) that were declared invalid. These invalid
provisions unreasonably reduced the State's share of mining revenues when foreign
shareholdings were transferred

Doctrine:

Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Act of 1995) and its corresponding Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRRs) were enacted to govern the exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral resources.

Case Title: Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc. vs. Gozun (G.R. No. 157882)

Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO,J

Facts:

The petition arises from questions surrounding the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 (the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, particularly DENR
Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996.The controversy also involves the Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on June 20, 1994, between the Republic of the Philippines
and a foreign-owned mining corporation originally known as Arimco Mining Corporation, later
consolidated into Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC).Petitioners, comprising Didipio Earth-
Savers Multi-Purpose Association, several individual residents, and indigenous groups, filed demand
letters beginning on September 7, 2001, requesting cancellation of the CAMC FTAA on the ground that
the Mining Act and its IRR are unconstitutional. The petitioners asserted that the provisions allow for the
entry, use, and even effective taking of private property without just compensation, violating Section 9,
Article III of the Constitution. They further claimed that the law compromises the State’s constitutional
duty to maintain full control and supervision over the country’s natural resources.

Issue:
Whether Section 76 of RA No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 constitute an unlawful taking of
private property without payment of just compensation in violation of the Constitution.

Ruling:

Court holds provisions should be harmonized, treating Section 76 as embodying eminent

domain authority. Court concludes the law grants the State adequate control and supervision
over mining activities. Court references prior ruling affirming State's broad supervisory powers
per the Mining Act: DENR and Mines & Geosciences Bureau (MGB) have extensive regulatory,
inspection, and monitoring powers. Contractors must comply with environmental, safety, and
social development obligations. Government may impose sanctions including FTAA cancellation
Doctrine:

Earlier laws (Commonwealth Act No. 137, PD No. 463, PD No. 512) addressed surface rights
acquisition and eminent domain for mining. PD No. 512 explicitly declared mining prospecting
and operations as public use allowing eminent domain. A 7942's Section 76 does not expressly
repeat eminent domain grant but does not repeal prior eminent domain provisions.

Case Title: Liwat-Moya vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 191249; March 14, 2018)

Ponente: CARANDANG, J

Facts:

On 22 May 1991, petitioner Corazon Liwat-Moya filed an application for a Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) covering 650
hectares located in Loreto, Surigao del Norte, within Parcel III of the Surigao Mineral
Reservation (SMR).Petitioner undertook the required publications and asserted that she had
substantially, though not completely, complied with the mandatory documentary requirements
for the MPSA application.The MGB issued letters-notice on 15 February 1993 and 19 February
1997, calling for the submission of additional documentary requirements by the petitioner.
Petitioner failed to respond to these notices, leaving her application incomplete. On 3 March
1995, Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Act of 1995) was enacted, which established
preferential rights for pending mining claims and applications. The DENR Secretary, on 13 June
2006, reversed an earlier denial by reinstating petitioner’s MPSA application, basing his decision
on the “convincing validity” of her assertions. The CA, on 30 September 2009, denied the
petition for review for lack of merit, and its reconsideration resolution on 8 February 2010
likewise upheld the denial of the petitioner’s MPSA application.

Issue:

Was petitioner’s MPSA application properly denied due to her failure to comply with the
documentary requirements within the deadlines set by DMO No. 97-07?

Ruling:

Office of the President (OP) Ruling. The OP reversed the DENR Secretary’s decision to reinstate
the MPSA application, citing laches due to the applicant's negligence in compliance. Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision. Affirmed the OP ruling, emphasizing the right of Rapid City Realty &
Development Corp. (RCRDC) to intervene and the expiration of the MPSA application due to
noncompliance with deadlines.

Doctrine:
R.A. No. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995): Governs mining operations and establishes
requirements for MPSA applications’ Administrative Orders: Such as DAO No. 57 and DAO No.
96-40 outline the procedural requirements for mining applications.

Case Title: SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP VS BALITE PORTAL MINING CORP
(G.R. No. 135190; April 3, 2002)

Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO,J

Facts:

This case concerns the petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision, which dismissed a
special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus regarding mining rights in the
Diwalwal Gold Rush Area in the Philippines. Petitioner: Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
Corporation (SEM). Respondents: Balite Portal Mining Cooperative, DENR Secretary, Provincial
Mining Regulatory Board of Davao. The Diwalwal area, rich in mineral resources, has been
subject to mining disputes since the mid-1980s, leading to numerous safety and legal
challenges.

Issue:

Whether the memorandum order was a directive for studies, not a definitive policy.

Ruling:

The court dismissed the petition, stating: The memorandum order was a directive for studies,
not a definitive policy. No legal rights were conclusively affected at this stage.

Doctrine:

Republic Act No. 7076: Governs small-scale mining operations.

Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (R.A. No. 7942): Establishes ownership and regulation of mineral
resources. The case underscores the principle that mining rights in the Philippines are privileges
granted by the State and can be modified or revoked.

The DENR Secretary's memorandum was a preliminary measure to assess direct state
involvement in mining, not a final policy decision.
Case Title: Apex Mining Co., Inc. vs. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp.; G.R. No.
152613 ; Nov 20, 2009

Ponente: NACHURA, J

Facts:

The case involves multiple petitioners and respondents, notably Apex Mining Co., Inc.,
Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), and other mining claimants and
cooperatives.The dispute centers on the rights over the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area, a mineral‐
rich tract located within a forest reserve formerly proclaimed under historical executive orders.
In March 1986, the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences issued Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in
favor of Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC).The assignment was executed without evidence
that SEM was MMC’s duly authorized agent, and without the requisite approval from the
proper authority as mandated by Presidential Decree No. 463.MMC (and later SEM) was
required to comply with a mandatory work program, including the submission of periodic
reports, environmental certification, and other reportorial requirements.EP 133 was extended
for one year but eventually expired by non-renewal on July 6, 1994. A separate opinion by one
of the justices further reflected on the need to determine the priority of rights between private
claimants (Apex and Balite) should the State eventually award mining operations.

Issue:

Whether the assignment or transfer of EP 133 from MMC to SEM was valid under the terms of
the permit and prevailing mining laws.

Ruling:

The assignment of EP 133 to SEM was found to violate the conditions of the permit which
required it to be for the exclusive use of Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) or its duly
authorized agents. SEM's claim to vested mining rights over the disputed area was rejected, as
it failed to demonstrate that it had perfected mining rights under applicable law. The
assignment of EP 133 to SEM was invalid due to violations of permit conditions and lack of
DENR approval.

Doctrine:

Proclamation No. 297 established the Diwalwal area as a mineral reservation, allowing the
State to directly undertake mining operations or award contracts to qualified entities.
Case Title: Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation (G.R. No. 149927;
Mar 30, 2004)

Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J

Facts:

A mining license exceeding the 100-hectare limit under P.D. No. 463 was voided by the
Supreme Court, upholding its cancellation as a valid exercise of police power and public
interest, overriding claims of due process and property rights violations. The case involves
petitioners represented by the DENR under then Minister Ernesto R. Maceda along with several
former government officials versus respondents Rosemoor Mining and Development
Corporation and affiliated individuals. The dispute centers on a mining/quarry license—Quarry
License No. 33—issued to respondents and later cancelled by the State.The petitioners, having
secured permission to prospect for marble deposits, discovered high-quality marble deposits in
the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. After incurring substantial expenses and
efforts, they applied to the Bureau of Mines (now Mines and Geosciences Bureau) for a license
to exploit the discovered marble deposits, which culminated in the issuance of License No. 33.
Shortly after the issuance of License No. 33, following the appointment of Ernesto R. Maceda as
Minister of DENR, the license was cancelled via Maceda’s letter dated September 6, 1986.

Issue:

Whether QLP No. 33 was issued in blatant contravention of the mandatory provision in Section
69 of PD 463, which limits any quarry license to a maximum area of 100 hectares per province.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court set aside the Court of Appeals’ decision, reinstating the trial court's ruling
that License No. 33 was void.The petition was granted; the Court found that QLP No. 33
violated PD 463, making it void.PD 463 explicitly limits quarry licenses to 100 hectares.The
interpretation that four separate applications could circumvent this limit was rejected.

Doctrine:

PD 463 clearly mandates that a quarry license in any province shall not exceed an area of 100
hectares, without exception even if the area is submitted through multiple separate
applications. Proclamation No. 84, issued after the cancellation, reaffirmed the State’s
disposition—reverting excluded parts of the land to its former status (as part of the Biak-na-
Bato national park)—and was central to the petitioners’ challenge regarding its impact on
property rights and due process.

Case Title: Atok Big-Wedge Mining Co. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 63528; Sep
9, 1996)
Ponente: PARAS, J

Facts:

A mining company's claim over land was dismissed due to non-compliance with annual work
requirements, favoring a landowner who proved 30+ years of adverse possession and
agricultural use. Petitioner: Atok Big Wedge Mining Company, which claimed rights over the
subject land through its recorded mining claims. - The Intermediate Appellate Court and private
respondent Tuktukan Saingan, who filed an application for land registration asserting adverse,
open, and continuous possession. - The trial court of Baguio City dismissed Saingan’s land
registration application based on the petitioner’s claim over the land as part of its mining
claim.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, favoring the adverse possession
claim of the private respondent

Issue:

Which right should prevail: the purported mining claim rights of the petitioner, or the adverse,
open, and continuous possession evidenced by the private respondent.

Ruling:

The Court of Appeals found that Atok Big Wedge Mining Company had abandoned its claim due
to lack of compliance with the assessment work requirement. Tuktukan Saingan provided
sufficient evidence of over thirty years of continuous possession and improvements on the land
applied for registration. The petitioner failed to demonstrate the connection to original locators
of the mining claims, undermining their claim.

Doctrine:

Philippine Bill of 1902: Established the framework for mining claims, providing rights to locators
while imposing strict compliance requirements. Executive Order No. 141: Clarifies that mere
filing of affidavits for assessment work is insufficient; actual work must be demonstrated.
Presidential Decree No. 1214: Mandates that holders of unpatented mining claims apply for
mining leases to retain any rights.
Case Title: Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait vs. Secretary
Angelo Reyes, et al. (GR No. 180771. April 21, 2015)

Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Facts:
This consolidated case arose from two petitions filed concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC-
46), which allowed the exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum resources within
Tañon Strait, a passage of water between the islands of Negros and Cebu. The first petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 180771, sought to nullify SC-46 for alleged violations of the 1987
Constitution and other laws. The second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 181527, sought to
nullify the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
in connection with SC-46. The initial contract between the Philippine government and Japan
Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) involved geophysical and geological studies, later
converted into SC-46 for petroleum exploration. Various procedural moves were made,
including objections to the respondents’ actions, filing of motions, and an attempt to implead
JAPEX Philippines and former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the case.

Issues:

Whether SC-46 violated the 1987 Philippine Constitution and other pertinent statutes.

Whether the continuation of oil exploration and proposed exploitation in Tañon Strait was
inconsistent with Philippine commitments to international environmental laws and instruments.

Ruling:

SC-46 was found to violate paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as it did
not meet the safeguards set forth by law, specifically: it wasn’t crafted in accordance with a
general law providing standards; it wasn’t signed by the President; and it wasn’t reported to
Congress within 30 days from its execution. SC-46 was also found to violate the National
Integrated Protected Areas System Act (NIPAS Act) due to the lack of an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) prior to activities that went beyond exploration, demanding
specific congressional enactment.

Doctrine:

The decision reiterated the doctrine regarding strict compliance with constitutional
requirements for agreements involving natural resource exploration by foreign entities. It also
highlighted the need for congressional legislation to permit exploitation and utilization of
energy resources within protected areas.

Case Title: Republic of the Philippines vs Filemon Saromo (GR No 189803. March 14, 2018)

Ponente: Caguioa, J.

Facts:

On September 25, 1980, Geodetic Engineer Francisco C. Guevarra surveyed land for Filemon
Saromo, preparing Survey Plan No. PSU-4-A-004479, which noted that the land was formerly a
portion of China Sea and was inside unclassified public forest land. Saromo filed an Application
for Free Patent covering 45,808 square meters, claiming to have occupied the land since 1944.
On May 18, 1981, Jaime Juanillo approved Saromo’s application, stating the land as alienable
and disposable, and on May 26, 1981, Original Certificate of Title No. P-331 was issued to
Saromo. Luis Mendoza filed a protest against the grant of free patent to Saromo, but the
investigation was terminated unresolved. An investigation found that the land was not
alienable and disposable, as it was “inside unclassified public forest” and part of a marine
reserve according to Proclamation No. 1801.

Issues:

Whether the CA erred in upholding that the subject land is alienable and disposable at the time
of issuance of free patent.

Whether the principle of Regalian doctrine applies in this case.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court granted the petition, finding the land to be unclassified public forest land,
thus inalienable and non-disposable; therefore, Saromo’s title was void. It was ruled that the
presidential proclamation declaring the area as a tourist zone and marine reserve did not
automatically make it inalienable. The examination of testimonies revealed the land remained
classified as forest land without a proclamation declaring it otherwise. The doctrine reinforced
that no amount of possession can ripen unclassified land into private ownership. The Court
ordered the cancellation of Saromo’s title and the reversion of the land to state ownership.

Doctrine:

Lands within the public domain are classified under the Regalian Doctrine as State-owned.
Official proclamations are necessary to declassify forest lands into alienable and disposable
lands. The State cannot be bound by omissions or errors of public officials under the Public Land
Act. Possession does not confer ownership on lands unclassified as agricultural.

Case Title: Aurellano Agnes et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines (GR No 156022. July 6, 2015)

Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Facts:

This case involves petitioners Aurellano Agnes et al., who are settlers on Calauit Island in
Palawan, against the respondent Republic of the Philippines. The petitioners claim ownership of
lands on Calauit Island which they had occupied for generations. In 1976, Presidential
Proclamation No. 1578 declared Calauit Island as a game preserve and wildlife sanctuary. The
settlers were relocated to other areas under Resettlement Agreements. Some settlers later
returned to Calauit, prompting the government to file a complaint for specific performance to
compel them to vacate. The lower courts ruled in favor of the government. However, in 2008,
the Office of the President issued a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) over Calauit
Island to the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community. The Supreme Court ruled that the
issuance of the CADT rendered the case moot and academic, as it negated the need to
determine whether the settlers could be compelled to vacate based on the Resettlement
Agreements.

Issues:

Whether Proclamation No. 1578 breached the petitioners’ rights.

Whether the resettlement agreements procured by deceit, intimidation, or fraud.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court upheld that the petitioners’ claims of ownership were unsubstantiated due
to the lack of appropriate government declassification rendering the land non-alienable and
retaining it as part of the public domain. The Court noted that Presidential Proclamation No.
1578 was within the state’s rights to preserve and utilize land in public interest without
conflicting with the petitioners’ qualified claims. The claims of fraud, deceit, and
misrepresentation were ruled out. As such, the agreements were not voidable. The Court
acknowledged inadequate government provisioning but stated petitioners’ remedy was
enforcement of proper compensation and facilities within resettlement areas rather than self-
help measures of returning to Calauit.

Doctrine:

The Supreme Court reiterated public domain principles asserting that without explicit
government declassification, presumed state ownership stands paramount. It emphasized that
proper necessary judicial forums and time frames must be adhered to for contesting state
actions and agreements.

Case Title: PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation and Mines
Adjudication Board (GR No. 163509. December 6, 2006)

Ponente: Tinga, J.

Facts:

In 1987, Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI) executed a Mines
Operating Agreement (Agreement) with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation for
mining operations in Agusan del Sur. Banahaw Mining sought mining lease contracts from the
Bureau of Mines and was granted a temporary permit in 1988, renewed until 1991. A portion of
these mining claims overlapped with PICOP Resources Inc.’s logging concession. An agreement
was made allowing Banahaw Mining access/right of way. In 1991, Banahaw Mining applied for
Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA). In 1996, Banahaw Mining assigned its mining
rights to Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base Metals), which CMMCI approved.
On October 7, 1997, Base Metals’ amended MPSA applications were published. Subsequently,
PICOP filed an Adverse Claim/Opposition with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), arguing
that the MPSA would impair contractual obligations and defeat PICOP’s rights. Base Metals
countered, arguing no breaches occurred, asserting the Adverse Claim was late, and suggesting
compensation discussions if damages occurred.

Issues:

Whether the area subject to Base Metals’ MPSA is closed to mining operations without PICOP’s
consent under laws and the Presidential Warranty.

Ruling:

The Court determined that differing classifications (“forest reserve”, “permanent forest”)
alleged by PICOP did not preclude mining operations. RA 7942 and related laws allow mining in
forest lands, subject to existing rights and necessary clearances, which had been obtained by
Base Metals. Thus, PICOP’s concession was not inherently closed to mining. The Court held that
the Presidential Warranty merely confirmed PICOP’s timber rights and didn’t constitute a
separately enforceable contract. It reasserted that timber licenses are not contracts protected
under the non-impairment clause as established in prior jurisprudence. The warranty did not
assure exclusivity regarding under-land resources, maintaining the state’s prerogative over
natural resources.

Doctrine:

Timber licenses do not equate to private contracts under the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution. The multiple-use policy allows for the rational coexistence of timber and mineral
rights on public land under existing laws, provided proper compensatory measures are
addressed.

Case Title: Wilson Po Cham v. Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro: A Case of Misrepresentation and
Fraud in Real Estate Transaction (A.C No. 5499. August 16, 2005)

Ponente: Carpio Morales, J.

Facts:

In July 1995, Emelita Cañete, Elenita Alipio, and Mario Navarro, then the Municipal Assessor of
Morong, Bataan, offered Wilson Po Cham a parcel of land (Lot 1683, Cad. Case No. 262, Sitio
Gatao, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan) for sale. Cham expressed interest and met with Atty.
Edilberto D. Pizarro at Pizarro’s residence, where Pizarro asserted the land was alienable and
disposable. Pizarro showed Cham several documents, including a Real Property Tax Order, a
Deed of Absolute Sale signed by Jose R. Monzon, transferring land ownership to Virgilio Banzon,
Rolando B. Zabala, and Pizarro for PHP 500,000.00, and a Special Power of Attorney authorizing
Pizarro to sell the land. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Pizarro, Banzon, and Zabala,
confirming the land sale to Cham for PHP 3,372,533.00. Cham paid the balance with two
checks. Upon trying to fence the property, Cham was informed by a forest guard that the land
was part of Bataan National Park, thus not alienable or disposable. Cham filed an administrative
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Pizarro for misrepresentation and falsehood. Cham also
filed an estafa complaint.

Issues:

Whether Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro committed misrepresentation and deceit in his dealings with
Wilson Po Cham.

Ruling:

The Court found that Pizarro misrepresented the status of the property, fraudulently induced
Cham into purchasing rights to non-existent alienable land. Pizarro’s documents, including tax
declarations and receipts, did not substantiate a legitimate claim to the land. The Court cited
the DENR certification and Proclamation No. 24, proving the land was part of the inalienable
Bataan National Park. The Court emphasized that misconduct reflecting moral unfitness,
whether professional or private, justified disciplinary action.

Doctrine:

The Court emphasized that conduct involving deceit or fraud, whether related to professional
practice or not, justifies suspension or disbarment. Moreover, a lawyer can be disciplined for
dishonest actions outside professional capacity as it reflects upon their fitness to practice law.

Case Title: Maynilad Water Services, Inc. vs. Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (GR No. 202897. August 6, 2019)

Ponente: Hernando, J.

Facts:

On April 2, 2009, the Environmental Management Bureau Region III (EMB-RIII) filed a complaint
against MWSS, Maynilad, and Manila Water before the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB),
alleging non-compliance with wastewater treatment standards under the Clean Water Act
(Republic Act No. 9275). Soon after, EMB’s National Capital Region and Region IV-A offices
followed suit with similar complaints regarding inadequate Wastewater Treatment Facilities
(WWTFs) and failure to connect sewage lines leading to the degradation of water bodies and
Manila Bay. Prompted by these complaints, the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources (SENR) issued Notices of Violation (NOVs), citing violations of Section 8 of the Clean
Water Act due to the insufficient provision and maintenance of WWTFs. A technical conference
ensued where MWSS, Maynilad, and Manila Water defended their actions, asserting
compliance under Section 8 through their Concession Agreements with MWSS, which set
milestones for water, sewerage, and sanitation projects spread over 25 years. On October 7,
2009, the SENR ordered MWSS, Maynilad, and Manila Water to pay fines for violations of the
Clean Water Act, amounting to PhP 29.4 million jointly and severally, plus PhP 200,000 daily
until compliance. Reconsideration motions by MWSS and Manila Water were denied by the
SENR on December 2, 2009, and subsequent motions by Maynilad were dismissed as untimely.

Issues:

Whether petitioners were deprived of procedural due process when the Secretary of the DENR
imposed a fine on them for violation of the Clean Water Act.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court determined that the SENR had the authority to impose fines under Section
28 of the Clean Water Act, upon recommendation from the PAB. The nature of the process,
including technical conferences and opportunity for petitioners to respond, satisfied procedural
due process. Petitioners’ procedural lapses, such as filing appeals directly to the Court of
Appeals without exhausting administrative remedies through the Office of the President,
rendered their appeals dismissible, and the SENR’s orders attained finality.The Court held that
Section 7 did not serve as a condition precedent to Section 8. The latter imposed an
unconditional obligation on petitioners to connect sewage lines within five years from the Act’s
effectivity. The Agreements’ provisions and compliance targets under the Concession
Agreements were subordinate to statutory obligations. Petitioners could not contract away
their statutory responsibilities, nor did the MMDA ruling supersede legislative mandate. The
petitioners’ non-compliance resulted in a severe detrimental impact on water quality and public
health; thus, stringent enforcement of Section 8 was justified.

Doctrine:

The Court underscored that water resources are held in trust by the state for the benefit of the
public and must be protected and preserved, aligning with the Clean Water Act’s mandates.
The obligation to connect sewage lines within the specified period of five years from the Act’s
effectivity is absolute and unconditioned by other statutory or contractual stipulations.
Case Title: Mark Anthony V. Zabal et al., vs Rodrigo Duterte et al. (GR NO. 238467. February
12, 2019)

Ponente: Del Castillo, J.

Facts:

President Rodrigo R. Duterte, witnessing Boracay Island’s devastation due to abuse, declared a
need for its temporary closure to undergo rehabilitation. He branded the island as a cesspool
during a February 2018 business forum. The closure was announced to be a maximum of six
months, commencing on April 26, 2018. Police and military troops were deployed to the island,
and guidelines for closure were disseminated by the Department of Interior and Local
Government.

Petitioners Mark Anthony V. Zabal and Thiting Estoso Jacosalem, both residents reliant on
Boracay’s tourism, together with Odon S. Bandiola who frequents the island for business and
leisure, challenged the legality of the island’s closure on April 25, 2018. They sought immediate
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Preliminary Injunction. They argued that
the decline in tourist engagements severely affected their livelihoods and feared complete
economic loss due to the upcoming closure. On April 26, 2018, President Duterte officially
promulgated Proclamation No. 475, formally declaring Boracay in a state of calamity, and
ordered a six-month closure, substantiating the earlier verbal declarations.
The Supreme Court required respondents to comment on the petition. Petitioners emphasized
that the Proclamation represented an invalid exercise of legislative powers and infringed upon
their constitutional rights to travel and due process, affecting their livelihood.

Respondents, on their part, contended that the President is immune from suit. They argued
that the petition is inappropriate since the acts complained of (closure and rehabilitation) have
already started, and that mandamus does not lie as they were performing a duty to protect the
environment, not neglecting it.

Issues:

Whether Proclamation No. 475 infringes on constitutional rights to travel and due process.

Whether the Proclamation unduly intrudes upon the autonomy of affected LGUS.

Ruling:

The Court dismissed the petition, finding Proclamation No. 475 constitutional. The closure was
within the ambit of powers vested to the executive branch and in compliance with the
Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act and other environmental laws, The
Proclamation No. 475 does not limit the right to travel in its essential sense because it only
prohibits entry of tourists and non-residents to Boracay temporarily to facilitate its
rehabilitation, and does not restrict petitioners' movement elsewhere. The closure represents a
valid police power measure. The state of calamity in Boracay and the need for rehabilitation
and restoration measures justified the President's issuance of the Proclamation under the
police power of the State. The Proclamation did not unduly intrude upon LU autonomy, as it is
mandated by law to coordinate with them for disaster risk reduction and management. The
environmental crisis in Boracay necessitates national intervention, beyond local capabilities.

Doctrine:

The right to travel is part of the liberty protected by the due process clause. This right, however,
is not absolute and can be restricted for legitimate government interests such as public safety
or public health, as interpreted in accordance with Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Additionally, the police power of the State is inherent and does not require express
constitutional grant. It can be exercised to promote public welfare, provided it does not infringe
upon individual rights without due process.
Case Title: Republic of the Philippines vs. N. Dela Merced & Sons, Inc. (GR NO. 201501.
January 22, 2018)

Ponente: Sereno, CJ.

Facts:

The case centers around the Guadalupe Commercial Complex, operated by N. Dela Merced &
Sons, Inc., which was inspected by the Environmental Management Bureau-National Capital
Region (EMB-NCR) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) on July 13,
2006. Violations were found for operating without necessary permits (air pollution source
installations and discharge permits for water pollutants), leading to the issuance of a Notice of
Violation (NOV) on August 28, 2006.

Following another inspection and a failed effluent sample test, a cease and desist order (CDO)
was issued on February 6, 2007. After much procedural engagement and subsequent partial
lifting of the CDO upon the company’s compliance, the DENR-Pollution Adjudication Board
(DENR-PAB) computed a fine amounting to P3.98 million covering the period from October 12,
2006, to November 13, 2007. Dela Merced & Sons contested this, leading to a reduction by the
Court of Appeals (CA) to P2.63 million due to what it perceived as unreasonable delay by EMB-
NCR.

Both parties moved for reconsideration which were both denied, propelling the matter to the
Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the issuance of a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) exempts compliance with RA 9275.
Whether Sec. 28 of RA 9275 violates Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution for being
excessive.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that Dela Merced & Sons was not denied due process. The procedural
steps taken by the DENR-PAB, including notice, opportunity to comply, and technical
conferences, sufficed for administrative due process. It emphasized that trial-type proceedings
are not required in administrative contexts. CNC and Compliance with RA 9275: The Court ruled
that the issuance of a CNC does not exempt Dela Merced & Sons from other environmental
laws, like RA 9275 (Clean Water Act of 2004). The CNC only exempts a project from submitting
an Environmental Impact Statement and obtaining an Environmental Compliance Certificate
but not from other environmental requirements.The issue of constitutionality brought up by
Dela Merced & Sons was considered a collateral attack and not properly presented.
Furthermore, the Court noted the issue was not the lis mota of the case, and the provision
remained constitutionally valid. Even if properly raised, the fines were determined to be part of
administrative penalties, not criminal, thereby not falling under Article III, Section 19’s
prohibition of excessive fines. The fines were held not to be excessive. Amount of Fine: The
Supreme Court disagreed with the CA’s reduction of the fine to P2.63 million, reasoning that
the delay in effluent sampling by the EMB was reasonable and within the time frame allowed.
Hence, the original fine of P3.98 million imposed by the DENR-PAB was reinstated.

Doctrine:

The Court emphasized that compliance with procedural steps ensuring notice and the
opportunity to comply and be heard suffices for due process in administrative proceedings. The
issuance of a Certificate of Non-Coverage does not exempt project proponents from
compliance with other environmental laws. Moreover, administrative fines, unless proven to be
flagrantly oppressive or shockingly disproportionate, are not considered excessive under
constitutional guarantees, as these provisions typically apply to criminal penalties.
Case Title: Universal Robina Corp. vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority (GR NO. 191427.
May 30, 2011)

Ponente: Carpio Morales,J.

Facts:

Case Title: Universal Robina Corp. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority (G.R. No. 191427.
May 30, 2011)

Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

Facts:

This case involves Universal Robina Corp. (CORN DIVISION), the petitioner, against the Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA), the respondent. The dispute arose from LLDA's regulation
of wastewater discharges from Universal Robina's corn oil refinery plant located in Bagong Ilog,
Pasig City. On March 14, 2000, the LLDA conducted a laboratory analysis of the wastewater
produced by Universal Robina and discovered that it did not meet the environmental standards
set forth in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative
Orders Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. Following this finding, the LLDA issued an Ex-Parte Order
on May 30, 2000, requiring Universal Robina to explain why it should not be ordered to cease
operations due to the discharge of polluting effluents into the Pasig River and for operating
without the requisite clearance or permit. Subsequent inspections revealed continued non-
compliance, leading to hearings commencement on March 1, 2001. In 2003, Universal Robina
communicated its intention to upgrade its wastewater treatment facility, a project completed
only in 2007. A re-sampling of the wastewater on May 9, 2007, confirmed compliance with legal
standards. Nevertheless, LLDA issued an Order to Pay on January 21, 2008, demanding PHP
1,247,000.00 in accumulated penalties for 1,274 days of non-compliance based on calculations
from March 14, 2000, to November 3, 2003 (932 days) and from March 15, 2006, to April 17,
2007 (342 days). Universal Robina sought reconsideration, arguing for a lower penalty based on
its actual operational days of 560, but LLDA denied the motion, asserting that substantial
evidence supported its original findings. Universal Robina then appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which upheld LLDA's orders, concluding that the documentation submitted by
Universal Robina was not verified and thus deemed unreliable. The appellate court noted that
Universal Robina should have exhausted its administrative remedies before seeking judicial
intervention, leading to the filing of a petition for review on certiorari.

Issues:

Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the LLDA's orders without considering Universal
Robina's claims of compliance and denial of due process?

Was Universal Robina justified in bypassing the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies
before resorting to judicial action?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition filed by Universal Robina and affirmed the decisions of
the Court of Appeals and the LLDA orders. The court upheld the evaluation method used by
LLDA to compute the penalties for discharges of pollutive wastewater, confirming that the
periods were justified and well-supported by evidence. Moreover, the court rejected the claims
of due process violations and the assertion of the need to bypass administrative remedies.

Doctrine:

The ruling underscored the principle that administrative agencies like the LLDA must be allowed
to perform their functions and address violations within their jurisdiction before courts become
involved, as established in Executive Order No. 192, which mandates DENR guidelines for
pollution control. Moreover, the court clarified that due process in an administrative context
does not require a hearing akin to criminal trials but instead necessitates fair notification and an
opportunity to respond, which Universal Robina had received. Consequently, Universal Robina's
failure to establish any substantial basis for its claims of procedural inadequacy or unjust
penalties validated LLDA's imposed sanctions and maintained the integrity of environmental
regulatory standards.
Case Title: The Alexandria Condominium Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority
(GR NO. 169228. September 11, 2009)

Ponente: Carpio, J.

Facts:

From 1987 to 1993, Philippine Realty and Holdings, Inc. (PhilRealty) developed The Alexandra
Condominium Complex in Pasig City, Philippines. PhilRealty executed a Deed of Conveyance on
April 18, 1988, transferring a parcel of land and common areas to The Alexandra Condominium
Corporation (TACC). The complex comprised several building clusters, each requiring permits
and certificates issued by the Pasig City Building Official. Upon completion in 1993, PhilRealty
turned over the project to TACC without the as-built plans for drainage, foundation, and utility
layouts. TACC managed the project through Century Property Management Corporation.On
June 24, 1998, Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) informed TACC that its wastewater
discharge did not comply with government standards. TACC’s attempts to treat the wastewater
with biological enzymes from Larutan Resources Development Corporation were unsuccessful.
LLDA found TACC’s discharge failed to meet standards for Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) and
Oil/Grease (OG) and imposed a penalty of P1,000 per day from March 26, 1999, for the said
violations. TACC contracted World Chem Marketing to construct a Sewage Treatment Plant
(STP) costing P7,550,000, completed in October 2001. On April 1, 2002, TACC requested
dismissal of the pollution case from LLDA citing favorable analysis results, yet LLDA ordered a
penalty payment of P1,062,000. TACC filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
which was dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence, leads to the
current Supreme Court petition.

Issues:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding TACC’s exhaustive efforts to comply with
government effluent discharge standards.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petition for certiorari was prematurely
filed due to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ruling:

On non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Court upheld that TACC should first have
pursued an administrative remedy before the DENR Secretary prior to filing for certiorari. The
LLDA’s authority to impose penalties was affirmed by referencing Republic Act No. 4850 and
subsequent legislative and executive decrees which empower LLDA to manage ecological
standards and penalize non-compliance. The court found that LLDA had not committed grave
abuse of discretion in imposing penalties, as TACC became responsible for adherence to
standards post-transfer. On the potential for penalty condonation, the Supreme Court
identified that claim compromise power lies with the Congress and the Commission on Audit,
beyond the court’s jurisdiction. With no motion for reconsideration filed by TACC regarding the
LLDA’s order, the court emphasized the necessity of exhausting administrative remedies before
judicial intervention.

Doctrine:

The Doctrine of Non-Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies requires that parties must undergo
the administrative processes available before resorting to judicial relief. Under administrative
law, administrative determinations are given a chance to be corrected by the agency concerned
before the courts intervene.