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2024 SCC OnLine All 8245 : (2025) 168 ALR 348

In the High Court of Allahabad

(BEFORE SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH AND DONADI RAMESH, JJ.)

Dinesh Ahuja and Another … Petitioners;

Versus
District Magistrate and Others … Respondents.
Writ - C No. - 33687 of 2021
Decided on November 22, 2024
Advocates who appeared in this case :
Counsel for Petitioner : - Nitin Sharma
Counsel for Respondent : - Abhitab Kumar Tiwari, C.S.C., Vinay
Khare, Vivek Saran
ORDER
1. Mediation offered to the parties has failed. Accordingly, the matter
has been proceeded.
2. Heard Sri Nitin Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners; Sri
Vivek Saran, learned counsel for the private respondent and Ms. Kritika
Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State
respondents.
3. Present writ petitions has been filed for the following relief:—
(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing
the order dated 22.11.2021 (Annexure No. 5 to this instant writ
petition) passed by the Additional City Magistrate (Brahmpuri),
Meerut (Respondent No. 2) in Case No. 4925 of 2021
(Computerized Case No.D202111520004925) title Inderjeet
Ahuja v. Dinesh Ahuja @ Chinu, under Section 7(1) U.P. the
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act,
2007.
(ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus
directing the respondent authority not to take any coercive action
against the petitioners in pursuance of the order dated
22.11.2021.
(iii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus
directing the respondent authority not to interfere in the peaceful
possession of the premises of the petitioners.
4. The factual matrix giving rise to the present writ petition is
undisputed. The petitioner Dinesh Ahuja (herein after described as ‘S
2’) is the younger son of respondent no. 3 Indrajeet Ahuja (hereinafter
referred to as ‘F’). ‘F’ has another son (elder) born to him, namely,
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Hemant Ahuja (hereinafter described as ‘S 1’). It is also admitted to

the parties that ‘F’ (along-with his sons ‘S 1’ and ‘S 2’ and their wives)
is residing in the dwelling house described as House No. 689/56, (Old
No.B-99), Jwala Nagar, Sabun Godaam, Police Station T.P. Nagar,
Meerut City, District Meerut (hereinafter described as ‘property’). At
present ‘F’ and ‘S 1’ and his wife and family enjoy good relations to the
extent there is no litigation between those parties, inter se. At the
same time it does appear that petitioner ‘S 2’ and his wife have fallen
apart with ‘S 1’ and his family. The petitioners allege that ‘F’ is acting
in collusion and/or under the undue influence of ‘S 1’ and his family. As
a result, at the instigation and prompting offered by ‘S 1’ and his
family, ‘F’ instituted a proceeding under Section 22 of the Maintenance
and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘Act’) read with Rule 21 of the Uttar Pradesh Maintenance
and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2014 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘Rules’), on 24.09.2021.
5. Further, according to the petitioners, that proceeding was
instituted by ‘F’ only to defeat the earlier suit proceedings instituted by
the petitioner/‘S 2’ being O.S. No. 837 of 2020, (Dinesh Ahuja v.
Indrajeet Ahuja) seeking an injunction against ‘F’ and ‘S 1’. That suit
proceeding is described to be pending. At the same time, no injunction
has been granted in such proceedings.
6. In the proceedings instituted under Section 22 of the Act read
with Rule 21 of the Rules, the petitioners appeared and filed their
objections on 08.11.2021. It is their grievance that their objections
have been wrongly rejected, and erroneously, a direction has been
issued to evict the petitioners from the property in question.
7. In such facts, Sri Nitin Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners
has primarily raised three submissions. First, it has been submitted
that the application filed by ‘F’ under Section 22 of the Act read with
Rule 21 of the Rules is a proxy litigation at the behest and instigation of
‘S 1’. ‘F’ has no grievance with the petitioners. Only for reason of other
disputes existing between ‘S 1’ and ‘S 2’, ‘F’ has been needlessly
dragged into the situation, at the behest of ‘S 1’.
8. Second, it has been submitted, no proceeding may have been
instituted under the Act read with the Rules seeking eviction simplicitor
of the petitioners. At most, ‘F’ would have a right to seek right to claim
maintenance allowance from such of his sons who may inherent to his
property. Only in the event of default in payment of maintenance
allowance if any awarded, a proceeding for eviction may follow. In the
present facts, neither ‘F’ has claimed any maintenance allowance from
the petitioners nor there pre-exists any order providing for such
maintenance allowance. In support of his submission, learned counsel
for the petitioner has relied on a decision of a learned single judge of
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this Court in Krishan Kumar v. State of U.P. (Neutral Citation No. -

2023 : AHC-LKO : 54220) decided on 18.08.2023 in Writ Petition No.
35884 of 2019 (2023 9 ADJ 113), wherein it has been observed as
below:—
“29. Further, this court is of considered opinion that a Tribunal,
under Chapter-II of Act, 2007 cannot direct eviction simplicitor from
the property at the instance of senior citizens, though the Tribunal
can direct the children and relatives to make available a residence to
such senior citizens in pursuance of an application, filed under the
abovesaid chapter. It further emerges that the District Magistrate as
an appellate authority under the Act, 2007, can ensure that no one
should make any hindrance to a senior citizen to enjoy the property
as per his ‘need’ and the right to eviction is the last step, where such
authority finds that the need of a senior citizen is not being fulfilled.
The case in hands is that the present petitioner is living in one room
with his wife and he is not making any hindrance in the peaceful
living of the parents, in other part of the house and therefore, so far
as the objective of the Act, 2007 is concerned, is no way hampered
by the petitioner.”
9. Then reliance has been placed on another decision of a learned
single judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Simrat Randhawa
v. State of Punjab [2020 Supreme (P & H) 5], wherein a learned single
judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court declared unconstitutional
the Comprehensive Action Plan (CAP in short), framed by the Punjab
State Government under the provisions of the Act. Thus, a learned
single judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court reached the
conclusion that there was no power vested under the Act and the
delegated legislation arising thereunder, in support of eviction
simplicitor from any immovable property, at the instance of the senior
citizen who may be the owner of such property. To the same effect
reliance has been placed on a decision of Supreme in Smt. S. Vanitha
v. The Deputy Commissioner Bengaluru Urban District [(2021) 15 SCC
730], wherein in the context of parallel proceedings having arisen
under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 at
the instance of a daughter-in-law of a senior citizen (seeking eviction
from her property), the Supreme Court set aside the orders passed by
the authorities under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and thus
protected the occupant daughter-in-law from her eviction from such
premises.
10. Last, he has relied on a decision of a Division Bench of Patna
High Court in Ravi Shanker v. State of Bihar, Letters Patent Appeal No.
907 of 2023 in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 7851 of 2022, decided
on 03.01.2024, wherein following the Punjab and Patna High Court
Simrat Randhawa v. State of Punjab (supra) and Smt. S. Vanitha v. The
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Deputy Commissioner Bengaluru Urban District (supra), the Patna High

Court has also ruled against eviction simplicitor being offered at the
instance of a senior citizen, under the provisions of the Act and Rules
framed thereunder.
11. Third, it has been submitted that in any case, the proceedings
under the Act and the Rules are summary in nature. Natural jurisdiction
of the Civil Courts has neither be excluded nor eclipsed nor restricted.
In face of civil suit seeking injunction instituted by the petitioner No.
1/‘S 2’ prior to the institution of application under the Act read with the
Rules framed thereunder and in face of such suit proceedings being
pending, specifically with respect to the property in dispute, no
jurisdiction survived with the authorities constituted under the Act and
the Rules framed thereunder to proceed to pass any order to evict the
petitioners during pendency of O.S. No. 837 of 2020, (Dinesh Ahuja v.
Indrajeet Ahuja) pending in the court of Civil Judge (S.D.), Meerut.
Again reliance has been placed on the above noted decisions specially
in Smt. S. Vanitha (supra) and Ravi Shanker (supra). Reliance has also
been placed on another decision of Supreme Court in Sau Rajani v. Sau
Smita, 2022 INSC 805.
12. On the other hand, Sri Vivek Saran, learned counsel for the
respondent would submit that there is no collusion between ‘F’ and ‘S-
I’. ‘F’ has instituted the proceedings on his own account with respect to
his own property for reason of his own grievance against ‘S 2’. Merely
because ‘S 1’ is not opposed to ‘F’ and merely because ‘S 1’ may be
supporting ‘F’ generally in life and specifically in the litigation between
‘F’ and ‘S 2’, it may not be said-that therefore there exists collusion
between ‘F’ and ‘S 1’. These being family disputes and parties being
closely related, it is not an uncommon occurrence that a parent may
have no grievance with one of his two more children or that they may
have grievance with another child. For reason of absence of grievance
between the father of his first son/‘S 1’, it cannot be said that the
father is acting under the influence of his first son or that the
proceeding instituted by the father is a proxy litigation on behalf of his
first son. No material or evidence exists on record in support of that
objection raised by learned counsel for the petitioner.
13. Coming to the second point raised by learned counsel for the
petitioner, it has been submitted that the issue is no longer res integra.
Insofar as our court is concerned, the issue was squarely thrashed out
by a co-ordinate bench in Shivani Verma v. State of U.P., 2023 (6) ADJ
496. In that decision the co-ordinate bench had the occasion to take
note of the comprehensive of CAP framed by Government of U.P. in the
context of the Act and the Rules. For ready reference and useful to our
discussion, we may note that the co-ordinate bench observed as below:
—
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“51. Chapter IV of the Rules, 2014, mandates for providing the

scheme for management of old age homes for indigent senior
citizens.
52. Chapter V, relevant for the purposes of the instant writ
petition, provides for duties and power of the District Magistrates.
The relevant portion of Rule 21 of Rules, 2014, is extracted:
“21. Duties and Power of the District Magistrate- (1) The
District Magsitrate shall perform the duties and exercise the
powers mentioned in sub-rules (2) and (3) so as to ensure that
the provisions of the Act are properly carried out in his district.
(2) It shall be the duty of the District Magistrate to:
(i) ensure that life and property of senior citizens of the district
are protected and they are able to live with security and dignity.”
53. On bare perusal the Sub-rule (i) of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 21, it
employs the expression ‘property’ which is referable to the definition
of ‘property’ defined under Sub-clause (f) of Section 2 of Act, 2007.
In other words, the expression ‘residence’, has not been employed in
the Rules, 2014. Though ‘property’ would include residential
property but would certainly not include or mean the residence
sought for maintenance by the senior citizen. The provision for
residence could include property owned by the senior citizen or that
of his children or relative as the case that may be setup by the
senior citizen before the Tribunal claiming maintenance.
54. Further, Rules, 2014 does not confer on the District Magistrate
explicit power of eviction of the occupants from the residence of the
senior citizen, though, it confers power upon the District Magistrate
to ensure that the ‘life and property’ of the senior citizen is protected
and they are able to live securely with dignity.
55. The State Government vide Government Order dated 21 March
2006, in purported exercise of powers under Sub-section (2) of
Section 22 of Act, 2007, has framed policy for the senior citizen. The
relevant portion reads thus:
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56. Paragraph 2.4 of the policy with regard to the ‘protection of

life and property’ reads thus:

57. Most of the senior citizens live with their parents (sic
children). They face tussle over inheritance or division of property.
Elders come under intense pressure to sell off their property or
transfer ownership to their sons and are subjected to various forms
of abuse if they relent. Senior citizens face harassment and threat
from neighbours, encroachment of property, etc.
58. In the event, property of a senior citizen as defined under Sub
-clause (f) of Section 2 of Rules, 2014, is under threat from any
person, District Magistrate has been conferred power to protect the
life and property of the senior citizen.
59. Property can be tangible items, viz., homes, cars or appliances
or it can refer to intangible items that carry the promise of future
worth, such as, stock and bond certificates. Intellectual property
refers to idea such as logo, design and patents.
60. Chapter V, in particular, Section 22, read with, Rule 21(2)(i)
and the Government action plan/policy framed by the State
Government, it mandates and directs the District Magistrate/District
Police officers to protect the property of the senior citizen. Protection
of property without the power and authority of eviction would render
the provision meaningless. Protection of property would certainly
include the power to order eviction of the occupant and restoration of
the property to the senior citizen.
61. The question that follows is which kind of property and
against whom. Any kind of property [Section 2(f))] in the possession
or threat of dispossession by the senior citizen from the relatives,
family member, helps, service providers or anti social/criminals.
Family members would include children of senior citizen. The senior
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citizen in respect of such property other than covered under

maintenance (residence), would have to approach the District
Magistrate for protection.
62. In other words, the expression ‘property’ would not include
the property claimed by the senior citizen for ‘maintenance’ before
the Tribunal for provision of residence. Accordingly, a senior citizen
seeking maintenance, other than monetary maintenance, i.e., only
residence to the exclusion of his children and relative of a property in
his possession or otherwise owned by him, the remedy for such
property (residence) would lie before the Tribunal.
63. In this backdrop, it follows that protection of ‘life and
property’ would confer implicit power upon the District Magistrate to
evict unauthorized occupant of the property, including,
children/relative or third party from the property of the senior
citizen. However, Tribunal alone would have power to order eviction
from the property of a senior citizen/parent on an application
claiming maintenance towards residence to the exclusion of his
children/grand-children.
64. The senior citizen while making an application (Form A) before
the Tribunal may claim only residence as maintenance for his need
to enable him to lead a normal and peaceful life, irrespective of the
plea that his children/relatives are subjecting the senior citizen to
harassment or not. The plea of harassment is not a prerequisite to
maintain an application for an order of maintenance for provision for
residence. In the event, Tribunal if (sic) satisfied on the claim of the
senior citizen, it would order maintenance for residence, that would
necessarily include eviction of the occupant of the residence being a
consequence of the maintenance order. [Rule 14] In other words,
Tribunal while exercising powers on an application seeking
maintenance of residence by a senior citizen, while making order of
maintenance for provision of residence, in consequence can direct
eviction of the occupants, i.e., children/relative but not against
minor children. An order of residence towards maintenance without
passing the consequential order of eviction would render the power
and authority of the Tribunal meaningless.
65. It follows that Tribunal has power to deal only with a
particular kind of property (residence) sought for maintenance but
lacks powers to adjudicate upon any other kind of property of the
senior citizen. Such power is vested with the District Magistrate
under Chapter V to protect any kind of property, movable or
immovable, tangible or intangible against any person, i.e.,
children/relative or third party, but would not include the property
sought by the senior citizen for residence towards maintenance from
his children/relatives. Any other interpretation would be conferring
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power upon the District Magistrate to deal and adjudicate upon

property sought by the senior citizen for provision of maintenance,
merely for the reason that the power of eviction has to be read
exclusively into the expression ‘protection’ of the property of senior
citizen. Tribunal has a limited power while adjudicating the issue of
property required only for the maintenance of the senior citizen.
66. Tribunal can be approached by senior citizen or parent, as the
case may be, for maintenance. Whereas, senior citizen alone can
approach the District Magistrate for protection of his life and property
of any kind, other than the property (residence) involved in
proceedings before the Tribunal.”
14. Thereafter, the co-ordinate bench recorded its conclusions.
Conclusion number “iv” reads as below:—
“(iv) Chapter V is confined to protection of life and property of the
senior citizen alone. Protection of property would also include
eviction of the occupant from the tangible property. The power is
conferred on the District Magistrate. The occupant could be
children/relatives or third party.”
15. Thus, it has been submitted, insofar as the State of U.P. is
concerned, there is no doubt as to existence of CAP. The same has
never been declared unconstitutional. There is no challenge to the CAP
in these proceedings. As to the power of the District Magistrate under
Chapter V of the Act, there exists no doubt. A senior citizen may apply
and the District Magistrate may provide for eviction simplicitor from an
immovable property belonging to a senior citizen.
16. The ratio of the learned single judge decision in Krishna Kumar
(supra) to the extent it runs contrary to the ratio in Shivani Verma
(supra) remains per incuriam and does not declare binding law.
17. With respect to the decision of the Punjab and Haryana, High
Court, in Simrat Randhawa (supra) a point of distinction has been
drawn on the reasoning that in the present facts there is no challenge
to the CAP and again in view of co-ordinate bench decision in Shivani
Verma (supra) the ratio in Simrat Randhawa (supra) may remain of non
persuasive value. Also, it has been pointed out that there exists an
earlier decision of Punjab and Haryana, High Court in Harcharan Singh
v. Bhagat Singh, (2019) 2 RCR (Civil) 313, wherein it was observed as
below:—
“The petitioner, herein, is residing in the house of respondent No.
1 on the basis of concession given by his father in the property
owned by him. He, as a licensee, is only permitted to enjoy the
possession of the property licensed but without creating any interest
in the property. A licence stands terminated the moment the licensor
conveys a notice of termination of a licence. There is no vested right
of any type to remain in possession of the property of respondent
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No. 1. Admittedly, respondent No. 1 is owner of the property, in

dispute. Respondent no. 1 is required to be protected as mandated
by Section 22 of the Act read with Rule 23 of the Rules and para 1 of
the Action Plan. There cannot be any effective protection of property
of the senior citizens unless the District Magistrate has the power to
put the senior citizen into possession of the property and/or to
restrain or eject the person who interferes in the possession of the
property of the senior citizen. The protection of the property of a
senior citizen includes all incidences, rights and obligations in
respect of property in question. Once a senior citizen makes a
complaint to District Magistrate against his son to vacate the
premises of which the son is a licensee, such summary procedure
ensures for the benefit of the senior citizen. The petitioner has no
right to resist his eviction only on the ground that he is the only son
or he does not have any source of income. The eviction is one part of
the right to protect 8 of 10 the property of a senior citizen and this
right can be exercised by a senior citizen in terms of provisions of
the statute, Rules framed and the Action Plan notified.”
18. As to the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. S. Vanitha
(surpa), it has been submitted that, that decision has no bearing to
the present facts. In the first place the Supreme Court has not ruled or
reasoned that no summary eviction may arise under the provisions of
the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Second, in the facts of that
case, summary eviction ordered under the Act was set aside for reason
of those proceedings being a device.
19. That point of distinction as supported by the reasoning of the
coordinate bench of this Court in Shivani Verma (supra) has also been
pressed against the applicability of ratio of the Patna High Court
decision in Ravi Shankar (supra).
20. As to the third submission advanced by learned counsel for the
petitioner, it has been submitted, in absence of any jurisdictional error
on part of the statutory authority, it cannot be said that the
proceedings thus initiated would abate or be placed in abeyance during
the pendency of a civil suit instituted by one of the parties, whose
eviction has been sought. If that were to be applied by way of principle
in law, no proceeding for eviction may ever arise under the Act and
Rules framed thereunder as the party at risk of eviction may only file a
civil suit and defeat the entire object and purpose of the Act and the
Rules framed thereunder.
21. Once the Parliament has recognized the vulnerability factor of
the aged members of the society and has enacted the special welfare
provisions to protect senior citizens from exploitation and abuse,
occasioned by their vulnerability, accompanying feeble health and
frugal means, there exists no room to accept the line of reasoning being
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canvassed by learned counsel for the petitioner.

22. Having heard leaned counsel for the parties and perused the
record, in the first place we do not find any evidence or material to
reach an exceptional finding that the proceedings instituted by ‘F’ are
proxy proceedings instituted by him for the benefit of ‘S 1’. Merely
because ‘S 1’ may either be neutral to the dispute between ‘F’ and ‘S 2’
and/or merely because ‘S 1’ may be supporting ‘F’ in his dispute with
‘S 2’, it may not lead to the conclusion as suggested by learned counsel
for the petitioner.
23. No pleading made by ‘F’ and no process applied by ‘F’ is shown
to be one instituted or performed by ‘S 1’ for his benefit. To that extent
the objection raised by the petitioner is found to be misconceived and
unfounded, on facts and evidence.
24. As to the second objection, we may have been invited to offer a
detailed discussion with respect to the submissions advanced by
learned counsel for the parties. However, as noted above, the co-
ordinate bench in Shivani Verma (supra) speaking through Suneet
Kumar (J) has made a detailed, lucid and nuanced discussion covering
all aspects and facets of the submission presently advanced. The
decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. S. Vanitha (supra) was also
considered. Having quoted in extenso the reasoning offered by the co-
ordinate bench, no useful or further purpose may be served in
repeating the same. Suffice to record, we find ourselves in complete
agreement with the reasoning of the co-ordinate bench. There being
proceedings referable to Chapter V of the Act, the pre-condition of
claim/or maintenance allowance does not exist. The application filed by
‘F’ before the District Magistrate was wholly maintainable.
25. At the same time, with respect to the decision in Smt. S.
Vanitha (supra), we may add that the said decision arose in the context
of facts that were entirely different. The applicable law and its effect
was also found different. In the present case, no proceeding has been
instituted under the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act,
2005, on the contrary here the senior citizen ‘F’ is seeking the eviction
of both ‘S 2’ and his wife. In Smt. S. Vanitha (supra), the senior citizen
(mother-inlaw), was seeking eviction of her daughter-in-law alone, the
latter having suffered proceeding for dissolution of her marriage.
Further, the property in issue (in that case) was originally purchased by
the son of the senior citizen. He sold it to his father who in turn gifted it
to his wife.
26. Then, the said daughter-in-law had also instituted proceedings
seeking residence under the Protection of Women From Domestic
Violence Act, 2005. Therefore, it was also her objection that the
proceeding set up under the Act were by way of a device to defeat her
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just claim under that special Act.

27. Last, before the Supreme Court, the submissions as were
advanced on behalf of the daughter-in-law were recorded in paragraph
9 in Smt. S. Vanitha (supra) as below:—
“9. The appellant, aggrieved by the judgment of the Division
Bench of the High Court, has preferred the present special leave
petition. Mr Yatish Mohan, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant submitted that:
(i) The appellant is residing in her matrimonial home as the
lawfully wedded spouse of the Fourth respondent and she
cannot be evicted from her shared household, in view of the
protection offered by Section 17 of the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
(ii) The proceeding under Section 3 and 4 of the Senior Citizens
Act, 2007 was filed by her mother-in-law and father-in-law in
connivance with her estranged spouse to deprive her of her
matrimonial home;
(iii) The finding of the Division Bench on the appellants current
residential status was based on a fraudulent set up. The
alleged postal cover was dispatched on 21 June 2018, during
the pendency of the proceedings before the Single Judge, and
merely indicated a postal endorsement (“no such person”) as it
arrived when nobody was present at home to receive it;
(iv) The decree for the dissolution of marriage which was passed
against the appellant by the Trial Judge on 5 December 2013
has been set aside by the High Court on 14 January 2016 and
the proceedings have been remanded back to the jurisdictional
Family Court for a disposal afresh. Hence, as of date, the
appellant continues to be in a lawful relationship of marriage
with the Fourth respondent and she has no other place to live
except the suit premises, with her minor daughter;
(v) The provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 have been
manipulated to defeat the rights of the appellant. The manner
in which the premises were transferred by the spouse of the
appellant to his father and the gift deed thereafter to mother-in
-law of the appellant are indicative of an attempt to misuse the
provisions of the Act, to defeat the claims of the appellant; and
(vi) In asserting her right under Section 17 of the PWDV Act,
2005, the appellant relies on the decision of this Court in
Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (Civil Appeal No. 2483 of
2020, decided on 15 October 2020). In sum and substance, it
has been urged that the authorities constituted under the
Senior Citizens Act, 2007 had no jurisdiction to order the
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eviction of the appellant. Moreover, the proceedings have been

utilised to secure the eviction of the appellant so as to deny her
claim of a right to reside in the shared household under the
PWDV Act, 2005.”
28. Thus, no submission was advanced to the effect that authorities
constituted under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder have no
jurisdiction to seek eviction simplicitor under Chapter V of the Act.
Though, that nature of submission may have existed earlier before the
Karnataka High Court in the writ petition and the writ appeal, at the
same time, that submission was not advanced before the Supreme
Court. Therefore, the same has not been considered by the Supreme
Court. That is not part of the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court.
29. In fact the Supreme Court observed in summation point 24(ii)
and 24(iv) that the daughter-in-law (in that case) may not be evicted
summarily during pendency of her proceedings under the Protection of
Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Thus, it appears to us the
Supreme Court itself was cognizant that the summary eviction
proceeding may otherwise arise and be concluded under the Act and
the Rules framed thereunder. However, it reasoned that such
proceeding may not be concluded and made final during the pendency
of another proceedings under another special Act. To that extent,
discussion exists in the decision of the Supreme Court itself that
Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and the
protections thereunder are not to be trifled or ignored.
30. In view of that reason offered by us, we find ourselves in
respectful disagreement with the decision of the Patna High Court in
Ravi Shankar (supra) and the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High
Court in Simrat Randhawa (supra). The decision of the learned single
judge of this Court in Krishna Kumar (supra) is distinguishable, that
being referable to proceedings under Chapter II of the Act and not
Chapter V of the Act, as is the present case.
31. As to the third objection raised by learned counsel for the
petitioner based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sau Rajani
(supra), we find the same has no application in the present case. While
the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts may survive summary proceedings
for eviction under Chapter V of the Act read with the Rules framed
thereunder, read with the CAP, that summary proceeding may remain
subject to the out come of any civil suit wherein larger issues and other
rights may be involved.
32. At present, we make it clear that we are not proposing to rule as
to the exact extent and nature of proceedings to which the summary
eviction proceedings under Chapter V of the Act may remain subject to.
However, solely to deal with the objections raised on the strength of
plenary jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, we provide that the summary
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eviction under the Act would remain subject to final out come of O.S.
No. 837 of 2020 (Dinesh Ahuja v. Indrajeet Ahuja) pending in the Court
of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Meerut. In those proceedings larger
and other rights of the parties may be contested and decided. Any
other construction made would defeat the entire object and purpose of
the special welfare law, namely, the Act and the Rules framed
thereunder.
33. Unfortunate as it may be, it is a hard reality of life that upon
breaking down of joint families and perhaps as a direct result of smaller
units of family, the aged are feeling isolated and at times abused.
Whatever be the true reasons that may exist in particular families, the
Act and the Rules offer a life preserving protective umbrella to all the
aged members of the society, who may feel victimized or helpless at
the hands of their children, or their relatives and others, both with
respect to provision for maintenance allowance and with respect to
protection of their properties. Once that protection has been granted,
there is no reason to restrict its operation. Any margin of restriction
created by courts may be wholly counter productive to fulfillment of the
legislative and societal needs as those standing under the umbrella of
protection offered by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder are in
their sunset years and do not have decades of time or abundance of
energy and resources or the motivation or the conviction to contest
legal proceeding-that too often with those who came into the world
through them.
34. In view of the above, we find no merit in the submissions
advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner. In absence of any other
submissions, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.
35. No order as to costs.
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