Policy Paper

China's Grip
on the Global South
Here to Stay?
Alessia Amighini

Contributions by:
Alicia Garcìa Herrero
Jagannath P. Panda
 Policy Paper

China's Grip
on the Global South
Here to Stay?
Alessia Amighini
Alessia Amighini, Co-Head of Asia Centre and Senior Associate Research Fellow at ISPI. She is Associate Professor
of Economics at the Department of Economic and Business Studies (DiSEI) at the University of Piemonte Orientale
(Novara, Italy).

© 2024 ISPI

China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

by Alessia Amighini
First edition: April 2024
Cover Image Alamy Photo

ISBN 9788894469486

ISPI. Via Clerici, 5

20121, Milan
www.ispionline.it

This Policy Paper is realized with the support of the Policy Planning Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
International Cooperation pursuant to art. 23-bis of Presidential Decree 18/1967.
The opinions contained in this Paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and ISPI.
Policy Paper

Table of Contents

IN BRIEF 6

WHAT'S AT STAKE 9

THE RISE OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH 9

1. FROM "SOUTH OF THE WORLD" TO "GLOBAL SOUTH" 9
2. ECONOMIC AND GEOPOLITICAL RISE OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH 13

CHINA AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 23

1. THE SOUTH IN CHINA'S GLOBAL CONNECTIVITY 23
BOX 1 - THIRD BELT AND ROAD FORUM CONFIRMS
HOW DIVIDED THE WORLD IS, ALICIA GARCÌA HERRERO 31
2. A CONTEST FOR LEADERSHIP IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 34
BOX 2 - BETWEEN BRICS & G20: INDIA & GLOBAL SOUTH
ARE A RESOLUTE MATCH!, JAGANNATH P. PANDA 36

EXPLORING OPTIONS 39
OUR TAKE 42

NOTES 44

ABOUT THE AUTHORS 47

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

In Brief

S
ince the early twenty-first century, China from countries and international organisations. In
has been interacting diplomatically with the past decade, the BRI has become a flagship
other developing countries in a way that strategy of the PRC’s involvement in the Global
progressively clustered the developing world South. China has already spent roughly US$1
into a group of countries that acted cohesively trillion on the BRI, with 155 countries and 30
in international affairs. Notwithstanding the international organisations that have joined
many dissimilarities and potentially contrasting the Initiative. Even though the third BRI forum
positions among more than 150 countries was advertised by Beijing as an important
from all parts of the world, China (as the platform for discussing BRI cooperation and
largest among them) has acted as a galvanising the celebration of the BRI’s 10-year anniversary,
example. It is a strong and voluble group the BRI’s reputation has declined since the
sponsor that has inspired the South as a whole pandemic.
to develop an awareness of its relevance in
According to a recent study1 based on global
global affairs and sing to the same tune in
media reports, the perception of the initiative
international fora.
deteriorated significantly in many countries from
At the same time, China has expanded its 2017 to 2022. The notable exception is sub-
economic presence in the developing world up Saharan Africa where the BRI’s image remains
to a level that created a range of asymmetries positive, even if slightly less so than in the past.
(in trade, finance and investment) with partner This is notwithstanding several increases in
countries. This is now often viewed as a new levels of indebtedness to China, much of which
dependence by developing countries on China now face potential restructuring. Furthermore,
rather than on the North. China itself is also very we find significant inter- and intra-regional
reluctant to merge with the South/developing differences in the average sentiment towards
world in international affairs and organisations, China’s landmark project, as well as a much
where it is often separated from the core group of worse image of the initiative in countries that
developing countries and mentioned separately, are not so far part of the BRI. Perceptions of the
for example as in the “G7 and China” group. BRI have partly suffered from a deteriorating
image of China abroad, and partly to what is
At the ten-year anniversary of the Belt and
perceived as an excessive Chinese presence in
Road Initiative (BRI), in October 2023, China
many countries in terms of direct investment,
hosted its third Belt and Road Initiative Global
trade relations and foreign indebtedness.
Forum in Beijing. The first two fora were held
in 2017 and in 2019 respectively, and brought Becoming the leader of the Global South is
together a considerable number of heads of what Beijing’s diplomacy towards the South has
State and governments and representatives so far achieved through a variety of approaches:

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Policy Paper

traditional bilateral relations, “global multilateral”

(i.e. UN diplomacy), a relatively new mode,
launched by China in the early XXI century, i.e.
“collective diplomacy for developing regions”
(such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
– FOCAC or 14 + 1), and “group-type multilateral
diplomacy” (such as “G77 and China”), which is
a form of collective diplomacy within the UN
system.
However, the other large developing countries
in the South have become less comfortable
with China’s self-proclaimed role. Most of
them have been growing economically and
geopolitically, into what are now known as rising
powers of the South, or the Emerging South,
and they stand out as a much more assertive
part of the Global South. This is particularly
true of India, which has engaged in global
governance fora as much as China.
China’s new strong influence on the Global
South has started being perceived as excessive
by some recipient developing countries, such as
certain small countries in the South Pacific.2 At
the same time, Papua New Guinea, Palau, and
Micronesia have all recently signed agreements
with the United States and in September 2023,
US President Joe Biden hosted a summit with
the 18 members of the Pacific Island Forum at
the White House. This led some observers in
the United States to conclude that the game
is not over on the Global South, and that the
various points of contention between China and
some developing countries could be leveraged
to secure more affinity between the South and
the West or North.3

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 N(EU) Fiscal Rules:
China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

why they are needed

LONG-TERM
TRENDS:
• Carbon Neutrality
• Digital Transformation

UKRAINE NEED FOR LEGACY

WAR:
• Higher prices, lower growth
NEW FISCAL PROBLEMS:
• Complex, obscure rules
• Need for EU public goods RULES • Extra-ordinary ECB measures
(security/defence)

COVID:
• Higher public spending/debt
• Recession
Policy Paper

What's at Stake

THE RISE OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH

1. FROM "SOUTH OF THE WORLD" TO "GLOBAL SOUTH"

The catchy term “Global South” is now a fully accepted description of
a country grouping. It is used as shorthand for parts of the world other
than the “West” or the “North”.4 It has thus become yet another meta-
category for studying developing countries as a group, or issues of
interest to the whole developing world in international and transnational
affairs. As emphasised by Kohlenberg and Godeheardt (2021),5 “meta-
geographies are particularly powerful because they “lose their specific
spatial coordinates and become imbued with extraneous conceptual
baggage (such as ‘discussions of Japan as [a] Western nation’)”. As
a loosely-defined meta-category, Global South follows other meta-
categories inspired (although not neatly defined) by cardinal points,
most notably the “South of the world”, i.e. areas of the world formerly
under colonial rule, and the Third World, i.e. the part of the world
not belonging to the “West” (market economies), nor to the “East”
(Communist systems), the common ideological division during the Cold
War. It shares the convenience of some kind of geographical reference

'50s-'60s
with the former categories, as well as their limitations, insofar as not all
countries in the Global South are also in the geographical South – e.g.
Popularisation of south of the equator. Moreover, as we will discuss later in this paper, the
the North and South very category of “South” has been acknowledged differently by some
distinction
countries (most notably, China), as a direct consequence of both the lack
of a clear geographical definition, and the blurred distinction between
North/West/developed countries (sometimes used interchangeably)
on the one hand and South/East/developing countries on the other.
The distinction between a North and a South of the world was
popularised by the Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch in the 1950s and
1960s, to indicate that the world economy was divided into a “core” and
a “periphery”, respectively called the North and the South: the former
was the group of earlier colonial powers, located in the geographical
North, and the latter was a group of colonised countries, located in the
geographical South. Later, during the 1970s and 1980s, and particularly

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

with the end of the Cold War, the “South” became, “an acceptable
overarching term for referencing former Third World countries
and identifying the uniqueness of the many socio-economic and
environmental issues affecting them”.6 Accordingly, the term emerged
in the international trade and development literature and policy circles
as a way to identify the periphery of the world economy, i.e. the group of
developing countries, largely dominated by a strong and powerful core
of industrialised countries. The meta-category of “South” is therefore
connected to patterns of political and economic differences, and,
according to Nour Dados and Raewyn Connell (2021),7 to the notion of
South (a synonym for periphery) as defined by Antonio Gramsci when
explaining how southern Italy had been colonised by northern Italy.
The North-South language has also been an important reference in

1964 multilateral institutions and negotiations, since the founding of the Group
of 77 (G-77) in 1964. As its name suggests, the G-77 was established
Founding of the by 77 developing countries signatories of the “Joint Declaration of the
Group of 77 (G-77)
Seventy-Seven Developing Countries” issued at the end of the first
session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) in Geneva. It began with the first “Ministerial Meeting of the
Group of 77 in Algiers (Algeria) on 10-25 October 1967. This meeting
adopted the Charter of Algiers”, a permanent institutional structure that
gradually developed into the creation of Chapters of the Group of 77 with
Liaison offices at UNCTAD in Geneva, at UNEP in Nairobi, at UNESCO

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in Paris, at FAO/IFAD in Rome, at UNIDO in Vienna and at the IMF and

the World Bank in Washington, D.C. Although the members of the G-77
have increased to 134 countries (and are far more heterogenous than in
the original grouping), the original name was retained due to its historic
significance. The Group of 77 is still today the largest intergovernmental
organisation of developing countries in the United Nations. It provides a
means for countries of the South to voice and promote their collective
economic interests, enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major
international economic issues within the United Nations system, and
promote South-South cooperation (SSC).
The milestone for the formation of SSC can be traced back to the
Asian-African Conference that took place in Bandung in Indonesia, in
1955, known as the Bandung Conference.8 Although there had been
gatherings similar to it in the past, the Bandung Conference was
perceived as being the very first of its kind, because the countries in
attendance were for the first time no longer under colonial rule.9 Each
attending country supported progress on decolonisation efforts in both

1978 Africa and Asia and the group “provided the first major instance of the
post-colonial countries’ collective resistance to Western Dominance in
Establishment of the
International relations”.10
UN Unit for South-
South Cooperation Despite the strong momentum for collective initiatives in the mid-
1950s and 1960s, it was only in 1978 that a specific Unit for South-
South Cooperation was established in the UN Secretariat to promote
South-South trade and collaboration within its agencies. This happened
immediately after an Independent Commission for International
Developmental Issues was established in 1977 with the aim of reviewing
international development issues. The former German Chancellor
Willy Brandt was appointed as its Head by Robert McNamara, then the
World Bank President. The first report by that Commission, the Brandt
Report, published in 1980, provided an insight into drastic differences
in the economic development of the North and the South. Great gaps
in standard of living were acknowledged between industrialised
countries (the North or the “core”) and developing countries (the South
or the “periphery”), mainly due to their different roles in the international
division of labour and therefore in international trade. The report’s main
argument was that the countries in the North were extremely wealthy
due to their successful production and trade in manufactured goods,
whereas the countries in the South suffered poverty due to their
production and trade in intermediate goods. By producing manufactured

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

goods, countries in the North could add a lot of domestic value (i.e. the
added value of production activities to process intermediate goods and
input into final products) and therefore secured higher incomes than in
the South, where countries only produced and exported intermediate
goods, often primary non-processed goods and commodities. The
Brandt Report emphasised that international trade relations inherited by
a colonial past were impoverishing countries in the South while enriching
countries in the North. The end of colonial rule was not enough for the
South to recover from past economic and politic dominations, as long
as international trade perpetrated structural differences between the
North and the South, which had accumulated during the colonial era.
Therefore, the Brandt Report advocated a strong drive in favour of a
large transfer of resources from developed to developing countries.
1980 G-77 countries have also been active in the debate over South-South
The Brandt Report cooperation across academic and policy circles, which later contributed
is published to influence the field of development in the late 1990s. At that time,
mounting evidence suggested that the South as a whole was increasing
its economic relevance in the world economy, in terms of GDP and trade,
as well as its influence on international affairs. The South was on the
rise. The “rise of the South” topic progressively shifted the focus of the
original North-South divide from the development gaps differentiating
the periphery of the world from its core, towards the growing influence
of developing countries in global affairs, i.e. their new economic and
geopolitical influence.
In this context, the qualifier “Global” can be used to describe the
outbound reach of developing countries beyond or outside of the South,
in terms of economic and politic relevance and influence. In other words,
while the North-South language highlighted the differing development
levels of core countries and peripheral countries, the new Global North-
Global South terminology points to the rising weight of the South in a
global context, be it in reference to the growing importance of Southern
economies both as producers and as consumers (“emerging markets”),
or to the growing position of Southern countries in international affairs
(“rising powers”).
We must acknowledge that the “Global South” meta-category has
gained increasing prominence in the study of world politics. Haug et
al. (2021) searched Scopus (an abstract and citation database) for
references to the “Global South” in publications across disciplines and

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found they have grown almost exponentially since the 1990s, with a
sharp increase over the last 15 years. References to the “Global South”
in titles, abstracts and keywords have increased from only one in 1994,
to 30 in 2005 and to more than 1600 in 2020.11
Despite the booming research interest in the Global South, it is astonishing

1600
that “most publications framing research as focusing on the “Global
South” also have surprisingly little to say about the analytical value of
References to the this meta-category for making sense of empirical phenomena”.12 The
“Global South” in Global South as a meta-category has not developed into a notion of
titles, abstracts and
Global South beyond the simple classification of countries included in
keywords in 2020
the group. The South has simply been replaced by Global South as a
new label, which often ignores the very essence of the term: As Haug et
al. rightly suggest, “whereas hardly anyone would think about framing
studies on, say, US politics, French bureaucracy or Brexit negotiations
as “Global North” research, an increasing body of work on phenomena
within and across Asia, Africa and Latin America is indeed labelled as
‘research on the Global South’, often without a consideration of what this
framing implies”.13
It is far beyond the aims of this paper to discuss the conceptual and
empirical validity of the Global South as a group, or to provide a
discussion of it as a notion in the research agenda, or even to comment
on the rough use of the term in policy contexts. The aim of this policy
paper is to discuss the role in international affairs of China – the largest
developing country – within the broader group of developing countries,
which is increasingly referred to as Global South.

2. ECONOMIC AND GEOPOLITICAL RISE OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH

When “Global South” is used to describe a group of developing countries
in the economic and trade literature, the term is much less controversial
than when it is used in the study of world politics. Since the beginning of
the twenty-first century, the increasing part played by large emerging
economies in international trade and investment revived academic
and policy interests for South-South cooperation, which was leading
to economic integration within the developing world, i.e. increasing
interaction and interdependence among developing countries as a
group.
This field of research (which started back in 2004 with the UNCTAD
Secretariat background paper on the new geography of international

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

economic relations, presented at the Doha High-level Forum on Trade

and Investment) has focused on how the South is gradually moving
from the periphery of global trade to the centre. As countries in the
South have been undergoing a process of economic development and
structural transformation, while engaging in investment and trade flows
with developed countries in the North, they have developed economic
and political power and contributed to the emergence of a more
polycentric production and trade landscape.14 More specifically, the
world share of manufacturing exports originating in the South reached
47% in 2015. The dominant direction of global trade flows for the South is
also no longer South-North but South-South, hence the use of the term
40% Global South to indicate that the former South of the world is no longer
Developing countries’ largely “dependent” on the North, but has grown into a new relatively
global GDP share independent centre of economic strength for the global economy.
by 2022
The geographic composition of global GDP over time ably reflects the
phenomenon of the “Rise of the South” (Figure 1). Developing countries
have accounted for rapidly increasing shares of global GDP from
approximately 15% in the early 1970s, to more than 40% by 2022. This is
driven particularly by rapid economic development in Asia, most notably
China. Asia’s share (excluding China) rose from 5.7% in 1970 to 13.7% by
2022. China’s share of global GDP started growing over 3% after 1997,
and increased to 18% by 2022. By contrast, developing African and Latin
American countries have not achieved significant gains in their share of
overall world GDP since the 1970s. More specifically, developing Africa
in 2022 (2.8%) accounted for less than in 1970 (3.4%), while developing
Latin America was slightly above 5%, i.e. the same as half a century ago.
The rise of the South in global GDP has been driven by a much greater
participation in global trade, most notably since the early 2000s. The
share held by developing countries in world exports has risen from
around 25% in 1995 to around 30% in 2000 to 45% in 2022 (Figure 2).
Developing Asia has driven growth in the share held by developing
13.7% countries in global trade, with an aggregate share increase from 19% in
1995 to 36% in 2022. This is mostly, but not only, a Chinese story: while
Asia’s global GDP
share by 2022 China’s share increased from less than 3% in 1995 to 14.5%, the rest of
(excluding China) Asia also improved its participation in global exports, from 16% in 1995
to over 22% in 2022.

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

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Policy Paper

The North-South terminology tends to sound confrontational and, most

importantly, it does not allow a proper consideration of the series of
interdependencies between countries in the North and countries in the
South. However, it still greatly contributes to our understanding of how
far the South has become pivotal for the world economy and central
to trade relations. In short, it has developed into a pillar of the world
economy. South-South trade has grown in relative importance since
the mid-1990s (Figure 3). The South is increasingly more self-reliant on
imports (58%) and exports mostly to other countries in the South (55%).
The same is not true for North-North trade, which has declined since the
mid-1990s, more so in the case of imports, 40% of which now are from
the South. So, while the South has largely overcome its dependence on
the North, the latter has progressively developed a sort of dependence
on supplies from the South.
The increasing share held by large emerging economies in international
trade and investment has also prompted a debate on the growth and
development implications for the less developed recipient countries.15
Most studies in this field focused on African economies as recipients of
trade and investment.
It is widely recognised that external flows in the form of trade and capital
are among the main vehicles of knowledge acquisition in developing
countries. Greater openness to external flows makes it possible to import
technology, which can lead to faster accumulation of knowledge and
higher total factor productivity, due to resource allocation from lower
to higher productive activities. Foreign trade exposes domestic firms to
international competition and provides an additional incentive for them
to improve efficiency and adopt more advanced technology.
Foreign direct investment is also an important vehicle for the transfer
of technology. Along with capital, foreign companies bring in advanced
production technology and management capabilities, which are
potential sources of technological spillovers. The presence of foreign
companies also increases local competition and forces domestic firms
to improve their efficiency. Overall, knowledge spillovers arising from
external flows are a major channel for encouraging export upgrading.

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

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Policy Paper

An idea has emerged in the literature that, compared to external flows

per se, specific South-South flows would bring more benefits than
North-South flows to developing countries. However, research suggests
that the composition of partner countries also plays an important role
in determining the ability to benefit from knowledge spillovers arising
from the use of imported goods. Southern countries’ imports and inward
direct investments from the North and the South differ as regards the
technological distance from domestic products and capital investment
and such “technology gaps”16 affect the capacity of recipient countries
to internalise external knowledge flows. However, the literature has not
yet explored empirically whether South-South integration through trade
and FDI is superior to North-South integration as regards its impact on
export upgrading by recipient economies.
In a pioneering study on the differential impact of imports and FDI from
the North and from the South on the export performance of African
countries over the period 2003-10, Amighini and Sanfilippo (2014) tested
for the first time the impact of external investment and trade flows
on two different measures of export performance: an index of export
diversification (in terms of product variety) and the unit value of exports (a
proxy for the quality level of exported goods).17 They relied on a dataset
that matches sector-level bilateral data on both trade and investment
flows, so as to be able to clearly assess the impact of external flows
going to each sector on that sector’s export performance, distinguishing
those flows by both type (trade vs investment) and origin (North vs
South).
This research provided novel and strong empirical support to what was
until then only a conjecture that African economies might benefit more
from economic integration with other southern countries, through both
investment and trade. Specifically, the analysis shows that importing
southern products, which are technologically closer to domestic
production compared to northern products, has a limited impact on
improving export quality but can enhance export variety for low-tech
African manufacturing sectors. Similarly, hosting southern (compared to
northern) FDI improves the ability to raise manufacturing export quality
and to introduce new product varieties in low-tech sectors (especially
agro-industries, textiles, and apparel), with a stronger effect in less
diversified countries.

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

A lot of further evidence has been produced over the last decade on
the importance of inward direct investment and imports for developing
countries’ production capabilities and export upgrading. More generally,
the increasing economic integration of the developing world has been
recognised as a specific engine for better economic performance.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries contributes to
increases in GDP per capita in the long run (although there is no evidence
of any growth-enhancing effect of FDI). Yet the positive long-term effect
of FDI on the level of GDP per capita does not arise irrespective of the
nature of investing and recipient countries. More specifically, the source
of FDI matters as positive effects are only observable when capital flows
originate in the North and the Emerging South (i.e. emerging economies
in the South). Consequently, the positive effect of FDI is limited to
North to North FDI, North to Emerging South FDI, and Emerging South
to Emerging South country pairs.18 Therefore, there is evidence of a
positive impact on GDP per capita of FDI among the largest developing
countries, but not necessarily among all the countries in the South.
This contributes to our understanding of the increasing divergences in
economic performance of the Emerging South compared to the rest of
the South.
Besides their economic rise, countries in the Global South have
developed an increasing geopolitical influence. This is due partly to their
increased weight in production and trade activities, and partly to their
more cohesive voice in international affairs. The rise of the Global South
as a very large group of developing countries coming together around
international issues about which they often share a common interest is not
straightforward to assess. However, there is one widely acknowledged
way to try to evaluate the extent to which a large grouping of countries
develops an increasing affinity among its members, and acts in a more
or less united way, i.e. their similarity in voting patterns at the UN General
Assembly. When trying to understand the extent to which members of
the broad developing world have increased their affinity in international
affairs is to study their voting affinity on specific issues. One interesting
case in point is the recent voting patterns on the resolution A/RES/ES-
11/619 on 2 March 2023, exactly one year after the Russian invasion of
Ukraine, calling for Russia to end hostilities in Ukraine and withdraw its
forces.
Among its 193-members, 141 members voted in support of the
resolution, 7 voted against, 32 abstained and 13 were absent. Despite

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the vast majority of supporting votes, the combined total of 52 votes

against and abstentions attracted considerable attention, as 45 out of
52 are from the world’s poorest and least industrialised countries in the
Global South (Figure 3).20
This voting behaviour inspired speculation about new alliances
emerging in the Global South, led by China, the largest in the group,
notably adopting a position of neutrality in the conflict. China’s close

109
relations with a vast number of countries might have influenced their
votes. The 109 countries out of 133 in the Global South that are part of
Out of 133 countries China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – a comprehensive programme of
in Global South are bilateral economic and political relationships that China has built since
part of the BRI
2013 as a canvas for its economic diplomacy and a major tool of soft
power – may have looked at China’s abstention and decided not to cast
a vote against Russia for fear of jeopardising their own bilateral relations
with China.
Research on the reasons why some countries consistently declined to
condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the United Nations General
Assembly’s first emergency session since 1997 has so far focused on
the role of economic, military, political, geographic, and historical ties
with Russia only.21 Evidence shows that those countries are among
those that have defence cooperation agreements with Russia, have a
longer history of leftist governments, are major recipients of Russian aid,
have political similarities with Russia, and have no history of war with the
Soviet Union.
This research shows that economic, strategic and military influence
by Russia in many countries, usually among the poorest nations in the
world, were pretty effective in securing political support in the UNGA
for the Ukraine resolution on 2 March 2023. Arms imports, Russian aid
and defence cooperation are the most important factors explaining
voting behaviour in UN resolution A/RES/ES-11/6. At the same time,
soft power initiatives by China have cemented a broad consensus within
the Global South towards voting preferences aligned with the two big
powers in the group.

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

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Policy Paper

CHINA AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH

1. THE SOUTH IN CHINA'S GLOBAL CONNECTIVITY

It is commonly acknowledged that China’s foreign policy strategy shifted
from a rather cautious stance to an increasing presence and interaction
abroad around the end of the 1990s. Among the first strategic initiatives
launched at that time, the “go global” policy promoted in 1999 aimed at
expanding the international outreach of Chinese firms in search of new
markets and new partnerships. Although that policy was not specifically
targeted to other developing countries only, the latter have been the
preferred partners to increase China’s international economic relations
through direct investment and trade, ever since the creation of the
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2010.
South-South cooperation or collaboration has shaped and inspired
Beijing’s entire official foreign policy approach, which was given a formal
position by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2003.22 At the same time, the
progressive reformatting of China’s foreign policy agenda around the

2010
axis of South-South cooperation went along with a changing concept
of the South itself, in China’s official statements and terminology. The
Creation of the Forum very concept of South “has been progressively reconfigured: Beijing’s
on China-Africa interpretation of the South has increasingly become a function of its
Cooperation (FOCAC) overarching ‘connectivity politics’”:23 China’s own idea of the South
includes countries that do not share or that are uncomfortable with the
Western liberal order, or that may share China’s foreign policy principles
of win-win cooperation without interference.
Such ideas of the South have become less defined either by
geographical categories or by development criteria in China’s foreign
policy terminology. It led to an “increasingly flexible South/non-South
dichotomy”24 in Chinese policy documents, as well as in China’s foreign
policy initiatives. The South has increasingly been defined through its
relationship with China’s own initiatives. It therefore become more a
kind of “cooperative space [that] is not limited to Africa, Asia and Latin
America but may well reach as far as Central and Eastern Europe”. This
type of space is usually defined in ways that allow China to stand out
as a single high-status partner, mentioned separately, as in “China + x”
or “x + China” regional arrangements, e.g. China-CEEC or 14+125, where
China’s South has welcomed developed countries in the geographic
North (most notably some European Union Member States, such as
Greece).
China’s own peculiar take on the South originates from its need to
overcome the traditional distinctions between developed-northern

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

countries on the one hand, and developing-southern countries on

the other. As the world’s largest developing country in search of a
leading role among developing countries, China’s position has become
increasingly uncomfortable, because it has at the same time claimed
the right to be accorded a market economy status in international trade
relations,26 at least since 2015.
Not surprisingly, the increasing divergence between China’s notion or
idea of South and the widely acknowledged North-South language as
a proxy for developed and developing countries has paved the way for
further mis-readings of China’s foreign policy initiatives. This is most
notably the case of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013.
An unprecedented and largely unexpected foreign policy shift, the BRI
truly marked the ultimate change in China’s international projection in the
twenty-first century from the introverted attitude held throughout the

2013 XX century.27 Originally aimed at connecting China to Western European

markets by land and sea, the BRI has now expanded to Africa and Latin
The BRI is launched America, and its objectives reach far beyond transport networks: the BRI
has increased China's international connectivity and integration, not only
in terms of infrastructure, logistics and trade, but also culturally, digitally,
energetically and financially and it has become a foreign policy tool in
its own right.28
Initially showcased and recognised as a simple transport connectivity
programme between China and countries mostly in Central and
Southeast Asia, the BRI has expanded to Africa, the Middle East and

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Policy Paper

Latin America, aiming to create a broad, economically interdependent

transcontinental area in which China serves as the driving and nerve
centre. Therefore, the BRI is much broader than a physical connectivity
plan. With the BRI, China pursues important internal and external
economic objectives. The major internal objective is the rebalancing of
the huge regional development gaps between the coastal and internal
provinces, developed during the course of the Thirty Glorious Years
(1980-2010) of very rapid economic growth. To an equally important
extent, the BRI pursues a goal of finding new outlet markets for the great
productive overcapacity accumulated in those same years by China’s
system of big state-owned enterprises.
Over time, China’s diplomatic efforts to broaden the range of BRI partner
countries have intensified at a rapid pace and, to date, according to
official Chinese sources, the number of countries that have joined the
BRI by signing a Memorandum of Understanding with China is 155, as of
August 2023 (accounting for almost 75% of the world’s population and
more than half of the world’s GDP). The BRI countries are spread across
all continents: 34 BRI countries are in Europe (including 18 in the EU) and
Central Asia; 25 BRI countries are in East Asia & Pacific (including China);

155 22 BRI countries are in Latin America and Caribbean; 19 BRI countries in
Middle East and North Africa. This intense diplomatic activity has been
Countries that have accompanied by equally vigorous state lending to a growing number
joined the BRI of countries on the basis of the BRI agreement. This intense diplomatic
action has been accompanied by equally energetic state lending to a
growing number of low- and middle-income countries, investment by
Chinese companies abroad, and the strengthening of trade links with
partner countries.
The BRI has confirmed that China’s concept of the South goes well
beyond the way China’s South-South relations are normally described
outside of China. While many observers were originally sceptical about
the truly inclusive scope of the BRI beyond developing countries,29 it
has become clear over time that any country, rich or poor, can join this
coalition and “become a partner”.30 The BRI also confirms and ramps
up a peculiar style of China’s diplomacy, i.e. group diplomacy. This is a
mechanism for grouping together partner (developing and developed)
countries on the basis of their participation or acceptance of China being
the strongest agenda-setting power. At the same time, the BRI has
taken over the topic of South-South cooperation, as the vast majority of
China’s journal articles now mention both in the same breath, as if the
BRI had officially become the framework for implementing South-South
cooperation (Figure 4).

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

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Policy Paper

In October 2023, China hosted its third Belt and Road Initiative Global
Forum in Beijing, marking the BRI’s ten-year anniversary. The first two fora
were held in 2017 and 2019 respectively, and gathered a considerable
number of heads of State and governments and representatives from
countries and international organisations. In the past decade, the BRI
has become a flagship strategy of the PRC’s involvement in the Global
South. China has already spent roughly USD1 trillion dollars on the BRI,
with 155 countries and 30 international organisations joining the Initiative.
Even though Beijing advertised the third BRI forum as an important
platform for discussing BRI cooperation and celebrating the BRI’s 10-
year anniversary, the BRI is currently suffering from a reputational crisis
compared to before the pandemic.

US$1 tn According to a recent study31 based on global media reports, the

perception of the initiative deteriorated significantly in many countries
China's investment
from 2017 to 2022. The notable exception was sub-Saharan Africa where
on the BRI with
155 countries and the BRI’s image remains positive, even if slightly less so than in the past.
30 international This is notwithstanding several increases in debts owed to China, much of
organisations which now face potential restructuring. Furthermore, we find significant
inter- and intra-regional differences in average sentiments towards
China’s landmark project, as well as a much worse image of the initiative
in countries that are not so far part of the BRI. Perceptions of the BRI
have partly suffered from a deteriorating image of China itself abroad,
and partly from what is perceived as an excessive Chinese presence
in many countries, in terms of direct investment, trade relations and
foreign indebtedness.
As a likely consequence of the deteriorating perception of the BRI,
other group-type diplomatic initiatives have recently been set up –
because Beijing’s need to build international consensus as a positive
development and security player has not waned – namely the twin Global
Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI), not
to mention the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), which was proposed by
Chinese President Xi Jinping at the CPC in Dialogue with World Political
Parties High-Level Meeting in 2023. Unlike the BRI, which was officially
inspired and led by the PRC, both the new initiatives are “born global”, i.e.
they have been launched within the UN system, as partnerships in which
China is a sponsor, but not the official leading country.
The decision to launch such initiatives within the UNGA suggests that
China is pursuing a very different strategy compared to the group

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 China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

diplomacy activated to expand BRI participation. Today, China’s desire is

to play a central role in the context of multilateral development promotion
within the UN system. In particular, China wants to associate its activities
within the Global Development Initiative (the contours of which are still
very vague, however, as they were for the BRI) with the UN’s policies
to achieve its Sustainable Development Goals by 2030, with a focus on
poverty reduction, food security and economic recovery. At present, no
specific numbers are available for the GDI, but it has already been used
as a basis for creating a consensus group within the United Nations.

21/9/2021 As reported by the UN website,32 Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed

the Global Development Initiative when addressing the general debate
The Global Development of the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly, on 21
Initiative is launched
September 2021. The GDI aims to support the timely achievement
of all 17 SDGs of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by
revitalising a global development partnership. His speech was entitled
“Bolstering Confidence and Jointly Overcoming Difficulties to Build a
Better World”. In June 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping chaired the
High-level Dialogue on Global Development under the theme “Foster a
Global Development Partnership for the New Era to Jointly Implement
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”. As of October 2022,
more than 100 countries and international organisations have expressed
their support for the Initiative and 68 countries have joined the Group of
Friends of the GDI at the UN.
While the GDI has received very little attention from Western observers,
and in some cases is almost unknown even to Chinese experts, much
more attention has been focused on the Global Security Initiative (GSI),
which was proposed at the Asian session of the Boao Forum on 21 April.
The greater interest inevitably depends on the fact that we are in the
21/4/2022 middle of an ongoing war and an initiative on security appears much
more tangible than one on development. However, even in this case, the
The Global Security
Initiative is announced actual implications are very vague. The bottom line is not what it seems.
As in the case of the GDI, the GSI is a narrative construction to attract
international consensus for the Chinese goal of revising the existing
international order. It is no coincidence that articles accompanying
the launch in the Chinese press lament the inadequacy of the world
security architecture and its alleged bias in favour of the West. We
should therefore not expect any GSI-related military actions – instead
this concept will be used as a basis for bilateral discussions with smaller
countries that will give their political endorsement for a Chinese world

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Policy Paper

view in order to obtain security agreements or, in other cases, economic

development in return. The GDI was not mentioned during Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s trip to the Pacific Islands in May 2022, but
the GDI was the second item in the Ministry’s communiqué, referring
directly to the UN Sustainable Agenda.
Overall, China’s diplomatic engagement in and with the South has
evolved from traditional bilateral ties to a wide-ranging set of tools and
frameworks aimed at bringing together the voices from the South into
a more cohesive group, at least in international affairs. Under Xi Jinping,
China has accelerated its outreach to developing countries, and applied
its use of the label “South-South cooperation” more generally. A related
idea of a “new type of South-South cooperation” was initiated to coincide
with a redefinition of the South. This cooperation is to be led by China
acting as the economic and diplomatic leader (i.e. a Global China) of a
developing world whose collective weight now allows it to play a central
role in international affairs – a Global South.

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

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Policy Paper

BOX 1
THIRD BELT AND ROAD FORUM CONFIRMS
HOW DIVIDED THE WORLD IS*

Alicia Garcìa Herrero

W
hile the world continued to sleepwalk This time around, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia
into a cold war after events in Ukraine Meloni also reversed her country’s tradition of joining
and Israel-Gaza, the third global summit the first two summits, but she had already made that
of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) intention clear in an official announcement at the
took place in Beijing on 17-18 October. Group of Twenty meeting in September.
Based on the participation and main outcomes, Apart from the attendance, this summit was
this summit looks very different from the first, different because it focused much less on
which took place in May 2017, or even the second improving trade and investment connectivity
in April 2019. through building infrastructure and much
Firstly, a lot fewer heads of state participated: more on foreign policy. This might be related
only 23 this time, down from 37 at the second to China’s increasing disengagement in some
summit. Secondly, several of the participants of the countries concerned, at least in terms of
were anti-Western regimes, with Russia’s lending and investment. China’s much-reduced
President Vladimir Putin as guest of honour. investment globally, including in BRI countries, is
Another landmark was the presence of Taliban probably a consequence of bad experiences with
delegates from Afghanistan. Hungary’s Viktor some of the enterprises as, reportedly, one-third
Orban participated as expected (he did not miss of BRI projects have run into trouble.
either of the previous summits) but this time he In addition, China’s GDP growth in 2023 was
also officially declared his opposition to the de- only half of 2012, when Xi Jinping conceived
risking strategy employed as part of the European this landmark project. The Chinese economy
Union’s economic-security strategy. is struggling with a real estate collapse and an
At the other end of the political spectrum, no EU increasingly heavy debt burden, which makes it
member joined the BRI Forum other than Orban, difficult to keep funding BRI projects.
while no fewer than six and seven (respectively) On the foreign policy front, the general theme of
joined the 2017 and 2019 summits. the summit reflected opposition to the policies of

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

the United States and its allies. This has important so we should expect that the BRI – even with the
consequences for the war in Ukraine, as the EU current inclination toward foreign policy – will
and the US painfully experienced during United remain very much a hub-and-spoke system.
Nations (UN) voting on Ukraine-related issues. Given all the above, the final question is how
The Global South marching alone with China important the BRI will remain. According to
has become much more evident with the more Beijing’s BRI white paper for the summit,
recent Israel-Gaza and the lack of support for “China will continue to promote the BRI as
Israel and the US at the UN. its overarching plan and its top-level design
More generally, Beijing’s relations with the Global for opening up and win-win international
South have become key for China, and the BRI is a cooperation.” This means that China’s leadership
useful platform for this purpose even if still below, has no intention to see the BRI die out. On
in terms of China’s own hierarchy at its Ministry of the contrary, the plan seems to be that of
Foreign Affairs (MoFA), to the “global community a transformation of the BRI away from a
of shared future”. In other words, President Xi connectivity platform for trade and investment
Jinping’s vision of where China places itself in the to a foreign policy, and even security, tool. The
world is much broader than the BRI since it covers reason for this transformation is two-fold. Firstly,
the whole world with China at the center. China can no longer afford to finance so much
infrastructure in the emerging/developing world.
Going back to the BRI, and even if foreign
Secondly, in a world of strategic competition in
policy were the overriding theme, any such
which the US pushes to keep its allies, China
summit needs some specific deliverables to
needs to find its own. This means that the BRI
claim success. Among the wealth of measures
does not need so many members but that those
announced, a few stand out. Firstly, “integrity-
members should be aligned with China. This is
based” (anti-corruption) and “clean” (green)
key for pushing through common standards and
were the key objectives that accompanied
projects that might face opposition from the US
most references to the BRI, given the frequent
and the West in general.
criticism on corruption, financing of coal plants,
etc. Secondly, a global artificial intelligence To conclude, the BRI is becoming one of China’s
(AI) governance initiative was also announced. key instruments for building an increasingly anti-
Interestingly, though, the financial commitments Western agenda. Some see this agenda as a
made by China were very small compared to those response to the United States’ bipartisan interest
in the past, namely the RMB equivalent of USD 48 in containing China’s rise toward hegemony.
billion of additional resources for policy banks, and Others believe that China started this race.
USD 11 billion for the Silk Road Fund. There was Independently on who started this race, we
also no announcement of any relevant multilateral Europeans should not fool ourselves as to where
framework being created to support BRI projects, we are.

This is an updated of an article appeared on Asian Times

on 20 October 2023: A. Garcia Herrero, “Third Belt and
Road Forum confirms how divided the world is", Asia Times,
20 October 2023.

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Policy Paper

As a result of its rapidly expanding and deepening engagement in

economic and diplomatic relations with most countries in the developing
world, China’s rising influence in the Global South has grown into a
complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Many studies emphasise
China’s significant and evolving role in the Global South. For example,
Vadell (2014) explored the unbalanced relationship between China and
the Global South,33 characterising it as a new centre-periphery global
network power. Hung (2018) discussed the diverse impact of Chinese
capital in the Global South,34 particularly in the extractive, infrastructure
and trade sectors. Chen (2018) highlighted the impact of China’s
westward development on its Asian neighbours. Murphy (2022) argued
that China is constructing an alternate international order in the Middle

1991-20
East and Sub-Saharan Africa.35 At the same time, China has leveraged
its diplomatic and economic ties with the G-77 group to influence its
Sino–Russian members’ voting decisions within the UNGA (Figure 5).36
positions in the UNGA
enjoy broader global More recently, Nurullayev and Papa (2023) studied how China and
support than those Russia have been progressively deepening their partnership in global
of the US governance to achieve common goals and how other states share their
policy positions.37 To investigate how states align with the positions of
these major powers, they examine voting patterns in the UN General
Assembly over a 30-year period from 1991 to 2020. Results show that the
Sino-Russian positions enjoy much broader global support than those of
the United States. Additionally, states that belong to the Group of 77 (G-
77) and soft-balancing institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are
more likely to align with China and Russia than states that do not belong
to these groups. Conversely, members of NATO are more likely to side
with the United States than their non-NATO counterparts. The affinity of
G-77 as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), BRICS,
and their outreach states toward China-Russia positions increases over
time. However, the affinity of NATO countries toward US positions lacks
a clear temporal trajectory. These findings suggest a growing level of
fragmentation along bloc lines within the UNGA, with states belonging
to formal alliances demonstrating less bloc-oriented behaviour than
those in informal intergovernmental groups.38

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

A CONTEST FOR LEADERSHIP IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

China’s diplomatic and economic engagement in the South has increased
exponentially since the beginning of the XXI century. In contrast with
the timid approach that prevailed in the past, China has totally reserved
the course of its international outreach to increase its foreign economic
presence and diplomatic influence. The new China in international affairs
– increasingly called “Global China” – is increasingly perceived as acting
very much like a self-proclaimed leader of the developing world.
Becoming the leader of the Global South is what Beijing’s diplomacy
towards the South has so far achieved through a variety of approaches:
the traditional bilateral relations, “global multilateral” (i.e. UN diplomacy),
a relatively new mode, launched by China in the early twenty-first century,
as “collective diplomacy for developing regions” (such as FOCAC or 14
+ 1), and “group-type multilateral diplomacy” (such as “G77 and China”),
which is a form of collective diplomacy within the UN system.
However, the other large developing countries in the South have
become less and less comfortable with China’s self-proclaimed role.
Most of them have been growing economically and geopolitically into
what are now called rising powers of the South, or the Emerging South,
and stand out as a much more assertive part of the Global South. This
is chiefly the case of India, which engages in global governance fora as
much as China.
With India set to become the third largest world economy in the next
five years, it is increasingly unlikely it will passively accept a China-led
Global South. India and China have both positioned themselves with
reference to their global power aspirations, and questions of solidarity
with (the rest of) the “Global South.” Chinese and Indian engagement
patterns have been rather different with reference to the Group of 20
(G20) and the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) alliance. As
China has so far been quite successful in manoeuvring both inside and
outside spaces traditionally associated with the multilateral “South”,39
India has tried to claim a more visible role as a large emerging country
within the Global South.
In this spirit India hosted a special Voice of Global South Summit, “Unity
of voice, Unity of purpose,” from 12-13 January 2023. It was a new and
unique initiative that envisaged bringing together countries of the Global
South and share their perspectives on a common platform. The Indian
government suggested that the relevant existing platforms have proven
to be inadequate in addressing these challenges and the developing

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countries’ concerns. The initiative was inspired by Prime Minister Shri
Narendra Modi’s vision of Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas Sabka Vishwas aur
Sabka Prayas (Together with all, development for all and the trust of all),
and also underpinned by India’s philosophy of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam
(The entire world is a family). The Voice of Global South Summit was
India’s endeavour to provide a common platform to deliberate on the
concerns, interests and priorities that affect developing countries, in line
with India’s presidency of the G20, which provided India with a special,
strong opportunity to channel these inputs into G20 deliberations and
discourse.

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

BOX 2
BETWEEN BRICS & G20: INDIA & GLOBAL SOUTH
ARE A RESOLUTE MATCH!*

Jagannath P. Panda

I
n November 2023, a year after its much- beyond the confines of the capital city of New
celebrated and talked about presidency of the Delhi and for popularizing the bloc (and its
Group of Twenty (G20) – an economic-focused agenda) among not just domestically but across
forum with a broad ambit embracing today’s the developing world. The almost year-long
pressing challenges – India finally passed the events (about 200) in more than 50 cities across
baton to Brazil via a virtual closing summit. With India have certainly forwarded the notion of G20
two G20 and two Voice of Global South summits as an accessible, people-centric forum.
held during its 2023 presidency, India has provided
As such, the criticism in some quarters about India
momentum to its Global South-centered rejig of
creating a “barnstorming carnival” buzz over a
international governance. India intends to fast-
rotating presidency rang somewhat unwarranted
track not only equitable growth and representation
and smacked of the very underlying elitism the
for the developing world, but also its multipolar
emerging and developing world constantly faces.
world aspirations by demonstrating its convening
More so because in recent history, the Global
and consensus-building power.
South has not received even a fraction of the
The evolving non-Western meeting ground of attention India’s diplomatic endeavors managed to
an expanding BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China- garner during its G20 presidency.
South Africa), which is also looking to reform
In this context, the historic, albeit belated, entry
multilateralism while reconfiguring the Western
of the African Union (EU) into the G20 was one
dominance in global geopolitical narrative and
of the core achievements. Increasing Africa’s
institutions, has provided another avenue for
representation in the G20 by also inviting two
such a mission. How far will India’s political intent
African states as summit observers is not just
transcend the global fragmentation?
a question of Global South solidarity but also
politically relevant, including to counter China’s
THE G20 JUGGERNAUT
growing clout in the continent.
One of the foremost features of India’s G20
Besides, India also succeeded in initiating
presidency was its projection of the G20 as a
projects (from working groups to conferences) on
people’s forum, both in terms of the foreign
topical themes including Startup 20; disaster risk
participants experiencing an emerging India

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Policy Paper

reduction; climate-resilient and nutritious grains New Delhi has used its watershed moment as
(with a focus on millets, a “superfood” favored in G-20 president to strategically advance the
many developing countries); green, responsible economic, human, climate, and developmental
consumption; women-led development; and interests and concerns of developing nations.
technological transformation.
In particular, as a vocal proponent of integrating
The latest highlight is the creation of a Social Impact environmental considerations and social
Fund to build the Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) equity into G-20 discussions, India has been
in the Global South countries, with India’s initial making the right noises in promoting a just
contribution of US$25 million. The DPI project is transition to cleaner energy sources. The UN
a viable means to accelerate sustainable growth Assistant Secretary-General Ligia Noronha, too,
and development, as evidenced by its successful has hailed the just transition efforts as “being
implementation in India. finally given the attention they deserve.”
Importantly, the release of a joint Delhi Declaration Thus, even as India’s G20 extravaganza suggests
amid deep-seated fragmentation between the an image-building exercise, that is not the whole
Global South and West on areas ranging from truth: India has sought to use its leadership
climate action to the Ukraine war was an incredible rhetoric to pave the way for a new, more
achievement for India’s diplomacy. At the same inclusive, and open global order. Furthermore,
time, criticism about the language on the Ukraine Delhi has championed values like inclusivity and
war, which even though “refrained” countries from a more balanced economic order, by calling for
forceful territorial “acquisition” did not condemn fair trade and investment practices, addressing
Russia’s actions, did highlight a lost chance for trade barriers and protectionism that hinder the
establishing a strong anti-war rhetoric. But that a economic progress of Global South nations,
consensus was at all possible indicated the power better financial inclusion, healthcare, education,
of compromise. and bridging the digital divide.
Announcements such as establishing a Green
WITHER INDIA’S CLOUT IN BRICS+?
Hydrogen Innovation Centre; upping climate
finance; enhancing digital inclusion; addressing debt The 2023 BRICS Summit in Johannesburg
vulnerabilities; and “reinvigorating” multilateralism was another milestone event with its historic
enhanced the Global South’s visibility. expansion inviting six states Argentina, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE and the
The launch of an inter-regional rail and shipping
emphasis on using local currencies for trade and
initiative, the India Middle East Europe Corridor
investment. Argentina’s refusal to come on board
(IMEC), was also being seen as a counter to the
has had little effect on the grouping’s allure in the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, the Hamas-
developing world or the new momentum toward
Israel war has for the time being put a spanner
South-South cooperation.
in the works. The inherent value of the ambitious
IMEC lies in boosting trade, energy, and digital The presence of six of the 10 top oil producers
connectivity, which should work as an incentive for reflects that BRICS+ will be extraordinarily important
the war-weary Middle East in the long term. for not just energy trade but also shaping the
sustainability-oriented economic development.
Above all, via unprecedented four summits within
The West disregards this growing forum of the so-
a year, where over 150 world leaders participated,
called “globally grumpy” at its own peril.

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

As regards the expansion helping China’s clout cake. India is certainly in a position to act as a glu-
in Global South, certainly China’s economic, ing agent between the West and the East while
political, and diplomatic resources have championing the concerns of the Global South.
allowed it greater dominance in non-Western Even the state-owned Chinese media has grudg-
forums, including the expanded BRICS. The ingly accepted that India’s G20 presidency was
China-brokered Saudi-Iranian deal; China’s gaining worldwide attention, which could “turn
strengthened synergy with Brazil; and its latest this influence into a driving force for growth.”
pro-Palestinian neutrality in the Hamas-Israel war,
In this vein, the Chinese President Xi Jinping
among other efforts, have propelled its stakes as
not attending any of the summit meetings was
a Global South leader.
downplayed even by China. And Russian Presi-
Notwithstanding such concerns, the consen- dent Vladimir Putin speaking at the virtual summit
sus-backed expansion of the BRICS has strength- marked a “rare interaction” with the West in a
ened India’s Global South proposition that pri- multilateral setting since Ukraine’s invasion. This
marily centers around values like inclusivity and highlights India’s growing sway among friends
diverse representation. India’s growing economic and rivals in the emerging Asian and Indo-Pa-
fortunes coupled with India’s cooperative, con- cific security architecture – from the China-led
sultations-based efforts, as evidenced by its out- Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to the
reach during Global South summits, in contrast US-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).
to China’s “declining power” trajectory amid BRI’s
Moreover, India’s successful balancing of its part-
growing “debt-trap diplomacy” concerns will for
nerships, whether they be oil trade-based with
now make India a more attractive option.
Russia or security with the US, as well its policy of
Moreover, the 2023 BRICS summit highlighted reiterating dialogue and diplomacy as a way out
that China’s anti-West agenda will not find favor of conflicts has paved the way for an optimistic
among the majority in the Global South, which multilateral trajectory.
would rather focus on economic development
In sum, both the BRICS summit and India’s G20
measures and climate action than get caught up
presidency has pushed forth the strengthening
in major power geopolitical battles.
of multipolarity as an abiding change. It has also
signaled that the world indeed is undergoing a
ENGENDERING MULTIPOLARITY,
re-balancing of sorts, with the Global South no
REINVIGORATING MULTILATERALISM
longer willing to be contained on the sidelines.
For India, both the BRICS summit and the G-20 At the same time, the promise of consensus
presidency outcomes have become markers building has instilled hopes for revitalizing endan-
of its economic and technological growth; the gered multilateralism.
Global South leadership has been the icing on its

* This article is a revised and updated version of the

article that first appeared on/in Korea on Point on
11 September 2023: J. Panda, “Between BRICS & G20:
India & Global South Are a Resolute Match!”, Korea
on point, Korean Association of International Studies,
11 September 2023.

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Policy Paper

Exploring Options

Compared to Beijing’s longstanding and extensive outreach to the

Global South, Western engagement with developing countries seems to
have been forgotten. Yet the major donors of foreign aid to developing
countries were always and still are all in the North, with the United States
being first (US$55.28 billion in 2022), Germany (US$35.02 billion), Japan
(US$17.48 billion), France (US$15.88 billion), United Kingdom (US$15.75
billion), Canada (US$7.83 billion), Netherlands (US$6.47 billion), Italy
(US$6.47 billion), Sweden (US$5.46 billion), Norway (US$5.16 billion),
Switzerland (US$5.46 billion) and Spain (US$4.21 billion).40
This shows that the traditional cooperation channels and mechanisms
are not as effective as other more market-based flows. In other words,
the standard cooperation mechanism through state aid or even
concessional loans does not secure closeness or affinity like the win-
win initiatives led by China, which emphasises the mutual benefits
achievable from cooperation activities.
This divergence in cooperation models and resulting geopolitical
influence led many in the West to take it for granted that the United
States and Europe may have lost out to China. However, China’s influence
on the Global South was leveraged on large discrepancies in economic
performance that initially fostered hopes of the poorest developing
countries catching up, but progressively led to continued divergencies
within the Global South. The “Emerging South” has benefited much more
from the current China-led model of SSC than the rest of the South. Many
poor developing countries are not getting any benefit from the growth
and rise of the Global South, the effects of which are concentrated in a
few stronger developing economies. At the same time, poor countries’
indebtedness vis-à-vis China has increased, often to alert levels. China is
now the largest creditor to many of the world’s poorest countries, which
places Beijing in a similar position to that of other major Western donors,
or even more so, due to its great influence over their economic direction.
This is perhaps the most obvious signal of rising power imbalances
between China and the rest of the South.

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

However, the national image of China among developing countries is

largely positive. According to Schuman (2023),41 a 2022 global poll by
the YouGov-Cambridge Globalism Project noted “an obvious divide
between the West and other parts of the world in general sentiment”
toward China. In Saudi Arabia and Egypt, 57% expressed a positive view
of China’s role in the world; other figures included Mexico 59%; Brazil
50%; Indonesia 53%; Thailand 66%; Kenya 82%; Nigeria 83%; and South
Africa 61%.
China’s new strong influence on the Global South has started being
perceived as excessive by some recipient developing countries, such
as some small countries in the South Pacific.42 At the same time, Papua
New Guinea, Palau, and Micronesia have all recently signed agreements
with the United States and in September 2023, US President Joe Biden
hosted a summit with the 18 members of the Pacific Island Forum at
the White House. This had led some observers in the United States
to conclude that the game is not over on the Global South, and that
the various points of contention between China and some developing
countries could be leveraged to secure more affinity between the South
and the West or North.43
The recommended approach to counterbalance the leading role of
China in the Global South included, most importantly, the need for the

2023 West and North to improve their overall group image and individual
national images, to combat the increasing fascination exerted by China.
US President Joe According to the Atlantic Council, the West needs to “offer a fresh vision”
Biden hosted a of what the relationship between developed and developing countries
summit with the should be in the future. “This framework should also stress the benefits
18 members of the
of open societies and civil liberties to counter China’s pro-authoritarian
Pacific Island Forum
at the White House principles.” Furthermore, that vision should be supported with real
money, with reference to the launch of two infrastructure programmes to
compete with China’s BRI – the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure
and Investment and the European Union’s Global Gateway Strategy.
Instead of mimicking China style initiatives, focused mostly on
infrastructure projects, we see a need to upgrade the overall scale and
scope of traditional cooperation in favour of broader partnerships. In
the current geopolitical context, the need to counterbalance China’s
economic and political influence on the rest of the South is increasing
among Western countries as well as among the rest of the Emerging
South, and maybe also among many of the poorest countries in the

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Policy Paper

South. The increasing divergence in the benefits of SSC between China

on the one hand and the rest of the South on the other is creating scope
for new economic and geopolitical alliances. For both sides, the need to
de-risk from China creates a common interest towards comprehensive
partnerships between developed and developing countries, with the
aim of promoting economic interaction and production sharing. This will
be appealing for the Emerging South and progressively also for the rest
of the South.
China started increasing its economic presence in the South by attracting
countries with the win-win benefits of China-led initiatives. Over time, it
has become progressively clearer that the odds are stacked on China’s
side and concerns are rising that a new type of dependence is taking
place, to the detriment of the development objectives of the poorest
countries. China’s claim that it is the natural leader of the South vis-
à-vis the North is increasingly less justified. In fact, there is a contest
for leadership among emerging countries in the South. This should
be leveraged by developed countries to establish more sustainable
relations with the South.
In late 2022 and early 2023, the European Union (EU) launched the Global
Gateway, an international infrastructure development plan aimed at
increasing Europe's connectivity with the rest of the world, in particular
with developing countries in the European neighbourhood. Launched
in December 2021, it is part of a broader approach to guarantee the
EU strategic autonomy through consistent design of its international
economic relations with the rest of the world. The Global Gateway is
the first European infrastructure plan of a global nature. Before there
had been no real overall strategy, as well as a mismatch between
key EU interests and the resources in place to address key strategic
vulnerabilities. In a way, the plan provides structure and coherence to
the action of the Union in the field of infrastructure investments. At the
same time, it reinforces the previous plans for European connectivity
with the rest of the world, through partnerships such as the 2018’s
EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy, the 2019’s Partnership on Sustainable
Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure between the European Union
and Japan and the EU-India Connectivity Partnership.
To December 2022, the EIB launched the Global Gateway Fund (Ggf),
aimed at encouraging private sector investment in developing countries,
with funds earmarked 40% for sustainable infrastructure projects, 40%

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

to support the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises in these

countries, and 20% in project finance. In addition, at the end of February
2023, the EIB and the European Commission signed an agreement to
mobilise loans and guarantees amounting to €4 billion for projects in
Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa (Acp countries) until 2027. In
April 2023, the EIB and the Commission concluded a further agreement
providing for €18 billion of additional investment under the Global
Gateway. This brings total investments of the EIB Global Financial
Instrument to €31 billion under the Global Gateway, in line with the
objective of investing EUR 100 billion by 2027.
The Global Gateway plan aims to mobilise up to €300 billion by 2027.
It is the European attempt to contribute to the reduction of the global
infrastructure gap of approximately USD 15 trillion and offer an alternative
investment model to that proposed by Beijing. The sectors identified
as central to the European strategy are the digital sector, climate and
energy, transport, health, education and research. The partnerships
that the EU will establish will be based on fundamental principles
identified by the Commission such as high-quality standards, respect
for democratic values, good project governance and transparency,
equal partnerships, green investments, security and attraction of private
investment through public-private partnerships (PPP). In this respect, the
need to leverage private investment should not overshadow, but always
go along with a rigorous assessment of private entities involved, so as to
guarantee high quality standards and promote the quality upgrading of
firms participating in the plan.

OUR TAKE
The financing of infrastructure abroad through the Global Gateway
could promote the dissemination of European standards and values in
the world, reinforcing the objectives of the European industrial policy
objectives and the market penetration capacity of European companies
and could facilitate the achievement of decarbonisation goals in the
rest of the world, a key principle of the European green strategy. The
ambition to go beyond mere financing of investments and infrastructures
is in fact confirmed not only by the Commission, the involvement of
the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Defence Policy,
Josep Borrell, as well as the Commissioners for Neighbourhood and
Enlargement, and for International Partnerships. Global Gateway is
therefore a candidate to become one of the main instruments of the

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Policy Paper

European Union's external action in the immediate future and one of the
cornerstones of its industrial policy. Alongside the proposal for a new
EU Net Zero Industry Act, the European Green Deal, the Chips Act, the
Critical Raw Materials Act, the Strategic Compass and the RePower EU
plan, the European Gateway represents a fundamental building block
for the realisation of the Union's economic and geopolitical objectives
of the Union, as well as for the strengthening of its competitiveness and
resilience in a scenario of increasing tensions.
However, potential obstacles could hamper effective implementation.
As the EU Global Gateway seems to be an attempt to catch up with
competing plans such as the Chinese BRI, new funding needs to be
put on the table and not simply reformulations or shifts of already
earmarked funds and the private sector should be more and more
thoroughly assessed, through strong scrutiny in the design and technical
and financial feasibility (as well as verification of environmental and
social standards. Moreover, preconditions for establishing an effective
international competition must be secured, so as not to penalize
European firms competing with firms from third countries where lower
quality standards prevail.
In an era characterised by hyper-competitiveness between powers,
in the words of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, any
ambition for strategic autonomy cannot be detached from a solid
external action aimed at strengthening ties with partner countries and
reducing the strategic dependencies of the Union. This is even more
pressing considering the awakening of the infrastructure sector in the
United States, with $1.2 trillion Bipartisan Infrastructure Law passed by
the US Congress in 2021. That tool is specifically aimed to strengthen
national infrastructure companies, making them more solid and efficient
in the domestic market and, subsequently, better prepared to face
international competition in third-country markets.

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

Notes
1. A. García-Herrero and R. Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, the
Schindowski, “Global trends in Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,
countries’ perceptions of the Belt Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Democratic
and Road Initiative”, Working Paper Republic of Vietnam, State of
04/2023, Bruegel, 2023. Vietnam, and Kingdom of Yemen.
2. When Wang Yi, then serving as Acharya, Amitav, “Studying the
China’s Foreign Minister, went on an Bandung conference from a Global
expedition through the South Pacific IR perspective”, Australian Journal
in mid-2022, carrying a security and of International Affairs, vol. 70, no. 4,
economic pact he expected the 2016, pp. 342-57.
leaders of the island nations there to 9. Indonesia’s President at that time,
sign, he got no support in the region. Sukarno, referred to it as “the first
3. M. Schuman, Why China won’t intercontinental conference of
win the Global South, Report, The coloured peoples in the history
Atlantic Council, October 2023. of mankind”. He added that
“Now we are free, sovereign, and
4. At least, this was the original
independent. We are again masters
meaning of the term, as first used
in our own house. We do not need
by Carl Oglesby in 1969, in a special
to go to other continents to confer”,
issue on the Vietnam War published
Ibid.
in Catholic journal Commonweal,
where he wrote that centuries of 10. Ibid.
northern “dominance over the global 11. S. Haug, J. Braveboy-Wagner and G.
south […] [has] converged […] to Maihold, “The ‘Global South’ in the
produce an intolerable social order”. study of world politics: examining
5. P.J. Kohlenberg and N. Godehardt, a meta category”, Third World
“Locating the ‘South’ in China’s Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 9, 2021, pp.
connectivity politics”, Third World 1923-44, DOI:10.1080/01436597.202
Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 9, 2021, pp. 1.1948831, cit. p. 1924.
1963-81. 12. Ibid.
6. J. Braveboy-Wagner, The Idea 13. Ibid.
of the Global South: The Limits 14. R. Horner and K. Nadvi, “Global
of the Material and the Need for value chains and the rise of the
Imagination, Working Paper, 2018. Global South: unpacking twenty-
1–18. first century polycentric trade”,
7. N. Dados and R. Connell, The Global Networks, vol. 18, no. 2, 2017,
Global South, Contexts, vol. 11, pp. 207-37.
no. 1, 2012, pp. 12-13, https://doi. 15. This section is mostly taken from A.
org/10.1177/1536504212436479 Amighini and M. Sanfilippo, “Impact
8. The conference was sponsored of South–South FDI and Trade on
by Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, the Export Upgrading of African
and Pakistan, and was attended by Economies”, World Development,
these 29 independent countries: vol. 6, 2017, pp. 1-17.
Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, 16. S. Gelb, South-South investment: the
Ceylon, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, case of Africa in Africa in the world
Gold Coast, India, Indonesia, Iran, economy – The national, regional
Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon,

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Policy Paper

and international challenges, The 25. China-CEEC (or China-CEE) is the

Hague, Fondad, 2005. Cooperation between China and
17. Amighini and Sanfilippo (2017). Central and Eastern European
Countries. It is known as 14+1
18. F. Demir and L. Sunhyung,
initiative; formerly 17+1 from 2019
“Foreign direct investment, capital
to 2021 and 16+1 from 2021 to 2022,
accumulation, and growth: The rise
prior to the 2022 withdrawal of
of the Emerging South”, International
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It is an
Review of Economics and Finance,
initiative by the Chinese Ministry of
vol. 80, 2022, pp. 779-94.
Foreign Affairs to promote business
19. Available at N2306307.pdf (un.org). and investment relations between
20. Here the classification of countries China and now 14 countries of
in the Global South, as opposed Central and Eastern Europe, some
to “Global North” is taken from the of which Member States of the
United Nations Finance Center for European Union: Albania, Bosnia and
South-South Cooperation, who Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the
maintains arguably the world’s most Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary,
reputable and reliable list of Global Montenegro, North Macedonia,
South countries. It is available at Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia,
https://worldpopulationreview. and Slovenia.
com/country-rankings/global- 26. According to Reuters, “China had
south-countries. insisted that they treat it as a ‘market
21. M.R. Farzanegan and H.F. Gholipour, economy’, countering their view that
“Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the price of Chinese exports could
votes in favor of Russia in the UN not be taken at face value due to
General Assembly”, International state interference in the economy.
Interactions, vol. 49, 2023, DOI: It took legal action saying that
10.1080/03050629.2023.2179046 under its 2001 WTO membership
22. As discussed by S. Breslin, “China terms it must be recognized as a
and the South: objectives, actors ‘market economy’ after 15 years”.
and interactions”, Development https://www.reuters.com/article/
and Change, vol. 44, no. 6, 2013, pp. idUSKCN1TI107/#:~:text=China%20
1273-94 who collected articles and had%20insisted%20that%20
statements from the Foreign Ministry they,market%20economy%22%20
that deal with South-South relations, after%2015%20years.
starting from the Foreign Ministry 27. During the first decades of
formal “position” (lichang) on “South- economic reforms, Chinese
South Cooperation” in 2003, with the leaders mostly followed the
aim to describe its objectives and principles laid down by Deng
the actors involved, i.e. State-Owned Xiaoping, namely “keeping a low
Enterprises, beyond the Ministry of profile in the management of
Foreign Affairs. international affairs”. From Deng
23. Kohlenberg and Godehardt (2021), Xiaoping’s suggestion to “hide one’s
p. 1963. capabilities, bide one’s time, get
things done where possible”, the
24. Kohlenberg and Godehardt (2021), leadership change in 2012 marked
p. 1964.

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China's Grip on the Global South: Here to Stay?

a major shift in the strategic thinking 37. D. Nurullayev and M. Papa, “Bloc
of Chinese leaders from a ‘small Politics at the UN: How Other States
country’ to a “big country” mentality. Behave When the United States
28. A. Amighini, Money and Might along and China-Russia Disagree”, Global
the Belt and Road, Milan, Bocconi Studies Quarterly, vol. 3, 2023, pp.
University Press, 2021. 1-11.
29. For example, Timothy R. Heath 38. A.F. Cooper, “China, India and the
argued that “Chinese authorities pattern of G20/BRICS engagement:
insist any country can become a differentiated ambivalence
partner, but a closer look at official between ‘rising’ power status and
statements makes it clear that solidarity with the Global South”,
the real aim is to build a political Third World Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 9,
coalition of developing countries” 2021, pp. 1945-62.
(RAND Blog, 8 October 2018, https:// 39. J. Panda, “Between BRICS & G20:
www.rand.org/blog/2018/10/ India & Global South Are a Resolute
what-does-chinas-pursuit-of-a- Match!”, Korea on point, Korean
globalcoalition-mean.html). Association of International Studies,
30. Italy was a notable case, when 11 September 2023
it signed an MoU in 2019 and 40. Data from Statista, available
joined the BRI, until it did not at https://www.statista.com/
confirm willingness to extend its statistics/263287/ranking-of-the-
participation in 2024. largest-development-aid-donors/
31. García-Herrero and Schindowski 41. Schuman (2023).
(2023). 42. When Wang Yi, then serving as
32. https://sdgs.un.org/partnerships/ China’s foreign minister, went on an
global-development-initiative- expedition through the South Pacific
building-2030-sdgs-stronger- in mid-2022, carrying a security and
greener-and-healthier-global economic pact he expected the
33. J. Vadell, L. Ramos, P. Neves, "The leaders of the island nations there to
international implications of the sign, he got no support in the region.
Chinese model of development in 43. Schuman (2023).
the Global South: Asian Consensus
as a network power", Revista
Brasileira de Política Internacional,
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações
Internacionais Brasília, Brasil vol. 57,
2014, pp. 91-107.
34. Ho-fung Hung, "The tapestry of
Chinese capital in the Global South,"
Palgrave Communications, Palgrave
Macmillan, vol. 4, no. 1, December
2018, pp. 1-6.
35. C.M. Dawn, China's Rise in the Global
South: The Middle East, Africa, and
Beijing's Alternative World Order,
Oxford University Press, 2022.
36. T. Takahashi, “Rising and Leading:
China with the G77 at the United
Nations General Assembly”, Social
Science Research Network,
3944408, 18 November 2021.

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Policy Paper

About the Authors

• Alessia Amighini, Co-Head of Asia Centre and Senior Associate Research
Fellow at ISPI. She is Associate Professor of Economics at the Department of
Economic and Business Studies (DiSEI) at the University of Piemonte Orientale
(Novara, Italy) and a non-resident fellow at Bruegel. Amighini previously
worked as an Associate Economist at the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD, Geneva, Switzerland). Alessia holds a PhD in
Development Economics from the University of Florence (Italy) and a Master in
Economics as well as a BA in Economics from Bocconi University (Milan, Italy).
She has published in many international peer-reviewed journals such as China
Economic Review, World Development, The World Economy, International
Economics, China and the World Economy. Her latest book is Money and Might
along the Belt and Road (Milan: Bocconi University Press 2021).
• Alicia Garcìa Herrero, Senior fellow at Bruegel. She is the Chief Economist for
Asia Pacific at French investment bank Natixis, based in Hong Kong and is an
independent Board Member of AGEAS insurance group. Alicia also serves as
a non-resident Senior fellow at the East Asian Institute (EAI) of the National
University Singapore (NUS). Alicia is also Adjunct Professor at the Hong Kong
University of Science and Technology (HKUST). Finally, Alicia is a Member of the
Council of the Focused Ultrasound Foundation (FUF), a Member of the Board of
the Centre for Asia Pacific Resilience and Innovation (CAPRI), a member of the
Council of Advisers on Economic Affairs to the Spanish Government, a member
of the Advisory Board of the Berlin-based Mercator Institute for China Studies
(MERICS) and an adviser to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s research arm
(HKIMR).
• Jagannath P. Panda is the Head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and
Indo-Pacific Affairs (SCSA-IPA) at the Institute for Security and Development
Policy (ISDP), Sweden. In addition to his primary appointment at ISDP, Dr. Panda
is a Visiting Professor at the University of Warsaw; the Director for Europe-Asia
Research Cooperation at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS);
and a Senior Fellow at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), The
Netherlands. Dr. Panda also holds several adjunct affiliations in various think
tanks and institutions in Asia/Indo-Pacific. As a senior expert on China, East
Asia, and Indo-Pacific affairs, Dr. Panda’s research focuses primarily on India’s
relations with Indo-Pacific powers (China, Japan, Korea, USA); China-India
Relations, EU-India Relations; and EU-Indo-Pacific interaction. Dr. Panda has
testified to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission at the
US Congress. He is the Series Editor for Routledge Studies on Think Asia, and
also the Editorial Board Member of the Journal of Asian Public Policy (JAPP:
Routledge).

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About
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