Received: 22 July 2021 Revised: 21 October 2021 Accepted: 8 December 2021

DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12804

ARTICLE

Philosophical foundations of mixed methods

research

Yafeng Shan

Department of Philosophy, University of Kent,

Canterbury, UK Abstract
This paper provides a critical review of the debate over the
Correspondence
philosophical foundations of mixed methods research and
Yafeng Shan, Department of Philosophy,
University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NZ, UK. examines the notion of philosophical foundations. It distin-
Email: [email protected]
guishes axiology-oriented from ontology-oriented philo-
Funding information sophical foundations. It also identifies three different senses
British Academy, Grant/Award Number: of philosophical foundations of mixed methods research.
SRG1920\101076; Leverhulme Trust, Grant/
Award Number: RPG-2019-059 The weak sense of philosophical foundations (e.g., pragma-
tism) merely allows the possibility of the integration of both
quantitative and qualitative methods/data/designs. The
moderate sense of philosophical foundations (e.g., trans-
formativism) provide a good reason to use mixed methods
in (at least some) social scientific research. The strong sense
of philosophical foundations (e.g., dialectical pluralism) justi-
fies a normative thesis that mixed methods research should
be encouraged in (at least some) social scientific research.

1 | INTRODUCTION

Since the last decade of the 20th century, mixed methods research has rapidly become more and more popular in
the social sciences, especially in educational research, family studies, and anthropology. There has been a sharp
increase of the number of publications mentioning mixed methods in the title or abstract over the past 20 years (Cre-
swell, 2012; Timans et al., 2019). This has been accompanied by the production of textbooks and handbooks and the
founding of journals (e.g., Journal of Mixed Methods Research and International Journal of Multiple Research Approaches).
However, some basic issues of mixed methods research are still under debate. Although mixed methods research
is roughly construed as a methodology, or a methodological orientation employing both qualitative and quantitative
elements (e.g., methods, data, and designs), there is still no consensus on its definition (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018;
Johnson et al., 2007; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). In addition, there is no consensus on how to mix or combine
qualitative and quantitative elements in research. There are at least seven ‘levels of research’ that can be mixed
or combined: data, methods, design, epistemology, ontology, purposes of research, and practical roles of research

Philosophy Compass. 2022;17:e12804. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/phc3 © 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 1 of 12
https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12804
 17479991, 2022, 1, Downloaded from https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12804 by North West University, Wiley Online Library on [19/08/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
2 of 12 SHAN

(Biesta, 2010). And there are various ways of mixing or combining these ‘levels’ (e.g., Creswell et al., 2003; Creswell
& Plano Clark, 2018; Grootel et al., 2020; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009).
What is more, there is no consensus on the philosophical foundations of mixed methods research: how to mo-
tivate and justify the use of mixed methods from a philosophical point of view is still controversial. There are a
variety of positions that are employed to provide philosophical foundations of mixed methods research. A popular
position is the pragmatist position (e.g., Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; Feilzer, 2010; Johnson et al., 2017; Johnson &
Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Morgan, 2007; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Other popular positions include the dialectical po-
sition (Greene, 2006; Greene et al., 1989; Greene & Hall, 2010), the dialectical pluralist position (Johnson, 2017), the
transformative position (Mertens, 2003, 2007, 2010), and the critical realist position (Maxwell & Mittapalli, 2010).1
In this paper, I provide a critical examination of the philosophical foundations of mixed methods research. The
paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the context of the origins of mixed methods research. Section 3
reviews the main accounts of the philosophical foundations of mixed methods research. Section 4 disambiguates
the notion of philosophical foundations and provides a critical analysis of these philosophical positions accordingly.

2 | THE CONTEXT OF THE ORIGINS OF MIXED METHODS RESEARCH

In the twentieth century social sciences, there were two popular approaches (or, methodologies): the quantitative
research approach and the qualitative research approach.2 The quantitative research approach relies on the collection
of quantitative data, obtained by the methods like experiments, quasi-experiments, surveys, and longitudinal studies,
while the qualitative research approach relies on the collection of qualitative data, obtained by the methods such
as narrative research, phenomenological research, ethnography, and case study. Traditionally, these two approaches
were parallel, or even mutually alien, to each other in practice (Kelle, 2015). For example, in sociology, there has been
a division between social theorists and quantitative researchers. Quantitative researchers focus on statistical models
and analyses and usually neglect the need to ‘develop sociological models mirroring conceptions of mechanisms of
social processes’ (Sørensen, 1998, p. 239). In contrast, social theorists are ‘often so concerned with their concepts
and theoretical frameworks that they pay little attention to the significance of quantitative findings’ (Mahoney, 2001,
p. 582). In political science, there has also been a methodological divide between the quantitative research approach
and qualitative research approach. As Peter John (2010, p. 267) indicates, ‘Many researchers still tend to use one ap-
proach, but not the other.’ Such a methodological division in the social sciences reflects the underlying philosophical
disagreement. Many social scientists view methodology and its underlying philosophy as two important and intrin-
sically related issues when they design and conduct their research (e.g., Pole & Lampard, 2002, pp. 6–8; Maxwell &
Mittapalli, 2010, p. 147; Tebes, 2012, p. 14; Johnson & Gray, 2010, p. 88; Creswell & Creswell, 2018, pp. 4–5). As
Martina Yvonne Feilzer (2010, p. 7) puts it, ‘The choice of social sciences research questions and methods […] is a
reflection of researchers’ [philosophical] understanding of the world, even if it is not articulated or made explicit.’
The quantitative research approach was originally rooted in positivism (e.g., Comte, 1830; Quetelet, 1835;
Pearson, 1900) and is now typically associated with the postpositivist position (e.g., Garrison, 1986; Phillips, 1990;
Phillips & Burbules, 2000), while the qualitative research approach has been generally coupled with the construc-
tivist/interpretivist position (e.g., Dilthey, 1883; Weber, 1904; Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Geertz, 1973; Lincoln &
Guba, 1985).3 The postpositivist position and constructivist/interpretivist position mainly differ in three basic issues:
‘ontology’, ‘epistemology’, and ‘axiology’.4 ‘Ontologically’, the postpositivist position assumes that there is a single,
mind-independent reality, though it can be only understood imperfectly (e.g., Campbell, 1974, pp. 448–49; Cook &
Campbell, 1979, p. 29), while the constructivist/interpretivist position assumes that there are multiple, socially con-
structed, and holistic realities (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Guba, 1990; Guba & Lincoln, 2005). ‘Epistemologically’, the
postpositivist position assumes that social scientific research is to a great extent objective in the sense that the rela-
tionship of the researcher to the object of the research should be independent (Smith, 1983), whereas the construc-
tivist/interpretivist position assumes that social scientific research is subjective in the sense that the relationship of
 17479991, 2022, 1, Downloaded from https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12804 by North West University, Wiley Online Library on [19/08/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
SHAN 3 of 12

the researcher to the object of the research is interactive (e.g., Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Guba & Lincoln, 1989, 2005).5
‘Axiologically’, the postpositivist position assumes that social scientific research is value-laden, but the influence of
values can be well controlled (e.g., Cook & Campbell, 1979; Shadish et al., 2002), while the constructivist/interpre-
tivist position assumes that social scientific research is essentially value-sensitive (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Teddlie
& Tashakkori, 2009). Accordingly, the postpositivist position assumes that the aim of social scientific research is to
describe, explain, predict, and intervene social phenomena (e.g., Black, 1999; Fay, 1975; Phillips & Burbules, 2000),
whereas the constructivist/interpretivist position assumes that the main purpose of social scientific research is to
interpret and understand social phenomena (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 2005).
The methodological debate over the quantitative research approach and the qualitative research approach was
intertwined with a persistent philosophical confrontation between the postpositivist position and constructivist/
interpretivist position, which is known as the paradigm wars (or, the paradigm debate). Advocates of the quantita-
tive research approach contend that research should be centred around quantitative methods in order to develop a
nomothetic body of knowledge of the mind-independent reality, while supporters of the qualitative research main-
tain that research should be undertaken mainly by qualitative methods in order to develop an ideographic body
of knowledge of the socially constructed realities. The contenders in the debate believe that their disagreement
over methodology is a result of their disagreement over philosophy (i.e., ‘ontology’, ‘epistemology’, and ‘axiology’). As
Charles Teddlie and Abbas Tashakkori (2009, p. 20) indicate, the paradigm wars is basically ‘the conflict between the
competing scientific worldviews of positivism (and variants, such as post-positivism) and constructivism (and variants,
such as interpretivism) on philosophical and methodological issues’.

3 | MIXED METHODS RESEARCH AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

Mixed methods research was formally introduced in the heyday of the paradigm wars. In the late 1980s, it quickly
developed as an methodological alternative to the quantitative research approach and qualitative research approach
in order to ‘overcome the speechlessness between both traditions’ (Kelle, 2015, p. 603). However, there was an
immediate difficulty. As I have shown in Section 2, the quantitative research approach is often associated with the
postpositivist position, while the qualitative research approach is usually coupled with the constructive/interpretivist
position. Thus, it seems to many that an integration of quantitative and qualitative methods is impossible due to the
incompatibility of their underlying philosophical positions. Thus, it has been an important task for the advocates of
mixed methods research to develop its distinctive philosophical foundations, which need to motivate and justify the
use of both quantitative and qualitative methods/data/designs.6
The most popular position as the philosophical foundations of mixed methods research is the pragmatist position.
The Pragmatist position is rooted in American pragmatism, especially the works of John Dewey, Charles Saunders
Peirce, and Richard Rorty (e.g., Cherryholmes, 1992; Feilzer, 2010; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Tebes, 2012).
It assumes that knowledge, as a product of person-environment interaction, is both constructed and based on the
mind-independent reality and highlights the instrumental feature of theories in inquiry (e.g., Johnson & Gray, 2010;
Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Morgan, 2014). According to the pragmatist position, both the mind-independent
physical world and the constructed social and psychological world exist, and the reality is complex and multiple
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 18; Johnson & Gray, 2010, p. 88; Creswell & Creswell, 2018, pp. 10–11); social
scientific research is value-oriented (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 16–18; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, p. 74);
and the aim of social scientific research is to solve problems (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 18; Teddlie & Tashak-
kori, 2010, pp. 17–18). Thus, social scientists do not have to make an either-or choice between the postpositivist
position and the constructivist/interpretivist position (e.g., Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018; Johnson & Onwuegbuz-
ie, 2004; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). They are free to choose the methods, data, and procedures of research that
best meet their needs and purposes and can employ both quantitative and qualitative methods/data when designing
 17479991, 2022, 1, Downloaded from https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12804 by North West University, Wiley Online Library on [19/08/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
4 of 12 SHAN

and conducting research (e.g., Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Greene, 2006; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Teddlie &
Tashakkori, 2009).7
An alternative position is the dialectical position (e.g., Greene, 2007; Greene et al., 1989; Greene & Hall, 2010).
Like the pragmatist position, the dialectical position maintains that social scientists do not have to make a choice
between the postpositivist position and constructive/interpretivist position. Unlike the pragmatist position, the di-
alectical position recognises and accepts the legitimacy of all other philosophical positions (e.g., the postpositivist
position and the constructive/interpretivist position). The dialectical position maintains that different philosophical
positions importantly guide and direct different inquiry decisions. Therefore, different positions are encouraged to be
employed in order to motivate the use of mixed methods for the purpose of a better understanding of the phenom-
ena being studied. In short, the dialectical position ‘actively welcomes more than one philosophical position, along
with more than one methodology and type of method, into the same inquiry space and engages them in respectful
dialogue one with the other throughout the inquiry’ (Greene & Hall, 2010, p. 124).
Recently, based on the pragmatist position and dialectical position, Burke Johnson (2017) develops a refined
position, ‘dialectical pluralism’. According to the dialectical pluralist position, reality is multiple and there are multi-
ple ways of conceptualising reality; knowledge in the social sciences is fallible and contextual; and social scientific
research is value-laden. Therefore, social scientists ‘should dialectically listen and consider multiple methodological
concepts, issues, inquiry logics, and particular research methods and construct the appropriate mix for each research
study’ (Johnson, 2017, p. 167). Johnson argues that the dialectical pluralist position complements and extends the
dialectical position by articulating its philosophical assumptions.8
Another influential position is the transformative position, mainly developed by Donna Mertens (2003, 2007,
2010). The transformative position assumes that there are multiple realities that are socially constructed and defined
by social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, racial, gender, age, and disability values; the nature of the relationship
between researchers and participants is characterised by close collaboration between them with specific attention
given to issues of communication and power within a complex context; an important aim of social scientific research
is to ‘serve the ends of creating a more just and democratic society’ (Mertens, 2003, p. 159). Mertens argues that
a careful mixed use of quantitative and qualitative methods provides an avenue to obtaining data that represent a
variety of perspectives, including those have been traditionally overlooked. In other words, good mixed methods
research can help to achieve an increase in social justice. Therefore, according to the transformative approach, social
scientists should prefer mixed methods ‘for working toward increased social justice’ (Mertens, 2007, p. 224).
In addition, Joseph Maxwell and Kavita Mittapalli (2010) develop a critical realist position to motivating mixed
methods research. This critical realist position assumes that there is a mind-independent physical world and ‘there
can be more than one scientifically correct way of understanding reality in terms of conceptual schemes with differ-
ent objects and categories of objects’ (Lakoff, 1987, p. 265). Maxwell and Mittapalli argue that these critical realist
assumptions imply a mechanistic account of causality, a realist account of mental phenomena, a realist concept
of validity, and a realist account of diversity. Accordingly, they argue that these ‘realist assumptions’ justify a pro-
cess-based qualitative approach to causality, a critical approach to qualitative research, a mixed methods approach
to validity, and overcome the neglect of methodological diversity in practice. In these ways, Maxwell and Mittapalli
claim that mixed methods research can be justified from a critical realist perspective.
Most of these positions can be classified into two types: monistic positions and pluralistic positions. In a nutshell,
a monistic position tries to motivate and justify use of mixed methods in the social scientific research based on a par-
ticular set of philosophical assumptions.9 The pragmatist position and transformative position are good examples of
monistic positions. The pragmatist position assumes a pragmatist framework, which encompasses a set of philosoph-
ical assumptions. And these assumptions are argued to be partner with the use of mixed methods in social scientific
research. The transformative position also endorses a set of philosophical assumptions, which provides a basis for the
application of mixed methods in practice.
By contrast, a pluralistic position motivates and justifies the use of mixed methods by different sets of philosoph-
ical assumptions.10 Advocates of the pluralistic position contend that different set of philosophical assumptions can
 17479991, 2022, 1, Downloaded from https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12804 by North West University, Wiley Online Library on [19/08/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
SHAN 5 of 12

be employed to motivate and justify the use of mixed methods. As Maxwell (2011, p. 29) argues, ‘I do not think it
is generally appropriate or useful to attempt to synthesise different philosophical approaches or assumptions into a
single, logically consistent paradigm for mixed methods research. Different situations and research problems may re-
quire different sets of assumptions and models, as well as different combinations of methods.’ The dialectical position
and dialectical pluralist position are typical cases of pluralistic positions. Both maintain that different philosophical
assumptions importantly guide and direct different inquiry decision.
It is worth noting that the critical realist position is neither a monistic nor a pluralistic position. On the one hand,
Maxwell and Mittapalli (2010, p. 147) are explicit on the point that they are sceptical of ‘the entire concept of unified
paradigms in research, a concept that has dominated the discussion of the relationship between philosophical as-
sumptions and research methods’. In other words, their critical realist position is not a monistic position. On the other
hand, Maxwell and Mittapalli argue that their critical realist position provides merely good motivations of the use of
mixed methods in some cases rather than a general framework to justify the universal use of mixed methods in the
social sciences. Therefore, it is more appropriate to regard Maxwell and Mittapalli's critical realist position as a set of
realist assumptions within a pluralistic position.

4 | A CRITICAL ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

In order to make a critical analysis, I find it necessary to revisit the concept ‘philosophical foundations’: what does
‘philosophical foundations of mixed methods research’ exactly mean? What are philosophical foundations expected
to provide?

4.1 | ‘Ontology-oriented’ versus ‘axiology-oriented’ philosophical foundations

The debate over the philosophical foundations of mixed methods research emerged from and has been framed by the
paradigm debate. Most philosophical positions for mixed methods research try to provide a set of assumptions about
‘ontology’, ‘epistemology’, and ‘axiology’ just like those for quantitative research and qualitative research. However,
there is a crucial difference.
Both the postpositivist position and constructive/interpretivist position provide, what I shall call, ‘ontology-ori-
ented’ philosophical foundations.11 For example, the postpositivist position consists of a set of ‘ontological’, ‘epis-
temological’, ‘axiological’ assumptions, in which ‘ontological’ assumptions are privileged over other assumptions. As
illustrated in Figure 1, the quantitative research approach is justified by the postpositivist ‘axiological’ assumptions,
which are constrained by the postpositivist ‘epistemological’ assumptions that are ultimately by the postpositivist
‘ontological’ assumptions. In a similar vein, the constructive/interpretivist ‘ontological’ assumptions play a central role
in the philosophical foundations of the qualitative research approach. Such a kind of philosophical foundations, as
Morgan (2007, p. 67) indicates, ‘had a strong tendency not only to privilege epistemology over methods but also to
emphasise ontological issues above all others’.
By contrast, the pragmatist position, the dialectical position, the dialectical pluralist position, and the transforma-
tive position provide, what I shall call, ‘axiology-oriented’ philosophical foundations. For example, the transformative
position consists of a set of ‘ontological’, ‘epistemological’, ‘axiological’ assumptions, in which ‘axiological’ assumptions
are privileged over other assumptions. As illustrated in Figure 2, the transformative ‘axiological’ assumptions lead
to the transformative ‘ontological’ assumptions, and both the transformative ‘axiological’ and ‘ontological’ assump-
tions lead to the transformative ‘epistemological’ assumptions. The transformative methodological assumptions that
reflect all these assumptions eventually lead to support for mixed methods research (Mertens et al., 2010, p. 199).
As Mertens (2010, p. 470) puts it, ‘The axiological belief is of primary importance in the transformative paradigm
and drives the formulation of the three other belief systems (ontology, epistemology, and methodology).’ In a similar
 17479991, 2022, 1, Downloaded from https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12804 by North West University, Wiley Online Library on [19/08/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
6 of 12 SHAN

FIGURE 1 An example of ‘ontology-oriented’ philosophical foundations

vein, the ‘axiological’ assumptions play a central role in all of the pragmatist position, the dialectical position, and the
dialectical pluralist position.12

4.2 | Three senses of philosophical foundations

As I have mentioned in Section 3, mixed methods research was initially introduced as a methodological alternative
to the quantitative research approach and the qualitative research approach in the heyday of the paradigm debate. A
good account of philosophical foundations of mixed methods research is assumed to motivate and justify the mixed
use of quantitative and qualitative methods/data/designs in practice. More precisely speaking, it is necessary to show
the practicality of the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods/data, which are viewed to assume inconsist-
ent philosophical positions by the contenders of the paradigm debate. I propose that there are three different senses
of philosophical foundations of mixed methods research in the literature.

a) Weak sense: Philosophical foundationsA allow the possibility of the integration of both quantitative and quali-
tative methods/data/designs.
b) Moderate sense: Philosophical foundationsB provide a good reason to use mixed methods in (at least some)
social scientific research.
 17479991, 2022, 1, Downloaded from https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12804 by North West University, Wiley Online Library on [19/08/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
SHAN 7 of 12

FIGURE 2 An example of ‘axiology-oriented’ philosophical foundations

c) Strong sense: Philosophical foundationsC justify a normative thesis that mixed methods research should be
encouraged in (at least some) social scientific research.

It is clear that philosophical foundationsA is weaker than philosophical foundationsB, while philosophical founda-
tionsB is weaker than philosophical foundationsC. Showing that the integration of both quantitative and qualitative
methods/data/designs is possible does not necessarily provide a good reason to integrate or mix quantitative and
qualitative methods/data/designs, while having a good reason to integrate or mix quantitative and qualitative meth-
ods/data/designs does not imply that the integration of both quantitative and qualitative methods/data/designs
should be encouraged universally.
The pragmatist position provides philosophical foundationsA. It justifies that mixed methods research is possible.
As Jennifer Greene and Jori Hall (2010, p. 138) perfectly summarise, ‘Whatever works; whatever can best engage
and usefully inform the important practical problem at hand’ is the best methodology, according to the pragmatist
position. It makes a perfect sense for social scientists to use mixed methods when necessary. Thus, the pragmatist
position does not constrain the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods, data, and designs. However, from
a logical point of view, there are situations in which the quantitative research approach or the qualitative research
approach might be the best methodology. In other words, the pragmatist position does not provide a good reason
 17479991, 2022, 1, Downloaded from https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12804 by North West University, Wiley Online Library on [19/08/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
8 of 12 SHAN

to prefer mixed methods research to the quantitative research approach or the qualitative research approach. It is
not clear in what situation or context one should be encouraged to use both quantitative and qualitative methods/
data/designs. According to the pragmatist position, the choice of methods completely depends on whether they
contribute to solve the problems. As Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998, p. 24) summarise, ‘Decisions regarding the use of
either qualitative or quantitative methods (or both) depend upon the research question.’ In short, the pragmatist po-
sition merely justifies a possibility of the integration of quantitative and qualitative methods rather than a normative
thesis that the integration of quantitative and qualitative methods should be encouraged. Therefore, the pragmatist
position at best, as Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004, p. 14) put it, provides ‘an attractive philosophical partner for
mixed methods research’.
The transformative position provides philosophical foundationsB. Given that the aim of research is to increase
social justice and there are multiple realities that are socially constructed and defined by social, political, cultural, eco-
nomic, ethnic, racial, gender, age, there is a good reason to use a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods/data/
designs in (at least some) social scientific research. That said, as Mertens et al. (2010, p. 196) indicate, ‘Researchers
who situate themselves within the transformative worldview do not necessarily use mixed methods.’ Mixed methods
research is just ‘reflective of’ the transformative position. Thus, the transformative position does not justify the nor-
mative claim that the integration of quantitative and qualitative methods/data/designs should be encouraged where
possible.
Both the dialectical position and dialectical pluralist position provide philosophical foundationsC. According to
the dialectical position, any position (e.g., the postpositivist position) provides but one perspective, inevitably partial,
on human phenomena. Given that social phenomena are complex, ‘better understanding of this complexity can be
attained with the use of more than one perspective’ (Greene & Hall, 2010, p. 124). Therefore, the integration of both
quantitative and qualitative methods/data is not only possible but also beneficial. This is also why Greene and Hall
(2010, p. 139) argue that the dialectical position and mixed methods research are ‘often the best match’. Similarly,
the dialectical pluralistic position encourages the integration of quantitative and qualitative methods/data/designs.

4.3 | Problems and prospects

There is more work to be done for advocates of these positions. As I have argued, the pragmatist position provides
the weakest sense of philosophical foundations: the pragmatist position just shows that it is compatible with mixed
methods research. According to the pragmatist position, the best methodology is ‘[w]hatever works; whatever can
best engage and usefully inform the important practical problem at hand’. However, the pragmatist position provides
little guidance on what counts as ‘best engage and usefully inform the important practical problem at hand’. In order
to make the pragmatist position to provide a stronger sense of philosophical foundations, one needs to explicate
what philosophical assumptions are employed in what context to motivate and justify the use of mixed methods.
The transformative position provides a good reason to use mixed methods in some social scientific research, whose
purpose is to increase social justice. However, there are other purposes of social scientific research (e.g., the search
for an explanation of a social phenomenon). The transformative position is insufficient to provide a good reason for
using mixed methods in these cases. Advocates of the transformativist position can either defend it as a particular set
of philosophical assumptions within a pluralistic position or explore what motivates and justifies the mixed methods
in other contexts. The dialectical position faces a problem of scope. It is not very clear how widely mixed methods
research should be encouraged. Nor is it clear what position motivates the mixed use of methods/data in different
contexts. The critical realist position, if understood as a philosophical foundation, is most problematic and least philo-
sophically sophisticated. Maxwell and Mittapalli's central argument is that the critical realist position implies a mech-
anistic account of causality, a realist account of mental phenomena, and a realist concept of validity, which in turn
justify a process-based qualitative approach to causality, a critical approach to qualitative research, a mixed methods
approach to validity respectively. However, the arguments are highly problematic. For example, it is not clear why the
 17479991, 2022, 1, Downloaded from https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12804 by North West University, Wiley Online Library on [19/08/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
SHAN 9 of 12

regularity account of causality is not a realist account. Nor is it clear why only the process-based qualitative approach
is the only approach to causality. To sum up, if we need a philosophical foundationC rather than a philosophical part-
ner of mixed methods research, we have to do more.

ACKNOWLE DG E ME NTS
I would like to thank Jon Williamson, Samuel D. Taylor, and an anonymous reviewer for the helpful comments.
This paper is supported by the BA/Leverhulme project “The Metaphysical Foundations of Evidential Pluralism”
(SRG1920\101076) and the Leverhulme project “Evidential Pluralism in the Social Sciences” (RPG-2019-059).

O RCID
Yafeng Shan https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7736-1822

EN D NOTE S
1
Other recent approaches include the feminist approach (Hesse-Biber, 2015) and the preformative approach (Schoonen-
boom, 2019). Unfortunately I lack the space here to examine them.
2
The quantitative research approach and the qualitative research approach are also called ‘the quantitative research par-
adigm’ and ‘the qualitative research paradigm’ (e.g., Agerfalk, 2013; Feilzer, 2010; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). How-
ever, given the notorious ambiguity of the concept of paradigm in the social sciences (Biesta, 2010), I adopt a less contro-
versial term ‘approach’ in this paper.
3
Social scientists' characterisations of philosophical positions are quite different from philosophers'. In order to avoid con-
fusion, I would refer ‘the X-ist position’ to social scientists' accounts and refer ‘X-ism’ to philosophers' accounts for a phil-
osophical position X-ism. For example, the pragmatist position refers to social scientists' accounts of pragmatism, while
pragmatism refers to philosophers' accounts.
4
It should be noted that in this context social scientists use the terms ‘ontology’ and ‘epistemology’ in a distinctive way,
where ontology is concerned with the nature of reality and epistemology is about the relationship between the knower
and the known (see Lincoln & Guba, 1985, pp. 37–38).
5
According to the postpositivist position, the researcher and the object of the research in the social sciences should be in-
dependent of each other, just as those in the natural sciences. In other words, it is possible and mandatory for a researcher
to exteriorise the phenomenon studied, keeping detached and distant from it. However, this is not possible, according
to the constructivist/interpretivist position: the researcher and the object of the research are humans. It is impossible to
separate them and eliminate the mutual interaction. The result of the research is created by the interaction between the
researcher and the object of the research (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 88).
6
Social scientists often talk of philosophical foundations in terms of ‘paradigms’ (e.g., Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Some-
times ‘stances’ (e.g., Greene et al., 1989; Maxwell & Mittapalli, 2010) and ‘worldviews’ (e.g., Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018)
are used. In order to avoid confusion, I will use ‘position’ instead in this paper.
7
It is worth noting that there are different versions of the pragmatist position, from ‘dialectical pragmatism’ (Johnson &
Christensen, 2014; Johnson & Gray, 2010; Teddlie & Johnson, 2009), which offers a wholesale justification of mixed
methods research, to Gert Biesta's ‘Deweyan pragmatism’ (2010), which only ‘[helps] us to have a more precise discussion
about the strengths and weaknesses of mixed methods approaches’. And the pragmatist position is sometimes associated
with the perspectivist position (Tebes, 2012) and the pluralist position (Johnson, 2017; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).
8
It is worth noting that Johnson (2017, pp. 159–60) regards the dialectical pluralist position as a ‘metaparadigm’, which
operates beyond the philosophical positions (e.g., the pragmatist position) to argue for how multiple sets of philosophical
assumptions can be in dialogue with one another in a study.
9
This is similar to what Charles Teddlie and Abbas Tashakkori (2010) call ‘the single paradigm stance’, or what John Creswell
and Vicki Plano Clark (2018) call “one ‘best’ worldview for mixed methods.”
10
This is similar to what Charles Teddlie and Abbas Tashakkori (2010) call ‘the multiple paradigms stance’, or what John
Creswell and Vicki Plano Clark (2018) call ‘multiple worldviews for mixed methods.’
11
Morgan (2007, p. 62) makes a similar point. He regards the positivist position, postpositivist position, and constructivist
position as ‘top-down, ontology-driven metaphysical paradigms’.
12
Note that the critical realist position provides the only ‘ontology-oriented’ foundations of mixed methods research, in
which the ‘ontological’ assumptions still play a driving role.
 17479991, 2022, 1, Downloaded from https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12804 by North West University, Wiley Online Library on [19/08/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
10 of 12 SHAN

R EF ERE NCE S
Agerfalk, P. J. (2013). Embracing Diversity through Mixed Methods Research. European Journal of Information Systems, 22,
251–256.
Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The Social Construction of Reality. Doubleday.
Biesta, G. (2010). Pragmatism and the Philosophical Foundations of Mixed Methods Research. In A. Tashakkori & C. Teddlie
(Eds.), Sage Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research (2nd ed., pp. 95–118). SAGE Publications, Inc.
Black, T. R. (1999). Doing Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences. Sage.
Campbell, D. T. (1974). Evolutionary Epistemology. In P. A. Schilpp (Ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper (pp. 413–463). Open
Court.
Cherryholmes, C. H. (1992). Notes on Pragmatism and Scientific Realism. Educational Researcher, 21(6), 13–17.
Comte, A. (1830). Cours de Philosophie Positive. Rouen.
Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (1979). Quasi-Experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings. Rand McNally.
Creswell, J. W. (2012). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches. Sage.
Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2018). Research Design (5th ed.). Sage.
Creswell, J. W., & Plano Clark, V. L. (2018). Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research. Sage.
Creswell, J. W., Plano Clark, V. L., Gutmann, M. L., & Hanson, W. E. (2003). Advanced Mixed Methods Research Designs.
In A. Tashakkori & C. Teddlie (Eds.), Sage Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research (1st ed., pp.
209–240). SAGE Publications, Inc.
Dilthey, W. (1883). Einleitung in Die Geisteswissenschaften. Duncker & Humblot.
Fay, B. (1975). Social Theory and Political Practice. Routledge.
Feilzer, M. Y. (2010). Doing Mixed Methods Research Pragmatically: Implications for the Rediscovery of Pragmatism as a
Research Paradigm. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 4(1), 6–16.
Garrison, J. W. (1986). Some Principles of Postpositivistic Philpsophy of Science. Educational Researcher, 15, 12–18.
Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. Basic Books.
Greene, J. C. (2006). Towards a Methodology of Mixed Methods Social Inquiry. Research in the Schools, 13(1), 93–98.
Greene, J. C. (2007). Mixed Methods in Social Inquiry. Jossey-Bass.
Greene, J. C., Caracelli, V. J., & Graham, W. F. (1989). Toward a Conceptual Framework for Mixed-Method Evaluation Designs.
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 11(3), 255–274.
Greene, J. C., & Hall, J. N. (2010). Dialectics and Pragmatism: Being of Consequences. In A. Tashakkori, & C. Teddlie (Eds.),
Sage Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research (2nd ed., pp. 119–144). SAGE Publications, Inc.
Grootel, L. van, Nair, L. B., Klugkist, I., & van Wesel, F. (2020). Quantitizing Findings from Qualitative Studies for Integration
in Mixed Methods Reviewing. Research Synthesis Methods, 11(3), 413–425.
Guba, E. G. (1990). The Alternative Paradigm Dialog. In E. G. Guba (Ed.), The Paradigm Dialog (pp. 17–29). Sage.
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1989). Fourth Generation Evaluation. Sage.
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). Paradigmatic Controversies, Contradictions, and Emerging Confluences. In N. K. Denzin
& Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research (pp. 191–215). Sage.
Hesse-Biber, S. N. (2015). Feminist Approaches to Mixed Methods Research: Linking Theory and Praxis. In A. Tashakkori &
C. Teddlie (Eds.), SAGE Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research (2nd ed., pp. 169–192). Sage.
John, P. (2010). Quantitative Methods. In D. Marsh & G. Stoker (Eds.), Theory and Methods in Political Science (3rd ed., pp.
267–284). Palgrave Macmillan.
Johnson, R. B. (2017). Dialectical Pluralism: A Metaparagidm Whose Time Has Come. Journal of Mixed Methods Research,
11(2), 156–173.
Johnson, R. B., & Christensen, L. (2014). Educational Research (5th ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc.
Johnson, R. B., de Waal, C., Stefurak, T., & Hildebrand, D. L. (2017). Understanding the Philosophical Positions of Classical and
Neopragmatists for Mixed Methods Research. KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift Für Soziologie Und Sozialpsychologie, 69, 63–86.
Johnson, R. B., & Gray, R. (2010). A History of Philosophical and Theoretical Issues for Mixed Methods Research. In A. Tashak-
kori & C. Teddlie (Eds.), Sage Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research (2nd ed., pp. 69–94). SAGE
Publications, Inc.
Johnson, R. B., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2004). Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose Time Has Come. Edu-
cational Research, 33(7), 14–26.
Johnson, R. B., Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Turner, L. A. (2007). Toward a Definition of Mixed Methods Research. Journal of Mixed
Methods Research, 1(2), 112–133.
Kelle, U. (2015). Mixed Methods and the Problem of Theory Building and Theory Testing in the Social Sciences. In S. N. Hes-
se-Biber & R. B. Johnson (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Multimethod and Mixed Methods Research Inquiry (pp. 594–605).
Oxford University Press.
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind. University of Chicago Press.
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic Inquiry. Sage.
 17479991, 2022, 1, Downloaded from https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12804 by North West University, Wiley Online Library on [19/08/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
SHAN 11 of 12

Mahoney, J. (2001). Review: Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory and Method Reviewed Work(s): So-
cial Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory by Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg; Fuzzy-Set Social
Science by Charles C. Ragin. Sociological Forum, 16(3), 575–593.
Maxwell, J. A. (2011). Paradigms or Toolkits? Philosophical and Methodological Positions as Heuristics for Mixed Methods
Research. Mid-Western Educational Researcher, 24(2), 27–30.
Maxwell, J. A., & Mittapalli, K. (2010). Realism as a Stance for Mixed Methods Research. In A. Tashakkori & C. Teddlie (Eds.),
Sage Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research (2nd ed., pp. 145–168). SAGE Publications, Inc.
Mertens, D. M. (2003). Mixed Methods and the Politics of Human Research: The Transformative-Emancipatory Perspective.
In A. Tashakkori & C. Teddlie (Eds.), Sage Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research (1st ed., pp.
135–164). Sage.
Mertens, D. M. (2007). Transformative Paradigm: Mixed Methods and Social Justice. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1(3),
212–225.
Mertens, D. M. (2010). Transformative Mixed Methods Research. Qualitative Inquiry, 16(6), 469–474.
Mertens, D. M., Bledsoe, K. L., Sullivan, M., & Wilson, A. (2010). Utilization of Mixed Methods for Transformative Purposes.
In A. Tashakkori & C. Teddlie (Eds.), Sage Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research (2nd ed., pp.
193–214). SAGE Publications, Inc.
Morgan, D. L. (2007). Paradigm Lost and Pragmatism Regained. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1(1), 48–76.
Morgan, D. L. (2014). Pragmatism as a Paradigm for Social Research. Qualitative Inquiry, 20(8), 1045–1053.
Pearson, K. (1900). The Grammar of Science (2nd ed.). Adam and Charles Black.
Phillips, D. C. (1990). Postpositivist Science: Myths and Realities. In E. G. Guba (Ed.), The Paradigm Dialog (pp. 31–45). Sage.
Phillips, D. C., & Burbules, N. C. (2000). Postpositivism and Educational Research. Rowman & Littlefield.
Pole, C. J., & Lampard, R. (2002). Practical Social Investigation. Prenticem Hall.
Quetelet, A. (1835). Sur L’Homme Et Le Developpement de Ses Facultes, Ou Essai de Physique Sociale. Vol. 1. Bachelier.
Schoonenboom, J. (2019). A Performative Paradigm for Mixed Methods Research. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 13(3),
284–300.
Shadish, W. R., Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (2002). Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Infer-
ence. Houghton, Mifflin and Company.
Smith, J. K. (1983). Quantitative versus Qualitative Research: An Attempt to Clarify the Issue. Educational Researcher, 12(3),
6–13.
Sørensen, A. B. (1998). Theoretical Mechanisms and the Empirical Study of Social Processes. In H. Peter & R. Swedberg (Eds.),
Social Mechanisms: An Analytic Approach to Social Theory (pp. 238–239). Cambridge University Press.
Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (1998). Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Appraoches. Sage.
Tebes, J. K. (2012) Philosophical Foundations of Mixed Methods Research: Implications for Research Practice. In L. A. Jason
& D. S. Glenwick (Eds.), In Methodological Approaches to Community-Based Research (pp. 13–31). American Psychological
Association.
Teddlie, C., & Johnson, R. B. (2009). Methodological Thoughts since the 20th Century. In C. Teddlie & A. Tashakkori (Eds.),
Foundations of Mixed Methods Research (pp. 62–82). Sage.
Teddlie, C., & Tashakkori, A. (2009). Foundations of Mixed Methods Research. Sage.
Teddlie, C., & Tashakkori, A. (2010). Overview of Contemporary Issues in Mixed Methods Research. In A. Tashakkori & C. Ted-
dlie (Eds.), SAGE Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research (2nd ed., pp. 1–42). SAGE Publications, Inc.
Timans, R., Wouters, P., & Heilbron, J. (2019). Mixed Methods Research: What It Is and What It Could Be. Theory and Society,
48, 193–216.
Weber, M. (1904). Die ‘Objektivität’ Sozialwissenschaftlicher Und Sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis. Archiv Für Sozialwissenschaft
Und Sozialpolitik, 19, 22–87.

AUT HOR BI OGRAPHY

Yafeng Shan is Research Associate in Philosophy at the University of Kent. He received his PhD from University
College London in 2016. Yafeng's main research interests are philosophy of science, epistemology, and meta-
physics. He is the author of Doing Integrated History and Philosophy of Science: A Case Study of the Origin of Genetics
(Springer, 2020), the co-editor of New Directions in the Historiography of Genetics (a special issue of Studies in His-
tory and Philosophy of Science) and Evidential Diversity in the Social Sciences (a topical collection of Synthese), and
has published research articles in Synthese, Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, and
European Journal for Philosophy of Science.
17479991, 2022, 1, Downloaded from https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12804 by North West University, Wiley Online Library on [19/08/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
SHAN

How to cite this article: Shan, Y. (2022). Philosophical foundations of mixed methods research. Philosophy
Compass, 17(1), e12804. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12804
12 of 12