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Non-Ideal Epistemology
Non-Ideal Epistemology
R OB I N MCK E N N A
 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
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© Robin McKenna 2023
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 To Sophie, Edie, and Henry
It wouldn’t be a family without them
 Contents

Preface ix
1. What Is Non-Ideal Epistemology? 1
1.1 Three Aims 3
1.2 Three Faces of Non-Ideal Epistemology 5
1.3 Non-Ideal Epistemology and Feminist Epistemology 11
1.4 Overview 15
2. Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory 19
2.1 Ideal Theory in Ethics and Politics 22
2.2 Full vs. Partial Compliance Theory 28
2.3 Utopian vs. Realistic Theory 29
2.4 Mills and Ideal Epistemology 31
2.5 Objections 35
3. Anderson and Goldman on Identifying Experts 45
3.1 Goldman on Identifying Experts 46
3.2 Goldman and Ideal Theory 49
3.3 Anderson on Identifying Experts 50
3.4 Goldman vs. Anderson 56
3.5 Two Tasks for Anderson 59
4. Persuasion and Paternalism 61
4.1 Non-Ideal Institutional Epistemology 63
4.2 Gathering the Evidence 66
4.3 Epistemic Paternalism and Intellectual Autonomy 70
4.4 Riley on Nudging and Epistemic Injustice 74
4.5 Meehan on Nudging and Epistemic Vices 78
4.6 Tsai on Rational Persuasion and Paternalism 81
4.7 Intellectual Autonomy 85
5. Intellectual Autonomy 87
5.1 What Is Intellectual Autonomy? 88
5.2 Against Carter on Intellectual Autonomy 92
5.3 More on Motivated Reasoning 96
5.4 Against Roberts and Wood on Intellectual Autonomy 98
5.5 Intellectual Autonomy and Epistemic Paternalism 100
5.6 Becoming Intellectually Autonomous 102
viii 

6. The Obligation to Engage 105

6.1 Mill on the Obligation to Engage 107
6.2 Cassam on the Obligation to Engage 110
6.3 The Obligation to Engage in Inhospitable Environments 112
6.4 The Obligation to Engage and Epistemic Exclusion 116
6.5 Full vs. Partial Compliance Theory 121
6.6 Ballantyne, Fantl, and Srinivasan 124
6.7 Towards a Non-Ideal Theory 129
7. Liberatory Virtue and Vice Epistemology 133
7.1 Liberatory Virtue Epistemology 134
7.2 Medina on Intellectual Virtue and Vice 138
7.3 Making Sense of Responsibility 142
7.4 Medina on Epistemic Responsibility 147
7.5 Ideal Theory and Epistemic Responsibility 153
8. Scepticism Motivated 157
8.1 Even More on Motivated Reasoning 158
8.2 The Unreliability of Politically Motivated Reasoning 161
8.3 Politically Motivated Reasoning and Basing 166
8.4 Debunking Arguments 174
8.5 Scepticism in Non-Ideal Epistemology 175

References 181
Index 195
 Preface

This book has its origins in a class I taught on social epistemology at the
University of Vienna in 2016. While preparing the class I was struck by a divide
between two camps in social epistemology. One camp worked with idealized
models of human beings, the social interactions between them, and the social
spaces in which they interacted. This camp tended to focus on foundational issues
in the epistemology of testimony (under what conditions am I justified in accept-
ing what someone tells me?) and disagreement (what should I do when I learn that
someone whom I regard as my epistemic peer disagrees with me?). While they
acknowledged the importance of social interactions, this camp tended to view
social interactions as a means of transferring epistemic goods (knowledge, infor-
mation), and paid little attention to the ways in which social power differentials
coloured and shaped these interactions.
The other camp did not do these things. When they talked about the same
issues as the first camp, their interests seemed different. They were less concerned
with the foundational issues and more concerned with the ways in which social
power differentials shaped testimonial and other social interactions. More gener-
ally, they wanted to ask different questions. In what ways are our systems of
knowledge production and dissemination dysfunctional? How might we improve
these systems? How do our social identities and situations influence the evidence
to which we have access? Can epistemological frameworks and systems them-
selves be sources of oppression? Why is it that so many of us are ignorant of the
reality of oppression and injustice? What can epistemology do to help us answer
all these questions?
In teaching the class, I used this divide as a way of framing the material for the
students. The first camp did what I call ‘ideal epistemology’. The second camp did
what I call, for obvious reasons, ‘non-ideal epistemology’. I suggested to my
students that this divide was, in many ways, more useful than the divide between
‘traditional’ and ‘social’ epistemology. Whether or not they found this helpful,
I have been thinking about this divide ever since. This book is my attempt to set
out what I think about it. In the pages that follow I argue that the divide between
ideal and non-ideal epistemology is as—if not more—important as the divide
between traditional and social epistemology. However, this is not primarily a work
in philosophical methodology. My basic aim is to make the case for non-ideal
epistemology by doing it. I argue that some epistemological issues and problems
call for a non-ideal rather than an ideal approach. This book is therefore a defence
of non-ideal epistemology.
x 

While this book is a defence of non-ideal epistemology, it is not necessarily, or

at least not primarily, a critique of ideal epistemology. The part of the more
general picture I have struggled the most with is the question of whether ideal
and non-ideal epistemology are in opposition to each other. This question is much
like the question of whether traditional and social epistemology are in opposition
to each other. With traditional and social epistemology, a large part of the
difference between them is just that they are often about different things. The
same goes for ideal and non-ideal epistemology. Where the ideal epistemologist
might want to know what knowledge is, the non-ideal epistemologist wants to
know why it is that some people do not have it and what we can do about the fact
they do not have it.
That said, my view is that ideal and non-ideal epistemology can come into
conflict. Imagine we are interested in the question of whether we all have an
obligation to engage with challenges to our beliefs. Many are inclined to answer in
the affirmative, for reasons familiar from John Stuart Mill’s famous discussion of
freedom of expression and the value of robust critical debate in On Liberty. Mill’s
discussion of these matters might strike the reader as a little idealistic. One wants
to agree that an idealized version of debate might have the sorts of benefits Mill
alleges, but many—me included—are inclined to dispute whether actual debate is
much like the idealized version of debate Mill seems to have in mind.
Now, my claim is not that the ideal epistemologist must give an affirmative
answer to the question of whether we are under an obligation to engage with
challenges. It may be possible to argue, from an ideal perspective, that we are
under no such obligation. But the Millian picture of the value of robust critical
debate is particularly attractive to someone who is inclined to think that, at least in
its essential respects, actual debate is like the idealized version of it that Mill
envisages. It is, however, not attractive to someone who is inclined to think that, at
least with respect to certain issues (e.g. politically contentious issues), and for
certain people (e.g. members of marginalized groups), actual debate is little like
how Mill imagines it to be. As a result, we can expect the Millian picture to be
more attractive from the standpoint of ideal epistemology than it is from the
standpoint of non-ideal epistemology. If you think—as I do—that the Millian
picture is wrong, then this points to one place where ideal and non-ideal epis-
temology can come into conflict. The pages that follow highlight some other
places.
However, I want to highlight that, while ideal and non-ideal epistemology can
come into conflict, they often do not. It may even be that they usually do not. In
many ways, then, the situation with ideal and non-ideal epistemology parallels the
situation with traditional and social epistemology. Traditional and social epistem-
ology are two ways of doing epistemology that complement each other.
A ‘complete’ epistemology needs both. This point is particularly important
given the current state of epistemology. It is fair to say that non-ideal epistemology
  xi

is increasingly popular. But ideal epistemology, whether in a traditional or more

social form, dominates the syllabi of standard epistemology courses, and—at least
until very recently—the pages of the major journals. If it really is true that ideal
and non-ideal epistemology complement each other, and if they are—as I think—
equally deserving of our time and attention, then this is an imbalance that needs to
be corrected.
Several people have helped shape my thinking about these issues over the years.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank them and apologize to anyone I have
forgotten to mention.
The first group of people I want to thank are those who have read and
commented on portions of the book at various stages of its development.
Special thanks are due to Veli Mitova and to two anonymous readers for
Oxford University Press. The book is much improved due to their many insightful
comments and probing objections. Thanks also to Joshua Habgood-Coote for a
helpful set of comments on Chapter 2, Nick Hughes for several objections to non-
ideal epistemology that I work through in Chapter 2, the members of the Oxford
Epistemology Group (especially Nick and Rachel Fraser) for their invaluable
comments on Chapter 5, Daniella Meehan for her detailed comments on my
discussion of her work Chapter 5, and to Miriam McCormick for urging me to
discuss Jeremy Fantl’s work on open-mindedness in Chapter 6. Finally, this book
incorporates some previously published work (see below for details), on which
I received helpful comments from Guy Axtell, Amiel Bernal, Jeroen de Ridder,
Michael Hannon, Kirk Lougheed, Jon Matheson, and reviewers for the Canadian
Journal of Philosophy and the Journal of Applied Philosophy.
The second group of people I would like to thank are those who gave me
comments on presentations of material from the book. I presented a version of
Chapter 2 to Joachim Horvath’s philosophical methodology research group at the
Ruhr-University Bochum. Thanks to Joachim for the invitation and a stimulating
discussion. Thanks also to Steffen Koch for asking a question about ideal and non-
ideal theory in political philosophy that helped me to reshape the chapter.
I presented a version of Chapter 6 to the University of Glasgow’s Epistemology
Work in Progress Group, organized by the Cogito Research Centre. Thanks to
J. Adam Carter for the invitation and to the audience for their questions. I cannot
recall who said what, but the many objections were helpful in figuring out how to
frame the chapter and the argument of the book. (I suspect the most forceful
objections were from Mona Simion and Chris Kelp.) Finally, I presented versions
of Chapter 7 at a workshop on Epistemic Blame at the University of Johannesburg,
organized by Veli Mitova, and at the European Epistemology Network at the
University of Glasgow, organized by the Cogito Research Centre. Thanks to both
audiences for their helpful comments and to Veli for the invitation.
The third group of people I would like to thank are those who I have had
conversations with about the book and related issues over the years. Let me single
xii 

out Martin Kusch for special thanks here. Martin employed me for four years, but
he also helped shape my thinking about epistemology and philosophy a lot more
than might be apparent from reading this book. While I did not start drafting the
book until after I left Vienna, once I started it quickly become clear that I had been
writing whole parts of it in my head while I was in Vienna. I expect long
conversations with Martin about epistemology and its tendency to idealize were
the impetus. (I also expect he will complain: where is the sociology of scientific
knowledge in all this?) In Vienna, I also benefitted from long conversations with
Natalie Alana Ashton, Delia Belleri, David Bloor, Dirk Kindermann, Katherina
Kinzel, Anne-Kathrin Koch, Carlos Núñez, Lydia Patton, Katherina Sodoma,
Johannes Steizinger, Niels Wildschut, and Dan Zeman. Thanks also to (this is a
very incomplete list) Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, Cameron Boult, J. Adam Carter,
Quassim Cassam, Katherine Furman, Mikkel Gerken, Sandy Goldberg, Michael
Hannon, Allan Hazlett, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Ian James Kidd, Aidan
McGlynn, Alessandra Tanesini, Vid Simoniti, and to the members of the Social
Epistemology Network and Board-Certified Epistemologists Facebook groups.
Finally, this book makes use of previously published material, though with
several changes, and sometimes to ends quite different to those originally
intended. Chapter 4 incorporates two book chapters: ‘Persuasion and Epistemic
Paternalism’, published in Guy Axtell and Amiel Bernal (eds), Epistemic
Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications (pp. 89–104), Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2020, used with kind permission from Rowman &
Littlefield, and ‘Persuasion and Intellectual Autonomy’, published in Kirk
Lougheed and Jon Matheson (eds), Epistemic Autonomy (pp. 113–31),
Abingdon: Routledge, 2021, used with kind permission from Taylor and
Francis. Chapter 8 incorporates two journal articles: ‘Irrelevant Cultural
Influences on Belief ’, published in Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 (5), (2019)
755–68, used with kind permission from John Wiley and Sons, and ‘Skepticism
Motivated: On the Skeptical Import of Motivated Reasoning’, published in
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6), (2021) 702–18 (co-written with J. Adam
Carter), used with kind permission from Cambridge University Press. I would like
to express my gratitude to my co-author and these journals and publishers for
allowing me to borrow from this previously published work.
 1
What Is Non-Ideal Epistemology?

What is epistemology? If you have taken an epistemology class, you were likely
told that epistemology is the ‘theory of knowledge’. (If you have taught an
epistemology class, you perhaps told your students it is the theory of knowledge.)
So understood, epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge, which
for many epistemologists really means the conditions under which someone
knows something (‘S knows that p if and only if . . .’).
If your epistemology class (I am assuming you had an epistemology class) was
about this, you might have had the nagging feeling that there was something odd
about the whole thing. You were probably asked to consider what you would say
about imagined scenarios where someone believed something to be true on what
seemed to them like good evidence but, unbeknownst to them, something odd was
going on. Perhaps our imagined individual—let us call them Smith—was in a field.
Smith, you were told, sees something that looks a lot like a sheep. Surely, you
thought, that means Smith knows there is a sheep in the field. But then your
teacher told you the twist. The thing Smith is looking at is really a rock that looks
like a sheep but behind the rock is an actual sheep obscured from view. What now?
Does Smith know that there is a sheep in the field?
It may be that you figured out how epistemologists usually answered these
questions. Maybe you even got good at concocting your own examples to test the
plausibility of this-or-that theory of knowledge. On the other hand, it may be that
you decided the whole thing was not for you. Either way, it was probably clear to
you that, whatever epistemology is, it is an extremely abstract and theoretical
enterprise. You might have asked what relevance it has to your life. You might
have wondered whether it has any applications to ‘real world’ issues and problems.
If you were fortunate enough to have taken your introductory epistemology
class recently, your teacher might have said that things are different now.
Epistemologists do not just talk about lone individuals (or people called Smith).
They also do not just talk about the theory of knowledge. One exciting develop-
ment is that they now talk about social interactions. You might have been asked
what you think about examples featuring two individuals—let us call them Smith
and Jones—who tell each other things. Perhaps Smith tells Jones that the train
leaves in ten minutes. Is Jones justified in believing what Smith has told him
without checking whether Smith is trustworthy first? Maybe you were also asked
to consider scenarios where Smith and Jones disagree with each other. Perhaps
Smith says that the restaurant bill works out at £20 each whereas Jones says it is £21.

Non-Ideal Epistemology. Robin McKenna, Oxford University Press. © Robin McKenna 2023.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192888822.003.0001
2 - 

Should Smith and Jones redo their sums until they come to an agreement, or should
they each conclude that the other has made an arithmetical mistake?
It may be that these developments satisfied you. You might have said that at
least you can see why these questions might matter. We have all been in situations
where we had to decide whether to believe what someone has told us and are not
able to check whether they are trustworthy or not. We have also all had disagree-
ments over the bill. Alternatively, it may be that these developments did not satisfy
you at all. You might have objected that these sorts of scenarios are too simplified
to be of any practical relevance. You might have got frustrated about the lack of
detail. Why would Jones approach a stranger to ask when the train leaves when he
could just use an app on his phone? How does Smith know that Jones is not just
trying to trick him into paying more than he needs to? Why can’t they just
calculate their shares of the bill using an app on their phones?
Let us continue our story. Imagine that, despite your misgivings, you ended up
doing more advanced courses in epistemology. Perhaps you even ended up doing
a PhD on the subject and teach it yourself. If nothing else, this gave you the
vocabulary to articulate the misgivings you had always had about epistemology.
Your first exposure to epistemology was to what epistemologists now often
derisively refer to as ‘Gettierology’, which is a central topic in ‘traditional epis-
temology’. Gettierology—so called because it was sparked by Edmund Gettier’s
1963 paper ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’—is the project of trying to find
necessary and sufficient conditions for a subject S to know some proposition p. It
turns out that, at least nowadays, many professional epistemologists do not like
Gettierology either.
You were then exposed to what is called ‘social epistemology’, which considers
the epistemological implications of social interaction (Goldman and O’Connor
2021). However, as you now recognize, the problem with social epistemology is
that you can consider the epistemological implications of social interaction while
working with highly idealized pictures of what social interaction, and the creatures
who do the interacting, are like. Any dissatisfaction with your initial exposure to
social epistemology was really with these highly idealized models. Your complaint
was that these idealized models do not tell us much about social interactions and
so, despite its promise, social epistemology is of far less ‘real world’ relevance than
it might initially appear to be.
Before this veers (too far) into autobiography, let me get to the point. This book
is about the idealized models of human beings and the social interactions between
them favoured by many social epistemologists. My central aim is to argue that
serious problems can result from working with these idealized models. This book
is therefore at least in part a defence of the bemused reaction of our imagined
student (ok, me) to their first exposures to epistemology.
I say ‘in part’ because it is not a complete defence. Frustratingly for our
imagined student, I am not going to come down entirely on their side. My basic
   -  ? 3

claim is that what we can call ‘ideal epistemology’—the kind of epistemology that
works with these idealized models—goes wrong in that we sometimes need to
work with less idealized models of human beings and of the social interactions
between them. There is, therefore, a need for what we can call ‘non-ideal epis-
temology’. Where ideal epistemology works with idealized models of humans and
social interaction, non-ideal epistemology works with less idealized, more realistic
models.
But let me be clear. I do not claim that ideal epistemology is fundamentally
misguided, or that it is always a mistake to work with idealized models of
epistemic agents and the interactions between them. Idealization can be a valuable
tool, and it would be a grave mistake to object to idealization per se, both in
general and in epistemology. Two sorts of problems can, however, arise when you
engage in idealization. The first is that you might end up ignoring phenomena that
are of real interest because you work at a level of idealization from which they are
rendered invisible. The second problem arises when you forget that idealization is
a tool or—still worse—when you forget that you are engaging in idealization in the
first place.

1.1 Three Aims

Let me get into the specifics. In this book, I set out to achieve three things. First,
I demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between ideal and non-ideal
epistemology. The main obstacle to recognizing the importance of this distinction
is the existing distinction between traditional and social epistemology. What, you
might ask, does the distinction between ideal and non-ideal epistemology give us
that we do not already get from the distinction between traditional and social
epistemology? My answer is that it is possible—indeed common—to pursue social
epistemology in a way that is highly idealized. In the following chapters I argue
that problems can result when we pursue social epistemology in an overly
idealized fashion.
My claim is not that the distinction between ideal and non-ideal epistemology
should replace the distinction between traditional and social epistemology. My
claim is that we need to complicate this distinction by recognizing the differences
between ideal and non-ideal approaches to social epistemology. More generally,
my contention is that we should pause to consider what ties together the various
approaches adopted, and issues considered, within the umbrella of ‘social epis-
temology’. What does the debate between reductionists and anti-reductionists in
the epistemology of testimony have in common with the literature on epistemic
injustice and oppression? What does the debate between conciliationism and the
steadfast view in the epistemology of disagreement have in common with the
(epistemological) literature on group polarization? To say that they are all
4 - 

concerned with the epistemological implications of social interaction is fine, but it

ignores the many differences. These differences have to do with the fact that some
of these debates are predicated on certain idealizations while others are not.
Second, I show that, at least with respect to some issues and problems of (social)
epistemological interest, the non-ideal epistemologist’s approach is preferable to
the ideal epistemologist’s approach. I have already said this earlier, but it bears
emphasis, so I will say it again. I do not argue that non-ideal epistemology is
‘better’ than ideal epistemology (whatever that might mean), or even that it is
usually the right approach to adopt. My claim is just that it is sometimes the right
approach to adopt.
This claim is, I think, modest. I do not view this book as arguing for a
particularly radical claim. However, there is one sense in which it is a little less
modest. I suspect—though have no evidence to back this up—that many epistem-
ologists are tempted by the view that ideal and non-ideal epistemology are about
different things and so cannot come into conflict in the way I think they can. I also
suspect that this attitude is common when it comes to feminist epistemology (for
more on the difference between non-ideal and feminist epistemology, see §1.3).
Feminist epistemologists have identified some important questions and brought
new issues to the foreground of epistemology (for example, epistemic injustice).
But—you might think—the key contribution of feminist epistemology lies in the
ways in which it expands the field of epistemology, not in the ways in which it
critiques central assumptions of traditional (and much social) epistemology.
Whether this attitude is common or not, I think it is misplaced (Ashton and
McKenna 2020; Dotson 2014, 2018; Toole 2019, 2022). In the chapters that follow,
I identify some places where ideal and non-ideal epistemology can—indeed, do—
come into conflict. I therefore do not just intend to show that ideal epistemology
must be supplemented by non-ideal epistemology. I intend to show that, at least in
certain cases, it must be replaced by non-ideal epistemology.
Third, I make progress in several debates in social epistemology by adopting a
non-ideal approach. In the chapters that follow, I defend the following claims, all
of which I take to be characteristic of non-ideal epistemology (I say more about
what ties these claims together in §1.2):

(1) Solving the problem of public ignorance about consequential political and
scientific issues like global warming requires creating a better epistemic
environment and better social institutions (Chapter 3, Chapter 4).
(2) An ‘epistemic’ form of paternalism is (sometimes) justified (Chapter 4,
Chapter 5).
(3) We often should not strive to be intellectually autonomous (Chapter 5).
(4) Some (e.g. John Stuart Mill) think we should all engage with challenges to
our views. But, contra Mill, some of us are under no obligation to engage
with (certain) challenges to our views. Indeed, sometimes we can dismiss
   -  ? 5

challenges without engaging at all. More generally, our obligations as

inquirers depend on and vary with aspects of our social situation such as
our social roles and identities (Chapter 6, Chapter 7).
(5) The core idea behind ‘responsibilist’ virtue epistemology is that epistem-
ically responsible agency involves manifesting the intellectual virtues and
avoiding intellectual vice. But making good on this idea requires a con-
textualized and socialized conception of epistemic agency and responsibil-
ity (Chapter 7).
(6) If we take the empirical literature on political cognition seriously, we are
pushed towards a form of scepticism about whether our beliefs about
political and politically relevant scientific issues are justified (Chapter 8).

This book is emphatically not just an exercise in epistemological method-

ology. Indeed, I spend far more time on first-order epistemological issues and
questions than I do on methodology. While I offer some broad methodological
considerations (particularly in Chapter 2), my aim is primarily to make the case
for non-ideal epistemology by doing it rather than by talking about doing it. In
the process, I hope that the distinctive features of non-ideal epistemology will
become clearer.
It might, however, be helpful if I say a little more at the outset about what non-
ideal epistemology is and what I take its distinctive features to be. I also want to
say something about how my approach in this book differs from other
approaches, especially feminist epistemology, and provide the reader with an
overview of the book’s contents. I start with the task of saying what non-ideal
epistemology is in §1.2, before turning to situating my approach with respect to
other approaches in §1.3 and the overview in §1.4.

1.2 Three Faces of Non-Ideal Epistemology

My distinction between ideal and non-ideal epistemology is based on Charles

Mills’ work on ideal and non-ideal theory in ethics and political philosophy (Mills
2005, 2007). Following Mills, I understand ideal epistemology as an approach to
epistemological issues and questions that involves certain characteristic idealiza-
tions. Non-ideal epistemology is, then, an approach to epistemological issues and
questions that eschews these sorts of idealizations. The idealizations that are
characteristic of ideal epistemology include:

• Idealizations about the nature and psychology of epistemic agents or

inquirers (e.g. about their cognitive capacities).
• Idealizations about the interactions between inquirers (e.g. about the extent
to which they are influenced by social power differentials).
6 - 

• Idealizations about social institutions (e.g. about their capacity to produce

and disseminate knowledge).
• Idealizations about the environments in which inquirers are embedded (e.g.
about the prevalence of information over misinformation).

I expand on these brief remarks in Chapter 2 but for now let me say two further
things. First, it may often be the case that ideal and non-ideal epistemology deal
with different issues and questions. This a consequence of the fact that there is a
connection between the sorts of idealizations we engage in and the issues and
questions that seem most pressing. If you work with a highly idealized picture of
epistemic agents on which you abstract away from aspects of their social situation
such as their social identity or role, you are hardly going to consider whether there
are interesting epistemological differences between differently situated agents (e.g.
do they have access to different bodies of evidence, as feminist standpoint theorists
suggest?). If you ignore the fact that there are power differentials between epi-
stemic agents, you are hardly going to consider the epistemological consequences
of social power differentials between epistemic agents (e.g. do we afford more
credibility to agents with more social power?). What this tells us is that one way in
which non-ideal epistemology might improve on ideal epistemology is by identi-
fying issues and questions that are of epistemological interest but obscured by the
idealizations that are typical of ideal epistemology.
Second, the reader might find it uninformative to be told that ideal epistemol-
ogy is an approach to epistemology that deals in idealizations while non-ideal
epistemology is an approach that avoids idealizations. But this is no less inform-
ative than standard ways of distinguishing between traditional (or individual)
epistemology and social epistemology. On one way of drawing the distinction,
traditional and social epistemology differ in that traditional epistemology focuses
on socially isolated individuals while social epistemology focuses on individuals
embedded in a social context. This is all very well, but it is not terribly informative.
If you want to better understand the distinction between traditional and social
epistemology, you are best advised to look at concrete examples of social epis-
temological projects and compare them with concrete examples of more trad-
itional epistemological projects. Similarly, if you want to better understand the
distinction between ideal and non-ideal epistemology, you need to look at con-
crete examples of non-ideal epistemology. The chapters that follow supply several
such examples.
Over and above offering a characterization of ideal and non-ideal epistemology,
this book identifies three key aspects or ‘faces’ of non-ideal epistemology. The first
key aspect or face of non-ideal epistemology is a focus on systems of knowledge
production and the social institutions that play a crucial role in these systems.
Now, a focus on systems and institutions is of course also a key aspect of
social epistemology. Consider, for example, what Alvin Goldman (2010a) calls
   -  ? 7

‘systems-oriented social epistemology’ or what Elizabeth Anderson (2006) calls

‘institutional epistemology’. Because these approaches are quite similar, I will
confine my attention to Anderson’s institutional epistemology. For Anderson,
institutional epistemology is a branch of social epistemology that looks at the
epistemic powers of social institutions. It considers questions such as:

• What sorts of knowledge reside within our social institutions, and what sorts
of problems is this knowledge needed to solve?
• What problems should we assign to these institutions?
• How can these institutions be (re)designed to improve their epistemic
powers?

These questions can be answered, and the programme of institutional epistem-

ology can be pursued, in an idealized fashion or a non-idealized fashion. To make
things more concrete, let us focus on the third question. One way of answering
it—a way typical of an ideal approach to institutional epistemology—would be to
consider what the optimal (epistemic) design of a social institution like science
might be. On this approach, a central question would be something like ‘how
might we design science as a social institution so that it produces knowledge of the
things we want to know about and tackles the sorts of problems we want it to
tackle?’ Philip Kitcher’s work on science is a prime example of this sort of
approach to institutional epistemology (Kitcher 2001, 2011).
Another way of answering the third question—a way typical of non-ideal
epistemology—would be to start with the social institution as it currently is and
ask which concrete steps we could take to improve its epistemic design. The
proposed modifications would need to be evidence-based. That is, there would
need to be evidence that the proposed modifications would secure the desired
epistemic improvement. In the first half of this book, particularly in Chapters 3
and 4, I pursue this non-ideal approach to institutional epistemology. I do this in
the context of a pressing social and political problem: science denialism, in
particular the various forms of global warming scepticism. My task will be to
survey the literatures on the causes and psychological drivers of global warming
scepticism and on effective strategies for persuading sceptics to change their mind.
Based on a survey of these literatures, I will make concrete proposals for what
science communicators can do to combat global warming scepticism. The first
half of this book therefore illustrates the institutional face of non-ideal
epistemology.
While non-ideal epistemology pays particular attention to social institutions, it
does not ignore individuals. The second face of non-ideal epistemology is a view of
epistemic agents or inquirers as deeply socially situated. A view of epistemic
agents as in some sense socially situated is of course also a key aspect of social
epistemology. But the crucial question is which aspects of social situation are
Another Random Scribd Document
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 Oceanography - Book Review
Winter 2021 - Program

Prepared by: Associate Prof. Williams

Date: July 28, 2025

Background 1: Historical development and evolution

Learning Objective 1: Current trends and future directions
• Literature review and discussion
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Learning Objective 2: Assessment criteria and rubrics
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Learning Objective 3: Statistical analysis and interpretation
• Key terms and definitions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 3: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Learning Objective 4: Best practices and recommendations
• Experimental procedures and results
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Learning Objective 5: Key terms and definitions
• Study tips and learning strategies
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Definition: Problem-solving strategies and techniques
• Best practices and recommendations
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Definition: Theoretical framework and methodology
• Learning outcomes and objectives
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Note: Literature review and discussion
• Key terms and definitions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 8: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Note: Literature review and discussion
• Historical development and evolution
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Key Concept: Study tips and learning strategies
• Fundamental concepts and principles
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Practice 2: Interdisciplinary approaches
Important: Interdisciplinary approaches
• Assessment criteria and rubrics
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Definition: Practical applications and examples
• Theoretical framework and methodology
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Practice Problem 12: Historical development and evolution
• Theoretical framework and methodology
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Definition: Critical analysis and evaluation
• Case studies and real-world applications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Note: Key terms and definitions
• Comparative analysis and synthesis
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 15: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Definition: Assessment criteria and rubrics
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 16: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Key Concept: Historical development and evolution
• Interdisciplinary approaches
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Remember: Comparative analysis and synthesis
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Key Concept: Comparative analysis and synthesis
• Research findings and conclusions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Practice Problem 19: Learning outcomes and objectives
• Theoretical framework and methodology
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Module 3: Research findings and conclusions
Example 20: Research findings and conclusions
• Problem-solving strategies and techniques
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Definition: Theoretical framework and methodology
• Theoretical framework and methodology
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Definition: Literature review and discussion
• Historical development and evolution
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Key Concept: Literature review and discussion
• Statistical analysis and interpretation
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Example 24: Learning outcomes and objectives
• Fundamental concepts and principles
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 25: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Important: Key terms and definitions
• Theoretical framework and methodology
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Definition: Comparative analysis and synthesis
• Current trends and future directions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Example 27: Assessment criteria and rubrics
• Theoretical framework and methodology
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Note: Assessment criteria and rubrics
• Current trends and future directions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 29: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Remember: Research findings and conclusions
• Problem-solving strategies and techniques
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Review 4: Interdisciplinary approaches
Remember: Problem-solving strategies and techniques
• Case studies and real-world applications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Example 31: Literature review and discussion
• Experimental procedures and results
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Important: Best practices and recommendations
• Fundamental concepts and principles
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Note: Case studies and real-world applications
• Case studies and real-world applications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Note: Literature review and discussion
• Theoretical framework and methodology
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Key Concept: Ethical considerations and implications
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Example 36: Ethical considerations and implications
• Best practices and recommendations
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Remember: Interdisciplinary approaches
• Practical applications and examples
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Definition: Statistical analysis and interpretation
• Study tips and learning strategies
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Key Concept: Interdisciplinary approaches
• Comparative analysis and synthesis
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
References 5: Best practices and recommendations
Example 40: Statistical analysis and interpretation
• Theoretical framework and methodology
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 41: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Remember: Theoretical framework and methodology
• Historical development and evolution
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Important: Practical applications and examples
• Best practices and recommendations
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Example 43: Learning outcomes and objectives
• Study tips and learning strategies
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Definition: Assessment criteria and rubrics
• Best practices and recommendations
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Practice Problem 45: Ethical considerations and implications
• Learning outcomes and objectives
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Remember: Study tips and learning strategies
• Interdisciplinary approaches
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Important: Critical analysis and evaluation
• Theoretical framework and methodology
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 48: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Important: Best practices and recommendations
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Practice Problem 49: Research findings and conclusions
• Learning outcomes and objectives
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Unit 6: Current trends and future directions
Definition: Comparative analysis and synthesis
• Problem-solving strategies and techniques
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Key Concept: Key terms and definitions
• Best practices and recommendations
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Practice Problem 52: Problem-solving strategies and techniques
• Fundamental concepts and principles
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 53: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Remember: Key terms and definitions
• Practical applications and examples
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
[Figure 54: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Definition: Experimental procedures and results
• Statistical analysis and interpretation
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 55: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Remember: Historical development and evolution
• Experimental procedures and results
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Remember: Current trends and future directions
• Study tips and learning strategies
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Key Concept: Best practices and recommendations
• Learning outcomes and objectives
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 58: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Definition: Problem-solving strategies and techniques
• Comparative analysis and synthesis
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Key Concept: Statistical analysis and interpretation
• Statistical analysis and interpretation
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Summary 7: Study tips and learning strategies
Important: Experimental procedures and results
• Problem-solving strategies and techniques
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 61: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Example 61: Research findings and conclusions
• Experimental procedures and results
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Remember: Experimental procedures and results
• Critical analysis and evaluation
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Key Concept: Case studies and real-world applications
• Key terms and definitions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Note: Historical development and evolution
• Study tips and learning strategies
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Example 65: Statistical analysis and interpretation
• Literature review and discussion
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Practice Problem 66: Theoretical framework and methodology
• Best practices and recommendations
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Important: Literature review and discussion
• Assessment criteria and rubrics
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 68: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Practice Problem 68: Fundamental concepts and principles
• Comparative analysis and synthesis
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Definition: Comparative analysis and synthesis
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
[Figure 70: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Exercise 8: Ethical considerations and implications
Example 70: Comparative analysis and synthesis
• Study tips and learning strategies
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Remember: Best practices and recommendations
• Learning outcomes and objectives
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Example 72: Literature review and discussion
• Theoretical framework and methodology
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Remember: Best practices and recommendations
• Practical applications and examples
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Definition: Learning outcomes and objectives
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 75: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Example 75: Key terms and definitions
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Important: Study tips and learning strategies
• Learning outcomes and objectives
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Definition: Research findings and conclusions
• Research findings and conclusions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Key Concept: Experimental procedures and results
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 79: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Practice Problem 79: Research findings and conclusions
• Experimental procedures and results
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Results 9: Best practices and recommendations
Important: Critical analysis and evaluation
• Interdisciplinary approaches
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
[Figure 81: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Important: Research findings and conclusions
• Problem-solving strategies and techniques
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Example 82: Learning outcomes and objectives
• Current trends and future directions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Important: Historical development and evolution
• Theoretical framework and methodology
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 84: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Example 84: Study tips and learning strategies
• Comparative analysis and synthesis
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 85: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Key Concept: Experimental procedures and results
• Historical development and evolution
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Example 86: Historical development and evolution
• Statistical analysis and interpretation
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Remember: Fundamental concepts and principles
• Key terms and definitions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Note: Literature review and discussion
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Note: Interdisciplinary approaches
• Statistical analysis and interpretation
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Part 10: Learning outcomes and objectives
Definition: Theoretical framework and methodology
• Learning outcomes and objectives
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Note: Current trends and future directions
• Fundamental concepts and principles
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 92: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Important: Statistical analysis and interpretation
• Theoretical framework and methodology
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 93: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Note: Learning outcomes and objectives
• Interdisciplinary approaches
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 94: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Remember: Interdisciplinary approaches
• Key terms and definitions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Remember: Literature review and discussion
• Problem-solving strategies and techniques
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Example 96: Research findings and conclusions
• Assessment criteria and rubrics
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Key Concept: Experimental procedures and results
• Problem-solving strategies and techniques
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Important: Problem-solving strategies and techniques
• Interdisciplinary approaches
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
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