* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 14th May, 2009
+ L.P.A. No. 204 of 2009 & CM No. 6638/2009
M/S HINDUSTAN MOTORS LTD. ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Lalit Bhasin, Advocate.
versus
AMARDEEP SINGH WIRK & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NEERAJ KISHAN KAUL
1. Whether Reporters of the Local Newspapers may be allowed to see the
Judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the Judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes
NEERAJ KISHAN KAUL, J. (ORAL)
1. The issue which arises for our consideration in the present
appeal is whether the proceedings before the Consumer Forum
should remain stayed and await the decision of the outcome of the
proceedings involving similar issues pending before this High Court.
The present appeal arises out of the order dated 5th March, 2009
passed by the learned Single Judge. The appellant (original
petitioner in the writ petition) claimed a direction to set aside an
order dated 6th November, 2007 passed by the State Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, in a complaint preferred by the
respondent No.1 (original respondent in the writ petition). The basis
of the writ petition was that substantially similar, if not identical
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 1 of 18
issues are pending trial in this Court in Civil Suit No. 1700 of 2005
(Jatinder Kaur Wirk vs. Mitsubishi Motor Corporation and Ors). The
respondent No. 1 claimed to have purchased a Mitsubishi Pajero,
manufactured by the appellant. The vehicle met with an accident
while being driven by respondent No. 1‟s brother who sustained fatal
injuries and died. As per the respondent No. 1, the vehicle had
manufacturing defects and on the ground of those and other
allegations, he claimed compensation. The wife of respondent No. 1‟s
brother, Mrs. Jatinder Wirk filed a suit before this Court, claiming
inter alia, damages for negligence against the appellant.
2. As per the appellant, the issues which concern the respondent
No. 1 are common to the suit pending in this Court which was at an
advanced stage. As per the appellant, continuation of both the
proceedings, would have a deritorious effect and could result in
conflicting orders. As per the appellant, despite this being pointed
out, the State Commission had proceeded with the complaint and he
contended that the impugned order of the State Commission recorded
that merely because a plea had been raised before the High Court
alleging manufacturing defect, there would be no bar against the
owner of the car to seek release as prescribed under Section 14(1) of
The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the
„Act‟). As per the appellant, identical issues with regard to alleged
manufacturing defect of some parts of the said vehicle have been
raised which require a trial and in these circumstances, it would be
appropriate that the authority under the Consumer Protection Act
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 2 of 18
should have stayed its proceedings in the interest of justice and
awaited the order and decree of the High Court as that would have
been binding on the appellant.
3. The case of the respondent No. 1 in the writ petition was that
the parties in the two proceedings are different. The respondent No.
1 was asserting an alleged deficiency in the service, based on its
contractual relationship by having purchased the vehicle, whereas
the plaintiff in the suit before this Court had claimed damages on the
basis of alleged tortuous liability of the appellant. Both being
independent causes of action and the parties claiming such reliefs
being different, it was urged on behalf of respondent No. 1 that there
was no question of the State Commission having acted illegally in
refusing the appellant‟s request.
4. The learned Single Judge has rightly held that Section 3 of the
Act cannot imply that the rights created under the Act could be
curtailed on the ground of pendency of other proceedings. It was also
correctly held relying on judgments of the Supreme Court, by the
learned Single Judge that existence of parallel or other adjudicatory
Forums cannot take away or exclude jurisdiction created under the
Consumer Protection Act.
5. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to some decisions of
the Supreme Court. In the case of Satpal Mohindra vs. Surindra
Timber Stores, (1999) 5 SCC 696, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 3 of 18
para-5 has held as under:-
“5. After perusing the record, we find that
whereas the appellant had filed the complaint on
21-5-1994 seeking damages, the suit was filed
by the respondent much later in the civil court
claiming the price of the material supplied by it.
Under these circumstances, the State Forum
was not justified in dismissing the appeal filed
by the appellant without recording any finding
on the merits of the appeal because the filing of
the suit by the respondent during the pendency
of the proceedings before the Consumer Forum
for a different type of relief could not oust the
jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum. The order
of the State Forum dated 14-10-1996 is
completely erroneous. It cannot be sustained.
We, accordingly accept this appeal and set aside
the order of the State Forum dated 14-10-1996
as well as that of the National Forum dated 21-
7-1998. We remand the appeal to the State
Forum for its disposal on merits in accordance
with law. The State Forum shall dispose of the
appeal expeditiously. No costs.”
6. In that case, the appellant had filed a complaint before the
District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Ambala, alleging
deficiency of service by use of sub-standard material by the
respondent, with whom an order had been placed by him for
fabricating of doors and windows. The appellant sought suitable
compensation from the respondent. The complaint of the appellant
was dismissed and the appellant took the matter in appeal to the
State Consumer Forum. However, the State Consumer Forum,
without going into the merits of the appeal, non-suited the appellant
on the ground that the matter was subjudice before a Civil Court. As
per the State Consumer Forum, the appellant would have an
opportunity to file a counter-claim there and that as the matter
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 4 of 18
would be decided on merits by the Civil Court, there was no scope for
any further action in the Consumer jurisdiction. The revision
petition of the appellant before the National Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission was also dismissed holding that the appellant
could raise all the points before the Civil Court in the pending suit. It
was in this background that the appellant approached the Supreme
Court by way of a Special Leave Petition, wherein the above
observations and findings were given by the Supreme Court.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Thirumurugan
Co-operative Agricultural Credit Society vs. M. Lalitha &
Ors. (2004) 1 SCC 305, held that having due regard to the scheme
of the Consumer Protection Act and the purpose sought to be
achieved to protect the interest of the consumers better, its
provisions are to be interpreted broadly, positively and purposefully
to give meaning to additional/extended jurisdiction, particularly
when Section 3 seeks to provide remedy under the Act in addition to
other remedies provided under other Acts unless there is a clear bar.
Some of the relevant findings of the Supreme Court in that matter are
reproduced hereinbelow:-
“11. From the statement of objects and reasons
and the scheme of 1986 Act, it is apparent that
the main objective of the Act is to provide for
better protection of the interest of the consumer
and for that purpose to provide for better
redressal, mechanism through which cheaper,
easier, expeditious and effective redressal is
made available to consumers. To serve the
purpose of the Act, various quasi judicial forums
are set up at the district, State and National
level with wide range of powers vested in them.
These quasi judicial forums, observing the
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 5 of 18
principles of natural justice, are empowered to
give relief of a specific nature and to award,
wherever appropriate, compensation to the
consumers and to impose penalties for non-
compliance of their orders.
12. As per Section 3 of the Act, as already stated
above, the provisions of the Act shall be in
addition to and not in derogation to any other
provisions of any other law for the time being in
force. Having due regard to the scheme of the
Act and purpose sought to be achieved to protect
the interest of the consumers, better the
provisions are to be interpreted broadly,
positively and purposefully in the context of the
present case to give meaning to
additional/extended jurisdiction, particularly
when Section 3 seeks to provide remedy under
the Act in addition to other remedies provided
under other Acts unless there is clear bar.
13. The view we are taking is supported by the
earlier decisions of this Court. In Lucknow
Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1
SCC 243, this Court observed, thus: -
"We therefore come straight away to the
legal issue involved in these appeals. But
before doing so and examining the
question of jurisdiction of the District
Forum or State or National Commission to
entertain a complaint under the Act, it,
appears, appropriate to ascertain the
purpose of the Act, the objective it seeks to
achieve and the nature of social purpose it
seeks to promote as it shall facilitate in
comprehending the issue involved and
assist in construing various provisions of
the Act effectively. To begin with the
preamble of the Act, which can afford
useful assistance to ascertain the
legislative intention, it was enacted, to
provide for the protection of the interest of
consumers. Use of the word 'protection'
furnishes key to the minds of makers of
the Act. Various definitions and provisions
which elaborately attempt to achieve this
objective have to be construed in this light
without departing from the settled view
that a preamble cannot control otherwise
plain meaning of a provision. In fact the
law meets long felt necessity of protecting
the common man from such wrongs for
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 6 of 18
which the remedy under ordinary law for
various reasons has become illusory.
Various legislations and regulations
permitting the State to intervene and
protect interest of the consumers have
become a haven for unscrupulous ones as
the enforcement machinery either does not
move or it moves ineffectively, inefficiently
and for reasons which are not necessary
to be stated. The importance of the Act
Ties in promoting welfare of the society by
enabling the consumer to participate
directly in the market economy. It
attempts to remove the helplessness of a
consumer which he faces against
powerful, business, described as, 'a
network of rackets' or a society in which,
'producers have secured power' to 'rop the
rest' and the might of public bodies which
are degenerating into storehouses of
inaction where papers do not move from
one desk to another as a matter of duty
and responsibility but for extraneous
consideration leaving the common man
helpless, bewildered and shocked. The
malady is becoming so rampant,
widespread and deep that the society
instead of bothering, complaining and
fighting against it, is accepting it as part of
life. The enactment in these unbelievable
yet harsh realities appears to be a silver
lining, which may in course of time
succeed in checking the rot."
14. In Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. And Anr. v.
N.K. Modi, (1996) 6 SCC 385, this Court, after
referring to Lucknow Development Authority
case (supra), held that the provisions of the Act
are to be construed widely to give effect to the
object and purpose of the Act. It went on to say
that "It is seen that Section 3 envisages that the
provisions of the Act are in addition to and are
not in derogation of any other law in force. It is
true, as rightly contended by Shri Suri, that the
words "in derogation of the provisions, of any
other, law for the time being in force" would be
given proper meaning and effect and if the
complaint is not stayed and the parties are not
relegated to the arbitration, the Act purports to
operate in derogation of the provisions of the
Arbitration Act. Prima facie, the contention
appears to be plausible but on construction and
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 7 of 18
conspectus of the, provisions of the Act we think
that the contention is not well founded.
Parliament is aware of the provisions of the
Arbitration Act and the Contract Act, 1872 and
the consequential remedy available under
Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, i.e., to
avail of right of civil action in a competent court
of civil jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Act
provides the additional remedy." Further,
dealing with the jurisdiction of the forums under
the 1986 Act in paragraph 16 this Court has
stated, thus: -
"16. It would, therefore, be clear that the
legislature intended to provide a remedy in
addition to the consentient arbitration
which could be enforced under the
Arbitration Act or the civil action in a suit
under the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Thereby, as seen, Section 34 of
the - Act does hot confer an automatic
right nor create an automatic embargo on
the exercise of the power by the judicial
authority under the Act. It is a matter of
discretion Considered from this
perspective, we hold that though the
District Forum, State Commission and
National Commission are judicial
authorities, for the purpose of Section 34
of the Arbitration Act, in view of the object
of the Act and by operation of Section 3
thereof, we are of the considered view that
it would he appropriate that, these forums
created under the Act are at liberty to
proceed with the matters in accordance
with the provisions of the Act rather than
relegating the parties to an arbitration
proceedings pursuant to a contract
entered into between the parties. The
reason is that the Act intends to relieve
the consumers of the cumbersome
arbitration proceedings or civil action
unless the forums on their own and on the
peculiar facts and circumstances of a
particular case, come to the conclusion
that the appropriate forum for
adjudication of the disputes would be
otherwise those given in the Act."
(emphasis supplied)
XXX XXX XXX
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 8 of 18
16. A Bench of three learned Judges of this
Court in a recent decision in State of Karnataka
v. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop Society
and Ors. MANU/SC/0033/2003, expressed the
view that the 1986 Act was brought into force in
view of the long-felt necessity of protecting the
common man from wrongs where for the
ordinary law for all intent and purport had
become illusory and that in terms of the said
Act, a consumer (sic) entitled to participate in
the proceedings directly as a result whereof his
helplessness against a powerful business house
may be taken care of. Referring to the Fair Air
Engineers (P) Ltd. Case (aforementioned), the
Court stated that the provisions of the said Act
are required to be interpreted as broadly as
possible. On the question of jurisdiction it is
stated that the forums under the Act have
jurisdiction to entertain a complaint despite the
fact that other forums/courts would also have
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the lis. It is also
noticed that the Act provides for a further
safeguard to the effect that in the event a
complaint involves complicated issues requiring
recording of evidence of experts, the complainant
would be at liberty to approach the civil court for
appropriate relief.”
8. In Secretary, Thirumurugan Co-operative Agricultural
Credit Society vs. M. Lalitha & Ors. (supra) case, the respondents
being members of the appellant-society, had pledged paddy bags for
obtaining loan. The appellant-society had issued notices to the
respondents demanding payment of loan amount with interest
thereon. The respondents filed petitions in the District Consumer
Forum, seeking direction to the appellant to release the paddy bags
pledged on receipt of the loan amount or in the alternative to direct
the appellant to pay the market values of the paddy bags with
interest thereon. The appellant contested the claims of the
respondents before the District Forum raising a preliminary objection
that Consumer Forum had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 9 of 18
between the members and cooperative society in view of Section 90 of
the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act, 1983. One of the issues
framed by the District Forum was whether it had jurisdiction to
entertain the complaints of this nature? The District Forum decided
in favour of the respondents. The appellant took the matter in appeal
to the State Consumer Commission. The State Commission allowed
the appeal filed by the appellant and dismissed the appeal filed by
the respondents. The State Commission held that the complaints
filed by the respondents were themselves not maintainable having
regard to Section 90 of the Act. The respondents approached the
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission by way of a
revision petition. The National Commission allowed the revision
petition and set aside the order of the State Commission. It would be
material to reproduce relevant provisions of the Tamilnadu
Cooperative Societies Act, 1983, hereinbelow:-
"Section 90. Disputes - (1) If any dispute
touching the constitution of the board or the
management or the business of a registered
society (other than a dispute regarding
disciplinary action taken by the competent
authority constituted under Sub-section (3) of
Section 75 or the Registrar or the Society or its
board against a paid servant of the society)
arises -
(a) among members, past members and persons
claiming through members, past members and
deceased members, or
(b) between a member, past member or person
claiming through a member, past member or
deceased member and the society, its board or
any officer, agent or servant of the society, or
(c) between the society or its board and any past
board, any officer, agent or servant, or any past
officer, past agent or past servant, or the
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 10 of 18
nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any
deceased officer, deceased agent, or deceased
servant of the society, or
(d) between the society and any other registered
society, such disputes shall be rendered to the
Registrar for decision.
Explanation - For the purpose of this section, a
dispute shall include -
(i) a claim by a registered society for any debt or
demand due to it from a member, past member
or the nominee, heir or legal representative of
the deceased member whether such debt or
demand be admitted or not.
(ii) A claim by a registered society against a
member, past member or the nominee, heir or
legal representative of a deceased member for
the delivery of possession to the society of land
or other immovable property resumed by it for
breach of the conditions of assignment or
allotment of such land or other immovable
property, and
(iii) a decision by the board under Sub-section
(3) of Section 34:
Provided that no dispute relating to, or in
connection with, any election shall be referred
under this sub-section till the date of the
declaration of the result of such election."
Section 156 - "Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts
- Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force no order or
award passed, decision or action taken or
direction issued under this Act by an arbitrator,
a liquidator, the Registrar or an officer
authorized or empowered by him, the Tribunal
or the Government or any officer subordinate to
them, shall be liable to be called in question in
any court and no injunction shall be granted by
any court in respect of anything which is done
or intended to be done by or under this Act."
9. The Supreme Court in Secretary, Thirumurugan Co-
operative Agricultural Credit Society vs. M. Lalitha &
Ors. (supra) case upheld the decision of the National Commission.
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 11 of 18
The Supreme Court held that remedies that are available to an
aggrieved party under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 are wider.
Though there was a special statute to deal with the disputes between
the parties, in that case, the Supreme Court held that merely
because the rights and liabilities were created between the members
and the Management of the society under the Tamilnadu Act and
Forums were provided, it could not take away or exclude the
jurisdiction conferred on the Forums under the Consumer Protection
Act, expressly and intentionally to serve a definite cause in terms of
the objects and reasons of the Act.
10. Further in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority vs.
Balbir Singh, (2004) 5 SCC 65, the Supreme Court observed that
Consumer Protection Act, 1986, had a wide reach and the
Commission had jurisdiction even in cases of service rendered by
statutory and public authorities. Such authorities become liable to
compensate for misfeasance in public office i.e. an act which is
oppressive or capricious or arbitrary or negligent provided loss or
injury is suffered by a citizen. It was held that it was open to the
Commission to determine the amount for which the authority is liable
to compensate the consumer for his sufferance due to misfeasance in
public office by the officers.
11. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on
a decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in India Household &
Healthcare Ltd. vs. LG Household & Healthcare Ltd., (2007) 5
SCC 510. In that case, an application under Section 11 of the Act
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 12 of 18
had been filed for appointing an Arbitrator on the respondent‟s
purported failure to do so despite a notice. The reliance was placed
on an arbitration clause contained in the agreement entered into
between the parties. The respondent, however, contended that the
said agreement was preceded by a Memorandum of Understanding
and that the said purported Memorandum of Understanding and
Licence Agreement were vitiated by fraud. The respondents had
also filed a suit in the Madras High Court, wherein the Madras High
Court by way of an interim injunction had restrained the appellant
from directly or indirectly acting on the so called Memorandum of
Understanding and Licence Agreement. The allegations in the said
matter were of fraud and the very existence of the agreement
containing the arbitration clause. The Supreme Court took note of
the fact that fraud vitiates all solemn acts and observed in
paragraph-16 as follows:-
“16. The said issue is pending consideration
before the Madras High Court. Not only the
parties to the agreement but also those officers
who have negotiated on behalf of the respective
companies are also parties therein. LG
Corporation which is the owner of the LG logo is
also a party therein. Therein, an order of
injunction had been passed. In terms of the said
order of injunction, the applicant herein was
prohibited from taking any action in terms of the
said agreement which would include the
arbitration clause also. The order dated
21.01.2006 has become final. No appeal has
been preferred thereagainst. The applicant could
have filed an appropriate application for
modification of the order of injunction which it
did not choose to do. The doctrine of comity or
amity required a court not to pass and order
which would be in conflict with another order
passed by a competent court of law. The courts
have jurisdiction to pass an order of injunction
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 13 of 18
not only under Order XXXIX, Rule 2 of the Code
of Civil Procedure but also under Section 151
thereof.”
12. The Supreme Court was of the view that the Court while
exercising its judicial function would ordinarily not pass an order
which would make one of the parties to the lis violate a lawful order
passed by another court. The Supreme Court, accordingly, declined
to entertain the application for appointment of an Arbitrator at this
stage. This decision of the Supreme Court in India Household &
Healthcare Ltd. vs. LG Household & Healthcare Ltd. (supra) case
has no application to the facts of the present case. Nowhere was the
issue of ouster of the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum while a
matter involving similar issue is pending in the Civil Court,
considered. Moreover, the Supreme Court declined to entertain the
application under Section 11 of the Act as the very existence of an
arbitration agreement was under challenge in a separate proceedings
where allegations of fraud had been made and interim orders passed
by the High Court. The said judgment is, thus, of no assistance to
the appellant. The appellants also placed reliance on the decision of
the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission in Dinesh
Premji Shah vs. S.N. Pathak, II (2006) CPJ 200 (NC). All that was
observed in the said case was that Consumer Forum cannot go
against the order passed by the Civil Court and that Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 provides only an additional remedy but does not
confer jurisdiction on a Consumer Forum to act as an Appellate body
or exercise powers which do not emanate from the Act constituting it.
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 14 of 18
This proposition is well settled. However, it in no way advances the
case of the appellant. Nor does it suggest that the proceedings in the
Consumer Forum must be stayed merely because the issues are
substantially similar in proceedings pending in a Civil Court.
13. The appellant also relied on an order of the Supreme Court in
Proprietor, Jabalpur Tractors vs. Sedmal Jainarain & Anr.,
1995 Supp. (4) SCC 107. It is well settled that a judgment is good
law for the facts on which it is decided and an order or a judgment
cannot be cited out of context. It is evident from a bare perusal of the
said short order passed by the Supreme Court in the matter that it
was an order made in the facts of the case and does not lay down any
legal principle that where proceedings are pending in a Civil Court
involving similar issues, the Consumer Courts cannot exercise their
jurisdiction and entertain a validly instituted complaint under the
Consumer Protection Act.
14. As held by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs. Mohd.
Illiyas, (2006) 1 SCC 275, a decision is a precedent on its own facts.
Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a
judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. A decision
is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in
a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein, nor
what logically flows from the various observations made in the
judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a
question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a
precedent. A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 15 of 18
decides and no more. It was also observed by the Supreme Court in
Rajbir Singh Dalal vs. Chaudhary Devi Lal University, Sirsa,
2008 (9) SCC 284, that a decision of a court is a precedent if it lays
down some principle of law supported by reasons. Mere casual
observations or directions, without laying down any principle of law
and without giving reasons does not amount to a precedent. Further
the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Dhanwanti
Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44, held that it is not everything said by a Judge
while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in
a Judge‟s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the
case is decided and for this reason, it is important to analyse a
decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. A decision is only an
authority for what it actually decides. Further in another case
Union of India vs. Major Bahadur Singh, 2006 (1) SCC 368, the
Supreme Court observed that courts should not place reliance on
decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in
with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.
Observations of the courts are neither to be read as Euclid‟s
theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of
their context. These observations must be read in the context in
which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of the courts are
not to be construed as statutes. Judges interpret statutes, they do
not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their
words are not to be interpreted as statutes. Circumstantial flexibility,
one additional or different fact may make a world of difference
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 16 of 18
between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly
placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
None of the judgments cited by the appellant in the present
case lay down the legal principle that where proceedings are pending
in a Civil Court involving similar issues, the Consumer Court should
not exercise its jurisdiction and entertain a validly instituted
complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 or that it should
stay its proceedings and await the decision of the Civil Court.
Further the judgments cited by the appellant have no relevance to the
facts of the present case for the reasons stated hereinabove.
15. On the contrary, the judgments of the Supreme Court, as
noticed above, clearly state that as per Section 3 of the Act the
provisions of the Act are in addition to and not in derogation of any
other provision of any other law for the time being enforced. Having
due regard to the scheme of the Act and the purpose sought to be
achieved to protect the interest of the consumers better, the
provisions are to be interpreted broadly, positively and purposefully
to give meaning to additional/extended jurisdiction, particularly
when Section 3 seeks to provide remedy under the Act in addition to
other remedies provided under other Acts unless there is a clear bar.
16. In the light of the judgments discussed hereinabove, there is no
room for any doubt that proceedings under the Consumer Protection
Act and in a Civil Court can simultaneously go on, even if the issues
involved in the two proceedings are substantially similar. The
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 17 of 18
remedies are independent of each other. The existence of parallel or
other adjudicatory Forums cannot take away or exclude the
jurisdiction created under the Consumer Protection Act. It is also
pertinent to mention that in the present case, the proceedings in the
Civil Court and those in the Consumer Forum have been initiated by
two different parties though, admittedly, their grievances relate to the
same incident as also the fact that the two parties are related.
However, the fact remains that they are two independent parties who
have initiated independent and separate proceedings before this High
Court and the Consumer Forum.
17. The learned Single Judge has rightly declined to grant the relief
to the appellants in the writ petition filed by them. We see no
infirmity in the order of the learned Single Judge to warrant any
interference by us. The appeal must fail. Accordingly, the appeal is
dismissed. The pending application stands disposed of.
NEERAJ KISHAN KAUL, J.
CHIEF JUSTICE
MAY 14, 2009
sb
LPA No. 204/2009 Page 18 of 18