The

Druze
Sect
History, Doctrine
& Reality

Compiled by
A. R. Kelani
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All Right Reserved
July, 2025
 Contents

Introduction .................................................................................... 6
Origins and the Intellectual Environment...................................... 9
The Doctrinal Emergence of Ismaʿilism – Roots, Motives, and
Historical Backgrounds ............................................................................. 10
The Fatimid State and the Cradle of the Daʿwah ................................. 16
Druze Doctrine – A Critical Analysis .............................................21
The Druze Doctrine from Within – Presentation and Analysis ........ 22
The Druze in the Theological Scale of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah
....................................................................................................................... 38
The Political and Military History of the Druze Sect ................... 44
Geographic Dispersion and the Construction of Local Identity ....... 45
Ethnic Origins and the Spread of the Druze in Bilād al-Shām .......... 50
The Druze in the Era of the Crusades and Mongol Invasions .......... 53
From Sectarian Isolation to Regional Power: Fakhr al-Dīn II and the
Rise of Druze Influence ............................................................................ 58
The Druze During the Mutasarrifiyyah and the French Mandate:
From Rebellion to Sectarian Balance ...................................................... 65
The Druze in the Modern Era ...................................................... 69
The Druze in Lebanon: From Civil Wars to Sectarian Principalities 70
The Druze in Syria: From Jabal al-ʿArab to the Battle for Identity
(2025) ........................................................................................................... 81
The Druze in Palestine: From Mandate Forces to the Golani Brigade
....................................................................................................................... 89

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 The Druze in Syria: From Neutrality to Hostility — Sectarian Shifts
in the Revolutionary Era and Beyond .................................................... 97
The Druze Between Secrecy and Transparency — Challenges of
Understanding .......................................................................................... 104
Toward a Sunni Understanding of the Druze Reality Today ........... 107
Between Secrecy and Identity: The Druze at a Crossroads in
Contemporary History ............................................................................ 110
Epilogue..................................................................................................... 113
Appendices................................................................................... 115
Appendix I: Key Figures in Druze History ......................................... 115
Appendix II: Timeline of Key Historical Milestones in Druze History
..................................................................................................................... 119
Appendix III: Glossary of Key Terms and Doctrines ....................... 123
Appendix III: Doctrinal Concepts and Terminology in Druze
Theology .................................................................................................... 126
Appendix IV: Core Theological Concepts in Druze Doctrine ......... 131
Appendix V: Have the Druze Contributed to Islamic Civilization? —
An Analytical Reflection ......................................................................... 136
Appendix VI: Selected Passages from the Epistles of Wisdom ....... 140
Bibliography ................................................................................ 143
Index of Proper Names................................................................ 145
Index of Key Terms ..................................................................... 147

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 Introduction

In the mountainous corners of the Levant, on the fringes of the

political and spiritual formations that shaped Islamic history, a sect
emerged—mysterious in doctrine, secretive in ritual, and neutral in
the conflicts of the Muslim ummah—yet deeply influential in the
realms of power and politics. This is the Druze sect.
For centuries, the Druze have posed an enigma to the Islamic
and Arab mind. They are neither a group completely severed from
Islam, nor are they openly or doctrinally aligned with Sunni or Shia
Islam. Their stance has oscillated between withdrawal and
engagement, caution and integration, silence and allegiance—
especially in critical junctures of Muslim history, from the Crusader
and Mongol invasions to the era of French colonialism, and more
recently in their positions toward Zionism in Palestine and the
revolution in Syria.
This book is not a response to Orientalist curiosity, nor is it an
exploration of obscure identities for the sake of exoticism. Rather,
it is a serious attempt to understand this sect comprehensively—
from its doctrinal origins in esoteric Ismaʿilism, to its closed
monotheistic belief system (tawhīd), to its political and military role
in the history of Greater Syria, and finally to its contemporary
posture and interaction with major issues facing the Muslim world.
Because the pursuit of truth cannot be achieved through
narrative alone, this work follows a dual methodology:
On one hand, it presents historical events and facts with rigorous
documentation and objective academic analysis, drawing from
Druze, Islamic, and Western sources.

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 On the other hand, it incorporates the theological lens of Ahl al-
Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah, clarifying the Islamic position on the Druze
creed as articulated by classical and modern scholars—from Ibn
Taymiyyah to Ihsan Ilahi Zaheer.
The purpose of this book is not to issue blanket judgments or
provoke sectarian discord, but rather to offer a fair and well-
substantiated exposition that places the Druze within their proper
religious and historical context. It aims to reveal to the discerning
reader how this sect emerged, what it truly believes, and where it
has stood on the major causes of Islam.
This study comes at a time when doctrinal boundaries have
blurred, historical truths have been replaced by politicized
narratives, and sound Islamic criteria have been eroded by calls for
“legitimate diversity” and “sectarian pluralism.” In such a climate,
the need arises to renew our understanding, liberate our awareness,
and articulate our stance using the balanced scales of both
knowledge and faith.
Let this book be a window—both scholarly and theological—
into a sect that remains geographically and historically present, yet
doctrinally and ideologically closed. A window, we hope, that will
illuminate understanding, sharpen insight, and build a bridge
between truth and justice.
Research Methodology and Structure of the Book
This book adopts a critical, analytical, and documentary
approach that balances the tools of academic research with the
theological perspective of Sunni Islam (Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-
Jamāʿah). The sources consulted reflect a wide range of
backgrounds and references, including:

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• Primary Druze texts, such as the Epistles of Wisdom (Rasāʾil
al-Hikmah) and internal narratives transmitted within the
sect;
• Classical Islamic historical works by renowned
historians such as al-Dhahabi, Ibn al-Athir, al-Maqrizi, and
others;
• Modern Western studies examining the Druze from
sociopolitical and anthropological perspectives;
• Sunni theological writings that have critically examined
the doctrines of the Druze and Ismaʿili movements,
particularly the works of Ibn Taymiyyah, Ihsan Ilahi Zaheer,
and others.
The book is organized into chapters and sections that cover:
1. The sect’s doctrinal emergence;
2. Its Ismaʿili background;
3. The intellectual framework of Druze theology;
4. Their historical trajectory;
5. Their modern political and social status;
6. And finally, the Islamic ruling and theological assessment of
the sect.

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Origins and the Intellectual
Environment

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 1
The Doctrinal Emergence of Ismaʿilism –
Roots, Motives, and Historical Backgrounds

The Ismaʿili movement first arose as a Bātinī (esoteric) sect that

split from the larger Imāmī Shīʿī current. However, it soon evolved
into an independent ideological and organizational force with its
own distinct theological structure and philosophical underpinnings.
At various stages in its development, it took on a clandestine
political character aimed at undermining the Sunni ʿAbbāsid
caliphate and—according to numerous Sunni scholars—even
sought to dismantle Islam from within. This movement, especially
in its revolutionary and esoteric phases, served as the fertile ground
from which the Druze faith would later emerge in the fifth Islamic
century (11th century CE).
To understand how the Druze doctrine crystallized, one must
first trace the roots of Ismaʿilism itself—examining its historical,
theological, and political motives. This includes analyzing its links
with earlier Gnostic and philosophical currents, as well as
investigating suspicions about its infiltration by elements from
Jewish and Persian traditions who sought to weaken Islam
internally.

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I. Historical and Intellectual Roots of Ismaʿilism
Ismailism began as an offshoot of Imāmī Shīʿism following the
death of Imām Jaʿfar al-Sādiq in 148 AH / 765 CE. The Shīʿī
community split into two main factions:
• The Twelvers (Ithnā ʿAshariyyah), who believed that the
Imamate passed to his son Mūsā al-Kāẓim.
• The Ismaʿilis, who held that the Imamate remained with
Jaʿfar’s son Ismāʿīl or his grandson Muhammad ibn
Ismāʿīl, despite the fact that Ismāʿīl had died during his
father's lifetime.
This schism, however, was not merely a genealogical dispute—
it marked the beginning of a profound doctrinal and philosophical
divergence. The Ismaʿilis quickly gravitated toward an esoteric
interpretation of Islamic texts, rejecting the outward meanings
(ẓāhir) of Islamic law in favor of hidden (bāṭin) truths. Their
theology absorbed elements of Gnostic cosmology, Neoplatonist
metaphysics, Persian dualism, and even Indian and Eastern
religious motifs.
By the third Islamic century, Ismaʿilism had developed into a
highly organized movement operating in secretive cells. Iraq,
Yemen, and Persia became its main centers. Outwardly, its mission
promoted "esoteric knowledge" (ʿilm al-bātin), but politically, it
sought the overthrow of the Sunni ʿAbbāsid state and the
establishment of an alternative, esoterically inspired caliphate.
II. Esotericism and Philosophical Underpinnings
A hallmark of mature Ismaʿili doctrine was its esoteric
worldview: every religious law, ritual, and text possessed a hidden,
symbolic meaning accessible only to an elite class of initiates. The
outward acts of worship—such as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage—

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were reinterpreted as metaphysical symbols, eventually discarded
altogether in favor of internalized, spiritualized alternatives. The
movement claimed access to “divine knowledge” (ʿilm ladunnī) and
“luminous intellect” (al-ʿaql al-nūrānī), to which only the initiated
could aspire.
Ismaʿili thought was profoundly influenced by Gnosticism, a
religious-philosophical tradition that held the material world to be
intrinsically evil and posited salvation through hidden knowledge
(gnosis) known only to a spiritual elite. This belief led to the division
of humanity into hierarchical categories: the enlightened (khāssa)
and the ignorant masses (ʿāmma).
They were also deeply indebted to Neoplatonism, especially the
metaphysics of Plotinus and Plato, with its theories of emanation
(fayd), the chain of intellects, and the structure of existence
emanating from a single “First Intellect” (al-ʿaql al-awwal). These
ideas were adapted into Ismaʿili cosmology, as evidenced in texts
like the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity (Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-Safāʾ), the
writings of the Fatimid daʿwah, and the Epistles of Wisdom (Rasāʾil
al-Hikmah), which were later foundational for the Druze.
III. Secret Organization and the Undermining of the Islamic
State
From the third century AH onward, the Ismaʿili movement
operated as a highly secretive network with carefully tiered systems
of initiation. Doctrine was revealed progressively to new members,
following a hierarchy of seven levels of concealment, where the
deeper truths of the faith were known only to the upper echelons.
A vast system of duʿāt (missionaries) was dispatched to spread
the creed covertly, build underground communities, and lay the
groundwork for revolutionary action. One of the most infamous
offshoots of this system was the Nizārī Ismaʿili faction, founded

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by Hasan ibn al-Sabbāh, which gave rise to the Assassins—a
secret order renowned for its political assassinations of prominent
Sunni leaders and figures.
In North Africa, the Ismaʿilis succeeded in establishing the
Fātimid Caliphate, beginning in the Maghreb in 297 AH / 909
CE and later conquering Egypt in 358 AH / 969 CE. Cairo became
the intellectual and political capital of Ismaʿilism. It was within this
Ismaʿili–Fatimid context that the Druze movement would later
emerge.
IV. Alleged Links with Judaism and Zoroastrianism
Numerous Muslim scholars accused the Ismaʿilis of being
ideologically connected to Persian dualism and Zoroastrianism, and
of being infiltrated by Jewish elements hostile to Islam. Among the
earliest and most prominent voices in this regard:
• Imām Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī, who wrote in Fadāʾih al-
Bātiniyyah that the Ismaʿilis were not a religious community
but a political conspiracy exploiting religion to deceive the
masses while holding no belief in it themselves.¹
• Ihsān Ilāhī Zahīr, who elaborated extensively on the
Ismaʿilis' connections with Persian Zindīq heresies and
alleged that both Jewish and Persian agents played a major
role in constructing the movement’s hidden framework.
These accusations are bolstered by historical records indicating
that ʿAbd Allāh ibn Maymūn al-Qaddah, one of the founders of
early Ismaʿilism, had obscure origins and possibly heterodox
affiliations. The organizational structure of Ismaʿilism bears striking
resemblances to ancient Persian secret societies like the
Dehqānate, as well as to Jewish traditions of secret instruction and
the restriction of divine knowledge to a priestly elite.

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 V. From Esotericism to Deification: The Link to the Druze
Emergence
By the time of the Fatimid caliph al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh (r.
996–1021 CE), the Ismaʿili environment had become increasingly
radical and esoteric. In this climate, extreme factions began to deify
the caliph, viewing him as a divine emanation or manifestation of
the cosmic intellect.
From this milieu arose the Druze movement, led by figures such
as Hamzah ibn ʿAlī and Muhammad ibn Ismāʿīl al-Darazī,
who proclaimed al-Hākim as an embodiment of God Himself. They
rejected the pillars of Islam, adopted a theology based on
incarnation (hulūl) and metempsychosis (tanāsukh), and
developed a closed system of initiation and secrecy—hallmarks of
the Druze creed to this day.
Conclusion
The Ismaʿili doctrine—esoteric, philosophical, and politically
subversive—represented one of the most dangerous deviations in
Islamic intellectual history. It posed as Islam while undermining its
foundations, preached enlightenment while enforcing secrecy, and
manipulated religion as a tool for power and control. Its ideological
and organizational models laid the groundwork for the emergence
of the Druze sect, which represented a later and more radical
evolution of this inner-Islamic esotericism.
Sources and References
• Al-Ghazālī, Abū Hāmid, Fadāʾih al-Bātiniīyah.
• Ihsān Ilāhī Zahīr, al-Shīʿah wa al-Qurʾān; al-Shīʿah wa Āl al-Bait; al-
Shīʿah wa al-Tashayūʿ.
• Muhammad Ahmad al-Khatīb. Al-Firaq al-Bātiniyyah fī al-ʿĀlam
al-Islāmī.
• Mustafā Ghālib. Tārīkh al-Daʿwah al-Ismāʿīliyyah.

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• Bernard Lewis. The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam.
• Farhad Daftary. The Isma’ilis: Their History and Doctrines.
• Wilferd Madelung. Ismaili Thought in the Classical Age.

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 2
The Fatimid State and the Cradle of the
Daʿwah

The Rise of the Fatimid Caliphate and Ismaʿilism — Al-

Hākim bi-Amr Allāh and the Turbulent Era
The emergence of the Druze faith was not a sudden or isolated
occurrence within the landscape of Islamic sects. Rather, it was the
culmination of a long and complex development within the Bāṭinī
(esoteric) framework of Ismaʿilism, unfolding within a highly
sensitive religious and political context: the zenith of the Fatimid
Caliphate. Understanding the origins of the Fatimid state and the
doctrinal evolution of Ismaʿilism is essential to grasp the fertile
ground from which the Druze tawhīd movement later arose.1
I. The Seeds of Revolution: Ismaʿilism in the Shadow of the
ʿAbbāsids
By the late second century AH (8th century CE), during a period
of internal unrest within the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, an underground
movement began to grow—a clandestine force that moved from
region to region, bearing a vision for an alternative Islamic order.
This force would come to be known as Ismaʿilism, a Shīʿī sect that
broke away from mainstream Jaʿfarī Shīʿism after the death of

1 See “An Overview of the Ubaydid (Fatimid) State,” by A. R. Kelani

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Imām Jaʿfar al-Sādiq. Its adherents insisted that the Imamate had
passed not to Mūsā al-Kāzim, but to Jaʿfar’s son Ismāʿīl, or to his
progeny Muhammad ibn Ismāʿīl—thus establishing a new line of
Imams, the seventh of whom, they believed, entered a state of
occultation (ghaybah), after which began a period of secret daʿwah.
From the beginning, the Ismaʿili movement was characterized
by strict secrecy, hierarchical structure, and revolutionary
aspirations. It was less a theological school than a missionary-
political network. Its chief center in early years was the town of
Salamiyya in the Syrian steppe, where a cadre of highly disciplined
duʿāt (missionaries) operated under the cover of taqiyyah (religious
dissimulation). Among them were Maymūn al-Qaddāh and his son
ʿAbd Allāh, considered the ideological architects of what would
later evolve into the Fatimid Caliphate.¹
Before this movement achieved statehood, however, it fractured
into multiple competing factions. One of the most notorious was
the Qarmatians, who based themselves in Bahrain and launched a
series of bloody uprisings against the ʿAbbāsids—including the
theft of the Black Stone from the Kaʿbah in 317 AH (929 CE).
Other splinter groups surfaced in Kūfa, Basra, Yemen, and
Khurāsān, reflecting the volatility and doctrinal experimentation
prevalent in the Shīʿī world during that era.
II. The Rise of the Fatimid Dynasty in North Africa
Amid this turbulent landscape appeared a figure named Saʿīd ibn
al-Husayn ibn Ahmad ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Maymūn al-Qaddāh—a
man who would later rename himself ʿUbayd Allāh al-Mahdī.
Claiming descent from Fātimah al-Zahrāʾ and ʿAlī ibn Abū Tālib,
he sought to establish his legitimacy as the awaited Mahdī and
maʿsūm Imam. Yet many Sunni scholars and genealogical
researchers disputed his lineage, asserting that it was fabricated and

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that his true origins traced back to Persian clients (mawālī) of
questionable background.
Leaving Salamiyya, ʿUbayd Allāh traveled through the Levant
and Egypt, eventually reaching the Maghrib (modern-day Algeria
and Tunisia). There, he secured the loyalty of the powerful Kutāma
Berbers and declared the founding of the Fatimid State in 297
AH/909 CE. He took the title al-Mahdī, claiming to be the hidden
Imam whose reappearance would usher in a new esoteric
dispensation.
The Fatimids’ decision to launch their state from the distant
Maghrib—far from Sunni power centers like Baghdad and
Damascus—was a calculated move that allowed them to
consolidate power without immediate confrontation with the
ʿAbbāsids. ʿUbayd Allāh built the city of al-Mahdiyya on the
Tunisian coast and made it the capital of his regime. From there, he
dispatched duʿāt to Egypt and Yemen in preparation for future
conquests.
From its inception, the Fatimid project was met with fierce
theological opposition from Sunni scholars. It was denounced as
heretical on multiple grounds: its dubious genealogical claims, its
esoteric reinterpretation of the Qurʾān, and its dismissal of sharīʿah
obligations. The famed historian al-Dhahabī wrote,
“They are heretics (zanādiqah), Magians (majūs), unbelievers
(kuffār) who give no weight to the sharīʿah, believe not in the
apparent meanings of the Qurʾān, and have deceived the people
under the guise of the Prophet’s family.”³
For this reason, many Sunni chroniclers refused to call them
“Fātimids,” referring to them instead as the ʿUbaydiyyūn, to
dissociate them from Fātimah.

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III. Expansion into Egypt and the Height of the Fatimid
Power
Over the following decades, the Fatimids consolidated their
control over Ifrīqiyyah (Tunisia and eastern Algeria). It was not until
the reign of al-Muʿizz li-Dīn Allāh that their most ambitious goal
was realized: the conquest of Egypt, the heart of the Islamic world.
In 358 AH / 969 CE, al-Muʿizz led his forces from al-Mahdiyya
and entered Egypt without major resistance. There he founded the
city of Cairo (al-Qāhirah) and built al-Azhar Mosque, which would
become a major center for Ismaʿili doctrine and missionary activity.
Outwardly, the Fatimids adopted a policy of religious tolerance
and political pragmatism. Inwardly, however, their theological
agenda continued to evolve toward ever-deeper levels of bātinī
interpretation. The Imam was seen as the infallible interpreter of
divine will—the sole possessor of the inner meanings of revelation.
The hierarchy of duʿāt functioned as intermediaries of divine
wisdom, guiding adherents through tightly controlled levels of
esoteric knowledge.
IV. The Rule of al-ʿAzīz and the Rise of al-Hākim bi-Amr
Allāh
After al-Muʿizz, the caliphate passed to al-ʿAzīz bi-llāh, who was
notable for his maternal Jewish ancestry and for his open inclusion
of Christians and Jews in state institutions. He was succeeded by his
eleven-year-old son al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh in 386 AH / 996 CE—
a figure who would become one of the most controversial
personalities in Islamic history.
Al-Hākim’s reign was marked by contradictory behavior,
theological ambiguity, and despotic measures. He enacted eccentric
decrees such as banning women from appearing in public,
forbidding certain foods, outlawing specific schools of law, and
then reversing those same decrees. He ordered the destruction of

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the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem, only to later
authorize its reconstruction. These erratic decisions created one of
the most unstable periods in Fatimid governance.
In the midst of this instability, the Druze daʿwah was born—
launched by figures operating within the heart of the Fatimid
system, most notably Hamzah ibn ʿAlī ibn Ahmad and Muhammad
ibn Ismāʿīl al-Darazī. They proclaimed that al-Hākim was not
merely a caliph, but a divine incarnation—a mazhar ilāhī, a physical
manifestation of God Himself, who had descended to unveil the
supreme esoteric unity (al-tawhīd al-akbar).
Conclusion
The story of the Druze sect begins here—not as a mere
continuation of Ismaʿilism, but as a radical break, an escalation into
full-fledged deification, the abrogation of religious duties, and
eventually, the closure of the daʿwah altogether. These defining
features would be explored in greater depth in the following
chapter.

References and Sources

• Al-Dhahabī, Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ, under the entry on the
Fātimid caliphs.
• Al-Ghazālī, Fadāʾih al-Bātiniyyah.
• Bernard Lewis, The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam.
• Daftary, Farhad. The Ismaʿilis: Their History and Doctrines.

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Druze Doctrine – A Critical Analysis

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 3
The Druze Doctrine from Within –
Presentation and Analysis

The casual reader may be surprised to discover that members of

the Druze sect do not call themselves “Druze” at all. In fact, they
consider this label a historical distortion that has little to do with
their true identity. Instead, they refer to themselves as “the People
of Monotheism” (Ahl al-Tawhīd) or “the Unitarians” (al-
Muwahhidūn), and they describe their religion as “the Unitarian Call”
(al-daʿwah al-tawhīdiyyah). This name reflects their claim to uphold
the purest form of divine oneness—what they describe as an inner,
esoteric understanding of tawhīd, free from all forms of idolatry,
anthropomorphism, and legalistic superficiality. 1

1 The Origin of the Name “Unitarian Sect”

The Druze refer to themselves as “the People of Monotheism” (Ahl al-Tawhīd)
or simply “the Unitarians” (al-Muwahhidūn). They claim to uphold a pure and
absolute form of tawhīd (divine oneness), one that is free from
anthropomorphism (tashbīh) or embodiment (tajsīm), and unbound by the literal
meanings of scripture. Instead, they pursue what they describe as “intellectual,
inner, absolute monotheism” (al-tawhīd al-ʿaqlī al-bātinī al-mutlaq). Among their
followers, this creed is known as “the Unitarian Call” (al-daʿwah al-tawḥīdiyyah), and
their doctrinal texts—most notably the Epistles of Wisdom (Rasāʾil al-Hikmah)—
consistently affirm this name.
In contrast, the commonly used name “Druze” is derived from Muhammad ibn
Ismāʿīl al-Darazī, one of the early missionaries who spread their doctrine.
However, he was a controversial figure whom the Druze later rejected. For this
reason, they internally reject the name “Druze,” considering it an external label
that does not reflect the true essence of their faith.

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 However, this bold claim to monotheism quickly collapses
under the weight of any serious theological inquiry. The doctrine
adopted by the Druze since the 5th century AH (11th century CE)
is grounded in deeply esoteric, gnostic, and philosophical
foundations—a worldview that systematically contradicts the
revealed concept of tawhīd upheld by the prophets. The
“monotheism” championed in the Druze sacred text, the Epistles

Why Do They Claim Monotheism While Committing Polytheism?

From the standpoint of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah, merely claiming tawhīd is
not sufficient unless that claim conforms to the revelation and the divinely
prescribed law. In the case of the Druze, several beliefs and practices place them
in clear contradiction to authentic monotheism:
• They deify al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh, claiming he is a divine manifestation
in human form;
• They deny the outward pillars of Islam, such as prayer, fasting,
pilgrimage, and almsgiving;
• They rely on esoteric interpretation (taʾwīl bāṭinī) of the Qur’an and
Sunnah to the point of nullifying and discarding the revealed texts;
• They believe in reincarnation (tanāsukh), a doctrine that negates the
belief in the Last Day, resurrection, and divine judgment.
Therefore, as clarified by Sunni scholars, the tawhīd professed by the Druze
is not genuine tawḥīd, but rather a philosophical, gnostic, esoteric construct with
no relation to the monotheism preached by the prophets. It is a conception of
divine unity closer to Eastern illuminative philosophy or Neoplatonism, in which
God's attributes are negated, His actions denied, and tawḥīd becomes a mystical,
intellectual idea embodied in a “divine Imam.”
Ibn Taymiyyah’s Critique
Ibn Taymiyyah, one of the foremost critics of esoteric and pseudo-Islamic
philosophies, addressed these claims directly. In his critique of similar groups, he
wrote:
“They call themselves the People of Monotheism, yet they are the farthest
from it. They deny the Creator as distinct from His creation, and regard all
existence as manifestations of Him. Their shirk (polytheism) and extremism are
even greater than that of the original idolaters.” — See: al-Radd ʿalā al-Bakrī
Conclusion
The Druze designation as “Unitarians” does not reflect genuine, divinely
revealed monotheism. Rather, it is:
• Either an internal attempt to cloak their creed in an Islamic appearance,
• Or an esoteric philosophical concept that has deviated entirely from the
revealed tawhīd of the Lord of the worlds.

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of Wisdom (Rasāʾil al-Hikmah), is not the tawhīd of Noah,
Abraham, Moses, or Muhammad (peace be upon them.) Rather, it
is a monotheism emptied of God’s names and attributes, stripped
of divine law and moral obligation, built upon the deification of the
Fatimid caliph al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh, and centered on an extreme
glorification of hidden knowledge (al-bātin) over divine revelation
(al-wahy).
A Monotheism That Undermines Divine Transcendence
According to Druze belief, God manifested Himself in human
form, specifically in the person of al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh, the
eccentric and authoritarian Fatimid ruler who disappeared in 1021
CE. By affirming this incarnation, Druze theology denies God’s
transcendence and elevates a human to divine status. They assert
that salvation lies in obedience to this divine figure, and they reject
the outward practices of Islam—such as prayer, fasting, and
pilgrimage—as unnecessary for those who attain esoteric truth.
In this framework, worship becomes irrelevant, obligations fall
away, and divine guidance is no longer found in revealed scripture
but in the pronouncements of the incarnate “Lord.” This is not a
form of monotheism, but a striking example of hidden polytheism
(shirk khafī) masquerading in the language of philosophical
mysticism.
The Theological Contradiction: Tawhīd or Shirk?
This paradox—calling themselves “People of Monotheism”
while assigning divinity to a man—is not lost on the discerning
theologian. Classical Sunni scholars were quick to expose this
contradiction. Ibn Taymiyyah, the eminent scholar and theologian
of the 7th/8th Islamic century, wrote:
“These people, known as the Nusayris and Ismaʿilis, are
considered disbelievers by consensus of the Muslims... They claim

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to be Muslim, but are more disbelieving than the Jews and
Christians, and even more than many idolaters... They believe that
God incarnates in their imams, advocate the doctrine of the unity
of existence, accuse other Muslims of disbelief, and nullify the
outward and inward practices of Islam.”1
In other words, the Druze tawḥīd is not monotheism at all—it is
a metaphysical system that undermines the very core of Islamic
belief by erasing the Creator-creation distinction and replacing
divine revelation with secret esoteric codes.
The Core of the Druze Creed: Hidden Knowledge and
Esoteric Hierarchy
At the heart of the Druze doctrine is a closed system of belief
transmitted through a hidden priestly elite. Their scriptures—the
Epistles of Wisdom—are not accessible to the general public, nor even
to most members of the sect. Only a privileged class of initiates,
known as the ʿuqqāl (the “wise” or “knowers”), are allowed to study
and interpret them. These ʿuqqāl serve as the custodians of truth,
gatekeepers of salvation, and guardians of the inner meanings of the
universe.
The religion functions much like ancient Gnostic systems: it
divides humanity into two classes—the enlightened elite and the
ignorant masses. It denies the universality of revelation, replacing it
with the idea that true knowledge is the privilege of a few. Salvation,
in this view, is not a matter of faith or action, but of belonging to
the right spiritual class and gaining access to the hidden truth.
The Druze theology denies prophecy after al-Hākim, rejects the
Qur’anic message as outward and symbolic only, and replaces

1 Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, vol. 35, pp. 161-165.

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revelation with a mystical metaphysics that borrows heavily from
Neoplatonism, Gnosticism, and earlier Ismaʿili esotericism.
From Sharīʿah to Reincarnation: Theological Deviations
With the denial of the outward law (sharīʿah), Druze doctrine
replaces Islamic acts of worship with an inner ethical code that is
largely defined by allegiance to the hierarchy and belief in
reincarnation (tanāsukh). This belief holds that the soul migrates
through multiple human forms in a cycle of purification and
spiritual ascent. There is no concept of paradise or hell in the
traditional sense—no Day of Judgment, no bodily resurrection.
Instead, salvation is an inward process of enlightenment, achieved
through secrecy, loyalty, and esoteric realization.
Thus, the Druze faith:
• Denies the divine attributes of God;
• Rejects the finality of prophethood;
• Abolishes Islamic rituals and obligations;
• Deifies a human being;
• Closes the door to conversion or daʿwah;
• Replaces the Hereafter with reincarnation.
These tenets clearly diverge not only from Sunni Islam, but from
the core of Islam itself as revealed in the Qur’an and exemplified by
the Prophet ‫ﷺ‬.
The Modern Misrepresentation: A Call for Clarity
In recent decades, political narratives and interfaith discourse
have portrayed the Druze as a “peaceful, monotheistic community”
and an “authentic Islamic sect.” This portrayal, while politically
expedient, is factually and theologically misleading. It contributes to

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the erosion of doctrinal clarity and fosters confusion about the
boundaries of Islamic belief.
Studying the Druze creed, therefore, is not a matter of academic
curiosity—it is a religious and intellectual obligation. It helps
protect the integrity of Islamic theology and prevents the dilution
of tawḥīd in the name of tolerance or relativism. The truth must be
stated clearly: the Druze creed is closer to philosophical gnosticism
than to any form of genuine Islamic monotheism.
Purpose of This Chapter
This chapter does not merely summarize the Druze beliefs. It
undertakes a methodical and critical analysis of the doctrine based
on the Epistles of Wisdom, placing them under the scrutiny of the
Qur’an, Sunnah, and the principles of orthodox Sunni theology.
Our aim is to:
• Reveal the doctrinal deviations at the heart of the Druze
faith;
• Distinguish between genuine tawḥīd and philosophical
metaphysics;
• Uphold the clarity of divine revelation against esoteric
secrecy;
• Do justice to history and creed alike.
This task is not driven by polemics or sectarianism, but by a
sincere commitment to the truth, and to preserving the purity of
the Islamic faith as conveyed by the final Prophet ‫ﷺ‬.
The Origin of the Term “Unitarian Sect”
The Druze refer to themselves as “Ahl al-Tawhīd” (the People
of Monotheism) or simply “al-Muwahhidūn” (the Unitarians). They
claim to follow a pure monotheistic path that rejects
anthropomorphism, corporealism, and the literal interpretation of

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religious texts. Instead, they promote what they describe as an
“absolute inner rational tawiīd”—a kind of monotheism rooted in
esoteric knowledge and intellectual abstraction. Within their
community, their religious path is known as “al-Daʿwah al-
Tawhīdiyyah” (the Unitarian Call), and their theological texts—
most notably the Rasāʾil al-Hikmah (Epistles of Wisdom)—
frequently affirm this self-designation.
The more common label “Druze” is derived from the name of
Muhammad ibn Ismāʿīl al-Darazī, one of the early propagators of
their faith. However, al-Darazī remains a controversial figure whose
views were eventually repudiated by the Druze leadership. For this
reason, the community internally rejects the name “Druze” as a
foreign or imposed term that misrepresents the essence of their
doctrine.
Why Do They Claim Monotheism While Falling into
Polytheism?
From the perspective of Sunni Islam, simply claiming to follow
monotheism (tawhīd) is insufficient if that claim does not conform
to the revelation and divine law brought by the Prophets. When
subjected to doctrinal scrutiny, the Druze belief system displays
glaring contradictions to genuine tawhīd. Specifically, the Druze:
• Deify al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh, claiming that he was a divine
manifestation in human form;
• Reject the foundational rituals of Islam such as prayer,
fasting, pilgrimage, and almsgiving;
• Rely heavily on extreme esoteric reinterpretation (taʾwīl
bātinī) of the Qur’an and Sunnah, often nullifying or
disregarding the explicit texts altogether;
• Believe in reincarnation (tanāsukh), a doctrine rooted in
polytheistic cosmologies that negates belief in the

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 Resurrection, the Day of Judgment, and divine
accountability.
For these reasons, what they call tawhīd is, according to Sunni
scholars, a distorted and philosophical concept divorced from
revealed religion. It resembles more closely the esoteric mysticism
of Eastern philosophies such as Neoplatonism or Hindu Vedanta,
rather than the monotheism of Noah, Abraham, Moses, and
Muḥammad (peace be upon them). Their version of tawḥīd negates
God’s names and attributes, denies His actions, and instead treats
monotheism as a purely inward rational abstraction that finds its
highest expression in the figure of the “divine imam.”
Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyyah critiqued these doctrines with
powerful clarity, stating:
“They call themselves the People of Monotheism, yet they are
the farthest from it. They deny a Creator distinct from His creation
and claim that all existing things are manifestations of the divine…
Their polytheism and extremism exceed even that of the early
idolaters.”
(See: al-Radd ʿala al-Bakrī by Ibn Taymiyyah)

The Emergence of Druze Doctrine

The Druze doctrine arose within a highly complex intellectual
and religious milieu in the late fourth and early fifth centuries AH,
during the era of the Fatimid Caliphate, which had adopted the
esoteric Ismaʿili madhhab. Although the Druze trace their origins
to the Call to Monotheism (daʿwat al-tawhīd) proclaimed by al-Hākim
bi-Amr Allāh in 408 AH, the doctrinal roots of this call extend
much deeper, shaped by a range of philosophical and spiritual
traditions.

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 In the isolation of mountainous landscapes—and through
obscure texts layered in secrecy—the creed of the Druze
community gradually took form, known within its own literature as
the Unitarian Doctrine (al-ʿaqīda al-tawhīdiyya). At its essence,
however, this creed is a metaphysical and esoteric system, rooted in
Ubaydid Ismaʿili thought but ultimately departing from it in
significant ways: by deifying the figure of al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh,
rejecting the outward obligations of Islamic law, and embracing
reincarnation (taqammus) as a key to understanding human destiny.
The principal source of Druze doctrine is the corpus known as
the Epistles of Wisdom (Rasāʾil al-Ḥikma), composed during the Druze
missionary period between 408 and 434 AH by Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī ibn
Aḥmad and his companions. These writings constitute the
foundational texts that crystallized the Druze creed in its final
form—rich in symbolism, steeped in esoteric hermeneutics, and
distinctly detached from the broader Islamic tradition.
I. The Doctrinal Source: The Epistles of Wisdom

The “Epistles of Wisdom” (Rasāʾil al-Hikma) comprise

approximately 111 treatises—though accounts vary, with some
sources listing 111 and others as many as 157—attributed to the
founders of the Unitarian Call (daʿwat al-tawḥīd). Chief among these
figures are:

• Hamza ibn ʿAlī ibn Ahmad – regarded as the chief

architect of the Druze doctrine and known as Hādī al-
Mustajībīn (“The Guide of the Responders”).

• Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-Samūqī – recognized as the author of

the final epistle.

• Ismāʿīl al-Tamīmī al-Tanūkhī – one of the foremost

missionaries of the early call.

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 • Al-Husayn ibn Hamdān al-Khasībī and Muhammad
ibn Wahb al-Qurashī – key figures during the
foundational phase of the daʿwah.
These epistles are marked by their intensely symbolic language,
layered ambiguity, and esoteric hermeneutics. Their reading or
study is explicitly forbidden for the uninitiated—referred to in
Druze terminology as al-juhhāl (“the ignorant”). To this day, the
Rasāʾil remain under strict religious secrecy, accessible only to those
who have undergone a formal process of spiritual advancement.
This includes a ritual pledge of allegiance (bayʿa) and full induction
into the elite circle of the ʿuqqāl (the “wise” or enlightened ones),
who alone are entrusted with the deeper meanings of the faith.
Here is your polished passage, revised for clarity, elegance, and
publication-level academic tone. I’ve retained your structure and
nuance while enhancing consistency, flow, and scholarly precision:

II. Religious Ranks: The Juhhāl and the ʿUqqāl

Druze religious society is formally divided into two distinct
ranks:
• The Juhhāl (“the ignorant”): This group comprises the
general populace who are denied access to the full doctrine.
They are regarded as living in spiritual darkness, expected
to obey and conform without receiving knowledge of the
deeper teachings.

• The ʿUqqāl (“the enlightened”): This is the initiated elite

granted access to al-ḥikma (“the wisdom”). Their lives are
characterized by asceticism, piety, and strict discipline. They
are entrusted with interpreting the sacred texts and guiding
the community in both doctrine and conduct.

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 Entry into the class of the ʿuqqāl requires the performance of a
solemn covenant (mīthāq) before a council of elders. This rite
includes an oath of secrecy and a lifelong commitment not to reveal
the inner teachings—even to one’s closest relatives.
This hierarchical division is not merely administrative; it is
central to Druze theology, which posits that ultimate truth is not
accessible to all. Instead, it is veiled from the masses and disclosed
only to a spiritually awakened few. The path to hikma is thus an elite
spiritual journey rather than a universally available revelation.
III. The Pillars of Druze Doctrine
The Druze creed diverges fundamentally from the outward
practices of Islamic law. It does not uphold the canonical five pillars
of Islam (prayer, fasting, almsgiving, pilgrimage, and testimony of
faith). Instead, it proposes five inward, esoteric pillars, rooted in
metaphysical and spiritual ideals:
1. Truthfulness in speech (al-sidq fī al-qawl)
2. Mutual protection and solidarity among believers (hifz
al-ikhwān)

3. Renunciation of all forms of false worship (barāʾa min

ʿibādat al-tāghūt), based on their distinctive interpretation of
divine unity

4. Disavowal of enemies of the faith (barāʾa min al-aʿdāʾ),

defined as those who reject the doctrine

5. Complete submission to the will of God (al-ridā bi-fiʿl

Allāh)
Notably absent are ritual obligations such as salāh (prayer), sawm
(fasting), zakāh (almsgiving), and hajj (pilgrimage). These acts are
reinterpreted as allegories for deeper spiritual truths. The Druze

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tradition maintains that such outward rites were appropriate during
the earlier ages of concealment, but that the current age of wisdom (ʿasr al-
hikma) transcends them, having been granted access to the inner
reality of faith.

IV. The Druze Position on Islamic Sharīʿa

The Druze doctrinal stance on Islamic sharīʿa reflects a

fundamental departure from normative Islamic practice. They hold
that the outward obligations of the sharīʿa—such as prayer, fasting,
and pilgrimage—are no longer binding in the current spiritual
epoch. According to their belief, these rituals were abrogated with
the advent of the new daʿwa (mission). Instead, the Druze
emphasize ʿibāda ʿaqliyya bātiniyya—an “intellectual, esoteric
worship”—which manifests as obedience to the divine
manifestation of al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh and the pursuit of spiritual
ascent through the degrees of wisdom.
This view is articulated in the Epistle of Purpose and Counsel (Risālat
al-Ghāya wa-l-Nassīha), attributed to Hamza ibn ʿAlī, where it is
stated that anyone who denies his Lord in this age or hesitates in
submitting to Him “is among the losers,” and that outward religious
deeds alone will be of no benefit to such a person.
V. The Deification of al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh
Although Druze theology initially developed from within the
esoteric currents of Ismāʿīlī thought—which already emphasized
symbolic interpretation and veneration of the Imams—the Druze
took this trajectory further by explicitly deifying al-Hākim bi-Amr
Allāh. This doctrinal evolution marked a theological rupture even
from mainstream Ismāʿīlism.
The critical turning point came when prominent early Druze
missionaries—most notably Hamza ibn ʿAlī and Muḥammad ibn

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Ismāʿīl al-Darazī—proclaimed that al-Hākim was not merely an
Imam or Caliph, but a divine manifestation in human form. This
bold assertion catalyzed the Druze community’s withdrawal from
broader society and their consolidation into a closed, highly
secretive religious structure.
This act of deification remains the most radical theological
departure within Druze belief. According to the Rasāʾil al-Hikma,
al-Hākim did not die or suffer assassination, but instead “entered
occultation” and will one day return. He is described with exalted
titles such as “the Word,” “the Universal Intellect,” and “the
Manifestation of Unity.” Several epistles declare that “God
appeared in human form,” and depict al-Hākim as the luminous
force by which minds perceive, the One who manifested in pure
human bodies, and through whom truth is unveiled and falsehood
exposed.
This belief is not a hidden esoteric mystery for the ʿuqqāl; rather,
it is a foundational tenet within their doctrine. However, it remains
concealed from the juhhāl and the broader public, in strict
observance of the Druze system of hierarchical concealment. This
structure of secrecy has preserved the esoteric and exclusivist nature
of the Druze faith from its inception to the present day.
VI. The Doctrine of Reincarnation
Perhaps the most distinctive element of Druze theology is the
doctrine of taqammus—reincarnation. This belief holds that the
soul, upon death, transmigrates into another human body in an
unending cycle aimed at the soul’s perfection and ultimate union
with the Universal Intellect. Within this metaphysical framework,
traditional Islamic doctrines concerning the afterlife—such as
bodily resurrection, paradise and hell, and divine judgment—are
effectively nullified.

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 In Druze belief, paradise is interpreted as the attainment of
hikma (wisdom), hell as the state of jahl (ignorance), and divine
reckoning as an internal, ongoing process within the soul itself. The
spirit is either elevated or degraded in accordance with its condition
and conduct in its new incarnation.
This concept displaces the Islamic principle of maʿād (return to
God and bodily resurrection), representing a radical departure from
core tenets of Islamic eschatology. In its philosophical structure and
metaphysical orientation, the Druze view of the soul aligns more
closely with Eastern religious systems such as Hinduism,
Manichaeism, and Zoroastrianism—traditions that had, over
centuries, permeated esoteric currents within Islamic history. These
traditions provided fertile ground for a Druze cosmology steeped
in allegory, symbolism, and a deep metaphysical reading of reality.
Conclusion
The Druze creed emerged as a sophisticated synthesis of
esoteric Ismāʿīlī elements, Gnostic philosophy, Neoplatonic
metaphysics, and spiritual concepts drawn from ancient Eastern
religions. It coalesced into a closed religious-political project under
the banner of Tawḥīd (“Unitarianism”), aiming at the spiritual
elevation and political rule of an enlightened elite. This project first
manifested during the revolutionary aspirations of the Fatimid state,
but following the political collapse of the Druze daʿwa, it retreated
into concealment—recasting itself as a cryptic sect that severed ties
with the wider Muslim community.
The Epistles of Wisdom (Rasāʾil al-Hikma)—the exclusive
doctrinal corpus of the Druze—encapsulate this closed theological
system. They reveal a worldview grounded in esoteric
hermeneutics, hierarchical initiation, rejection of Islamic
exotericism and its legal pillars, and the elevation of a spiritual
aristocracy that alone possesses access to truth.

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 The Druze doctrine is thus not merely a sectarian variation or
interpretive school within Islam; it constitutes a full theological
rupture. While the community may present itself as inclusive or
tolerant in social or political contexts, this openness is largely
superficial. The doctrinal core remains sealed behind layers of
secrecy, accessible only to those who have undergone the rites of
mīthāq (allegiance) and taʿaqqul (initiation into wisdom).
Although the Druze refer to themselves as Ahl al-Tawhīd (“The
People of Monotheism”), their theology—when examined against
the prophetic tradition, the sharīʿa of Islam, and the creed of Ahl al-
Sunna wa-l-Jamāʿa—reveals profound and irreconcilable
divergences. These theological departures will be the subject of
critical analysis in the following chapter.

Sources and References

1. Abu-Izzeddin, Nejla M. The Druzes: A New Study of Their History, Faith,
and Society. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984.
2. Daniel De Smet. La pensée ésotérique d’Ismaëlisme à la Druzisme. Peeters
Publishers, 2002.
3. De Smet, Daniel. “The Druzism of the Epistles of Wisdom.” In The
Druzes: An Annotated Bibliography, edited by Nejla M. Abu-Izzeddin.
Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 1971.
4. Farhad Daftary, The Ismailis: Their History and Doctrines
5. Friedman, Yaron. “Al-Husayn ibn Hamdan al-Khasibi: A Historical
Biography of the Founder of the Nusayri-‘Alawite Sect.” Studia
Islamica, No. 93 (2001), pp. 91-112.
6. Henry Corbin. History of Islamic Philosophy. Translated by Liadain
Sherrard, Kegan Paul International, 1993.
7. Ibn Taymiyyah. Al-Radd ʿala al-Bakrī. Cairo: Maktabat al-Sunnah, n.d.
8. Moosa, Matti. Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects. Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 1988.

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9. Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.). Sectarianization: Mapping the
New Politics of the Middle East. Oxford University Press, 2017.
10. Nuseibeh, Naim. “The Metaphysical Doctrines of the Druzes.” The
Muslim World 33, no. 1 (1943): 36–47.
11. Sālih ibn Fawzān al-Fawzān. Al-Mulakhkhas fī Sharh ʿAqīdat al-Tawhīd.

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 4
The Druze in the Theological Scale of Ahl al-
Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah

Having explored the doctrines of the Druze in the previous

chapter through their primary sources, we now turn to the doctrinal
scale of Islamic orthodoxy—Ahl al-Sunnah wa’l-Jamaʿah—to
evaluate this creed through the lens of scholars recognized as the
custodians of divine revelation, the heirs of Prophetic methodology
in affirming monotheism, safeguarding the faith from distortion,
and upholding religious clarity and balance.
From the earliest generations, the Islamic ummah was
distinguished by its sharp clarity in theological concepts. Any
deviation from the principles of tawhīd, suspension of the authority
of revelation, or innovation in foundational beliefs was met with
scholarly response—not out of hatred or sectarian zeal—but as an
act of mercy to the ummah, a defense of truth, and a deep concern
for the purity of faith. It is within this framework that the scholars
of Islam approached esoteric sects in general, and the Druze creed
in particular.
I. The General Position of Sunni Scholars Towards Esoteric
Sects
Esoteric sects such as the Ismāʿīliyya, Qarmatiyya, and the
Druze were subject to near-unanimous consensus among Sunni

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scholars regarding the danger they pose to faith and community.
These sects are marked by several defining traits:
• Suspension of Islamic Law: They deny the outward law
and claim that sacred texts possess secret meanings
accessible only to specific spiritual elites like the “Imām” or
“Dāʿī.”
• Deification of Human Figures: They assign divine
attributes to historical leaders and claim infallibility or
godhood.
• Denial of Pillars of Islam: The five pillars are dismissed
or reinterpreted through symbolic or metaphysical lenses.
• Secrecy and Sectarian Loyalty: Their doctrines
emphasize concealment, dissimulation (taqiyya), and an
allegiance that runs parallel to and often in contradiction
with the broader Muslim ummah.
Al-Dhahabī, commenting on the Fātimid dynasty (also known
as the ʿUbaydīs), wrote:
“The Ubaydid state in Egypt was characterized as Rāfidī (Shiʿite)
and Bātinī (esoteric), marked by elements of heresy (zandaqa). Its
viziers openly espoused Shiʿite beliefs while secretly harboring pure
disbelief.”1
Ibn al-Jawzī was even more forthright,
“Outwardly they professed Rāfidī beliefs, but inwardly they held
pure disbelief. They detested the Sharīʿa, claiming it had both an
outer and an inner meaning, and they interpreted all its commands
and prohibitions in accordance with their own desires.”2

1 Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ, vol. 15, p. 151.

2 Talbīs Iblīs, p. 99.

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 Such judgments encompassed all branches of Ismāʿīlism,
including the Qarmatiyya and, by extension, the Druze.
II. The Druze According to Sunni Scholars
Based on collective scholarly testimony, the Druze sect is
classified as an esoteric group outside the fold of Islam due to the
following core beliefs:
1. Rejection of Islamic duties: There is no obligation to
pray, fast, give zakāt, or perform pilgrimage.
2. Belief in reincarnation (tanāsukh): This doctrine
contradicts explicit Qur’anic verses affirming resurrection,
judgment, Paradise, and Hell.
3. Deification of al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh: They believe him
to be a manifestation of the Divine in human form.
4. Concealment of doctrine: Sacred knowledge is restricted
to a privileged class of initiates known as ʿuqqāl.
5. Disavowal of all Muslims: They maintain that those
outside their sect are spiritually condemned.
Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyyah issued emphatic rulings in this
regard,
“These people who are called Nusayris, along with other sects of
the Qarmatian Bātinis, are more disbelieving than the Jews and
Christians. Indeed, they are more disbelieving than many of the
polytheists. Their harm to the Muslims is greater than that of overt
enemies such as the Tatars. They are perpetually aligned with the
disbelievers among the polytheists and the People of the Book
against the Muslims. They are apostates from the religion of
Islam—they are not considered Muslims. They do not acknowledge
the obligation of fasting during Ramadan, nor the pilgrimage to the
Sacred House [Kaʿbah]. They do not uphold the prohibitions

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established by God and His Messenger, such as those concerning
carrion, wine, and other forbidden matters.”1
He further added regarding the Druze,
“Likewise, the Druze—they are of the Nusayri sect, and to those
who truly understand them, they are even more disbelieving. They
deny the resurrection, Paradise, and Hell. They do not affirm the
obligations of Islam, nor the lawfulness of what Allah has
permitted, nor the unlawfulness of what He has prohibited. They
do not observe prayer or fasting, nor any other Islamic duties. They
do not forbid immorality or the consumption of wine. In fact, they
are among the most misguided of people.”2
This verdict was echoed and affirmed by other notable scholars
such as al-Dhahabī, Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Shātibī, al-Suyūtī, and others.
III. The Position of Ihsān Ilāhī Zahīr
Dr. Ihsān Ilāhī Zahīr stands as one of the most prominent
contemporary scholars who critically addressed esoteric sects,
dedicating considerable analysis to the Druze in works such as al-
Bātiniyya, al-Bahāʾiyya, and al-Ismāʿīliyya.3
Zahīr warned that the threat posed by the Druze could, in
certain contexts, rival even that of Zionism, precisely because they
live among Muslims while concealing animosity and unbelief
beneath layers of secrecy and isolation.
IV. The rule regarding the “Ignorant” and the “Initiated”
Some may ask whether such rulings extend to every individual
within the Druze community, including those unaware of the
creed’s inner workings.

1 Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, vol. 35, pp. 149–150.

2 Ibid., pp. 161–162.
3 See al-Ismāʾīliyya: Tārīkh wa ʿAqāʾid, pp. 722-733.

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Scholars differentiate between:
• Judgment upon the sect: This is based on doctrinal
deviation and is categorical.
• Judgment upon individuals: This considers ignorance,
misinterpretation, and coercion. Individuals are invited to
the truth through wisdom and clarity.
Nevertheless, whoever is proven to know the sect’s creed,
believe in it, and defend it, then he takes on its ruling regarding
apostasy and departure from the faith, as established by the
scholars.
V. Are the Druze Muslims?
According to the theological framework of Ahl al-Sunnah wa
al-Jamāʿah, the answer is unequivocal: no, the Druze are not
Muslims. They do not belong to the ummah of Islam nor fall within
the parameters of the People of the Qibla. Islamic laws regarding
marriage, inheritance, ritual slaughter, and burial do not apply to
them.
Nevertheless, the obligation remains to invite them to guidance,
clarify the falsehood of their creed, and warn against their esoteric
ideology—not with injustice or hostility, but with firmness in creed
and mercy in approach.
Ibn Taymiyyah emphasized that Muslims are duty-bound either to
guide them to the straight path, or treat them as disbelievers and
apostates as appropriate.
Conclusion
The stance of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah regarding the Druze
is not rooted in personal bias or sectarian hostility. It is a scholarly
position derived from careful study of doctrine, consistency
between words and deeds, and methodical comparison of creedal

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sources. Islam’s judgments are never based on mere suspicion or
accusations—they rest upon evidence and proof.
It is firmly established that the Druze creed—both in its
foundations and expressions—lies outside the boundaries of Islam.
The monotheism it claims is not the monotheism taught by
prophets, but a theological construct that denies prophetic
revelation and redefines religion according to esoteric abstraction.
In the next chapter, we shall trace the historical trajectory of the
Druze, exploring how these beliefs manifested in political and
military stances—from the Fātimid era through the invasions of the
Levant, the Crusades, and into the Ottoman period.

Sources and References

• Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, Volumes 28 and 35
• Ibn al-Jawzī, Talbīs Iblīs
(The Devil’s Deception)
• al-Dhahabī, Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ
Ihsān Ilāhī Zahīr, al-Shīʿa wa’l-Ismāʿīliyya
• al-Shātibī, al-Iʿtisām
Ibn al-Qayyim, Madārij al-Sālikīn

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The Political and Military History of
the Druze Sect

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 5
Geographic Dispersion and the Construction
of Local Identity

After the roots of the Druze creed had entrenched themselves

in a theology of divine embodiment and secrecy, this esoteric
movement began its geographic expansion in search of safe havens
that could ensure its survival and shield it from rejection and
suspicion. The emergence of the Druze as a distinct religious sect
was not a sudden rupture, but rather the outcome of layered
theological, political, and organizational evolutions. Its geographic
stage was Bilād al-Shām, particularly the mountainous regions of
Lebanon and the southern plains of Syria.
I. Retreat from Egypt to Greater Syria
With the decline of the Fātimid state and the waning of Ismāʿīlī
influence in Egypt, the ideological incubator for the Druze
invitation collapsed. Given the Druze doctrine’s extreme
positions—especially its deification of al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh—it
became a threat even to its former allies. Consequently, the Druze
began to migrate northward, carrying with them their secret
theological legacy and doctrinal manuscripts, seeking sanctuary and
isolation.
The southern Lebanese mountains, with their rugged and
inaccessible terrain, proved ideal for the practice of their rites far
from the gaze of authorities and religious scholars. From there, they

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expanded into Jabal al-Druze (Mount Druze) in southern Syria,
limited areas in the Upper Galilee of northern Palestine, and select
villages in Hawrān in northeastern Jordan.1
II. Geography as a Doctrinal and Political Refuge
The Druze intentionally settled in geographically challenging
regions for two principal reasons:
1. Protection from doctrinal infiltration: The isolation
offered by mountainous terrain made it difficult for Sunni
preachers and scholars to reach them or engage in
theological refutation.
2. Enabling of local autonomy: These secluded areas
allowed them to impose their unique social and political

1
The Druze community in Jordan is spread across various regions, but their
most prominent concentrations are found in the following areas:
Azraq (Eastern Azraq District)
• Considered the main center of the Druze in Jordan, locally known as
"Druze Azraq."
• The Druze settled there in the early 20th century, especially after the
Great Syrian Revolt.
• It includes the Bani Ma'arouf Diwan and is regarded as the social and
spiritual heart of the sect in the kingdom.
Umm al-Quttein (Mafraq Governorate)
• A town located in northeastern Jordan, near the Syrian border.
• Historically part of Jabal al-Arab before the Sykes–Picot Agreement.
• Home to prominent Druze families such as the Safadi and Al-Barayhi.
The Capital, Amman
• Druze communities are present in areas such as Al-Jabal al-Akhdar,
Marka District, and some neighborhoods of Zarqa and Ruseifa.
• They gradually relocated there since the founding of the Emirate,
particularly from Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine.
Other Areas
• Wadi al-Sirhan: Some Druze families from Jabal al-Arab settled here.
• Ajloun: Small Druze clusters are found in the northern highlands.
• Aqaba: A number of Druze families live in the southern coastal city.

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 order rooted in “Uqqāl’s rule,” with leadership passed down
through founding families.
This geographic seclusion facilitated the construction of a
distinct Druze identity—not only religious but also social and
cultural. They prohibited intermarriage with outsiders, refused to
admit non-Druze into their faith regardless of intent, and developed
an internal caste system distinguishing between the ʿuqqāl
(initiates) and the juhhāl (uninitiated), forbidding the latter from
accessing religious texts or doctrinal details.
III. Formation of Druze Identity in the Mountains
The Druze did not merely seek geographic isolation; they
constructed a tightly closed and cohesive social system to safeguard
their creed and resist assimilation. Several factors contributed to
this:
• Exclusive endogamy: Marriage within the community
only, with absolute refusal to admit outsiders, regardless of
desire.
• Organizational secrecy: Religious texts are exclusively
entrusted to the ʿuqqāl and strictly prohibited from public
reading, copying, or distribution.
• Belief in reincarnation (tanāsukh): Death is not
considered a finality but a transition to another body,
reinforcing internal loyalty and collective identity.
Over time, this identity evolved into a quasi-political entity
capable of forging alliances, waging wars, and determining loyalty
and enmity within a framework of sectarian solidarity.
IV. Relationship with Surrounding Sunni Communities
From the moment Druze communities took root in the
mountains, their relationship with surrounding Sunni populations

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was marked by mutual apprehension. Scholars of Greater Syria
openly rejected Druze doctrines and warned against their
theological and political influence. Nevertheless, certain historical
moments witnessed pragmatic alliances or temporary partnerships,
especially in confronting foreign invasions or regional threats.
Despite these instances, the Druze remained steadfast in their
refusal to assimilate into the broader Islamic society, preserving
their religious, social, and political separation. At times, they
presented themselves merely as “mountain folk” rather than a
religious sect—an evasion of doctrinal scrutiny.
V. Symbols of Local Leadership
This period witnessed the emergence of Druze leadership
figures who consolidated the sect’s mountainous identity and
administered their territories. Among the most prominent:
• The Jumblatt family in Jabal al-Shouf, combining political
leadership with doctrinal influence.
• The Arslan family, rivals of the Jumblatts for mountain
leadership, engaging in local political disputes.
• Shaykh Fakhr al-Dīn al-Maʿnī II, who will be discussed
in a separate chapter for his major role in regional expansion
and military campaigns.
As we shall see, these families gradually transformed from local
chieftains into regional powers capable of negotiating with the
Ottomans and forming alliances or waging conflicts with fellow
princes.
Conclusion
The phase of geographic dispersion and identity formation
represented the foundational moment for the Druze’s social and
political presence. The sect evolved from a persecuted esoteric

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group into an insular mountain-based community with the means
for survival, semi-autonomy, and cautious engagement with
surrounding powers.
This phase laid the groundwork for the Druze’s subsequent
trajectory across centuries, in confrontations with the Crusaders,
the Mamluks, and the Ottomans, as well as in forging distinctive
political alliances—topics to be explored in the following chapters.
B
Sources and References
• Dr. Hassān Hallāq, Studies in Modern History of Lebanon
• ʿAbd al-Rahmān Badawī, Esoteric Thought in Islam
• Kamāl al-Salībī, The Druze in History. Lebanese American
University, Beirut, 2001.
• Corbin, Henry. The History of Islamic Philosophy (Arabic edition.)
Beirut.

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 6
Ethnic Origins and the Spread of the Druze
in Bilād al-Shām

The Druze presence in Bilād al-Shām (Greater Syria) is tied to

the emergence of their esoteric doctrine under the Fatimid
Caliphate, particularly during the reign of al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh
(386–411 AH / 996–1021 CE), who was regarded by them as a
divine manifestation. Initially, the daʿwah (missionary call) appeared
in Egypt, but it was swiftly rejected by a broad spectrum of
Muslims—both Sunnis and even mainstream Ismaʿilis within the
Fatimid ranks. Consequently, the Druze missionaries sought more
fertile ground to propagate their secretive and radical creed,
eventually turning toward Syria.
Were the Druze a Migrant People from Egypt?
Historical evidence suggests that the Druze did not migrate in
groups from Egypt to Syria. Rather, it was primarily their
missionaries who made the journey, most notably: Hamza ibn ʿAlī
al-Zūzanī, Ismāʿīl al-Tamīmī, and Muhammad ibn Wahb al-
Qurashī. These figures targeted mountainous regions in Bilād al-
Shām—areas known for their sectarian diversity or alienation from
central political-religious authority.
The movement was rejected in Egypt early on. The missionary
al-Darazī (after whom the sect was—somewhat misleadingly—

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named, though Druze themselves dislike him) was killed, and the
remaining missionaries fled. The mountainous regions of Syria and
Lebanon offered them a safe haven, often lying beyond the
effective control of the central state.
Who Were the First Converts in the Levant?
According to historical sources, the earliest adherents to the
Druze doctrine in the Levant were local populations—particularly
in Jabal al-Summaq in northern Syria (modern-day Idlib
governorate), and later in Mount Lebanon and Jabal al-ʿArab. Their
conversion was not always theological; it was sometimes motivated
by local loyalties or the desire for protection via a secretive sect that
could shield them from the dominant political-religious systems.1
Many historians suggest that Yemeni-origin tribes such as Āl
Tanūkh and Āl Maʿn in Mount Lebanon were among the first to
adopt the Druze faith, indicating that the sect was more of an
ideological transformation of local Levantine populations rather
than a transplanted foreign group.2
The Non-Ethnic Character of the Sect
Unlike many religious communities, the Druze are not a uniform
ethnic group. They are a mix of Levantine Arabs, Yemeni tribes
(some exiled to the Levant during the Abbasid era), and local
populations of Aramean or Syriac origin who converted later. There
are also indications that some Turks joined Druze communities in
Mount Lebanon during the Mamluk period.
Scholar S.D. Goitein notes that one of the key reasons for the
Druze daʿwah’s spread in the Levant was the fragmentation of
Islamic sects and the political upheavals of the time, which led

1 See: Nadim Nayif Hamza, al-Tanukhūyūn the Ancestors of the Druze and their Rules
in Mt. Lebanon. Dar al-Nahar: Beirut, 1984, pp. 67-68.
2 Wikipedia: Tanukh

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certain groups to seek independent religious identities. This made
Mount Lebanon and southern Syria fertile ground for the Druze
creed.1
A Doctrinal, Not Demographic, Transformation
The adoption of the Druze creed was not due to mass migration,
but rather due to secretive missionary activity that succeeded in
converting local communities. Historian Kamal Salibi observes
that most Druze in Lebanon and Syria today descend from the
indigenous population of those regions, who "changed their
religious skin" during the medieval period—not migrants, but local
converts to an esoteric doctrine.2
Why the Mountains?
The concentration of Druze in mountainous areas (Jabal al-
Druze, Mount Lebanon, Jabal al-Summaq) reflects a functional link
between their creed and closed geography. A secretive religion
cannot thrive in open cities or cosmopolitan societies—hence, the
mountains were a strategic choice. This geography later contributed
to the Druze community’s isolationist character and allowed them
to survive across centuries despite their separation from broader
Islamic society.3

1 S.D. Goitein, “The Origins of the Druze People and Religion,” Studia Islamica,
No. 26 (1967), pp. 55–84.
2
Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon
Reconsidered, London: I.B. Tauris, 1988, pp. 94–96.
3 Hasan al-Amīn, ibid., pp. 56–59.

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 7
The Druze in the Era of the Crusades and
Mongol Invasions

As the bells of the Crusades echoed across the Levant, the Druze
community had already begun entrenching its presence in the
mountains stretching from the Shouf region to Mount Hawrān. Its
religious and social identity had crystallized in ways that
distinguished it from the surrounding Islamic milieu. These
events—the Crusader and Mongol invasions—were not merely
tests of military resilience, but decisive moments for defining
loyalties, stances, and identity.
I. The Druze and the Crusades
Neither Islamic nor Western historical sources point to any
significant or organized Druze involvement in fighting against the
Crusaders, despite their geographic proximity to key battlefronts.
While Sunni Muslims were actively engaged in defending Jerusalem
and the Levant—from Nūr al-Dīn Zengī to Salāh al-Dīn al-
Ayyūbī—Druze participation remained minimal and, at times, a
source of suspicion among Muslim chroniclers.
Some accounts even suggest that Druze leaders in Mount
Lebanon adopted a stance of neutrality or tactical alignment with
the Crusaders, seeking to preserve their mountain autonomy and
fend off external interference. Their doctrinal ambiguity and social

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seclusion likely influenced this choice, especially in contrast to
participation in a unifying Islamic project.
Ibn Taymiyyah explicitly criticized this stance, stating:
“They [i.e., the Druze] are always aligned with every enemy of the
Muslims; they side with the Christians against the Muslims. Among
the greatest calamities in their eyes is the Muslims’ conquest of the
coastal regions and the defeat of the Christians. In fact, one of the
gravest disasters for them is the Muslims’ victory over the Tatars.”1
Such statements reflect the perception that the Druze of his
time did not actively oppose the Crusaders and were instead aligned
with them, provoking strong condemnation from Sunni scholars
who viewed this as a betrayal of faith and communal loyalty.
II. During the Mongol Invasions
When the Mongol armies swept into Iraq and the Levant in the
7th century AH, history posed another heavy question: where did
the sects stand? As with the Crusades, the historical record notes
little, if any, military engagement from the Druze against the
invading Mongols.
In fact, some historians indicate that Druze regions were not
direct targets for the Mongol invasions and that their mountainous
territories were spared from conflict. As such, the Druze again
opted for seclusion and neutrality, carefully observing the balance
of power before committing to any position. The newly emerging
Mamluk state—spearheading the defense of Islam in the famous
Battle of ʿAyn Jālūt in 1260 CE—did not consider the Druze a
reliable ally or military partner.
Tensions between the Druze and the Mamluks occasionally
flared, especially under Sultan Baybars, who sought to consolidate

1 Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, vol. 35, pp. 150-151 and beyond.

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central authority over all local powers, including the Druze
leadership in the mountains.
III. Underlying Motives and Doctrinal Background
The cautious or neutral Druze positions during these critical
episodes can be attributed to a variety of factors:
1. Esoteric belief structure: Their secretive doctrine does
not frame the Islamic ummah as a unified whole, but rather
distinguishes between “those who know” and the general
masses, which diminished their identification with broader
Muslim concerns.
2. Preservation of local autonomy: Maintaining their
mountain enclave took precedence over risky external
entanglements or costly warfare.
3. Absence of a unifying Islamic vision: The Druze lacked
a comprehensive Islamic framework and often viewed
Sunni rule as a potential threat to their existence—on par
with Crusader or Mongol threats.
IV. Responses from Sunni Scholars
Sunni scholars did not remain neutral regarding Druze
ambivalence or alignment with adversaries. Ibn Taymiyyah
categorized the Druze alongside other sects he deemed outside the
fold of Islam, famously statin,
“These Druze and Nusayris are disbelievers by the consensus of the
Muslims. It is not permissible to eat their slaughtered animals. Even
if they outwardly proclaim the two testimonies of faith, their beliefs
render them disbelievers by unanimous agreement of the Muslims.
They are among the Qarmatian Bātinis, who are more disbelieving
than the Jews, the Christians, and the polytheists of the Arabs.”1

1 Fatawā Shaykh al-Islām fī al-Nusayriyyah wa al-Durūz, p. 79.

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 He issued rulings that permitted fighting against them, barred
them from public office, and prohibited consumption of their
slaughtered meat. In his view, they revealed only the name of Islam
while concealing beliefs antithetical to the core of Islamic
monotheism and law.
This position arose from a clear analysis of their behavior
during those decisive junctures—particularly their alliances with the
Crusaders and Mongols, which scholars saw as evidence of
opposing the faith during critical trials.
V. Consequences and Legacy
The Druze refusal to engage actively against the Crusader and
Mongol invasions left a lasting imprint on their historical image
within the Islamic conscious. Many scholars and chroniclers
regarded them as an insular sect with ambiguous loyalties and
hesitant positions in times of crisis.
This perception contributed to further isolation from the
broader Muslim society, reinforcing public and scholarly
wariness—an image that would persist well into the Ottoman
period.
The era of the Crusader and Tatar invasions served as a true
moment of reckoning, revealing the stances of various groups.
During this time, the Druze emerged as a local force that chose
isolation, neutrality, or even accommodation with the enemies of
the Muslims, in order to preserve their own existence. This was not
a mere coincidence, but rather the product of a particular creed,
historical trajectory, and a closed social structure—factors that
would later shape their political roles in subsequent eras.
B
Sources and References
• Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā

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• Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wa’l-Nihāyah (The Beginning and the End)
• al-Dhahabī, Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ
• Ihsan Ilahi Zahir, al-Ismāʿīliyah.
• Muhammad Suhayl Taqqush, The History of the Mamluk State in
Egypt and the Levant (Arabic ed.)

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 8
From Sectarian Isolation to Regional Power:
Fakhr al-Dīn II and the Rise of Druze
Influence

After centuries of isolation and withdrawal in the mountainous

regions of the Shouf and Hawrān, the Druze began to emerge as an
influential local political force, especially with the rise of Emir Fakhr
al-Dīn al-Maʿnī II in the seventeenth century CE. This phase
marked a notable turning point: a once esoteric and secretive sect
transformed into a quasi-autonomous power exercising
governance, forging alliances with Western powers, and
confronting Ottoman central authority. What enabled such a shift?
And what role did European influence play?
I. Emir Fakhr al-Dīn II: Biography and Vision
Born in 1572 CE, Fakhr al-Dīn II belonged to the illustrious
Maʿn family, a Druze dynasty that ruled parts of Mount Lebanon
as Ottoman-appointed emirs of the Shouf region. Yet Fakhr al-Dīn
aspired to far more than provincial administration—he sought
political independence, the construction of a powerful Druze-led
entity, and openness to the West.
What distinguished Fakhr al-Dīn was:
• His diplomatic acumen

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 • His ambition to unify Mount Lebanon’s sects under his
authority
• His pursuit of political sovereignty apart from the Sublime
Porte
II. Alliance with Western Powers
In a bold and unprecedented move for the region, Fakhr al-Dīn
forged a strategic alliance with the Duchy of Tuscany, Italy. He
exchanged envoys, dispatched delegations, and established
diplomatic relations with European states. The aim was clear: to
leverage Western support against Ottoman interference and curb
imperial control over his expanding power base.
As part of this alliance, he received military aid, European
engineers, and modern weaponry. He began fortifying his
strongholds and extended his reach across Mount Lebanon to
Baalbek, the Beqaa Valley, Sidon, and even northern Palestine.
A contemporary Western scholar remarked:
“Fakhr al-Dīn embodied the first attempt at local independence in
Mount Lebanon—an initiative that intersected with European
interests and served long-term colonial ambitions.”1
But why Did Fakhr al-Dīn al-Maʿnī seek an Alliance with
Tuscany?
The alliance between Fakhr al-Dīn II al-Maʿnī and the Grand
Duchy of Tuscany in the early seventeenth century emerged from
a convergence of political interests, strategic ambitions, and
regional dynamics that created fertile ground for opposition to
Ottoman authority. At a time when the Levant was under firm
Ottoman control, Fakhr al-Dīn—an astute and ambitious Druze

1 See, Sectarianism, Identity and Conflict in the Middle East, Michael C. Hudson, Editor.

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emir—sought to assert his autonomy and expand his rule beyond
the confines of Mount Lebanon.
Fakhr al-Dīn found himself constrained by the Ottoman system
of tax farming (iltizām), which treated local rulers as mere
administrators rather than sovereigns. His aspirations to extend his
influence into Damascus, Palestine, and southern Syria brought him
into direct conflict with Ottoman governors, particularly the
powerful vālī of Damascus. As his territorial ambitions met with
resistance, Fakhr al-Dīn recognized the need for an external ally—
a European power that could provide military and political support.
Tuscany, with its own Mediterranean ambitions, appeared to be the
ideal partner.
At the time, Grand Duke Ferdinando I de’ Medici was pursuing
an expansionist policy aimed at increasing Tuscan influence in the
eastern Mediterranean. His strategic objectives included:
• Challenging Ottoman dominance along the Levantine
coast;
• Establishing a permanent maritime and political presence in
the region;
• Creating footholds in Syria and Palestine that could serve as
staging grounds for further Christian influence.
Tuscany viewed Fakhr al-Dīn as a promising regional ally—an
independent-minded leader who could undermine Ottoman
control from within. For Fakhr al-Dīn, the relationship promised
not only military aid, but international legitimacy and a gateway to
the broader Christian world.
In 1608, Fakhr al-Dīn signed a secret agreement with Tuscany
that outlined:
• The dispatch of an Italian military mission to Lebanon to
train his forces;

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 • The supply of cannons, firearms, and ammunition;
• Technical support in fortification building, particularly at
strategic sites such as Qalʿat al-Shuqayf (Beaufort Castle);
• Potential logistical and naval support should he rise openly
against the Ottomans.
As part of the agreement, Italian military engineers arrived in
Lebanon to construct and reinforce defensive structures—marking
a significant evolution in the emir’s military capabilities.
While Tuscany was a Catholic state and Fakhr al-Dīn a Druze
leader, pragmatic politics overshadowed theological differences.
The alliance fit neatly within Tuscan aspirations of launching a “new
crusade”—albeit a political and maritime one—against the
Ottomans. Fakhr al-Dīn, in turn, leveraged the alliance to open
diplomatic channels with the Vatican and other Catholic powers
such as France, enhancing his standing as a legitimate and
formidable regional authority.
The alliance significantly strengthened Fakhr al-Dīn’s political
and military position for over a decade. However, it also alarmed
the Ottoman administration, which perceived the collaboration as
a direct threat. In 1613, the Ottomans dispatched an expedition
under Ahmed Pasha al-Küçük to suppress Fakhr al-Dīn’s growing
power. Facing imminent defeat, he fled to Tuscany, where he lived
in Florence from 1613 to 1618, hosted by the very court with which
he had forged his alliance.
This episode became a historical precedent, symbolizing the
potential of Levantine local powers to engage with European states
for mutual gain—and underscoring the fragility of Ottoman control
in its Arab provinces. The Fakhr al-Dīn–Tuscany alliance would
echo in later centuries as European interest in the Levant grew ever
deeper.

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III. Confrontation with the Ottoman State
Naturally, the Ottoman Empire did not tolerate such ambitions.
Fakhr al-Dīn, once a loyal Druze governor, had become a threat to
imperial unity. In 1613 CE, a military campaign led by the governor
of Damascus, Ahmed Küçük Pasha, forced Fakhr al-Dīn into exile
in Europe.
Ironically, this exile became a “learning expedition” as he
resided in Tuscany, studied modern administrative and military
systems, and returned to Lebanon in 1618 CE with renewed
determination, empowered by foreign expertise.
His project continued until 1635 CE, when—after a prolonged
siege—he was captured and executed in Damascus by order of
Sultan Murad IV.1
IV. The Lasting Impact of Fakhr al-Dīn’s Project
Despite his tragic end, Fakhr al-Dīn’s endeavor left enduring
effects:
1. Consolidated the Druze as a regional political power in
Mount Lebanon and the Shouf
2. Catalyzed local consciousness around autonomy and
secession from the Ottoman state—a legacy inherited by
future Druze leadership
3. Introduced European influence into Lebanon—a precursor
to direct French intervention in the 19th century
4. Reshaped the region’s sectarian alliances, as Fakhr al-Dīn
courted Christian sects, notably the Maronites, in his anti-

1 See Fakhr al-Din II - Wikipedia.

H62H
 Ottoman project—laying the groundwork for later
sectarian complexities in the mountain
V. Druze–Western Relations: The Beginnings of a Strategic
Partnership
Western powers—particularly Italy and France—saw the Druze
as a useful instrument for undermining Ottoman dominance. This
perception later played into:
• Support for missionary activity under the guise of minority
protection
• Justification for European interference in Druze-Maronite
conflicts
• Advocacy for local autonomy schemes at the expense of
centralized Ottoman rule
Importantly, Druze–Western relations were rooted in political
interests, not religious alignment. The Druze did not adopt
Christianity nor exhibit theological affinity with the West, but rather
viewed Western alliance as a pragmatic military and political shield
against internal and external threats.
VI. Islamic Critique of the Druze–Western Alliance
From the standpoint of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah, alliances
between esoteric sects and Western powers against the Islamic state
have been historically and theologically condemned. Such alliances
are classified as impermissible acts of loyalty to the enemies of God.
Scholars have interpreted them as betrayals of the ummah and
deviations from legitimate allegiances.
Conclusion
The rise of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Maʿnī II marked a pivotal
transformation in Druze history—from a secluded sect to a political
power-seeking recognition on the world stage. Their alliance with

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the West initiated a series of strategic relationships with foreign
powers that would reemerge at key junctures in the histories of the
Levant and Lebanon.
Thus, Druze history moved beyond the confines of
sectarianism to become a shaping force in the political geography
of the region.
B
Sources and References
• Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām
• Lahd Khatir, Lubnan fī ʿAhd al-Mutasarrfiyah, Beirut, 1967.
• Michael Hudson, Sectarianism and Politics in the Middle East
• Muhammad Kurd ʿAlī, Khutat al-Shām
• Pulus Qarali, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Maʿnī al-Thānī Amīr Lubnān wa
ʿAlāqatuh bi-Findinando al-Awwal wa Kazma al-Thānī Amīrī
Tuskānā.
• Abu-Husayn, Abdul-Rahim. Provincial Leaderships in Syria,
1575–1650. American University of Beirut, 1985.
• Bonacina, Giovanni. “Fakhreddin II and the Medici: A
Political Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean.” Journal of
the Royal Asiatic Society, 2002.
• Preto, Paolo. Venezia e i Turchi. Marsilio Editori, 1975.
• Hourani, Albert. Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798–
1939. Cambridge University Press, 1962.

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 9
The Druze During the Mutasarrifiyyah and
the French Mandate: From Rebellion to
Sectarian Balance

In the mid-nineteenth century, Mount Lebanon entered a new

phase of political and social transformation following a series of
violent clashes between Druze and Christians—particularly the
Maronites—which culminated in the massacres of 1860. In
response, European powers, led by France, intervened and
brokered a new administrative system known as the Mutasarrifiyyah
(1861–1915). This marked a critical juncture in the Druze historical
narrative: a moment suspended between marginalization and
adaptation, between the erosion of traditional dominance and the
effort to safeguard regional influence.
I. The 1860 Sectarian Conflict: The Druze Face Europe
The 1860 civil strife erupted between Druze and Christians
(primarily Maronites) across Mount Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley
amid longstanding sectarian tensions and foreign interventions.
France assumed the mantle of “protector of the Maronites,” while
the Ottoman Empire officially positioned itself as a mediator,
though some of its administrative bodies leaned toward curbing the
Druze.

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 This crisis climaxed in direct French military involvement under
the banner of defending the Christians, significantly weakening the
Druze’s political standing and raising the larger questions:
Has the Druze political era come to an end? And has the Western
agenda succeeded in diminishing their historical weight?
II. The Mutasarrifiyyah System: Marginalization or Fragile
Balance?
In 1861, with international backing, the Mutasarrifiyyah was
established as a semi-autonomous administrative unit. It stipulated
that Mount Lebanon would be governed by a Christian (non-
Lebanese) governor appointed by the Ottoman Sultan and
approved by European powers. A meticulous sectarian distribution
of administrative posts was set in place:
• Maronites received the majority of governmental roles
• Druze were allocated a smaller share, reflecting their
political setback post-1860
• Seats on the “Administrative Council” were apportioned
among Maronites, Druze, and other groups
Despite this apparent regression, the Druze retained their
influence in regions like the Shouf, Rashaya, and Hasbayya. They
capitalized on their strategic geography and economic networks to
maintain a delicate balance with Christian counterparts.
III. The Rise of Druze Leadership and Strategic
Repositioning
Throughout the Mutasarrifiyyah period, a new generation of
Druze leaders emerged, intent on:
• Preserving internal cohesion and shielding the community
from missionary and Christian encroachment

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 • Building alliances with Sunni and Shiite leaders in the Beqaa
and Hawrān regions
• Engaging the Ottoman authorities with calculated
pragmatism, without compromising Druze identity
Among the most notable figures were Saʿīd Jumblatt and Nasīb
Bey Jumblatt, who pioneered a new political tradition based on
diplomacy over militancy and economic leverage over
confrontation.
IV. The French Occupation and Greater Syria: From
Revolution to Containment
Following World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire, the French entered Lebanon and Syria, fragmenting the
region into sectarian mini-states. The Druze community, led by
Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, stood firmly against this scheme and
spearheaded the Great Syrian Revolt (1925–1927) against the
French Mandate, with Druze strongholds in Jabal al-ʿArab serving
as the epicenter of resistance.
Conversely, in Greater Lebanon, which France established in
1920, French authorities attempted to pacify the Druze by offering
political representation and local guarantees. As a result, the Druze
became a measured force in the Lebanese equation—neither
dominant nor marginalized, but rather a “third player” whose
influence could not be ignored.
V. Analytical Reflection: From Defiance to Equilibrium
What explains the Druze transformation—from a Western
adversary in Syria to a political partner in Lebanon?
The Druze transformation—from fierce anti-colonial rebels in
Syria to accepted political partners in Lebanon—can be understood
as a product of calculated pragmatism, rooted in a long tradition of
mountain politics and adaptive leadership. Having shifted from

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outright defiance to strategic negotiation, Druze leaders displayed a
sophisticated grasp of regional power dynamics, capitalizing on
their unique identity to secure localized autonomy. Their ability to
navigate the shifting tides of Western colonial interests, while
maintaining communal cohesion, earned them a recognized place
in Lebanon’s emerging political system.
VI. The Islamic Perspective on This Period
From the standpoint of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah:
• The Druze’s engagement in the 1860 sectarian conflict and
their subsequent cooperation with French occupiers in
certain areas warrants theological censure
• However, their alignment with Sultan al-Atrash in resisting
French colonial rule is regarded as a noble stance—despite
doctrinal ambiguities
Conclusion
During this transformative period, the Druze succeeded in
maintaining political relevance despite sweeping regional upheavals.
They transitioned from insurrection and opposition to partnership
and equilibrium. Nevertheless, their esoteric creed and Western ties
continued to provoke questions among Islamic historians, making
any comprehensive reading of this era incomplete without
incorporating both doctrinal and geopolitical perspectives.
B
Sources and References
• Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria
• Mulhim Kurban, Tārīkh Lubnān al-Siyāsī al-Hadīth
• Philip Hitti, History of Lebanon

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The Druze in the Modern Era

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 10
The Druze in Lebanon: From Civil Wars to
Sectarian Principalities

Since the founding of independent Lebanon in 1943, the Druze

have entered a new phase of political adaptation, engaging with a
state built on a meticulously sectarian framework known as the
National Pact. After centuries of doctrinal secrecy and theological
ambiguity, they found themselves as official stakeholders within the
fabric of the modern Lebanese state—a radical transformation that
necessitated redefining their relationship with society and authority
while retaining their historical legacy and esoteric identity.
Lebanon, particularly its rugged mountainous regions like the
Shouf, has long served as a stage for the evolution of the Druze
political psyche—marked by military consolidation, shifting
alliances, rebellions, and even massacres. Here, the Druze political
persona morphed from withdrawal to dominance, from neutrality
to tacit complicity, and from taqiyya (dissimulation) to open
assertion. Their journey reveals the singularity of the Druze
experience within a deeply sectarian state governed more by
political balances than by principles, and driven by interests more
than doctrines.

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I. Historical Roots: The Maʿn and Shihāb Dynasties
During the 16th and 17th centuries, local emirates emerged
under Ottoman suzerainty, most notably the Maʿn dynasty led by
Druze emirs—chief among them Fakhr al-Dīn II. With the
assistance of European allies, especially the Italians, Fakhr al-Dīn
extended his authority over much of Bilād al-Shām and spent time
in Florence. His expansionist ambitions led to direct conflict with
the Ottoman state, which ultimately ended his rule and executed
him in 1635 CE.
This was followed by the Shihāb dynasty (initially Sunni, later
Christian), which marked a gradual shift of authority from the
Druze to the Maronites, though Druze influence remained
dominant—especially in mountain strongholds like the Shouf.
II. Sectarian Conflict with the Maronites
In the 19th century, tensions between Druze and Maronite
Christians escalated into widespread violence across Mount
Lebanon, culminating in the 1860 massacres that claimed thousands
of lives. Towns such as Deir al-Qamar, Zahleh, and Sidon
witnessed significant bloodshed, prompting French military
intervention under the pretext of Christian protection.
While this intervention curbed immediate violence, it planted
the seed for European sectarian patronage in Lebanon and
established the concept of “protected communities”—a precedent
the Druze would later exploit by fortifying their own military-
sectarian identity in response to external pressures.
III. Consolidation of Druze Leadership
With the proclamation of “Greater Lebanon” by General
Gouraud in 1920 under French Mandate, the Druze Mountain was
annexed to the newly formed state. The Druze, feeling sidelined in

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the emergent sectarian order despite their historical significance,
sought political placement within the newly drawn map.
Leadership alternated between the Arslan and Jumblatt families,
each vying to represent the Druze, with diverging stances toward
France and Arab causes.
In modern Lebanon, the Jumblatt family1 emerged as the
embodiment of Druze political adaptability, transitioning from
insular sectarianism to calculated national engagement.
Kamāl Jumblatt spearheaded the Druze modernization project
from the mid-20th century, founding the Progressive Socialist Party
and embedding Druze identity within a socialist, Arab nationalist
framework open to leftist movements. As a philosopher and
reformist, he co-founded the Lebanese National Movement and
strived to balance Druze identity with civic activism. After his
assassination in 1977, his son Walīd Jumblatt inherited leadership,
embracing a highly pragmatic political style—switching alliances as
needed and maintaining Druze representation in parliament and
cabinet.
Eventually, the Arslan family’s influence waned, leaving the
Jumblatts as the sole Druze power brokers within and beyond state
institutions. Their leadership style, however, was rife with
contradictions: publicly advocating secularism and reform while
perpetuating rigid sectarian patronage, turning the Shouf into a

1 It is likely that the name “Jumblatt” (Junblāt) has Turkish origins, composed of
two words: “Can,” meaning “soul” or “life,” and “Polat,” meaning “steel” or
“iron.” Thus, the name would mean “Soul of Steel” or “Iron-hearted”—a heroic-
style designation that was common during the Ottoman era. It is said that the
family’s founding ancestor was known as “Can Polat,” who entered Mount
Lebanon in the 17th century—either from Aleppo or Anatolia—and was
connected to Emir Fakhr al-Dīn al-Maʿnī II. The name later evolved in local
dialects into “Jumblatt.”

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Druze “principality” governed by entrenched networks and identity
politics wrapped in civil discourse.
IV. The Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990)
During Lebanon’s civil war, the Druze played a major military
role within the Lebanese National Movement. Walīd Jumblatt
aligned with the Palestinians, then with the Syrians, later shifting
allegiances. The war witnessed several atrocities, notably the
massacres of Sidon and al-Shahhār al-Gharbī, leading to the
infamous 1983 Mountain Massacre, in which Druze forces targeted
Maronites following the withdrawal of Kataeb militias after the
withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Shouf, Aliya and Baabda.
These events led to the mass displacement of tens of thousands
of Christians from the Shouf and the transformation of the region
into a Druze-dominated enclave ruled with an iron grip by the
Progressive Socialist Party. This consolidation came with
widespread destruction of villages and churches, and the imposition
of a new sectarian reality by force.
It is worth noting that the massacres were not one-sided; rather,
this civil war witnessed mutual massacres between the sects,
including some committed against the Druze as well—such as the
Shams Massacre and the Barouk Massacre.1
V. Relations with the Syrian Regime and Israel
After the war, the Druze cultivated close ties with the Syrian
regime, offering political loyalty in exchange for preserving their
leadership. Simultaneously, they opened unofficial channels with

1 For a more detailed account of the massacres and violations that occurred
during the Mountain War, particularly in 1983, see: Makram Riachi, The Conflict
over Mount Lebanon; Bernadette Schenk, Kamal Jumblatt: The Arab-Islamic Heritage
and the Role of the Druze in His Vision of Lebanese History.

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Israel—through local figures—positioning themselves as “trusted
sectarian intermediaries” in any future settlement.
Notably, some Druze leaders openly supported Syrian
occupation of Lebanon and used it to further solidify internal
dominance.
VI. Post-Taʾif: Entrenched Influence
Following the Taʾif Agreement of 1989, Lebanon entered a
fragile peace, yet Druze influence remained intact. Their role was
redefined within the sectarian system, maintaining their
“kingmaker” status in government formation. The Jumblatts
monopolized Druze representation and controlled appointments,
judiciary, education, and resources in their regions.
Walīd Jumblatt became emblematic of sectarian pragmatism—
supporting Hezbollah’s Iranian-backed arms, then opposing them,
then rejoining forces, depending on regional shifts.
VII. Their Position on Arab and Islamic Causes
The modern Druze stance has been characterized by ambiguity
and hesitation:
• Verbally supporting the Palestinian cause while field
behavior during the civil war ranged from backing
resistance to collaborating with Israeli forces
• Taking a cautious approach to the Syrian revolution, with
Druze in Suweyda divided between loyalty to the regime
and tentative support for opposition groups
• Prioritizing “sectarian interests” and “Lebanese specificity,”
distancing themselves from broader Islamic concerns
Kamāl Jumblatt once stated:

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“We do not wish to return to the past, but rather to create a new
society—one that grants human beings their dignity, awareness, and
rightful existence.”1
This reflects a controlled secularism that favors inward-looking
reform over ideological commitments.
VIII. Western Role and the History of Protection
Understanding the Druze’s modern position requires recalling
Western involvement in their protection and strategic deployment:
• They received British backing against French-supported
Maronites
• Adopted secular-modernist rhetoric to distinguish
themselves from other Muslim sects
• Were viewed by some Western policymakers as “useful
local partners” in partition or communal management
schemes
The Druze have expertly leveraged this ambiguity to safeguard
their existence and perpetuate their leadership.
IX. Recent Stances and Opposition to the New Syrian State
In 2025, with the fall of the Assad regime, the positions of both
regional and internal forces became increasingly clear. While the
majority of Sunni and Christian factions in Lebanon expressed their
support for the new Syrian state, leading Druze figures—chiefly
prominent figures from Mount Lebanon—declared their backing
of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri in his stance rejecting reconciliation with
the new authorities in Damascus. This was seen as a continuation
of the path of estrangement and rebellion.

1 Charter of the Progressive Socialist Party.

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 This coincided with the Israeli bombardment of Damascus on
July 16, 2025, further confirming a renewed phase of historical
deviation.
To be sure, the Druze scene is far more complex than a simple
narrative of collective support or a unified call for Israeli
intervention.
Even within Suwayda itself, the Druze leadership was divided
over Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri’s position. Armed factions such as Dirʿ
al-Tawhīd and Liwaʾ al-Jabal publicly backed al-Hijri, viewing his
stance as a defense of Druze autonomy. In contrast, other groups
like the Karāmah Guesthouse Alliance led by Laith al-Balaʿūs, and
Ahrār Jabal al-ʿArab, expressed support for the new Syrian state and
firmly rejected any form of foreign intervention.1
This internal fragmentation illustrates the deepening fault lines
within the Druze community—between isolationist insurgency and
cautious integration—against the backdrop of a volatile regional
realignment.
These events revealed that the alliance of this faction of the
Druze with the West and Israel was not a circumstantial occurrence,
but rather part of a long-standing political project rooted in
sectarian exceptionalism and a reliance on foreign powers.
For his part, Walid Jumblatt warned against dragging the Druze
community into an open war with the tribes and did not support
Israeli intervention. Regardless of the stance of the Lebanese
Druze, thrusting the Druze community into such a conflict amid
the vast sea of the Sunni Muslim nation will bring them no good.
The wise among them know that they stand to lose everything—
even if they have the Zionist entity, and indeed the entire West,
behind them.

1 See al-Usbūʿ, https://www.elaosboa.com/2339770/

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Wiam Wahhab’s Stance on the Syrian Revolution and the New
Government
Wiam Wahhab1 was one of the most prominent allies of Bashar
al-Assad’s regime during the years of war, fiercely defending him in
both media and political arenas. After the fall of Assad’s regime in

1 Wiam Wahhab is a Lebanese politician and media figure from the Druze
community. He was born in 1964 in the town of Jahiliyah in the Shouf district
of Mount Lebanon. He is the founder and leader of the Arab Unification Party
(Hizb al-Tawhīd), which he launched in 2006 after having been one of the figures
close to the Progressive Socialist Party led by Walid Jumblatt. Wahhab later broke
away from the party and took a different political path. He is known for his fiery
media appearances and sharp political rhetoric. He is aligned with the “Axis of
Resistance” in Lebanon—that is, the bloc allied with Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah.
Wahhab has consistently defended the regime of Bashar al-Assad and was one of
the most prominent Druze figures to oppose the 2011 Syrian revolution. He
repeatedly attacked Druze groups opposing the Syrian regime, both in Lebanon
and in Jabal al-ʿArab.
Positions and Orientation
• Wahhab is known for his fierce stance against Walid Jumblatt, the
traditional leader of the Druze community in Lebanon. He has
repeatedly sought to present himself as a political alternative and a
“nationalist Druze” not beholden to the West or Saudi Arabia, as he
puts it.
• He has close ties with the Syrian regime and leaders of Hezbollah, and
he takes part in the media discourse hostile to American and Gulf
policies in the region.
• He has run for parliamentary elections multiple times but has never
succeeded in securing a permanent seat in Parliament. However, he has
a popular base in some villages of the Chouf and Rachaya districts.
• He previously founded the OTV channel, and later established Tawhid
TV, affiliated with his party, to serve as a political platform for himself
and his ideological line.
Despite belonging to the Druze sect, Wahhab presents himself as a “pan-Arab
Islamic” politician. He has adopted a Druze discourse that is open to the Iranian
and Syrian axis, placing him at odds with several Druze religious authorities,
particularly in al-Suwayda.
Wiam Wahhab is considered one of the most controversial Druze figures,
combining populist media tactics with harsh political rhetoric. He has played a
marginal yet loud political role, especially within the internal Druze power
dynamics, where he seeks to capitalize on the rift between Jumblatt and Bashar
al-Assad for his own benefit.

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late 2024 and the rise of the new president, Ahmad al-Sharaa,
Wahhab adopted a hostile position toward the Sharaa
administration, describing it as a “usurper of power” and accusing
President Sharaa of being “a coup leader carrying out an American
agenda.”1
Wahhab called for an armed Druze resistance against the new
government and even urged for attacks on the presidential palace
in Damascus.2 He announced the formation of a militia called the
“Army of Tawhīd,” prompting the Syrian judiciary to open a legal
case against him on charges of incitement to sedition and armed
rebellion.
Within the Lebanese Druze community, reactions to Wahhab’s
stance were divided—some offered partial support, while others
expressed popular and political rejection. Hisham al-Aʿwar, the
Secretary-General of the Arab Tawhid Party, stated that Wahhab—
party leader—was “fully comfortable with his Druze support,”
adding that Druze officers had fought bravely in Syria.3 Some
sheikhs in Kfarhim even showed support for him during funeral
ceremonies for the victims of Suwayda, according to party
statements.4
On the other hand, several voices expressed concern and
rejection of Lebanese Druze involvement in Syria. At a condolence
gathering held in the Chouf region, Walid Jumblatt and a delegation
from the Progressive Socialist Party walked out as soon as Wahhab
arrived, leaving the venue nearly empty—a move widely interpreted
as a strong political message.5 Jumblatt publicly criticized Wahhab
and rejected his calls for intervention in Syria, stating that “the

1 https://thawra.sy/?p=677798
2 ‫ "التحريض المسلح"القضاء السوري يالحق وئام وهاب بتهم‬... Arabi21
3 https://annah.ar/233071
4 Ibid.
5 https://www.lebanondebate.com/article/724388

H78H
Druze are not border guards.” Wahhab responded by saying, “The
Druze authority is God and the Five Boundaries of Reason,”1
implying a claim to Druze independence in decision-making.2
X. Analytical Reflection: A Sectarian Principality Governing
from the Margins
Though comprising less than 5.2% of Lebanon’s population,
the Druze have retained disproportionate political power through
firm territorial control, intricate alliance-building, and a strategy of
temporary alignment with dominant forces.
Lebanon’s sectarian nature has allowed them to entrench
behind a closed communal identity, preserving a sense of autonomy
and fending off cultural or religious penetration.
They have demonstrated remarkable ability to harness conflict,
division, and crisis in service of their sectarian project—even while
projecting a façade of openness and civic dialogue. Their experience
in Lebanon stands as a microcosmic model of modern “sectarian
principalities.”
B
Sources and References
• Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East
• Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria
• Amnesty International Report, The 1983 Shouf Massacres
• Hanna Batatu, Palestinians Within
• Régis Blachère, Sects in the Arab East
• Kamal Jumblatt, Me and Arabism
• Kamal al-Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon

1 See Appendix III in this book to know what the Five Boundaries of Reason are.
2 https://kataeb.org/articles/sl-190729

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• French Archives on the 1860 Intervention
• Lebanese newspapers: Al-Akhbar, an-Nahar, al-Mustaqbal
(covering the recent events.)
• Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East.

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 11
The Druze in Syria: From Jabal al-ʿArab to
the Battle for Identity (2025)

Jabal al-ʿArab, historically known as Jabal al-Druze, represents

the religious and political heartland of the Druze community in
Syria. It has served as a cradle for local traditions forged under the
leadership of Druze spiritual authorities (Mashāyikh al-ʿAql) and
prominent families like the al-Aṭrash. Situated south of Damascus
near the Jordanian border, the mountain became a haven for Druze
clans migrating from Lebanon between the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Over time, it evolved into a quasi-autonomous
enclave, particularly during episodes of central state weakness. The
region's rugged terrain provided natural protection, enabling the
Druze to preserve their religious and social distinctiveness.
Jabal al-ʿArab is not merely the geographic homeland of the
Druze; it has become their strategic core and a platform for their
fluctuating political engagement. Since the twilight of Ottoman rule,
through the French Mandate and into the Baʿthist era, the Druze
role oscillated between rebellion and withdrawal, nationalism and
sectarian insularity. Their relative autonomy deepened during the
1920s when France granted them self-rule, planting the seeds for
local leaderships with separatist tendencies. Yet this balance
remained fragile—until the events of 2025 shattered it. The Druze
spiritual establishment turned against Syria’s post-Assad

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government and opened the door to overt Israeli intervention,
marking a dramatic shift in their stance toward the state and nation.
The episode exposed a deep-rooted isolationist drive that continues
to shape critical decisions within the community.
I. Historical Foundations: The Druze and French
Colonialism
In one of the most defining moments of modern Syrian history,
the Druze leader Sultan Pasha al-Atrash led the Great Syrian Revolt
against the French occupation in 1925—a popular uprising that
emerged from the heart of Jabal al-Druze, which France had already
designated as an autonomous entity in 1921 as part of its policy to
fragment the Levant into sectarian mini-states (for the Druze,
Alawites, Maronites, etc.). This sectarian entity granted the Druze a
form of self-rule and expanded the influence of their local leaders,
affording them political leverage not available in other regions.
Despite these privileges, Sultan al-Atrash chose to rise above
narrow sectarian identity and lead a comprehensive national
revolution. Sparked by a French assault on his home in al-Suwayda,
the revolt quickly spread to Damascus, its surrounding Ghouta, and
Hauran, evolving into a broad resistance movement that
confronted superior French military power. While it was not an
exclusively Druze uprising, it drew participation from Muslims in
Damascus, Daraa, Hama, and other regions. The revolt was
eventually crushed with brutal force, yet it left behind a legacy of
national unity that is still admired today, making al-Atrash a symbol
of inclusive patriotism.
However, the Druze community did not sustain this
revolutionary path for long. It soon withdrew inward, adopting a
strategy of “armed neutrality” in subsequent stages of Syrian
history. This reversion to isolationist tendencies eventually paved

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the way for more conservative political transformations in the
community’s relationship with the Syrian state.
II. The Baʿth Era and Assad Rule: A Tense Loyalty
After Syria gained independence in 1946, the Druze actively
entered national political life. They joined state institutions,
contributed to parliamentary life, and even secured ministerial roles
in alliance with Arab nationalist movements. This initial
engagement reflected a Druze ambition to integrate and shed the
isolationism of the past.
But the Baʿth coup of 1963 transformed Syria into a one-party
security state, reshaping political equations across all sects—
especially the Druze. Traditional leaderships were weakened, Druze
society was militarized through mass conscription, and religious
institutions were restructured to align with Baʿthist ideology.
Under Hafiz al-Assad, many Druze figures—particularly from
the al-Atrash family and other prominent clans—were absorbed
into the military and intelligence apparatus. They occupied sensitive
posts that gave them a sense of status, but they retained an air of
local detachment. This “partial integration” was fragile: the Druze
maintained their own education systems, religious practices, and
selective conscription policies. Moreover, through their diaspora—
especially in France and the United States—they cultivated special
foreign relationships, resulting in a dual image: officially present, yet
privately aloof.
With the rise of Bashar al-Assad, this pattern continued. Druze
elites were embedded in state institutions, but their cultural and
social demands remained largely ignored. The mountain appeared
outwardly neutral yet remained entangled within the regime’s
networks. As corruption deepened and legitimacy eroded,
discontent simmered—especially among younger Druze, who saw

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military service as a burden rather than an honor, being summoned
to fight wars with no clear purpose or reward.
This growing discomfort manifested in quiet, socially driven
forms: draft evasion, withdrawal from state events, and emigration.
Yet the official Druze discourse remained anchored in “functional
partnership,” not “emotional allegiance,” ensuring continued access
to privileges within state institutions.
Thus, the Druze–army relationship shifted from a symbol of
national integration to a tool of internal control—from a source of
influence to a source of alienation. The community hovered
between two paradoxes: “calculated partnership” and “unspoken
estrangement.”
III. Prominent Druze Figures in the Syrian Military
Establishment Under the rule of the Assad family, several
Druze officers emerged as notable figures within the Syrian
military establishment. Some played pivotal roles in the army and
security apparatus, while others maintained their positions through
delicate balances between loyalty to the regime and sectarian
identity. Here are some of the most prominent figures:

Name Position or Role Notes

Major General Played an important role in

Former commander of
Sharaf al-Din southern Syria, particularly in
the Fifth Division
Ahmad al-Suwayda and Daraa

One of the most prominent

Major General Commander in the figures of the Syrian war;
Issam Republican Guard and killed in Deir ez-Zor in 2017;
Zahreddine later in elite forces heavily promoted by state
media as a national hero

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 Name Position or Role Notes

Although not a field military

Major General commander, his role in local
Member of Parliament
Abdullah al- reconciliation efforts made
and local leader
Atrash him an influential figure in
the security establishment

Associated with sensitive

Brigadier
Officer in Military security files in Suwayda,
General Nazih
Security especially regarding
Jerbouʿ
conscription and arrests

• The Syrian regime relied on Druze officers to maintain local

security in their regions, particularly in al-Suwayda, but it did
not grant them strategic leadership roles at the national level.
IV. The Druze and the Syrian Revolution (2011–2024)
At the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the Druze
found themselves at a historic crossroads—torn between loyalty to
the regime, cautious neutrality, and silent opposition that later
evolved into localized resistance.
Most formal religious authorities sided with Bashar al-Assad,
citing protection from chaos and extremism. Thousands of young
Druze from Suwayda joined the regular army and pro-regime
militias, a stance that disappointed many revolutionaries—
especially given the Druze proximity to rebel strongholds like Daraa
and the Damascus countryside.
Meanwhile, youth-led voices in Suwayda called for neutrality
and non-participation in the war, forming local committees to
defend their areas without aligning with either side. Shaykh Wahīd
al-Balaʿūs emerged as a prominent religious leader promoting non-
alignment with either the regime or the opposition. His slogan was:

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“No to the state, no to the opposition,” and called to protect the
mountain only. However, he was assassinated in a mysterious
bombing in 2015, widely believed to be orchestrated by the regime,
sparking temporary internal unrest.
Between 2020 and 2024, local armed groups began to appear in
Suwayda, rejecting Iranian militias and Assad’s forces, calling for
their removal from the mountain. These factions refused to engage
in combat outside their territory and adopted a civilian ethos:
“We don’t seek to topple the state, but to purge it of corruption.”
This reflected a partial rebellion against the regime, centered on
maintaining Druze autonomy. The Druze proved to be a
fragmented entity, with diverse opinions and shifting loyalties—
oscillating between political retreat and explosive local dissent
depending on circumstances.
V. Collapse of Facades — The 2025 Crisis
Following the fall of Assad in December 2024 and the onset of
rebuilding a new Syrian state, the Druze spiritual authority—led by
Shaykh Hikmat al-Hijrī—turned against the transitional
government and launched an armed rebellion in Suwayda. The
movement was justified using vague claims such as “minority self-
defense” and “resistance to Salafi encroachment.”
In truth, however, the uprising followed the government’s
refusal to grant the Druze exceptional privileges or preserve the
undeclared autonomy Suwayda had enjoyed during the wartime
vacuum. Leaked reports revealed covert meetings between Druze
leaders and foreign entities, including representatives of the Israeli
occupation.
VI. Israeli Intervention and the Bombing of Damascus
On July 16, 2025—an unprecedented moment—Shaykh al-
Hijrī publicly requested Israeli protection, claiming the new

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government posed a threat to Druze existence. In response, Israel
launched airstrikes on Damascus, targeting military sites reportedly
preparing to enter Suwayda.
The Syrian public condemned this intervention in mass
demonstrations in Damascus, Homs, and Halab, denouncing the
“fifth column” that had invited foreign aggression. The interim
government called it a “national betrayal” and began a campaign to
liberate Suwayda from rogue militias.
VII. Druze Militias and the Army Massacres
In the days following the Israeli airstrikes, horrific massacres
were perpetrated by Druze militias against Syrian army personnel in
western villages of Suwayda province. Eyewitness reports
confirmed public executions, including beheadings and brutal
lynchings, with recorded footage showing local Druze fighters
coordinating via Israeli surveillance drones.
The shock of these atrocities reverberated across Syria. Citizens
were stunned that elements from within had resorted to this level
of betrayal—especially since the post-revolution Syrian army had
become a symbol of national unity, inclusive of all sects and regions.
VIII. The Collapse of the “Neutral Sect” Myth
For over a century, the Druze community in Syria portrayed
itself as a peaceful, non-aligned sect amidst wider national conflicts.
Yet the events of 2025 shattered this carefully cultivated image,
exposing foreign entanglements and a sectarian project that
resembled other separatist movements in the region.
These developments revealed that national loyalty is not a
slogan, and that “defending the mountain” cannot justify alliance
with Israel or the execution of fellow citizens. True protection lies
in integration within a shared national project—one that upholds

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equality, rejects external patronage, and resists sectarian
superiority.1
B
Sources and References
• Patrick Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East
• Carnegie Center Reports on Southern Syria
• Syrian Observatory for Human Rights Report – July 2025
• Thomas Pierret, Religion and Politics in Syria
• Fawaz Gerges, The Great Betrayal: The Struggle for Freedom and
Democracy in the Middle East
• Field Interviews and Press Coverage of Suwayda Uprising (2020–
2024)
• Syrian Revolutionary Archive (2025), Provisional Government
Records
• Syrian Free News Agency – Coverage of July 2025 Events

1The clashes remain intense between Syrian state forces and the dissident Druze
followers of Al-Hijri in Suwayda at the time of writing.

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 12
The Druze in Palestine: From Mandate
Forces to the Golani Brigade

Palestine has not been unfamiliar with a Druze presence. Since

the early Ottoman period, the Druze established themselves in
mountainous areas near the coastal corridor—particularly in the
northern Galilee—in villages such as Daliyat al-Karmel, Yarka, and
ʿIsfiyā. Though numerically limited compared to the major Druze
concentrations in Mount Lebanon and Jabal al-ʿArab, their
sociopolitical impact gradually increased by the late nineteenth
century, reaching a critical turning point with the rise of the British
Mandate and the Zionist state built atop Palestine’s ruins.
Contrary to stereotypical portrayals of religious minorities in
Palestine, the Druze presented a distinct model in their interaction
with the Zionist project. During the Mandate years, a Druze elite
emerged that aligned itself first with the British and later with the
Zionists. Today, Palestinian Druze are integrated into the Israeli
establishment, participating in its military, security, and political
structures. How did this transformation occur? How did a
community that at times participated in resistance become part of
the machinery that displaced its own people? This chapter analyzes
the historical roots and political consequences of this complex
alignment.

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I. From Ottoman Marginalization to British Patronage
Under Ottoman rule, the Druze in Palestine occupied a
marginal position relative to their counterparts in Lebanon and
Syria, with their presence confined to a handful of mountain villages
in the upper Galilee. They enjoyed modest local autonomy under a
symbolic allegiance to the Sultan and maintained relatively calm
relations with neighboring Muslim communities, though
intermittent tensions flared during periods of instability. Politically
inactive, they preferred to remain on the sidelines and aligned
themselves with whichever power dominated the stage.
Following Britain’s conquest of Palestine in 1917, this pattern
persisted. Influenced by Druze leadership in Mount Lebanon—
families such as the Arslans and Yazbaks, who had cultivated
relations with British officers since the Napoleonic campaigns—the
Druze in Palestine leaned toward supporting the new authority.
Seizing this opportunity, Britain opened communication channels
with the Druze, exploiting their desire for stability. They recruited
dozens into security forces, especially into the Auxiliary Police,1
which played a role in suppressing the Palestinian Revolt of 1936–
1939. This laid the groundwork for a Druze political milieu aligned
with Britain, which would soon become an entry point into the
Zionist enterprise.
II. Early Relations with the Zionist Movement
Ties between the Druze and the Zionist movement began
during the 1936–1939 Palestinian Revolt, when certain Druze

1 Among the tasks assigned to them were: protecting roads and vital
infrastructure, escorting British military convoys, and carrying out raids and
arrests against Palestinian rebels, especially in the mountainous areas. It is worth
noting that these auxiliary or special forces also included men from the Circassian
and Bedouin communities. This was a consistent practice of the colonial
occupier—relying on individuals from non-Arab local groups or minorities to
sow division and hatred among the people of the same nation.

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leaders pursued tacit cooperation with the Jewish Agency under the
pretext of “neutrality.” Zionist leaders seized upon this posture to
establish trust with Druze figures. According to Israeli historian
Yonatan Shapiro, early contacts between the two sides commenced
in the late 1930s and focused on potential cooperation should
broader conflict erupt.
During the following decades—particularly the 1940s—this
relationship intensified under a calculated Zionist policy aimed at
“neutralizing minorities” and co-opting them into the Israeli fold.
This policy largely succeeded. Upon Israel’s declaration of
independence in 1948, the Druze were the first non-Jewish
community to recognize the new state. Some Druze volunteered
for the Haganah, the Zionist paramilitary force, and later took part
in operations against Arab villages in the Galilee. Thus, the
foundation was laid for an enduring political and security
partnership between the Druze and the Israeli state—a historically
controversial chapter in Palestinian memory.
III. War, Conscription, and the New Identity (1948–1960)
After Israel’s establishment in 1948, its government imposed
mandatory military service on the Druze in 1956—a policy not
extended to other Arab citizens. Though some community leaders
voiced objections, the majority of Druze gradually assimilated into
the Israeli army, participating in major operations from the 1956
Suez Campaign to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.
Druze soldiers became prominent in elite infantry units such as
the Golani Brigade and in intelligence services where they were
often assigned to monitor Arab populations. Notable names
included Amos Yarkoni, a Druze commander, and later Mansour
Abbas, a political figure within Israel. This military involvement was
paired with an Israeli campaign to construct a distinct Druze
identity—separate from Arabs and Muslims—through state-

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sanctioned curricula, independent religious councils, and judicial
frameworks. The Druze were officially recognized as a separate sect
from Muslims, part of Israel’s broader “divide and rule” strategy
meant to extract them from the Palestinian cause and recast their
allegiance within the Israeli national framework.
IV. Voices of Dissent… But
Despite the widespread enlistment of some members of the
Druze community in the Israeli military establishment since the
imposition of mandatory conscription in 1956, voices emerged
rejecting this path and affirming the Arab Palestinian identity of the
Druze. Among these voices is activist Ameer Makhoul, one of the
most prominent defenders of Palestinian identity within Israel,
despite not being Druze himself, but a Christian from Haifa. Sheikh
Raed Salah, head of the Islamic Movement inside Israel, also
cooperated with young Druze who refused military service, offering
them moral and political support.
The movement “Refuse – Your People Will Protect You,” since
its launch in 2014, marked a turning point in opposing compulsory
conscription. It brought together activists from various religious
communities and regions, aiming to break the stereotypical image
of the Druze and to reconnect them with a unified Palestinian
identity.
Nevertheless, the impact of these movements has remained
relatively limited due to structural factors, most notably the
dominance of economic interest networks tied to military service,
familial ties to security institutions, and the legal and psychological
pressure exerted by the Israeli state on those who refuse to serve—
including threats of imprisonment and denial of social benefits.
Additionally, separate educational policies and the
reinforcement of a distinct “Israeli Druze identity” have further
deepened the rift between the Druze and the rest of the Palestinian

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people, despite the continued presence of dissenting currents
within the community that seek to reclaim national belonging and
dismantle the narrative of Israelization.
V. Druze Stance on the Intifadas and the Palestinian Cause
During the 1948 Nakba, the Druze community played no active
role in Palestinian resistance. Numerous sources suggest that some
Druze armed groups provided field support to Zionist militias—
offering terrain navigation and intelligence on guerrilla movements.
This early positioning solidified over time: the Druze took no
significant part in either the first (1987–1993) or second (2000–
2005) Intifadas.
Their official discourse remained closer to loyalty to the Jewish
state than to Palestinian national claims. In the first Intifada, limited
youth participation in civil demonstrations was recorded, but the
prevailing mood leaned toward cautious neutrality. During the
second uprising, Druze involvement was nearly nonexistent, and
some Druze units even helped suppress protests inside Israel’s Arab
communities.
Figures such as Ayoub Kara emerged in support of “Jewish
State” legislation, rejected the Nakba’s legitimacy, and opposed
Arabic curricula—consolidating the political estrangement between
the Druze and Palestinian identity, and signaling growing
normalization with Israel.
VI. Druze Today: Loyalty and Fragmented Identity
Although Druze make up roughly 1.6% of Israel’s population
and about 85% of their youth serve in the army, they are not treated
as full citizens. Discrimination persists in employment,
infrastructure, and access to public services. The 2018 “Jewish
Nation-State Law,” which restricted self-determination to Jews
alone, delivered a stunning blow to Druze self-perception and

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triggered widespread protests. These quickly subsided after
promises of financial compensation and improved services.
Over time, the divide between Druze and other Arab citizens
of Israel deepened—particularly as Druze youth increasingly took
part in Israeli military campaigns against Arabs both in Palestine
and abroad, from southern Lebanon to Gaza. Although this
elevated the Druze’s institutional profile, it did not erase their
marginalization. Instead, it fostered a sense of national dislocation:
caught between a marginalized Arab identity and active service
under a state that denies them full citizenship.
Recent years have seen calls within the Druze community to
abolish compulsory military service and rejoin the Arab fold, but
such voices remain faint against the military’s grip and the
socioeconomic networks entangled with it.
VII. A Case Study in “Alliance with the Adversary”
Some interpret the Druze relationship with Zionism as
pragmatic—an alignment with the dominant power for self-
preservation and protection. But a deeper ideological and political
analysis reveals that this alignment stems from an internal doctrinal
worldview. The Druze regard themselves as distinct from their
Arab and Islamic surroundings, even antagonistic at times, driven
by beliefs rooted in esotericism, isolationism, and exclusivity.
In this context, their structural integration into the Zionist
enterprise stands as one of the most striking examples of “minority
alliance with occupation.” This entanglement was facilitated by
Israel’s revival of sectarian fragmentation, Arab internal exclusion,
and weak nationalist integration before the Nakba.
Yet despite the security and institutional benefits this alliance
has offered, the Druze remain structurally marginalized within
Israel and face skepticism and rejection from much of the

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Palestinian and Arab world. This trajectory has eroded a significant
portion of their historical legacy in Mount Carmel and the Galilee.

VIII. Their Position on Gaza, the West Bank, and Syria

Druze positions on major Palestinian struggles—particularly in
Gaza and the West Bank—have largely been negative. During the
2021 and 2023 Gaza wars, Druze villages did not host protests or
solidarity actions. On the contrary, Druze soldiers actively
participated in bombardments as part of the Israeli army.
In the West Bank, Druze servicemen are known to operate
within border guard units implicated in arrests and raids. As for
Syria, most Palestinian Druze—under the leadership of the Carmel
religious establishment—endorsed Israel’s recent intervention in
Suwayda. Public statements from Druze figures openly declared
that “Israel must protect our brothers in the mountain.”
Thus, a complete picture emerges of a military, political, and
cultural bond linking Druze within occupied Palestine and Druze
allies of Israel beyond it.
B
Sources and References
• Adālah Organization — Minority rights documentation.
• Firnaz Atiya Ahmed, al-Tawā’if al-Dīnīyah wa al-Amn al-
Qawmī al-Isrā’īlī.
• Aref al-Aref, The Tragedy of Palestine, vol. 1–2.
• Declassified Hebrew documents on Druze–Zionist
cooperation (Israeli Army Archives).
• Haaretz (Hebrew-language newspaper) — Special reports
on Druze military service.
• Israel and the Druze, by Mordechai Nisan.

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• Kais Firro, The Druzes in the Jewish State: A Brief History, Brill,
1999.
• MADA Center — Civil rights studies on Arabs in Israel.
• Mordechai Nisan, Israel and the Druze
• Mustafa Murad al-Dabbagh, Mawsūʿat Bilādunā Filistīn.
• Yehoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement
• Yoni Shapiro, The Role of Minorities in the Israeli Military
• Mustafa Murad al-Dabbāgh, Bilādunā Filastīn (Our Country
Palestine).
• Nazih Abu Nidal, The Druze in Israel — The Minority That
Chose Zionism, Beirut, Arab Research Institute.
• Reports from the “I Refuse” Movement, 2015–2022.
• Walid al-Khalidi, Lest We Forget: The Palestinian Villages
Destroyed by Israel in 1948.
• Yehoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement
• Yoni Shapiro, The Role of Minorities in the Israeli Military

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 13
The Druze in Syria: From Neutrality to
Hostility — Sectarian Shifts in the
Revolutionary Era and Beyond

For decades, the name “Jabal al-Druze” — or “Jabal al-ʿArab”

— was synonymous with Syrian national identity and anti-colonial
resistance, symbolized by Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, whose legacy
transcended sectarian bounds. Yet after the outbreak of the Syrian
revolution in 2011, the Druze community underwent sharp
transformations — shifting from cautious neutrality to alignment
with the Assad regime, and ultimately to armed rebellion and
appeals for Israeli protection, as seen in the events of 2025.
This chapter traces those shifts, explores the factors behind
them, and assesses the prospects for reconciliation between the new
Syrian state and the Druze community after the bloodshed.
I. Cautious Neutrality: The Early Days of the Revolution
When the revolution erupted in Daraa, Suwayda — the Druze
stronghold — was geographically close, but politically distant.
Druze religious authorities and spiritual councils adopted a stance
of caution, calling on their followers to “avoid fitna,” even as
Assad’s security forces committed massacres in neighboring towns.
Initially, the Druze refused to engage in combat, but they also
refrained from condemning state violence. Some community

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leaders provided moral cover for the regime, in exchange for
guarantees that Druze youth would not be conscripted into combat
zones.
However, for Syrian revolutionaries, this neutrality appeared
superficial, especially as Druze recruits were deployed in military
and security institutions complicit in the crackdown.
II. Open Alignment with the Regime
By 2013, as the conflict took on a sectarian character, Druze
leaders and clerics increasingly aligned themselves with the regime,
portraying it as a protector of minorities against “Sunni extremism.”
This narrative was echoed in the sermons of religious figures like
Shaykh Yūsuf Jarbūʿ and Shaykh Hikmat al-Hijrī.
The regime created the “First Corps” in Suwayda and placed
the province’s security under the Air Force Intelligence Directorate.
Druze were authorized to form local militias under the banner of
“National Defense,” tasked with securing the mountain and
suppressing dissent.
Still, opposition voices emerged — young Druze protesters in
towns like al-Qaryā organized demonstrations that were swiftly
crushed or neutralized.
III. Between ISIS and Assad: Weaponizing Fear
To keep the Druze within its fold, the regime promoted fear of
“Sunni terrorism,” especially after ISIS encroached upon the
mountain. This threat was intentionally amplified through tactical
facilitation, then used as a pretext for full military control.
In July 2018, ISIS carried out a brutal massacre of Druze
civilians in Suwayda, killing over 200 people. Although the regime
was suspected of complicity, it leveraged the tragedy to extract
political loyalty from the community — a strategy that yielded
temporary success.

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IV. After Assad’s Fall: Changing Alliances
In December 2024, Assad fled to Moscow as the regime
collapsed. Armed opposition factions and civil councils announced
the birth of a new Syrian national state — democratic and non-
sectarian.
Most Syrian cities celebrated the transition, but Suwayda
remained hesitant and silent. Reconciliation efforts were launched,
with government delegations visiting the province, yet Druze
clerics, led by Shaykh Hikmat al-Hijrī, adopted a hostile stance,
refusing to recognize the new government.
V. The Rebellion of Hikmat al-Hijrī and the Israeli Alliance
In June 2025, Shaykh al-Hijrī declared from Suwayda that “what
happened in Damascus was a betrayal of covenant” and “a threat
to the mountain’s sectarian safety.” He warned that the new state
aimed to “invade Suwayda and annihilate minorities.”
On July 15, 2025, Hikmat al-Hijrī formally requested that Israel
provide international protection for al-Suwayda, threatening to
pursue secession if the "Druze distinctiveness" was not respected.
Israel responded swiftly, launching an airstrike at dawn on July
16 targeting the Ministry of Defense headquarters near Umayyad
Square in Damascus, as well as a facility near the Presidential Palace.
Israel claimed the strikes were “a defense of minorities against the
radical Islamic threat.” According to a statement from the Syrian
Ministry of Health, the strikes killed 3 people and wounded 23
others.1
Simultaneously, fierce battles erupted in Suwayda as Druze
militias loyal to al-Hijrī attacked positions held by the new Syrian

1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_2025_Damascus_airstrikes

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army, massacring soldiers in ʿAtīl and around Salkhad. The fighting
claimed over 400 lives in a single week and displaced hundreds of
families — evoking haunting memories of the 1860 massacres,
albeit in reversed roles.1
VI. Dimensions and Implications of the Rebellion
These events demonstrate that the Druze community, despite
claims of neutrality, has long occupied strategic spaces in Syria’s
political landscape. For decades, its dominant religious and social
leadership sided with authoritarian rule — and now with Israel —
in pursuit of sectarian self-preservation.
Al-Hijrī’s rebellion was the culmination of an isolationist
impulse that perceived the inclusive national state as a threat, and
Israel as a strategic ally. The rhetoric of “national unity,” often
repeated by religious leaders, was exposed as hollow — their closed
communal identity ultimately taking precedence over patriotism
and religious solidarity.

1 As we write these lines, we are receiving news and reports of crimes committed
by al-Hijrī’s militias against Syrian Bedouins in al-Suwayda, including forced
displacement, the killing of their young men, the rape of their women, and the
burning of their mosques. In doing so, these militias reveal their treacherous
face—aligned with the Nusayris and Zionists—and their vile hostility toward
Muslims. The matter later escalated to the declaration of a state for them in the
mountain region, with Al-Hijri appearing in a public broadcast thanking Israel—
its government and people—and calling on the International Criminal Court to
hold the Syrian state accountable for its 'crimes in Sweida' and to protect the
Druze there. Meanwhile, among the ranks of his militias are individuals wanted
for justice from the remnants of the Assad regime, including: General Jadallah
Qaisar, an air force commander implicated in bombing Syrian cities and towns;
Brigadier General Jihad Ghoutani of the Republican Guard; Brigadier General
Issam Salman Mazhar, a fighter pilot; Brigadier General Osama Zahreddine;
Brigadier General Samer Shaarani; Brigadier General Shakib Ajwad Nasr;
Brigadier General Anwar Adel Radwan; Lieutenant Colonel Yahya Miya; and
others—all of whom are implicated in crimes against the Syrian people, including
torture, killing, and bombings. (See the Zaman Al-Wasl report).

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VII. Druze Popular Sentiment: Is There a Countercurrent?
Despite this grim tableau, youth voices in Suwayda and
surrounding villages have rejected the Israel alliance. Independent
groups emerged to support the new state and condemn al-Hijrī’s
rebellion.
Dozens of families sought refuge in Druze villages in the
occupied Golan, distancing themselves from the violence. Some
communities opened their doors to Syrian refugees.
However, these dissenting voices remain marginal and
disconnected from the dominant Druze religious and political
leadership. They face defamation and internal hostility, rendering
prospects for coexistence uncertain and fragile.
VIII. Challenges Facing the New Syrian State
The new Syrian government faces a delicate dilemma in dealing
with the Druze: full-scale military confrontation or strategic
containment without rewarding rebellion.
These events raise existential questions about the possibility of
building an inclusive state when certain sects reject the very notion
of citizenship and seek foreign protection.
A nuanced approach will be needed — distinguishing between
ordinary Druze citizens and elite figures implicated in incitement
and collaboration. Transitional justice and open dialogue should be
offered to those genuinely willing to embrace national unity.
B
Sources and References
• Reports from Al Jazeera, and Jusoor Center on developments in
Suwayda
• Publications by the Syrian Network for Human Rights
• Video speeches by Shaykh Hikmat al-Hijrī (2024–2025)

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• Studies by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies –
Doha branch
• Zaman al-Wasl Website
• Haaretz (Israeli newspaper): Coverage of Israeli airstrikes on
Damascus

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Assessment and Creed Under Scrutiny

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 14
The Druze Between Secrecy and
Transparency — Challenges of
Understanding

Among the most distinguishing features of the Druze sect—

compared to other religious communities in the Islamic and Eastern
worlds—is its absolute secrecy surrounding doctrine, religious
teachings, and even the structure of its clergy and places of worship.
This secrecy is neither incidental nor solely historical; it constitutes
a core component of their religious and social identity, dating back
to their emergence in the fifth century AH (eleventh century CE),
during the reign of the Fatimid caliph al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh.
Why Do the Druze Reject Doctrinal Dialogue?
The Druze creed is not a school within Islam that invites
dialogue or theological inquiry. Rather, it is an esoteric doctrine,
accessible only to an elite known as the ʿuqqāl (initiates), while the
general Druze population—and outsiders—are barred from its
inner content. Members of the sect do not have the right to read
their own religious texts—known as the “Books of Wisdom”—
unless they reach a specific age and undergo certain initiation rites
into the faith.
This closure is not justified today, as is sometimes claimed, by
fear of persecution. Instead, it stems from an esoteric framework

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rooted in Ismāʿīlī and Gnostic traditions, which emphasize the
duality of exoteric and esoteric knowledge, the monopolization of
truth by the elite, and the belief that the masses are unqualified to
understand “higher realities.”
Such doctrinal insulation has led to a deep epistemological gap
between the Druze and the broader Islamic community, fostering
suspicion and turning secrecy into a barrier that prevents dialogue,
critique, or theological engagement.
The Risks of Doctrinal Obscurity
This deliberate secrecy surrounding Druze beliefs has serious
implications—not only for religious knowledge, but for the
community’s relationship with the broader ummah.
• First, secrecy hinders the possibility of correction, renewal,
or even honest reflection. Religious doctrines, by nature,
require a space of inquiry to evolve or be properly
understood. When a creed is cloaked in secrecy and
withheld from public discourse, it risks ossification,
deviation, or even unconscious sanctification.
• Second, this obscurity obstructs integration into the
Islamic environment and makes building trust extremely
difficult. How can a society trust a sect it knows nothing
about—one that forbids even basic questions about its
belief system?
• Third—and most concerning—is the use of doctrinal
secrecy as a political tool. In many instances, it has been
employed to justify shifting alliances and support for
regimes or forces hostile to the Muslim ummah, without
enabling others to discern the ideological or religious
motivations behind those actions, or to engage the sect in
genuine dialogue.

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 • Finally, such intentional concealment—whether deliberate
or not—often gives the impression that the Druze creed
contains elements contrary to Islam or detrimental to the
ummah. This deepens skepticism, even among moderates
who advocate coexistence and mutual understanding.
B

Suggested Sources and References

• Ihsan Ilahi Zahir, al-Ismāʿīlīyah: Tārīkh wa ʿAqāʾid
• Kais Firro, The Druzes in the Jewish State: A Brief History
• Muhammad al-Kurdi, al-Fikr al-Bātinī fī al-Islām (Esoteric
Thought in Islam)
• Sami Makarem, The Druze Faith
• The Epistles of Wisdom— the foundational text of the Druze Sect.

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 15
Toward a Sunni Understanding of the Druze
Reality Today

The Druze sect has long been a thorny subject among scholars
of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah, owing to its doctrinal ambiguity,
theological insularity, and politically inconsistent alliances. These
traits have complicated efforts to form precise jurisprudential
rulings or balanced daʿwah positions—ones that neither acquit them
unjustifiably nor condemn them without evidence.
Are They Still Adherents of Their Founding Creed?
To answer this question, one must recall the foundational
doctrine upon which the Druze sect was built, after its split from
Fatimid Ismāʿīlism in the early fifth century AH. Led by Hamza ibn
ʿAlī, the Druze faith declared al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh to be a divine
entity—God incarnate. They abolished prayer, zakāt, pilgrimage,
and replaced Islam with an esoteric code that undermined its pillars
and distorted its monotheism.
Scholars from the four madhāhib unanimously ruled that such
beliefs constituted an explicit departure from Islam. They labeled
the Druze as esoteric heretics (zanādiqa bātiniyyūn) whose creed
precludes Muslim affiliation unless they renounce their core
doctrines. Among these scholars were Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Qurtubī,
al-Nawawī, Ibn Hajar, Ibn ʿĀbidīn, and others, all of whom

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emphasized that the Druze creed violates the principle of Islamic
tawhīd.
But the pressing question remains: Does the Druze community
today still embrace that creed? Do its members continue to hold
those same beliefs?
The reality is that the absolute secrecy surrounding the sect
makes definitive answers elusive. Available evidence suggests that
the original doctrines remain preserved in the Epistles of Wisdom
(Rasāʾil al-Hikmah), and no Druze spiritual authority has publicly
renounced the divinization of al-Hākim, the rejection of Islamic
obligations, or the doctrine of reincarnation.
All inquiries into these issues are met with denial, evasion, or
appeals to so-called “religious secrets.” This implies that the
foundational creed remains intact, and that the sect has neither
openly returned to mainstream Islam nor formally repudiated its
esoteric doctrines.
There have been isolated calls from Druze individuals in
Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon advocating theological openness and
seeking religious truth. Some have converted to Islam and publicly
repented, but they remain a small minority, often subject to social
persecution or threats to their lives.
The Duty of Clarification and Religious Fairness
This prompts an essential question: What is the appropriate
Sunni position on the Druze sect today?
1. Doctrinally: The default jurisprudential ruling stands
unless there is a proven doctrinal shift. Beliefs in
divinization, denial of Islamic obligations, reincarnation,
and Gnostic elitism remain grounds for declaring disbelief
(kufr) until the sect explicitly renounces them, affirms the

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 two declarations of faith, and enters Islam on its prescribed
terms.
2. In Practice: Injustice, aggression, and sweeping
generalizations are forbidden. Each individual must be
treated according to his or her personal accountability,
invited to truth with kindness, and given worldly rights
without coercion in matters of faith.
3. In Daʿwah: Scholars and preachers are obligated to initiate
dialogue with moderate Druze, to convey the message of
Islam with wisdom, to expose the falsehood of esoteric
claims, and to reaffirm God’s oneness and the true religion.
Remaining silent in the face of misguidance is not
tolerance—it is an abandonment of truth.
4. Historically: Justice requires recognizing that some Druze
individuals have taken honorable stances throughout
history—especially in resisting foreign occupation—and
have supported the ummah’s causes at pivotal moments. At
the same time, others have allied with its enemies,
collaborated with Israel, and participated in atrocities
against Muslims. Integrity demands that we name things
precisely, without blanket condemnation or unqualified
absolution.
Conclusion
The path to truth begins with clarity—not violence, fairness—
not flattery, and honesty—not appeasement. If the Druze
community genuinely seeks an honorable future within its Islamic
environment, it must open the doors to candid discussion, submit
its creed to the judgment of revelation, and confront its existential
questions with sincerity and courage.
B

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 16
Between Secrecy and Identity: The Druze at
a Crossroads in Contemporary History

I. A Community Between Obscurity and Exposure

Since their emergence under the Fatimid rule, the Druze have
been known as a community marked by doctrinal secrecy, insular
identity, and loyalty to clan and creed above the state. This opacity
shaped a unique image in the Islamic and Arab consciousness—one
oscillating between respect and suspicion.
Yet in the past two centuries, that mystery has gradually eroded
under the pressure of secularization, expanding education, media
openness, and finally the digital revolution. Druze doctrine has
become subject to scrutiny, and the mystique that once protected it
no longer insulates it from intellectual or political challenges.
What once served as a shield has become a double-edged
sword: secrecy is no longer sufficient to preserve the community’s
cohesion or foster a shared project with its surrounding nations.
II. From a Martial Sect to a Hesitant Minority
The military role of the Druze during the era of the Crusades
and the Mongol invasions was local and limited, primarily focused
on protecting villages and mountainous regions, rather than
participating in major armies or organized campaigns. Their
prominent military presence began to take shape later, particularly

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during the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925 led by Sultan Pasha al-
Atrash, where they played a pivotal role in resisting French colonial
rule at the time.
In Palestine, the Druze lost their Arab depth and allied with the
Zionist regime. In Lebanon, they became a sectarian force
negotiating their political share. In Syria, they split between loyalty
to Assad and sectarian seclusion—eventually leading a rebellion in
Suwayda and requesting Israeli protection.
Thus, they transitioned from a fighting force to a hesitant and
anxious minority—living on the fringes of Arab and Islamic
decision-making.
III. The Danger of Alliance with the Enemy
Requesting protection from Israel, as Shaykh Hikmat al-Hijrī’s
leadership did in 2025, marks a dangerous departure in the Druze
creed and their place within the collective memory of the ummah.
To go from resisting the French under Sultan al-Atrash and
opposing Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon—to seeking
refuge from Israel against fellow citizens—is a profound rupture. It
echoes the earlier case of Palestinian Druze who served in the Israeli
army, only to be sidelined by the state and stripped of identity.
Those who believe that Israel will safeguard their future ignore
the reality: the Zionist regime protects only its own interests and
owes loyalty only to those who serve its supremacist project.
IV. The Alternative: Return to the Ummah
There remain among the Druze free-minded intellectuals and
honorable souls who reject this deviation from Islam’s spirit. They
believe in the unity of the Levant and resist the Zionist project.

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These voices are the hope for restoring ties between the Druze and
the ummah.1
The alternative to foreign reliance includes:
• Integration into the unified national identity
• Reconciliation with the Islamic and Arab environment
• Opening paths for education and theological engagement
• Renewing the religious discourse within enlightened
spiritual frameworks
It does not befit a sect known for courage and wisdom to follow
leaders who dismantle the dignity their forefathers built.

1 Among these figures is the scholar Shakib Arslan, who embraced Sunni Islam
from a young age. He wrote in defense of Islamic creed, criticized Bātinī sects
and philosophy, and considered himself part of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah. He
expressed this clearly in his works such as Al-Irtisāmāt al-Latīfah and The History of
the Arabs and Islam. He was also close to scholars of al-Azhar and prominent
figures of Islamic reform such as Rashid Rida and Muhammad ʿAbduh.
As for other individuals of Druze origin who left the sect and embraced Sunni
or Shia Islam, sources do not document many prominent cases. This is due to
the closed nature of the Druze community and the fact that leaving it is
considered more of a social and cultural rupture than merely a religious
conversion. Nevertheless, there are individual cases—especially in the diaspora—
of people who publicly declared their departure from the Druze faith and their
embrace of Islam. Among them is Shaykh Shihab al-Shater, who has given
lectures about the Druze religion in which he advises Druze followers to follow
the true religion. Watch here
It is worth noting that the Druze sect does not accept new converts into the
faith, nor does it recognize those who leave, which makes doctrinal conversions
rare and often surrounded by secrecy.

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 Epilogue

This book has aimed to examine the Druze experience not with
condemnation or glorification, but through analysis and candid
inquiry—recognizing the religious, political, and social sensitivities
involved. The goal of transparency is not to incite division, but to
build bridges, not trenches.
The Druze are an essential part of the region’s historical
tapestry, playing pivotal roles from their Ismāʿīlī-Fatimid origins to
their presence in Mount Lebanon and Jabal al-ʿArab, up to their
complex positions in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine—with
entanglements involving occupation powers and rival regimes.
Their stance on central issues—Palestine and the Syrian
revolution—has exposed fissures and contradictions.
This study has shown that doctrinal obscurity was not merely
theological peculiarity, but a mechanism of isolation, sectarian
fortification, and political exceptionalism that hindered sincere
integration into Islamic or pan-Arab projects. While their esoteric
doctrines remained hidden in secret manuscripts, modern Druze
elites formed alliances with foreign powers—from the French
during occupation, to Israel after the Nakba, to Assad’s regime and,
finally, to Israel again in the waning days of Syria’s revolution.
The events of July 16, 2025—Shaykh al-Hijrī’s rebellion against
the new Syrian government, his appeal to Israel for protection,
Israeli bombings of Damascus, and the massacres in Suwayda
against the Syrian state forces and Arab clans—must be seen within
this long-standing historical pattern of contradictory alliances and
strategic isolation.

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 Still, this book did not ignore the voices of reason within the
Druze community—men and women in Lebanon, Syria, and
Palestine—who stood with their societies, embraced their people
through hardship and hope, and refused narrow sectarianism.
This work has pursued truth, not defamation. It sought balance
through knowledge and justice, in a time where distorted narratives
and biased readings prevail. At every step, it anchored its findings
in reliable sources—classical and modern, Islamic and academic—
so as to offer the reader a clear, contextual understanding of a sect
that has shaped key chapters of Levantine history.
Now, the Druze stand at a decisive crossroads: will they rethink
their trajectory and return to the fold of the ummah—in creed,
identity, and allegiance—or will the path of isolation and alliance
with enemies remain their strategic choice? Such questions will not
be answered by books alone, but by time, by nations… and by the
wise among all faiths and communities.
B

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 Appendices

Appendix I: Key Figures in Druze History

1. al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh (375–411 AH / 985–1021 CE)

The sixth Fātimid caliph, he marked a major turning point
in Ismāʿīlī esoteric theology. His reign was characterized by
enigmatic and erratic behavior, and some followers
attributed divine qualities to him—laying the groundwork
for the emergence of the Druze movement. His mysterious
disappearance in 1021 CE became a foundational element
in Druze theology, which considers him a divine
manifestation whose occultation is sacred.
2. Hamza ibn ʿAlī ibn Ahmad
The principal theologian and founder of the Druze creed.
He proclaimed the esoteric monotheistic doctrine in 408
AH, declaring al-Hākim to be God incarnate. He authored
the religious texts known as Epistles of Wisdom (Rasāʾil al-
Hikmah), which remain the central reference for the sect.
His theology fused Ismāʿīlī esotericism with Illuminationist
philosophy and introduced the concept of divine duality
(nāsūt and lāhūt).
3. Muhammad ibn Ismāʿīl al-Durazī
A missionary whose name became historically associated
with the sect, although Druze reject the etymological link.
He was the first to publicly exaggerate al-Hākim’s divinity,
promoting a radical line that led to his death at the hands of

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 the masses in Cairo in 411 AH. Ḥamza and his followers
repudiated him, yet the sect came to be named after him in
historical usage.
4. Nashtakīn al-Durazī
A Persian missionary sent to the Levant who broke away
from the central leadership in Cairo and claimed a special
status for himself. His actions led to his death. Popular
usage associates the name “Druze” with him, though
adherents of the faith reject this connection.
5. Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-Tamīmī
Spiritual successor to Hamza, who assumed leadership after
al-Hākim’s occultation and Hamza’s retirement. He
completed the Epistles of Wisdom, and in 434 AH (1042 CE),
declared the closure of the invitation to the faith (bāb al-
daʿwah) and called for dissociation (taqiyya) and withdrawal.
This led to the permanent closure of the sect, which
stopped accepting new converts—explaining its continued
insularity to this day.
6. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Maʿnī II (1572–1635 CE)
A prominent Druze emir in Mount Lebanon who sought to
expand his influence beyond Druze areas. He cultivated
relations with European powers, especially Tuscany and
Venice, which provoked the Ottoman Empire. Considered
a pivotal figure in Druze history for his pursuit of quasi-
independence in the mountain, he was eventually defeated
and executed by the Ottomans.
7. Bashīr al-Shihābī II (1767–1850 CE)
A Lebanese emir who ruled Mount Lebanon through
delicate balance between Maronites and Druze. His
allegiance shifted between the Ottoman state and

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 Muhammad ʿAlī of Egypt, leading to his eventual removal.
His reign witnessed widespread sectarian strife between
Druze and Maronites.
8. Sultan Pasha al-Atrash (1891–1982 CE)
A nationalist Syrian Druze, and one of the leaders of the
Great Syrian Revolt against French colonial rule in 1925.
Though rooted in Druze heritage, his politics were secular
and pan-Arab. He championed Syrian independence and
unity, rejecting all partitionist schemes. He remains a
celebrated figure in Syria’s national memory.
9. Kamāl Jumblatt (1917–1977 CE)
A leading Lebanese politician and founder of the
Progressive Socialist Party. He represented the Arab
nationalist current in Lebanon, opposed Maronite political
dominance, and maintained close ties with the Palestine
Liberation Organization. Assassinated in 1977, allegedly by
the Syrian regime, he formed a bridge between the Druze
and broader Arab causes. His son Walīd Jumblatt later
adopted more pragmatic positions.
10. Walīd Jumblatt
Lebanese Druze leader who inherited his father’s mantle.
Known for politically fluid positions, he alternated alliances
between the March 14 coalition and Hezbollah, later
reconciling with the Syrian regime. Criticized for his
contradictions, he nonetheless remained the dominant
Druze leader in Lebanon for decades.
11. Hikmat al-Hijrī
The supreme spiritual authority of the Druze in Suwayda
(Syria). Initially neutral during the Syrian revolution, he later
adopted critical positions toward the regime. In 2025, he led

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an armed rebellion against the new Syrian state and formally
requested Israeli protection—triggering a serious escalation
that included Israeli airstrikes on Damascus and violent
clashes between his forces and the Syrian army in Jabal al-
Druze.

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 Appendix II: Timeline of Key Historical
Milestones in Druze History

The Origins of the Doctrine and Early Preaching

(985–1042 CE)

Year
Event
(CE)

al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh ascends to the Fatimid caliphate

985
in Egypt.

Hamza ibn ʿAlī declares the beginning of the secret

1005
monotheistic Druze call under al-Hākim’s rule.

Emergence of Muhammad al-Durazī in Cairo with

1017
public claims of al-Hākim’s divinity.

al-Durazī is killed in Cairo following public outrage at his

1018
extremist ideas.

al-Hākim disappears mysteriously, marking the

1021
beginning of the “sacred occultation” in Druze doctrine.

1021– Composition of the Epistles of Wisdom by Hamza and

1042 Bahāʾ al-Dīn.

Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-Tamīmī closes the door to conversion,

1042
initiating Druze insularity.

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 The Middle Period – Ottoman Struggles and Mountain
Leadership Formation (1516–1711 CE)

Year Event

The Ottomans conquer Greater Syria; beginning of

1516
Ottoman rule in Mount Lebanon.

Birth of Emir Fakhr al-Dīn II, the most prominent

1572
modern Druze leader.

Fakhr al-Dīn governs Mount Lebanon, expands

1605–
influence into Syria and Palestine, and forges alliances
1633
with Italian powers.

1635 Fakhr al-Dīn is captured and executed in Istanbul.

Battle of ʿAyn Dārah ends the Qaysite–Yamanite feud,

1711
consolidating Jumblatt leadership in the mountain.

Modern Era – From Emirate to Nation-State

(1860–1975 CE)

Year Event

Sectarian massacres between Maronites and Druze in

1860
Mount Lebanon; direct French intervention.

Establishment of the Mutasarrifiyyah of Mount Lebanon

1861
under European oversight; Druze influence diminishes.

Proclamation of Greater Lebanon; Druze Mountain

1920
annexed to the French Mandate in Syria.

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 Year Event

Outbreak of the Great Syrian Revolt led by Sultan Pasha

1925
al-Aṭrash against France.

End of French Mandate; Druze gradually exit the Syrian

1946
political arena.

Lebanese Civil War begins; Kamāl Jumblatt emerges as a

1975
nationalist Druze leader.

Contemporary Period – From Civil War to Current

Fragmentation (1977–2025 CE)

Year Event

Assassination of Kamāl Jumblatt; his son Walīd assumes

1977
Druze leadership.

Druze confront Israeli invasion of Lebanon as part of the

1982
National Movement.

Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon; Druze enter a

2000
new phase of political alliances.

Syrian revolution erupts; Suwayda’s Druze adopt

2011
neutrality and later demand reforms.

ISIS massacres in Suwayda’s countryside provoke

2018
widespread Syrian sympathy.

Fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime; rise of the new Syrian

2024
national state.

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Year Event

Rebellion led by Shaykh Hikmat al-Hijrī in Suwayda;

July
request for Israeli protection; Israeli airstrikes on
2025
Damascus and violent clashes with the Syrian army.

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 Appendix III: Glossary of Key Terms and
Doctrines

Term Definition

Sixth Fatimid caliph (r. 996–1021 CE),

considered by Druze doctrine to be a divine
al-Hākim bi-Amr
manifestation. His disappearance formed
Allāh
the basis for the Druze belief in “sacred
occultation.”

Founder of the Druze doctrine, proclaimed

Hamza ibn ʿAlī the secret monotheistic faith in 408 AH and
authored the foundational Epistles of Wisdom.

Successor to Hamza, who closed the door

Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-
to conversion and codified the sect’s
Tamīmī
isolationist practices.

Core religious texts of the Druze sect,

Epistles of Wisdom
written in Arabic, reserved exclusively for
(Rasāʾil al-Hikmah)
initiates (ʿuqqāl).

“The Wise” — an elite class within Druze

ʿUqqāl society entrusted with doctrinal knowledge
and religious texts.

“The Ignorant” — Druze individuals not

initiated into the inner teachings of the
Juhhāl
faith; not permitted to access religious
literature.

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 Term Definition

Religious dissimulation; adopted as a

Taqiyya survival strategy and doctrinal foundation
for concealment of belief.

Dualistic metaphysical concept of

al-Nāsūt wa’l-
“humanity and divinity” — used in Druze
Lāhūt
theology to articulate divine embodiment.

Belief in the disappearance of al-Hākim as a

Sacred Occultation divine act, paralleling esoteric views of
messianic concealment.

Belief in the transmigration of souls; central

Tanāsukh
to Druze eschatology and ethical
(Reincarnation)
worldview.

Esotericism; theological orientation

prioritizing hidden meanings over literal
Bātiniyyah
scripture — shared with Ismāʿīlī
foundations.

National uprising against French colonial

The Great Syrian
rule in 1925, led by Sultan Pasha al-Aṭrash
Revolt
from Jabal al-Druze.

Autonomous administrative system

Mutasarrifiyyah established in Mount Lebanon (1861–
1915), shaped by sectarian power-sharing.

Lebanese political alliance formed in 2005,

March 14 Coalition opposing Syrian influence; Walid Jumblatt
briefly aligned with it.

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 Term Definition

“Men of Dignity” — Druze grassroots

movement in Suwayda advocating local
Rijāl al-Karāma
autonomy and anti-corruption stance since
the 2010s.

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 Appendix III: Doctrinal Concepts and
Terminology in Druze Theology

This appendix clarifies key terms and concepts unique to the

Druze creed, distinguishing it from other esoteric and Ismāʿīlī sects.
The terminology is alphabetically organized with concise and
analytical explanations.
1. Tawhīd (Monotheism)
In Druze theology, tawhīd does not signify the Islamic
understanding of monotheism—affirming God’s oneness in His
divinity, lordship, and attributes—but instead refers to the
divinization of al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh. Druze call themselves al-
Muwahhidūn (Unitarians) based on this unique conception, viewing
al-Hākim as a manifestation of the divine essence.
Note: This belief deviates sharply from the Islamic creed, which defines tawhīd
as affirming God’s exclusive right to divinity, lordship, and perfection.
2. The Five Boundaries of Reason1
The five boundaries in Druze belief are symbolic and doctrinal
pillars that form the foundation of the Unitarian Druze faith. They
embody profound philosophical and spiritual concepts and are
linked to founding figures who are viewed as “divine boundaries”
or manifestations of elevated attributes.
Who Are the Five Boundaries (al-Hudūd al-Khamsah)?
Each “boundary? (hadd) represents an aspect of existence or the
Universal Intellect. They are:

1 For more details on the Five Limits, see https://dorar.net/frq/2220

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1. The Universal Inellect – Hamza ibn ʿAlī ibn Ahmad
o Considered the First Intellect, the supreme
boundary, and the source of knowledge and
emanation.
o He is the actual founder of the Druze call and is
viewed as a divine manifestation in terms of
intellect.
o He represents the green color in the Druze star.
2. The Universal Soul – Ismāʿīl ibn Muhammad al-Tamīmī
o Represents the second rank after the Intellect.
o Regarded as the first to believe in the Intellect
(Hamza) and plays the role of the dependent and
executing soul.
o He represents the red color in the Druze star.
3. The Word (al-Kalima/Logos) – Muhammad ibn Wahb al-
Qurashī
o Represents the principle of the “Word” or Logos.
o His function is to convey and explain — that is, to
transmit the revelation and the call to others.
o He represents the yellow color in the Druze star.
4. The Preceder (al-Sābiq) – Salmān ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-
Sāmirī
o Represents the will or the initial driving force.
o He is said to be responsible for organizing the ranks
and offering devotion.
o He represents the blue color in the Druze star.
5. The Successor (al-Tālī) – Bahāʾ al-Dīn Abū al-Hasan al-
Samūqī
o Represents the fifth rank, the one who completes
the structure of the daʿwah and finalizes the

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 Unitarian system. He assumed leadership after
Hamza’s occultation and closed the call in 434 AH.
o He represents the white color in the Druze star.
These hudūd are viewed as intermediaries between the “Divine
Essence” (Lāhūt) and creation (khalq), forming part of the
complex esoteric system adopted by the Druze creed.
Their Philosophical Significance
• These boundaries are considered luminous emanations of
the Universal Mind, eternal and uncreated, manifesting in
human bodies across time.
• It is believed that they reappear in every era, embodied in
chosen individuals who carry their attributes.
• The five-pointed star serves as a symbol of the Druze
faith, with each color representing one of the boundaries.
In Druze Doctrine
• Belief in the five boundaries is essential for understanding
the Unitarian doctrine.
• They are mentioned in the Epistles of Wisdom, the sacred
texts of the Druze.
• Hamza ibn ʿAli is regarded as the Universal Mind and
founder of the call, while Bahāʾ al-Dīn is known for having
closed the call and completed the message.
3. Epistles of Wisdom (Rasāʾil al-Hikmah)
A collection of 111 theological texts written by the founders of the
Druze faith. Considered the sect’s sacred scripture, they are
composed in symbolic and cryptic language, relying heavily on
allegory and esoteric interpretation. Access to these texts is
restricted to initiated members.

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4. Occultation (al-Ghaybah)
The belief that al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh did not die in 1021 CE but
entered into divine concealment (hijāb)—awaiting a future
reappearance. This notion parallels Twelver Shīʿī beliefs in the
hidden Imām.
5. Universal Intellect (al-ʿAql al-Kullī)
A Neoplatonic-inspired concept representing the first emanation
from God and the intermediary between the divine and creation. In
Druze theology, Hamza ibn ʿAlī embodies this intellect.
6. Secrecy (al-Kitmān)
Often described as “enhanced taqiyya,” secrecy is a foundational
principle in Druze belief. It mandates the concealment of religious
doctrines from non-Druze—and even from non-initiated Druze
(juhhāl). This has made external study of the sect extremely
challenging.
7. The ʿUqqāl and Juhhāl
• ʿUqqāl (The Wise): The religious elite permitted to read
sacred texts and attend doctrinal assemblies.
• Juhhāl (The Ignorant): Lay Druze who are barred from
accessing doctrinal teachings and are instead encouraged to
follow ethical and social customs.
8. Transmigration (Tanāsukh)
The Druze believe in the cyclical transfer of souls from body to
body after death, rejecting the Islamic conception of bodily
resurrection and the Day of Judgment. This belief reflects
influences from Gnostic, Hindu, and esoteric traditions.
9. Speaking and Silence (al-Nutq / al-Samt)
Symbolic terms referring to two theological eras:

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 • Nutq (Speaking): The period of open preaching during al-
Hākim’s reign.
• Samt (Silence): The period of withdrawal and concealment
following al-Hākim’s disappearance.
10. Manifestation (al-Zuhūr)
Refers to the anticipated return of al-Hākim as the divine presence.
Similar to Ismāʿīlī beliefs in the hidden Imām’s re-emergence.
11. al-Muwahhidūn (Unitarians)
The self-designation of Druze adherents, referring to followers of
the “call to monotheism”—that is, the recognition of al-Hākim’s
divinity. This usage diverges significantly from the Islamic
understanding of monotheism.

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 Appendix IV: Core Theological Concepts in
Druze Doctrine

This appendix aims to clarify foundational theological concepts

that define Druze belief and distinguish it from other Islamic
sects—especially the Ismāʿīlī tradition from which it originally
emerged. The definitions draw upon Druze doctrinal texts
(particularly the Epistles of Wisdom), scholarly analyses, and the
perspectives of Sunni scholars on these teachings.
1. Monotheism (Tawhīd) in Druze Theology
• Terminology: Druze refer to themselves as al-Muwahhidūn
(Unitarians), and designate their faith as the “Doctrine of
Unity.”
• Doctrinal Nature: Their concept of tawhīd diverges from
Islamic orthodoxy. It reflects a philosophical-esoteric
orientation influenced by Pythagorean and Neoplatonic
thought, where God is perceived as “absolute transcendent
existence” manifested in the “First Limit”—namely, al-
Hākim bi-Amr Allāh, whom they deem a divine
embodiment.
• Sunni Response: This belief constitutes a major deviation
from pure Islamic monotheism, and is classified as grave
shirk (ascribing divinity to creation).
2. Belief in al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh
• Druze doctrine holds that al-Hākim, the Fatimid caliph, did
not die but entered divine concealment (ghaybah) and
remains alive, destined to return in the eschaton.

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 • Their texts describe him as the “Divine Manifestation” and
ascribe to him invocations and praise reserved exclusively
for God.
• This view evolved from Ismāʿīlī concepts of the Hidden
Imām but ultimately crossed into divinization.
3. Doctrine of Reincarnation (Tanāsukh)
• The Druze believe in transmigration of souls—i.e., the soul
transfers immediately upon death into a newborn body.
• They reject Islamic beliefs in Paradise and Hell, favoring
symbolic recompense and metaphysical cycles.
• This doctrine reflects influences from ancient Hindu and
Persian philosophies and constitutes a departure from
Islamic eschatology.
4. Esotericism and Concealment (Kitmān)
• Secrecy is a central tenet of Druze faith. Doctrinal teachings
are preserved within the initiated elite (ʿuqqāl) and withheld
from the public.
• Non-initiates are forbidden from reading the Epistles of
Wisdom or attending religious councils.
• Taqiyya (dissimulation) is regularly practiced, particularly
during times of persecution or political vulnerability.
5. Books of Druze
• The Epistles of Wisdom (Rasāʾil al-Hikmah)1 are
considered the most important doctrinal source for the
Druze. The collection consists of 111 epistles distributed
across four volumes, attributed to the founders of the

1This book was published in Lebanon in 1986 in two volumes and available now
at archive.org

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 Unitarian (Tawhīdī) call. The epistles are notable for their
organized sequence. Hamzah ibn ʿAlī authored a large
number of them in the year 409 AH, shortly before his
disappearance, and al-Bahāʾ al-Dīn continued the writing
after 411 AH.
• The epistles include correspondences addressed to
prominent figures within the Fatimid state, as well as
discussions on the foundational principles of the faith and
the daʿwah (mission).
Other religious books include:
• Al-Nuqat wa al-Dawāʾir (The Dots and Circles): This work
addresses the Druze doctrines of monotheism and was
printed in Brazil in 1920.
• Sharh Mīthāq Walī al-Zamān (Commentary on the Covenant
of the Guardian of the Age): Authored by Muhammad Husayn,
this book presents the beliefs of the Druze in even greater
detail than the Epistles at times.
• Al-Suhuf al-Mawsūmah bi-l-Sharīʿah al-Rūhāniyyah fī
ʿUlūm al-Basīt wa al-Kathīf (The Scriptures Entitled The
Spiritual Law in the Sciences of the Subtle and the Dense): This
book spans approximately 360 pages and was mentioned by
the author of O Druze, Return to Your Den! as having been
authored by Kamāl Jumblatt in collaboration with ʿĀtif al-
ʿAjamī.
• The Druze also have a text they refer to as Al-Munfarid
bi-Dhātih (The One Unique in Essence), attributed to Hamzah
ibn ʿAlī, though some claim it was authored by Kamāl
Jumblatt. It is also said that he collaborated with ʿĀtif al-
ʿAjamī in composing it along with other epistles. This text
comprises forty-four chapters (ʿuruf ) and is styled to
emulate the Qur’an by echoing the contents of the Druze

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 epistles. The author incorporates verses from the Qur’an
that suit his objectives—particularly those relating to
paradise and punishment—assigning them exclusively to
those who worship the divinity they believe in, namely al-
Hākim bi-Amr Allāh. Those who worship him are promised
bliss, and those who disbelieve in him are condemned to
torment. ʿĀtif al-ʿAjamī commented on this “Qur’an” and
the other epistles they produced, saying, “They nearly
surpass the Qur’an in eloquence!”1
6. Their Stance on the Qur’an and Islamic Law
• Druze express outward respect for the Qur’an but do not
uphold it as their legal reference.
• They do not observe the Five Pillars of Islam as prescribed:
o Prayer: Not performed according to Islamic rituals
o Zakat, Fasting, and Pilgrimage: Abandoned or
reinterpreted symbolically
• They view Islamic law as a historical phase superseded by
the “Age of Wisdom” initiated under al-Hākim.
7. Their View of Islam and Muslims
• Islam is regarded as an initial stage of divine religion,
superseded by Druze doctrine.
• The Druze consider those who reject the divinity of al-
Hākim and the Druze creed to be astray.
• Historically, they maintained political and religious silence,
but occasionally allied with foreign powers against Islamic
or Arab states.

1 See https://dorar.net/frq/2226

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Sunni Scholars’ Verdict on Druze Doctrine
• Consensus: Sunni scholars unanimously regard the Druze
sect as outside Islam—not merely heterodox but esoteric
and heretical.
• Ibn Taymiyyah: The Druze and the Nusayris are
disbelievers by consensus. It is forbidden to consume their
slaughtered meat or marry their women.
See Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, 35/161. Also, see al-Ismāʿīliyyah, by
Ihsan Ilahi Zahir.

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 Appendix V: Have the Druze Contributed to
Islamic Civilization? — An Analytical
Reflection

Whenever a religious sect emerges within the broader context

of Islamic civilization, a fundamental question naturally arises:
Has this community made meaningful contributions—intellectual,
scientific, cultural, or civilizational—to the legacy of Islam?
In the case of the Druze, answering this requires a careful
analysis based on historical sources, biographical records of
scholars, and tangible contributions across eras.
1. Doctrinal Isolation and Intellectual Secrecy
Since their break from the Ismāʿīlī sect in the early fifth century
AH, the Druze have adopted a theological posture characterized by:
• Closing the door to conversion (bāb al-daʿwah) in 435 AH
• Concealing their religious texts and teachings from
outsiders
• Prohibiting intermarriage or deep social integration with
non-Druze communities
This stance led to complete epistemological separation from the
Muslim ummah. Their names are virtually absent from scholarly
circles, and from the annals of hadīth, tafsīr, fiqh, and linguistics.
2. Absence of Scientific or Cultural Contribution
In surveying the canon of Islamic intellectual history, one finds:

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 • No recognized Druze jurists, hadith scholars, or
grammarians
• No Druze exegetes, philologists, or classical literary figures
• No significant Druze presence in the classical centers of
Islamic learning
Their theological education remains confined to internal esoteric
texts (Rasāʾil al-Hikmah), which are only accessible to the initiated
elite (ʿuqqāl)—usually after age forty—reflecting severe intellectual
insularity.
3. Limited Political Engagement — Often Sectarian and
Reactive
• In Lebanon: The Druze gained political prominence under
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Maʿnī II (d. 1635 CE), but his alliances with
foreign powers (Tuscany and the Papacy) against the
Ottoman state ended in failure.
• In Syria: Sultan Pasha al-Atrash emerged as a leader of the
Great Syrian Revolt in 1925, yet his movement was
nationalist in tone and lacked Islamic grounding.
Historically, Druze political activity tended to revolve around
mountain-based sectarian conflicts or interactions with colonial
powers—not around Islamic civilizational reform or revival.
4. Sunni Scholarly Evaluation
The scholars of Ahl al-Sunnah have consistently ruled that the
Druze sect lies outside the fold of Islam due to its core beliefs,
including divinizing al-Hākim and rejecting Islamic obligations. Key
voices include:
• Ibn Taymiyyah in Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā (refutations of
esoteric sects)

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 • Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karīm al-Shihristānī in al-Milal
wa’n-Nihal
• Ihsān Ilāhī Ẓahīr in al-Ismāʿīliyyah, al-Shīʿāh wa al-Tashayyuʿ,
and al-Shīʿah wa’l-Qurʾān
Their verdict: Druze are not considered Muslims, their testimony is
not accepted in Islamic courts, their women may not be married by
Muslims, and they may not be buried in Muslim cemeteries.
5. In the Modern Era
Recent decades have witnessed the emergence of some Druze
figures in politics or media—particularly in Lebanon, Israel, or the
diaspora—but:
• No distinguished Druze Islamic thinkers have emerged
• There is no notable Druze contribution to core Islamic
civilizational questions
• Their roles often align with sectarian or Western-sponsored
projects
Conclusion
More than a millennium has passed since the formation of the
Druze sect. Yet there is no substantial record of contribution to
Islamic civilization—neither in religious sciences, nor language, nor
philosophical thought. This absence stems from:
• A deeply esoteric and inaccessible creed
• Social and intellectual insularity
• Political positions often opposed to central Islamic polities
This makes the Druze a unique case among Eastern religious
minorities: a sect with religious distinctiveness, yet with no
discernible civilizational legacy within the Islamic tradition.

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 Appendix VI: Selected Passages from the
Epistles of Wisdom

About the Epistles

The Epistles of Wisdom (Rasāʾil al-Hikmah) constitute the central
sacred text of the Druze sect. Traditionally attributed to Hamza ibn
ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad and other founding Imams of the Druze call, most
notably during the 5th century AH, the epistles contain esoteric
teachings focused on divine unity (tawhīd), negation, mystical
interpretation, and spiritual authority (wilāyah). They are composed
in dense symbolic language and are accessible only to initiated
members within the sect (al-muʿtarifūn).
Selected Passages and Interpretive Analysis
1. On Defining Divine Unity
“Praise is ours, gratitude belongs to us, creation is our servant, the
command resides in us, all is from us and to us it returns.”
(Epistle of Wisdom, No. 6)
Analysis:
This passage reveals an extreme form of divine attribution, merging
mystical unity (waḥdat al-wujūd) with esoteric leadership. It openly
attributes divine qualities to the initiates or spiritual figures of the
sect—challenging core Islamic principles of monotheism and
divine transcendence.
2. On the Doctrine of Reincarnation
“Reflect, dear brother, on what you were in the previous cycle, to
understand your rank in this cycle; for souls are never extinguished
but merely transferred from one form to another.”

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Analysis:
This affirms the Druze doctrine of tanāsukh (transmigration), which
holds that souls reincarnate into new bodies upon death. The
concept contradicts Islamic teachings on bodily resurrection, divine
judgment, and the eternal afterlife, placing the doctrine outside the
boundaries of mainstream Islamic belief.
3. On the Secret of Esoteric Knowledge
“The outward forms of the law are mere husks; the essence lies in
the inward. Whoever stops at the outward is misled; whoever is
unveiled to the inward attains salvation.”
Analysis:
This emphasizes the Druze sect’s esoteric orientation, similar to
Ismāʿīlī and Gnostic philosophies. It legitimizes the abandonment
or reinterpretation of Islamic practices—including prayer, fasting,
and pilgrimage—on the basis of hidden symbolic truths.
4. On Praising al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh
“He is the Creator, the Initiator, the Returner; the Giver of life and
death; the Ever-Living who does not die; it is He who has
established Himself upon the Throne.”
Analysis:
This passage attributes full divine characteristics to al-Hākim bi-
Amr Allāh, the sixth Fātimid caliph, presenting him as the earthly
manifestation of God. Such theological claims represent a stark
deviation from Islamic monotheism and align more closely with
extreme esoteric and incarnational beliefs.
Closing Notes
• The Epistles of Wisdom are not circulated publicly among
Druze adherents; they are restricted to recognized initiates.

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 • The sect has formally ceased accepting new converts since
1043 CE, rendering the epistles exclusive to the initiated
class.
• The majority of their content stands in contradiction to
Sunni Islamic creed—especially regarding divine unity,
prophethood, eschatology, and religious law.
References for Understanding and Critiquing the Epistles
• Muhsin al-Amīn, Aʿyān al-Shīʿah (Volume on Sects)
• Abd al-Rahmān Badawī, Doctrines of Islamic Thinkers
• Abū al-Fadl ʿĀrif, Epistles of Wisdom – Critical Edition, Druze
Manuscripts Collection
• Paul K. Walker, The Druzes, Harvard Press, 1990

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 Bibliography

Arabic Referenes
1. Abu Izziddin, Najla. Al-Durūz fī al-Tārīkh. Dar al-Ilm li al-
Malāyīn, Beirut.
2. al-Baghdādī, ʿAbd al-Qāhir. al-Farq bayn al-Firaq. Edited by
Muḥammad Muhyī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Hamīd. Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif,
n.d.
3. al-Dhahabī, Shams al-Dīn. Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ. Edited by
Shuʿayb al-Arnaʾūt. Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risālah, 1985.
4. al-Masʿūdī, ʿAlī ibn al-Husayn. Murūj al-Dhahab wa Maʿādin al-
Jawhar. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1980.
5. al-Muqaddasī, al-Bishārī. Ahsan al-Taqāsīm fī Maʿrifat al-Aqālīm.
Beirut: Dār Sādir, 1906.
6. al-Shahrastānī, Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm. al-Milal wa’l-
Nihal. Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, n.d.
7. Corbin, Henry, Tārīkh al-Falsafah al-Islāmīyah (Translated from
French). Uwīdāt Publisher, Beirut.
8. Hitti, Philip K. Tārīkh Sūriyā wa Lubnān wa Filastīn. Translated by
George Haddād. Beirut: Dār al-Thaqāfah, 1980.
9. Ibn Khaldūn. al-ʿIbar wa Dīwān al-Mubtadaʾ wa’l-Khabar. Beirut:
Dār al-Fikr, 1981.
10. Ibn Taymiyyah. Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā. Edited by ʿAbd al-Rahmān ibn
Muhammad ibn Qāsim. Riyadh: King Fahd Complex for the
Printing of the Holy Qur’an, n.d.
11. Kāmil, Muhammad Kamil. Tā’ifat al-Durūz: Tārīkhuhā wa
ʿAqāiduhā. Dar al-Ma’arif, Cairo, 1962.
12. Salībī, Kamāl. Tārīkh Lubnān al-Hadīth. Beirut: Dār al-Nahār,
1990.
———. Mintalaq Tārīkh Lubnān. Beirut: Dār al-Nahār, 1988.
13. ______. Al-Durūz fī al-Tārīkh, Lebanese American University.

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 14. Seale, Patrick. Asad: al-Sirāʿ ʿalā al-Sharq al-Awsat. Translated by
Sāmī Nuʿmān. Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1992.
15. Zahir, Ihsan Ilahi. Al-Islmāʿīliyyah Tārīkh wa ʿAqāʾid. Idārat
Tarjumān al-Sunnah, Lahore, Pakistan.
———. al-Shīʿah wa’l-Qurʾān. Idārat Tarjumān al-Sunnah,
Lahore, Pakistan.
Foreign-Language References
16. Betts, Robert B. The Druze. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1988.
17. Firro, Kais. A History of the Druzes. Leiden: Brill, 1992.
18. Harris, William. Lebanon: A History, 600–2011. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012.
19. Makarem, Sami Nasib. The Druze Faith. Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 1974.
20. Parsons, Laila. “The Druze Between Palestine and Israel, 1947–
1949.” The Middle East Journal 53, no. 1 (1999): 32–57.
Archival and Online Sources
21. Fustat Blog. https://efustat.blogspot.com
22. Al Jazeera Net. Archived Coverage of the Syrian Revolution.
23. Middle East Studies Centre, London. International Reports on
Druze–Israeli Relations.
24. SANA News Agency. Field Reports from Suwayda, July 2025.

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 Index of Proper Names

• Fakhr al-Dīn II al-Maʿnī — Druze emir considered the

founder of the Druze entity in Mount Lebanon during the
seventeenth century; clashed with the Ottomans and allied
with European powers.
• Majid Arslan — Prominent Lebanese Druze leader who
contributed to the founding of modern Lebanon and played
a key role in Druze and Arab politics.
• Shakib Arslan — Muslim nationalist thinker and advocate
of Islamic unity and the caliphate; lived in exile following
the French occupation. He was from a Druze background.
• Ibn Khaldūn — Muslim historian and philosopher; among
the first to reference the Druze as an esoteric sect.
• Ibn Taymiyyah — Salafi scholar noted for articulating
Sunni views on esoteric sects, including the Druze and
Nusayris.
• al-Hākim bi-Amr Allāh — Sixth Fatimid caliph and
central figure in Druze theology; believed by Druze
adherents to be divine.
• al-Zāhir Baybars — Mamlūk sultan who fought the
Mongols and Crusaders; faced Druze resistance during his
campaigns.
• Shaykh Hikmat al-Hijrī — Supreme Druze spiritual
authority in Suwayda after the Syrian revolution; led a
rebellion against the new Syrian state in 2025 and allied with
Israel.

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• Ihsan Ilahi Zahir — Pakistani Sunni scholar who authored
critical studies of Shīʿī and esoteric sects, including the
Druze and Ismāʿīlis.
• Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) — Renowned Muslim philosopher
and physician; referenced in Druze literature for
interpretive inspiration, though not directly affiliated.
• Kamal Jumblatt — Lebanese Druze leader; founder of the
Progressive Socialist Party and a key intellectual figure of
the twentieth century.
• Walid Jumblatt — Influential Druze leader and son of
Kamāl; known for shifting political stances during and after
the Lebanese civil war.
• Philip Hitti — Lebanese Christian historian; authored
works on Lebanese and Druze history within broader
Middle Eastern context.
• Faraj Allāh al-Hillū — Leftist Druze intellectual; leader in
the Lebanese Communist Party; executed by Syrian
intelligence in the 1950s.
• Kais Firro — Contemporary Druze historian; wrote
extensively in English on Druze religious and political
identity.
• Patrick Seale — Western journalist and historian; wrote in
depth about Syria and the Druze within state narratives.
• Robert Betts — American scholar; authored one of the
leading English-language books on the Druze titled The
Druze.
• Sami Makarem — Druze scholar; authored The Druze
Faith, an insider’s exposition of Druze theology.

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 Index of Key Terms

• Ismāʿīlism — A Shīʿī sect formed after the death of Imam

Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, asserting the Imamate of Ismāʿīl ibn Jaʿfar
and his descendants; serves as the theological foundation
from which the Druze emerged.
• Hidden Imam — A Shīʿī concept concerning the
disappearance and future return of the Imam; in Druze
theology, this idea evolves into the divinization of al-Hākim
bi-Amr Allāh.
• Esotericism (Bātiniyyah) — A theological current
emphasizing symbolic interpretation of sacred texts and
concealed beliefs; commonly used to describe sects like the
Druze and Ismāʿīlīs.
• The Call (Daʿwah) — Refers to the Druze’s “Call to
Unity” led by Ḥamza ibn ʿAlī during al-Hākim’s reign;
closed permanently and no longer open to converts.
• Dīwān — Term used by Druze for their doctrinal writings,
often synonymous with the Epistles of Wisdom.
• The Six Heralds — Founding figures of Druze theology,
particularly Hamza ibn ʿAlī and Muhammad ibn Ismāʿīl al-
Tamīmī.
• al-Hudūd (Cosmic Boundaries) — Spiritual ranks in
Druze cosmology that surround the Universal Intellect,
including Sābiq, Tāli, and Nātiq.

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• Taqiyya — The practice of concealing one’s beliefs to
avoid persecution; widely employed by Druze and Ismāʿīlīs.
• ʿUqqāl — Religious elite within Druze society permitted
access to doctrinal texts and sacred assemblies.
• Juhhāl — The general Druze public, denied access to
religious texts and instructed to follow the faith through
obedience alone.
• Gnosticism — Ancient philosophical-religious tradition
that parallels Druze esotericism in its symbolic
hermeneutics and gradated access to truth.
• Political Druze Identity — Modern expression denoting
the Druze role in regional politics across Lebanon, Syria,
and Palestine, especially since the nineteenth century.
• Greater Lebanon — The state entity created by the French
in 1920, with mixed Druze responses ranging from
cooperation to protest.
• Jabal al-Druze (Jabal al-ʿArab) — Mountain region in
southern Syria serving as the historical stronghold of Druze
community; modern-day Suwayda province.
• Bayān and Tawhīd — Symbolic phrase in Druze literature
referencing the supreme doctrinal principle of divine unity.
• Double Texts — Phenomenon in Druze tradition where
texts carry both exoteric and esoteric meanings, interpreted
across multiple layers.
• Enemies of the Universal Intellect — In Druze heritage,
refers to those who reject the true form of unity and oppose
the path of wisdom.

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