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SARTRE'S PHENOMENOLOGY
Also available from Continuum:

Deconstruction and Democracy, Alex Thomson

Deleave and Guattari's Philosophy of History, Jay Lampert
Deleave and the Meaning of Life, Claire Colebrook
Derrida and Disinterest, Sean Gaston
Husserl's Phenomenology, Kevin Hermberg
New Heidegger, Miguel de Beistegui
Sartre's Ethics of Engagement, T. Storm Heter
Wittgenstein and Gadamer, Chris Lawn
Deleave and the Unconscious, Christian Kerslake
SARTRE'S PHENOMENOLOGY

DAVID REISMAN

continuum
Continuum International Publishing Group
The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX
80 Maiden Lane, Suite 704, New York, NY 10038
www.continuumbooks.com

© David Reisman 2007

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in

any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording,
or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from
the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN-10: HB: 0-8264-8725-4

ISBN-13: HB: 978-0-8264-8725-4

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Reisman, David 1963-

Sartre's phenomenology / By David Reisman.
p. cm.
ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-8725-4
ISBN-10: 0-8264-8725-4
1. Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1905-1980. 2. Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1905-1980. Etre et le neant.
3. Existentialism. 4. Existential psychology. 5. Strawson, P. F. I. Title.

B2430.S34R45 2007
171'2-dc22
2006034643

Typeset by Aarontype Limited, Easton, Bristol

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Biddies Ltd, King's Lynn, Norfolk
 Contents

1. Sartre and Strawson 1

Introduction 1
Persons as fundamental particulars in our conceptual scheme 4
The properties we attribute to persons 11
Beyond Strawson 15

2. Pre-reflective consciousness and the perceptive field 26

Introduction 26
Sartre and Husserl on consciousness and its objects 27
Consciousness, negation, and temporality 34
Pre-reflective self-consciousness and reflection 40

3. Impure reflection and the constitution of the psyche 45

Introduction 45
Pure and impure reflection 48
Impure reflection, the ego, and psychic objects 52
The ontological status of the psychic 57
Impure reflection as the constitution of an outline for the body 68

4. The Look and the constitution of persons 75

Introduction 75
The body-for-itself, the body-for-others, and the Look 78
The role of the Look in apprehending other persons and 84
the objective world
The role of the Look in apprehending oneself 95

5. Bad faith 112

Introduction 112
Bad faith 116

Notes 131

Index 148
 Acknowledgements

The book is based upon a dissertation I wrote under the direction

of Richard Aquila. Sheldon Cohen and John Nolt made helpful comments.
Richard deserves special thanks for spending hundreds of hours with me,
discussing every idea in this book and twice as many that did not make it.
The philosophy department at the University of Tennessee treated me very
well, as has that at East Tennessee State University since then. My first
philosophy teachers, Ray Martin and Dan Kolak, are continual sources of
inspiration and encouragement.
Due to limitations of space I have relegated to endnotes whatever discus-
sion of commentary that has not been edited out altogether. Due to limita-
tions of space and time, I have not added discussions of some important
commentary that has come out since I did my original research.
Permission to quote from Individuals was kindly granted by Thomson
Publishing Services on behalf of Taylor and Francis books. Permission to
quote from Being and Nothingness was granted by Regeen Najar on behalf
of Philosophical Library. Finally, I would like to thank East Tennessee State
University's Research and Development Committee for providing a grant
for the book's index.
 Chapter 1

Sartre and Strawson

Introduction

What is a person?

It makes sense to say that a person is a body, a physical object, with con-
sciousness. We usually assume that we know well enough what a physical
object is. Attempts to understand what a person is, by philosophers both of
dualistic and of materialistic leanings, can thus be seen as attempts to figure
out what 'with consciousness' means. For the dualist, having consciousness
has to do with having (or being) some sort of nonphysical thing, a 'mind',
somehow associated with the body. A person is a body with a mind. For the
materialist, consciousness is a quality of certain physical objects, or perhaps
something more like an activity in which these objects are engaged. A per-
son is a physical object having such a quality or engaged in such activity.
In either case, a description of consciousness will tell us what it means to
satisfy one of the most important criteria for being a person and, if we have
the relevant information, which physical objects are persons.
Sartre attempts to provide such a description, but his approach and con-
clusions differ in important ways from those of both dualists and material-
ists. Sartre's view is developed by examining the way in which the world
appears to consciousness. His starting point, like Descartes', is our experi-
ence of the world as it appears to us. Rather than thinking of experience as
providing evidence for the existence of an immaterial substance (something
that has a manner of existing different from that of material objects), how-
ever, he thinks of the Cartesian ego as constituted by the process of reflec-
tion. He ends up identifying the subject of consciousness with the body, but
his view, if it can be considered to be a form of materialism at all, is unlike
other forms.
For Sartre, in order to understand what a person is we have to understand
the process by which we constitute ourselves as persons. On his view, con-
sciousness originally apprehends itself in terms of what it is consciousness
of, i.e., as an activity of apprehending the world. As with Descartes, one is
2 Sartre's Phenomenology

immediately aware of this activity and its objects. However, Sartre stresses
that at this level one is not aware of any substantial self supporting one's
consciousness. One is aware only of the world and the activity of apprehend-
ing it. The question, for Sartre, is how one gets from this minimal form of
self-awareness to apprehending oneself as a person.
The constitution of something like a Cartesian ego, described in The
Transcendence of the Ego,1 is part of the process. But, according to Sartre,
apprehending oneself as a physical object involves an awareness of another
consciousness. In Being and Nothingness2 Sartre examines this awareness and
its role in apprehending ourselves and in perceiving others.

Sartre via Strawson?

One way to approach Sartre's account is by comparing it to the explanation

of the concept of the person in Strawson's Individuals? For an essay emerging
from the analytic tradition, Strawson's is particularly apt for comparison
with Sartre's phenomenological work because the concepts he intends to
analyse are so very basic that he feels that he 'must abandon his only sure
guide', namely, the actual use of words:

Aiming to lay bare the most general features of our conceptual struc-
ture, [descriptive metaphysics] can take far less for granted than a more
limited and partial conceptual inquiry. Hence, also, a certain difference
in method. Up to a point, the reliance upon a close examination of the
actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in philosophy.
But the discriminations we can make, and the connexions we can estab-
lish, in this way, are not general enough and not far-reaching enough to
meet the full metaphysical demand for understanding. (I, xiii-xiv)

Strawson contrasts his project, descriptive metaphysics, with a revision-

ary metaphysics whose aim is to produce a new conceptual structure with
which to understand the world, rather than merely to describe the one we
use. Descriptive metaphysics, 'content to describe the actual structure of
our thought about the world' (I, xiii), is more akin to common conceptual
analysis than to the revisionary metaphysics of Berkeley or Descartes. How-
ever, descriptive metaphysics is concerned with our most basic concepts:

there are categories and concepts which, in their most general features,
change not at all. Obviously these are not the specialities of the most
refined thinking. They are the commonalities of the least refined thinking;
and are yet the indispensable core of the conceptual equipment of the
 Sartre and Strawson 3

most sophisticated human beings. It is with these, their interconnexions,

and the structure that they form, that a descriptive metaphysics will be
concerned. (I, xiv)

Sartre's early work, with its talk of being-in-itself, the Other, and the con-
stitution of the ego, might be taken to be the furthest possible thing from a
description of'the actual structure of our thought about the world'. But
many of the questions guiding Sartre's inquiry are quite similar to Straw-
son's. For example, the following one, to which Sartre devotes considerable
time, is central for Strawson as well.

I am in a public park. Not far away there is a lawn and at the edge of that
lawn there are benches. A man passes by those benches. I see this man;
I apprehend him as an object and at the same time as a man. What does
this signify? What do I mean when I assert that this object is a man? (341)

Admittedly, it is rare for Sartre to phrase a question in such a form: his chief
interest is in what is involved in apprehending other persons, the world, and
ourselves, not in what we mean by our assertions. Nevertheless, as this pas-
sage implies, to see something as a person, for Sartre, is to mean a person.
While the object of Sartre's study is our field of experience, rather than, as
for Strawson, the conceptual scheme underlying ordinary language, both
philosophers are concerned with the most basic components of what might
be called our scheme of meaning, namely, persons and things. Strawson
believes the first half of his book demonstrates . . .

the central position which material bodies and persons occupy among
particulars in general. It shows that, in our conceptual scheme as it is,
particulars of these two categories are the basic or fundamental particu-
lars, that the concepts of other types of particular must be seen as second-
ary in relation to the concepts of these. (I, xv-xvi)

Strawson's discussion of persons focuses on two questions: 'Why are one's

states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all?' and 'Why are they
ascribed to the very same things as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain
physical situation, &c.?' He says that, until we have answered them we do
not understand 'the concept we have of a person' and 'the use that we make
of the word " I " ' ( I , 84).
The part of Sartre's work I want to discuss addresses similar issues: what is
involved in apprehending others and ourselves as persons, i.e., as conscious
physical objects? Regarding the man in the park, Sartre says:
4 Sartre's Phenomenology

If I were to think of him as being only a puppet, I should apply to him the
categories which I ordinarily use to group temporal-spatial 'things.' That
is, I should apprehend him as being 'beside' the benches, two yards and
twenty inches from the lawn, as exercising a certain pressure on the
ground, etc. (342)

A person, by contrast, is apprehended as not only beside the benches and

near the lawn, but as somebody for whom the benches and lawn exist. How
are we able to perceive an object in the world as also somebody for whom
there is a world? Or, in words more like Strawson's, how are we capable of
ascribing, in addition to those predicates we ascribe to ordinary inanimate
objects, ones such as 'seeing the lawn' and 'wondering whether the benches
are comfortable', which we never ascribe to an inanimate object?
According to Strawson the properties to which these phrases refer are sig-
nificantly different from those that we attribute only to material objects,
and it is a mistake to think of our concept of a person as a mere offshoot of
our concept of a material object. Sartre would agree. However, I do not
want to overemphasize the similarity between their views, or their ultimate
concerns. There is a difference between naming something, or even thinking
about it, and perceiving it. The above quotation, with its talk of applying
categories to an object, sounds perhaps more like Strawson than Sartre.
However, this is only the beginning of his explanation of how we apprehend
a person as a person. In fact, he has only described the phenomenon to be
explained. The uniqueness of his view will emerge as we explore its detail
in the chapters that follow. For now, I will focus on Strawson.

Persons as fundamental particulars in our conceptual scheme

Fundamental particulars and identifiability-dependence

What does Strawson mean when he says that persons and material objects
play the role of fundamental particulars in our conceptual scheme? For
Strawson, one item is more fundamental than another if the ability to refer
to the latter depends on the ability to identify the former, and not vice-versa.
The notion of identification he is primarily concerned with is 'identifying
reference', which involves a speaker referring to an item in a way that
enables a listener to pick it out. According to Strawson our ability to make
identifying reference to persons and material objects ultimately enables us
to make identifying reference to things of other types, such as theoretical
constructs, historical events, and mental states. For example, the ability to
 Sartre and Strawson 5

identify strikes and lockouts depends on the ability to identify such things as
people, tools, and factories, and identifying subatomic particles requires
being able to identify bigger things (I, 34).
Instances of anger, hope, pain, and fear, are identification-dependent
particulars. In this respect they are like historical occurrences. Unlike
shapes and colours we are able to refer to them as particulars; but doing
so requires reference to particulars of other sorts, such as persons. That we
can refer to mental states as particulars means that I can refer not only to
anger in general, and, more specifically, to the anger Gertrude sometimes
feels toward Edgar for his inconsiderateness, but also to a particular instance
of anger, e.g., the anger Gertrude felt after Edgar took the last shrimp.
That mental states are identification-dependent means that referring to
them depends on the ability to refer to things that are not mental states,
like Gertrude.
Note that some things that might be regarded as mental properties, such
as honesty, irascibility, and intelligence, are not treated as particulars. Pains
can be qualitatively identical but numerically distinct. When I say, 'This is
the same pain I was feeling last week - I hope nothing's wrong with my
stomach', I mean only that it is the same type of pain; but T still have a
headache', means it is the very same one. But we do not ask whether the
honesty somebody exhibited on two separate occasions is the same, in
the way we might ask whether she still has the same headache. In general,
character traits and capabilities are treated more like shapes and colours
than objects or events.
Anyway, because Gertrude's mind, the subject of all her mental states but
none of her corporeal properties, is not itself a mental state, an instance of
Gertrude's anger would be identification-dependent if it required reference
to her mind. This is not Strawson's view, however. Identifying reference
to Gertrude's anger relies on identifying reference to Gertrude herself, a
subject of both physical and mental properties. Also, reference to minds, as
well as to mental states, relies on reference to persons (in the way that refer-
ence to both subatomic particles and physical events rely on reference to
inanimate objects). The mind has the same status as a particular mental
state: identifying a mental state does not require identifying the mind to
which it belongs, and identifying the mind does not require identifying any
of its mental states.
The special status, among particulars, of persons and material objects is
not metaphysical. Strawson is not saying that only these things are 'real' in
some special sense, or that statements about other things are somehow redu-
cible to statements about persons and material objects (I, 50). He is not
saying that the existence of subatomic particles depends on that of bigger
6 Sartre's Phenomenology

things, or that minds rely for their existence on creatures having physical
properties as well. Nor is the dependence merely logical: there is nothing
self-contradictory in the notion of a disembodied mind or a free-floating
electron. Finally, imagining or conceiving of minds or electrons does not
require imagining or conceiving them to be parts of something else. Straw-
son is concerned with identification-dependence. The ability to identify
persons and material objects enables us to identify things of other sorts;
and to identify, here, means to tell another person which item you are talk-
ing about.
What goes for talk, however, also goes for thought, at least in most cases.
For example, 'identifying thought about particulars other than material
bodies rests in general on identifying thought about material bodies, but not
vice versa' (I, 51). I can be said to identify something in this sense if I can re-
identify it, i.e., when encountering it a second time I recognize it as the very
same item. Re-identification is similar to referential identification: in refer-
ential identification the listener picks out the same thing as the speaker; in
re-identification a person picks out the same thing she encountered earlier
(I, 20). Workers' strikes and subatomic particles are thus re-identification-
dependent as well as being referential-identification-dependent. Similarly,
the re-identifiability of Gertrude's prolonged period of anger and the re-
identifiability of her mind rely on Gertrude's re-identifiability.

The identifiability-dependence of minds and mental states,

and the ego-subject view

It is easy to accept that my knowing what you mean when you speak of your
mind relies on my identification of you, the person, or at least your body,
and that my re-identification of your mind, relies on my re-identification of
you or your body. Just as re-identifying a subatomic particle or theoretical
construct requires re-identifying physical objects, re-identifying a mind
requires re-identifying a person or a body. But can I not re-identify my
own mind without re-identifying myself as a subject of both mental and phy-
sical properties?
On what Strawson calls the ego-subject (or Cartesian) view mental and
physical states are attributed, on the most basic level, to different subjects.
Re-identifying a mind, in most cases, requires re-identifying a body. But if
the mind is mine, I can bypass any reference to my body, because I already
know which mind I am thinking of. Referential identification of a mind or
mental state, however, requires at least one person to identify the subject
indirectly, via the body. As the story goes, we are able to do this because
our bodies are uniquely related to the experiences we have. I recognize
 Sartre and Siraw son 1

that my body's relationship to my experience is causally unique in that,

e.g., I feel pain when it collides with a hard surface but not when any other
two objects collide. It is also unique as an object of perception in that, e.g.,
unlike any other nearby object of comparable size I cannot view all its sides
simply by walking around it. Perceiving another body that looks and acts
much like mine allows me to identify another mind indirectly, as 'the subject
that stands to that body in the same special relationship I stand to this one'
(I, 96). If each of our minds was not uniquely related to a particular physical
object we could not make identifying reference to our mental states, because
there would be no way for anybody else to pick them out.
On this view, the concept of the mind is formed independently of, and
serves as a basis for, the concept of a person. The latter is a complex concept
formed by combining the concepts of mind and body. I can pick out my
mind and mental states privately, and even re-identify them, without iden-
tifying myself as a subject of physical properties. When I think about a par-
ticular hope I had earlier, T' means my mind, the one that did the hoping
and is now doing the remembering. My mind is the subject of all my mental
states and none of my physical ones. In everyday speech, T is used to make
identifying reference to a complex composed of a mind and a body. This use
of the word, however, is derived from two, more basic uses: to refer privately
to the subject of my mental states, and to refer to my body. I thus form the
concept, 'person', by adding corporeal characteristics to something already
conceived as my mind, the one mind whose states I have direct access to.
I apply the concept to another object if its appearance and behaviour are
sufficiently like mine to warrant the belief that it 'has' states of conscious-
ness. But the true subject of these states is a mind.
There is a problem with this story about how I come to make identifying
reference to my states of consciousness. As an ego-subject theorist, I claim to
apprehend beliefs, desires, and fears, and ascribe them to my mind. This,
however, is a very unusual case of ascription. Ordinarily when we attribute
a property to something, there are other things like it, which we can pick out
and to which we can meaningfully attribute the same property. There may
be a property that can be truly ascribed only to me, but if it would not even
make sense to ascribe it to anything else, I cannot be said to be ascribing it to
myself (I, 95n.3). Thus, if I ascribe, e.g., a given sensation or thought to my
ego, I must assume that there are other distinguishable things to which it
would be meaningful to ascribe this sensation or thought. Once the machin-
ery for mental-state-ascription is in place, there are plenty of persons, com-
pound subjects of mental and physical states, to which to attribute mental
states. At this stage there is nothing wrong with saying that we attribute
these states to ourselves. The problem with the ego-subject view is that it
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