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CH 1

Uploaded by

Sundari Elango
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Chapter One

TH E VEDAS AND THE UPANISADS

INTRODUCTION

he etymological meaning of the word ‘philosophy* is ‘love of

T learning*. It signifies a natural and a necessary urge in human


beings to know themselves and the world in which they ‘live
and move and have their being*. It is impossible for man to live without
a philosophy. The choice, as Aldous Huxley puts it, is not ‘between
metaphysic and no metaphysic; it is always between a good metaphysic
and a bad metaphysic*.
Western Philosophy has remained more or Jess true to the etymologi­
cal meaning of ‘philosophy’, in being essentially an intellectual quest
for truth. Indian Philosophy has been, however, intensely spiritual and
has always emphasized the need of practical realization of truth. The
word ‘darshana* means ‘vision* and also the ‘instrument of vision*. It
stands for the direct, immediate and intuitive vision of Reality, the
actual perception o f Truth, and also includes the means which lead to
this realization. ‘See the Self* (ätmä va are drastavyah) is the keynote
of all schools of Indian Philosophy. And this is the reason why most
of the schools of Indian Philosophy are also religious sects. Annihilation
of the three kinds of pains— ädhyatmika (physical and mental sufferings
produced by natural and intra-organic causes), ädhibhautika (physical
and mental sufferings produced by natural and extra-organic causes),
and ädhidaivika (physical and mental sufferings produced by super­
natural and extra-organic causes)— and realization of supreme happiness
is the end, and shravana (hearing the truth), manana (intellectual con­
viction after critical analysis) and nididhyâsana (practical realization) are
the means— in almost all the schools of Indian Philosophy.
The Vedas are the oldest extant literary monument of the Aryan
mind. The origin of Indian Philosophy may be easily traced in the
Vedas. Indian Philosophy, as an autonomous system, has developed
practically unaffected by external influences. Unfortunately our know­
ledge of the Vedic period is, even to this day, too meagre and imperfect.
The absence of chronological data, the complete indifference of the
ancient Indians towards personal histories, the archaic character of the

I
Vedic Sanskrit, the break in tradition, and the biased orthodox colouring
of interpretation, which instead of a help often proves a hinderance, are
some of the main reasons due to which our knowledge about this
period remains mostly shrouded in mystery and vagueness.
The name ‘Veda* (knowledge) stands for the Mantras and the
Brâhmanas (mantra-brähmanayor veda-nämadheyam). Mantra means
a hymn addressed to some god or goddess. The collection of the Mantras
is called ‘Samhitä*. There are four Samhitäs— Rk, Säma, Yajuh and
Atharva. These are said to be compiled for the smooth performance of
the Vedic sacrifices. A Vedic sacrifice needs four main priests— Hotä,
who addresses hymns in praise of the gods to invoke their presence and
participation in the sacrifice; Udgätä, who sings the hymns in sweet
musical tones to entertain and please the gods; Adhvaryu, who performs
the sacrifice according to the strict ritualistic code and gives offerings
to the gods; and Brahma, who is the general supervisor well-versed in
all the Vedas. The four Samhitäs are said to be compiled to fulfil the
needs of these four main priests— Rk for the Hotä, Säma for the Udgätä,
Yajuh for the Adhvaryu and Atharva for the Brahmä. Sometimes
the Vedas are referred to only as ‘Trayï,* omitting the Atharva. Rk
means a verse, Säma means a song; Yajuh means a prose passage. Thus
we see that the Samhitä-bhäga or the Mantra-portion of the Veda is the
Hymnology addressed to the various gods and goddesses. Rk-Samhitä is
regarded as the oldest and also the most important. The Rsis of the
Vedas are not the authors, but only the ‘seers’ of the Mantras (rsayo
mantra-drastärah). The Brâhmanas, unlike the Mantras, are written in
prose. They are the elaboration of the complicated ritualism of the
Vedas. They deal with the rules and regulations laid down for the
performance of the rites and the sacrifices. Their name ‘Brähmana*
is derived from the word ‘Brahman* which originally means a
prayer. There is little philosophy in these, though some philoso­
phical ideas flash here and there in the course of some speculative
digressions. The appendages to these Brâhmanas are called Aranyakas
mainly because they were composed in the calmness of the forests.
The Aranyakas mark the transition from the ritualistic to the philosophic
thought. We find here a mystic interpretation of the Vedic sacrifices.
The concluding portions of the Aranyakas are called the Upanisads.
These are intensely philosophical and spiritual and may be rightly
regarded as the cream of the Vedic philosophy. The Mantras and the
Brâhmanas are called the Karma-Kända or the portion dealing with the
sacrificial actions, and the Aranyakas and the Upanisads are called the
Jnanä-Kända or the portion dealing with knowledge. Some people
include the Aranyakas in the Karma-Kärida. Really speaking, they
represent a transition from the Karma-Kända to the Jnanä-Kända. The
Upanisads are also known as ‘Vedänta* or ‘the end of the Veda*, firstly

2
because they are literally the concluding portion, the end, of the Vedas,
and secondly because they are the essence, the cream, the height, of the
Vedic philosophy.

II
TH E VEDAS

we are concerned here only with the philosophical thought of the


Vedic period. As we have already remarked, we find little philosophy
in the pre-Upanisadic thought. But the seeds of the important philo­
sophical trends might be easily traced there. Moreover, there has been
a gradual development of the philosophical thought from the Mantras
and the Brâhmanas through the Aranyakas to the Upanisads. It is said
that we can notice a transition from the naturalistic and anthropo­
morphic polytheism through transcendent monotheism to immanent
monism in the pre-Upanisadic philosophy. The personified forces of
nature first changed into real gods and these later on, became mere
forms of one personal and transcendental God, the ‘Custodian of the
Cosmic and Moral Order*, who Himself, later on, passed into the
immanent Purusa. The Upanisads developed this Purusa into Brahman
or Atman which is both immanent and transcendent. The Mantra
portion has been called the religion of Nature, of the poets ; the Bräh-
mana ritualism, the religion of Law, of the priests; the Upanisadic
portion the religion of Spirit, of the philosophers.
The above-mentioned conception of the development of pre-
Upanisadic thought is to be taken in a very reserved sense. The western
scholars and some of the Indian scholars, inspired by and even obsessed
with the western interpretation, are apt to believe that when the early
Vedic Aryans, who were primitive, if not semi-civilized and semi-
barbarous, settled down and began to wonder at the charming and the
tempting and to fear the terrible and the destructive aspects of nature,
they personified them in an anthropomorphic fashion and called them
gods and goddesses and began to worship them. This was the stage of
naturalistic and anthropomorphic polytheism. Then gradually poly­
theism yielded place to monotheism and the latter to monism. Max
Müller introduces ‘henotheism* as a transitional stage from polytheism
to monotheism. Henotheism means ‘belief in one only God*, because the
Vedic Aryans regarded any god they were praising as the most supreme
and the only God. If this western interpretation is taken literally and
in its entirety, we have no hesitation in saying that it is based on an
ignorance of the Vedic literature. Neither polytheism nor henotheism
nor even monotheism can be taken as the key-note of the early Vedic
philosophy. The root-fallacy in the western interpretation lies in the
mistaken belief that the Vedic seers were simply inspired by primitive

3
wonder and awe towards the forces of nature. On the other extreme is
the orthodox view that the Vedas are authorless and eternal, which too
cannot be philosophically sustained. The correct position seems to us
to be that the Vedic sages were greatly intellectual and intensely spiritual
personages who in their mystic moments came face to face with Reality
and this mystic experience, this direct intuitive spiritual insight over­
flew in literature as the Vedic hymns. The key-note of the Vedic hymns
is the same spiritual monism, the same immanent conception of the
identity-in-difference which ultimately transcends even itself, the same
indescribable absolutism which holds both monism and pluralism
within its bosom and which ultimately transcends both, which we find so
beautifully and poetically developed in the Upanisads. T o read anthro­
pomorphic polytheism and then henotheism and monotheism in the
Vedas is, to borrow a phrase from Gaudapäda, to see the foot-prints of
birds in the air. If there were polytheism in the Vedas, how is it that the
binding principle of this world, the Supreme Soul of this Universe, the
Guardian of this Cosmos, is so much emphasized and repeated? Again,
in the ordinary course when polytheism leads to monotheism, the most
powerful god among the hierarchy of gods is enthroned as the ruler of
this universe. But this is conspicuous by its absence in the Vedas.
Instead of taking the trouble of coining the word ‘henotheism*, Max
Muller could have simply said that the gods are regarded as mere
manifestation of the Supreme God so that when any god was praised
he was not praised in his individual capacity, but merely as the mani­
festation of the Supreme God. The gods are praised; yet not the gods,
but God is praised through them. So there is no question of crude
monotheism also in the Vedas. Hence there is no development from
polytheism through monotheism to monism, but only of monism from
the first Mantra portion to the last Upanisadic portion.
Let us take some illustrations. ‘The One Real, the wise declare as
many*.1 ‘Purusa is all this, all that was, and all that shall be*.2 ‘The real
essence of the gods is one*.3 ‘The same Real is worshipped as Uktha
in the Rk, as Agni in the Yajuh and as Mahâvrata in the Säma*.4 ‘Aditi,
the Boundless, is the sky, the air, the mother, the father, the son, all
the gods and all the men, all that is, all that was and all that shall be*.6
‘He is the Custodian of the Rta (Truth), the binding Soul of the universe,
the unity-in-difference in the cosmic and the moral order’.6 The gods
also are the guardians of the Truth (rtasya gopä); even the rivers flow
in this Rta (rtamarpanti sindhavah)*. ‘Only the wise, the wide awake,
the mindful, know the ultimate Abode of the Lord*.7 ‘We make sacrifices
to the ultimate Lord of the universe, who runs through every particle
1 ekam sad viprä bahudhä vadami.— Rgveda, I. 164. 46. 1 Puruça cvedam sarvam
yad bhûtam yachcha bhavyam.— Ibid, X . 90. 9 Ibid, III. 55. 4 Aitareya Aran-
vaka, III. 2. 3. 12 . 4 Rgveda, I. 89. 10. 4 Ibid, X . 190. 1. 1 Viçnoryat paramani
padam.— Ibid, I. 22. 21.

4
of this universe, the whole existence, and who is Blissful and Inde­
scribable*.1 ‘Desireless, self-possessed, immortal, self-proved, ever full
of Bliss, inferior to none, ever-young and everlasting is He, the Soul
of this universe; through His knowledge alone can one spurn death*.2
‘There was neither Being nor non-Being, neither air nor sky, neither
death nor immortality, neither night nor day; That One breathed
calmly, self-sustained; nought else beyond it lay.*8 ‘The Indescribable
is the ground of all names and forms, the support of all the creation*.4
‘All the gods form the body of this World-Soul*.6 ‘He is immanent in
all this creation and yet He transcends it.*4

I ll
TH E U PAN ISAD S

we now come to the Upanisads which are the concluding portion as


well as the cream o f the Veda and are therefore rightly called ‘Vedanta*.
The word ‘Upanisad* is derived from the root ‘sad* which means (i) to
sit down, (ii) to destroy and (iii) to loosen. ‘Upa* means ‘near by* and *ni*
means ‘devotedly”. The word therefore means the sitting down of the
disciple near his teacher in a devoted manner to receive instruction about
the highest Reality which loosens all doubts and destroys all ignorance
of the disciple. Gradually the word came to signify any secret teaching
about Reality and it is used by the Upanisads in this sense (rahasya or
guhya vidyä). The Muktikopanisad gives the number of the Upani­
sads as 108. But ten or eleven Upanisads are regarded as important
and authentic, on which Shankarâchârya has commented. These are:
Isha, Kena, Katha, Prashna, Mundaka, Mändükya, Taittiriya, Aitareya,
Chhändogya and Brhadaranyaka. The teaching, being the highest, was
imparted at private sittings only to the qualified disciples. Heraclitus
has also said that if men care for gold, they must dig for it or be content
with straw. If one wants pearls, one has to dive deep into the ocean or
be content with pebbles on the shore.
The traditional view holds that the Upanisads as Revealed Texts
teach the same doctrine. But there has been extremely wide difference
in their interpretation. The problems discussed in them as well as their
unique style make them liable to many interpretations. All their
teachings are not equally prominent. Some are mere flashes of thought;
some are only hinted at; some are slightly developed; some are
mentioned by the way; while some are often repeated, emphasized and
1 kasmai D e viya haviçâ vidhema.— Ib id ,X . 121. 1. * tameva vidvàn na bibhâya mytyor
àtmànam dhiram ajaram yuvânam.— Atharvaveda, X . 8. 44. tameva viditvâ 'tim-
ftyum eti nänyab panthä vidyate ayanäya.— Yajurveda. 3 nâsadâsit no sadâsït tadânïm.
— Rgveda, X . 129. 4 Atharvaveda, X I. 9. 1. 6Nirukta, V II. 4. 9. 6 pâdo'sya vish vi
bhutâni tripädasyä'mrtam divi.— Rgveda, X . 90. 3

5
thoroughly dealt with. There is an essential unity of purpose in them.
They emphasize the same fundamental doctrine which may be called
monistic idealism or idealistic monism. These poetic-philosophic works
are full of grand imagery, extremely charming and lucid expression
abounding in crystal clarity (prasäda guna). T o the mind, they bring
sound philosophical doctrines and to the heart, peace and freedom.
They are full of Änanda or Supreme Joy out of which all things arise,
by which they live and into which they return again. Passionate yearning
for knowledge, restless striving after truth, and a ceaseless search for
Reality have found a most touching expression in them. Deussen says
that the Upanifadic seers have thrown, ‘if not the most scientific, yet
still the most intimate and immediate light upon the last secret of
existence,* and that there are in them ‘philosophical conceptions un­
equalled in India or perhaps anywhere else in the world*. Prof. Wintemitz
writes that these old thinkers ‘wrestle so earnestly for the truth and in
their philosophical poems the eternally unsatisfied human yearning for
knowledge has been expressed so fervently* that these works are
invaluable for mankind. Some of them match the Platonic Dialogues.
Impressed by them the great German philosopher Schopenhauer
declared: ‘In the whole world there is no study so beneficial and so
elevating. It has been the solace of my life and it will be the solace of
my death*. Such masterly works have always been ‘the ridicule of fools
and the endless meditation of sages*.
The Upanisads develop the monistic ideas scattered in the Samhitäs.
During the Brahmana period, these scattered philosophical ideas were
almost overlooked and emphasis was laid on merely the rigorous ritualis­
tic sacrifices. The Äranyakas mark the shifting of the emphasis from the
ritualistic to the philosophical thought which work was completed by
the Upanisads. The Upanisads tell us that the Vedas— the storehouse
of knowledge— have been breathed forth from Him;1 but they regard
the Karma-Kända as secondary, being only a help to purify the mind
by which purification one is made fit to receive the real teaching about
Brahman. Thus we find the sage Närada telling Sanatkumära: ‘ I know
the Rgveda, sir, the Yajuh, the Säma, with all these I know only the
Mantras and the sacred books, I do not know the Self . . . I have heard
from persons like you that only he who knows the Self goes beyond
sorrow*.3 The Mundaka tells us: ‘Two kinds of knowledge must be
known, the higher and the lower. The lower knowledge is that which
the RJc, Säma, Atharva, Ceremonial, Grammar give . . . but the higher
knowledge is that by which the immortal Brahman is known*.3 In the
Gîta also the Lord asks Arjuna to rise above the three Gunas, telling
him that the Vedas deal with the three Gunas and that he who has
known Brahman has little to do with the Vedas.4 Sometimes the Mantras
1 Bfh. 2. 4. 10. * Chhàn. 7. 2. * Munçjaka I. 1. 4-5. 4 G iti 2. 45-46.

6
are interpreted as subjective symbolism or pyschological spiritualism
concealed in a concrete and material way to hide the truth from the
profane and reveal it only to the qualified and the initiated. Thus
Sürya signifies intelligence, Agni will, Soma feeling; Ashvamedha
means meditation where the whole universe is offered as the horse and
desires are sacrificed and true spiritual autonomy (sväräjya) is attained.
The Brähmana ceremonialism is often contrasted with spiritual medi­
tation. There is a satirical passage in the Chhändogya where dogs are
described as marching in a procession like the priests saying: ‘Aum!
Let us eat, Aum! Let us drink etc.'1 Thus the complicated and rigorous
ritualism and ceremonialism of the Brâhmanas was fortunately arrested
in the Upanisads. But it is important to note that the criticisms are
directed against ritualism and ceremonialism only and not against the
lofty philosophical conceptions found in the Mantras, which are faith­
fully acknowledged and developed.

IV
ATMAN

the individual self stands self-proved and is always immediately


felt and known. One is absolutely certain about the existence of one’s
own self and there can be neither doubt nor denial regarding its
existence. The individual self is the highest thing we know and it is the
nearest approach to the Absolute, though it is not itself the Absolute.
In fact the individual self is a mixture of the real and the unreal, a knot
of the existent and the non-existent, a coupling of the true and the false.
It is a product of Ignorance. But its essence is the light of the Absolute.
Its real nature is pure consciousness, self-shining and self-proved and
always the same. It is called the ultimate witness or the Säksi and as such
is one with the Absolute. The senses, the mind, the intellect, feeling
and will, the internal organ are all products of Avidyä and they invariably
surround the individual self and constitute its ‘individuality’. But the
self really is above them, being the Absolute.
The word ‘Atman’ originally meant life-breath and then gradually
acquired the meanings of feeling, mind, soul and spirit. Shahkarächärya
quotes an old verse giving the different connotations of the word
‘Atman*. The verse says that ‘Atman* means that which pervades all;
which is the subject and which knows, experiences and illuminates the
objects; and which remains immortal and always the same.2
The true self has been the main topic of investigation in the Upanisads.
Socrates of ancient Greece has also persistently advocated the supreme
1 Chhändogya I. 12. 4-5. * yadâpnoti yadâdatte yachchâtti viçayâniha. yachchâsya
santato bhàvas tasmäd âtmeti kïrtyate.— Shahkara’s Com . on Kafha 2. 1. 1.

7
necessity of ‘Know Thyself*. We may select three Upaniçads— the
Chhändogya, the Mändükya and the Katha, for our present purpose.
In a dialogue between Prajâpati and Indra, narrated in the Chhändogya,1
we find a development of the concept of the self from the waking or the
bodily self through the dreaming or the empirical self and the self in
deep dreamless sleep to the Absolute Self. The gods and the demons,
the dialogue tells us, sent Indra and Virochana respectively, to Prajâpati,
to learn the teaching about the self. The teacher asked them to undergo
penance for thirty-two years to qualify themselves to receive the teach­
ing. After fulfilling the prescribed condition, both come to Prajâpati
who teaches them that the self is that which is seen when one looks into
another’s eye or into water or a mirror. Virochana was satisfied and went
away. But Indra began to think thus: How can the self be the reflection
of the body? Or, how can it be identified with the body itself? If the
body is well adorned and well dressed this self also is well adorned and
well dressed. If the body is beautiful, this self also is beautiful; if the
body is blind or lame or crippled, this self also is blind or lame or
crippled; in fact if the body perishes, this self also should perish
together with it. There is no good in this. Being dissatisfied, Indra
approaches Prajâpati again and tells him his doubts and difficulties.
Prajâpati now tells him that he who is seen in dreams roaming freely,
i.e., the dreaming subject, is the self. Indra, again doubts thus: Though
this self is not vitiated with the defects and faults of the body, though
it cannot be said to be perishing along with the body, yet it appears as
if this self feels afraid and terrified, as if it is being chased and struck,
it appears to be conscious of pain and to be weeping. There is no good
in this also. Indra again returns to Prajâpati and tells him his doubts.
This time Prajâpati teaches him that the enjoyer of deep dreamless
sleep is the self. But Indra feels his difficulties. The self, he thinks, in
deep sleep reduces itself to mere abstraction. There are no objects to be
felt, to be known, to be enjoyed. This self appears to be absolutely
unconscious— knowing nothing, feeling nothing, willing nothing. It is
a zero, a cipher. There is no good in this too. And again he approaches
Präjapati and tells him his doubts. The teacher is now very much
pleased with the ability of the disciple. And now follows the real
teaching: Dear Indra! The body is not the self, though it exists for the
self. The dream-experiences are not the self, though they have a
meaning only for the self. The self is not an abstract formal principle of
deep sleep too. The eye, the body, the mental states, the presentation
continuum, the stream of consciousness— are all mere instruments and
objects of the self. The self is the ground of waking, dream and sleep
states and yet it transcends them all. The self is universal, immanent
as well as transcendent. The whole universe lives and moves and breathes
w i n . 3-12.

8
in it. It is immortal, self-luminous, self-proved and beyond doubts and
denials, as the very principle which makes all doubts, denials and
thoughts possible. It is the ultimate subject which can never become
an object and which is to be necessarily presupposed by all knowledge.
This dialogue brings out the essential nature of the self and has very
important implications. The empiricism of Locke and Berkeley and the
scepticism of Hume, the flux of Heraclitus, William James and Bergson,
the Copernican revolution of Kant and the abiding contribution of
Hegel, the positions of Green, Bradley and McTaggart— all have been
long before anticipated in this dialogue. The self, surely, cannot be
identified with the body, senses or the internal organ, nor can it be
regarded as a mere by-product of matter. The bodily self or the waking
self identifies itself with its contents— body, senses, mind, wife, son,
daughter, sister, father, mother, brother, relation, friend. It stretches
itself and identifies itself with the objects and feels as if they constitute
its being, as if it is incomplete, nay, no more, without them. But in
fact that which can be known as an object can never itself be the
subject. It cannot be a mere bundle of the qualities. It cannot be the
empirical self. Dreams have been selected by Prajäpati because here
the objects have to be framed by the mind independently of the body
or the senses. In the waking life, the objects are there apart from and
outside of the mind which are only known and not created by it. Here
the mind is helped by the senses which take the fleeting and scattered
manifold of sense-impressions caused by external objects to the mind
which arranges them into order and gives meaning and unity to them.
But in the dreams, the mind has to function alone and fabricate
imaginary objects for itself. It is the state, therefore, of perception
without sensation. The self in the waking as well as in the dream state
is ever changing and therefore cannot be the real self. The self must
persist throughout the changes as their knower. The ego, limited by
space and time, by birth and death, is a miserable creature. Indra, not
being able to find the self in the waking and dreaming states, anticipates
Heraclitus, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, William James and Bergson, and
also some of the Buddhists. There is only change and you can never
bathe twice in the same river, says Heraclitus. Locke regards the mind
as a tabula rasa, a blank tablet, by itself as good as nothing, on which
experience writes with the fingers of sensation and perception. There­
fore ‘in sleep and trances the mind exists not* declares Berkeley. ‘Every
drowsy nod explodes the self theory* says Locke. T can never catch
my self ’ says Hume, ‘whenever I try, I always stumble at some sense-
impression or idea.' ‘The so-called “ self” is only a stream of thought;’
declares William James, ‘the passing thought itself is the thinker.’
These empiricists, sceptics and pragmatists take the self as a mere
bundle of ideas. Indra also came to the same conclusion. The self in

9
waking and in dreams is ever changing, tortured, chased, vanishing.
There is no good in this. What we get here is only a fleeting mass o f
qualities, the scattered manifold of sense-impressions or ideas, and no
permanent self. The same conclusion is arrived at by Bradley also. Indra
rightly thinks that in the deep sleep the self becomes a mere abstraction
as there are no contents at all. A contentiess self in the empirical life is
an impossibility. The self, as subject, must oppose itself to an object.
But in deep sleep there are no objects at all, neither real nor imaginary.
Hence in the absence of the objects the self also ceases to exist. T h e
Copernican revolution of Kant is the celebrated doctrine which he
introduced into European Philosophy that knowledge requires both
sensation and thought, that ‘concepts without percepts are empty
and percepts without concepts are blind’, and that every knowledge
situation necessarily presupposes the self, the ‘transcendental unity o f
pure apperception’ which is not a category of unity, but the fundamental
postulate of all knowledge which makes possible the play of categories.
The abiding contribution of Hegel has been the persistent insistence
that the self should not be taken as a substance but as a subject and that
this subject does not mean the empirical ego but the transcendental and
yet immanent Absolute Idea running though the categories which are
the various stages of the development of thought. Green, M cTaggart
and others have emphasized the same point. In fact, the foundation o f
this true Idealism was already laid down, many centuries before Kant
and Hegel, in the Upanisads. Prajäpati’s emphasis on the fact that the
true self is the ultimate subject, the fundamental postulate of all know­
ledge, the transcendental background of the empirical trinity o f
knowledge, knower and known, the self-luminous and the self-proved
pure consciousness which manifests itself as the subject and the object,
as the self and the not-self, and which at once overreaches that division ;l
Yâjnavalkya’s declaration in the Brhadâranyaka that the self, the ultimate
knower, can never be known as an object because it knows all objects,
and yet it does not reduce itself to an abstraction because never is the
knowledge of the knower destroyed, never is the sight of the seer
destroyed; that when the sun has set, when the moon has set, and when
the fire is extinguished, the self alone shines in its light;2 the thundering
assertion in the Katha that ‘Not there the sun shines, nor the moon or
the stars, not these lightnings either. Where then could this fire be?
Everything shines only after the shining spirit; through its light all this
shines;’3 and in the Mündaka ‘The fire is its head, the moon and the
sun are its eyes, the four quarters of the sky its ears, the Vedas are its
speech, the wind is its breath, the universe is its heart, for verily it is
the immanent self of all beings;’4 are sufficient to prove our assertion.
Prajapati teaches Indra that the real self illumines consciousness but
1 Chhândogya V i l i . 12. a Bfh. IV . 3. 6. 3 Kaçha II. 2. is- 4 Muntjaka II. 1. 4.

10
itself is not in consciousness. The Atman is the transcendental back­
ground of both self and not-self, and none can doubt its reality.
In the Mândükya Upanisad also we find a similar analysis of conscious­
ness. We are told that the self in the waking state enjoys gross objects,
it has the consciousness of the external world and is called ‘Vishva*.
In the dreaming state it enjoys subtle objects, it has the consciousness
of the internal world and creates its own imaginary objects and is called
‘Taijasa*. In the state of sound sleep there is no object, neither gross
nor subtle, and hence no subject; the subject-object duality is trans­
cended and here the self is called ‘Prajna’. In sleep we have absence of
pain. We have neither desires nor dreams. We have the shadow of the
supreme bliss. It is called shadow because we do not enjoy positive bliss.
Ignorance persists in its negative aspect of concealment in this state,
although its power o f projection is arrested. Ignorance and unconscious­
ness remain in this state and therefore a higher positive state is necessary.
This is the fourth state of the self, a state of pure consciousness where,
like the deep sleep, there is no subject-object duality, but unlike it there
is enjoyment of positive bliss. All ignorance vanishes here. The self
shines in its own light as the ultimate subject without reducing itself to
a mere abstraction. This is the true self, the foundation of all existence
and the presupposition of all knowledge. It cannot be fully described
for descriptions are possible only in the empirical state of subject-
object duality. It can be realized directly and intuitively. It is called
‘Turiya*, the Fourth, or ‘Amätra’, the Measureless. It is calm, non-dual,
blissful and all-consciousness where all plurality is merged. Aumkära
with its parts A -U -M , the waking, dreaming and sleeping states, is its
symbol. This self is the common ground of all these states. It manifests
itself in these three states and yet in its own nature it transcends them all.
In the Katha Upanisad, the Atman is said to be the ultimate reality.
T h e objects are the roads, the body is the chariot, the senses are the
horses, the mind is the reins, the intellect is the charioteer, the ego is
the enjoyer and the Atman is the Lord sitting in the chariot.1 The
senses are further compared to good and bad horses. Plato in his
Phaedrus has also compared them to the white and the black horses.
T h e Katha further states that the senses are higher than the objects,
the mind is higher than the senses, the intellect is higher than the
mind, the subtle reason (mahat) is higher than the intellect, the Unmani­
fest (avyakta) is higher than the subtle reason, and the Purusa (ätman)
is higher than the Unmanifest, and there is nothing higher than the
Purusa which is the ultimate end, the highest reality.3 Objects, senses,
mind, intellect, reason— all exist for the self and serve its purpose. It is
the self that is immanent in them and gives them life and meaning. But
these cannot be identified with the self, for it transcends them all.
1 Kafha 2 . 3-4. * Ibid.
This is the cru?: of the teaching imparted to Nachiketä by Yama. The
self is immortal, self-proved and self-luminous and can only be directly
realized by transcending the empirical subject-object duality.

V
BRAHMAN

from the objective side this ultimate reality is called Brahman. The
word is derived from the root *Brh* which means to grow or to evolve.
In the beginning it meant sacrifice, then prayer and then it acquired
its present meaning of ultimate reality which evolves itself as this world.
Brahman is that which spontaneously bursts forth as nature and
soul. It is the ultimate cause of this universe. In the Chhändogya,
it is cryptically described as ‘Tajjalân*1— as that (tat) from which
the world arises (ja), into which it returns (la), and by which it is
supported and it lives (an). In the Taittiriya, Brahman is defined as
that from which all these beings are born, by which they live, and
into which they are reabsorbed.2 The evolution of the elements is
given in this order: From Brahman arises ether, from ether air, from
air fire, from fire water and from water earth. But the real theory of
evolution is given in the doctrine of the five sheaths (koshas) in the
Taittiriya.3 The lowest level is that of matter (annamaya). Matter is
unconscious and dead and cannot account for life. It is purely on the
physical plane. Brahman cannot rest content with matter. The purpose
of matter is fulfilled only when life is evolved. The highest state of
matter is therefore life. Though matter cannot account for life, yet
there can be no life without matter. The inorganic matter must be
transformed into organic life. Hence the second state of evolution is life
(pränamaya). Now we are on the biological plane. The vegetable life
(osadhayah) emerges first. But the vegetable life must lead to the
animal life. The vegetable products must be transformed into living
animal cells. Life pervades the universe and binds man with the rest of
creation. But the destiny of life is fulfilled only when consciousness is
evolved. Hence the third state of evolution is mind or perceptual
Consciousness (manomaya). Here we are on the mental or psychological
plane. This state is shared by lower animals with men. Mind or con­
sciousness remains in the lower animal life at the level of instinct and
reflex action. Human beings have also got instincts and reflex actions
and these play an important part in determining the human life. But
brute instinct is mute and rebels against itself. It wants to express itself.
It is on the level of infra-relational undifferentiated feeling. The subject-
object duality is absent here because it has not yet been evolved. The
1 III. 14. 2 III. I. »II. 1-5.

12
end of this instinctive consciousness will be fulfilled only when a
higher principle has been evolved where consciousness becomes self-
conscious or rational. Hence the fourth state of evolution is self-con­
scious reason (vijnânamaya). Here we are on the metaphysical plane.
This state is the sole monopoly of human beings. Reason becomes self-
conscious only at this state and this fact distinguishes human beings
from lower animals. Arts, sciences, aesthetics, morals, poetry, philo­
sophy, religion, all become possible only at this state. The empirical
trinity of knower, knowledge and known has been evolved. But even
this will not suffice. There is a higher experience of which we get a
negative glimpse in the empirical life and which cannot be accounted
for by mere intellect. The relational and analytical, the discursive and
dichotomous intellect points to something higher as its end in which
it wants to merge itself. The subject-object duality wants to transcend
itself ; not that it wants to fall back on the instinctive undifferentiated
feeling which it has left far behind, but it wants to fulfil its destiny by
merging itself in the Absolute, the Abode of Bliss, where there is no
trace of duality and plurality. The fifth and the highest state of evolu­
tion, therefore, is the non-dual bliss (änandamaya). Here we are on the
mystic plane. The empirical trinity of knower, known and knowledge
has been fused into a transcendental unity. Here philosophy terminates.
This Brahman, the supreme Reality, transcends all, yet it underlies all
as their background. The lower is not lost or annihilated; it is simply
transformed in the higher. Matter is not lost in life; life is not lost
in mind; mind is not lost in reason; reason is not lost in bliss. Brahman
pervades them all. It is the immanent inner controller of all (antaryâ-
min) and the self o f all (sarva-bhütäntarätmä). As all spokes are con­
tained in the axle and the wheel, so all beings, all gods, all worlds,
all organs are contained in the Universal Self, the Brahman.1 This
is the Brahman, the self-luminous, the immortal, the support of
all the worlds, the highest and leaving nothing beyond it.2 Matter is its
body, it is its soul ; the individual souls are its body, it is their soul. It
holds the self and the not-self together which are equally its own mani­
festations and yet in its own nature it transcends both.V I

VI
BRAHMAN AND ATMAN

w e have seen that the same reality is called from the subjective side
as ‘Atman* and from the objective side as ‘ Brahman*. The two terms
are used as synonyms. The Absolute of the Upanisads manifests
itself as the subject as well as the object and transcends them both.
1 Bfh a. 5. 15. * Kafha a. 6- t.

13
The Absolute is as certain as the Atman and also as infinite as the
Brahman. This blending of the subject and the object in a transcen­
dental principle, this synthesis of the self and the not-self in the
Absolute, this dialectical march of pure self-consciousness from the
subject through the object to its own synthetic nature was arrived at
by the Upanisadic sages centuries before Hegel, and many many
years before Plato was born. T o quote Deussen: ‘It was here that for the
first time the original thinkers of the Upanisads, to their immortal
honour, found it when they recognized our Atman, our inmost indi­
vidual being, as the Brahman, the inmost being of universal nature and
of all her phenomena*.1 ‘That thou art’ (tat tvam asi) is the great saying
(mahäväkya) of the Upanisads. ‘I am Brahman.* ‘Atman is Brahman.*
‘I am that.* ‘I am the non-dual Bliss.’ The subject lacked infinitude and
the object lacked certitude. The Absolute has both infinitude and
certitude. The self and the not-self are equally manifestations o f the
Absolute and are at bottom one. The individual self is, in fact, no
longer individual, but universal. The microcosm and the macrocosm
are blended together. In microcosm we find the three states of waking,
dreaming and sound sleep and we find the self as the Fourth, the
immanent yet transcendent reality. In macrocosm waking (jagrat)
corresponds to Virât, dreaming (svapna) to Hiranyagarbha, deep sleep
(susupti) to Ishvara, and the Fourth (turiya) to Brahman. In macro­
cosm, body corresponds to Virât, life and mind correspond to Hiranya­
garbha, self-consciousness corresponds to Ishvara and bliss corresponds
to Brahman. The Absolute is Pure Existence, Pure Knowledge, and
Pure Bliss— all in one. It is called Sachhidänanda. It is Satyam (Truth),
Jnänam (Knowledge) and Anantam (Infinite). It is Truth, Goodness
and Beauty— Satyam-Shivam-Sundaram. By knowing it the unseen
becomes the seen, the unknown becomes the known, the unthought of
becomes the thought of.
All this is beautifully described in theChhândogya in a dialogue between
Uddälaka and Shvetaketu.2 The father teaches his son Shvetaketu thus:
‘In the beginning Sat alone was, without a second. It thought “ M ay
I be many” .* Then it evolved itself into this manifold world. Thou, O
Shvetaketu! art that— ‘Tat tvam asi Shvetaketo!*. This teaching blends
the subject with the object, the indubitable with the infinite, the
microcosm with the macrocosm, the self with the not-self. None of them
can be taken as independent and separate. Both are relative terms and
like the two sides of the same coin, both are manifestations of the same
Sat. The Sat runs through them (tadevänuprävishat) and constitutes
their being. Yet the Sat cannot be confined to them. In its own nature
it transcends them both. The individual self of Shvetaketu of which he
is immediately conscious and absolutely certain is identified with the
P h ilo so p h y o f the Upaniçads, p. 40. 2Chhändogya. 6,

»4
infinite objective reality which is the cause of this universe including
the individual selves and the world of matter. But how can a portion of
the effect be identified with the whole cause? How can the self of
Shvetaketu which is itself an effect along with others (i.e., other selves
and matter) be one with the cause, the Brahman? How can the private
and the limited self of Shvetaketu be the cause of this entire universe?
T h e answer is that both the self and the not-self are mere manifestations
o f the Absolute. The Absolute is immanent in them all and constitutes
their being. The self of Shvetaketu is one with the Universal Self which
is immanent in it. T live, yet not I, but God liveth in me/
This Brahman is described in two ways in the Upanisads. It is called
cosmic, all-comprehensive, full of all good qualities— Saprapancha,
Saguna and Savishesa. And it is also called acosmic, qualityless, indeter­
minate, indescribable— Nisprapancha, Nirguna, Nirvishesa and Anirva-
chaniya. This distinction is the root of the celebrated distinction made
by Shankarächärya between God and the Absolute. The former is called
lower Brahman (apara Brahma) or Ishvara, and the latter higher
Brahman (para Brahma) or the Absolute. God is the personal aspect of
the Absolute and the Absolute is the impersonal aspect of God. Matter,
self and God are only manifestations of the Absolute. But Rämänujä-
chärya has challenged this distinction. T o him, the Absolute is the
personal and the immanent God, and matter and selves alike form His
real body, He, being the soul of nature and the soul of souls. Ramanuja
interprets the Upanisads in the sense of Brahma-parinama-väda;
Brahman really transforms Himself as the world of matter and of souls.
Shankara interprets them in the sense of Brahma-vivarta-vâda;
Brahman unreally appears, through Ignorance, as the world of matter
and of souls. Shankara does not deny the existence of a personal God.
He is the highest appearance admitted by Advaitism.
The cosmic Brahman is regarded as the cause of production, main­
tenance and destruction of this universe. All beings arise from Him, live
in Him and are absorbed in Him.1 The Mändükya calls Him ‘the lord
o f all, the knower of all, the inner controller of all, the fans et origo of all,
the final haven of all'. Like sparks arising from fire, like earthen-ware
arising out of earth, like gold ornaments being made out of gold, like
cob-web coming out of a spider, like hair coming out of the body, like
the lustre shooting out of a pearl, like the musical sound coming out of
a lute, the entire creation arises out of Brahman. Just as when clay is
known, everything made out of clay becomes known, for it is only ‘name
and form', the reality being only clay, similarly when Brahman, the
cause is known, everything, being a mere effect, becomes known, for
the effects are only names and forms, the reality is Brahman alone. In
the Bfhadäranyaka we are told that nature is the body of God Who is
1 Chh. 3. 14. I. ; T aitt. 3. I.
its soul. Earth, water, fire, air, ether, the sun, the moon, the stars, the
sky, the quarters, the rivers, the mountains, in fact, all beings, all
creatures, all life, all senses, all speech, all minds are the body of God.
God is immanent in them all and controls them from within and holds
them together. He knows them all, but they do not know Him, for how
can the body know the soul? He who knows this Antaryämin, knows the
Ätman, knows the Brahman, knows the Vedas, knows all the worlds,
in fact, he knows all.1 God is not only the soul of nature, He is also the
soul of souls. T he souls are His body; He is their soul. The souls are
souls in relation to the bodies, but in relation to God, they become His
body and He becomes their soul. Just as the spokes are held together
inthe axle and the wheel, so all the souls are held together in the Supreme
Soul.2 Just as sparks emanate from fire, so all the souls emanate from
the Supreme Soul.3
The acosmic Brahman is the transcendental Absolute, the Turiya or
the Fourth, the Amätra or the Measureless, the Anirvachaniya or the
Indescribable. It is the foundational consciousness, the fundamental
postulate of all knowledge. It holds the subjective and the objective
world in a transcendental unity. It is the background of the empirical
trinity of knowledge, knower and known. It is the indubitable ultimate
knower which is presupposed by all affirmations and negations, all
positions and doubts and denials. It is self-luminous and self-proved.
The discursive intellect cannot know it for the ultimate subject cannot
be made an object of knowledge. As Kant says: ‘What I must presup­
pose in order to know an object, I cannot know as an object.* How can
he be known by whom all this is known? How, O dear, can the knower
be known?4 All speech together with the mind turns away unable to
reach it.6 The eye does not go there, nor does speech, nor does mind.
We cannot know it. We cannot teach it.6 The Absolute can be best
described only in a negative way, though it is not itself negated by it.
Yâjnavalkya describes it thus: ‘This is the imperishable, O Gârgî, which
wise people adore— not gross, not subtle, not short, not long, without
shadow, without darkness, without air, without space, without attach­
ment, without taste, without smell, without sight, without ears, without
speech, without mind, without light, without breath, without mouth,
and without either inside or outside. It does not eat anything nor can
anything eat it.*7 Lest this description should be mistaken as mere
solipsism and pure nonsense, Yâjnavalkya is cautious enough to add
immediately that ‘never is the sight of the seer destroyed; never is the
knowledge of the knower destroyed,* that when it is said that the Absolute
does not see what is really meant is that it sees and yet does not see.
There is nothing outside it which it may see. The Eternal knower, the
1Bfh. III. 7- •Bf'h 2. 5. 15. ' I b i d 2. 1. 20. 4Brh. a. 4. 13. 6T aitt. a. 4. 6 K en a
2. 3.: Muntfaka, 2. 1.; Kaçha 1, 3, 10. 7 B|rh 3. 8. 8.

l6
self-luminous Real shines forth by itself.1 Silence is the ultimate
philosophy and Yajnavalkya has to tell Gârgî: Gârgï! ask not too much,
ask not too much, otherwise thy head will fall.2 In the Kena we are
told; That which cannot be spoken by the speech, but by which speech
is made possible; that which cannot be thought by the mind, but by
which, they say, the mind thinks; that which cannot be seen by the eye,
but by which the eye is made to see; that which cannot be heard by the
ear, but by which the ear is made to hear; that which does not breathe,
but by which breath is made possible, know that alone to be the Brah­
man, not this which they worship outside.3 Brahman is known to him
who says he does not know it and it is unknown to him who says he
knows it.4 The meaning is that he who knows the Brahman as the
Indescribable really knows its nature and he who thinks that Brahman
can be adequately described by the finite mind misses its nature. The
empirical and negative description of the Absolute by means of neti
neti (not this, not this) or ‘the neither-nor* necessarily presupposes
the affirmation of the Absolute as all-Comprehensive and culminates
in the transcendental Absolute which goes beyond both negation and
affirmation. The neti neti negates all descriptions about the Brahman,
but not the Brahman itself. In fact, the Absolute is the Existence of all
existences, the Truth of all truths, the Reality of all realities.3 Realizing
this, a wise person should remain merged in it and transcending all
categories of the intellect, should acquire child-like innocence.6 There
is no plurality here. Those who are engrossed in plurality go on revolving
in the cycle of birth and death. Fear proceeds from diversity. Unity is
fearlessness. Grief and delusion are gone for him who realizes this
unity.7 All joys fade into insignificance before the supreme Joy of
Brahman.8 Just as rivers, leaving their names and forms, merge in the
ocean, so a wise man, arising above name and form, becomes one with the
Absolute.® He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman. This is the
secret teaching. Only by knowing it can one cross the ocean of birth-
ahd-death; there is no other way for liberation.10VI

V II
MÄYÄ OR A V ID Y Ä

so m etim es it is said that the doctrine of Mäyä or Avidyä is either


borrowed by Shankara from Buddhism or it is a fabrication of the
fertile brain of Shankara. Both these views are wrong. The fact is that
the theory of Mäyä is present in the Upanisads and Shankara has
elaborated it like a true thinker. Prof. R. D. Ranade, in his great work,
1 Ibid 4. 3. 23. * Ibid 3. 6. I. * Kena 1, 4-8. * Ibid 2, 3. * Brh 2. 3. 6.
• Ib id 3. 5. I. M sha 7 ;T a it t . 2. 7. 1. *Taitt. 2, 8, 1*4. 9 Mup^aka, 3, 2, 8.
10 Shvetishvatara 6, 15.

17
‘A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy*, has rightly pointed
out the origin of this doctrine in the Upanisads. He gives the following
points:
“ (i) Isha tells us that the veil that covers the truth is golden, so
rich, gaudy and dazzling that it takes away the mind of the
observer from the inner contents. (Isha, 15.)
(2) Katha says how people live in ignorance and thinking them­
selves wise, move about wandering, like blind men following
the blind. (1, 2, 4-5.)
(3) Mundaka compares ignorance to a knot which a man has to
untie before he gets possession of the self in the recess of his
own heart. (II, 1, 10.)
(4) Chhändogya tells us that knowledge is power and ignorance
is impotence. (I, 1, 10.)
(5) Brhadäranyaka compares Unreality to Not-being, to Dark­
ness and to Death. (I, 3, 28.)
(6) Prashna tells us that we cannot reach the world of Brahman
unless we have shaken off the crookedness in us, the false­
hood, the illusion. (I, 16.)
(7) Brhadäranyaka tells us ‘as if there were a duality* implying
thereby that there is really no duality. Mäyä is a semblance,
an as-it-were, an appearance. (II, 4, 14.)
(8) Chhändogya tells us that Atman is the only Reality, every­
thing else is merely a word, a mode and a name. (VI, 1, 4.)
(9) Shvetäshvatara describes God as a Mäyin who creates this
world by His power. (IV, 9.)**V I

VIII
UPANISADS, THE SOURCE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

the Upanisads are rightly regarded as the fountain-head of all Indian


philosophy. Bloomfield remarks: ‘There is no important form of Hindu
thought, heterodox Buddhism included, which is not rooted in the
Upanisads.* Dr. S. Radhakrishnan says: ‘Later systems of philosophy
display an almost pathetic anxiety to accomodate their doctrines to the
views of the Upanisads, even if they cannot father them all on them.’
Prof. R. D. Ranade says: ‘The Upanisads constitute that lofty eminence
of philosophy, which from its various sides gives birth to rivulets of
thought, which, as they progress onwards towards the sea of life, gather
strength by the inflow of innumerable tributaries of speculation which
intermittently join these rivulets, so as to make a huge expanse of waters
at the place where they meet the ocean of life.’
The Bramha-sütra claims to be an aphoristic summary of the

18
Upanisads. The Gita is the milk milked out of the Upanisad-cows and
is particularly influenced by the Katha and the Isha. The various
Ächäryas of Vedanta— Shankara, Ramanuja, Nimbarka, Madhva and
Vallabha— have always regarded the Upanisads as the sacred texts and
have interpreted them so as to make them suit their theories. The hetero­
dox Jainism has taken its idealism and its doctrine of Karma from the
Upanisads. The heterodox Buddhism derives its idealism, monism,
absolutism, the theory of momentariness of all worldly things, the theory
of Karma, the .distinction between the empirical and the absolute
standpoints, and the theory that Ignorance is the root-cause of this
cycle of birth-and-death and that Nirvana can be attained by right
knowledge alone, from the Upanisads. Sänkhya derives from them the
doctrine of Prakrti (from Shvetâshvatara), the theory of the three
Gunas (from the three colours in the Chhândogya), the doctrine of
Purusa, the relation of mind, intellect and soul (from Katha), the
doctrine of Linga-sharira (from Prashna). Yoga is rooted in Shvetâsh­
vatara. Katha speaks of Dhäranä and Mundaka speaks of the soul as a
mere onlooker. Isha preaches the combination of Karma and Jnäna;
Mimämsä takes up Karma; Vedanta takes up Jnäna; and some writers
take up the combination itself.1

1 For a detailed study o f this the reader is referred to Prof. R. D. Ranade’s 'A Construc­
tive Survey o f Upani$adic Philosophy*.

*9

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