2025 INSC 963

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.16217 of 2024)

NAVNEESH AGGARWAL & OTHERS …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA & ANOTHER …RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

NAGARATHNA, J.

Leave granted.

2. Being aggrieved by the order dated 01.08.2024, passed by

the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in CRM-M No.6635 of

2024 by which the application filed by the appellant under

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short

‘CrPC’) seeking quashing of FIR No.67 dated 15.05.2019

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registered at Police Station Radaur, District Yamunanagar,

Haryana and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom,

initiated under Sections 323, 406, 498-A and 506 of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), pending before the Judicial Magistrate

First Class, Jagadhri, Yamuna Nagar, was dismissed by the High

Court, the appellants have preferred this appeal.

3. Appellant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are the erstwhile husband, father-

in-law and mother-in-law respectively of respondent No. 2.

4. We have heard learned counsel Sri Abhinav Ramkrishna for

the petitioners and Sri Shekhar Raj Sharma, Deputy Advocate

General for the respondent-State.

5. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the marriage

between appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 was solemnised on

06.03.2018. Owing to certain differences arising between them,

respondent No.2 left the matrimonial home around ten months

after the marriage along with her daughter from an earlier

marriage. Subsequent to this, multiple cases came to be filed by

appellant No.2 and respondent No.2 respectively. Among these

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was FIR No.67 of 2019 registered pursuant to a complaint by

respondent No.2 at P.S Radaur, District Yamuna Nagar, Haryana

against appellant Nos.1 to 3 under sections 323, 406, 498-A and

506 of the IPC. On 7.11.2019, a chargesheet came to be filed in

the FIR No.67 of 2019.

6. There was subsequently a decree of divorce by mutual

consent granted by the concerned Family Court on 19.01.2024.

At this stage, all the pending proceedings that were filed by

respondent No.2 came to be withdrawn.

7. In the aforesaid circumstances, the appellants herein sought

quashing of the complaint filed by respondent No.2 herein as well

as all proceedings initiated pursuant to the said complaint by

filing a petition under section 482 of CrPC before the High Court.

It is pertinent to note that respondent No.2 also filed her reply to

the petition, stating that she had no objection to FIR No.67 of

2019 and associated criminal proceedings being quashed. The

High Court however, dismissed the said application. The High

Court noted that the case would not be a fit one for quashing, as

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certain allegations regarding the victimisation of the child had

been sufficiently substantiated.

8. Hence, learned counsel for the respective parties have made

their submissions in the above backdrop of the aforesaid facts.

9. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that having

regard to the fact that both the parties have been since divorced

by mutual consent and a compromise decree had been

effectuated as well, no purpose would be served by the

continuation of the prosecution of the criminal case as against

the appellants herein. He further submitted that the divorce

decree has attained finality and further, respondent No.2 had no

objections to the quashing of the criminal proceedings and the

child is also aware of the compromise having been reached by the

parties.

10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-State

submitted that the complaint is well-justified having regard to the

acts and omissions of the appellants herein. He further submitted

that there were specific allegations regarding the victimisation of

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the child by appellant No.1 and as a result, this would not be a fit

case to quash the ongoing criminal proceedings.

11. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and

upon perusal of the material placed on record, the only question

that arises for consideration is, whether, the allegations contained

in FIR No.67 of 2019 warrant invocation of this Court’s powers in

exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India owing to the settlement arrived at between

the parties without going into the merits of the matter.

12. In the present case, the allegations in FIR No.67 of 2019

pertain to offences punishable under Sections 323, 406, 498-A

and 506 of the IPC. For ease of reference, the aforesaid Sections

are extracted as under:

“323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.—

Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334,
voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one
thousand rupees, or with both.
xxx
406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.—
Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a

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 term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or
with both.
xxx

498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman

subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband
or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to three years and shall also
be liable to fine.
xxx

506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.—Whoever

commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with
both.”

13. This Court, in Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of

Telangana, (2025) 3 SCC 735, has clearly held that family

members of the husband ought not to be unnecessarily roped into

criminal proceedings arising out of matrimonial discord. The

Court observed that it has become a recurring tendency to

implicate every member of the husband’s family, irrespective of

their role or actual involvement, merely because a dispute has

arisen between the spouses. It was further held that where the

allegations are bereft of specific particulars, and particularly

where the relatives sought to be prosecuted are residing

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separately or have had no connection with the matrimonial home,

allowing the prosecution to proceed would amount to an abuse of

the process of law. The Court noted that criminal law is not to be

deployed as an instrument of harassment and that judicial

scrutiny must be exercised to guard against such misuse.

14. Furthermore, this Court has consistently taken the view that

where the matrimonial relationship has come to an end by way of

divorce, and the parties have since settled into their respective

lives, criminal prosecution emanating from that past relationship

ought not to be permitted to linger as a means of harassment. In

the cases of Mala Kar vs. State Of Uttarakhand, Criminal

Appeal No.1684 of 2024 dated 19.03.2024 (“Mala Kar”) and

Arun Jain vs. State of NCT of Delhi, Special Leave Petition

(Criminal) No.9178 of 2018 dated 01.04.2024 (“Arun Jain”),

this Court, while exercising its powers under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India, quashed the criminal proceedings arising

out of matrimonial discord against the husband. The Court took

note of the fact that the couple therein had divorced and held that

in such a situation, to continue with criminal prosecution would

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amount to abuse of the process of law. The reasoning adopted

therein applies with equal force to the facts of the present

case. Paragraph 12 of Mala Kar and the relevant paragraph in

Arun Jain are extracted respectively as under:

“12. Following the aforesaid judgment, in the instant

case, we have already noted that there has been a decree
of divorce passed between the parties dated 18.10.2014.
It is thereafter that on 06.04.2015, the FIR was registered
in respect of the criminal complaint filed on 09.08.2014.
More significantly, both the appellant No.2 and
respondent No.2 have since remarried and are leading
their independent lives. Therefore, both parties have
accepted the decree of divorce passed by the Family
Court on 18.10.2014. Moreover, the appellant No.2-
former husband of the respondent No.2 has agreed to pay
a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) as ex-
gratia to the respondent No.2 herein in full and final
settlement of all her claims, with a prayer to this Court to
do complete justice in this matter and for invoking its
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

xxx

Following the aforesaid judgments, in the instant case, it

is noted that the appellants and respondent No.2 were
married on 01.11.1996 and a daughter was born to them
on 19.04.2001. It is also stated by learned counsel for the
appellants that appellant No.1 left the matrimonial home
on 23.04.2007 and thereafter respondent No.2 sought
divorce which was granted by the Competent Court on
04.04.2013. It was only thereafter on 31.10.2013 that
respondent No.2 filed the complaint against the
appellants herein and the FIR was registered on
13.02.2014 and the chargesheet was filed on 22.09.2015.
It is also to be noted that the proceedings initiated under

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 the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005 in the year 2008 by respondent No.2 herein
culminated in the dismissal of the said proceeding on
merits by order dated 28.07.2017 which has attained
finality. Having regard to the aforesaid peculiar and
crucial aspects of the present case and by following the
order dated 19.03.2024, the appeal is liable to be allowed
as we find that this is a fit case where we can exercise
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.”

15. This Court, in the case of Ramawatar vs. State of Madhya

Pradesh, (2022) 13 SCC 635 (“Ramawatar”), while considering

quashing of proceedings under Section 482 of CrPC, in the

context of the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the

Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, took into

consideration the fact that there had been a settlement arrived at

between the parties in the said case and therefore, exercising

jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the

Court quashed the complaint, the FIR, and subsequent criminal

proceedings against the accused therein. The relevant portion of

the said judgment is at paragraph 15 which is extracted as

under:

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 “15. The Constitution Bench decision in the case of
Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India &
Another. has eloquently clarified this point as follows:

“48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its

jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to
make such order as is necessary for doing
complete justice “between the parties in any
cause or matter pending before it”. The very
nature of the power must lead the Court to set
limits for itself within which to exercise those
powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a
statutory provision governing a subject, except
perhaps to balance the equities between the
conflicting claims of the litigating parties by
“ironing out the creases” in a cause or matter
before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of
restricted jurisdiction of only dispute-settling. It
is well recognised and established that this Court
has always been a law-maker and its role travels
beyond merely dispute-settling. It is a “problem
solver in the nebulous areas” (see K. Veeraswami
v. Union of India) but the substantive statutory
provisions dealing with the subject matter of a
given case cannot be altogether ignored by this
Court, while making an order under Article 142.
Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in
any way, be controlled by any statutory
provisions but at the same time these powers are
not meant to be exercised when their exercise
may come directly in conflict with what has been
expressly provided for in a statute dealing
expressly with the subject.”

16. This Court took note of the peculiar facts arising in the

aforesaid case and the fact that a settlement had been arrived at

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between the parties and consequently, found it appropriate to

invoke powers of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution

of India and quashed the criminal proceedings to do complete

justice between the parties. Further, this Court set-aside the

order of the High Court and allowed the appeal filed therein.

17. Following the aforesaid judicial dicta, in the instant case, we

have again noted the following facts:

(i) that there has been a decree of divorce by mutual consent

passed between the parties;

(ii) the appellants and respondent No.2 have also accepted the

decree of divorce passed by the Family Court on

19.01.2024 which has attained finality;

(iii) a compromise decree in full and final settlement of all

claims has further been effectuated between the parties by

way of which all the differences between them have come to

be resolved;

(iv) all other pending cases between the parties have come to be

withdrawn; and

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(v) Respondent No. 2 has no objection to the quashing of the

criminal proceedings.

18. In the considered opinion of this Court, the power under

Article 142 must be invoked to advance the cause of complete

justice in matters of this nature. Once the marital relationship

has ended in divorce and the parties have moved on in their lives

individually, the continuation of criminal proceedings against

family members, especially in the absence of specific and

proximate allegations, serves no legitimate purpose. It only

prolongs bitterness and burdens the criminal justice system with

disputes that are no longer live. The law must be applied in a

manner that balances the need to address genuine grievances

with the equally important duty to prevent its misuse. In

appropriate cases, the power to quash such proceedings is

essential to uphold fairness and bring quietus to personal

disputes that have run their course. The aforesaid facts noted

above reflect that both parties are not interested in pursuing the

criminal proceeding.

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19. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of M.P. vs.

Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, observed in paragraph 15.5

thereof that while exercising power under Section 482 CrPC to

quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable

offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious

impact on society, on the ground that there is a

settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, it is

necessary to consider the antecedents of the accused; the

conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was

absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed

with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.

20. Applying the aforesaid to the present case, we find that the

appellant herein would not come within the scope of the aforesaid

observations by which the plea of the appellant for quashing of

the FIR and consequent proceedings against him could be

declined.

21. We also refer to Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10

SCC 303 wherein this Court observed that where the High Court

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quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the

dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled,

although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its

opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise

in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute

between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored,

securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. In

this regard, a specific reference was made to offences arising out

of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or a family

dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim but the

offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them

amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been

made compoundable. The High Court may, within the framework

of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal

complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such

settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being

convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice

shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated.

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22. In Naushey Ali vs. State of U.P., (2025) 4 SCC 78, one of

us (Viswanathan, J.) observed in paragraph 32 that proceeding

with the trial, when the parties have amicably resolved the

dispute, would be futile and the ends of justice require that the

settlement be given effect to by quashing the proceedings. It

would be a grave abuse of process particularly when the dispute

is settled and resolved.

23. In the circumstances, while invoking our powers under

Article 142 of the Constitution, we quash the chargesheet dated

07.11.2019 as well as the FIR No.67 of 2019 dated 15.05.2019

registered at P.S Radaur, District Yamuna Nagar, Haryana

against appellant Nos.1 to 3 under sections 323, 406, 498-A and

506 of the IPC and all other criminal proceedings commenced

pursuant thereto. Consequently, the order dated 01.08.2024

passed by the High Court is set aside. We hold so for the reason

that the prosecution of the criminal case by respondent No. 2

herein is not as per her intention any longer. Moreover, the

continuation of the criminal proceeding would only be an

instance of harassment to the appellants having regard to the

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peculiar facts of the case. Further, no fruitful purpose would be

served in the continuation of the court proceedings and taking it

to its logical end. In this context, we have relied upon the judicial

dicta of this Court discussed above.

The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

…….……………………………..J.
(B. V. NAGARATHNA)

.…………………………………..J.
(K.V. VISWANATHAN)

NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 12, 2025.

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